As Obama Accepts More Migrants, Heed the Threat Lessons

Syrian Refugees – Organised Crime’s New Market and Jihadis’ New Cover

TRAC: In an intense propaganda blitz, the Islamic State published eight videos pertaining to refugees and the refugee crisis. The media push by the Islamic State complimented the Caliphate’s recent written propaganda regarding hijrah and refugees fleeing the Middle East in the eleventh issue of Dabiq.  Published from a wide cross-section of the Caliphate – Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The specific Islamic State provinces in the media campaign included:

  • Wilayat Ninawa
  • Wilayat al-Barakah
  • Wilayat Hadramawt
  • Wilayat Hims
  • Wilayat al-Khayr
  • Wilayat al-Furat
  • Wilayat al-Fallujah
  • Wilayat al-Janub
  • Wilayat Salahuddin

For complete access to each video and complete analysis

Introduction

Image: March -May 2015 Maritime and land based migrant routes

Click Image for larger view

Reported Cases of ISIS Migrant Incidents

After years of Syrian civil war, the refugee population en masse has finally reached beyond the borders of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to reach the European Union (EU).  The media has made much of the Islamic State taking advantage of the migrant community through traveling to Europe in their midst to avoid detection.  To date, there are five media-reported incidents of Islamic State (ISIS) trying to infiltrate Europe by hiding among the refugees and two reported Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). (see cases below)

Not an Islamic State Priority Right Now

Islamic State operatives seem to be able to enter and leave Turkey nearly at-will.  ISIS cell activity within Turkey is well documented and, until at least recently, was tolerated on some level. Evidence to this point includes pictures on social media posted throughout 2014 of ISIS fighters enjoying meals in popular restaurants and making shopping trips in Turkish cities.  While the Islamic State is comfortable within Turkish borders, there will not be much need for hiding among the refugees.  However, as soon as pressure becomes too intense to stay and operate within Turkey (i.e travel becomes inhibited or the need for attacking within Europe becomes a priority) the necessity to slip unnoticed into the migrant population will reach urgency for the Islamic State. One Islamic State smuggler claimed that IS was forced to use migrant paths to move people because as the world has gotten better at tracking jihadis returning from Syria, return plane travel from Turkey has just become too dangerous.It cannot be stressed enough that at this point in time the proportions of known Islamic State militants that have “passed” as refugees are minuscule compared to the legitimate number of urgent victims of tyranny.   The fear that even a few IS operatives could attack soft targets in EU countries has sounded a great alarm within the right wing movement.  So much so that some countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, are impeding the flow of immigrants into Western Europe.

Win/Win for ISIS

For the Islamic State hiding among the migrants is a win/win scenario. Either

  • the ruse will be successful and ISIS will have yet another way to travel into areas where they do not have an operational presence —or—
  • the few ISIS members who are caught will incite a backlash of popular opinion and a harsh over reaction from EU members which will radicalize more within their own borders.

The far right wing has already seized the opportunity to capitalize on the Islamic State threat within the migrant population and shifted popular opinion in many areas to distrust the group of people who are fleeing war.

Case Studies

Opportunity for Terrorist Organisations

Any terrorist organization, but most especially the Islamic State, will seek to exploit the current situation to their operational benefit. It is already well known that in both Libya and Turkey, ISIS often cooperates with organised criminal elements both on the individual and group level.  To date, there are only five media-reported cases of Islamic State infiltrating migrant networks:

Image: September 17, 2015 Unverified photo of Abdel Majid Touil the Bardo Museum planner (Case Study I below) emerges. 

Case I : Bardo Museum Planner

May 20, 2015 — Abdel Majid Touil, a Moroccan national and the planner of the attacks on Bardo Museum in Tunisia, utilised sea routes between Libya and Italy in order to reach the EU. He is also thought to be involved in recruitment for ISIS[1].  For More: TRAC Insight: Translation and Commentary on Islamic State: Adopting the Bardo Museum Operation in Islamic Tunisia

Case II : 5 Arrested at Macedonia-Bulgaria Border

September 03, 2015 — Five men linked to ISIS attempted to cross over the MacedoniaBulgaria border and were promptly arrested after a failed attempt to bribe the border security officer. The five men aged from 20 to 24 years, traveling aboard a car registered in Kosovo, came to the border post Gyueshevo. The guard was suspicious after the group tried to bribe their way past the border with US Dollars.  Upon searching their smartphones, beheadings videos as well as Islamic State propaganda material were discovered.[2]

Case III : Moroccan National

September 09, 2015 — An ISIS operative, a Moroccan national with a German passport, was detained by Bulgarian authorities and extradited to Germany. The 21 year old suspect was detained at the Hamzabeyali/Lesovo border between Turkey and Bulgaria, carrying forged documents. It is reported that the suspect insisted on being extradited to Germany where he faces a European Arrest Warrant. [3]

Case IV : Calais, France Refugee Camp

September 11, 2015 — A suspected terror operative is believed to be amongst the migrant camps in Calais, France, prompting a search by French authorities. Residing in one of the largest refugee camps within France, the suspect is believed to have left Syria at the end of August 2015 with the intention of traveling to Britain. To further complicate the search, the camp is also a ‘no-go’ zone for French authorities. [4]

CASE V : Stuttgart, Germany Refugee Center

September 09, 2015 — An ISIS operative was arrested in a refugee center in Stuttgart, Germany in possession of forged Syrian passports. Identified after police linked him to a European arrest warrant issued by the Spanish authorities, he was arrested for attempting to infiltrate under the guise of a refugee seeking asylum. [5]

Case I : JN Already in Germany

September 09, 2015 —  Hungarian media outlets reported that a Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) member has also been reported to have made it all the way into the heart of Europe disguised as a refugee. [6]

Case II : JN En Route to Germany

September 9, 2015 An Estonian reporter recognizes an AQ operative whom he interviewed two years ago among refugees en route to Germany. (see image below)

Organized Crime

Image: September 16, 2015 Dutch journalist buys Syrian passport for $825 including picture of PM Mark Rutte.

Counterfeit Passports

The trade for counterfeit Syrian passports is at an all time high.  German customs officers have reported seizing boxes containing Syrian passports being smuggled into Europe.  Fake Syrian passports are being traded for at least $1,500 USD.  Surprisingly many posing as migrants have been found to have multiple passports, which indicate some are not authentic refugees but rather buying their way to “asylum seeker” status.

Lucrative Human Trafficking into EU

From kidnapping refugees stuck at border crossings out of Syria to becoming a part of the human smuggling machine, the Islamic State is notorious for creating and then exploiting refugees, thereby taking full advantage of criminal economic activities.

From the Libyan route, Syrians count for the largest share of migrants taking the journey to Europe.  Before the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya had drastically limited the migration and trafficking in Europe, but with Gaddafi gone and despite the growing insecurity in Libya, the number of migrants risking the dangers of crossing the Mediterranean has soared. Just about anyone with access to a boat can draw substantial profit by transporting migrants from North African to Southern Europe.  This includes the Islamic State.

Bulgaria acts as a predominant transit point of human trafficking within and into the EU. Organised crime syndicates in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have established links with Bulgaria at the centre. The routes from the South Caucasus to Bulgaria are sea and land based through the Black Sea and Turkey respectively, connecting the South Caucasus to the EU. Therefore, with Syrian refugees in Turkey, this paves way for organised crime syndicates to move with or define the direction of migration.

The Fixers

In January 2015, BuzzFeed had the rare interview with a self-proclaimed Islamic State human smuggler out of Turkey.  His claim of sending small groups of Islamic State fighters hidden inside cargo ships filled with refugees cannot be independently verified by TRAC, but his story is nonetheless useful in understanding the overall mindset of the Islamic State.  The unnamed smuggler claimed that the fighters smuggled into Europe were from many locations: some fighters were Syrian, others from various Middle Eastern states, yet others from European nations. He said that a minority claimed to be from the United States.  He also claimed that they waited until the ship was filled to capacity (even over capacity) to send the fighters over.

Buzzfeed also interviewed two other “independent” smugglers who claimed to have also helped the Islamic State for a profit.  One claimed to have smuggled at least 10 fighters on his ships, then backed out for fear of being caught when the Islamic State wanted him to send more.   The other said he’d been sending ISIS fighters for months.  The second smuggler claimed that some of the fighters’ intentions were merely to take leave from the battle front to visit their families back home, while others claimed that they were going back to Europe to be ready when the battle begun in the EU. [7]

Narcotics from Bulgaria

In May 2015 Syrian coastal province of Latakia seized about two tons of narcotics near the beach of Cape of Ras al-Bassit believed to have originated in Bulgaria.  Nearly six million tablets of Captagon were contained in the seizure and suspected to be headed toward the Islamic State.

Captagon, known by its most active ingredient fenethylline, is a powerful psychotropic known for helping to overcome fear, fatigue and pain.  (It is also known for increasing sexual performance).  Industrial production in Bulgaria has been active since the communist regime and Bulgarian ‘experts’ have been reported to “travel the Arab world, selling their skills”.   Since 2013, Captagon production within Syria has accelerated to such high levels that it has outpaced production in other countries such as Bulgaria.  Though Syria started producing Captagon itself,  “Bulgarian expertise in the matter persists.” Bulgarian exports are largely consumed by the fighters of the Islamic State and is rumored to be the “drug of choice” among its fighters.  The implication is that Syrian and Bulgarian producers stay in touch, and Bulgarian experts not only continue to teach them how to produce a better product but also continue provide the Islamic State Capatgon in the form of small white pills. [8]

Additionally, heroin trafficking syndicates in the South Caucasus region and Turkey have established connections and conduits in Bulgaria which facilitate the movement of consignments into and within the EU. Routes through the Black Sea are often one part of a larger web of routes from Afghanistan through Central Asia and Iran. As with human trafficking, Turkey and the Black Sea act as channels towards the EU.

Images: September 9, 2015 An Estonian reporter recognizes an AQ operative whom he interviewed two years ago among refugees en route to Germany. Although this is not an Islamic State fighter, it should be noted that the threat remains the same.

Rationale

The increased momentum in the exodus of refugees/migrants towards the EU has put the spotlight on the role of organised crime. Organised crime elements would seek to capitalise upon the presence of a new market of Syrian refugees in using their logistical operations to facilitate the travel of migrants. This can also be extended to accommodate the expansion of their operations (drugs, arms and/ or contraband) under the cover of travelling migrants. In the broader scheme of the situation, terrorist organisations would utilise the circumstances of migrant influx into the European Union in order to mask their infiltration, where they will see benefit in cooperating with organised crime elements, defining a nexus. In turn this has put Turkey and Libya at the centre of the issue given its status of permitting the entry of Syrian refugees and access to the European mainland. Further, this sheds light on the possible routes migrants can take where the weighing factors are availability of journeys, financial feasibility, lower mortality risks and shorter travel time or distances. Additionally, this influences the choice of possible routes that can be taken by land, sea or air, discussed in the following section.

Image: Internal and External directional movement of displaced Syrians, January to June 2015

Air, Land & Sea Routes

Sea

Aegean and Mediterranean Sea (Turkey & Libya)

Turkish Coast

Identified routes used by organised crime elements include the Turkish coastal cities of Izmir in the north-west and Mersin in the south-east. Given their geographical proximity to the Aegean Sea, it makes sense that migrants using these boarding points would aim to disembark in Greece. These migrants often make their way to the north- Aegean Greek islands of Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Ikaria or Samos just off the north-eastern coast of Turkey. After spending an amount of time in a refugee camp, they are transferred to Athens. Often migrants seeking refuge then journey to countries such as Germany or Sweden with relatively liberal asylum laws. However, the weather conditions of the Aegean and Mediterranean make such a journey a risk to safety and security as cases of boats capsizing have been a prominent recurrence. Prices for boat journeys from Izmir are an estimated $5000.

Image: Greek Islands of Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria

Libya: Travel Through Egypt and Sudan

The role of organised crime elements also factor into this where militias and terrorist organisations cooperate with such elements in order to achieve infiltration into the EU. Libya in North Africa is also a prominent origin point for refugees fleeing conflict, to make their journey towards the EU. To reach Libya, Syrian refugees often go through Egypt and Sudan, two of the few countries that still do not require a visa to Syrian citizens.  Inputs from a recent interview confirm these routes are also being used to smuggle ISIS operatives into the EU by assigned handlers. Prices for smugglers’ boat trips from Libya to Italy reportedly range from $400-$4000. Additionally, prices from Alexandria to Greece or Italy are $7000 plus.

Image: Routes from Sudan and Egypt to the Libyan ports of Benghazi, Tripoli and Zuwarah

Constantly Changing Port of Origin

In going to and from Syria, the operatives are provided fake Syrian passports to get into Syria or to increase the chances of a successful asylum application in the EU. Additionally, such handlers are required to constantly change their port of origin due to crackdowns by Turkish authorities. Due to this plus joint action from NATO nations in tracking ISIS movements, the use of air travel proves risky as well as land routes. Hence, the use of these routes to move ISIS operatives to and from Syria is paramount to their logistical operations.

Security concerns over the cooperation of terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates in Libya towards facilitating the infiltration of ISIS operatives have led to increased focus in the region.

Capsizing leads to Alternative Routes

Furthermore, reports of capsizing refugee boats in the Mediterranean and the Aegean would compel would-be asylum seekers to find alternate routes towards Europe. Moreover, with the heightened discourse of the EU permitting asylum to refugees, the safety and economic security of the EU would also prompt refugees to journey towards Turkey; given its borders with the EU, the chances of gaining entry and asylum in the EU are higher.

Black Sea (Turkey to Bulgaria via Georgia)

An Alternative for Refugees

The Black Sea is a relatively unexplored avenue, known to be used for civilian and industrial maritime transport.  These would serve as possible mechanisms for Syrian refugees to enter the EU. With a surge of refugees seeking journeys to the EU, the pressure on overland routes, adverse weather conditions in the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea and scarcity of civilian maritime transport journeys in the Black Sea, would present the Black Sea as an alternative transit point towards the EU. Domestic politics in the South Caucasus would also prompt refugees to capitalise upon this alternative if and when required. Organised crime syndicates trafficking heroin and human consignments would recognise these factors and hence, supply the alternative in the creation of a new market, trafficking Syrian refugees to the EU

Civilian Maritime Transport & Regional Politics

Examining the ferry route map below, it is clear that there are many points amongst the different nations along the Black Sea which serve as points for boarding and disembarking. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey places civilian maritime transport as a channel for passage into the EU from Turkey via Georgia to Bulgaria. Nations in the South Caucasus like Armenia, Georgia and its seceded breakaway, Abkhazia have all voiced their willingness to accept fleeing Syrians, although with different motives. Abkhazia has shunned ethnic Georgians in the past but wishes to repatriate those with Abkhaz roots to Abkhazia increasing their ethnic population. Therefore, domestic politics fuelled by ethno-nationalism acts as a motivator for Abkhazia to accept Syrian refugees. Georgia and Armenia have also opened their doors to Syrian Christians fleeing violence. Syrian refugees in Turkey if not meeting these criteria, would ideally use forged documents to demonstrate their Christian faith or Abkhaz roots, looking at cases of Syrian refugees’ conversions to Christianity to increase their chances of successful asylum applications in Germany.

Image: Map of UKR Ferry’s routes in the Black Sea

Therefore, the potential for directional movement towards these nations exist, moreover as a transit point towards the EU where desirable. In the Black Sea ferry route map below, it is evident that Batumi is the main port of departure from Georgia for journeys towards Bulgaria and Romania. The price for a passenger ticket using Navbulgar’s ferry service is ‎€100.

Image: Screenshots of UKR Ferry’s ferry routes and schedule details from Batumi, Georgia to Constanta, Romania

Image: Screenshots of Navibulgar’s ferry routes and schedule details from Batumi, Georgia to Varna, Bulgaria

Scarcity: Opportunity for Organised Crime

Although departures to the port of Varna in Bulgaria happen once a week, departures to Constanta in Romania occur just twice a month. Furthermore, some of these route schedules transit through Ukraine. The infrequency of civilian transport in the Black Sea as well as the non-directness of routes overall would prompt migrants to seek alternatives, particularly in the event of unavailable space on the ferry routes.

The presence of organised crime syndicates in the South Caucasus, Turkey and the Balkan Peninsula is not a new occurrence. Human trafficking from Georgia to Turkey and Bulgaria as well as drug trafficking from Georgia to Bulgaria, via the Black Sea are identified routes. This is owing to the high frequency of instances of human trafficking from Batumi, Georgia to Varna, Bulgaria. The number of Georgian nationals revealed in post-trafficking interviews and investigations as well as Armenian, Turkish and EU nationals indicate the presence of a land and maritime based human trafficking infrastructure. Additionally, land and maritime trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan through central Asia and Iran use Batumi, Georgia as a port of transit towards the EU via the Black Sea. Hence, the convergence of human and drug trafficking networks in the Black Sea constitute a concrete trafficking infrastructure. Ranging from the South Caucasus, through West Asia and the Balkan Peninsula, this acts as an alternative route for Syrian refugees.

Image: Map depicting heroin trafficking routes through the Black Sea and other locations

Stable weather conditions at this time of year in the Black Sea compared to the Mediterranean and Aegean reduce the operational risks of travel. Coupled with the finite number of conventional options available, the circumstances of migrants compels them to take advantage of sea based trafficking initiatives by organised crime syndicates, where it is seen as a mutually beneficial venture.

Land Routes

Hamzabeyli/Lesovo Border (Turkey to Bulgaria)

Image: Border between Turkey and Bulgaria at the Hamzabeyli/Lesovo crossing

Border Infrastructure

The land connectivity from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria present two entry routes to the EU for Syrian refugees. The economic circumstances in Greece makes it a  transit point for refugees to the rest of the EU. Bulgaria however, does not have as much a robust land border infrastructure compared to its EU counter-part Greece. This gives incentive for refugees to reach the EU through Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s lack of a robust land border infrastructure can be attributed to its economic factors and internal corruption, particularly in recent cases of Bulgaria’s Interior Ministry where numerous officials have been sacked for involvement in facilitating human and drug trafficking into Bulgaria. Although it is important to note that circumstances have improved since Bulgaria’s entry into the EU in 2007, yet the legacy of these factors are felt on the ground today. Bulgaria is currently mulling strengthening its border security infrastructure with Turkey. Bulgaria is especially eager to do this to demonstrate itself as a responsible stakeholder in the EU, in ensuring border security. This also has much to do with its prospective acceptance into the Schengen Treaty and hence Bulgaria draws upon EU financial resources to implement these infrastructure changes.

Scarcity of Civilian Land Transport

Land travel has its advantage and provides greater flexibility in terms of the availability of alternatives, in the event of a border closing. The routes and the conditions of travel even if inconvenient, have a greater degree of certainty compared to turbulent weather conditions through sea travel in the Mediterranean or Aegean. The use of civilian transport such as buses are limited in capacity.

Organised Crime: Opportunities & Travel Conditions

Organised crime elements would capitalise on a now larger land based clientele, Syrian refugees. However, land based trafficking requires that the vehicle of transport be moving for most of the time in order to evade detection. It also requires refugees if in large numbers, to remain hidden in a concealed manner to achieve this which proves hazardous. Hence, if refugees prefer safety over desperation, movement would be restricted only to a handful of refugees at a time. With favourable weather conditions and compelling circumstances of conflict in the region, incidents of land based trafficking can be expected to rise. Additionally, the strengthening of security at Bulgaria-Turkey border would prompt refugees to take alternative routes through the sea into Varna, Bulgaria, Constanta, Romania or risk a short but dangerous trip across the Aegean. The reported price for land-based smuggling between Turkey to the EU ranges from $7,500-$12,500.

Air Routes

Turkey to the European Union

High Costs

Air travel is a direct route yet expensive and reserved for those Syrian refugees who come from wealthy backgrounds or those who have family in the EU who can sponsor their air travel. This is the most advantageous in terms of directness, safety and security as well as assurance of arriving at the intended destination, assuming stable conditions for air travel in the region. Although, this opportunity is limited due to financial constraints and possible barriers should EU policies turn towards restricting the entry of refugees.

Organised Crime: Facilitators

The role of organised crime syndicates is also limited in this. If not being responsible for the passage of refugees, they can facilitate the procurement of flight tickets for air travel by offering higher prices, factoring in the presumed wealth of their air fare customer base and desperation to reach the EU. Black market air fares for direct flights from Turkey to Germany are reportedly $10,000.

Intra-EU Travel

Image: Info-graph depicting refugee statistics (Source: CNN/UNHCR)

Whilst refugees may travel to certain entry points into the EU, these points may not be their final destination. As seen in recent trends of refugees fleeing to the EU, there are pushes towards those EU states whose policies and perceived attitudes towards refugees are friendlier. Hence, it would prompt travel towards countries such as Sweden and Austria. Although Germany has temporarily reinstate its border controls owing to a massive influx of refugees which can be attributed to Germany’s refugee-friendly policies amongst EU nations.

EU Nations (+Norway & Switzerland) Ranked by Syrian Asylum Applications

Image: Screen shot of Cumulative Syrian Asylum Applications in EU + Norway & Switzerland from April 2011 to August 2015 (Source UNHCR)

  • Germany: 108,897
  • Sweden, 64,685
  • Hungary: 54,125
  • Austria: 20,946
  • Netherlands: 15,254
  • Bulgaria: 15,197
  • Denmark: 12,277
  • Switzerland: 8,683
  • United Kingdom: 7,196
  • France: 6,895
  • Belgium: 6,334
  • Spain: 5,554
  • Norway: 5,210
  • Greece: 3,969
  • Cyprus: 2,622
  • Romania: 2,332
  • Italy: 2,143
  • Malta: 928
  • Poland: 718
  • Finland: 656
  • Croatia: 352
  • Czech Republic: 304
  • Luxembourg: 241
  • Portugal: 188
  • Slovenia: 187
  • Ireland: 101
  • Latvia: 89
  • Slovakia: 61
  • Estonia: 42
  • Lithuania: 28

The number of asylum applications towards individual EU nations act as individual scores of preference amongst refugees and indicate the direction of intra-EU movement. Coupled with attempted crossings from countries like Macedonia into Bulgaria or from Serbia into Hungary to reach refugee- friendly Austria, this indicates an intra-EU movement of the majority refugees from the east towards the north and west of the European Union.

It should be noted that Hungary closed its borders on September 16, 2015. This would prompt movement of refugees towards the EU state of Croatia. However, mortal risks would further alter the directional movement of a significant portion of migrants (See link below).

For More on First Migrants Enter Croatia After Hungary Seals Border

Final Note

The current issue of refugees fleeing to the EU incentivises organised crime elements to capitalise on the presence of a new market, the trafficking of refugees. The convergence of human and drug trafficking networks  as a single whole, defines the presence of a vast trafficking infrastructure.

Limited resources and pressure on civilian transport for land routes, prices of air routes and limited availability of civilian maritime routes make organised crime elements a prominent stakeholder in enterprising land and maritime routes as a part of its trafficking infrastructure and facilitating access to air routes. Individuals may be willing to incur such risks; however, those with families may or may not have the emotional capacity to do so. It is also important to note that irrespective of whether refugees reach their final destination or not, the financial outcome for organised crime syndicates remains unaffected. This is even more so due to the interaction between the desperation of refugees and the financial gains for organised crime syndicates.

Terrorist organisations would additionally capitalise and avail the opportunities of infiltration. Under the guise of refugees through the routes discussed above in conjunction with organised crime syndicates, foreign fighters can pass virtually unnoticed. Additionally, the securing of borders opens up alternatives elsewhere, possibly where the terrain is favourable for infiltration, e.g. forests and mountains. This presents mounting challenges for the EU where it is compelled to find the thin line between allowing the entry of refugees whilst weeding out terror operatives or a blanket order of shutting its doors to refugees.

 


The data in this TRAC insight is deemed reliable although not independently confirmed by TRAC in all cases.

[1] Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3089046/Moroccan-believed-taken-gun-massacre-Tunisian-museum-left-21-tourists-dead-arrested-Italy.html (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[2] Available at http://www.dreuz.info/2015/09/03/arrestation-de-5-combattants-de-letat-islamique-infiltres-parmi-des-migrants/ (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[3] Available at http://www.novinite.com/articles/170738/Bulgarian+Court+Extradites+Suspected+IS+Affiliate+to+Germany

[4] Available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4553674.ece (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[5] Available at http://newobserveronline.com/isis-terrorist-arrested-in-stuttgart-refugee-center-boxes-of-fake-syrian-passports-intercepted/ (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[6] Available at https://www.rt.com/news/314788-hungary-migrants-isis-terrorists/ (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[7]  ISIS Operative: This Is How We Send Jihadis To Europe

[8]  Insight: War turns Syria into major amphetamines producer, consumer  and Vu de Bulgarie. Aux origines de la potion magique de Daech – View from Bulgaria. The origins of the Islamic State’s magic potion and Bulgaria – Iraq – Syria: Islamic State Would Have Obtained Important Quantities of Captagon From Bulgaria

Obama/Kerry to Announce Iran Deal Czar

Given the diplomatic background of Stephen Mull, there is nothing of any significance that proves he is up to the newly created position. Simply put, this is a very odd choice but more to a puppet position. In fact, as Ambassador to Poland, he was expelled.

US to name coordinator for implementing Iran nuclear deal

Author: Laura Rozen

AlMonitor: With the Iran nuclear deal expected to emerge intact this week from a grueling 60-day congressional review, the Barack Obama administration is preparing to unveil a new office for coordinating its implementation, to be led by outgoing US Ambassador to Poland Stephen Mull.

The announcement of Mull’s appointment as US coordinator for the Iran nuclear deal implementation is expected to be made by Secretary of State John Kerry as early as Sept. 17 — the deadline for Congress to have sent a resolution of disapproval to the president, a move that was blocked by Senate Democrats — or shortly thereafter, US officials said. It is expected to come as the White House also announces the nomination of State Department Counselor Tom Shannon to succeed Wendy Sherman as undersecretary of state for political affairs, as Al-Monitor previously reported.

A veteran foreign service officer, Mull previously served as executive secretary of the State Department (2010-12), ambassador to Lithuania and, most critically, as senior adviser to then-Undersecretary of State William Burns (2008-10) when Burns was the lead US Iran nuclear negotiator and the United States was helping negotiate UN Security Council Resolution 1929 that sanctioned Iran over its nuclear program, among previous relevant assignments. (Mull was described by one former State Department colleague as “Burns’ right arm.”)

Mull, contacted by Al-Monitor, declined to comment on his anticipated new appointment before it is officially announced. His successor as US envoy to Poland, Paul Jones, was sworn in by Kerry at the State Department on Sept. 11.

Mull “is a brilliant choice,” Richard Nephew, former top State Department Iran sanctions official, told Al-Monitor, noting Mull’s experience on the Iran file under Burns from 2009-10 and wide-ranging work with agencies across the government. He may want to bring on as his deputy coordinator somebody who has invested a decade-plus specifically on the Iran file to complement his experience, Nephew said.

Beyond the near-term ribbon-cutting, the office may get off to a somewhat slow start, as Mull gathers his team, meets with all the senior people throughout the government and foreign interlocutors, and brings himself up to speed on every detail of the past two years of negotiations and the 159-page Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, former US officials suggested.

Mull is expected to oversee a small team of up to seven people, based at the State Department, who will coordinate US government implementation of the JCPOA across US government agencies as needed, including the White House, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Department of Energy and so on.

The team will be “lean … not more than seven” people, and Mull “will have reach” across the entire interagency to convene what he needs, said a US official, speaking not for attribution to discuss the still-fluid plans for the office.

The small team working under Mull will be “coordinating this very large interagency group of people, hundreds of people,” across multiple agencies, including the State and Treasury departments and the labs employing Department of Energy nuclear experts, to ensure that both Iran lives up to its commitments under the JCPOA, and the United States lives up to its commitments, a second US official said, stressing that “the function of the team is a coordinating function.”

On the nuclear and sanctions issues, Mull brings a variety of expertise to the table, including his experience serving as Burns’ senior adviser from 2008 to 2010 when the United States was helping negotiate the critical UN Security Council Resolution 1929, and as executive secretary of the State Department, in which he coordinated lots of people to serve then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, now Democratic presidential candidate.

The coordinating team will be structured with Mull in charge; he will have an assistant coordinator and a handful of deputies responsible for different functions, including congressional reporting, verifying the nuclear piece, sanctions and sanctions relief.

The other members of the P5+1 — the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — are also in the process of organizing themselves to implement the JCPOA. The JCPOA mandated that a Joint Commission — comprised of each member of the P5+1, plus the European Union and Iran — be established to meet regularly to coordinate implementation of the landmark Iran nuclear deal and work out any disputes that may arise.

“We are still in process and have not decided yet who will be representing us in the Joint Commission,” a Russian official told Al-Monitor, adding that Russia is likely to be represented on the Joint Commission at the expert level, rather than by its chief Iran nuclear negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov.

France is likely to be represented on the Joint Commission by its political director and chief Iran nuclear negotiator Nicolas de Riviere, a French official told Al-Monitor.

Who will lead the European Union team on the Joint Commission “is still a work in progress,” an EU official told Al-Monitor on Sept. 15. An Iran task force has been established at the European External Action Service, led by Portuguese diplomat Hugo Sobral. Also mentioned as a possibility is Stephan Klement, the longtime top nonproliferation adviser to European Union Deputy Secretary-General Helga Schmid, who played the central role in over two years of Iran nuclear deal negotiations and the drafting of the final deal, reached July 14 in Vienna.

Iranian officials told Al-Monitor they were still figuring out their representation on the Joint Commission, and they understood the same to be true of some of the other P5+1 governments.

“At this moment, all these questions are under consideration in Iran and even, I assume, by other P5+1 countries, and no definite position has yet been made on them,” a member of the Iranian negotiating team, speaking not for attribution, told Al-Monitor on Sept.16.

Diplomats from Iran and the P5+1 are expected to meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly opening session that gets underway in New York later this month. Both US President Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani are scheduled to address the UN General Assembly on the first day, Sept. 28.

The first meeting of the Joint Commission is likely to happen in New York at the political director level. “It’s supposed to be held on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York,” a senior Iranian official, speaking not for attribution, told Al-Monitor on Sept. 15. He added that the date is not finalized yet.

“Adoption day” of the JCPOA is Oct. 18 — 90 days after the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution endorsing the deal, US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told journalists at a press conference in Vienna on Sept. 14 on the sidelines of an International Atomic Energy Agency general conference.

Barring surprises from Congress, after Sept. 17, “our expectation … is that the agreement will then go forward,” Moniz told journalists in Vienna on Sept. 14. “Certainly our thinking … is [then] on the question of implementation.”

“This is a large task,” Moniz said. “And my view … is that over the next year and a half, the most important thing is in fact implementing well on all sides, and essentially demonstrating the value [of the Iran nuclear deal] so that … next year, what we will see [is that] the Iran nuclear program has been rolled back substantially.”

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/mull-coordinator-iran-nuclear-deal.html#ixzz3m1azEm00

Kerry’s Iran Deal Destroys Power of Congress, Stalls Business

If John Kerry was still in the Senate, would he have accepted or tolerated this kind of action? Further, what if any government employee or diplomat would hold hostage an entire body of government?

Obama Admin: Iran Deal Limits New Congressional Action on Iran

The recently inked nuclear accord with Iran restricts the United States’ ability to impose new sanctions on the Islamic Republic in response to terror activities, human rights abuses, and ballistic missile development, according to a document provided to Congress by the Obama administration and obtained exclusively by the Washington Free Beacon.

Secretary of State John Kerry writes in the document that although the nuclear accord theoretically allows Congress to impose new non-nuclear sanctions, American lawmakers will be restricted from enacting legislation that Iran could use as an excuse for walking away from the deal, according to the document, which was provided as an on-the-record response to a series of questions from Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.).

Experts who spoke to the Free Beacon raised alarms about the Obama administration’s response, which they claim would give Iran a veto over congressional efforts to respond to Iranian human rights atrocities and global terror activities. Tehran, they say, would claim that such measures are an excuse for re-imposing nuclear sanctions slated to be lifted under the deal.

Iran claimed in a letter sent to the United Nations last July that it would treat any new sanctions efforts—including those not related to its nuclear program—as a violation of the deal, specifically if those sanctions targeted Iranian entities that had once been penalized for illicit nuclear activity.

Iran emphasized in the letter that it would enforce that interpretation “irrespective of whether such new sanctions are introduced on nuclear related or other grounds,” according to a copy of the letter published by Foreign Policy.

Kerry, in his recent letter to Rubio, admitted that the United States will have limited options in sanctioning Iran.

Congress will not have “free rein to simply re-impose tomorrow all of our nuclear-related sanctions under some other pretext,” Kerry wrote. “Iran would obviously see that as bad faith.”

“We do not have free rein to re-impose nuclear-related sanctions without a credible rationale,” Kerry said later in the document.

Insiders told the Free Beacon that the administration’s stance would likely prevent the United States from responding to Iranian aggression and human rights violations.

“You have to understand how crazy backwards this is,” a senior D.C.-based political strategist involved in the fight over Iran sanctions legislation told the Free Beacon. “If you’re an Iranian general who is just involved in terrorism, we may be able to sanction you for that.”

“But let’s say you’re an Iranian general who was involved in the nuclear program, and we designated you for that but now under the deal we’re delisting you,” the strategist said. “If you now switch to being an arch-terrorist, Congress can’t touch you because the Iranians will say we’re doing an end-run around the JCPOA.”

Kerry declined to support new congressional actions against Iran, stating that the administration would “remain vocal about human rights violations in Iran” and would only “continue to enforce existing human rights sanctions.”

The administration’s stance comes amid repeated promises to lawmakers that the administration would double down on the use of sanctions as a means to push back against Iranian non-nuclear aggression.

Meanwhile:

Corporate America stuck on the sidelines in Iran

TheHill: U.S. companies won’t be rushing in to do business in Iran, even once the terms of the landmark nuclear accord go into effect.

Lawmakers have been unable to kill the terms of the agreement on Capitol Hill, but lingering sanctions and the threat of new action will prevent the vast majority of American companies from setting up shop in Iran — even while their foreign competitors race in.

“If you’re a U.S. company, the day after implementation day is going to look a lot like the day before implementation day,” said Richard Nephew, who worked on Iran sanctions within the Obama administration and is now a program director at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

“I’m really, really skeptical that any major U.S. companies are going to want to tread in that space until they are pretty sure that they’re not going to get bitten as a result of this.”

“It would be a big mistake,” agreed Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), one of the few Senate Democrats to oppose the deal, “because there’s going to be still a whole host of other sanctions that will still exist for Iran’s non-nuclear transgressions, and it is likely that we will see other sanctions come down the road.”

In fact, except for caviar, carpets and a few other specific areas, the U.S. economic relationship with Iran won’t change much at all.

The nuclear deal lifts sanctions on Iran’s oil and financial sectors in exchange for limits on its ability to build a nuclear bomb.

The vast majority of U.S. sanctions, however, will only be lifted on foreign companies — not American firms.

“We are not removing our trade embargo on Iran,” a senior administration official said in a recent briefing with reporters. “U.S. persons and banks will still be generally prohibited from all dealings with Iranian companies, including investing in Iran [and] facilitating cleared country trade with Iran.”

However, there are a few exceptions.

Once regulators certify that Iran has taken a number of steps to shut down its nuclear program — which won’t happen for a few months — some industries will have a small amount of flexibility.

The most notable is civilian aircraft materials, of which Iran is in desperate need.

 The U.S., in return, will allow imports of Iranian carpets and foodstuffs including caviar and pistachios. Those shipments serve a symbolic purpose but aren’t likely to have a transformational effect on the Iranian economy, analysts said.

Some foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies can also begin doing business in Iran. The Obama administration has yet to signify exactly what types of activities might be allowed, though, so it remains to be seen how overseas subsidiaries will respond.

In any case, corporate America doesn’t appear to be chomping at the bit to rush in to Iran, which may be in part due to the threat of new sanctions from Congress.

Opponents of the Iranian nuclear deal on Capitol Hill have so far failed in their bid to block it and are now turning to other avenues to undermine the agreement.

Meanwhile, as GOP presidential candidates are quick to remind people, the terms of the deal could be abandoned with the stroke of a pen from the next resident of the White House.

Those comments might cause

businesses to be wary of investing heavily in a legal opening that could close in just 16 months.

Europeans, meanwhile, have a different story to tell.

While many American firms will be on the outside looking in at Iran, the deal will lift most United Nations and European Union sanctions on Iran, which could open the floodgates for foreign firms.

“The bottom line is U.S. companies and U.S. persons will be more constrained, because we will have what is essentially a unilateral, U.S.-only embargo,” said William McGlone, a partner at the Latham & Watkins law firm who specializes in export controls and sanctions.

Some jostling has already begun.

“There are huge trade delegations over there,” said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who leads the Senate Armed Services Committee and is strongly opposed to the deal.

“There’s not an empty hotel room in Tehran.”

The main target of that foreign activity is likely to be energy, though the degree to which American firms get in on the game remains a question mark.

Federal analysts say the country has up to 30 million barrels of oil in storage and could grow its production by up to  700,000 barrels a day once sanctions are lifted.

Iran’s oil minister said in May that “we will witness involvement” of American firms once that happens, but even companies bullish on the prospects aren’t moving quickly to confirm their involvement.

Royal Dutch Shell told The Hill in May that the company is “interested in exploring the role Shell can play in developing Iran’s energy potential,” but a spokesman Wednesday said only that that position still stands.

Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-La.), a member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said he doesn’t expect many U.S. companies to join the parade to Iran, citing uncertainty about the stability of the country’s legal system and its lax environmental regulations.

But other countries, Cassidy predicted, are ready to move in when they can.

“The Chinese are going to be the ones who benefit the most in terms of trade, and then the Russians and then the Germans,” he said. “I don’t think the American companies would be anywhere close to it.”

“This is an incredible deal — if you’re in another country, starting with Iran.”

Release bin Ladin AQ Iran Documents

Former VP Dick Cheney gave a speech a week ago that proved Iran played a large role in support of al Qaeda and the attacks of 9-11.

Backgrounder on Iran and al Qaeda beginning in 2007.

WSJ Editorial: White House Should Release Bin Laden Letters Showing Iran-Al Qaeda Alliance

The Obama administration should release all of the papers found at Osama Bin Laden’s complex that expose the ongoing ties between Iran and al-Qaeda, The Wall Street Journal urged in an editorial (Google link) Tuesday.

The editorial noted that former Vice President Dick Cheney gave a speech last week in which he quoted Gen. Michael Flynn, the former chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as saying that the papers included “letters about Iran’s role, influence and acknowledgment of enabling al-Qaeda operatives to pass through Iran as long as al-Qaeda did its dirty work against the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Flynn described the contents of the papers as “very telling” and said that Congress should seek the complete collection.

The editorial cited an example from one of the papers that has been made public.

In a memo to bin Laden, an al Qaeda operative talks about another who is ready to travel:

“The destination, in principle, is Iran, and he has with him 6 to 8 brothers that he chose. I told him we are waiting for final complete confirmation from you to move, and agree on this destination (Iran). His plan is: stay around three months in Iran to train the brothers there then start moving them and distributing them in the world for their missions and specialties.”

The editorial observed that while the 9/11 Commission concluded that there was no proof that Iran knew about al-Qaeda’s plan to strike the United States on September 11, 2001, “there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al-Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers.” A number of the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission about Iran’s cooperation with al-Qaeda were collected here.

The editorial also cited State and Treasury Department reports on the ties between Iran and al-Qaeda during the past four years, and called on President Barack Obama to release all the documents detailing the ties between Iran and al-Qaeda. If he does not, “Congress ought to demand them.”

Many governments and news sources have reported in recent years on ties between Iran and al-Qaeda. The Canadian government said in 2013 that two suspects in a plot to attack a passenger train had been supported by members of al-Qaeda who were based in Iran. A spokesman for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria said last year that al-Qaeda did not target Iran in order to leave its network inside Iran intact. The pan-Arab newspaper a-Sharq al-Awsat reported in February that Saleh al-Qarawi, a senior member of al-Qaeda who operates in Iran, had been targeting American interests in the Gulf since 2007.

Sky News reported on Sunday that Iran was freeing five senior al-Qaeda members it had been holding. It is thought that they will leave Iran and head to Syria, “prompting fears they will join other terrorists in Syria planning attacks on the West.”

***

Not long after his inauguration in January 2009, President Barack Obama penned a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. As a presidential candidate, Obama had promised to conduct “tough, direct diplomacy” with the Iranians. And Obama figured, correctly, that all diplomatic entreaties would end up on Khamenei’s desk. So, the newly elected president decided to write Iran’s ultimate decision-maker directly. And he has written several letters since.

According to the Wall Street Journal, which first reported on the correspondence, Obama sent his latest letter to Khamenei in October of last year. The president was hoping to find common ground with the Iranians in Iraq, where the Islamic State, an offshoot of al Qaeda, has made stunning advances since early 2014. Obama believes that the United States and the Shiite jihadists of Iran have a common interest in pushing back the Sunni jihadists of the Islamic State. If the two sides can just resolve the thorny issue of Iran’s nuclear program, Obama reportedly thinks, that will pave the way for détente, and possibly a de facto alliance against our mutual enemies. Indeed, the president entertains the idea that Iran can be America’s partner in combating Sunni extremism throughout the region.

President Obama’s assumption is grossly mistaken. The president’s own State and Treasury Departments have repeatedly exposed Iran’s ongoing sponsorship of al Qaeda. Moreover, terrorists directly tied to al Qaeda’s Iran-based network have plotted attacks in the West on three occasions since Obama took office.

Most recently, in September, the Obama administration launched missile strikes against al Qaeda’s so-called Khorasan Group in Syria. The administration pointed to intelligence indicating that this cadre of “core” al Qaeda operatives was planning mass killings in the West, and possibly even in the United States. Two of the terrorists who lead the Khorasan Group formerly headed al Qaeda’s operations in Iran. Tellingly, Iran allowed this pair to continue their fight against the West, even as they have battled Iran’s chief allies in Syria.

Obama’s Treasury Department first publicly recognized the relationship between the Iranian regime and al Qaeda on July 28, 2011. Treasury added six al Qaeda operatives to the U.S. government’s list of designated terrorists. The principal terrorist among them is known as Yasin al-Suri, “a prominent Iran-based al Qaeda facilitator” who operates “under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian government.” Treasury described al Qaeda’s presence in Iran as a “core pipeline” and “a critical transit point for funding to support al Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Treasury made it clear that other high-level al Qaeda members were actively involved in shuttling cash and recruits across Iran.

On December 22, 2011, the State Department announced a reward of up to $10 million for any information leading to Suri’s capture. The reward is one of the largest offered by the U.S. government in its “Rewards for Justice” program, which is designed to help hunt down terrorists. “Operating under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian Government, al-Suri moves money and al Qaeda recruits from the Middle East through Iran and on to Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Foggy Bottom said in its announcement. “Iranian authorities maintain a relationship with al-Suri and have permitted him to operate within Iran’s borders since 2005.”

Just a few months later, on February 16, 2012, Treasury designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) a terror-sponsoring organization. “MOIS has facilitated the movement of al Qaeda operatives in Iran and provided them with documents, identification cards, and passports,” Treasury explained. “MOIS also provided money and weapons to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) .  .  . and negotiated prisoner releases of AQI operatives.”

The Islamic State is the successor to Al Qaeda in Iraq and grew out of the organization. Obama, therefore, seeks Iran’s cooperation against an entity the Iranian regime has supported.

The administration’s public scrutiny of the deal between Iran and al Qaeda, especially Suri’s role, likely had an effect, but it hardly ended the collusion. In late 2011, Suri was temporarily replaced as al Qaeda’s chieftain inside Iran. But another veteran terrorist filled in for him.

On October 18, 2012, the Treasury Department announced another designation, saying it “further exposes al Qaeda’s critically important Iran-based funding and facilitation network.” Muhsin al-Fadhli, a Kuwaiti long wanted by the U.S. government, had replaced Suri, Treasury noted. Fadhli “began working with al Qaeda’s Iran-based facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by the Iranians.” But the regime “subsequently released” Fadhli in 2011, and he quickly assumed al Qaeda’s top post in the country.

“In addition to providing funding for al Qaeda activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Treasury explained, Fadhli and his al Qaeda comrades in Iran are “working to move fighters and money through Turkey to support al Qaeda-affiliated elements in Syria.” Treasury also named Fadhli’s deputy in Iran, Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi, in the designation.

Fadhli’s arrest and release is hardly surprising. This is how the Iranian government makes sure al Qaeda doesn’t step out of line. In its October 2012 designation, Treasury explained how the deal works.

“Under the terms of the agreement between al Qaeda and Iran, al Qaeda must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities,” Treasury revealed. “In return, the Government of Iran gave the Iran-based al Qaeda network freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists and their families. Al Qaeda members who violate these terms run the risk of being detained by Iranian authorities.”

Curiously, the Iranians continue to allow the al Qaeda terrorists operating on their soil to support the Nusra Front, which has been fighting Iranian-backed forces in Syria. The Nusra Front is an official branch of al Qaeda and openly loyal to al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.

On February 6, 2014, Treasury designated yet another al Qaeda member working in Iran. “The [al Qaeda] network also uses Iran as a transit point for moving funding and foreign fighters through Turkey to support al Qaeda-affiliated elements in Syria, including the al-Nusrah Front,” Treas-ury said at the time. And there was another new development: Fadhli had relocated to Syria, where he linked up with the Nusra Front.

Ayman al Zawahiri ordered a number of al Qaeda operatives from around the globe to move to Syria in 2013 and 2014. These terrorists, including Fadhli, formed the Khorasan Group, which was instructed to explore different ways to launch mass-casualty attacks in the West. The Khorasan Group is not a separate entity, but instead deeply embedded with the Nusra Front. When the United States launched missile strikes against the Khorasan Group in September 2014, officials pointed to Fadhli, in particular, as a threat to international security. It was rumored that Fadhli had been killed in the airstrikes, but his death was never confirmed, and he may very well have survived.

Another member of al Qaeda’s Khorasan Group in Syria is a senior al Qaeda leader known as Sanafi al-Nasr. He, too, has been designated a terrorist by the Obama administration. Treasury added him to the government’s list of al Qaeda terrorists on August 22, 2014. Prior to working with al Qaeda in Syria, Nasr “served in early 2013 as chief of al Qaeda’s Iran-based extremist and financial facilitation network.” Nasr relocated to Syria, paving the way for Yasin al-Suri to resume his role as al Qaeda’s head man in Iran. Upon his arrival in Syria, Nasr posted multiple tweets on his popular Twitter feed indicating that he could not wait to strike American interests.

The Iranians may or may not have known what al Qaeda’s Khorasan Group was up to in September 2014, when the Obama administration decided military force was necessary to stop them. But the Iranian regime has long worked with the likes of Fadhli and Nasr. They almost certainly would not have been allowed to relocate to Syria in the first place if the Iranians had not blessed the move. And, according to the Obama administration, the Iranians knowingly allow the al Qaeda facilitators inside Iran to funnel support to Al Nusra, which houses the Khorasan operatives.

On at least two other occasions since January 2009, terrorists tied to al Qaeda’s Iran network planned to lash out at the West. As first reported in these pages (“Al Qaeda’s Network in Iran,” April 2, 2012), American and European counterterrorism officials thwarted a Mumbai-style attack in the West in 2010. The international plot, which was likely the last one overseen by Osama bin Laden prior to his death, relied on European recruits who traveled to northern Pakistan for training. The cell traveled through Iran, relying on Yasin al-Suri and his subordinates to coordinate their movements. According to one of the would-be terrorists who was put on trial in Germany, they relied on the Iranian ratlines in order “to not get caught.” After the plot was broken up, some of the cell’s surviving members were given safe haven inside Iran for a time, even as they were hunted by the West.

And on April 22, 2013, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced that they had disrupted an al Qaeda plot to derail a passenger train traveling from New York to Toronto. Canadian officials said the plotters received “direction and guidance” from al Qaeda members in Iran. According to Reuters, investigators think that one of the suspects “traveled to Iran on a trip that was directly relevant to the investigation of the alleged plot.” Citing “U.S. national security sources close to the investigation,” Reuters added that the detained operative had met with “low- to middle-level al Qaeda fixers and ‘facilitators’ based in the town of Zahedan, close to Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, that moves money and fighters through Iran to support its activities in South Asia.” That description is entirely consistent with Treasury’s summary of the network headed by Yasin al-Suri, who has maintained a base of operations in Zahedan.

Fortunately, none of these al Qaeda plots against the West has come to fruition. Western counterterrorism and intelligence officials intervened in each case. But a clear pattern emerges: Al Qaeda is using its Iran-based operations to export terrorism around the world. And the Iranians, according to the Obama administration, allow them to do so.

President Obama seeks a nuclear deal with Iran and hopes that this will pave the way for cooperation against our common enemies throughout the Middle East. He fundamentally misunderstands the situation. Even though Iran and its allies are clearly opposed to al Qaeda everywhere from Yemen to Syria, the Iranians still see value in supporting al Qaeda. For Khamenei, the United States is Iran’s chief adversary, not al Qaeda.

The Iranians do not want to work with the United States against the Islamic State either. Khamenei repeatedly, and falsely, blames the United States for the Islamic State’s rise in Iraq and Syria. The supreme leader consistently says the West, not the Islamic State, is the biggest threat to Iranian interests.

More than six years into his presidency, Obama is still seeking a deal with the Iranians. Meanwhile, al Qaeda has had a much easier time coming to an accommodation with Iran.

Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

BUSTED: Immigrant’s Handbook Getting into Europe

 

Behind this handbook operation is: http://bordermonitoring.eu/ Germany has been in full cooperation until command and control was lost and other neighboring pushed back hard like Hungary. This site requires translation.

 

Sky Finds ‘Handbook’ For EU-Bound Migrants

The “rough guide” contains maps, tips and phone numbers of organisations which might help refugees making the perilous crossing.

 

 

 

About this site

w2eu.info provides information to refugees and migrants that might be useful on their journey to and through Europe. We want to give access to counseling and useful contacts in different european countries.

From the very start at the outer borders of Europe, many forces are going in an inhuman direction: people are refused entry, are imprisoned and deported. Nevertheless they are coming – challenging the migration regime. And there are movements supporting them in their struggle for a better life.

“I can see clearly now what Europe looks like, that it sends its armies to fight us at the sea and puts us in awful prisons. Together we have to start a second journey to another safe place that might exist in the future.” (Eritrean woman, arriving on the island of Lesvos)

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If you find anything on the site that is no longer valid, please let us know by sending an email.

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