Terrorists likely stockpiling explosives in EU, says Europol
The threat of terrorists attacks in the EU remains the top national security concern among member states, with some 211 foiled plots last year alone, according to a top EU security official.
The threat of another attack similar in scale to the Paris attack in November last year or in Brussels this past March has national authorities on edge. Manuel Navarrete Paniagua, the head of the European Counter Terrorism Centre at the EU police agency Europol, told euro-deputies on Monday (23 May) that terrorist cells in the EU were likely stockpiling explosives for later use.
“We have some information reported by the member states that terrorists groups are trying to establish large clandestine stockpiles of explosives in the European Union to be used eventually in large scale home attacks,” he said.
Related: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
Paniagua was briefing MEPs in the civil liberties committee on the yet-to-be published EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE-SAT) compiled by Europol and member states.
The report is set for publication in a few weeks’ time.
Paniagua cited figures and broader conclusions due in the report, noting that “jihadist terrorism” remains the top threat to security in the European Union.
The latest attacks in the EU suggest much better coordination among the terrorists than previously thought. He said their combined use of explosives and firearms was also a novelty and a threat that is evolving rapidly.
Authorities have yet to nail down any single profile of a home-grown terrorist or foreign fighter.
But he said many have petty criminal backgrounds. He pointed out a significant proportion of foreign fighters have also been diagnosed with mental problems.
More than 4,000 so-called foreign fighters have been identified in the EU and entered into a Europol database.
“Using the terrorist financial tracking programme, we provided last year more than 2,700 leads regarding foreign terrorist fighters to the member states,” he said.
Some 1,057 people were also arrested last year on terrorism-related offences, he said.
He said there are also unconfirmed reports that some jihadist militants have set up training camps in the Western Balkans and some EU states.
Terrorists and migration flows
Other concerns related to terrorists exploiting the migration flows from Turkey and elsewhere to enter the European Union.
“We found no evidence of the systematic of using this flow to infiltrate terrorists into the European Union. But they do, they use it, we have some cases, some of the people that perpetrated the Paris attacks were eventually disguised in this immigration flow,” he said.
Paniagua said migrants were being victimised twice as result. First they flee terrorists and then again when the same attempt to infiltrate the EU by hiding among the refugees, he said.
“Again, we have no indication that this systematic,” he said.
Earlier this month, Europol announced it would deploy some 200 counter-terrorist and other investigators to migrant arrival centres known as hotspots in Italy and Greece.
Related: Implementing the European Agenda on Security:
EU action plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives.Of those, Europol said it would dispatch around 50 “at key points on the external border of the EU” to track down and help identify suspected criminals and terrorists.
A European Commission report earlier this month noted that Turkey is suspected to have around 1,300 Turkish citizens fighting alongside Islamic militant groups in Syria and Iraq.
It noted that the plan to lift visa restrictions on Turkish nationals “could potentially have an impact on the terrorist risk in the EU”.
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For the United States, the Warning from DHS in 2011
(U//FOUO) DHS Warning: Terrorists Making Explosives With Commercial Products
Terrorist Acquisition of Commercial Products for Improvised Explosive Device Production(U//FOUO) Recent plots and attacks in the Homeland and overseas demonstrate a continuing terrorist focus on acquiring commercially available materials and components that can be used in constructing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Heightened public and state and local official awareness, as well as tightened legal controls, have made it more difficult to purchase certain products that contain explosive precursors in bulk quantities or concentrated forms. Operatives are now more likely to use surreptitious, though legal, methods—such as multiple purchases in smaller quantities—to acquire sufficient amounts to create explosives.
— (U) On 27 July 2011, investigators found precursor chemicals and other IED components, including smokeless powder, clocks, batteries, wires, and other items commonly used to make IEDs in the hotel room of a US Army soldier who allegedly sought to target military personnel.
— (U) The admitted perpetrator of the 22 July 2011 attacks in Oslo, Norway avoided law enforcement suspicion by acquiring through legal means the ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, nitromethane, and blenders he used in constructing IEDs.
(U//FOUO) Commercial products containing precursor materials may include:
— (U//FOUO) Fertilizer and first aid cold packs (ammonium nitrate).
— (U//FOUO) Swimming pool chemicals (calcium hypochlorite/hydrogen peroxide).
— (U//FOUO) Some types of water filtration/treatment systems (potassium permanganate).
— (U//FOUO) Beauty supply products (hydrogen peroxide and acetone).
— (U//FOUO) Industrial cleaning supplies (hydrochloric acid or sulfuric acid).
(U) Potential Indicators of suspicious purchases: Most commercial products suitable for constructing IEDs serve legitimate purposes. Consequently, it is often difficult to identify purchases or other activities that may be associated with terrorist intent to create explosives. No single indicator is likely to divulge suspicious purchases, but, depending on specific circumstances, a combination of the behaviors listed below may warrant reporting and investigation:
— (U) Attempts to purchase all available stock or materials in bulk, especially by individuals with no previous history of bulk purchases.
— (U) Payment or insistence on payment in cash for bulk purchases, or using a credit card in another person’s name.
— (U) Insistence on in-store pickup instead of store delivery of bulk purchase.
— (U) Use of rented or out-of-state vehicle to transport bulk purchases.
— (U) Smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of time.
— (U) Displays of nervous or suspicious behavior and evasive or vague responses to questions about intended use of products.
(U//FOUO) For additional information, please see DHS-FBI Joint Homeland Security Assessment “(U//FOUO) Use of Common Precursor Chemicals to Make Homemade Explosives,” 10 August 2010; and Roll Call Release “(U//FOUO) Indicators of Suspicious Acquisition of Beauty Supply Products,” 26 February 2010.
