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Obama Advisor Pro Iran Lobby, Not Valerie

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Obama Adviser on Iran Worked for Pro-Regime Lobby

The White House released a list of its high-ranking officials who took part in a video conference with President Obama late Tuesday. Among them appears Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, who has formerly worked for the National Iranian-American Council.

The White House brief, which was disclosed by The Daily Beast, listed Sahar Nowrouzzadeh as the National Security Council Director for Iran. Nowrouzzadeh appears to be a former employee of the alleged pro-Tehran regime lobbying group, NIAC (National Iranian-American Council).

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Breitbart News has found that a person with the same name has previously written several publications on behalf of NIAC. According to what appears to be her LinkedIn account, Nowrouzzadeh became an analyst for the Department of Defense in 2005 before moving her way up to the National Security Council in 2014.
A NIAC profile from 2007 reveals that Sahar Nowrouzzadeh appears to be the same person as the one who is currently the NSC Director for Iran. The profiles indicate that she had the same double major and attended the same university (George Washington).

Critics have alleged that NIAC is a lobby for the current Iranian dictatorship under Ayatollah Khamenei. A dissident journalist revealed recently that NIAC’s president and founder, Trita Parsi, has maintained a years-long relationship with Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif.

NIAC was established in 1999, when founder Trita Parsi attended a conference in Cyprus that was held under the auspices of the Iranian regime. During the conference, Parsi reportedly laid out his plan to introduce a pro-regime lobbying group to allegedly counteract the influence of America’s pro-Israel and anti-Tehran regime advocacy groups.

NIAC has been investing heavily in attempts to influence the talks in favor of an agreement with the state sponsor of terror. In recent days, its director, Trita Parsi, has been spotted having amiable conversation with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s brother.

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The possible revelations about the NSC Director’s apparent past with the alleged pro-regime group come as the U.S. has reportedly struck an agreement with Iran and the rest of the P5+1 world powers on Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.
***
So what else is not being addressed in the negotiations?
Experts: Iran Housing Nuke Materials in North Korea, Syria

LAUSANNE, Switzerland — A top State Department official on Monday dismissed reports that Iran may be hiding key nuclear-related assets in North Korea and implied that she was unaware of the possibility, despite the publication this weekend of several articles by top analysts expressing alarm at the extent of nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Pyongyang.

Marie Harf, a spokeswoman for the State Department, dismissed as “bizarre” the reports, which described the transfer of enriched uranium and ballistic missile technology back and forth between the two rogue regimes.

The existence of an illicit Iranian nuclear infrastructure outside of the Islamic Republic’s borders would gut a nuclear deal that the administration has vowed to advance by Tuesday, according to these experts and others.

If Iran is not forced to disclose the full extent and nature of its outside nuclear work to the United States, there is virtually no avenue to guarantee that it is living up to its promises made in the negotiating room, according to multiple experts and sources in Europe apprised of the ongoing talks.

Gordon Chang, a North Korea expert who has written in recent days about Iran’s possible “secret program” there, described the State Department’s dismissal of these reports as naïve.

“Let me see if I get this straight: The country with the world’s most highly developed technical intelligence capabilities does not know what has been in open sources for years?” Chang said. “No wonder North Korea transfers nuclear weapons technology to Iran and others with impunity.”

“The North Koreans could go on CNN and say, ‘Hey, Secretary Kerry, we’re selling the bomb to Iran,’ and the State Department would still say they know nothing about it,” Chang said. “No wonder we’re in such trouble.”

Other Iranian experts specializing in the country’s military workings also have raised recent questions about Tehran’s collaboration with North Korea.

Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht, both senior fellows at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), have revealed that a nuclear reactor destroyed in Syria in 2007 by Israel was likely a North Korean-backed Iranian project.

Gerecht told the Free Beacon in a follow-up interview that key issues regarding Iran’s past military work and outside collaboration are being ignored in the negotiating room as diplomats rush to secure a tentative deal by Tuesday night.

“It certainly appears that the administration has backed away from [previous military dimensions] questions,” Gerecht said. “The plan appears to be to let the [International Atomic Energy Agency] continue its so far fruitless effort to gain access to sensitive sites, personnel, and paperwork, but to keep these questions out of the talks.”

“The administration is doing this because it fears the Iranians would walk out,” he added. “Any military work revealed by the Iranians would prove the Supreme Leader and [President] Rouhani liars.

Despite concerns from countries such a France over the issue, the United States has attempted to accommodate Iran, Gerecht said.

“The White House wants to believe that monitoring of known sites will be sufficient. It’s a bit mystifying given the Iranian track record and the CIA’s longstanding inability to penetrate the nuclear-weapons program (it’s just too hard of a target to do this reliably),” he explained. “But since they fear a breakdown, they bend their credulity in Iran’s favor. This has been the story of the negotiations from the beginning.”

Alfoneh also told the Free Beacon that Iran should be pressed by the United States to disclose the full extent of its nuclear relationship with North Korea.

“I certainly think the Islamic Republic should come clean concerning its past record of nuclear activities: Did the Islamic Republic ever try to build a nuclear weapon? If not, how are we to understand the opaque references to Tehran-Pyongyang nuclear cooperation in the 1990s?” Alfoneh said.

“As long as the Islamic Republic does not provide a clear record of its nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s, and as long as we do not know the full scope of Tehran-Pyongyang nuclear cooperation, there is always the risk of the two states renewing that cooperation, which in turn would jeopardize any agreement the Islamic Republic and the P5+1 Group may reach,” he said.

Another potential complication includes the ability of international inspectors to discern the extent of Iran’s nuclear work in Syria.

“Syria’s current chaos makes it virtually impossible for inspectors to do their job even if the Syrians were compliant,” according to Emanuele Ottolenghi, a onetime advisor to foreign ministries in Europe.

There is no way to determine whether Syria is housing any other nuclear sites on behalf of the Iranian, according to Ottolenghi, another senior fellow at FDD.

“Syria has covered up its nuclear activities after the 2007 [Israeli Air Force] raid on Deir al-Azour,” he said. “After four years of inconclusive efforts, the [International Atomic Energy Agency] ended up deferring the issue to the [United Nations Security Council] after declaring Syria in non-compliance.”

On Iran, Reagan Delivered an Aggressive Response

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Known as Operation Praying Mantis, President Reagan ordered an aggressive response to the Iranians. Given the capitulation today be the Obama administration, we have a reason to miss a real leader in the White House.

A Look Back at How U.S. Naval Forces Responded to Hostile Forces in the Arabian Gulf.

An engagement 25 years ago on April 14, 1988 sparked a determined and quick response four days later from the U.S., known as Operation Praying Mantis, which demonstrated the same priorities the Navy maintains today.

In early 1988, as part of Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. Navy was engaged in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf as Iraq and Iran continued in a bloody war. The USS Enterprise (CVN 65) was operating in the region.

Little did anyone know that what would happen that day would draw naval forces into action and alter the course of history.

Watchstanders aboard USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58), Northeast of Qatar, sighted three mines floating approximately one-half mile from the ship. Twenty minutes after the first sighting, as Samuel B. Roberts was backing clear of the minefield, it struck a submerged mine. The blast injured 10 Sailors and tore a 21-foot hole in the hull, nearly ripping the warship in half. Quick and determined actions by the crew, who worked for seven hours to stabilize the ship, kept the vessel from sinking.

“We heard about it right away and very shortly thereafter I was told I was going to fly off to Bahrain to help put a plan together and command one of the Surface Action Groups (SAG),” said Vice Adm. (Ret.) James B Perkins, III, who was a Surface Action Group (SAG) commander during Operation Praying Mantis. “We spent the 17th of April flying from one side of the gulf to the other, briefing the SAG commanders as to what the plan was.”

Four days after the mine blast, forces, of the now-Joint Task Force Middle East, executed a response — Operation Praying Mantis. The operation called for the destruction of two oil platforms used by Iran to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping.

“The gas-oil platforms were huge structures,” said Perkins. “What I had in mind were the oil platforms off the coast of Santa Barbra. But These were floating cities with berthing quarters and all that sort of stuff,” Perkins recalled.

“On the morning [of April 18] we called them up and told them, in Farsi and English, that we were getting ready to destroy them and to get off the platforms,” said Perkins. “There was a lot of running around looking for boats to leave the decks.”

By the end of that day the coalition air and surface units not only destroyed the two oil rigs but also Iranian units attempting to counter-attack U.S. forces.

Naval aircraft and the destroyer USS Joseph Strauss (DDG 16) sank the Iranian frigate Sahand (F 74) with harpoon missiles and laser-guided bombs. A laser-guided bomb, dropped from a Navy A-6 Intruder, disabled frigate Sabalan (F 73), and Standard missiles launched from the cruiser USS Wainwright (CG 28) and frigates USS Bagley (FF 1069) and USS Simpson (FFG 56) destroyed the 147-foot missile patrol boat Joshan (P 225). In further combat, A-6s sank one Bodghammer high-speed patrol boats and neutralized four more of the speedboats.

“The air wing from Enterprise did a superb job taking on the Bodghammers,” said Perkins.

By the end of the operation, U.S. air and surface units had sunk, or severely damaged, half of Iran’s operational fleet.

“This particular exercise, in my view, finished the Iranian Navy in the Arabian Gulf,” said Perkins. “They were still around – but after that operation, they didn’t have as active a stance.”

Operation Praying Mantis proved a milestone in naval history. For the first time since World War II, U.S. naval forces and supporting aircraft fought a major surface action against a determined enemy. The success of Praying Mantis and the broad-based allied naval cooperation during Operation Earnest Will proved the value of joint and combined operations in the Gulf and led the way for the massive joint coalition effort that occurred during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The operation also demonstrated the importance of being ready to fight and win today, of providing offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty; and showcased the teamwork, talent and imagination of the Navy’s diverse, capable force.

It also proved the value of all the training the Navy had done.

“You have to be ready on a moment’s notice,” Perkins said. “You may not always have sufficient time to get prepared, so train hard and often. (In this case) it worked out very well.”

Timeline:

First light: The Roberts’ SH-60 helicopter, now flying from the USS Trenton (LPD 14), lifts from the deck of the amphibious transport dock. The aircraft, call sign Magnum 447, heads off to give the targets a final visual check, and to stand by to evacuate wounded troops.

8:00 a.m.: A few minutes after delivering a radio warning, the destroyers of Surface Action Group Bravo open fire on the Sassan oil platform, which was being used by Iranian forces as a command-and-control center for attacks on Gulf shipping.

8:05 a.m.: The ships of Surface Action Group Charlie open fire on the Sirri oil platform, which is being used to control Iranian maritime attacks.

9:25 a.m.: Twin-rotor CH-46 helicopters deliver U.S. Marines to the Sassan platform, where they collect intelligence and set demolition charges. Plans are scratched to send Navy SEALs to the Sirri platform, which was set afire by the bombardment.

11:30 a.m.: The Iranian patrol boat Joshan ignores radio warnings and approaches SAG Charlie. About 45 minutes later, Joshan fires a U.S.-made Harpoon missile — the remnant of a pre-Revolutionary arms purchase by the Iranian shah. Some 13 miles away, the U.S. ships fire chaff and dodge the incoming weapon. They return fire with Harpoons and Standard missiles, sinking Joshan in the world’s first missile duel between warships.

12:50 p.m.: A pair of Iranian F-4 fighters approach the cruiser Wainwright, which chases them off with a pair of Standard missiles.

1:30 p.m.: Iranian Boghammar speedboats attack the Scan Bay, a Panamanian jack-up barge with 15 American workers in the Mubarak oil field off the United Arab Emirates. Through a lengthy commo hookup, President Reagan himself authorizes a strike against the boats — the first time U.S. forces had intervened to stop an attack on a non-U.S. flagged vessel in the Gulf, and a harbinger of a formal policy to come. Two A-6E Intruders and an F-14 Tomcat are dispatched to attack; SAG Bravo provides a vector.

2:25 p.m.: The A-6s sink the lead Boghammar with Rockeye cluster bombs. Four other boats flee to the Iranian-controlled Abu Musa island and beach themselves.

3:30 p.m.: U.S. A-6s and warships attack the Iranian frigate Sahand with coordinated bombs and missiles. The frigate will sink several hours later.

5:15 p.m.: The Iranian frigate Sabalan fires at an A-6, which dodges the missile and returns to drop a 500-pound bomb down the ship’s exhaust stack, leaving it dead in the water. Top U.S. defense officials in Washington, who are monitoring the fight, decide not to sink a third Iranian warship. They tell U.S. ships and aircraft to lay off Sabalan, and Iranian tugs eventually tow the damaged frigate back to the Bandar Abbas naval base.

Teaching Immigrants to Unionize, Chicago

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The National Labor Relations Board is signing agreements with Mexico, Ecuador and other countries. Of note: Lafe Soloman being investigated for violating ethics. Richard Griffin is devoted to big labor.

August 26, 2013 the Chicago Office of the NLRB and the Mexican Consulate in Chicago will sign a local agreement to strengthen cooperation and collaboration between the NLRB and the Consulate and improve access to information and education regarding rights and responsibilities for Mexican workers, their employers, and Mexican business owners in the United States.

On July 23, 2013 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Mexican States signed a national letter of agreement in Washington D.C.  The NLRB is the independent government agency responsible for enforcing the National Labor Relations Act, the primary law governing relations between employers and employees in the private sector. The Act guarantees workers the right to join together, with or without a union, to improve their wages and working conditions, or to refrain from such activities. Employers and employees alike are protected from unfair labor practices.

Under the framework, the NLRB and the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., as well as NLRB Regional Offices and Mexican Consulates nationwide, will cooperate to provide outreach, education, and training, and to develop best practices. The Agreement is an outgrowth of initial negotiations between the NLRB’s Chicago office and the Mexican Consulate in Chicago. The framework has been used by other federal labor agencies, including the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which have similar agreements with the Mexican Embassy and its consulates.

“With coordination from the consulates, we expect to meet with Mexican workers around the country to help forge innovative solutions to issues specific to their needs,” Acting NLRB General Counsel Lafe Solomon said. He noted the letter of agreement will also increase the NLRB’s ability to provide employers, including Mexican business owners in the United States, with resources directly available to them, including access to education and training resources regarding rights and responsibilities under the Act.

*** There is more:

U.S. signed agreement with Mexico to teach immigrants to unionize

The federal government has signed agreements with three foreign countries — Mexico, Ecuador and the Philippines — to establish outreach programs to teach immigrants their rights to engage in labor organizing in the U.S.

The agreements do not distinguish between those who entered legally or illegally. They are part of a broader effort by the National Labor Relations Board to get immigrants involved in union activism.

The five-member board is the agency that enforces the National Labor Relations Act, the main federal law covering unions. In 2013, Lafe Solomon, the board’s then-acting general counsel, signed a “memorandum of understanding” with Mexico’s U.S. ambassador. The current general counsel, Richard Griffin, signed additional agreements with the ambassadors of Ecuador and the Philippines last year.

“Those are the only countries that the NLRB has MOUs with,” said spokeswoman Jessica Kahanek.

The agreements are substantially similar, with several sections repeated verbatim in each one. All three documents state that the No. 1 outreach goal is “to educate those who may not be aware of the Act, including those employees just entering the work force, by providing information designed to clearly inform [that nation’s] workers in the United States of America their rights under the Act and to develop ways of communicating such information (e.g., via print and electronic media, electronic assistance tools, mobile device applications, and links to the NLRB’s web site from the [country’s] web sites) to the … workers residing in the United States of America and their employers.”

The board has said the law’s protections for workers engaged in union organizing extend even to people who are not legally authorized to work in the U.S. An employer who fires an illegal immigrant worker — which is required under federal immigration law — can be sanctioned by the board if it decides the worker’s union activism was the real reason for the dismissal.

In the documents, the countries’ foreign consulates agree to help locate foreign nationals living in the U.S. “who might aid the NLRB in investigations, trials or compliance matters” involving businesses and to develop a system for the consulates to refer complaints from foreign workers to the board’s regional offices.

The documents also call for systems to inform foreign businesses operating in the U.S. of their responsibilities to their employees under federal labor law. In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on March 24, Griffin characterized that as the principal focus of the agreements.

“We have executed letters of agreement with foreign ministries designed to strengthen collaborative efforts to provide foreign business owners doing business in the United States, as well as workers from those countries, with education, guidance and access to information regarding their rights and responsibilities under our statute,” he told lawmakers.

Griffin, formerly a top lawyer for the International Union of Operating Engineers, testified that the agreements save taxpayer money because they would “pay dividends as employers will be able to avoid unintentionally violating our statute and workers will be educated about their statutory rights to engage with one another to improve their conditions of employment, both of which benefits taxpayers, and the country as a whole, through increased economic growth.”

If the main intention is to provide legal information to foreign employers, it is not clear why the board pursued agreements with those countries, which represent a relatively small portion of businesses operating the in the U.S.

A November study by the Bureau of Economic Analysis found that Mexican businesses operating in the U.S. employ slightly less than 69,000 people total. The numbers employed by Ecuadorian and Philippine businesses operating in the U.S. are so small, the bureau doesn’t publish a measurement for either one.

By comparison, Canadian businesses employ well over a half-million people in the U.S. British businesses employ nearly a million, Japanese nearly 720,000 and German 620,000.

Mexico and the Philippines, one the other hand, represent two of the countries providing the most immigrants to the U.S. Mexico accounts for 11.6 million immigrants living in the U.S., the most from any single country, according to the Migration Policy Institute. The Philippines is fourth overall, accounting for 1.8 million.

A 2013 board press release stated the Mexican agreement was “an outgrowth of initial negotiations between the NLRB’s Chicago office and the Mexican Consulate in Chicago. The framework has been used by other federal labor agencies, including the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which have similar agreements with the Mexican Embassy and its consulates.”

The release quoted Solomon saying, “With coordination from the consulates, we expect to meet with Mexican workers around the country to help forge innovative solutions to issues specific to their needs.”

Last month, Griffin instituted a new policy in which the board will “facilitate” obtaining visas for illegal immigrants if their status impedes it from pursuing a labor violation case against a business. The policy gives illegal immigrants living in the U.S. a strong incentive to engage in labor activism, because doing so will make employers reluctant to fire them and potentially get them a visa, and therefore legal status, if they are fired.

What About the P5+1 and Iran/North Korea

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If you are inclined to read about the technical cooperation agreement between North Korea and Iran go here.

 

Ed Schroeder’s Military Intelligence Report: Does Iran Have Secret Nukes in North Korea?

In October 2012, Iran began stationing personnel at a military base in North Korea, in a mountainous area close to the Chinese border. The Iranians, from the Ministry of Defense and associated firms, reportedly are working on both missiles and nuclear weapons. Ahmed Vahidi, Tehran’s minister of defense at the time,denied sending people to the North, but the unconfirmed dispatches make sense in light of the two states announcing a technical cooperation pact the preceding month.

The P5+1—the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany—appear determined, before their self-imposed March 31 deadline, to ink a deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its nuclear energy program, which is surely a cover for a wide-ranging weapons effort. The international community wants the preliminary arrangement now under discussion, referred to as a “framework agreement,” to ensure that the country remains at least one year away from being able to produce an atomic device.

The P5+1 negotiators believe they can do that by monitoring Tehran’s centrifuges—supersonic-speed machines that separate uranium gas into different isotopes and upgrade the potent stuff to weapons-grade purity—and thereby keep track of its total stock of fissile material.

The negotiators from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China are trying to get Tehran to adhere to the Additional Protocol, which allows anytime, anyplace inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog. If Iran agrees to the IAEA’s intrusive inspections, proponents of the deal will claim a major breakthrough, arguing for instance that Iran will not be able to hide centrifuges in undisclosed locations.

There were so many North Korean nuclear and missile scientists, specialists, and technicians at Iran’s facilities that they took over their own coastal resort there.

But no inspections of Iranian sites will solve a fundamental issue: As can be seen from the North Korean base housing Tehran’s weapons specialists, Iran is only one part of a nuclear weapons effort spanning the Asian continent. North Korea, now the world’s proliferation superstar, is a participant. China, once the mastermind, may still be a co-conspirator. Inspections inside the borders of Iran, therefore, will not give the international community the assurance it needs.

The cross-border nuclear trade is substantial enough to be called a “program.” Larry Niksch of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., estimates that the North’s proceeds from this trade with Iran are “between $1.5 billion and $2.0 billion annually.” A portion of this amount is related to missiles and miscellaneous items, the rest derived from building Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.

Iran has bought a lot with its money. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, thought to be Tehran’s chief nuclear scientist, was almost certainly in North Korea at Punggye-ri in February 2013 to witness Pyongyang’s third atomic test. Reports put Iranian technicians on hand at the site for the first two detonations as well.

The North Koreans have also sold Iran material for bomb cores, perhaps even weapons-grade uranium. The Telegraph reported that in 2002 a barrel of North Korean uranium cracked open and contaminated the tarmac of the new Tehran airport.

In addition, the Kim Jong Un  regime appears to have helped the Islamic Republic on its other pathway to the bomb. In 2013, Meir Dagan, a former Mossad director,charged the North with providing assistance to Iran’s plutonium reactor.

The relationship between the two regimes has been long-lasting. Hundreds of North Koreans have worked at about 10 nuclear and missile facilities in Iran. There were so many nuclear and missile scientists, specialists, and technicians that they took over their own coastal resort there, according to Henry Sokolski,  the proliferation maven, writing in 2003.

Even if Iran today were to agree to adhere to the Additional Protocol, it could still continue developing its bomb in North Korea, conducting research there or buying North Korean technology and plans. And as North Korean centrifuges spin in both known and hidden locations, the Kim regime will have a bigger stock of uranium to sell to the Iranians for their warheads. With the removal of sanctions, as the P5+1 is contemplating, Iran will have the cash to accelerate the building of its nuclear arsenal.

So while the international community inspects Iranian facilities pursuant to a framework deal, the Iranians could be busy assembling the components for a bomb elsewhere. In other words, they will be one day away from a bomb—the flight time from Pyongyang to Tehran—not one year as American and other policymakers hope.

The North Koreans are not the only contributors to the Iranian atom bomb. Iran got its first centrifuges from Pakistan, and Pakistan’s program was an offshoot from the Chinese one.

Some argue that China proliferated nuclear weapons through the infamous black market ring run by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. There is no open source proof of that contention, but Beijing did nothing while Khan merchandised Chinese parts, plans, and knowhow—its most sensitive technology—from the capital of one of its closest allies. Moreover, Beijing did its best to protect the smuggler when Washington rolled up his network in the early part of last decade. The Chinese, for instance, supported General Pervez Musharraf’s controversial decision to end prematurely his government’s inquiry, which avoided exposing Beijing’s rumored involvement with Khan’s activities.

And there are circumstances suggesting that Beijing, around the time of Khan’s confession and immediate pardon in 2004, took over his proliferation role directly, boldly transferring materials and equipment straight to Iran. For example, in November 2003 the staff of the IAEA had fingered China as one of the sources of equipment used in Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons effort. And as reported in July 2007 by The Wall Street Journal, the State Department had lodged formal protests with Beijing about Chinese enterprises violating Security Council resolutions by exporting to Tehran items that could be used for building atomic weapons.

Since then, there have been continual reports of transfers by Chinese enterprises to Iran in violation of international treaties and U.N. rules. Chinese entities have been implicated in shipments of maraging steel, ring-shaped magnets, and valves and vacuum gauges, all apparently headed to Iran’s atom facilities. In March 2011, police in Port Klang seized two containers from a ship bound to Iran from China. Malaysian authorities discovered that goods passed off as “used for liquid mixing or storage” were actually components for potential atomic weapons.

In the last few years, there has been an apparent decline in Chinese shipments to Iran. Beijing could be reacting to American pressure to end the trade, but there are more worrying explanations. First, it’s possible that, after decades of direct and indirect illicit transfers, China has already supplied most of what Iran needs to construct a weapon. Second, Beijing may be letting Pyongyang assume the leading proliferation role. After all, the shadowy Fakhrizadeh was reported to have traveled through China on his way to North Korea to observe the North’s third nuclear test.

Fakhrizadeh’s passage through China—probably Beijing’s airport—suggests that China may not have abandoned its “managed proliferation.” In the past, China’s proxy for this deadly trade was Pakistan. Then it was China’s only formal ally, North Korea. In both cases, Chinese policymakers intended to benefit Iran.

In a theoretical sense, there is nothing wrong with an accommodation with the Islamic Republic over nukes, yet there is no point in signing a deal with just one arm of a multi-nation weapons effort. That’s why the P5+1 needs to know what is going on at that isolated military base in the mountains of North Korea. And perhaps others as well.

Cheryl Mills, the Firewall for Hillary’s SpyNet

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Cheryl Mills: The Woman Who Knew Too Much?

The New York Times reports that Cheryl Mills, Hillary Clinton’s long-time henchwoman will not be joining the Presidential campaign now presumably in the final stages of formation. Why? Perhaps Mills is, to borrow a phrase from Alfred Hitchcock, the woman who knew too much.

Mills, who was the State Department’s counselor and chief of staff during the entirety of Hillary’s tumultuous tenure, is up to her waist in the Benghazi matter, where the overwhelming evidence is that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put politics before the security and safety of U.S. citizens serving their country in that hell-hole.

Earlier this month, Judicial Watch obtained emails  through a federal lawsuit which contained multiple references to the, “so-called Benghazi Group. A diplomatic source told Fox News that was code inside the department for the so-called Cheryl Mills task force, whose job was damage control.”

Clearly Clinton, and Obama, were concerned about the “optics” and potential political fallout of the al-Qaeda 9/11 assault on the Benghazi consulate where four Americans were murdered less than 60 days from election day. The emails show Mills “running interference internally during the 2012 Benghazi terror attack.”

Specifically, Mills instructed then State Department spokesman Victoria Nuland “to stop answering reporter questions about the status of Ambassador Chris Stevens, who was missing and later found dead.” Nuland quickly demurred.

This is the same Nuland who objected to the original Benghazi talking points drafted by the CIA because they included references to the al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Sharia and to previous CIA warnings about terror threats in Benghazi. Nuland worried that any mention of the the CIA warnings “could be used by Members [of Congress] to beat the State Department for not paying attention to Agency warnings so why do we want to feed that? Concerned …”

Surely Nuland was given guidance by Mills.

Mills continued the cover-up by telling State Department employees to obstruct the 2013 congressional investigation. In June, 2013 Gregory Hicks, the former deputy chief of mission in Libya during the Benghazi attack, testified to Congress that Mills was “personally instructed to allow the RSO [Regional Security Officer], the acting deputy chief of mission, and myself to be personally interviewed by Congressman Chaffetz.”

In true Clinton form, Hicks said in a September 2013 interview that as a result of cooperating with Congress he was “punished” and “shunted aside, put in a closet,” not receiving a new assignment from State.

Like Nixon and his White House tapes, Hillary is now arguing that the e-mails are her personal property and she should decide what the American people get to read. While serving as secretary of State, Hillary Clinton no doubt sent and received countless emails pertaining to personal issues with no relevance to State Department issues via her private account. But Supreme Court precedent in the Nixon case seems clear: she doesn’t get to decide what to release and what not to.

What does this have to do with Ms. Mills? Mills is the trusted aide who reviewed the e-mail to decide which e-mails to erase. Mills joined Hillary in eschewing government e-mail so e-mails between her and her boss are illegally kept from public view  when they conducted public business.

Mills has another darker distinction. When the Palm Beach police seized the address book of convicted billionaire pedophile and friend of Bill, Jeffrey Epstein, they found the cell phone and personal e-mail address for Mills.

What did Hillary know of Epstein’s sexual abuse of underage girls? What did Hillary think Bill was doing when he and his now disaffected wingman Doug Band visited Epstein’s palatial Palm Beach home where neighbors say the POTUS partied until the wee hours with scores of women who were dropped off by limousine after the arrival of the presidential motorcade.

What did Hillary think Bill was doing on Epstein’s hedonistic island retreat where he was seen in the company of two 17 year-olds flown in from New York for the former Presidents amusement? Perhaps Mills can tell us.

Mills is a member of the Clinton Foundation’s Board of Directors, now under fire for taking millions from foreign governments, particularly those in the Middle East who oppress women and deny them the most basic human rights. Perhaps Mills has seen the e-mails that show the self-dealing nexus between Hillary’s stint at State and the avalanche  of cash the Clintons have scammed from foreign powers for a charity that spends more on luxury travel for the Clintons and a huge staff of political retainers than they do on charitable works to help actual people.

Pine not for Ms. Mills. As the Clintons demonstrated when they placed Epstein’s pedophilic pimp Ghislaine Maxwell in a job at a non-profit funded by the Clinton Foundation, the Clintons sometimes buy silence. Maxwell was granted immunity for her role in procuring underage girls for Epstein to molest. She was present when Bill partied in both Palm Beach and on Epstein’s orgy island, his private retreat in the carribean. Like Mills, Maxwell knows too much.

Or perhaps Mills should be concerned. Cheryl Mills figures into every scandal dogging Hillary Clinton and probably a few we don’t know about yet. As they did with James Carville, Dick Morris, Doug Band, and others the Clinton’s have no problem discarding staff when they are no longer useful. But sometimes, as in the case of former Clinton Security Chief Jerry Parks who knew chapter and verse on Bill Clinton’s sexual peccadilloes and whose brutal murder goes unsolved, those who know too much are silenced.

**** As an aside, my buddy Larry Klayman, at Freedom Watch filed a lawsuit against Hillary Clinton for operating a criminal enterprise, charges of racketeering.