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Obama/Rice Abuse of Surveillance Started During Iran Deal

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Image result for obama surveillance israel VOA

The Guardian more than a year ago, validates the summary posted below.

US ‘spied on Binyamin Netanyahu during Iran nuclear deal talks’

Despite Barack Obama’s promise to curtail eavesdropping on allies in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations about the scale and scope of US activities, the National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance included phone conversations between top Israeli officials, US congressmen and American-Jewish groups, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Further, we cannot eliminate any complicity that would include NSC advisor, Ben Rhodes.

Did the Obama Administration’s Abuse of Foreign-Intelligence Collection Start Before Trump?

One clue: The Russia story is a replay of how the former White House smeared pro-Israel activists in the lead-up to the Iran Deal

Tablet: The accusation that the Obama administration used information gleaned from classified foreign surveillance to smear and blackmail its political opponents at home has gained new traction in recent days, after reports that former National Security Adviser Susan Rice may have been rifling through classified transcripts for over a year that could have included information about Donald Trump and his associates. While using resources that are supposed to keep Americans safe from terrorism for other purposes may be a dereliction of duty, it is no more of a crime than spending all day on Twitter instead of doing your job. The crime here would be if she leaked the names of U.S. citizens to reporters. In the end, the seriousness of the accusation against Rice and other former administration officials who will be caught up in the “unmasking” scandal will rise or fall based on whether or not Donald Trump was actively engaged in a conspiracy to turn over the keys of the White House to the Kremlin. For true believers in the Trump-Kremlin conspiracy theories, the Obama “spying and lying” scandal isn’t a scandal at all; just public officials taking prudent steps to guard against an imminent threat to the republic.

But what if Donald Trump wasn’t the first or only target of an Obama White House campaign of spying and illegal leaks directed at domestic political opponents?

In a December 29, 2015 article, The Wall Street Journal described how the Obama administration had conducted surveillance by US Gov on Israeli officials to understand how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials, like Ambassador Ron Dermer, intended to fight the Iran Deal. The Journal reported that the targeting “also swept up the contents of some of their private conversations with U.S. lawmakers and American-Jewish groups.”

Despite this reporting, it seemed inconceivable at the time that—given myriad legal, ethical, political, and historical concerns, as well as strict National Security Agency protocols that protect the identity of American names caught in intercepts—the Obama White House would have actually spied on American citizens. In a December 31, 2016, Tablet article on the controversy, “Why the White House Wanted Congress to Think It Was Being Spied on By the NSA,” I argued that the Obama administration had merely used the appearance of spying on American lawmakers to corner opponents of the Iran Deal. Spying on U.S. citizens would be a clear abuse of the foreign-intelligence surveillance system. It would be a felony offense to leak the names of U.S. citizens to the press.

Increasingly, I believe that my conclusion in that piece was wrong. I believe the spying was real and that it was done not in an effort to keep the country safe from threats—but in order to help the White House fight their domestic political opponents.

“At some point, the administration weaponized the NSA’s legitimate monitoring of communications of foreign officials to stay one step ahead of domestic political opponents,” says a pro-Israel political operative who was deeply involved in the day-to-day fight over the Iran Deal. “The NSA’s collections of foreigners became a means of gathering real-time intelligence on Americans engaged in perfectly legitimate political activism—activism, due to the nature of the issue, that naturally involved conversations with foreigners. We began to notice the White House was responding immediately, sometimes within 24 hours, to specific conversations we were having. At first, we thought it was a coincidence being amplified by our own paranoia. After a while, it simply became our working assumption that we were being spied on.”

This is what systematic abuse of foreign-intelligence collection for domestic political purposes looks like: Intelligence collected on Americans, lawmakers, and figures in the pro-Israel community was fed back to the Obama White House as part of its political operations. The administration got the drop on its opponents by using classified information, which it then used to draw up its own game plan to block and freeze those on the other side. And—with the help of certain journalists whose stories (and thus careers) depend on high-level access—terrorize them.

Once you understand how this may have worked, it becomes easier to comprehend why and how we keep being fed daily treats of Trump’s nefarious Russia ties. The issue this time isn’t Israel, but Russia, yet the basic contours may very well be the same.

***

Two inquiries now underway on Capitol Hill, conducted by the Senate intelligence committee and the House intelligence committee, may discover the extent to which Obama administration officials unmasked the identities of Trump team members caught in foreign-intelligence intercepts. What we know so far is that Obama administration officials unmasked the identity of one Trump team member, Michael Flynn, and leaked his name to the Washington Post’s David Ignatius.

“According to a senior U.S. government official,” Ignatius wrote in his Jan. 12 column, “Flynn phoned Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak several times on Dec. 29, the day the Obama administration announced the expulsion of 35 Russian officials as well as other measures in retaliation for the hacking. What did Flynn say, and did it undercut the U.S. sanctions?”

Nothing, the Times and the Post later reported. But exposing Flynn’s name in the intercept for political purposes was an abuse of the national-security apparatus, and leaking it to the press is a crime.

This is familiar territory. In spying on the representatives of the American people and members of the pro-Israel community, the Obama administration learned how far it could go in manipulating the foreign-intelligence surveillance apparatus for its own domestic political advantage. In both instances, the ostensible targets—Israel and Russia—were simply instruments used to go after the real targets at home.

In order to spy on U.S. congressmen before the Iran Deal vote, the Obama administration exploited a loophole, which is described in the original Journal article. The U.S. intelligence community is supposed to keep tabs on foreign officials, even those representing allies. Hence, everyone in Washington knows that Israeli Ambassador Ron Dermer is under surveillance. But it’s different for his American interlocutors, especially U.S. lawmakers, whose identities are, according to NSA protocol, supposed to be, at the very least, redacted. But the standard for collecting and disseminating “intercepted communications involving U.S. lawmakers” is much less strict if it is swept up through “foreign-foreign” intercepts, for instance between a foreign ambassador and his capital. Washington, i.e. the seat of the American government, is where foreign ambassadors are supposed to meet with American officials. The Obama administration turned an ancient diplomatic convention inside out—foreign ambassadors were so dangerous that meeting them signaled betrayal of your own country.

During the long and contentious lead-up to the Iran Deal the Israeli ambassador was regularly briefing senior officials in Jerusalem, including the prime minister, about the situation, including his meetings with American lawmakers and Jewish community leaders. The Obama administration would be less interested in what the Israelis were doing than in the actions of those who actually had the ability to block the deal—namely, Senate and House members. The administration then fed this information to members of the press, who were happy to relay thinly veiled anti-Semitic conceits by accusing deal opponents of dual loyalty and being in the pay of foreign interests.

It didn’t take much imagination for members of Congress to imagine their names being inserted in the Iran deal echo chamber’s boilerplate—that they were beholden to “donors” and “foreign lobbies.” What would happen if the White House leaked your phone call with the Israeli ambassador to a friendly reporter, and you were then profiled as betraying the interests of your constituents and the security of your nation to a foreign power? What if the fact of your phone call appeared under the byline of a famous columnist friendly to the Obama administration, say, in a major national publication?

To make its case for the Iran Deal, the Obama administration redefined America’s pro-Israel community as agents of Israel. They did something similar with Trump and the Russians—whereby every Russian with money was defined as an agent of the state. Where the Israeli ambassador once was poison, now the Russian ambassador is the kiss of death—a phone call with him led to Flynn’s departure from the White House and a meeting with him landed Attorney General Jeff Sessions in hot water.

Did Trump really have dealings with FSB officers? Thanks to the administration’s whisper campaigns, the facts don’t matter; that kind of contact is no longer needed to justify surveillance, whose spoils could then be weaponized and leaked. There are oligarchs who live in Trump Tower, and they all know Putin—ergo, talking to them is tantamount to dealing with the Russian state.

Yet there is one key difference between the two information operations that abused the foreign-intelligence surveillance apparatus for political purposes. The campaign to sell the Iran deal was waged while the Obama administration was in office. The campaign to tie down Trump with the false Russia narrative was put together as the Obama team was on its way out.

The intelligence gathered from Iran Deal surveillance was shared with the fewest people possible inside the administration. It was leaked to only a few top-shelf reporters, like the authors of The Wall Street Journal article, who showed how the administration exploited a loophole to spy on Congress. Congressmen and their staffs certainly noticed, as did the Jewish organizations that were being spied on. But the campaign was mostly conducted sotto voce, through whispers and leaks that made it clear what the price of opposition might be.

The reason the prior abuse of the foreign-intelligence surveillance apparatus is clear only now is because the Russia campaign has illuminated it. As The New York Times reported last month, the administration distributed the intelligence gathered on the Trump transition team widely throughout government agencies, after it had changed the rules on distributing intercepted communications. The point of distributing the information so widely was to “preserve it,” the administration and its friends in the press explained—“preserve” being a euphemism for “leak.” The Obama team seems not to have understood that in proliferating that material they have exposed themselves to risk, by creating a potential criminal trail that may expose systematic abuse of foreign-intelligence collection.

Lee Smith is a senior editor at the Weekly Standard and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. He is also the author of the recently published The Consequences of Syria.

Is the U.S. Prepared for North Korea or Russia? Well…

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Two weeks ago North Korea conducted a failed missile test that came on the heels of an earlier test in March where four medium range ballistic missiles were fired in a salvo. Those missiles traveled to their maximum range of 620 miles with some falling in the waters belonging to Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

North Korea has previously test-fired missiles near Sinpo, where it has a submarine base.

A KN-11 submarine launched missile was successfully launched from waters off Sinpo last August that traveled 310 miles into the Sea of Japan.

In February, North Korea successfully tested a land-based version of the KN-11 that also traveled the same distance.

General John Hyten, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told a Congressional panel Tuesday that the February launch marked a significant advancement for North Korea because it was its first successful solid-fueled missile fired from a mobile launcher.

Hyten labeled the February launch of the KN-11 missile as “a major advancement” by North Korea because it was “a new solid medium range ballistic missile off a new transporter erector launcher.”

And Hyten said North Korea showed off pictures “for the entire world to see out of a place we’d never seen before that showed a new technology. A new North Korean capability to employ a very challenging technology for us.”

He explained that liquid-fueled missiles can be unstable and take a long time to fuel and set-up. But “a solid (fueled) rocket can be rolled out and launched at a moment’s notice.”

Hyten added that America’s early missile program was based on liquid fueled rockets that could be unstable and dangerous but “a solid is a much better solution. So all of our inventory now is solids.” More here from ABC.

*** How badly did Obama’s sequestration affect the United State’s ability to deter or intercept an ICBM or MRBM or miniature nuclear weapon launched by North Korea? I am betting on some hope of electronic warfare or U.S. cyber intrusion that would go through China.

*** North Korea has detonated nuclear devices and is trying to develop long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States.

The Pentagon has spent more than $40 billion on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system — GMD for short. It’s designed specifically to thwart a nuclear strike by North Korea or Iran. Yet there are grave doubts about whether it’s up to the task.

Here is a look at the system’s origins, how it’s supposed to work and the technical problems that have bedeviled it.

What exactly is GMD supposed to do?

It’s designed to defend the United States against a “limited” nuclear attack. That means a strike with a handful of missiles, as opposed to a massive assault of the kind that Russia or China could launch. The United States relies on deterrence — the threat of overwhelming retaliation — to prevent Russia or China from ever unleashing missiles against us. In the case of North Korea or Iran, we would rely on GMD to knock incoming warheads out of the sky. More here.

***

The THAAD system is in place now as a defensive measure. The Chinese are very concerned on this system as they do not know all the features or abilities of the THAAD.

General Hyten, Commander of STRATCOM presented chilling testimony on April 4th explaining the condition of offensive and defensive systems with particular emphasis on the nuclear TRIAD platform which is slowly aging out, meaning all too soon, the submarines are no longer able to dive.

So, are there other options? Yes, but they were not revealed in open session testimony and when General Hyten tells us that every action the United States takes to maintain the edge militarily, our adversaries especially Russia takes twice as many.

What about SDI as pursued decades ago by President Reagan? Well, this may help that discussion, but sadly we are not there yet.

The Multi-Object Kill Vehicle can simultaneously destroy ICBMs and decoys with a single interceptor

The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency is in the early phases of engineering a next-generation “Star Wars”-type technology able to knock multiple incoming enemy targets out of space with a single interceptor, officials said.

The new system, called Multi-Object Kill Vehicle, or MOKV, is designed to release from a Ground Based Interceptor and destroy approaching Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs — and also take out decoys traveling alongside the incoming missile threat.

“We will develop and test, by 2017, MOKV command and control strategies in both digital and hardware-in-the-loop venues that will prove we can manage the engagements of many kill vehicles on many targets from a single interceptor. We will also invest in the communication architectures and guidance technology that support this game-changing approach,” a spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency, told Scout Warrior a few months ago.

Decoys or countermeasures are missile-like structures, objects or technologies designed to throw off or confuse the targeting and guidance systems of an approaching interceptor in order to increase the probability that the actual missile can travel through to its target.

If the seeker or guidance systems of a “kill vehicle” technology on a Ground Base Interceptor, or GBI, cannot discern an actual nuclear-armed ICBM from a decoy – the dangerous missile is more likely to pass through and avoid being destroyed.  MOKV is being developed to address this threat scenario.

The Missile Defense Agency has awarded MOKV development deals to Boeing, Lockheed and Raytheon as part of a risk-reduction phase able to move the technology forward, Lehner said.

Steve Nicholls, Director of Advanced Air & Missile Defense Systems for Raytheon, told Scout Warrior the MOKV is being developed to provide the MDA with “a key capability for its Ballistic Missile Defense System – to discriminate lethal objects from countermeasures and debris. The kill vehicle, launched from the ground-based interceptor extends the ground-based discrimination capability with onboard sensors and processing to ensure the real threat is eliminated.”

MOKV could well be described as a new technological step in the ongoing maturation of what was originally conceived of in the Reagan era as “Star Wars” – the idea of using an interceptor missile to knock out or destroy an incoming enemy nuclear missile in space. This concept was originally greeted with skepticism and hesitation as something that was not technologically feasible.

Not only has this technology come to fruition in many respects, but the capability continues to evolve with systems like MOKV. MOKV, to begin formal product development by 2022, is being engineered with a host of innovations to include new sensors, signal processors, communications technologies and robotic manufacturing automation for high-rate tactical weapons systems, Nicholls explained.

The trajectory of an enemy ICBM includes an initial “boost” phase where it launches from the surface up into space, a “midcourse” phase where it travels in space above the earth’s atmosphere and a “terminal” phase wherein it re-enters the earth’s atmosphere and descends to its target. MOKV is engineered to destroy threats in the “midcourse” phase while the missile is traveling through space.

An ability to destroy decoys as well as actual ICBMs is increasingly vital in today’s fast-changing technological landscape because potential adversaries continue to develop more sophisticated missiles, countermeasures and decoy systems designed to make it much harder for interceptor missile to distinguish a decoy from an actual missile.

As a result, a single intercept able to destroy multiple targets massively increases the likelihood that the incoming ICBM threat will actually be destroyed more quickly without needing to fire another Ground Based Interceptor.

Raytheon describes its developmental approach as one that hinges upon what’s called “open-architecture,” a strategy designed to engineer systems with the ability to easily embrace and integrate new technologies as they emerge.  This strategy will allow the MOKV platform to better adjust to fast-changing threats, Nicholls said.

The MDA development plan includes the current concept definition phase, followed by risk reduction and proof of concept phases leading to a full development program, notionally beginning in fiscal year 2022, Nicholls explained.

“This highly advanced and highly technical kill vehicle takes a true dedication of time and expertise to properly mature. It is essential to leverage advancements from other members of the Raytheon kill vehicle family, including the Redesigned Kill Vehicle,” Nicholls said.

While the initial development of MOKV is aimed at configuring the “kill vehicle” for a GBI, there is early thinking about integrating the technology onto a Standard Missile-3, or SM-3, an interceptor missile also able to knock incoming ICBMs out of space.The SM-3 is also an exo-atmopheric “kill vehicle,” meaning it can destroy short and intermediate range incoming targets; its “kill vehilce” has no explosives but rather uses kinetic energy to collide with and obliterate its target. The resulting impact is the equivalent to a 10-ton truck traveling at 600 mph, Raytheon statements said.

“Ultimately, these Multi-Object Kill Vehicles will revolutionize our missile defense architecture, substantially reducing the interceptor inventory required to defeat an evolving and more capable threat to the homeland,” an MDA official said.

***

So what about North Korea?

North Korea’s Most Important Submarine Base

A look into Sinpo and Mayang-do: the keys to North Korea’s ongoing search for a ballistic missile submarine.

North Korea’s submarine force is one of the more capable wings of its generally decrepit military. The current force’s strength lies mostly in its numbers — North Korea possesses roughly 70 submarines in all, roughly 40 of which are its newest Shark-class vessels. (Though still dangerous to its adversaries, even the Shark-class reflects pretty dated technology.) With that number, the DPRK can and does crowd its coasts with torpedo-armed or mine-laying submarines, establishing a respectable anti-surface capability near its waters. Though most of its submarine force is old, loud, or both, still North Korea tinkers on, boldly determined to achieve a reliable sea-based nuclear deterrent.

North Korea's Most Important Submarine Base
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (front) stands on the conning tower of a submarine during his inspection of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Naval Unit 167 in this undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 2014.
Image Credit: KCNA via Reuters

To this effect, the DPRK is building the new Gorae-class submarine (or Sinpo-class) and testing Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) accordingly. Remarkably, most of this activity and materiel are headquartered within a few kilometers of each other in the city of Sinpo and the nearby Mayang-Do Naval Base. Shipyards for the new Gorae-class, SLBM research and development facilities, many or most of the DPRK’s east coast submarines, and the only known ground-based launch platforms for SLBM tests — all are located along the same 35 square kilometer stretch of the North Korean coast. A well-coordinated first strike on this facility would hamstring the North’s submarine fleet, its submarine building capacity, and its hopes of a credible naval nuclear deterrent all in one go.

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Source: Strategic Sentinel

Significance

Sinpo, a small city bordering the Sea of Japan, has been building North Korean submarines for decades. Sinpo’s shipyards churned out dozens of the aforementioned Shark-class submarines in the 1990s, and are now constructing more of the newest Gorae-class as well. (Nuclear missile submarines are generally larger than their conventional counterparts — Gorae, not incidentally, is Korean for “whale.”) As Joe Bermudez, a renowned expert on North Korean military matters, reported — twice — this particular vessel may very well undergo more testing and tweaking before more are built. In light of Sinpo’s history with the Shark-class, its current status as headquarters for the Gorae, and the overall prominence of submarines within the DPRK Navy, North Korea undoubtedly regards Sinpo as one of its most valuable shipbuilding sites.

Not content with the prospect of a mobile, surface-launched ICBM capability, North Korea is simultaneously — albeit much more slowly — working toward a sea-based nuclear deterrent. Crafting a reliable SLBM is a long, arduous process, full of tests, setbacks, and incremental improvement. Lamentably, however, North Korean ballistic missile development is progressing much faster than historical precedent would suggest, thanks in large part to newly unemployed Soviet scientists traveling to Pyongyang as the Cold War ended. Still, rigorous testing is necessary for new models to be considered remotely reliable, and the North has yet to come near this threshold in its SLBM program.

Source: Strategic Sentinel

A very poor test of an infant SLBM program could result in substantial damage to the submarine itself. To avoid any such potential and costly destruction, North Korea has constructed a land-based SLBM launch platform at Sinpo, barely a kilometer away from the Gorae’s submarine pen. We believe this to be the only such facility heretofore identified by open-source intelligence. Destroying it — and the Gorae next door — would deliver a crushing body blow to the North’s SLBM program.

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Source: Strategic Sentinel

Whether North Korea could realistically achieve a working long-range, nuclear SLBM by 2025 remains in serious doubt. Actually producing a functioning naval nuclear deterrent is several other matters entirely. The Gorae-class subs would need to be both quiet and capable of traveling the length of the Pacific Ocean to get into range of the United States, and both of these prospects seem a ways off. Once the vessel design is perfected, North Korea would need to produce at least six such submarines to maintain a continuous, credible deterrent. Then there’s the need for reliable command, control, and communications infrastructure, all of which would need to markedly improve on current conditions. North Korea remains rather far from a sea-based deterrent; one successful strike on Sinpo could set them back many more years.

Scanning a satellite photograph (dated December 2016) of Sinpo’s naval facilities and the Mayang-Do Naval Base not three kilometers off the coast, I personally counted over 25 docked submarines. Satellite imagery from March and May of that year do not reveal quite so many, but still well over a dozen are clearly visible. Most of these were the older, less capable Yono­- and Romeo-class models. Still: the quantity of submarines facing simultaneous destruction is more than high enough to warrant attention; these smaller submarines can be used to traffic North Korean Special Ops into South Korean territory; the brand new Gorae lies within two kilometers of the other clustered submarines; and the research, testing, and naval support facilities add substantially to the base’s strategic value.

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Source: Strategic Sentinel

Predictably, a surprise strike would be practically necessary to eliminate all of these assets in one fell swoop. The DPRK would be expected to disperse their submarines during times of heightened tension. (Note that the satellite images from March 2016 — taken during the annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises — show fewer submarines than in December.) A surprise strike could effectively cripple the North Korean East Sea Fleet; recall that submarines are the backbone of the DPRK Navy. Mayang-Do is one of but two east coast submarine bases, and Sinpo is the flagship of the North’s SLBM program.

Vulnerability

Rarely in military strategy do significance and vulnerability pair as smoothly together as they do at Sinpo and Mayang-Do. Generally, a base’s significance bestows upon it a certain vulnerability, for shrewd adversaries tend to strike their opponent’s center of gravity. This can then be ameliorated with physical fortifications, air defense networks, missile defense systems, secrecy, and so on. But truly, little in North Korea is “well defended” by modern military standards.

Sinpo and its related military facilities lie within close range of Toksan and Iwon air bases, both loaded with MiG-21 fighter aircraft. North Korea possesses several sophisticated or pseudo-sophisticated air defense systems, from the ancient SA-2 to the more modern KN-06. The KN-06 is very similar to the Russian S-300 and the Chinese HQ-9, the latter itself also being curiously similar to the S-300. This makes the KN-06 North Korea’s most advanced surface-to-air missile to date and the most plausible threat against American or allied aircraft. The KN-06 is still undergoing testing, however, and it is unclear how many batteries the North plans to produce.

As of right now, MiG-21s and S-200s look to be the most likely defenders of Sinpo and Mayang-Do. These platforms represent no real threat to the U.S., South Korean, or Japanese air forces. In Operation Desert Storm, American F-15s made quick work of Iraqi MiG-21s, 23s, 29s, and Su-25s. North Korea does not currently operate a single aircraft better than those the United States easily defeated over 25 years ago. Perhaps the North Korean Air Force or its SAMs would get lucky and destroy a few U.S. aircraft. Perhaps they get really lucky and slay a few more. Unless they can somehow shoot down most of the planes involved in a first strike — possibly including stealthy F-22s and B-2s or pseudo-stealthy F-35s — and intercept the cruise missiles fired from American and allied ships, the North Koreans would not be able to defend their base from utter destruction.

Conclusion

A strike on Sinpo and the island of Mayang-Do would be a tactician’s dream. One full salvo on the submarines stationed there (and their supportive infrastructure) could constitute the most brutally efficient military operation of the next Korean War. The risk-reward ratio dramatically favors the aggressor. Esteemed professionals — two former secretaries of defense, for example — have called for preventative strikes against North Korean military facilities. That is not what I am doing here. But should an aggressor choose to target Sinpo in such a wave, they could simultaneously cripple much of North Korea’s submarine force and slam its SLBM program to a halt.

 

Sharyl Attkisson’s Lawsuit Advances

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Screen Shot 2017-04-02 at 4.35.08 PMShe wrote a book, it is chilling and a must read, STONEWALLED.  Further, Ms. Attkisson had to sue the Department of Justice to get access to the FBI file concerning her case. Why won’t the FBI show me my FBI file –as the law requires? Anyone else asking besides me, since we have a new AG at Main Justice, how come we have no declassified Fast and Furious and Benghazi just to mention a few? Any, read on…

Image result for sharyl attkisson foia fbi

***

Many of you have asked for the status of my computer intrusion lawsuit against the federal government.On March 19, 2017, a federal judge denied the government’s motion to dismiss my computer intrusion lawsuit, and transferred the case from Washington D.C. to the Eastern District of Virginia.

Below are excerpts from the judge’s opinion, which provides a good summary.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION, by U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan

As an investigative reporter for CBS News, Ms. Attkisson was responsible for investigating and reporting on national news stories. Between 2011 and 2013, she investigated and prepared various high-profile news reports, including ones related to the “Fast and Furious” “gunwalking” operation and the attack on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya…

In 2011——at the same time that Ms. Attkisson was conducting investigations and issuing certain of her high-profile news reports——the Attkissons “began to notice anomalies in numerous electronic devices at their home in Virginia.” These anomalies included Ms. Attkisson’s work-issued laptop computer and a family desktop computer “turning on and off at night without input from anyone in the household,” “the house alarm chirping daily at different times,” and “television problems, including interference.” All of these electronic devices used “the Verizon FiOS line installed in [the Attkissons’] home,” but Verizon was unable to stanch the anomalous activity despite multiple attempts. In January 2012, the Attkissons’ residential internet service “began constantly dropping off.”

In February 2012, “sophisticated surveillance spyware” was installed on Ms. Attkisson’s work-issued laptop computer. A later forensic computer analysis revealed that Ms. Attkisson’s laptop and the family’s desktop computer had been the “targets of unauthorized surveillance efforts.” That same forensic analysis revealed that Ms. Attkisson’s mobile phone was also targeted for surveillance when it was connected to the family’s desktop computer. The infiltration of that computer and the extraction of information from it was “executed via an IP address owned, controlled, and operated by the United States Postal service.” Additionally, based on the sophisticated nature of the software used to carry out the infiltration and software fingerprints indicating the use of the federal government’s proprietary software, the infiltration and surveillance appeared to be perpetrated by persons in the federal government.

An independent forensic computer analyst hired by CBS subsequently reported finding evidence on both Ms. Attkisson’s work-issued laptop computer and her family’s desktop computer of “a coordinated, highly-skilled series of actions and attacks directed at the operation of the computers.” Computer forensic analysis also indicated that remote actions were taken in December 2012 to remove the evidence of the electronic infiltration and surveillance from Ms. Attkisson’s computers and other home electronic equipment.

As Ms. Attkisson’s investigations and reporting continued, in October 2012 the Attkissons noticed “an escalation of electronic problems at their personal residence, including interference in home and mobile phone lines, computer interference, and television interference.” In November of that year, Ms. Attkisson’s mobile phones “experienced regular interruptions and interference, making telephone communications unreliable, and, at times, virtually impossible.”

Additionally, in December 2012, a person with government intelligence experience conducted an inspection of the exterior of the Attkissons’ Virginia home. That investigator discovered an extra Verizon FiOS fiber optics line. Soon thereafter, after a Verizon technician was instructed by Ms. Attkisson to leave the extra cable at the home, the cable disappeared, and the Attkissons were unable to determine what happened to it. In March 2013, the Attkissons’ desktop computer malfunctioned, and in September of that year, while Ms. Attkisson was working on a story at her home, she observed that her personal laptop computer was remotely accessed and controlled, resulting in data being deleted from it. On April 3, 2013, Ms. Attkisson filed a complaint with the Inspector General of the Department of Justice. The Inspector General’s investigation was limited to an analysis of the compromised desktop computer, and the partially-released report that emerged from that investigation reported “no evidence of intrusion,” although it did note “a great deal of advanced mode computer activity not attributable to Ms. Attkisson or anybody in her household.”

The Attkissons allege that the “cyber-attacks” they “suffered in [their] home” were perpetrated by “personnel working on behalf of the United States.” Accordingly, they have asserted various claims against the United States and against former Attorney General Eric Holder, former Postmaster General Patrick Donahoe, and unknown agents of the Department of Justice, the United States Postal Service, and the United States, all in their individual capacities. Those claims include claims against the United States under the FTCA and claims against the individual federal officers for violations of constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)…

Having determined that venue is improper as to the Attkissons’ FTCA claims and that the pendent venue doctrine is inapplicable, the Court may either “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [this] case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” “The decision whether a transfer or a dismissal is in the interest of justice . . . rests within the sound discretion of the district court,” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983), but the “standard remedy for improper venue is to transfer the case to the proper court rather than dismissing it——thus preserving a [plaintiff’s] ability to obtain review.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 237 F.3d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Court will use that standard remedy here and find that

the interest of justice warrants transfer rather than dismissal so that the Attkissons’ claims can be adjudicated on the merits.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ amended motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE. As to their assertion that the Attkissons’ FTCA claims are improperly venued, defendants’ motion is granted. Accordingly, this consolidated case shall be transferred in its entirety to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The remainder of defendants’ amended motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice so that defendants may refile it, if appropriate, upon transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia. Likewise, the Attkissons’ motion for reconsideration of the Order denying various motions related to third-party discovery is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE so that it may be refiled in and more appropriately resolved by the transferee court. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 19, 2017

Top U.S. Universities Challenge Free Speech, Get Big Dollars

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FNC: Controversial author Charles Murray is scheduled to speak at the University of Notre Dame on Tuesday and despite growing calls for protests from some students and faculty, organizers are standing behind the invitation.

The event comes weeks after violent protests broke out at Middlebury College where Murray was set to speak.

The 74-year-old author of “Coming Apart: The State of White America” was invited to the Catholic university as part of a lecture series for a constitutional law and politics class.

CHARLES MURRAY: ‘INTO THE MIDDLE OF A MOB’ — WHAT HAPPENED WHEN I TRIED TO SPEAK AT MIDDLEBURY

*** When domestic universities go global due to foreign money, do we really know what is being taught and why?

FNC: During the past 20 years, eight British universities — among them Oxford and Cambridge — have taken more than $292 million from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic governments. These contributions represent “the largest source of external funding to UK universities,” according to the director of Brunel University’s Center for Intelligence and Security Studies.

This phenomenon is also not isolated to the United Kingdom: Harvard alone has received more than $30 million from the Saudi government.

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Stop and think about this.

Money used to fund professorships, scholarships and centers of study is coming from regimes with long histories of violating religious freedoms. As well-intentioned as the contributors might be, it is clear these contributions are not arriving without strings attached.  A cynic might say that they are buying off professors and universities in order to advance their own agenda, even while forbidding similar activities within their own countries. They are happy to exploit Western freedoms in order to strengthen their own theocracies.

They’re not just doing it via the academy, either.

Saudi Arabia also plays a significant role in the establishment of mosques — the centerpieces of Muslim communities — across the world. According to a hearing conducted before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security in 2003, the vast majority of mosques in the United States were then under Saudi influence. In all, it is estimated that Saudi Arabia has spent more than $100 billion to spread the country’s worldview. More here from FNC.

What about our own government dollars going to universities? What influence does that have? Glad you asked…

FNC: Over a six-year period, Ivy League schools have received tens of billions in tax dollars, bringing in more money from taxpayers than from undergraduate student tuition. In fact, they received more federal cash than 16 state governments.

The stunning numbers are all part of a new report, first seen by Fox News, released Wednesday by Open the Books — a non-profit group whose stated mission is to capture and post online all disclosed spending at every level of government.

The 43-page report shows the massive amount of money flowing into not-for-profit Ivy League schools, including payments and entitlements, costing taxpayers more than $41 billion from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2015.

The spending is controversial because these eight schools — Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University and Yale University — have enormous resources at their fingertips, including endowment funds (money raised from donors) in 2015 exceeding $119 billion. Take that total and split it up among Ivy League undergrads and it comes out to $2 million each.

The study says another federal perk — the schools pay no tax on investment gains on their endowment — a tax break is estimated at $9.6 billion over the six years of the study.

In a statement, Princeton, suggested the study was flawed because it didn’t take into account all the money the college receives and then reinvests. Robert Durkee, a Princeton vice president and secretary, said most of the tax incentives the college receives goes toward libraries, laboratories, classrooms, research and financial aid.

“The tax exemption for endowment earnings allows these institutions to use all of those earnings to support their missions of teaching and research, for this generation and for future generations,” Durkee said in a statement. “This means
that the universities spend earnings now, but they also reinvest a portion so they can continue to support their programs of teaching and research well into the future.”

Yale said that rather than being a drain on taxpayers — as the study suggests — the college is a huge financial boon to the towns that surround it.

“Since 2000, over 50 startups based on Yale inventions and located in New Haven have attracted over $5 billion in investment to New Haven and surrounding towns,” Tom Conroy, a Yale spokesman, told Fox News. “Alexion, which employs 1,200 people in New Haven, is a prime example of Yale’s impact.”

Conroy also pointed out that Yale funds a large portion of its research.

Some question if these schools should receive any federal funding…much less, such a large amount.

Here’s a reality check list:

  • With continued donations at the present rate, the money could provide free tuition to the entire student body in perpetuity,
  • Without new donations, the endowment could provide a full-ride scholarship for all Ivy League undergraduate students for 51 years

The report also shows that in fiscal year 2014, the balance sheet for all eight Ivy League schools combined showed accumulated gross assets of more than $194 billion, or the equivalent of $3.35 million per undergraduate student.

“The Ivy League needs to pay its own way…The taxpayer gravy train needs to end,” Adam Andrzejewski, founder of Open the Books, told Fox News.

His report does say that Americans should be proud of the schools and “applaud the many contributions of Ivy League colleges and graduates.” But he told Fox News he feels that “they don’t need taxpayer help, they don’t need taxpayer assistance.”

Some of the federal spending makes sense, like the study of AIDs. But, he said, some are less defensible.

One grant was given to Cornell for nearly $1 million to study whale presence in the Virginia offshore wind energy area. Other grants to Ivy League schools were to study college binge drinking, ethics in Tanzania and sex chromosomes in turtles.

“They have got an endowment, right?” Andrzejewski said. “They can use their endowed funds – they don’t need public funds – to fund studies.”

He went on to compare what he calls Ivy League, Inc. to “a hedge fund with classes.”

Finally, the report dives into some of the big bucks being paid out to Ivy League employees. It shows more than $62 billion in salaries, benefits and reportable compensation to faculty, staff and other employees from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2014 and names four employees who made more than $20 million and three more who made more than $13 million.

Fox News reached out to every Ivy League school for comment Wednesday morning. Princeton and Yale replied, Dartmouth declined to comment, and the others have not responded.

The entire report can be read here.

Please Don’t Sign it Mr. Trump, You Cant Sign it…

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(CNN)FBI Director James Comey warned Wednesday that Americans should not have expectations of “absolute privacy,” adding that he planned to finish his term leading the FBI.

“There is no such thing as absolute privacy in America; there is no place outside of judicial reach,” Comey said at a Boston College conference on cybersecurity. He made the remark as he discussed the rise of encryption since 2013 disclosures by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden revealed sensitive US spy practices.
“Even our communications with our spouses, with our clergy members, with our attorneys are not absolutely private in America,” Comey added. “In appropriate circumstances, a judge can compel any one of us to testify in court about those very private communications.”
Did you get that? What? Keep reading, it gets worse….

Here’s the Data Republicans Just Allowed ISPs to Sell Without Your Consent

Privacy watchdogs blasted the vote as a brazen GOP giveaway to the broadband industry.

Motherboard: Financial and medical information. Social Security numbers. Web browsing history. Mobile app usage. Even the content of your emails and online chats.

These are among the types of private consumer information that House Republicans voted on Tuesday to allow your internet service provider (ISP) to sell to the highest bidder without your permission, prompting outrage from privacy watchdogs.

The House action, which was rammed through by a vote of 215 – 205 on a largely partisan basis by the GOP majority, represents another nail in the coffin of landmark Federal Communications Commission consumer privacy rules that were passed in 2016. The rules, which were set to go into effect later this year, would have required broadband providers to obtain “opt-in” consent before using, sharing, or selling private consumer data.

“Ignoring calls from thousands of their constituents, House Republicans just joined their colleagues in the Senate in violating internet users’ privacy rights,” Craig Aaron, CEO of DC-based public interest group Free Press Action Fund, said in a statement. “They voted to take away the privacy rights of hundreds of millions of Americans just so a few giant companies could pad their already considerable profits.”

Last week, the Senate passed its version of the legislation. President Trump, who “strongly” supports the FCC privacy rollback, is expected to sign the measure soon, as part of the widening Republican campaign to reverse federal safeguards across broad swaths of the economy, including rules protecting the environment, public health, and consumer interests.

Privacy watchdogs say the FCC’s policy is necessary because ISPs can see everything that consumers do online. Unless you use a Virtual Private Network (VPN), every website you visit, every mobile app you use, every online search you conduct, is visible on their networks. Needless to say, this data is immensely valuable because it can be used to create detailed profiles for marketing and tracking purposes.

Related reading: Is Your Favorite Website Spying on You?

Corporate giants like Comcast, AT&T and Verizon already rake in billions of dollars annually from internet, cable, and mobile subscriptions. Now, these broadband firms will be able to make even more money by selling your private data to third party marketers without your permission.

“What the heck are you thinking? What is in your mind?”

Last year, the FCC detailed the data covered by its privacy policy. Thanks to Capitol Hill Republicans, ISPs will no longer be required to obtain “opt-in” consent before using, sharing, or selling this data.

Image: FCC

“What the heck are you thinking?” Rep. Michael Capuano, the Massachusetts Democrat, demanded of his GOP colleagues during floor debate earlier Tuesday. “What is in your mind? Why would you want to give out any of your personal information to a faceless corporation for the sole purpose of them selling it?”

Privacy advocates are particularly outraged because Republican lawmakers are nuking the FCC privacy policy using a controversial legislative tool called the Congressional Review Act (CRA), which allows Congress to nullify recently-approved federal regulations. “Resolutions of disapproval” passed under the CRA cannot be filibustered, and prohibit the agency in question, in this case the FCC, from adopting “substantially similar” privacy rules in the future.

“Once President Trump signs this resolution, there will be no effective federal cop on the beat to proactively protect consumer information collected by ISPs,” Dallas Harris, Policy Fellow at DC-based digital rights group Public Knowledge, said in a statement. “Without the FCC’s broadband privacy rules, Americans go from being internet users to marketing data—from people to the product.”

It should come as no surprise that many of the Republicans leading the charge to roll back the FCC’s privacy rules, including Rep. Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee, have received vast sums of campaign cash from the broadband industry.

Over the course of Blackburn’s 14-year career in the House, she has received $75,750 from AT&T and $72,650 from Verizon, her second and third largest corporate donors, respectively, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Blackburn has also received $66,000 from NCTA, the broadband industry trade group, and $49,500 from Comcast.

For the last year, the broadband industry has complained that the FCC’s privacy policy is unfair because it doesn’t apply to so-called “edge providers” like Google and Facebook, which are regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). But instead of fighting to bolster the FTC’s privacy policy to create a level playing field, Republican lawmakers instead chose to eliminate the FCC’s more robust protections. Now the measure moves to Trump’s desk.

“If President Trump was serious about his campaign promises to stand up for the rights of the individual over the powerful special interests in Washington DC, then he would veto this bill,” Nathan White, Senior Legislative Manager at Access Now, said in a statement.