Terrorists in U.S. Several Years Before Being Radicalized, then Canada

The Homeland Security report is based on unclassified information from Justice Department press releases on terrorism-related convictions and attackers killed in the act, State Department visa statistics, the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment from the U.S. intelligence community and the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.

The three-page report challenges Trump’s core claims. It said that of 82 people the government determined were inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or try to carry out an attack in the United States, just over half were U.S. citizens born in the United States. The others were from 26 countries, led by Pakistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq and Uzbekistan. Of these, only Somalia and Iraq were among the seven nations included in the ban.

Of the other five nations, one person each from Iran, Sudan and Yemen was also involved in those terrorism cases, but none from Syria. It did not say if any were Libyan.

The report also found that terrorist organizations in Iran, Libya, Somalia and Sudan are regionally focused, while groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen do pose a threat to the U.S.

The seven countries were included in a law President Barack Obama signed in 2015 that updated visa requirements for foreigners who had traveled to those countries. More here from Associated Press.

Then we have the gullible Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau who has invited Middle Eastern migrants, asylees and refugees in a welcome to Canada. Yet the intelligence and security authorities in Canada have a different position.

The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda (AQ) continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada.

Infographic: A terrorism timeline of incidents involving Canadians between October 20, 2014 and September 30, 2016. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Terrorism timeline

2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to CanadaThe principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda (AQ) continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada.

As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers—including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling—poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2016, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travellers who had returned to Canada.

The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada’s borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. In addition, 2016 saw Daesh’s expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as a Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment.

Canadians and Canadian interests are also affected. Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of 2016. In January 2016, an AQ-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an Al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work.

International Cooperation

The international security environment continues to result in increased threats to Canada and its interests, both domestically and abroad. Ongoing conflicts in several regions of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere show no signs of abating and continue to have serious national and international security implications. Worldwide incidents of terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, illegal migration, cyber-attacks and other acts targeting Canadians—directly or indirectly—remain ever present. Since the bulk of such threats originate from (or have a nexus to) regions beyond Canada’s borders, CSIS needs to be prepared and equipped to investigate the threat anywhere.

Additionally, certain security threats continue to evolve. Over the past several years, the globalization of terrorism, fueled by elaborate online propaganda videos by extremist groups, has expanded the breadth of radicalization. In some instances, individuals influenced by extremist ideology and driven by a need to feed their sense of belonging have travelled (or attempted to travel) abroad to participate in terrorist activity. Others may continue to support their extremist ideology through training, fundraising, recruitment and attack planning within Canada. As the threat posed by ‘foreign fighters’ is international in scope, a global reach is an absolute necessity in efforts to track and thwart threats to Canada and its allies posed by such individuals.

Furthermore, while the international focus has been on countering terrorism, espionage threats remain ever present and have become far more complex due to continuing advancements in technology and the globalization of communications. On the cyber front, foreign governments and hackers continue to exploit the Internet and other means to target critical infrastructure and information systems of other countries.

Such threats cannot be countered in isolation, and CSIS must remain adaptable in order to keep abreast of developments in both the domestic and international spheres. Despite differences in mandate, structure or vision, security intelligence agencies around the globe are all faced with very similar priorities and challenges. To meet the Government of Canada’s priority intelligence requirements, CSIS maintains a well-established network of relationships with foreign agencies. In accordance with s.17(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, all such arrangements are authorized by the Minister of Public Safety and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These arrangements provide CSIS access to timely information linked to a number of threats and allow the Service (and, in turn, the Government of Canada) to obtain information which might otherwise not be available.

As of March 31, 2016, CSIS had established over 300 foreign arrangements in some 150 countries. Of those, 69 remain defined as ‘Dormant’ (due to a lack of need for engagement or exchanges for a period of one year or more), while nine remained defined as ‘Restricted’ due to concerns over the affected agencies’ respect for human rights or its reliability. The human rights reputations of foreign agencies with which CSIS engages is not something which the Service takes lightly. In order to mitigate potential risks of sharing information, CSIS regularly assesses its foreign relationships and reviews various government and non-government human rights reports for all countries with which the Service has implemented ministerially approved arrangements, always cognizant of the fact that our first responsibility is to the Canadian people and their safety. CSIS opposes in the strongest possible terms the mistreatment of any individual by a foreign agency. The Service must and does comply with Canada’s laws and legal obligations in sharing information with foreign entities, and expects the same from its foreign counterparts.

Terrorist Group Profiles

Cyber threats from hostile actors continue to evolve. State-sponsored entities and terrorists alike are using Computer Network Operations (CNO) directed against Canadian interests, both domestically and abroad. Canada remains both a target for malicious cyber activities, and a platform from which these hostile actors conduct CNO against entities in other countries.

Infographic: Graphic depicting Canadian sectors vulnerable to cyber threats. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Canadian sectors at risk

These state-sponsored and terrorist CNO actors are increasing in number, capability and aggression, and have access to a growing range of tools and techniques that they can employ to accomplish their mission. As these tools and techniques evolve and become more complex, so too do the challenges of detecting and attributing CNO.

Moreover, despite the fact that they originate in the virtual realm, the consequences of CNO can be very real. For example, in December 2015, a cyber-attack conducted against three Ukrainian power companies resulted in a power outage that left hundreds of thousands of people in the dark. The type of systems the actors exploited in this attack is used by energy companies worldwide. Should such destructive cyber-operations be targeted against similar systems in Canada, they could potentially affect any and all areas of its critical infrastructure.

Unfortunately, CNOs are not uncommon and agencies at all levels of government in Canada have faced this threat. The Government of Canada witnesses serious attempts to penetrate its networks on a daily basis.

CSIS is also aware of state-sponsored cyber-espionage and influence activities targeting the private sector in Canada and abroad. The targets of these attacks often fall within Canada’s advanced technology sector and throughout the critical infrastructure spectrum. Universities engaged in advanced research and development have also been subjected to CNO. In addition to stealing intellectual property, one of the objectives of state-sponsored CNO is to obtain information which will give their own companies a competitive edge over Canadian firms. This could impact investment or acquisition negotiations involving Canadian companies and the Government of Canada, and, in turn, lead to lost jobs, revenue, and market share. Ultimately, cyber-espionage negatively impacts Canada’s economy as a whole.

In responding to these threats, CSIS relies on specialized collection techniques to report on state-sponsored cyber-espionage or cyber-terrorism activity. For instance, by analyzing networks or malware behind CNOs, the Service can uncover clues that help identify the origins of the cyber-attacks (known as “attribution”).

The Service also maintains relationships with domestic and foreign agencies to provide the Government of Canada with the most up-to-date intelligence regarding the cyber threats facing Canada and who is behind them.

The CSIS Security Screening program represents one of the most visible of the Service’s operational sectors. It helps defend Canada and Canadians from threats to national security emanating from terrorism and extremism, espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Security screening prevents persons who pose these threats from entering or obtaining status in Canada, or from obtaining access to sensitive sites, government assets or information. In addition, through its government screening program, CSIS assists the RCMP with the accreditation process for Canadians and foreign nationals seeking access to or participating in major events in Canada.

2014-2015 2015-2016

Note: Figures have been rounded
**Individuals claiming refugee status in Canada or at ports of entry

Infographic: Statistics on the security screening program at CSIS for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 fiscal years. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Statistics from the security screening program

Long description of infographic: Statistics for the 2015 Pan Am Games

Read more about the CSIS Security Screening program

The CSIS Security Screening program also played a key role in achieving the Government of Canada’s goal to resettle 25,000 refugees from Syria by February 29, 2016. Between November 2015 and February 2016, CSIS conducted screening investigations on the applicants selected for resettlement in Canada. CSIS continues to work closely with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) to provide timely security advice regarding permanent resident applicants who could represent a threat to Canada’s national security, while ensuring legitimate refugees are screened and resettled in a timely manner.

The people of CSIS are committed to ensuring a Service that is nimble, flexible and innovative, and takes responsible risks in the delivery of its mandate and in the pursuit of its strategic outcome.

As of March 31, 2016
Infographic: the make-up of CSIS workforce and awards received. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Statistics related to CSIS’ workforce and awards received

Recruiting the right talent to deliver on our mandate remains a key priority for the Service and the CSIS recruiting website, csiscareers.ca represents the cornerstone of our efforts. During 2014-2016, there were over 2 million hits to the site resulting in close to 90,000 applications being submitted.

Infographic: Statistics from csiscareers.ca and the total applications received during 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. Long description below.

Visit the CSIS recruiting site(External link)

Long description of infographic: Statistics from the CSIS recruiting site

The Service prioritizes a diverse workforce which allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect, therefore better equipping us to collect relevant and accurate intelligence. Our recruiting team includes a diversity recruiter who liaises with a variety of community leaders across the country, and attends diversity job fairs and networking events in an effort to attract applicants from designated groups such as visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples and persons with disabilities.

In addition, a partnership has been established with Public Safety, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Correctional Service Canada (CSC), Communication Security Establishment (CSE) and Department of National Defence to share best recruiting practices and hold joint initiatives.

The Academic Outreach (AO) program at CSIS seeks to promote conversations with experts from a variety of disciplines and cultural backgrounds working in universities, think tanks and other research institutions in Canada and abroad.

Infographic: Statistics related to the Academic Outreach program for 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Academic Outreach statistics

Infographic: Academic Outreach publications from 2014-2016. Long description below.

Political Stability in West and North Africa - Highlights from the Conference Pitfalls and Promises: Security Implications of a Post-revolutionary Middle East - Highlights from the Conference Russia and the West: The Consequences of Renewed Rivalry - Highlights from the Workshop Brittle Might? Testing China's    Success - Highlights from the Conference Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security  Trends in the Middle East - Highlights from the Workshop

Long description of infographic: Publications from Academic Outreach

In 2014-2015, AO hosted a conference that brought together multi-disciplinary experts from several countries. The conference was entitled “A Brave New World: Exploring the Evolving Nature of Cyber-conflict” and examined cyber threats facing Canada and its Western allies, our adversaries and their intent, as well as countermeasures that could help mitigate the proliferation of cyber conflict. In 2015-2016, we hosted another conference, “Brittle Might? Testing China’s Success”, which explored the challenges facing modern China, assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s leadership, examined Beijing’s involvement in global affairs and debated China’s trajectory in the coming years.

The international conferences, however, represent only one component of the AO program. We also hosted a number of in-depth briefings on other topics of interest. For instance, one reviewed the global banking sector’s experience at identifying money laundering and terrorist financing activity. Another expert explored the phenomenon of radicalization in Western countries, while another guest specialist assessed the capabilities of Shia militias operating in Iraq and Syria.

During the period of review,  outside experts engaged CSIS staff on discussions covering a range of security and strategic issues, including Russia’s strategy towards the Arctic; the uses and limitations of ‘big data’ for intelligence analysis; Boko Haram’s campaign of violence in Nigeria; and the regional consequences of the conflict in Iraq and Syria on Lebanon.

The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) is an external independent review body that reports to Parliament on CSIS’ operations. It does so through its three core functions: certifying the CSIS Director’s annual report to the Minister of Public Safety, carrying out in-depth reviews of CSIS activities and conducting investigations into public complaints about CSIS. CSIS’ External Review and Liaison Unit (ER&L) manages the Service’s relationship with SIRC, ensuring that it receives all of the necessary information required to fulfil its mandate.

Infographic: Statistics related to SIRC reviews and complaints made to SIRC. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: SIRC reviews and complaints 2014-2015 and 2015-2016

Each year, SIRC provides a research plan identifying the reviews it plans to undertake. For each review, ER&L works closely with SIRC to ensure it has the documents it needs and to arrange briefings by CSIS employees. ER&L manages the correspondence between SIRC and the Service during a review as well as the Service’s response to the resulting report. These reviews, reflected in SIRC’s Annual Public Report, provide comprehensive assurance to Parliament and the Canadian public about the Service’s exercise of its authorities.

ER&L is also the primary point of contact for all stakeholders on public complaints made to SIRC and ensures that SIRC’s legal counsel has the information required for complaint investigations. When an investigation involves a hearing, ER&L assists Department of Justice legal counsel in preparing the CSIS case, including preparation of submissions, exhibits and arranging witnesses to testify at hearings.

ER&L coordinates CSIS responses to SIRC on questions, requests, recommendations, and correspondence. While CSIS is not required to accept all SIRC recommendations, they are reviewed carefully and CSIS responds in writing and these responses are reflected in SIRC’s Annual Report. In ensuring continuity and transparency, ER&L tracks progress and reports to SIRC on CSIS’ implementation of actions recommended by SIRC.

CSIS Internal Audit Branch / Disclosure of Wrongdoing and Reprisal Protection

The Internal Audit (IA) Branch is led by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE), who reports to the CSIS Director and to the CSIS External Audit Committee (AC). The IA Branch is subject to the Treasury Board Policy on Internal Audit, the Internal Auditing Standards for the Government of Canada as well as the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

The CAE provides assurance services to the Director, Senior Management and the AC, as well as independent, objective advice and guidance on the Service’s risk management practices, control framework, and governance processes. The CAE is also the Senior Officer for Disclosure of Wrongdoing.

The AC examines CSIS’ performance in the areas of risk management, control and governance processes relating to both operational activities and administrative services. By maintaining high standards in relation to its review function in particular following-up on the implementation of management action plans derived from audit recommendations, the AC supports and enhances the independence of the audit function.

In the capacity of Senior Officer for Disclosure of Wrongdoing, the CAE is responsible for administering the Internal Disclosure of Wrongdoing and Reprisal Protection Policy. The Policy provides a confidential mechanism for employees to come forward if they believe that serious wrongdoing has taken place. It also provides protection against reprisal when employees come forward, and ensures a fair and objective process for those against whom allegations are made.

The mandate of the Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Unit is to fulfill the Service’s obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. The Service’s Chief, ATIP is entrusted with the delegated authority from the Minister of Public Safety Canada to exercise and perform the duties of the Minister as head of the institution.

Infographic: ATIP statistics for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 fiscal years. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: ATIP statistics

As the custodian of expertise related to the Service’s obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, the ATIP Unit processes all requests made under the relevant legislation and responds to informal requests for information. In doing so, the unit must balance the need for transparency and accountability in government institutions while ensuring the protection of the Service’s most sensitive information and assets.

The Financial Resources table below provides a snapshot of CSIS expenditures over the last 6 years (from 2010-2011 to 2015-2016).

Infographic: Bar graph of CSIS expenditures over the last six years. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: CSIS expenditures from 2010-2016

 

ATF is an Agency with Rogue Operations on Cigarettes?

Primer: In deference to the ATF, it is known with historical cases that tobacco smuggling does fund terror, see document at end of post)

In 2013, Sixteen Palestinian men, some with ties to convicted terrorists, were indicted in a scheme of cigarette smuggling that spanned New York, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia and New Jersey states. Some of them had ties to known terrorist organizations. See the official case here.

A.T.F. Filled Secret Bank Account With Millions From Shadowy Cigarette Sales

Charlie Batten, a fifth-generation tobacco farmer and U.S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc. board member, at his farm in Four Oaks, N.C. The co-op negotiated a deal to buy a tobacco distribution company whose owners had secret ties to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Credit Jeremy M. Lange for The New York Times

NYT’s/WASHINGTON— Working from an office suite behind a Burger King in southern Virginia, operatives used a web of shadowy cigarette sales to funnel tens of millions of dollars into a secret bank account. They weren’t known smugglers, but rather agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

The operation, not authorized under Justice Department rules, gave agents an off-the-books way to finance undercover investigations and pay informants without the usual cumbersome paperwork and close oversight, according to court records and people close to the operation.

The secret account is at the heart of a federal racketeering lawsuit brought by a collective of tobacco farmers who say they were swindled out of $24 million. A pair of A.T.F. informants received at least $1 million each from that sum, records show.

The scheme relied on phony shipments of snack food disguised as tobacco. The agents were experts: Their job was to catch cigarette smugglers, so they knew exactly how it was done.

Government records and interviews with people involved reveal an operation that existed on a murky frontier — between investigating smuggling and being complicit in it. After The New York Times began asking about the operation last summer, the Justice Department disclosed it to the department’s inspector general’s office, which is investigating. The inspector general “expressed serious concerns,” court records show.

The investigation and the looming racketeering trial will bring renewed scrutiny to the A.T.F., which has been buffeted in recent years by the botched gun-tracking operation known as Fast and Furious and its mismanagement of undercover investigations. Members of Congress, particularly Republicans, have heaped criticism on the agency for decades, and the National Rifle Association has lobbied to limit the agency’s authority and funding.

While government auditors have previously cited problems with A.T.F.’s tobacco investigations, this operation went beyond what was identified in that audit, released in 2013. The A.T.F. and the Justice Department declined to comment.

Documents in the racketeering lawsuit outline the A.T.F. operation. The tobacco cooperative is suing a former employee and a consultant who, according to court documents, both worked as A.T.F. informants. The informants have denied all wrongdoing.

Discarded cigarettes at a U.S. Tobacco manufacturing plant in Timberlake, N.C. The U.S. Tobacco co-op is made up of about 700 tobacco farmers who pool their crops and share the profits. Credit Jeremy M. Lange for The New York Times

Part of their defense, records show, is that they acted on behalf of the government. In response, a judge recently added the United States government as a defendant.

Since last summer, The Times has fought to make all the documents public, but the Justice Department has argued successfully in court to keep them secret. Crucial details, however, have been revealed through poor redaction, documents that were filed publicly by mistake and the sheer difficulty of keeping so much a secret for so long.

Buying Into an Operation

In spring 2011, U.S. Tobacco Cooperative was looking to expand its distribution network. The co-op is made up of about 700 tobacco farmers — from Virginia to Florida — who pool their crops and share the profits. Based in Raleigh, N.C., the company is a major exporter to China and produces discount-brand cigarettes including Wildhorse, Traffic and 1839.

“These are really, really good people,” said Stuart D. Thompson, the cooperative’s chief executive. “Every year, they take all their chips. They put them on the table, and they hope they get them all back.”

They also had an existing secret relationship with the A.T.F., records show.

The two men have filed court documents acknowledging “participation in undercover law enforcement activities.” And a judge’s sealed order, which is publicly available online, revealed that the two men worked “on behalf of various government agencies, primarily the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.”

Photo

Jason Carpenter and Christopher Small, who owned Big South Wholesale in Bristol, Va., have acknowledged participating in undercover law enforcement operations.

The basics of cigarette smuggling are simple. Each state sets its tobacco taxes. Buying cigarettes in low-tax states, like Virginia, and secretly selling them in higher-tax states, like New York, generates large profits. More complicated schemes have shipped cigarettes to Indian reservations, where they are not taxed, then rerouted them for sale on the black market.

A.T.F. agents try to disrupt these networks. Often that means working with informants to buy and sell tobacco on the black market, much the way agents pose as drug dealers to investigate cartels.

Because so much of the case remains sealed, Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Small are prohibited from answering questions about nearly every aspect of the case. “Everything we did that is being attacked now in litigation, we did in good faith,” they said in a statement.

Photo

Stuart D. Thompson, chief executive of U.S. Tobacco, on the manufacturing floor of the plant in Timberlake, N.C. Credit Jeremy M. Lange for The New York Times

Exactly who at U.S. Tobacco knew about their A.T.F. ties and what they knew are a matter of dispute. But there were signs that Big South was not a simple tobacco distributor. Its assets included more than two dozen vehicles, including expensive S.U.V.s and a fleet of Mercedes, B.M.W., Audi, Lexus and Jaguar sports cars.

Early 2011 was a time of intense pressure inside the A.T.F. The agency was under fire from Congress over the Fast and Furious operation, in which agents allowed gun traffickers to buy weapons and ship them to Mexico, hoping the shipments could lead them to major weapons dealers. Justice Department auditors began scrutinizing how A.T.F. agents managed their tobacco smuggling investigations.

With that audit continuing, the A.T.F. issued new rules to tightly monitor undercover investigations. Soon after those rules went into effect, U.S. Tobacco completed its purchase of Big South for $5.5 million, a deal that gave Big South the authority to buy and sell cigarettes on behalf of the cooperative. Almost immediately, the farmers say, Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Small began defrauding them.

It worked like this: An export company working with the A.T.F. placed an order for cigarettes to be shipped internationally — thus not subject to American taxes. Big South would instead ship bottled water and potato chips, making it look as if cigarettes had been exported. Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Small would then buy the tobacco at a slight markup through a private bank account. Lastly, they would sell the tobacco to Big South, again at a markup.

“It’s what I saw with my own eyes,” said Brandon Moore, the warehouse manager and one of the people who discussed the transactions in the case. Their accounts fit with descriptions in court records.

Mr. Moore said he was aware of the A.T.F. operation but became troubled by it as he learned more. “It shouldn’t be going on, even if it is the A.T.F.,” he said.

In one deal described in the lawsuit, the informants bought tobacco at $15 a carton and sold it to U.S. Tobacco at $17.50. The profit, about $519,000, went into what was known as a “management account.” That account, while controlled by Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Small, helped pay for A.T.F. investigations.

Mr. Moore, the warehouse manager, said agents often told him what to buy on the company’s credit card. For instance, he recalled spending tens of thousands of dollars at Best Buy on iPads, televisions and other gifts to curry favor with potential criminal targets.

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A testing room at U.S. Tobacco’s Timberlake facilities, where buyers can sample types of tobacco. Credit Jeremy M. Lange for The New York Times

Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Small have also acknowledged in court documents receiving more than $1 million each, though it is not clear from public documents whether that was profit or reimbursement for expenses paid on behalf of the government.

How that arrangement began is unclear. Ryan Kaye, an A.T.F. supervisor, testified that the management account was created “as a result of verbal directives from the A.T.F. program office and other headquarters officials.” Mr. Kaye’s full statement is sealed, but excerpts are cited in one publicly available document.

The defendants in the lawsuit contend that U.S. Tobacco got a good deal on the cigarettes, even at the prices they paid. The farmers tell a different story, saying they never would have purchased Big South if they understood that Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Small had a side arrangement that involved selling them tobacco at inflated values.

The arrangement began to break down in late 2012, when Mr. Thompson joined U.S. Tobacco as the chief financial officer. He was curious why his warehouse was placing so many orders for a brand of cigarette that competes against U.S. Tobacco. He could not get a straight answer, the company said in court documents.

In March 2013, Mr. Moore picked up the phone, called Mr. Thompson and explained what was happening. “I did what I did because of the ethics of it,” Mr. Moore said recently. “What was happening there was wrong.”

Once U.S. Tobacco discovered the bookkeeping irregularities, it reported them to the Justice Department, which investigates white-collar crime and government misconduct. Records show that the Justice Department, which includes the A.T.F., investigated some aspects of the case but no charges were filed.

“We voted unanimously to give everything we had to the government,” said Charlie Batten, a U.S. Tobacco board member whose family has worked the same North Carolina soil for generations. “We thought they would take it and run with it. What happened was, they’ve fought us tooth and nail.”

Because of the sealing order, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Batten and others are prohibited from discussing what happened to the money — even with their own farmers.

Three years into its lawsuit, U.S. Tobacco still cannot disentangle itself from the government. The cooperative recently told a judge that it was under investigation by the Treasury Department.

All those secret tobacco sales, it turns out, should have been taxed. And the government wants its money.

****

House Homeland Security Committee: Tobacco and Terror: How Cigarette Smuggling is Funding our Enemies Abroa… by stoptobaccosmuggling on Scribd

Iran Buying War Torn Syria Real Estate, Pipelines Abound

Damascus, Syria is known as the city of Jasmine. It is rich in religious history including Christians, Jews and Muslims. If there is any question about how Iran is advancing their power in the region to include Syria and eventually erasing history, then read on.

Now?  AFP

BEIRUT: Syrian government forces fired rockets at a rebel-held area on Damascus’s outskirts on Sunday, pressing an attack that began the day before and has killed up to 16 people, a medical worker and war monitors said.
The medical worker and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said it was the biggest attack on the Qaboun area, to the city’s northeast, in at least two years.
At least three shells hit government-held areas closer to the center of Damascus and near Qaboun on Sunday, but there were no reports of casualties, a Hezbollah-run military media unit and a Reuters witness said.
On Saturday, a government sniper killed one person in the area and rockets hit a cemetery on Qaboun’s outskirts, the medical worker, who asked not to be named, told Reuters.
The British-based Observatory also reported attacks on a cemetery.
Reuters could not independently verify the accounts.
There was no immediate government comment on the Damascus fighting.
The Observatory said 16 people had died in the violence around Qaboun since Saturday, the highest death toll from fighting there for more than two years.
The medical worker in nearby Eastern Ghouta, just outside Damascus, said at least 13 people had died. He said he could hear explosions coming from Qaboun early on Sunday.
Violence in western Syria has increasingly tarnished a shaky cease-fire which took effect on Dec. 30, backed by Damascus ally Russia and Turkey, which supports rebels.

*** Related image

The Syrian Commission for Media has issued a report regarding purchases and long-term renting carried out by figures with close ties to the Syrian regime, including Abdullah Nazzam, Iran’s man in Syria. Real estate offices in Damascus have confirmed Nazzam’s unprecedented activity in buying property in capital.

Reports from Damascus and Tehran said that Iran’s men have expanded their purchase activities to include a number of properties in the capital since last June.

The activities of pro-regime businessmen in the purchase of real estate were largely limited to areas of eastern Damascus, namely the Old City, but after June, Abdullah Nazzam expanded his sights on the entire capital.

In addition, the Iranians have also increased their purchasing activities in Eastern Ghouta, largely in Maliha, which is owned by the state, making it easier for the Iranians to circumvent local Syrian laws, especially after the decline of Eastern Ghouta’s battalions after fierce fighting rocked the region last year.

Syrian opposition sources confirmed earlier that many hotels – including Caldah, Iwan, Asia, Damascus International, Venice and Petra – are now owned by the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, ​​in addition to holding shares in the Samiramis Hotel. The Iranian Embassy also sought to buy huge portions of real estate in the Old City of Damascus, specifically in the area extending from behind the Umayyad Mosque to the Bab Touma area, and in the western region of al-Maryamiyah neighborhood.

Image result for iran buying real estate in syria VOA

*** Iranians Buying Up Land in War-Torn Syria

New buildings are seen in Damascus, Syria, in this file photo. Iranians are investing in and providing labor for some of the construction in the war-torn country. AFP PHOTO/ LOUAI BESHARA

New buildings are seen in Damascus, Syria, in this file photo. Iranians are investing in and providing labor for some of the construction in the war-torn country. AFP PHOTO/ LOUAI BESHARA

VOA: Iran’s government wants its builders to buy up property in Shi-ite majority neighborhoods of Syria’s capital, Damascus.

It is also asking construction workers to go to Syria.

This information comes from construction industry officials in Tehran and Iranian experts.

Iranian analyst Fariborz Saremi said owning real estate gives Iran more control over Syria and other parts of the Middle East.

Rich and conservative Iranian business people with ties to the government are buying expensive homes in Damascus, according to news reports. This is influencing price increases in Syria’s real estate markets.

“Five million houses have been destroyed in the civil war,” said Syrian economist Khorshid Alika told Voice of America. “The increased Iranian demand to buy land and properties has naturally led to more inflation in the market.”

Iran’s interest in Syrian real estate is not new. But it increased after the rebel uprising began in 2011.

Government-run media have been reporting recently about how Iran joined Russia to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Assad’s government has been fighting against rebels and the Islamic State terror group.

Iran is not only asking people to buy homes and property in Syria. The country is also asking construction workers and contractors to take jobs there.

One contractor said a fellow contractor with close ties to the Iranian government told him he had a chance to make money in Damascus.

“When we asked about the security, he said that the zone is even more secure than Tehran,” Iranian contractor Amir Maghsoudloo told VOA.

Iran is home to about 3 million people from Afghanistan. Many fled the war-torn country. Most earn low wages in Iran. They are being offered better paying construction jobs in Syria.

Some Damascus construction projects are run by Afghan nationals from Iran, said Tahi Esmali. He is an Afghan national who works as a bricklayer. He had worked in Iran before moving to Syria in 2015.

Iranian interests are not limited to Damascus. Iranian business people and companies are looking to invest in projects in the central Syrian city of Homs. The Syrian military and its Lebanese Hezbollah allies recaptured Homs in late 2015.

The Iranian government has supported Syrian President Assad. Recent reports in state-run media say that Iran increased the size of its Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria.

*** What more is causing all the interest in Syria by Iran and Russia? Well there are other countries with interests as well….pipelines.

As noted in late 2015: The Syrian Civil War stems from a disagreement between the Saudis and Russia over the route for a new gas pipeline ducting Gulf gas to the lucrative European markets. Russia, whose only Mediterranean base is located in Tartus, Syria, supports Assad’s initiative of a gas pipeline from Iran through Iraq and Syria (the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline). But Saudi Arabia’s hardline Sunni Muslims wants to overthrow Syria’s Assad, who is a Shia Muslim, for religious reasons. They want to run a 100 per cent Sunni-controlled pipeline from Qatar through Syria and Turkey (the Qatar-Turkey pipeline), into Europe. As a result of this disagreement a proxy war is taking place in Syria between the aforementioned powers. Meanwhile displaced Syrian refugees are flooding into Europe with jihadis in their midst.

Map of proposed Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline and Qatar-Turkey pipeline

Originally, Europeans were strongly in favor of deposing Assad for so-called “humanitarian reasons”. Their humanitarian concerns for Assad’s repressive regime veil the truth – Europe resents depending on Russia for 40 per cent of its gas. Russian President Putin annexed Crimea and maintained a belligerent stance, pushing Europe to favor the pipeline proposal of Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi plan to duct natural gas all the way to Europe through Syria and Turkey came with a catch – Assad would have to be toppled. The US supported the initiative as Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base would disappear with Assad. Thus, the Western world had itself a new plan that would bring peace and prosperity to the region. That is after the “initial shakeout” necessary to oust Assad.

The “initial shakeout” didn’t go as planned. Russia-backed Assad proved far more resilient than anticipated. But more importantly, western-backed Islamic militias committed such barbaric acts of terror they even made Assad, and Russia, look good in comparison. An emboldened ISIS gradually took over several of the region’s oil fields to fund its operations to the tune of $50 million per month by smuggling oil into Turkey. The routes and means were well established during the previous oil embargo on Iraq and so are the financial networks that profit from it in Turkey. Today, crude oil illegally smuggled by ISIS into Turkey accounts for a fairly significant 3.5 per cent of Turkey’s total oil imports. More here.

The JPOA, Billions Given by Obama to Iran Results in Huge Profits

Remember, Barack Obama and John Kerry gave billions to Iran, which is to say to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Two companies owned and controlled by the Supreme leader are Setad and Bonyad Mostazafan.

  For the full summary investigation performed by Reuters, go here.

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Iran Irony: IRGC And State Firms Are Benefiting From JCPOA

Mr. Alavi is an Iranian activist focusing on human rights, social crackdown, the regime’s support for terrorism, and its nuclear program.

Forbes: Those who raised the Iran deal flag, mainly in the United States and Europe, claimed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would boost trade and encourage foreign investment, enhancing Iran’s private sector and eventually downgrading the regime’s tight grip on the economy.

This was back in 2015 when the P5+1 agreed to lift sanctions in return for having Iran’s nuclear program curbed. Now in early 2017, however, signs indicate the main winners in Iran are none other than state-owned companies. This means Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the terrorist-supporting Revolutionary Guards are enjoying JCPOA benefits.

At least 90 of the nearly 110 agreements, totaling nearly $80 billion, involve such state-controlled companies. This includes the National Iranian Oil Company, parallel to others run by regime pension funds and massive conglomerates of semi-public nature.

Despite a long slate of harsh remarks made by Iran’s hardliners against the JCPOA, a recent Reuters study shows those businesses answering directly to Khamenei are benefiting most from the JCPOA.

Many deals, spanning the energy, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals and other sectors, remain in the preliminary stage. Iran’s foreign partners mainly include France, Germany, Italy, Russia and South Korea.

Iran’s “Setad Ejraiye Farman-e Hazrat-e Emam,” also known as the Headquarters for Executing the Order of the Imam and best known as Khamenei’s personal empire, has been the main benefactor of the highly flawed nuclear pact. This entity has stakes in and control over nearly all of Iran’s economy and benefits significantly through the JCPOA.

A 2013 Reuters probe shed light on Setad’s $95 billion empire, established through illegally seizing thousands of properties owned by business people, Iranians living abroad and religious minorities.

“A major network of front companies controlled by Iran’s leadership” is how the U.S. Treasury Department described Setad as it sanctioned the massive entity. Through the JCPOA, however, this conglomerate has enjoyed doing business with foreign companies.

One of the three such deals signed with foreign companies involves a $10 billion oil refinery construction plan. While Khamenei may not personally own these companies, his shadow—described as supervision—is essentially routing all invested finances.

In the past 18 months Khamenei-controlled companies, including the IRGC conglomerate, have sealed deals with foreign companies valued at over $11 billion.

It is a known fact that Tehran maintains a heavy hand over the economy, providing circumstances allowing state-controlled firms to acquire most business deals made possible after sanctions were lifted. The private sector makes up a mere 20% of Iran’s economy, according to official estimates.

To this end, private companies have received a dismal 17 deals, including a hotel management contract sealed most probably because of the French partner’s chief executive being the brother of Eshaq Jahangiri, Iran’s vice president.

The first slate of investments inked for Iran is most likely to strengthen state power, meaning Khamenei, counter to any hopes raised prematurely by JCPOA supporters. The supreme leader enjoys vast control, especially in the IRGC, through which he pursues his Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon policies.

Conglomerates, or foundations, whose chiefs are appointed directly by Khamenei, were the recipients of five of the 90 deals. Several of these entities enjoy widespread business transactions and not being obligated to pay full taxes. This includes Astan Qods Razavi, a vast religious institution controlling at least 36 subsidiary companies and entities.

One such firm is the Razavi Oil & Gas Development Company that sealed a preliminary agreement with Italy’s Saipem, also an oil and gas company.

The IRGC, known for its domestic crackdown and dispatching tens of thousands of Shiite militia members and arms throughout the region, is also considered a major destination point of JCPOA benefits.

The IRGC controls or has large stakes in four of the 90 deals sealed with the Iranian regime. And of course, Khamenei enjoys full hegemony over the IRGC. Despite remaining U.S. sanctions banning any “significant” business transactions with the IRGC, many of its front companies are free of any blacklisting.

Three of the four mentioned deals are signed with companies with strong ties to the IRGC and yet are not sanctioned. And to add insult to injury, the fourth company is on sanctions and yet enjoys involvement in a foreign deal through indirect routes.

Loopholes remain in the sanction regime imposed against Iran, all resulting from an appeasement/engagement approach adopted by former president Barack Obama. This is a gap in need of closing at a policy level.

“Despite a decline in sanctions… the Iranian economy is suffering from recession. The Iranian economy is under the control of the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC. They are the only one who will benefit from trade with Iran and not the Iranian people,” said Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi in a conference. Rajavi is president of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an umbrella group of Iranian dissident entities, including the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).

Debate over the JCPOA’s future remains a major issue. If kept intact despite all its flaws, the U.S. should fully implement all articles and have each and every loophole sealed. This initiative can be coupled with further sanctions punishing Iran’s lethal meddling across the Middle East, pursuing a dangerous ballistic missile program and atrocious human rights violations.

Presidential Daily Briefing for Trump on Russia

There are rumors flying that the intelligence agencies are holding back on key items that would otherwise be included in the PDB’s, especially items regarding Russia. Okay, we cannot know for sure that is true or not. In fact there are denials this is accurate. While countless media outlets are reporting that some ‘higher-ups’ in some intel agencies are in a war with President Trump, it is all because he is in a war with them. Sheesh….while all this is going on, other allied world leaders are watching all this and are feeling quite uneasy over intelligence collaboration and most especially where all this leads.

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Some one needs to restore order and confidence here and do it fast. At issue is Russia and Iran.

  1. The Russian spy ship doing an ‘in-your-face’ Atlantic coast water adventure and is presently just outside of Norfolk, Virginia and headed back to the Cuba region.
  2. Meanwhile, the new Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson is in Germany meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.
  3. Another item is General Dunford is in Azerbaijan, meeting with Russian Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Gerasimov.
  4. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Qods Force is in Moscow. Soleimani has a U.S. and U.N. travel ban and sanctions on him such that he is not allowed to travel. Hah…
  5. Ciaran Martin, head of GCHQ’s new National Cyber Security Centre states that Russia is escalating the rate of hacks against the UK. The United States, Canada, Australia and the UK are the four countries of record that make up GCHQ.
  6. Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work met with Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Pavlo Klimkin at the Pentagon regarding discussion over the recent escalation of violence by combined Russian separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.
  7. Because of Russian aggression and the lasting threat to the Baltic States, General Mattis has ordered U.S. troops deploy in Bulgaria.
  8. Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions 139 times using heavy armor in all sectors in Donbas in the past 48 hours.

    Situation in Donbas February 13, 2017 Ukraine conflict map

    9.  Russia tells White House it will not return Crimea to Ukraine.
    10. Russia has secretly deployed a new cruise missile that American officials say violates a landmark arms control treaty, posing a major test for President Trump as his administration is facing a crisis over its ties to Moscow. The missile (Kalibr) is a SSC-8. It is a nuclear capable missile first tested in 2008. While this launch was ground based, it can also be launched from a submarine and is capable of holding 1000 lbs of conventional explosives or a nuclear warhead. There are variants to this weapon, there is also the Iskander and the 9M728. Nonetheless, it is a violation of the INF Treaty.
    Lastly and a very good thing, while Vladimir Putin is calling for full intelligence cooperation with the United States, General Mattis has not, no….not ready. Further, Mattis said that Russia needs to prove itself….tic tic tic…

    11. Soldiers, tanks and M88 recovery vehicles from the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment’s “Fighting Eagles” recently arrived at the airbase in Romania in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. So far, more than 350 U.S. soldiers have arrived this month with another 150 set to arrive before the end of February.

So, should there be some normalizing of relations between the White House and the Kremlin? Nah….has not worked out so well when it comes to Iran or Cuba…