WH wants more Nukes, Why? Kanyon

Posted on January 18, 2018January 18, 2018 by Denise Simon

Yesterday, this website published an item regarding the Trump Executive Order requiring a total review and updated summary of the U.S. nuclear posture. Countless media outlets along with liberal think tanks wrote stinging critical articles on this review, mostly promoting the full elimination of nuclear weapons by the United States. This was the clear position of the Obama administration.

As this article is being published, the United Nations is holding a session on nuclear proliferation. Further, President Trump is at the Pentagon as this is being typed.

Trump and his national security team receives intelligence briefings and the summary below will likely explain why President Trump is right.

Image result for kanyon russia photo

Kanyon is designed to wipe out the enemy’s coastlines and make them unlivable for generations.

A key U.S. nuclear weapons document confirms that the Russian government is developing the most powerful nuclear weapon in more than a half century. A leaked copy of the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review states that Russia is developing a “new intercontinental, nuclear-armed undersea autonomous torpedo.”

The existence of the weapon, known as Kanyon to the Pentagon and “Ocean Multipurpose System Status-6” to Russia, was first leaked by Russian television in November 2015. A test involving the Sarov-class submarine mothership was leaked in December 2016. The Nuclear Posture Review report, dated January 2018, lists the weapon as part of Russia’s underwater nuclear arsenal. Here’s a screen capture, with Kanyon circled in red:

Kanyon is reportedly a very long range autonomous underwater vehicle that has a range 6,200 miles, a maximum depth of 3,280 feet, and a speed of 100 knots according to claims in leaked Russian documents.

But what really makes Kanyon nightmare fuel is the drone torpedo’s payload: a 100-megaton thermonuclear weapon. By way of comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 16 kilotons, or the equivalent of 16,000 tons of TNT. Kanyon’s nuke would be the equivalent of 100,000,000 tons of TNT. That’s twice as powerful as Tsar Bomba, the most powerful thermonuclear weapon ever tested. Dropped on New York City, a 100-megaton bomb would kill 8 million people outright and injure 6 million more.

Kanyon is designed to attack coastal areas, destroying cities, naval bases, and ports. The mega-bomb would also generate an artificial tsunami that would surge inland, spreading radioactive contamination with the advancing water. To make matters worse there are reports the warhead is “salted” with the radioactive isotope Cobalt-60. Contaminated areas would be off-limits to humanity for up to 100 years.

Kanyon is designed to get around American ballistic missile defenses, primarily the Ground-Based Interceptor missiles based in Alaska and California. Although GBI is meant to counter small numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue countries such as Iran and North Korea, Russia wants to make it abundantly clear that it could still penetrate U.S. defenses even if they were scaled up to deal with larger, more powerful nuclear arsenals. More here.

The Pentagon writes:

In addition to modernizing ‘legacy’ Soviet systems, Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers. These efforts include multiple upgrades for every leg of the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, sea-based missiles, and land-based missiles. Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, undersea autonomous torpedo. Link

The Pentagon report notes the Russians plan attacks from the erroneous position that a coercive nuclear “first use” policy might allow Russia to then negotiate terms favorable to itself (this is referred to as the escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine). The Pentagon writes:

Effective U.S. deterrence of Russian nuclear attack and non-nuclear strategic attack now requires ensuring that the Russian leadership does not miscalculate regarding the consequence of limited nuclear first use, either regionally or against the United States itself. Russia must instead understand that nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow. Our strategy will ensure Russia understands that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is unacceptable. More here.

The full 64 page document is here.

White House First Draft on Nuclear Weapons First Use

Posted on January 17, 2018January 17, 2018 by Denise Simon

WASHINGTON — A newly drafted United States nuclear strategy that has been sent to President Trump for approval would permit the use of nuclear weapons to respond to a wide range of devastating but non-nuclear attacks on American infrastructure, including what current and former government officials described as the most crippling kind of cyberattacks.

For decades, American presidents have threatened “first use” of nuclear weapons against enemies in only very narrow and limited circumstances, such as in response to the use of biological weapons against the United States. But the new document is the first to expand that to include attempts to destroy wide-reaching infrastructure, like a country’s power grid or communications, that would be most vulnerable to cyberweapons.

The draft document, called the Nuclear Posture Review, was written at the Pentagon and is being reviewed by the White House. Its final release is expected in the coming weeks and represents a new look at the United States’ nuclear strategy. The draft was first published last week by HuffPost.

It called the strategic picture facing the United States quite bleak, citing not only Russian and Chinese nuclear advances but advances made by North Korea and, potentially, Iran.

As an aside, Reuters is reporting that President Donald Trump complained on Wednesday that Russia was helping North Korea to evade international sanctions, signaling frustration with a country he had hoped to forge friendly relations with after his 2016 election win.

Image result for nuclear posture review photo

But back to the nuclear posture review and first strike options.

The draft document is here.

trump nuclear posture review cyberattacks

Russia and China are reportedly working on fourth-generation nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons in which certain nuclear effects are enhanced and others diminished, for example, nuclear weapons with enhanced radiation or electromagnetic-pulse effects.18

According to General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Russia is “developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”19

It is very hard to harden the infrastructure, whether civilian or military, when one does not properly understand how these effects might impact current systems. Yield-producing experiments would help the U.S. better understand what kind of shielding and hardening its systems might need in order to remain survivable in the case of a nuclear attack. There are also countries, such as North Korea, India, and Pakistan, that have (recently, in the case of North Korea) conducted relatively large underground nuclear weapon tests.

History teaches that unless regularly exercised, skills to conduct a meaningful nuclear warhead experiment atrophy quickly. The United States agreed to a nuclear-test moratorium between 1958 and 1961. In just three years, the skills needed to conduct a meaningful experiment had deteriorated, and lessons learned had to be painfully re-learned. The United States conducted its last yield-producing nuclear weapon test in 1992. It seems likely that the nation would not be able to perform a meaningful nuclear weapons test even if it needed to, for instance, if an error in the stockpile were discovered that required an experiment to ensure that this error was corrected.20

The concern does not have to do with the U.S. ability to detonate a nuclear weapon as much as it does with the U.S. ability to prepare the grounds, people, and necessary technical equipment to collect data from the test itself. There are fewer and fewer people in the United States who have hands-on experience with such equipment and its instrumentation. As with many hard skills, these can be only properly learned by doing.

There is no demonstrated link between the number of U.S. nuclear weapons and the number of nuclear-armed states. Countries have their own reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons.

U.S. experts with nuclear-testing experience are worried about “the steady degradation of U.S. nuclear test readiness” and question whether the Department of Energy has “any realistic appreciation for what nuclear testing involves or how to stay prepared to do it again within 24–36 months, as legally required by Presidential Decision Directive 15 (1993).”21

The United States lacks specialized skills and equipment to conduct a meaningful nuclear weapons test. Even more seriously, it lacks the skills that would allow such a test to be conducted. Reconstitution of this important capability is not a viable option as the whole process would have to be reinvented. Read the summary argument for why this review is required.

Article 32, Negligent Homicide Against 2 Naval Commanders

Posted on January 16, 2018January 16, 2018 by Denise Simon

Article 32 is a thorough and impartial investigation and proceeding under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice. This hearing is required to determine if the case should move forward to that of a court martial.

USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson, executive officer Cmdr. Sean Babbitt and command master chief CMC Brice Baldwin were removed from their positions by U.S. 7^th Fleet commander Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin this week based on the early results of several investigations into the June 17 collision between the destroyer and the merchant ship ACX Crystal. “Several junior officers were relieved of their duties due to poor seamanship and flawed teamwork as bridge and combat information center watchstanders. Additional administrative actions were taken against members of both watch teams,” read the statement.
“The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision that claimed the lives of seven Fitzgerald sailors, injured three more and damaged both ships.”

USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) commander Cmdr. Alfredo J. Sanchez and executive officer Cmdr. Jessie L. Sanchez were removed from their positions by U.S. 7th Fleet commander Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, “due to loss of confidence.”

The removals are a result of an ongoing investigation into the collision that cost the lives of 10 sailors and resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars of damage to the ship.

***

USNI: The commanders of the two guided-missile destroyers that were involved in fatal collisions with merchant ships in 2017 will face military criminal charges that include charges of dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel and negligent homicide, after the two incidents that resulted in the death of 17 sailors total, USNI News has learned.

Cmdr. Bryce Benson, former commander of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), along with three Fitzgerald junior officers, face a mix charges that include dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel and negligent homicide related to the June 17 collision between the ship and ACX Crystal that resulted in the death of seven sailors, according to a statement from the U.S. Navy provided to USNI News.

Cmdr. Alfredo J. Sanchez, former commander of USS John S. McCain (DDG-56), faces similar dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel and negligent homicide charges for the Aug. 21 collision between the guided-missile destroyer and a chemical tanker off the coast of Singapore that resulted in the death of 10 sailors.

The individuals will have the charges preferred via Article 32 preliminary hearings soon, the statement said.

“The announcement of an Article 32 hearing and referral to a court-martial is not intended to and does not reflect a determination of guilt or innocence related to any offenses. All individuals alleged to have committed misconduct are entitled to a presumption of innocence,” the statement said.
“Additional administrative actions are being conducted for members of both crews including non-judicial punishment for four Fitzgerald and four John S. McCain crewmembers.”

A chief petty officer also faces a dereliction of duty charge that has already been preferred related to the McCain incident.

The charges are part of accountability actions recommended by an independent investigation tasked with reviewing further disciplinary actions by Navy leadership.

Director of Naval Reactors Adm. James F. Caldwell was appointed as the Consolidated Disposition Authority (CDA) for administrative and disciplinary actions related to the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions by Vice Adm. Bill Moran in late October.

USS Fitzgerald photo(s)

USS McCain photo(s)

Other actions include removing Vice Adm. Tom Rowden from his position as the head of naval surface forces earlier than his planned Feb. 2 retirement date.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson and Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer are set to appear before the House Armed Services readiness and seapower and projection forces subcommittees on Thursday to testify on the two reviews conducted following the Western Pacific collisions. Richardson tasked U.S. Fleet Forces Command with leading a Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents, and Spencer directed a panel to lead a Strategic Readiness Review.

To date, the Navy has removed the commanding officers and executive officers of both McCain and Fitzgerald; Capt. Jeffery Bennett, commodore of the Japan-based Destroyer Squadron 15 to which both ships belonged; the Japan-based task force commander, Rear Adm. Charles Williams; and the commander of U.S. 7th Fleet, Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin.

U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Adm. Scott Swift announced his earlier-than-expected retirement in late September.

The following is the complete statement from the service on the CDA recommendations.

On 30 October 2017, Admiral William Moran, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, designated Admiral Frank Caldwell as the Consolidated Disposition Authority to review the accountability actions taken to date in relation to USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) collisions and to take additional administrative or disciplinary actions as appropriate.

After careful deliberation, today Admiral Frank Caldwell announced that Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) charges are being preferred against individual service members in relation to the collisions.

USS Fitzgerald: Courts-martial proceedings/Article 32 hearings are being convened to review evidence supporting possible criminal charges against Fitzgerald members. The members’ ranks include one Commander (the Commanding Officer), two Lieutenants, and one Lieutenant Junior Grade. The charges include dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel, and negligent homicide.

USS John S. McCain: Additionally, for John S. McCain, one court- martial proceeding/Article 32 hearing is being convened to review evidence supporting possible criminal charges against one Commander (the Commanding Officer). The charges include dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel, and negligent homicide. Also, one charge of dereliction of duty was preferred and is pending referral to a forum for a Chief Petty Officer.

The announcement of an Article 32 hearing and referral to a court-martial is not intended to and does not reflect a determination of guilt or innocence related to any offenses. All individuals alleged to have committed misconduct are entitled to a presumption of innocence.

Additional administrative actions are being conducted for members of both crews including non-judicial punishment for four Fitzgerald and four John S. McCain crewmembers.

Information regarding further actions, if warranted, will be discussed at the appropriate time.

Iraq Before and After ISIS, Satellite Images and Data

Posted on January 16, 2018January 16, 2018 by Denise Simon

Mosul in March 2016, under Islamic State control, when nighttime lighting had fallen by 55 percent compared to its pre-ISIS levels in January 2014

January 9, 2018

What Life Under ISIS Looked Like from Space

Rand Corporation: Mosul in March 2016, under Islamic State control, when nighttime lighting had fallen by 55 percent compared to its pre-ISIS levels in January 2014

Image by NOAA Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)

A sandstorm swept through the besieged Iraqi city of Ramadi on the day it fell to the Islamic State. In the murk and confusion, suicide car bombs raced into the city center and leveled entire blocks. By the afternoon, the black flag of ISIS flew from the government headquarters.

Hundreds of miles above, an array of satellites captured what came next. Markets emptied. Factories went cold. Fields of wheat and barley withered. And the lights went out all over the city.

Data from those satellites provided RAND researchers an unprecedented look at life inside the Islamic State. They found a path of economic destruction, with few exceptions. In city after city, as in Ramadi, the arrival of the Islamic State meant a plunge into darkness.

Local Economies Under ISIS

By the time Ramadi fell in mid-2015, the Islamic State controlled an area of Iraq and Syria approaching the size of Great Britain. Its advance had been ruthless, its brutality staggering. RAND researchers wanted to know: What happened to cities and local economies when the Islamic State tried to govern?

Satellites were their way in.

Satellite observations have opened windows on everything from nuclear weapon programs to rush-hour traffic in the decades since RAND first proposed a “world-circling spaceship” in 1946. The United States alone now has more than 800 active satellites in orbit; more than half of them are commercial. Analysts have used satellite data to measure poverty in Kenya, black markets in North Korea, even the number of customer cars in Home Depot parking lots.

Those same kinds of data, RAND researchers realized, could provide a remarkably detailed look inside one of the most dangerous places in the world.

Satellite data measuring surface reflections from the Earth, for example, would show how much land was planted for agriculture. Urban heat readings would help pinpoint working factories. And infrared ground scans would show where city lights were glowing in the night, bright spider webs against a dark background.

In Syria, more than 60 percent of the lights went dark as ISIS struggled to restore electricity or fuel generators. In Iraq, it was more like 80 percent.

The researchers collected data on more than 150 cities in Iraq and Syria, month by month. They estimated that as much as a third of the population had fled areas under ISIS control. Factories closed; fields dried up. In Syria, more than 60 percent of the lights went dark as ISIS struggled to restore electricity or fuel generators. In Iraq, it was more like 80 percent.

“What’s unique about this is that we were able to bring all these different measurements together and provide a much more holistic understanding of the local economies,” said Eric Robinson, a research programmer and analyst at RAND who led the project. “We were able to use nighttime lighting to understand electricity consumption, but control for population levels. We knew that if an entire city had depopulated, then there was no one there to turn the lights on.”

Some Economic Decay, Some Effective Governance

The researchers then zoomed in on five major cities using high-resolution photographs from commercial satellites. Those photographs, similar to the satellite-view images on Google Maps, were so detailed the researchers could count cars on the road or measure foot traffic at a market. A small army of volunteers helped them go through the images, one by one, and perform those counts by hand—a crowd-sourced solution to a big-data problem.

The images told two very different stories.

In cities like Ramadi, Tikrit, and Deir ez-Zor, where ISIS was under fire and struggling to maintain control, its rule brought economic decay. Satellite images of the main market in Ramadi, for example, showed a ghost town. Commercial trucks all but disappeared from the roads in Tikrit. And in Deir ez-Zor, the lights went dark in ISIS-controlled neighborhoods even though the group held massive oil fields outside the city that could have kept generators running.

But in the core of the caliphate, where ISIS control was more secure, the satellite images showed some evidence of effective governance. In its capital city of Raqqa, for example, the group managed to keep the lights on at hospitals even when the rest of the city went dark, a sign that it was managing electricity. In the big city of Mosul, the group transformed an open-air market into a covered shopping district that was soon bustling with shoppers and car traffic—all of which it could tax.

mosul-market-20160908 — Mosul City Center and Market

mosul-market-20140612 — Mosul City Center and Market

Following liberation of the city, recent satellite photo shows extensive damage and destruction to Mosul.

Satellite image by Digitalglobe

“There were obviously just terrible stories of brutality coming out of the city, but people still need to buy food, and shop owners still own shops, and goods are still moving in and out of this market,” Robinson said.

“One of the key takeaways of our report,” he added, “is that without the military campaign to retake this territory, the Islamic State could have tried to replicate some of the modest success it experienced in Mosul and Raqqa. We would be facing a much different enemy.”

Preparing for a Post-ISIS Recovery

In fact, the researchers concluded it wasn’t necessarily the harsh rule and high taxes of ISIS that ground out local economies. The group was constantly trying to fend off counterattacks and air strikes, and could not turn its attention to governing or building back local economies.

Its caliphate has since splintered. It lost Tikrit in 2015, Ramadi in early 2016. Iraqi forces declared Mosul liberated last year, after dislodging ISIS forces neighborhood by neighborhood. A RAND analysis calculated that the Islamic State had lost more than half its territory by early 2017, a rout that has continued since then.

The extensive destruction of West Mosul, Iraq, June 2017

Photo by Sipa via AP Images

The disintegration of the Islamic State as a state has given RAND’s satellite analysis new importance. No longer a window into how the group governs, though, it is now providing a window into the economic damage it left behind, and what it will take to rebuild. Researchers have been working with U.S. government agencies to prioritize work in Syria to help stabilize cities captured from ISIS—restoring the electric grid, for example, or investing in markets.

“I think the big concern in this region is that if we don’t help truly rebuild and reconstitute the local governance in those areas, that there will be a resurgence of an ISIS 2.0 or an ISIS-like group,” Robinson said. He’s hoping to continue tracking the satellite data, “to measure our progress so far, to make sure we don’t take our foot off the gas too soon.”

The scale of that need is apparent in Ramadi. It’s been almost three years since ISIS fighters swept into the city in the blur of a sandstorm, and two years since Iraqi forces swept them back out. RAND’s satellite data showed destruction in almost every neighborhood in the city; every bridge was demolished. The city was once home to nearly 300,000 people; RAND’s data suggest no more than 36,000 still lived there after ISIS.

— Doug Irving

Hawaii False Alarm vs. U.S. Interceptors and Don’t Travel Warnings

Posted on January 15, 2018January 15, 2018 by Denise Simon

WASHINGTON — The final ground-based interceptor for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system — designed to protect the homeland from intercontinental ballistic missiles threats from North Korea and Iran — is now in place at Fort Greely, Alaska, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency has confirmed.

Image result for Ground-based Midcourse Defense photo

“MDA and Boeing emplaced the 44th interceptor in its silo at the Missile Defense Complex at Ft. Greely on Thursday, Nov. 2,” the agency said in a statement sent to Defense News.

The agency planned to have all 44 required interceptors in the ground and ready to respond to threats by the end of 2017. The Pentagon and the MDA have indicated in recent months a serious move to build up beyond 44 interceptors. In September, the Pentagon proposed reprogramming $136 million in fiscal 2017 to start raising the number of ground-based interceptors from 44 to 64 in a new Missile Field 4 at Fort Greely. The boost was part of a $416 million reprogramming request targeting missile defense needs. And the White House submitted a supplemental budget request for FY18 on Nov. 6 that asked for further funding to increase the number of ground-based interceptors by 20 and to build an additional missile field at the Alaska base.

While the left is quick to blame President Trump on the matter of a nuclear North Korea, including Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard and those in Hollywood, Kim Jung Un has been collaborating and testing nuclear weapons and missiles long before Trump entered the White House. They omit the fact that in the last 8 years, Obama did nothing….NOTHING.

Americans can travel to North Korea, if they wish — but it may just be a death wish, the U.S. State Department cautioned.

The State Department last week issued a stark warning to people setting out for the Hermit Kingdom, cautioning that anyone heading to the dangerous dictatorship should prepare for the possibility of not returning.

“The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in North Korea as it does not have diplomatic or consular relations with North Korea,” the State Department published Wednesday on its website.

Those who wish to travel to North Korea must be approved for a special validation, which are handed out on “very limited circumstances.” U.S. travelers given the approval to experience Kim Jong Un’s regime should then prepare for the worst — including drafting a will and making funeral and property arrangements with family and friends.“Draft a will and designate appropriate insurance beneficiaries and/or power of attorney; discuss a plan with loved ones regarding care/custody of children, pets, property, belongings, non-liquid assets (collections, artwork, etc.), funeral wishes, etc.,” according to the recommendations. More here.

“On December 28, there was a large number of personnel (~100 to 120) observed in seven different formations whose purpose is unknown in the Southern Support Area,” it adds.

“It is rare to observe personnel in this area,” the report says.

The report concludes that such activities “underscore North Korea’s continued efforts to maintain the Punggye-ri site’s potential for future nuclear testing.”

News of apparent active nuclear test site comes just days after North Korean officials met with South Korean officials for the first time in more than two years. More here.

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Meanwhile there is the matter of the false alarm in Hawaii….

Hawaii Gov. David Ige claimed Saturday that alert was the result of an official simply “[pressing] the wrong button” during an employee shift change, but broader questions remain. Why didn’t I get the notification here in San Diego, well within the range of intercontinental ballistic missiles that North Korea has tested in recent months? And assuming you weren’t lucky enough to be on a beach in Hawaii when the alert went out, why didn’t the average U.S. citizen receive one where they live?

To understand today’s scare, it’s important to understand how our national emergency alert system functions. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the systematic approach laid out by the federal government for departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate any and all kinds of incidents, no matter the size or scope. NIMS dictates that the initial authority for disaster response resides at the county level, so that’s where most Mass Notification Systems that participate in the Emergency Alert System network reside.

The Emergency Alert System network is layered between federal, state, county, and local authorities through a system called the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) and controlled through the IPAWS Program Management Office at FEMA. The IPAWS PMO encourages partners to regularly test public alert and warning systems; in fact, the IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015, ratified in April 2016, requires IPAWS PMO to test the system not less than once every three years.

All systems compatible with IPAWS use the Common Alerting Protocol, an international standard, to send public alerts and warnings between systems and jurisdictions. State and local agencies, like Hawaii’s Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA), have their own systems, produced by a variety of manufacturers, to alert the public when a natural or manmade disaster is occurring or imminent. These mass notification systems use a variety of mediums to communicate danger to wide (or very narrow) swaths of people: they’re capable of desktop alerts, text messaging, reverse 9-1-1, email, Wireless Emergency Alerts, announcement or siren over a loudspeaker, and more. All systems in use on bases, municipalities, and other agencies are IPAWS compatible but not all can send information two-way; most of the bases operate in a receive-only manner.

Related: Ballistic Missile False Alarm That Sparked Panic In Hawaii Caused By Wrong Button, Officials Say »

These systems, the modern version of the CONELRAD (Control of Electromagnetic Radiation) method of emergency broadcasting established in 1951 at the outset of the Cold War, are powerfully effective in their ubiquity and power. Mass notification systems happen to be excellent tools for public awareness, and required testing can take any form. On many military bases, for example, the systems are tested each morning and night by using loudspeakers to play colors. Pretty smart, eh?

The specific kind of alert that Hawaiians received while they slept in or ate breakfast this morning was a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA). WEAs use a different technology than voice calls or text messages and can only be used in three situations: 1. Alerts issued by the President; 2: Alerts involving imminent threats to safety or life; or 3: Amber Alerts. Participating carriers may block all but Presidential alerts.

The good news about WEAs are that they are location specific: even if you happened to be a tourist visiting Hawaii this morning, you would’ve received the alert (so long as your carrier participates). Carriers who do not participate are required to notify consumers, but the major carriers have all opted in. But the big problem, obviously, is that they’re more subject to human error than their military counterparts.

Now, civilian agencies probably don’t have the capability to detect ballistic missile launches, so in a real-life incident that message would have to come from the military, likely U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) headquartered right there in Hawaii. PACOM would notify their base Emergency Operations Center (EOC) who would pass it up to the Regional EOC. Of note, the bases usually don’t have control of the WEA tech and can notify only those registered in their systems (but can receive all IPAWS notifications). Because of that, the base or regional EOC would have to notify Hawaii EMA for transmission. That didn’t happen today because there wasn’t a ballistic missile inbound.

The governor of Hawaii claims that during a shift change, an operator simply hit the wrong button. Well, it doesn’t exactly work that way. These alerts are not actuated by physically pushed buttons because the number of buttons that would require, for all of the different types of alerts, would be unwieldy. An operator would either type in the desired alert (or select from canned messages), select which communications mediums they’d like to use and the populations they’d like to alert, and then hit “send” and then again confirm that they really want to send that message. The canned messages might be available as electronically selectable on a computer screen (like a Windows button) but a “confirm” dialogue would still be required.

Time will tell what really happened, but as a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) who helped set up the Mass Notification System for a major military base, I know that what likely occurred was a serious breach in procedure at Hawaii EMA. The authority who issued today’s alert and then took 40 minutes to send a retraction on WEA. PACOM immediately released a message saying that there was no threat, so why didn’t Hawaii EMA immediately send a retraction via WEA? There are serious implications associated with false alerts. What happens when an alert about a tsunami, wildfire, or active shooter are real and people ignore them?

Maybe we were hacked, as some have alleged, but probably not. No matter what happened, someone must be held accountable for this egregious breach of professionalism — and that person is almost definitely sitting at HI-EMA. Let’s hope that this scare motivates agencies across the nation to take a look at their own procedures. And let’s hope Gov. Ige holds his team accountable. Hat tip.

What Life Under ISIS Looked Like from Space

Local Economies Under ISIS

Some Economic Decay, Some Effective Governance

Mosul City Center and Market

Preparing for a Post-ISIS Recovery