Who is in the United State of America living among us that are tied to terror organizations? ICE along with JTTF did some good work as noted below. However, what is being overlooked or waved off with regard to investigations?

ICE deports Afghan doctor with ties to terrorist group

PHILADELPHIA – An Afghan doctor convicted of immigration fraud was deported late Tuesday and turned over to authorities in Kabul, Afghanistan, by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).

Hayatullah Dawari, 62, of Philadelphia was sentenced to two years in federal prison Sept. 19 after an investigation found the man had ties to the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin anti-western insurgent group active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Dawari pleaded guilty to two counts of immigration fraud, and the judge suspended the sentence in favor of immediate deportation.

Dawari became a lawful permanent resident Nov. 11, 2008, and applied for U.S. citizenship in November 2013. In his plea, he admitted that he lied about his ties to the organization in his application for U.S. citizenship and omitted that he had a previous arrest in Russia in the late 1980s.

An investigation by ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the Philadelphia Police Department found Dawari still maintained contact with the group’s associates in the United States and Pakistan. HSI and JTTF special agents executed a search warrant at his home in January and seized a book sent from Pakistan that had a secret, coded message glued between two pages.

As part of Dawari’s guilty plea, it required that he would be sentenced to two years in prison but suspended due to an accompanying order requiring his transfer without undue delay into ICE custody for uncontested removal from the United States. He also agreed to relinquish his status as a lawful permanent resident, and he is now rendered permanently inadmissible to the United States.

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An Islamic village in Texas is reportedly a “jihadist enclave” and was investigated for possible links to terrorism by the FBI. Ryan Mauro, the journalist who broke the national security story, discussed the information released in FBI declassified during a Fox News interview this morning.

According to Mauro’s research, the Texas Islamic village is operated by the Muslims of the Americas group. The organization has reportedly been linked to Jamaat ul-Fuqra, a radical militant group in Pakistan. Group members are allegedly followers of Sheikh Mubarak Ali Gilani, an allegedly extremist Pakistani cleric.

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Several dozen suspected terrorist bomb-makers, including some believed to have targeted American troops, may have mistakenly been allowed to move to the United States as war refugees, according to FBI agents investigating the remnants of roadside bombs recovered from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The discovery in 2009 of two al Qaeda-Iraq terrorists living as refugees in Bowling Green, Kentucky — who later admitted in court that they’d attacked U.S. soldiers in Iraq — prompted the bureau to assign hundreds of specialists to an around-the-clock effort aimed at checking its archive of 100,000 improvised explosive devices collected in the war zones, known as IEDs, for other suspected terrorists’ fingerprints.

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A federal grand jury investigation going on all summer in St. Paul, Minnesota has been focused on a group of 20-30 Somali-Americans allegedly conspiring to join the fight with ISIS in Syria. Most of the youths being investigated have been going to the Al Farooq Youth and Family Center and mosque in Bloomington, where sources told the Star Tribune that 31-year-old Amir Meshal, an American of Egyptian descent, may have influenced them to join the jihadist movement.

Just do an internet search for yourself to determine who among us is a terrorist and imagine what we don’t know. The beheading in Moore, Oklahoma is but one of many clues at the risks in America. It is time to truly challenge the FBI and DHS.

The White House knew better than anyone else when it came to Iraq. At all costs, Barack Obama wanted out and to declare hostilities over. He prevailed however, today Iraq is a battleground not seen before.

In Mosul, two army divisions also disintegrated as thousands of soldiers and police officers shed their uniforms, dropped their weapons and ran for their lives. Shehab, told that his commanders had deserted, tossed his rifle and ran away too.

“We felt like cowards, but our commanders were afraid of Daesh. They were too afraid to lead us,” said Shehab, 43, using the Arabic acronym for Islamic State. The military collapsed in Mosul even though Washington spent eight years and $25 billion to train, arm and equip Iraq’s security forces. The United States has now deployed 1,400 advisors to try to rebuild the shattered military into a force that can repel Islamic State.

So how did Iraq reach this point?

Behind the U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq

Negotiations were repeatedly disrupted by Obama White House staffers’ inaccurate public statements

By James Franklin Jeffrey

Updated Nov. 2, 2014 7:31 p.m. ET

The spectacular success in early 2014 of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, an offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq, is often blamed on the failure of the Obama administration to secure an American troop presence in Iraq beyond 2011. As the U.S. ambassador to Iraq in 2010-12, I believed that keeping troops there was critical. Nevertheless, our failure has roots far beyond the Obama administration.

The story begins in 2008, when the Bush administration and Iraq negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement granting U.S. troops in the country legal immunities—a sine qua non of U.S. basing everywhere—but with the caveat that they be withdrawn by the end of 2011.

By 2010 many key Americans and Iraqis thought that a U.S. military presence beyond 2011 was advisable, for security (training Iraqi forces, control of airspace, counterterrorism) and policy (continued U.S. engagement and reassurance to neighbors). The Pentagon began planning for a continued military presence, but an eight-month impasse on forming a new government after the March 2010 Iraqi elections delayed final approval in Washington.

In January 2011, once the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was formed, President Obama decided, with the concurrence of his advisers, to keep troops on. But he wasn’t yet willing to tell Prime Minister Maliki or the American people. First, Washington had to determine the size of a residual force. That dragged on, with the military pushing for a larger force, and the White House for a small presence at or below 10,000, due to costs and the president’s prior “all troops out” position. In June the president decided on the force level (eventually 5,000) and obtained Mr. Maliki’s assent to new SOFA talks.

The Obama administration was willing to “roll over” the terms of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement as long as the new agreement, like the first, was ratified by the Iraqi Parliament.

Iraqi party leaders repeatedly reviewed the SOFA terms but by October 2011 were at an impasse. All accepted a U.S. troop presence—with the exception of the Sadrist faction, headed by the anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, which held some 40 of Iraq’s 325 parliamentary seats. But on immunities only the Kurdish parties, with some 60 seats, would offer support. Neither Mr. Maliki, with some 120 seats, nor former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the leader of the largely Sunni Arab Iraqiya party with 80 more, would definitively provide support. With time running out, given long-standing U.S. policy that troops stationed overseas must have legal immunity, negotiations ended and the troop withdrawal was completed.

Given the success in winning a SOFA in 2008, what led to this failure? First, the need for U.S. troops was not self-evident in 2011. Iraq appeared stable, with oil exports of two million barrels a day at about $90 a barrel, and security much improved. Second, politics had turned against a troop presence; the bitterly anti-U.S. Sadrists were active in Parliament, the Sunni Arabs more ambivalent toward the U.S., and polls indicated that less than 20% of the Iraqi population wanted U.S. troops.

Could the administration have used more leverage, as many have asserted? Again, the main hurdle was immunities. The reality is that foreign troops in any land are generally unpopular and granting them immunity is complicated. In a constitutional democracy it requires parliament to waive its own laws. An agreement signed by Mr. Maliki without parliamentary approval, as he suggested, would not suffice. (The legal status of the small number of “noncombat” U.S. troops currently redeployed to Iraq is an emergency exception to usual SOFA policy.)

Some suggest that the U.S. could have made economic aid or arms deliveries contingent on a Status of Forces Agreement. But by 2011 the U.S. was providing relatively little economic aid to Iraq, and arms deliveries were essential to American and Iraqi security. Was the 5,000 troop number too small to motivate the Iraqis? No Iraqi made that argument to me; generally, smaller forces are more sellable. Could someone other than Mr. Maliki have been more supportive, and were the Iranians opposed? Of course, but with or without Mr. Maliki and Iranians we faced deep resistance from parliamentarians and the public.

Could President Obama have showed more enthusiasm? True, Mr. Obama seemed to feel he couldn’t force an unwanted agreement on the Iraqi people, and he didn’t work with Mr. Maliki as President Bush had. But Mr. Obama spoke or met with Mr. Maliki three times in 2011, and Vice President Joe Biden was constantly in touch. What counted most with Mr. Maliki was not rapport but the coldblooded calculus of pluses and minuses affecting his political fortunes. On the other hand, the negotiations were disrupted repeatedly by White House staffers with public statements inaccurately low-balling the troop numbers and misinterpreting Iraqi decisions.

The withdrawal of troops allowed President Obama to declare that he was “ending the war in Iraq”—oddly, since it was the Bush administration’s military victories and successful negotiation of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement that had set the timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal. Later, during the 2012 presidential debates, Mr. Obama inexplicably denied that he had even attempted to keep troops in Iraq.

Could a residual force have prevented ISIS’s victories? With troops we would have had better intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq and later ISIS, a more attentive Washington, and no doubt a better-trained Iraqi army. But the common argument that U.S. troops could have produced different Iraqi political outcomes is hogwash. The Iraqi sectarian divides, which ISIS exploited, run deep and were not susceptible to permanent remedy by our troops at their height, let alone by 5,000 trainers under Iraqi restraints.

Iraqis in Shiite-dominated greater Baghdad generally support the army, he said. But he also acknowledged that the army cannot defend the surrounding “Baghdad belt” without the help of thousands of Shiite militiamen Kamil calls “volunteers,” particularly because areas just to the north, west and south have a Sunni majority.

Officers in one of many units that collapsed in Mosul, the 2nd Battalion of Iraq’s 3rd Federal Police Division, said their U.S. training was useful. But as soon as their American advisors left, they said, soldiers and police went back to their ways.

Retired Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, in charge of Iraqi training in 2007 and 2008, said Maliki’s government intimidated and assassinated Sunni officers while Maliki seized personal control of the security forces from commanders. Human rights groups have accused Iraqi security forces of detaining and killing Sunnis.

Selected quotes from the text above is from By David Zucchino

Why Iraqi army can’t fight, despite $25 billion in U.S. aid, training