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Category Archives: IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
There are several things in play. China, Iran and Russia and North Korea are watching all U.S. positions and it began with the Pompeo demands announced of Iran since exiting the JCPOA, nuclear deal. Iran has not only responded with several nasty grams but Iran is putting threats towards Europe on many of their demands to stay in the deal.
National Security Counsel chair John Bolton is also being blamed by North Korea for the breakdowns due to the reference of the Libya model. That is an excuse as the Libya model for removing the nuclear program was far in advance of the removal of Maummar Gaddafi and his eventual death.
Further, there is the matter of China injecting itself into the preparations and talks between North Korea and the United States. North Korea follows all advise and leads from President Xi. Now, where are those pesky nuclear weapons in North Korea since the nuclear test site collapsed and was further blown up in a gesture move for selected outside media?
There is also the issue of the other locations of interest in North Korea that the United States is well aware of that proves China has aided and assisted in the military sites and nuclear program as had Iran and Russia. China does not want to be confronted with that proof.
Further, there is the matter of the ‘nuclear umbrella’.
In this book, Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. While the role of the nuclear umbrella is often discussed in military terms, this book provides an important glimpse into the political dimensions of the nuclear security guarantee. As the security environment in East Asia changes with the growth of North Korea’s capabilities and China’s military modernization, as well as Donald Trump’s early pronouncements that cast doubt on traditional commitments to allies, the credibility and resolve of U.S. alliances will take on renewed importance for the region and the world.
The U.S. nuclear umbrella in the region is not focused on North Korea but also incorporates planning against potential Chinese aggression. Nullifying or weakening the umbrella over the Peninsula, some would argue, might leave South Korea open to potential Chinese coercion and send the wrong signal at a time when China is seem by some as trying to pressure Taiwan and reassert its influence in the region.
This speech/policy sets the table for the North Korea talks with President Trump. Further, it advances the mission on countering militant Islam not only in the region but globally. Europe has to decide on corporate business relationship with Iran versus human rights along with worldwide terrorism at the hands of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since 2014, a broad range of organizations, from medical companies such as GE Healthcare to aerospace firms such as Lufthansa Technik, as well as educational institutions such as Harvard University, have obtained permission and waivers to operate in Iran.
Other U.S. institutions that were permitted to do business in Iran include: General Electric Medical and Aviation Divisions, Bausch & Lomb, Boston Scientific, Smithsonian Institute, HSBC, Philips North America, University of California San Diego, University of Wisconsin, Loyola University, New York University, BNP Paribas S.A., American Pulp and Paper and Intelsat Corporation to list a few. More here.
(Reuters) – The United States on Monday demanded Iran make sweeping changes — from dropping its nuclear program to pulling out of the Syrian civil war — or face severe economic sanctions as the Trump administration hardened its approach to Tehran.
Iran dismissed Washington’s ultimatum and one senior Iranian official said it showed the United States is seeking “regime change” in Iran.
Weeks after President Donald Trump pulled out of an international nuclear deal with Iran, his administration threatened to impose “the strongest sanctions in history,” and vowed to “crush” Iranian operatives abroad, setting Washington and Tehran further on a course of confrontation.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded sweeping changes that would force Iran effectively to reverse the recent spread of its military and political influence through the Middle East to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
If Washington sees tangible shifts in Iran’s policies, it is prepared to lift sanctions, Pompeo said.
“The sting of sanctions will only grow more painful if the regime does not change course from the unacceptable and unproductive path it has chosen for itself and the people of Iran,” Pompeo said in his first major speech since becoming secretary of state.
“These will be the strongest sanctions in history by the time we are done,” he added.
Pompeo took aim at Iran’s policy of expansion in the Middle East through support for armed groups in countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
He warned that the United States would “crush” Iranian operatives and proxies abroad and told Tehran to pull out forces under its command from the Syrian civil war where they have helped President Bashar al-Assad gain the upper hand.
Iran’s president summarily dismissed Pompeo’s demands.
“Who are you to decide for Iran and the world?,” the semi-official ILNA news agency quoted Hassan Rouhani as saying.
“The world today does not accept America to decide for the world, as countries are independent … that era is over … We will continue our path with the support of our nation.”
Tension between the two countries has grown notably since Trump this month withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement aimed at preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
A senior Iranian official said Pompeo’s remarks showed that the United States was pushing for “regime change,” a charged phrase often associated with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein.
Pompeo warned that if Iran fully resumed its nuclear program Washington would be ready to respond and said the administration would hold companies doing prohibited business in Iran to account.
“Our demands on Iran are not unreasonable: give up your program,” Pompeo said, “Should they choose to go back, should they begin to enrich, we are fully prepared to respond to that as well,” he said, declining to elaborate.
Pompeo said Washington would work with the Defense Department and allies to counter Iran in the cyberspace and maritime areas.
The Pentagon said it would take all necessary steps to confront Iranian behavior in the region and was assessing whether that could include new actions or doubling down on current ones.
Pompeo said if Iran made major changes, the United States was prepared to ease sanctions, re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relations and support the country’s re-integration into the international economic system.
Any new U.S. sanctions will raise the cost of trade for Iran and are expected to further deter Western companies from investing there, giving hardliners, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an opportunity to cement their grip on power.
Iran’s ruling elite are mindful of recent protests sparked by economic hardship, which is, in part, their calculation for working with the Europeans on ways to salvage the nuclear deal.
Pompeo’s speech did not explicitly call for regime change but he repeatedly urged the Iranian people not to put up with their leaders, specifically naming Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.
“At the end of the day the Iranian people will get to make a choice about their leadership,” Pompeo said.
Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Brooking Institution think tank’s foreign policy program, said Pompeo’s speech did indeed amount to a strategy of regime change.
“There is only one way to read it and that is that Trump administration has wedded itself to a regime-change strategy to Iran, one that is likely to alienate our allies. One with dubious prospects for success,” she said.
The administration’s approach “explicitly puts the onus on the Iranian people to change their leadership or face cataclysmic financial pressure,” said Maloney who has advised the State Department on Iran in the Bush administration between 2005-2007.
Lebanese analyst Ghaleb Kandil, who has close ties to the pro-Iran Hezbollah group, said Washington’s demands have previously not worked.
“These are conditions that were tested in previous phases of American pressures, before the nuclear deal, when Iran was in more difficult circumstances than it is in these days, and it did not surrender to these conditions or accept them,” said Kandil.
Pompeo outlined 12 U.S. demands for Iran including to stop uranium enrichment, never to pursue plutonium reprocessing and to close its heavy water reactor.
It also had to declare all previous military dimensions of its nuclear program and to permanently and verifiably abandon such work, he said.
Pompeo’s demand that Tehran stop uranium enrichment goes even further than the nuclear deal. Iran says its nuclear work has medical uses and will produce energy to meet domestic demand and complement its oil reserves.
Washington’s regional allies, the Gulf and Israel, who were strong critics of the deal, praised the administration’s position on Monday.
European parties to the nuclear deal – France, Britain and Germany – are working to find a way to keep the nuclear pact in effect after Washington’s exit.
Speaking ahead of Pompeo’s speech, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said it would be difficult for the United States and its allies to deal with all the issues they had with Iran at the same time.
“If you try to pull all of those into a giant negotiation, a new jumbo Iran negotiation, a new treaty…that seems to be what they envisage and I don’t see that being very easy to achieve in anything like a reasonable timescale, Johnson said in Argentina.
Let’s begin with Ploughshares, shall we? Make sure you check the credits at the end of the video. Those that contributed money to the effort are listed here.
Meanwhile, there is a meeting scheduled in Vienna where Germany, France, Britain, Russia and China are to discuss saving the Iran nuclear deal. It is being chaired by Helga Schmid. Will it soon be called the Vienna nuclear deal?
Impact of U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal
May 2018
In Short
The Situation: On Tuesday, May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States has withdrawn from the Iran Nuclear Deal and will fully reimpose its suspended sanctions targeting Iran.
The Result: All currently suspended U.S. sanctions in respect of Iran, including sanctions applicable to non-U.S. persons, will be reimposed by November 5, 2018.
Looking Ahead: The reimposition of U.S. sanctions will have limited impact on U.S. companies. However, foreign companies majority-owned or controlled by U.S. persons must now begin winding down any Iran-related activities. In contrast, the impact of the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on non-U.S. companies is less clear, and as the international response develops, non-U.S. companies will increasingly face a complex compliance landscape.
As reported earlier this week, on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States will reimpose, after specified wind-down periods, all nuclear-related sanctions lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) (commonly known as the “Iran Nuclear Deal”). As a result, the U.S. sanctions regime will revert to its pre-JCPOA scope by November 5, 2018.
In light of the comprehensive U.S. primary sanctions that remained in place after implementation of the JCPOA, President Trump’s announcement will have little impact on U.S. companies. In contrast, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. organizations and their non-U.S. counterparts face a dramatically changed compliance landscape. With the reimposition of U.S. extraterritorial, or secondary, sanctions, non-U.S. companies must navigate increasingly complex terrain as they assess continued engagement with Iran, compliance with U.S. sanctions, and the pending response of the other JCPOA signatories.
Following a 90-day wind-down period ending on August 6, 2018, the United States will reimpose its secondary sanctions targeting activities related to:
Iran’s automotive sector;
The sale, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals (such as aluminum and steel), coal, and software for integrating industrial processes to or from Iran; and
Certain financial and banking transactions related to Iranian sovereign debt, the acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran, the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, Iranian rial-denominated funds or accounts, and trade in gold or other precious metals.
During the same period, the United States will revoke the following authorizations:
The general license authorizing the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs (as well as certain related financial transactions);
All specific licenses (and subsequent wind-down authorizations) issued in connection with the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (“JCPOA SLP”); and
General License I, which authorized certain transactions related to negotiating and entering contingent contracts for activities covered by the JCPOA SLP.
Following a 180-day wind-down period ending on November 4, 2018, the United States will reimpose its secondary sanctions targeting activities related to:
Certain transactions by foreign financial institutions with, and provision of specialized financial messaging to, the Central Bank of Iran and/or designated Iranian financial institutions;
Certain categories of transactions related to Iran’s energy sector, including certain investments (such as participation in joint ventures); provision of goods, services, technology or technical support; the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products, and/or natural gas to or from Iran; and transactions with certain designated persons (such as the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, and National Iranian Tanker Company);
Certain transactions involving Iran’s port operators and/or related to Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including activities involving the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, South Line Iran, or their affiliates; and
The provision of certain insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services.
Effective November 5, 2018, the United States will also revoke General License H (and any subsequent wind-down authorizations issued in connection with that general license), which previously authorized foreign entities majority-owned or controlled by U.S. persons to engage in most transactions involving Iran. It appears all other Iran-related general and specific licenses, including licenses issued under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”), issued by OFAC will remain unaffected.
Finally, no later than November 5, 2018, the United States will redesignate all persons who had been removed, through the JCPOA, from the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons and/or other U.S. sanctioned parties lists.
Consequently, by November 5, 2018, the United States is currently expected to have reimposed all sanctions that had been lifted pursuant to the JCPOA.
Near- and Long-Term Implications
As a practical matter, the reimposition of U.S. sanctions suspended under the JCPOA will have limited impact on U.S. companies. As noted in our prior Alerts and Commentaries, substantial U.S. sanctions in relation to Iran have remained in place and continued to prohibit U.S. persons from engaging, directly or indirectly, in virtually all transactions or dealings with Iran without authorization.
The reimposition of U.S. sanctions will, however, have immediate impact on non-U.S. organizations that are majority-owned or controlled by U.S. persons and on U.S.-linked aviation companies. As noted above, the United States intends to revoke all specific and general licenses issued in connection with the JCPOA “as soon as administratively feasible,” including General License H and aviation-specific licenses issued under the JCPOA SLP and General License I. In their place, OFAC intends to issue authorizations that will likely narrowly authorize only activities necessary to wind down previously authorized activities. Companies that rely on these authorizations should immediately reassess their existing Iran-related activities, including in-process and pending transactions, in order to prepare to wind down Iran-related activities and ensure compliance with U.S. sanctions during the wind-down period.
The near- and long-term implications of President’s Trump announcement for non-U.S. companies are less clear. Non-U.S. persons are not, with limited exceptions, subject to U.S. primary sanctions. However, U.S. secondary sanctions provide for an array of penalties that, in effect, foreclose access to U.S. markets—a meaningful deterrent for non-U.S. companies. The United States appears poised to rigorously enforce the renewed sanctions and has advised non-U.S. companies to begin winding up soon-to-be sanctionable activities to “avoid exposure to sanctions or an enforcement action when the applicable wind-down period ends.” Continued engagement with Iran will therefore become an increasingly fraught proposition for non-U.S. persons, and one that may be further complicated by the international community’s response to the United States’ withdrawal.
In that regard, following President Trump’s announcement, the European Union has reiterated its commitment to “the continued full and effective implementation of the JCPOA,” as long as Iran meets its nuclear-related obligations, adding that it “is determined to work with the international community” to preserve the deal. Although the European Union has not yet indicated any measures it may implement to preserve the JCPOA, it suggested earlier this year that it may expand its Blocking Regulation—Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of November 22, 1996—to protect EU-based organizations doing business in Iran following any U.S. withdrawal.
The Blocking Regulation was adopted in 1996 by the European Union (European Communities at the time) in response to the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and Libya. It prohibits EU companies from complying with blocked sanctions “whether directly or through a subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission.” The importance of the Blocking Regulation in the last decade has been limited. This would change if the scope of its application is expanded to cover the U.S. secondary sanctions in relation to Iran, possibly protecting EU companies from enforcement of U.S. judgments or administrative decisions giving effect to the secondary sanctions.
Historically, enforcement of the Blocking Regulation has generally been very limited, but expanding its scope now has the potential to lead to increased enforcement actions across Europe. An expanded Blocking Regulation would, however, place EU companies squarely between the competing demands of U.S. sanctions and EU and national requirements. The European Union may also try to negotiate an exemption for EU companies from the reimposition of the U.S. sanctions. The prospects of relief for EU companies under either approach remains uncertain.
China and Russia have likewise consistently reaffirmed their commitment to the JCPOA, and in a joint statement last month confirmed their “unwavering support” for the deal. In light of current tensions between the United States and Russia and China, it seems unlikely that the U.S. withdrawal will lead Russia or China to alter its commitment to the JCPOA or have a substantial impact on Russian and Chinese business interests in Iran.
As the international response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA develops, non-U.S. companies should take steps to protect their interests in light of the pending reimposition of U.S. sanctions. In particular, non-U.S. companies should reassess their Iran-related activities to determine their potential liability under the soon-to-be imposed U.S. secondary sanctions and/or any potential blocking statutes; open dialogues with their financial institutions, insurers, and other service providers regarding any Iran-related activities; and, significantly, prepare to possibly wind down any potentially sanctionable Iran-related activities in order to move promptly to comply with U.S. secondary sanctions, if warranted.
Jones Day will continue to monitor developments and provide updates.
Three Key Takeaways
The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement will result in the reimposition of sanctions that had been lifted as part of JCPOA, or, the “Iran Nuclear Deal.”
Because the comprehensive U.S. primary sanctions remained in place after implementation of JCPOA, the withdrawal and reimposition of sanctions hold few consequences for U.S. companies.
However, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. organizations and their non-U.S. counterparts face a markedly altered compliance situation, and those companies affected should take decisive and deliberate measures to protect their interests.
The meeting happen between Kim Jung Un and President Trump which has been scheduled sits on shaky ground due to recent demands by the United States including applying the Libya model of the nuclear program in North Korea.
Talks between North Korea and South Korea have been suspended after the items below were agreed to by both countries, known as the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace:
I. South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relations of the people and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and unification led by Koreans by facilitating comprehensive and ground-breaking advancement in inter-Korean relations. Improving and cultivating inter-Korean relations is the prevalent desire of the whole nation and the urgent calling of the times that cannot be held back any further.
1) South and North Korea affirmed the principle of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord and agreed to bring forth the watershed moment for the improvement of inter-Korean relations by fully implementing all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far.
2) South and North Korea agreed to hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields including at high level, and to take active measures for the implementation of the agreements reached at the summit.
3) South and North Korea agreed to establish a joint liaison office with resident representatives of both sides in the Gaeseong region in order to facilitate close consultation between the authorities as well as smooth exchanges and cooperation between the peoples.
4) South and North Korea agreed to encourage more active cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts at all levels in order to rejuvenate the sense of national reconciliation and unity. Between South and North, the two sides will encourage the atmosphere of amity and cooperation by actively staging various joint events on the dates that hold special meaning for both South and North Korea, such as June 15, in which participants from all levels, including central and local governments, parliaments, political parties, and civil organisations, will be involved. On the international front, the two sides agreed to demonstrate their collective wisdom, talents, and solidarity by jointly participating in international sports events such as the 2018 Asian Games.
5) South and North Korea agreed to endeavour to swiftly resolve the humanitarian issues that resulted from the division of the nation, and to convene the Inter-Korean Red Cross Meeting to discuss and solve various issues including the reunion of separated families. In this vein, South and North Korea agreed to proceed with reunion programs for the separated families on the occasion of the National Liberation Day of August 15 this year.
6) South and North Korea agreed to actively implement the projects previously agreed in the 2007 October 4 Declaration, in order to promote balanced economic growth and co-prosperity of the nation. As a first step, the two sides agreed to adopt practical steps towards the connection and modernisation of the railways and roads on the eastern transportation corridor as well as between Seoul and Sinuiju for their utilisation.
II. South and North Korea will make joint efforts to alleviate the acute military tension and practically eliminate the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula.
1) South and North Korea agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air and sea, that are the source of military tension and conflict. In this vein, the two sides agreed to transform the demilitarised zone into a peace zone in a genuine sense by ceasing as of May 2 this year all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets, in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line.
2) South and North Korea agreed to devise a practical scheme to turn the areas around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone in order to prevent accidental military clashes and guarantee safe fishing activities.
3) South and North Korea agreed to take various military measures to ensure active mutual cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts. The two sides agreed to hold frequent meetings between military authorities, including the defence ministers meeting, in order to immediately discuss and solve military issues that arise between them. In this regard, the two sides agreed to first convene military talks at the rank of general in May.
III. South and North Korea will actively cooperate to establish a permanent and solid peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice and establishing a robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is a historical mission that must not be delayed any further.
1) South and North Korea reaffirmed the Non-Aggression Agreement that precludes the use of force in any form against each other, and agreed to strictly adhere to this Agreement.
2) South and North Korea agreed to carry out disarmament in a phased manner, as military tension is alleviated and substantial progress is made in military confidence-building.
3) During this year that marks the 65th anniversary of the Armistice, South and North Korea agreed to actively pursue trilateral meetings involving the two Koreas and the United States, or quadrilateral meetings involving the two Koreas, the United States and China, with a view to declaring an end to the war and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime.
4) South and North Korea confirmed the common goal of realising, through complete denuclearisation, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. South and North Korea shared the view that the measures being initiated by North Korea are very meaningful and crucial for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and agreed to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities in this regard. South and North Korea agreed to actively seek the support and cooperation of the international community for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
The two leaders agreed, through regular meetings and direct telephone conversations, to hold frequent and candid discussions on issues vital to the nation, to strengthen mutual trust and to jointly endeavour to strengthen the positive momentum towards continuous advancement of inter-Korean relations as well as peace, prosperity and unification of the Korean Peninsula.
In this context, President Moon Jae-in agreed to visit Pyongyang this (northern) autumn.
April 27, 2018
Done in Panmunjom
Moon Jae-in, President, Republic of Korea
Kim Jong-un, Chairman, State Affairs Commission, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
***
Meanwhile, are U.S. officials assigned to working the back channel deals with North Korea suggesting lighter demands of North Korea in a long-term layered approach? Yes, just a down payment on partial denuclearization. Susan Thornton is pushing more feeble demands. Susan is the acting assistant secretary at the State Department and Pompeo wants her replaced. She has also pushed for a more conciliatory approach to China.
Susan should be removed and now we can see there is a real divided and fractured approach to the trade, military and nuclear issues in Asia.
The United States and South Korea do military drills often and Kim Jung Un was well aware of those planned stating the drills were a rehearsal for an invasion. Further, North Korea has canceled talks with South Korea. The Kim regime is making yet another demand stating the United States must be careful about deliberations and the summit itself due to the ‘ruckus’ over the drills.
This all comes from the conclusion of the meeting that North Korea has with China.
Meanwhile:
That nuclear test site that North Korea has declared inoperable and where media has been invited to see the dismantling of the site and tunnels may not be the only site and no one is speaking of other sites but should be. Why? Well Iran refuses to declared PMD (possible military dimension) sites that are part of the nuclear development plan. Since Iran and North Korea have long collaborated on nuclear programs, it stands to reason North Korea has other sites as well.
***
Ahead of the April 27 inter-Korean summit, NGA published a separate assessment that North Korea had started dismantling significant components and structures associated with nuclear test observation at Punggye-ri.
The North’s decision not only came before Kim Jong-un’s first meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in at Panmunjom, but also before the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting, scheduled for June 12 in Singapore.
Satellite imagery published by 38 North on Monday, May 14, provides open source corroboration of significant changes near the northern, western, and southern portals leading into the underground tunnel network that composes the Punggye-ri test site.
North Korea’s work to dismantle structures at the test site comes ahead of its announced intention to invite journalists and experts from China, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and the United Kingdom to observe the site’s dismantlement between May 23 and May 25.
A report published over the weekend by the country’s outward-facing state media, the Korean Central News Agency, said that the event would be to “ensure transparency of discontinuance of the nuclear test (sic).” U.S. President Donald Trump called Kim’s move a “very smart and gracious gesture” in a tweet.
The same report specified the process for the site’s disabling, which would include the collapsing of tunnels — presumably with explosives — and the removal of observation and research facilities. U.S. intelligence assessments suggest that much of the latter work will have been completed prior to the arrival of foreign observers.
The DIA and NGA assessments leave open the possibility that North Korea’s planned modifications to the test site next week could significantly extend the period of time necessary to restore Punggye-ri to a usable state.
Following Kim’s announcement that the Punggye-ri site will be shut down, international observers, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s (CTBTO) executive secretary, Lassina Zerbo, welcomed the announcement. Kim has not specified whether the CTBTO will be invited to verify the closure of the nuclear test site.
North Korea is the only country known to have conducted full-yield tests of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Kim Jong-un has not expressed an interest in signing the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, which has yet to enter into force.
With six nuclear tests, North Korea likely has a useful set of data that it can use to continue refining its nuclear weapons designs. The U.S. intelligence community has, with consensus, determined as of mid-2017 that North Korea is capable of mounting compact nuclear weapons atop its larger ballistic missiles, including its intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that threaten the continental United States.
In the same report to the Workers’ Party of Korea’s 7th Central Committee where Kim first acknowledged that Punggye-ri’s mission had come to an end, that North Korean leader, for the first time, publicly acknowledged that North Korea had conducted sub-critical nuclear weapons testing.
North Korea has not made any concessions on its sub-critical testing program, which will likely continue at its Nuclear Weapons Institute. Continued sub-critical testing would allow North Korea to maintain its existing weapons and refine their performance.
RCD: With the location and date of the forthcoming summit between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong‑un now fixed, speculation has turned to what sort of agreement might be achievable. US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently suggested that the ‘Libyan model’ of nuclear disarmament—from 2003–2004—might offer a framework that could be applied to North Korea in 2018.
The suggestion received what might kindly be called a mixed reception, not least because the North Koreans believe that Muammar al-Qaddafi was a fool to abandon his nuclear program. Still, I’d like to explore the Libyan case here because it offers one of the few examples of ‘denuclearisation’ that we have.
True, the two cases are markedly dissimilar: Libya, unlike North Korea, had made relatively little progress towards nuclear weapons when its leadership took the strategic decision to abandon the program. The Libyans had no nuclear weapons. Yes, they had a small number of centrifuges—some still in their original packing—and a quantity of uranium hexafluoride (the feedstock for a centrifuge enrichment cascade).
More ominously, they had a nuclear weapon design, apparently obtained from the A.Q. Khan network—although some Libyans claimed that the design was a ‘bonus’ intended as a reward for their other purchases.
But when US officials appeared before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early 2004 to talk about the disarmament effort, senators were at least as interested in the detailed picture of the nuclear black market that the Libyan program revealed as they were in the program itself. While a raft of fascinating material about the program had suddenly spilled forth, it was the procurement trail, stretching from Libya to Pakistan and Malaysia, that the committee chairman, Senator Richard Lugar, referred to as ‘the treasure trove’.
While North Korea’s current indigenous capabilities are far stronger than Libya’s were 15 years ago, one suspects there would be similar interest in Washington today about Pyongyang’s proliferation links.
Further, there are some aspects of the Libyan model that the current US administration might want to replicate in any deal with North Korea. Two of those aspects concern access and relocation. US and British experts were given extraordinary access to the Libyan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. See the statements made in 2004 by Paula DeSutter, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, to two congressional committees (here and here) and, separately, in an interview with Arms Control Today:
The Libyans said, ‘We are no longer going to have a nuclear weapons program.’ They invited the United States and the United Kingdom in. They gave the United States and the United Kingdom access to all facilities that we requested to see. They were willing to permit any tests that we wanted to conduct. They were willing to have their centrifuge program removed … They have been very forthcoming.
In the chemical weapons area, we assisted them in drafting their declaration to the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]. They had the OPCW technical secretariat come in. On one occasion they said, ‘You know, we really hadn’t told the others that came before, but there are some other munitions we need to show you.’ They took us to a facility that we almost certainly would not have been able to identify independently and showed us the unfilled munitions there. That is transparency. That is the kind of access that we are given when a country has made a strategic commitment. They volunteer information.
Some sources suggest that the procedure was not quite as straightforward as that passage of text implies. William Tobey, for example, argues that Libyan commitment and transparency varied on a day-to-day basis, at least in the early months. (See Tobey’s five-part series in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4 and Part 5, and his 2017 assessment of intelligence and policy cooperation in the Libyan disarmament case.)
It was because of that variability that the Americans wanted to relocate key parts of the WMD program quickly. The most proliferation-sensitive parts of the program—equipment and documents—were airlifted to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. The nuclear weapon design documents, revealed to the Americans on 20 January, were flown out of the country two days later.
During the night of 25–26 January 2004, an American C-17, its insignia painted over, landed at an air base near Tripoli, loaded its cargo—including advanced centrifuge rotors, five Scud‑C missile guidance sets and two tons of uranium hexafluoride—and took off again. Later, in March 2004, another 1,000 tons of materials and equipment were loaded aboard a US ship, the Industrial Challenger, its insignia again painted over, and taken to America.
Is that what President Trump is going to propose to Kim Jong‑un? Media sources say that the US has asked North Korea to ‘discard’ the data from its nuclear weapon development program and allow its nuclear scientists to emigrate. Of course, the manner—and direction—in which that data might be discarded is a non-trivial issue.
And emigration would, of course, be a humane solution to an intractable problem: that even after the weapons are gone and the data has been discarded, the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles will still exist in the minds of North Korea’s scientists. I don’t imagine, though, that Washington wants those scientists heading to the Middle East. Russia and China might be acceptable destinations. People say that Tennessee is nice this time of year.
As was the case with the Libyan deal, the US is also arguing that this is an opportunity for North Korea to abandon not merely its nuclear program, but all of its WMD. Still, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles seem likely to be the core of any deal.
On ballistic missiles, a key US objective in 2003–2004 was to ensure that Libya’s missile program was compliant with the thresholds set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime—namely, that its missiles were limited in their range to a maximum of 300 kilometres and in their payload to a maximum of 500 kilograms.
In short, the Libyan model sets high standards in relation to the exposure of proliferation linkages; provision of access to sites, personnel and materials; relocation of key items; and acceptance of international standards on WMD. Can an agreement with Pyongyang meet those standards? Frankly, it seems unlikely.
The Libyan model, after all, had one driver that might not be equally compelling in the North Korean case: the strategic commitment by the leadership to put aside WMD. Because of that commitment, the model unfolded quickly and the verification hurdles proved surmountable.
A similar level of strategic commitment on Kim Jong‑un’s part is what the Americans are hoping to find in Singapore on 12 June. The Trump administration is certainly signallingthat this is their desired approach.
There are several things in play. China, Iran and Russia and North Korea are watching all U.S. positions and it began with the Pompeo demands announced of Iran since exiting the JCPOA, nuclear deal. Iran has not only responded with several nasty grams but Iran is putting threats towards Europe on many of their demands to stay in the deal.
