As it has been proven by countless authorities, chemical weapons used in Syria still continues today with future conditions ripe for more death events by chemical weapons.

Bashir al Assad is a desperate man today and nothing is beyond desperate decisions including more chemical weapons or attempting to kill his Vice President.

In part from the WSJ:

Assad Chemical Threat Rises
U.S. intelligence agencies believe there is a strong possibility the Assad regime will use chemical weapons on a large scale as part of a last-ditch effort to protect key Syrian government strongholds if Islamist fighters and other rebels try to overrun them, U.S. officials said.

Analysts and policy makers have been poring over all available intelligence hoping to determine what types of chemical weapons the regime might be able to deploy and what event or events might trigger their use, according to officials briefed on the matter.

Last year, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad let international inspectors oversee the removal of what President Barack Obama called the regime’s most deadly chemical weapons. The deal averted U.S. airstrikes that would have come in retaliation for an Aug. 21, 2013, sarin-gas attack that killed more than 1,400 people.

Since then, the U.S. officials said, the Assad regime has developed and deployed a new type of chemical bomb filled with chlorine, which Mr. Assad could now decide to use on a larger scale in key areas. U.S. officials also suspect the regime may have squirreled away at least a small reserve of the chemical precursors needed to make nerve agents sarin or VX. Use of those chemicals would raise greater international concerns because they are more deadly than chlorine and were supposed to have been eliminated. Read more here.

*** Obama defers the chemical weapons operation in Syria to Russia. Obama announced his red-line of use of chemical weapons in Syria as a shallow and empty threat. This decision is best described as giving a known terrorist ICBM’s. How so?

In part from Congressional documents: When Yeltsin took office in January 1992, the US forced his public admission that there had been an offensive Soviet BW program and that it had continued until March 1992. Yeltsin promised the US president and the British prime minister to abolish the program, which he apparently presumed to think would be possible by decree, and to dismiss the military officials who had run the program for the preceding decades. However, he did not do any of these things. These same military officials who advised Yeltsin in January 1992 to continue the BW program remained in their positions. Following additional defections from the program, the US and UK stated that the BW program continued as of September 1992, and they forced Russian agreement to the Trilateral Statement, signed in Moscow in September 1992. Russia committed itself in the document to allow access to the biological weapon facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defense. However Russian negotiating teams ran these negotiations into the ground between 1993 and 1996, at which point they were discontinued. An unconcerned and essentially oblivious Yeltsin had long before this point simply washed his hands of the issue despite repeated appeals by President Clinton and his senior officials.

US and EU assistance programs for the conversion of the Biopreparat and Ministry of Agriculture facilities led to access to these and assurance that they were subsequently performing legitimate civilian research and commercial activities. Virtually no proliferation apparently took place from the Soviet BW program. Official annual US government declarations continue to question Russian compliance with the BWC, and the three major Ministry of Defense facilities remain closed to this day.

In a somewhat bizarre development in February and March 2012 Putin and then-Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov publicly referred to 28 tasks that Putin established for the RF-MOD in order “to prepare for threats of the future.” Putin wrote that Russia needed to be prepared for “quick and effective responses to new challenges,” and one of the 28 tasks that Putin specified as “The development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical, etc.”2 “Genetic” weapons would obviously be forbidden by the Biological Weapons Convention, and the remainder are an arms control nightmare that would explicitly contravene another multilateral arms control treaty that was championed by the Brezhnev administration, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Technologies, signed on May 18, 1977 and entered into force on October 5, 1978.

The three primary issues of current concern regarding Russia and biological weapons are therefore the following:

1) Russia destroyed the Trilateral negotiations that followed from the September 1992 US-UKRussian Trilateral Agreement.

2) As a corollary, the three Russian Ministry of Defense BW laboratories remain closed to international examination. There is no way of knowing whether these institutions continue an offensive BW program, and if so, to what degree.

3) The statement by President Vladimir Putin in February-March 2012 to develop genetic weapons is extremely problematic and troubling. Putin’s remarks were never revoked or clarified to this date.

 Where is Obama and Samantha Power at the UN on this matter?

What real explanation can Barack Obama offer that he turned to Putin to deal with the matter in Syria? How much more genocide will there be and will it be confined just to Syria?

In part: “Ken Alibek was Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, the first deputy chief of research and production for the Soviet biological-weapons program. He was the top scientist in the program, a sprawling, clandestine enterprise known as Biopreparat, or The System, by the scientists who worked in it. Biopreparat research-and-production facilities were flung all across the Soviet Union. As Dr. Alibekov, Ken Alibek had thirtytwo thousand scientists and staff people working under him. Alibek has a Doctor of Sciences degree in anthrax. It is a kind of superdegree, which he received in 1988, at the age of thirty-seven, for directing the research team that developed the Soviet Union’s most powerful weapons-grade anthrax. He did this research as head of the Stepnagorsk bioweapons facility, in what is now Kazakhstan, which was once the largest biowarfare production facility in the world. The Afibekov anthrax became fitfly operational in 1989. It is an amber-gray powder, finer than bath talc, with smooth, creamy particles that tend to fly apart and vanish in the air, becoming invisible and driffing for miles. The Alibekov anthrax is four times more efficient than the standard product. Ken Alibek is part of a diaspora of biologists who came out of Russia foflowing the breakup of the Soviet Union. Government funding for research decreased dramatically, and scientists who were working in the biowarfare program found themselves without jobs. Some of them went looking abroad. A few have come to the United States or Great Britain, but most went elsewhere. “No one knows where they are,” Alibek says. One can guess-that they’ve ended up in Iraq, Syria, Libya, China, Iran, perhaps Israel, perhaps India–but no one really knows, probably not even the Russian’ government. No doubt some of these biologists have carried the Alibekov formi4a in their heads, if not master seed strains of the anthrax and samples of the finished product in containers. The Alibekov anthrax may be one of the more common bioweapons in the world today. It seems plausible that Iraqi biologists, for instance, know the Alibekov formula by now. One day, Ken Alibek and I were sitting in a conference room near his office taMng about the anthrax he and his research team had developed. “It’s very difficult to say if I felt a sense of excitement over this. It’s very difficult to say what I felt like,” he said. “It woulddt be true to say that I thought I was doing something wrong..l thought I had done something very important. The anthrax was one of my [outstanding] scientific personal result.” I asked him if he’d tell me the formula for his anthrax. “I cadt say this,” he answered. “I won’t publish it. I’m just curious,” I said. “Look, you must understand, this is unbelievably serious. You can’t publish this formula,” he said. When I assured him I wouldn’t, he told me the formula for the Alibekov anthrax. He uttered just one sentence. The Alibekov anthrax is simple, and the formula is somewhat surprisingi not quite what you’d expect. Two unrelated materials are mixed with pure powdered anthrax spores. It took a lot of research and testing to get the trick right, and Afibek must have driven his research group hard and skdmy to arrive at it. “There are many countries that would to know how to do this,” he said.”