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Service Quality and Reputation
Although some believe that buying online is buying a pig in the poke, it is not. Canadian online pharmacies are excellent sources of information and are open for discussions. There one can read tons of users' feedback, where they share their experience of using a particular pharmacy, say what they like or do not like about the drugs and/or service. Reputable online pharmacy canadianrxon.com take this feedback into consideration and rely on it as a kind of expert advice, which helps them constantly improve they service and ensure that their clients buy safe and effective drugs. Last, but not least is their striving to attract professional doctors. As a result, users can directly contact a qualified doctor and ask whatever questions they have about a particular drug. Most likely, a doctor will ask several questions about the condition, for which the drug is going to be used. Based on this information, he or she will advise to use or not to use this medication.
Author of unsubstantiated dossier was also researching Trump for Clinton campaign associates when FBI sought to hire him
WASHINGTON– Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley today is seeking details on the FBI’s reported plans to hire former British spy Christopher Steele to investigate Donald Trump during the presidential campaign, even though the FBI was aware that he was being paid by Democrat political operatives to conduct opposition research on Trump. Steele is the author of the controversial dossier that includes unsubstantiated claims alleging ties between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.
In a letter today to FBI Director James Comey, Grassley is requesting a briefing on the agreement as well as the FBI use of the material in Steele’s memos. Grassley also wants to know whether the FBI ever independently verified the memos’ claims.
“The idea that the FBI and associates of the Clinton campaign would pay Mr. Steele to investigate the Republican nominee for President in the run-up to the election raises further questions about the FBI’s independence from politics, as well as the Obama administration’s use of law enforcement and intelligence agencies for political ends. It is additionally troubling that the FBI reportedly agreed to such an arrangement given that, in January of 2017, then-Director Clapper issued a statement stating that ‘the IC has not made any judgment that the information in this document is reliable, and we did not rely upon it in any way for our conclusions,’” Grassley said in the letter.
In the letter, Grassley is requesting records related to the reported agreement. He is also seeking answers to a number of questions, including who was involved in decisions related to hiring Steele and using his memos, whether the FBI used materials in the memo as the basis for seeking warrants and other investigative tools, and if the FBI has been able to independently verify allegations made in the memos.
On February 28, 2017, the Washington Post reported that the FBI reached an agreement a few weeks before the Presidential election to pay the author of the unsubstantiated dossier alleging a conspiracy between President Trump and the Russians, Christopher Steele, to continue investigating Mr. Trump.[1] The article claimed that the FBI was aware Mr. Steele was creating these memos as part of work for an opposition research firm connected to Hillary Clinton. The idea that the FBI and associates of the Clinton campaign would pay Mr. Steele to investigate the Republican nominee for President in the run-up to the election raises further questions about the FBI’s independence from politics, as well as the Obama administration’s use of law enforcement and intelligence agencies for political ends. It is additionally troubling that the FBI reportedly agreed to such an arrangement given that, in January of 2017, then-Director Clapper issued a statement stating that “the IC has not made any judgment that the information in this document is reliable, and we did not rely upon it in any way for our conclusions.”According to the Washington Post, the FBI’s arrangement with Mr. Steele fell through when the media published his dossier and revealed his identity.
The Committee requires additional information to evaluate this situation. Please provide the following information and respond to these questions by March 20, 2017. Please also schedule a briefing by that date by FBI personnel with knowledge of these issues.
All FBI records relating to the agreement with Mr. Steele regarding his investigation of President Trump and his associates, including the agreement itself, all drafts, all internal FBI communications about the agreement, all FBI communications with Mr. Steele about the agreement, all FBI requests for authorization for the agreement, and all records documenting the approval of the agreement.
All records, including 302s, of any FBI meetings or interviews with Mr. Steele.
All FBI policies, procedures, and guidelines applicable when the FBI seeks to fund an investigator associated with a political opposition research firm connected to a political candidate, or with any outside entity.
All FBI records relating to agreements and payments made to Mr. Steele in connection with any other investigations, including the reported agreements relating to his investigation of FIFA.
Were any other government officials outside of the FBI involved in discussing or authorizing the agreement with Mr. Steele, including anyone from the Department of Justice or the Obama White House? If so, please explain who was involved and provide all related records.
How did the FBI first obtain Mr. Steele’s Trump investigation memos? Has the FBI obtained additional memos from this same source that were not published by Buzzfeed? If so, please provide copies.
Has the FBI created, or contributed to the creation of, any documents based on or otherwise referencing these memos or the information in the memos? If so, please provide copies of all such documents and, where necessary, clarify which portions are based on or related to the memos.
Has the FBI verified or corroborated any of the allegations made in the memos? Were any allegations or other information from the memo included in any documents created by the FBI, or which the FBI helped to create, without having been independently verified or corroborated by the FBI beforehand? If so, why?
Has the FBI relied on or otherwise referenced the memos or any information in the memos in seeking a FISA warrant, other search warrant, or any other judicial process? Did the FBI rely on or otherwise reference the memos in relation to any National Security Letters? If so, please include copies of all relevant applications and other documents.
Who decided to include the memos in the briefings received by Presidents Obama and Trump? What was the basis for that decision?
Did the agreement with Mr. Steele ever enter into force? If so, for how long? If it did not, why not?
You have previously stated that you will not comment on pending investigations, including confirming or denying whether they exist. You have also acknowledged that statements about closed investigations are a separate matter, sometimes warranting disclosures or public comment. Given the inflammatory nature of the allegations in Mr. Steele’s dossier, if the FBI is undertaking or has undertaken any investigation of the claims, will you please inform the Committee at the conclusion of any such investigations as to what information the investigations discovered and what conclusions the FBI reached? Simply put, when allegations like these are put into the public domain prior to any FBI assessment of their reliability, then if subsequent FBI investigation of the allegations finds them false, unsupported, or unreliable, the FBI should make those rebuttals public.
I anticipate that your responses to these questions may contain both classified and unclassified information. Please send all unclassified material directly to the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified information directly to the Committee, and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although the Committee complies with all laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information, it is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by any handling restrictions or instructions on unclassified information unilaterally asserted by the Executive Branch.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter. If you have any questions, please contact Patrick Davis of my Committee staff at (202) 224-5225.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
cc:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
[1] Tom Hamburger and Rosalind Helderman, FBI Once Planned to Pay Former British Spy Who Authored Controversial Trump Dossier, The Washington Post (Feb. 28, 2017).
ALERT: Starting April 3, 2017, USCIS will temporarily suspend premium processing for all H-1B petitions. This suspension may last up to 6 months. We will notify the public before resuming premium processing for H-1B petitions. Read more here: USCIS Will Temporarily Suspend Premium Processing for All H-1B Petitions
US suspends expedited processing of H-1B visas
(CNN) The US is temporarily suspending expedited processing of H-1B visas, eliminating the option of shorter wait times for the program that helps highly skilled foreigners work at US companies.
Under the current system, companies submitting applications for H-1B visas for potential employees can pay extra for expedited processing, which is referred to as premium processing. Premium processing costs an additional $1,225 and ensures a response from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services in 15 days or the fee is refunded. Processing of standard H-1B applications — those that are not premium — takes between three to six months.
The suspension is effective April 3, and could last up to six months, according to USCIS.
The change comes as President Donald Trump is said to be drafting a new version of his court-halted executive order that banned travelers from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the US. The new ban will exclude existing visa holders, sources familiar with the plan have told CNN.
Fierce competition
The H-1B visa program is the main pathway for highly skilled foreigners to work at US companies. Various industries, including tech, engineering, journalism, medicine and academia, vie each year for the program’s 85,000 visas.
The visas are doled out by a lottery, and the number of applicants continues to swell each year. Last year, the demand was three times greater than the quota.
Outsourcing firms flood the system with applicants, obtaining visas for foreign workers and then farming them out to tech companies. They take a sizable cut of the salary.
While the visas are used to fill the US skills gap, Trump has spoken out about abuse of the program.
Calls for reform
A bipartisan bill introduced this week in Congress calls for reform of visas for highly skilled workers.
**** C’mon Donald…it is not enough as you said on the campaign trail.
That never happened, though critics held their tongues. After all, Trump had repeatedly campaigned for H-1B reforms, even inviting laid-off Disney IT workers to speak at his campaign rallies. Even so, patience is ending.
Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill), a long-time critic of the H-1B visa program and co-sponsor of a reform bill with Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), accused Trump today of failing “to put American workers first by cracking down on H-1B visa abuse.
“I am disappointed that you have broken your campaign promise to take action on the first day of your Administration to reform foreign guest worker visas – especially the H-1B visa – to put American workers first,” Durbin wrote in a letter to Trump sent Friday.
The White House did not respond to a request for comment. Durbin’s letter could be dismissed by some as a partisan attack by a Democrat, but he is not alone. The IEEE-USA has also warned that Trump is in danger of “letting down American workers.”
A key issue is the upcoming April 1 H-1B visa lottery. Trump has voiced support for a merit-based distribution system. As it stands now, however, the H-1B visas for the 2018 fiscal year will be distributed by lottery, no different than any other year. As a result, the IEEE-USA has warned that unless Trump moves to change the lottery, thousands of visas will go to offshore outsourcing firms.
IT workers have long complained about training H-1B-holding replacements, and Trump has spoken of the problem.
It’s not clear how much authority Trump even has to change the lottery. There are three competing views.
The IEEE-USA believes Trump needed to make a regulation to change the annual H-1B distribution. But Trump needed to do so this week to meet a 30-day notice requirement. But an official from the American Immigration Lawyers Association believes the only way Trump can change the lottery is with legislation, which means he has to wait for Congress to act. A third view is that Trump can change the lottery right up to April 1 with an executive order.
The Trump administration has given no indication of what it will do about this year’s visa lottery.
“The American people deserve an explanation for your decision not to pursue H-1B reforms on your first day in office,” wrote Durbin.
“If you do not take action in the next few weeks, outsourcers will secure the right to import tens of thousands of low-wage foreign guest workers to replace American workers,” wrote Durbin. “This is in addition to hundreds of thousands of H-1B workers who are already employed by outsourcing companies in the United States.”
SEOUL, March 6 (Yonhap) — North Korea on Monday fired four ballistic missiles into the East Sea, Seoul’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said, in an apparent reaction to the ongoing joint military drills between South Korea and the United States.
The four projectiles were launched from an area near the North’s Dongchang-ri long-range missile site at 7:36 a.m. and flew about 1,000 kilometers before splashing into the East Sea, JCS said in a text message.
“We estimate the North fired four ballistic missiles. We are conducting an analysis (with the U.S.) on the missiles to determine their type and other specifications. It will take a while before we can come up with a final analysis (based on U.S. satellite data),” the JCS said.
South Korean and U.S. troops here will stay on high alert to counter any provocations by the North, the defense ministry said.
Acting President and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn convened a National Security Council meeting after the missile launches.
Military officials raised the possibility that the projectiles could be intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the west of the U.S. mainland if launched at a high angle.
In this photo taken on March 6, 2017, two men watch a news report on North Korea’s firing of ballistic missiles into the East Sea early Monday morning. (Yonhap)
But experts say the projectiles could be short-range Scud with a range of 500-700 km or mid-range Rodong missiles with a range of 1,300-1500 km given the number of missiles.
“If North Korea test-fired a new long-range missile, it was not an ICBM as it’s not capable of launching multiple ones at the same time,” said Kim Dong-yub, an analyst at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Kyungnam University.
An ICBM with a range of more than 6,000 km could fly far less than 6,000 km if launched at a high angle. But as the long-range missile is still being developed and has yet to be deployed, the North could not have fired several missiles, he said.
The North test-fired a long-range ballistic missile at the Dongchang-ri or “Sohae” missile launch site in February last year. It launched seven ballistic missiles, including three Musudan intermediate-range missiles, during the Foal Eagle drills last year.
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga reportedly said three out of four missiles fired by the North fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), some 250 km west of Akita Prefecture.
The latest provocation comes a day after the U.S. said it may consider redeploying a tactical nuclear weapon to South Korea as a deterrent against growing nuclear and missile threats posed by the rogue regime.
On Friday, Pyongyang threatened to conduct more missile firings in response to the two-month-long Foal Eagle exercise between Seoul and Washington, which lasts through April.
The Rodong Sinmun, the ruling party’s official newspaper, said in a commentary that “new types of strategic weapons will soar” if Seoul and Washington continue their annual war drills, which the North claims to be a preparation for a war against it.
The communist state has staged a series of missile tests with increasing range, with the aim of eventually building long-range nuclear missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland.
In its latest provocations, Pyongyang launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile into the East Sea on Feb. 12 to boast its military readiness and test the response from the new Donald Trump administration.
It was the first test-firing of a North Korean missile since Trump became U.S. president on Jan. 20. and the country’s first major provocation in 2017.
***
How worrisome is this North Korea missile program? It is in fact worrisome while U.S. cyber interference may have had a real impact on the effectiveness of the missile launch successes which are coordinated with Iran.
Soon after ex-President Obama ordered the secret program three years ago, North Korean missiles began exploding, veering off course or crashing into the sea, the newspaper said Saturday.
By most accounts, the North Korean missile failures were caused by US sabotage, the Times says. But it’s also likely many of the missile failures resulted from North Korean incompetence.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un may have been rattled by the US cyber effort. Last fall, he was widely reported to have ordered an investigation into whether the US was sabotaging his country’s missiles.
Kim has said his country is in the final stage or preparations of launching an intercontinental missile that could reach much of the world. It might be a bluff — or it might not.
Obama reportedly ordered the cyber sabotage in early 2014 after deciding that 60 years of US efforts to figure out how to shoot down incoming missiles had not yielded a system that would reliably defend against a missile attack.
Obama’s effort is now left to President Trump and his administration. According to a senior administration official, the White House is looking at pre-emptive military strike options, the Times said.
It’s also possible the US will move tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. The weapons were withdrawn about 25 years ago.
The Homeland Security report is based on unclassified information from Justice Department press releases on terrorism-related convictions and attackers killed in the act, State Department visa statistics, the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment from the U.S. intelligence community and the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.
The three-page report challenges Trump’s core claims. It said that of 82 people the government determined were inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or try to carry out an attack in the United States, just over half were U.S. citizens born in the United States. The others were from 26 countries, led by Pakistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq and Uzbekistan. Of these, only Somalia and Iraq were among the seven nations included in the ban.
Of the other five nations, one person each from Iran, Sudan and Yemen was also involved in those terrorism cases, but none from Syria. It did not say if any were Libyan.
The report also found that terrorist organizations in Iran, Libya, Somalia and Sudan are regionally focused, while groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen do pose a threat to the U.S.
The seven countries were included in a law President Barack Obama signed in 2015 that updated visa requirements for foreigners who had traveled to those countries. More here from Associated Press.
Then we have the gullible Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau who has invited Middle Eastern migrants, asylees and refugees in a welcome to Canada. Yet the intelligence and security authorities in Canada have a different position.
The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda (AQ) continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada.
October 20, 2014
CAF member killed in a ramming attack in Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu
October 22, 2014
CAF member fatally shot at the Canadian War Memorial in Ottawa
January 14, 2016
Canadian killed in an attack on a Starbucks in Jakarta, Indonesia
January 16, 2016
6 Canadians killed during an attack on their hotel in Burkina Faso
March 14, 2016
2 CAF members stabbed at a CAF recruiting centre in Toronto
April 25, 2016
Canadian beheaded by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines
June 12, 2016
Canadian beheaded by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines
June 25, 2016
Canadian killed in an attack on the Somali parliament, Somalia
December 18, 2016
Canadian killed in an attack in Karak, Jordan
The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda (AQ) continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada.
As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers—including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling—poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2016, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travellers who had returned to Canada.
The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada’s borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. In addition, 2016 saw Daesh’s expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as a Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment.
Canadians and Canadian interests are also affected. Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of 2016. In January 2016, an AQ-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an Al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work.
International Cooperation
The international security environment continues to result in increased threats to Canada and its interests, both domestically and abroad. Ongoing conflicts in several regions of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere show no signs of abating and continue to have serious national and international security implications. Worldwide incidents of terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, illegal migration, cyber-attacks and other acts targeting Canadians—directly or indirectly—remain ever present. Since the bulk of such threats originate from (or have a nexus to) regions beyond Canada’s borders, CSIS needs to be prepared and equipped to investigate the threat anywhere.
Additionally, certain security threats continue to evolve. Over the past several years, the globalization of terrorism, fueled by elaborate online propaganda videos by extremist groups, has expanded the breadth of radicalization. In some instances, individuals influenced by extremist ideology and driven by a need to feed their sense of belonging have travelled (or attempted to travel) abroad to participate in terrorist activity. Others may continue to support their extremist ideology through training, fundraising, recruitment and attack planning within Canada. As the threat posed by ‘foreign fighters’ is international in scope, a global reach is an absolute necessity in efforts to track and thwart threats to Canada and its allies posed by such individuals.
Furthermore, while the international focus has been on countering terrorism, espionage threats remain ever present and have become far more complex due to continuing advancements in technology and the globalization of communications. On the cyber front, foreign governments and hackers continue to exploit the Internet and other means to target critical infrastructure and information systems of other countries.
Such threats cannot be countered in isolation, and CSIS must remain adaptable in order to keep abreast of developments in both the domestic and international spheres. Despite differences in mandate, structure or vision, security intelligence agencies around the globe are all faced with very similar priorities and challenges. To meet the Government of Canada’s priority intelligence requirements, CSIS maintains a well-established network of relationships with foreign agencies. In accordance with s.17(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, all such arrangements are authorized by the Minister of Public Safety and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These arrangements provide CSIS access to timely information linked to a number of threats and allow the Service (and, in turn, the Government of Canada) to obtain information which might otherwise not be available.
As of March 31, 2016, CSIS had established over 300 foreign arrangements in some 150 countries. Of those, 69 remain defined as ‘Dormant’ (due to a lack of need for engagement or exchanges for a period of one year or more), while nine remained defined as ‘Restricted’ due to concerns over the affected agencies’ respect for human rights or its reliability. The human rights reputations of foreign agencies with which CSIS engages is not something which the Service takes lightly. In order to mitigate potential risks of sharing information, CSIS regularly assesses its foreign relationships and reviews various government and non-government human rights reports for all countries with which the Service has implemented ministerially approved arrangements, always cognizant of the fact that our first responsibility is to the Canadian people and their safety. CSIS opposes in the strongest possible terms the mistreatment of any individual by a foreign agency. The Service must and does comply with Canada’s laws and legal obligations in sharing information with foreign entities, and expects the same from its foreign counterparts.
Cyber threats from hostile actors continue to evolve. State-sponsored entities and terrorists alike are using Computer Network Operations (CNO) directed against Canadian interests, both domestically and abroad. Canada remains both a target for malicious cyber activities, and a platform from which these hostile actors conduct CNO against entities in other countries.
These state-sponsored and terrorist CNO actors are increasing in number, capability and aggression, and have access to a growing range of tools and techniques that they can employ to accomplish their mission. As these tools and techniques evolve and become more complex, so too do the challenges of detecting and attributing CNO.
Moreover, despite the fact that they originate in the virtual realm, the consequences of CNO can be very real. For example, in December 2015, a cyber-attack conducted against three Ukrainian power companies resulted in a power outage that left hundreds of thousands of people in the dark. The type of systems the actors exploited in this attack is used by energy companies worldwide. Should such destructive cyber-operations be targeted against similar systems in Canada, they could potentially affect any and all areas of its critical infrastructure.
Unfortunately, CNOs are not uncommon and agencies at all levels of government in Canada have faced this threat. The Government of Canada witnesses serious attempts to penetrate its networks on a daily basis.
CSIS is also aware of state-sponsored cyber-espionage and influence activities targeting the private sector in Canada and abroad. The targets of these attacks often fall within Canada’s advanced technology sector and throughout the critical infrastructure spectrum. Universities engaged in advanced research and development have also been subjected to CNO. In addition to stealing intellectual property, one of the objectives of state-sponsored CNO is to obtain information which will give their own companies a competitive edge over Canadian firms. This could impact investment or acquisition negotiations involving Canadian companies and the Government of Canada, and, in turn, lead to lost jobs, revenue, and market share. Ultimately, cyber-espionage negatively impacts Canada’s economy as a whole.
In responding to these threats, CSIS relies on specialized collection techniques to report on state-sponsored cyber-espionage or cyber-terrorism activity. For instance, by analyzing networks or malware behind CNOs, the Service can uncover clues that help identify the origins of the cyber-attacks (known as “attribution”).
The Service also maintains relationships with domestic and foreign agencies to provide the Government of Canada with the most up-to-date intelligence regarding the cyber threats facing Canada and who is behind them.
Security Screening program
The CSIS Security Screening program represents one of the most visible of the Service’s operational sectors. It helps defend Canada and Canadians from threats to national security emanating from terrorism and extremism, espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Security screening prevents persons who pose these threats from entering or obtaining status in Canada, or from obtaining access to sensitive sites, government assets or information. In addition, through its government screening program, CSIS assists the RCMP with the accreditation process for Canadians and foreign nationals seeking access to or participating in major events in Canada.
Note: Figures have been rounded
**Individuals claiming refugee status in Canada or at ports of entry
In fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, CSIS completed 119,000 requests for the accreditation of applicants to the Toronto 2015 Pan Am/Parapan Am Games.
Read more about the CSIS Security Screening program
The CSIS Security Screening program also played a key role in achieving the Government of Canada’s goal to resettle 25,000 refugees from Syria by February 29, 2016. Between November 2015 and February 2016, CSIS conducted screening investigations on the applicants selected for resettlement in Canada. CSIS continues to work closely with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) to provide timely security advice regarding permanent resident applicants who could represent a threat to Canada’s national security, while ensuring legitimate refugees are screened and resettled in a timely manner.
A Unique Workplace
The people of CSIS are committed to ensuring a Service that is nimble, flexible and innovative, and takes responsible risks in the delivery of its mandate and in the pursuit of its strategic outcome.
National Capital Region’s top employers – 9th consecutive year
Canada’s top employers for young people – 1st year
Recruiting
Recruiting the right talent to deliver on our mandate remains a key priority for the Service and the CSIS recruiting website, csiscareers.ca represents the cornerstone of our efforts. During 2014-2016, there were over 2 million hits to the site resulting in close to 90,000 applications being submitted.
The Service prioritizes a diverse workforce which allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect, therefore better equipping us to collect relevant and accurate intelligence. Our recruiting team includes a diversity recruiter who liaises with a variety of community leaders across the country, and attends diversity job fairs and networking events in an effort to attract applicants from designated groups such as visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples and persons with disabilities.
In addition, a partnership has been established with Public Safety, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Correctional Service Canada (CSC), Communication Security Establishment (CSE) and Department of National Defence to share best recruiting practices and hold joint initiatives.
Academic Outreach
The Academic Outreach (AO) program at CSIS seeks to promote conversations with experts from a variety of disciplines and cultural backgrounds working in universities, think tanks and other research institutions in Canada and abroad.
In 2014-2015, AO hosted a conference that brought together multi-disciplinary experts from several countries. The conference was entitled “A Brave New World: Exploring the Evolving Nature of Cyber-conflict” and examined cyber threats facing Canada and its Western allies, our adversaries and their intent, as well as countermeasures that could help mitigate the proliferation of cyber conflict. In 2015-2016, we hosted another conference, “Brittle Might? Testing China’s Success”, which explored the challenges facing modern China, assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s leadership, examined Beijing’s involvement in global affairs and debated China’s trajectory in the coming years.
The international conferences, however, represent only one component of the AO program. We also hosted a number of in-depth briefings on other topics of interest. For instance, one reviewed the global banking sector’s experience at identifying money laundering and terrorist financing activity. Another expert explored the phenomenon of radicalization in Western countries, while another guest specialist assessed the capabilities of Shia militias operating in Iraq and Syria.
During the period of review, outside experts engaged CSIS staff on discussions covering a range of security and strategic issues, including Russia’s strategy towards the Arctic; the uses and limitations of ‘big data’ for intelligence analysis; Boko Haram’s campaign of violence in Nigeria; and the regional consequences of the conflict in Iraq and Syria on Lebanon.
Checks and Balances
The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) is an external independent review body that reports to Parliament on CSIS’ operations. It does so through its three core functions: certifying the CSIS Director’s annual report to the Minister of Public Safety, carrying out in-depth reviews of CSIS activities and conducting investigations into public complaints about CSIS. CSIS’ External Review and Liaison Unit (ER&L) manages the Service’s relationship with SIRC, ensuring that it receives all of the necessary information required to fulfil its mandate.
SIRC reviews and complaints 2014-2015 and 2015-2016
Reviews
N0 of SIRC reviews
2014-2015: 8
2015-2016: 10
Average n0 of documents per review
5,000 short review
15,000 thematic review
Briefings by Service employees per review
5-10 briefings
Average duration of a review
3-6 months
Complaints
N0 of new complaints to SIRC
2014-2015: 11
2015-2016: 17
Average n0 of documents per complaint
100-1,000 simple cases
3,000-13,000 complex cases
Average n0 of service witnesses providing testimony to SIRC
3-5 witnesses
Each year, SIRC provides a research plan identifying the reviews it plans to undertake. For each review, ER&L works closely with SIRC to ensure it has the documents it needs and to arrange briefings by CSIS employees. ER&L manages the correspondence between SIRC and the Service during a review as well as the Service’s response to the resulting report. These reviews, reflected in SIRC’s Annual Public Report, provide comprehensive assurance to Parliament and the Canadian public about the Service’s exercise of its authorities.
ER&L is also the primary point of contact for all stakeholders on public complaints made to SIRC and ensures that SIRC’s legal counsel has the information required for complaint investigations. When an investigation involves a hearing, ER&L assists Department of Justice legal counsel in preparing the CSIS case, including preparation of submissions, exhibits and arranging witnesses to testify at hearings.
ER&L coordinates CSIS responses to SIRC on questions, requests, recommendations, and correspondence. While CSIS is not required to accept all SIRC recommendations, they are reviewed carefully and CSIS responds in writing and these responses are reflected in SIRC’s Annual Report. In ensuring continuity and transparency, ER&L tracks progress and reports to SIRC on CSIS’ implementation of actions recommended by SIRC.
CSIS Internal Audit Branch / Disclosure of Wrongdoing and Reprisal Protection
The Internal Audit (IA) Branch is led by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE), who reports to the CSIS Director and to the CSIS External Audit Committee (AC). The IA Branch is subject to the Treasury Board Policy on Internal Audit, the Internal Auditing Standards for the Government of Canada as well as the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
The CAE provides assurance services to the Director, Senior Management and the AC, as well as independent, objective advice and guidance on the Service’s risk management practices, control framework, and governance processes. The CAE is also the Senior Officer for Disclosure of Wrongdoing.
The AC examines CSIS’ performance in the areas of risk management, control and governance processes relating to both operational activities and administrative services. By maintaining high standards in relation to its review function in particular following-up on the implementation of management action plans derived from audit recommendations, the AC supports and enhances the independence of the audit function.
In the capacity of Senior Officer for Disclosure of Wrongdoing, the CAE is responsible for administering the Internal Disclosure of Wrongdoing and Reprisal Protection Policy. The Policy provides a confidential mechanism for employees to come forward if they believe that serious wrongdoing has taken place. It also provides protection against reprisal when employees come forward, and ensures a fair and objective process for those against whom allegations are made.
Access to Information and Privacy
The mandate of the Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Unit is to fulfill the Service’s obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. The Service’s Chief, ATIP is entrusted with the delegated authority from the Minister of Public Safety Canada to exercise and perform the duties of the Minister as head of the institution.
As the custodian of expertise related to the Service’s obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, the ATIP Unit processes all requests made under the relevant legislation and responds to informal requests for information. In doing so, the unit must balance the need for transparency and accountability in government institutions while ensuring the protection of the Service’s most sensitive information and assets.
Financial Resources
The Financial Resources table below provides a snapshot of CSIS expenditures over the last 6 years (from 2010-2011 to 2015-2016).
Who is this Russian ambassador anyway? It is likely no coincidence that the Russian spy ship is presently off the coast of Florida as this post is about to be published either. We are watching this vessel as they are watching us. Moving on…
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak is a long time English speaking operative from the Kremlin who is called back to Moscow at any moment’s notice to confer with the Russian intelligentsia. Meanwhile, Ambassador Kislyak has been cultivating a network in Washington DC for many years and he makes the social government scene with regularity. In fact, Kislyak often made visits to the Obama White House where most recently he met with the former czar and still Obama advisor, John Holdren.
on the sofa bu.edu
The logs include which White House official hosted Kislyak each time he was cleared to visit. The hosts included are: Gary Samore, who was the senior National Security Council official on weapons of mass destruction during Obama’s first term (four visits); Robert Malley, who was Obama’s senior adviser on defeating the Islamic State (three visits); Lawrence Summers, who was Obama’s economic adviser (one visit); Michael Froman, Obama’s trade representative; Holdren (two visits); and the visitor’s office (four visits).
Kislyak was also listed in the logs an additional 12 times, but that was when there were between 180 and 3,000 other visitors also listed, such as for an event like a “holiday open house” or the “diplomatic corps reception.” More here.
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Kislyak is an expert on arms control negotiations with a degree from the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, Mr. Kislyak first served in the Washington embassy from 1985 to 1989 during the late Soviet period. He became the first Russian representative to NATO and was ambassador to Belgium from 1998 to 2003. He returned to Moscow, where he spent five years as a deputy foreign minister. He has told associates that he will leave Washington soon, likely to be replaced by a hard-line general. His name recently surfaced at the United Nations as a candidate for a new post responsible for counterterrorism, diplomats there said. Vitaly I. Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, died last month and that post remains vacant. More here.
While we are in somewhat of a scandal due to several within the Trump team and later his administration as having meetings with Russian officials, there is quite a lot of hypocrisy in the matter as noted by the countless democrats who too have been in the frequent company of the ambassador. But to several wrongs go right when the republicans do the same? Actually, there should be more vetting and control along with messaging for the republicans as they are in full power of government. Why you ask?
It is said that Sergey Kislyak is not just the ambassador of record, but he is also the top boss and manager of the Russian diplomatic architecture in the United States as well as the marshal of the intelligence wing and espionage operations across our homeland as well. It is questionable as to why he too was not expelled last December by Obama or perhaps that would have caused even more relational strain between the two countries. Kislyak was born in Ukraine and he declares he is not Ukrainian but rather a Russian. Could he have been quite busy with passing intelligence during the time Russia annexed Crimea and is presently continuing military aggressions against Ukraine? Yes. There is a war in Ukraine.
Most places in eastern Ukraine are still overwhelmed with Russian propaganda, which is as much of a threat to Ukraine’s overall war effort as the tanks and artillery. In some places, there is still not a single Ukrainian broadcast TV channel available—they’re all beamed in from Russia and the two separatist territories.
The diffuse Russian propaganda taps into attitudes leftover from the Soviet era, including deeply held, latent fears about fascism, and distrust for the central government in Kyiv. Conspiracy theories about the intentions of the U.S., NATO, and western Ukrainians are also pervasive. More here.
He is in fact a hardliner but has any government official outside of CIA paid attention?
Kislyak: Why do we need to provide assurances to the U.S. Congress? We provide assurances to the Russian parliament. So if the United States is interested in working with us in nuclear energy cooperation, that is fine. It is for the United States to decide what it is that it wants. If it wants to cooperate with us, the doors [for cooperation] are open. If we are asked to make our actions, our policies, reportable to the [U.S.] Congress in order for the U.S. to make decisions on cooperating with us, we are not interested in that kind of scheme. We are fully in compliance with our obligations, with our commitments. We have not violated any agreement with the United States or anybody else. Our cooperation with Iran is limited in the nuclear field to Bushehr. By the way, your president has welcomed the way we cooperate on Bushehr because a scheme for the project that was developed with the Iranians that is very reliable and provides an alternative, a visible alternative, to the need to develop an indigenous enrichment capability. Because we build the reactor, we provide the fuel, and we take it back.[18] This is the best way to provide access to nuclear energy and electricity derived from nuclear energy. It was also supported by Europe.
When it comes to the defense supplies you seem to be referring to, there are no inconsistencies with our obligations or the resolutions of the Security Council, because we do show restraint, and whatever we do is purely defensive and for deterrence. It is our policy, and it is reportable the Russian parliament and Russian people and not anybody else. If the United States is interested in working with us [in the field of nuclear energy], we will be more than ready to work together, but it needs to be based on mutual respect and the mutual respect of interests. I think there are all sorts of reasons why we could and should cooperate in this field because both of us can do a lot in order to promote nuclear energy. That is something that most probably for the coming 20-30 years will be the alternative of choice to fossil fuel, and I do not know of any other [alternative] source of energy that can be employable in the foreseeable future but nuclear energy. All other renewable energies are either in scarce supply or the technology has yet to be developed to the point where it becomes competitive.
So we will see, all of us, significant development of nuclear energy in a lot of countries, in yours as well. We also embarked on an ambitious program to expand nuclear energy production. Currently we have, I think, 16 or 17 percent of electricity produced in my country from nuclear energy sources, and we will expand it to 25 [percent] within maybe 15 or more years. It is an ambitious program. We are going to make it. At the same time, we have a lot of things that are of interest to your industries.
You might be interested in [our]technologies, so we are very much mutually complementary. But unless we have a bigger [legal] framework for that, there can be no reliable interaction between our respective businesses. If the United States wants to work with us, we would be more than willing to do so.
There is another initiative by the two presidents, and that is to develop alternative sources of nuclear energy for the rest of the world that are less prone to proliferation. We are offering the multilateral enrichment center and your president has launched the idea of the GNEP [Global Nuclear Energy Partnership].[19]
The Asahi Shimbun
Then we have the gullible Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau who has invited Middle Eastern migrants, asylees and refugees in a welcome to Canada. Yet the intelligence and security authorities in Canada have a different position.
