Category Archives: al Qaida al Nusra Boko Haram
The PR and Resurgence of al Qaeda
The re-emergence of al Qaeda under the leadership of bin Ladin again?

He was killed in the raid in Abbottabad, well maybe not. So the hunt was on. Seems he has surfaced.
Pakistan officials say Hamza bin Laden, perhaps Osama’s most militant son, escaped the raid that killed his father. David A. Graham reports on why having this bin Laden on the loose could be dangerous. Plus, full coverage of Osama bin Laden’s death.
DailyBeast: Hamza bin Laden was supposed to be a dead man. As the Obama administration made jubilant remarks in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death, counterrorism adviser John Brennan told reporters that the young man had been killed alongside his father.
Then the story changed: It was Khaled bin Laden, not Hamza, who was killed. That might have been the end of the story, but now reports out of Pakistan suggest the tale is even more elaborate: Not only was Hamza not killed, but he escaped in the midst of the raid.
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(CNN)One of Osama bin Laden’s sons could be expanding his role as a terrorist spokesman, with al Qaeda this week releasing another video that features his voice.
On Monday, an audio recording surfaced in which Hamza bin Laden calls for unity among jihadi militants in Syria, who currently fight under competing banners ranging from ISIS to al Qaeda. He also calls for jihad against Israel and its American backers to “liberate” Palestine, according to a translation by the SITE Intelligence Group.It is his second such recording in less than a year, and could represent an effort by al Qaeda to capitalize on the impact of the bin Laden name.“Obviously, he has the family name,” said CNN national security analyst Peter Bergen. “He’s now playing a propaganda role, and he’s a lot younger than some of the other leaders of al Qaeda, in their 50s or their 60s.”Hamza bin Laden is believed to be in his early or mid-20s, and could represent al Qaeda’s next generation.“From a very early age, his father was kind of grooming him,” said Bergen, who just published the book “United States of Jihad.” “Hamza has been very much indoctrinated with the whole jihadi kind of message. He’s a true believer. I think that makes him a concern.”Hamza bin Laden was not at his father’s compound at the time of the raid by American special forces in 2011 — unlike one of his brothers, who was killed there. Papers found at the compound indicate that Hamza had been sent off for terrorist training.“Just a month before the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound, we know Hamza was somewhere else in Pakistan being trained by al Qaeda leadership,” said Thomas Joscelyn, a terrorism researcher with The Long War Journal. “He was receiving high-end explosives training.”But it is not clear whether Hamza bin Laden now has an operational role in planning terrorist attacks, or whether his role is primarily focused on Qaeda’s propaganda operation.According to Joscelyn, “al Qaeda is saying, ‘This is the new generation of jihadi leadership. This is the new bin Laden, who is going to ultimately lead us into the future.”One U.S. intelligence official tells CNN that Hamza bin Laden currently has a relatively small role in the organization, but that al Qaeda could be grooming him for possible future leadership positions.“I don’t think he’s necessarily going to run al Qaeda tomorrow,” said Bergen, “but the family name, the fact that he’s a younger guy, the fact that he’s a true believer — all that suggests that he likely will play an important role in al Qaeda going forward.”While al Qaeda’s subsidiary franchises have been thriving in Yemen, Syria, and North Africa, al Qaeda’s parent organization in Pakistan has lost a number of top leaders, many of them to American strikes.Showcasing Hamza bin Laden, according to another U.S. intelligence official, “appears to be an attempt by al Qaeda to fill gaps in its ever-dwindling bench.”****
Al Qaeda magazine calls for targeting American business leaders
FNC: The latest issue of Al Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire released Saturday calls on would-be jihadis to undermine the American economy by targeting business leaders and entrepreneurs, according to analysts who monitor web chatter from the jihadist organization.
The newest edition obtained by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) features a cover with the headline “Professional Assassinations” and the subhead “Home Assassinations,” which the depiction of a hooded killer watching an upscale home from the outside.
Additional photos include in the issue include one of Microsoft founder Bill Gates splatted in blood with a pistol nearby. The magazine is published by Al Qaeda’s main affiliate located in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
MEMRI quotes Inspire’s editor, Yahya Ibrahim, as opening the issue by saying “assassination is an effective toll in warfare,” and notes that “The prophet ordered the killing of many criminal leaders using this method … And here we are, following the footsteps of the prophet on how he dealt with his enemies and friends.”
Ibrahim adds in this issue that the focus of the previous issue of Inspire was what he called “workplace” assassinations, and hopes to expand on the same topic in the current issue, which AQAP hopes will lead to training and preparing a more “professional” type of lone wolves.
“We will never put down our weapons until we fulfill what Allah wants from us. We are determined to keep fighting and striking Americans with operations by organized jihadi groups and by Lone Jihad, [and] pursuing America in its homeland — by the will of Allah,” MEMRI quotes Ibrahim as saying.
MEMRI also said an analysis of the issue “provides detailed information and instructions on preparing for and carrying out various targeted assassinations. It stresses that an assassin should possess different options to carry out an attack, which gives him or her a greater chance for success, and elevates the operation to a more ‘professional’ level.”
In addition to the main section on professional assassinations, the magazine also features a section on bomb-making and encouraging radical Islamic terrorists to emulate the Palestinian stabbings of Israelis by walking up to Americans and stabbing them to death.
AQAP was the first to use English publications to reach out to supporters in the West, with the launch in 2010 of its English-language magazine, Inspire.
The online magazine featured commentary by a radical U.S.-born cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was also killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2011.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Billions go Offshore
President’s Budget Includes $1.25 Billion for Millennium Challenge Corporation
The current Millennium Challenge Corporation CEO is Dana Hyde.
Hyde grew up in a small town in eastern Oregon and received her undergraduate degree in political science from UCLA.
From 1989 to 1991, Hyde served as a legislative assistant for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). She subsequently worked on President Bill Clinton’s first campaign for the White House. After Clinton’s inauguration, Hyde served as special assistant to the president in the White House Office of Cabinet Affairs, coordinating policy initiatives with the chiefs of staff of national security agencies. She remained in that post until 1995. She later served as special assistant to the Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Justice Department.
She received her law degree from Georgetown and passed the bar in 1997. From 1998 to 2000, Hyde worked as an attorney at the law firm Zuckerman, Spaeder. Then, from 2001 to 2002, she practiced law as part of the international arbitration group at WilmerHale. She also worked in London for the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
One of Hyde’s most prominent roles was as counsel to the 9/11 commission, where she served from 2003 to 2004. She focused on crisis management issues and the immediate response of the White House, the Pentagon, and the Federal Aviation Administration to the attacks.
After leaving the commission, Hyde was executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America. This organization has as its goal the advancement of bipartisan work on national security and foreign policy issues.
In 2009, after serving on the Obama-Biden transition team, Hyde was named a senior advisor for management and resources at the State Department. Then, in 2011, Hyde moved to the Office of Management and Budget, becoming associate director for general government programs.
Justification document for Congress
Where We Work
MCC forms partnerships with poor countries that show they are committed to good governance, economic freedom, and investing in their citizens. Click here to see the countries and then remind yourself about the terror and corruption in each.
Initiatives
Since its creation in 2004, MCC has been advancing and accelerating the conversation on aid effectiveness.
MCC is committed to helping our partner countries adapt to climate change and mitigate emissions through climate resilient, low carbon economic development.
Country ownership—or country-led development—has been broadly embraced by the international donor community as a critical element of international development aid.
One of MCC’s core principles is that aid is most effective in countries with a sound commitment to accountable and democratic governance.
MCC has been at the forefront of transparency in delivering aid.
MCC works with partner countries to integrate internationally-accepted principles of environmental and social sustainability into the design and implementation of compacts.
Controlling corruption a key indicator in selecting countries for compact eligibility and throughout the compact lifecycle. MCC—with the MCAs—promotes measures to prevent, detect and combat corruption before it occurs and to address problems after they emerge.
With its partner countries in the lead, the MCC portfolio of investments has been on the forefront of addressing food security priorities since MCC’s first compact in 2005.
MCC recognizes that gender and social inequality are significant constraints to economic growth and poverty reduction.
MCC leads the charge to uncover the best data available to fight corruption by partnering with experts to form a Governance Data Alliance. MCC and the alliance are committed to filling the gaps for measuring governance.
MCC has obligated nearly $3 billion for trade capacity building in AGOA countries on infrastructure like roads and power, on upping productivity of small and medium-size businesses and export-heavy sectors, and leveraging policy and regulatory reforms.
Through its compacts in partner countries, MCC has committed approximately $1.5 billion to support Power Africa, the U.S. Government’s effort to double access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa.
MCC supports its partner countries in their efforts to achieve the SDGs and improve the lives of their people by fighting poverty through inclusive economic growth.
MCC applies the principles of economic growth, strong policies, country-led plans and rigorous evaluation to create a more stable and prosperous future for the world’s poor.
Development needs around the world will not be met by foreign assistance alone. Official development assistance must increasingly catalyze other resources to finance development – including private-sector investment. Here’s one way MCC is doing just that.
In selecting partner countries, MCC relies on independent public data that captures as clearly as possible the actions governments take to fight corruption. MCC is seeking improved and expanded indicators from the institutions that produce this data.
NGO consultations are at the core of MCC’s compact development process. By listening to the voices and experience of the broader NGO community, MCC leverages all available expertise from others to maximize our investments.
MCC has been at the forefront of transparency in delivering aid.
MCC and other U.S. Government agencies have joined together to coordinate Partnership for Growth (PFG), a partnership between the United States and a select group of high-performing developing countries to accelerate and sustain broad-based economic growth.
Smart Aid Series
Since its founding, MCC has sought innovative ways to reduce poverty through economic growth. Smart Aid brings together development practitioners and MCC staff to share best practices, lessons learned, and engage in a dialogue to effectively move aid forward.
Country Scorecards
100 Years old, Sykes Picot Debate Heats Up
The Islamic State (IS) group wilfully defies any frontier blocking its route to an Islamic caliphate. According to Tarek Osman, author of Islamism, we are only part-way through a revolution with no clear endgame.“Sykes-Picot was a pillar of a system in the Middle East that we are watching fall apart today, as something new is being formed. Right now, we’re in a fluid, chaotic phase and a new system will not emerge for a number of years,” Osman told Middle East Eye. More from MiddleEastEye.
More on Sykes-Picot: The Agreement as Written
As I noted in my first post on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was concluded a century ago this month, “Sykes-Picot” has become a convenient shorthand for the entire constellation of agreements and understandings that contributed to the postwar settlement, agreements spread out from as early as 1915 to as late as 1939, or even later if we include the partition of Palestine. In coming days I’ll be dealing with the actual agreements, but first let’s look at the real Asia Minor Agreement negotiated between Sir Mark Sykes and M. François Georges-Picot in 1916 and what borders it actually envisioned.
Britain and France began discussions of a post-Ottoman settlement on November 23, 1915, with Georges-Picot negotiating with Sir Arthur Nicolson, soon replaced by Sir Mark Sykes,. At that time efforts by David Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel to promote a Jewish state in Palestine were already under way, and Sir Henry McMahon in Egypt was already committing Britain to support an independent Arab state in correspondence with Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Another round of negotiations took place in December, and in February 1916 Sykes visited Petrograd to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Segey Sazonov. Negotiations with the Zionists and the commitments to Sharif Hussein were known to Sykes.
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| Sir Mark Sykes |
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| F. Georges-Picot |
The basic text was ready by May. On May 9, French Ambassador to London Paul Cambon transmitted it in a letter to British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, who returned it with approval on May 16. Signed May 19 and with a formal exchange of notes May 2, the precise date that should be “celebrated” as the centenary is a little slippery.
The agreement’s text is below after the map. Although the agreement gives lip service to the idea of an “independent” Arab stste, it would be subordinate to British and French zones of influence, and both had zones in which they claimed direct control. Britain and France made a umber of guarantees to each other (Palestine would be under international control but with Britain controlling Haifa, Acre, a railway to Egypt and a future railway to Iraq.)
Both parties seemed to recognize that the agreement had potential conflicts, but it was a secret agreement, and intended to remain so. As I’ve tried to make clear, I’m not defending Sykes-Picot, which was imperialist arrogance at its worst;I’m simply saying that, except for a general roe for France in Syria (but then including Mosul) and Britain in Iraq. The status of Mosul and Palestine would be among the first things to change, and of course the whole disposition of Anatolia would change.
One thing that would speed the unraveling of the details of Sykes-Picot was its sudden revelation by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, which we’ll discuss in Part 3.

Text of Sykes-Picot Agreement
It is accordingly understood between the French and British governments:
That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab states or a confederation of Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief.
That in area (a) France, and in area (b) great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.
That in the blue area France, and in the red area great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.
That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the Shariff of Mecca.
That great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His majesty’s government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French government.
That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, or (b) area, or area (a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.
That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against french goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.
That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad and Aleppo via the Euphrates valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two governments.
That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times. It is to be understood by both governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the Polygon Banias Keis Marib Salkhad Tell Otsda Mesmie before reaching area (b).
For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (a) and (b), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversions from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers.
There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.
It shall be agreed that the french government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third power, except the Arab state or confederation of Arab states, without the previous agreement of his majesty’s government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the french government regarding the red area.
The British and French government, as the protectors of the Arab state, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.
The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab states shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two powers.
It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two governments.
I have further the honor to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, his majesty’s government are proposing to the Russian government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your excellency’s government on the 26th April last. Copies of these notes will be communicated to your excellency as soon as exchanged. I would also venture to remind your excellency that the conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of claims of Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of turkey in Asia, as formulated in Article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the allies.
His Majesty’s Government further consider that the Japanese government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded.
U.S. Small Teams Back in Libya
Libya has a new but rather feeble UN backed government. This has caused still more political conflict in the country and there are divided regions that remain.
The Government of National Accord and the council has worked to gain political power in the divided country, including by appropriating government facilities in Tripoli, such as the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation, as well as freezing the assets of political opposition members. While the international community hailed the Presidential Council’s arrival as the coming of Libyan unity, events on the ground suggest this is far from reality.
Meanwhile, several Western allied countries have had some small deployments in Libya since 2015 due to Islamic State having an estimated 5 to 6000 fighters in the region. The United States has 2 small teams LPOP’s (listening posts/observation posts) there gathering intelligence, cultivating friendlies and plotting action should the order be given to take on ISIS controlled towns.
U.S. establishes Libyan outposts with eye toward offensive against Islamic State
WaPo: American Special Operations troops have been stationed at two outposts in eastern and western Libya since late 2015, tasked with lining up local partners in advance of a possible offensive against the Islamic State, U.S. officials said.
Two teams totaling fewer than 25 troops are operating from around the cities of Misurata and Benghazi to identify potential allies among local armed factions and gather intelligence on threats, according to the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive mission overseas.
A 2011 photo shows buildings ravaged by fighting in Sirte, Libya, \an Islamic State stronghold. U.S. Special Operations troops have established outposts in Libya to build relations with Libyan forces moving on Sirte. (Manu Brabo/AP)
The insertion of a tiny group of U.S. personnel into a country rife with militant threats reflects the Obama administration’s worries about the Islamic State’s powerful Libyan branch and the widespread expectations of an expanded campaign against it. For months, the Pentagon has been developing plans for potential action against the group, which has at least several thousand fighters in the coastal city of Sirte and other areas. And the U.S. personnel, whose ongoing presence had not been previously reported, is a sign of the acceleration toward another military campaign in Libya.
The mission is also an illustration of President Obama’s reliance on elite units to advance counterterrorism goals in low-visibility operations.
The activities of the American “contact teams,” as they are known, take place in parallel to those of elite allied forces from France and other European nations in the same areas, U.S. and Libyan officials said.
Officials hope the special operators will ultimately have an outsize impact on the effectiveness of local forces. Special Operations forces in Syria, for instance, have been trying to guide opposition operations and help them capitalize on foreign air power as they advance on the Islamic State.
“These types of activities can be the difference between success and failure in what the administration refers to as areas outside of active hostilities,” said William F. Wechsler, who was a senior Pentagon official overseeing Special Operations activities until last year. “You’re mapping local networks, both friendly and unfriendly.”
The U.S. troops, who began making visits to Libya last spring and established their twin outposts six months later, have been cultivating relationships among forces that are mobilizing for a possible assault against the Islamic State in its Sirte stronghold.
Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook declined to provide specific information about the U.S. assessment teams. But he said that military personnel had been meeting periodically with a variety of Libyans “in an effort to help them reestablish a safe and secure environment.” The effort is part of a larger Obama administration strategy to bring Libya’s feuding factions together behind a fragile new unity government, which officials believe is best positioned to combat the Islamic State.
In Libya, a key element of the mission is identifying which factions will align themselves with the unity government. Since a civil conflict erupted in 2014, Libya has been dominated by two rival governments in the country’s east and west. The Obama administration and its European allies are hoping the unity government, installed after U.N.-brokered peace talks, can end Libya’s partition, which opened the door to extremists and plunged the oil-rich country into economic crisis.
The troops also are assessing security conditions so that, if a broader mission takes place, the United States can move in additional personnel more safely.
“How do you avoid Libya becoming like Syria?” said Paul Scharre, a former Army Ranger and Defense Department official who is now at the Center for a New American Security. “This is one of the tools in your toolbox to stave that off.”
Although the Islamic State is far smaller in Libya than its parent organization in Iraq and Syria, the group and has used similar tactics to enforce its brutal version of Islam, including mass executions, and has launched attacks across the North African nation.
“We’re obviously watching the threats very closely,” a senior administration official said, also speaking on the condition of anonymity.
If the White House does authorize a broader campaign in Libya, it is expected to be on a smaller scale than operations in Iraq and Syria. Apart from the ongoing air campaign against the Islamic State, the United States has more than 5,000 troops on the ground in Iraq, and Obama recently expanded the Special Operations force in Syria.
The United States has launched two airstrikes against Islamic State targets in Libya since late 2015, but Pentagon officials have said they have identified dozens of other targets that might be hit if a more sustained operation takes place.
An expanded mission in Libya will be forced to grapple with the same internal divisions that have undermined other foreign attempts to foster stability since 2011. In an illustration of those tribal and political fissues, the two forces preparing to advance on the Islamic State — militia forces loyal to Misurata and army troops under Gen. Khalifa Hifter — have clashed with each other.
The Misuratan forces recognize the unity government in Tripoli; those loyal to Hifter do not. Likewise, three factions have established separate command centers to oversee an offensive against the Islamic State in Sirte, including Hifter; the unity government; and an alternate prime minister in Tripoli, who continues to assert his authority.
American officials fear that uncoordinated offensives will only afford the Islamic State an opportunity to grow stronger.
At the same time, some officials privately complain that foreign support for eastern forces loyal to Hifter — including from U.S. allies France and Egypt — makes consolidation of the unity government’s power more difficult.
“We have been working with our allies to urge focus on ISIL and not fueling rivalries across the country,” a senior U.S. official said, using an acronym for the Islamic State. Local factions are being asked to do the same, and “as the ISIL threat becomes clearer and clearer, it becomes easier to find Libyans who are prepared to do that.”
The French Embassy in Washington declined to comment on French military activity in Libya. “Our priority in Libya is full support to the government and not support to a particular force,” a French diplomatic official said.
A spokeswoman for the Egyptian Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Military officials have sought to keep the ongoing presence of U.S. personnel quiet, in part because of Libyans’ sensitivities about foreign troops and also because of the vulnerability of small teams operating in a country gripped by lawlessness. Benghazi was the site of the 2012 attacks that killed four Americans, including the U.S. ambassador.
Last December, a visit by one team of special operators to far western Libya was made public when local militia forces took photos of the Americans with their assault rifles, grenade launchers and GPS devices. The U.S. personnel promptly departed.
The Pentagon is seeking to enhance protection of its advance force from the sky. This year, Italy granted the United States permission to use Italian airfields to launch armed drone flights over Libya for defensive purposes.
Wechsler said the Pentagon had been willing to accept the dangers faced by such teams because of the value they provided to subsequent military operations.
“When the military is dropping Hellfires from a drone, there is by design a zero percent chance of
an American getting killed,” Wechlser said. “But when you’re trying to do the important work to understand the human terrain and build up surrogates, the risk . . . can never be mitigated down to zero.”



