Sanctions Relief Summary by U.S. per Iran JPOA

Posted on September 13, 2015September 13, 2015 by Denise Simon

The White House has never been concerned about an up or down vote by Congress to approve the Iran deal, rather the only concern is what Congress will do on the outside in regards to the sanctions on Iran. In the past week, Republicans and conservatives in Congress have been meeting to discuss all options to hurt the deal as it moves forward. One such option is to sue again Barack Obama on abuse of power over Congress using waiver authority on laws and standing sanctions on Iran and that discussion is taking place.

Sanctions Relief under the JCPOA (Direct text transfer from page 17 on in detailed Congressional Report. For the full report, click here.

The easing of sanctions under the JCPOA is relatively consistent with the stipulations of the framework accord. Under the JCPOA, the overwhelming bulk of sanctions relief occurs at Implementation Day—the day when the IAEA certifies that Iran has completed those stipulated core nuclear requirements listed in Annex V of the JCPOA (primarily reducing the size and scope of its enrichment of uranium). According to the JCPOA, the following sanctions are to be eased:

 On Implementation Day, many U.S., virtually all EU, and most U.N. sanctions are to be lifted or suspended that Iran has taken certain key nuclear-related steps that are U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20 contains this provision.

 The U.S. sanctions that are to be suspended are primarily those that sanction foreign entities and countries for conducting specified transactions with Iran (so-called “secondary sanctions”). U.S. sanctions that prohibit U.S. firms from conducting most transactions with Iran are not being suspended. However, the JCPOA does commit the United States to a slight modification in the U.S. “trade ban” with Iran (Executive Order 12959 of May 1995) to permit: licensing the sale to Iran of commercial aircraft, and the importation of Iranian luxury goods such as carpets, caviar, and some fruits and nuts.

 The U.S. sanctions to be suspended are mostly those imposed since U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 was enacted in June 2010.55 That resolution identified Iran’s energy sector as a potential contributor to Iran’s “proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.”

 Type of Sanctions to Be Removed or Suspended. The sanctions relief on Implementation Day includes lifting or suspension of U.S. sanctions on foreign firms involved in Iran’s:57 (1) energy sector, including those that penalize Iran’s exportation of oil and sanction foreign sales to Iran of gasoline and energy sector equipment, and which limit foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2) U.S. sanctions on foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iranian banks; (3) U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto sector and trading in the rial. The United States is to revoke the designations made under various Executive Orders of numerous specified Iranian economic entities and personalities (listed in Attachment III of Annex II of the JCPOA), including the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), various Iranian banks, and many energy and shipping-related institutions. That step would enable foreign companies to resume transactions with those Iranian entities without risking being penalized by the United States.

 U.S. Laws to Be Waived and Executive Orders to Terminated. The suspension of U.S. sanctions as required under the JCPOA will necessitate: exercising presidential authority to waive sanctions mandated by the core operative provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172 as amended);58 Section 1245(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81); the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158); the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239); and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195). The statutory basis for the sanctions would remain unchanged by the agreement. Implementing the U.S. commitment will also require terminating the provisions of the following Executive Orders: 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628. For information on the exact provisions of the Executive Orders and the laws referenced above, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions.

 Request for Congress to Lift Sanctions Outright. The JCPOA requires the U.S. Administration, within eight years (“Transition Day”), to request that Congress lift virtually all of the sanctions that will be suspended under the JCPOA. The JCPOA requires all U.N. sanctions to terminate after 10 years of adoption of the JCPOA. Under the JCPOA, the eight year mark after JCPOA adoption is known as the Transition Day and the 10-year mark is known as the Termination Day.

 EU Lifting of Sanctions on Implementation Day. The EU sanctions to be lifted include: (1) the EU ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; (2) the ban on Iran’s use of the SWIFT electronic payments system that enables Iran to move funds from abroad to its Central Bank or its commercial banks; and (3) the lifting of EU sanctions (assets freezes/visa bans) on entities listed in Annex II, Attachment 1. This attachment does not include one controversial personality –IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. EU nuclear-related sanctions on him are to remain until Transition Day, although he will remain sanctioned under EU decisions on Syria and on terrorism. U.S. sanctions on Soleimani will remain, including secondary sanctions on entities that deal with him.

 U.S. Sanctions to Remain in Place. Other U.S. sanctions that are not required to be suspended in accordance with the JCPOA are mostly those sanctioning Iran’s support for terrorism, its human rights abuses, and worldwide arms and WMD-related technology to Iran. The specific Executive Orders and statutory provisions that will not be suspended include (1) E.O. 13224 sanctioning terrorism entities (not specific to Iran); (2) the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act that sanctions foreign firms that sell arms and weapons of mass destruction-related technology to Iran; (3) the Iran-North Korea-Syria Non-Proliferation Act (INKSNA);59 and (4) the Executive Orders and the provisions of CISADA and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act that pertain to human rights or democratic change in Iran. Iran also will be remaining on the “terrorism list” and all sanctions triggered by that designation will remain in place, at least for now. The United States has not pledged in the JCPOA to remove or to reconsider Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. That designation triggers numerous U.S. sanctions, including a ban on any U.S. foreign aid to Iran and on U.S. exportation to Iran of controlled goods and services, and a prohibition on U.S. support for international lending to Iran.

 U.N. Sanctions on Arms Sales and Ballistic Missiles to Be Terminated After Several Years. One issue that arose during final negotiations on the JCPOA was the suspension of U.N. sanctions on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and on Iran’s importation or exportation of conventional weaponry. The April 2 framework accord indicated that these sanctions would remain in place in the JCPOA. However, as subsequently negotiated, the ban on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is to be lifted within eight years of the JCPOA and the ban on conventional arms sales to Iran and on Iran’s exportation of arms are to be lifted within five years,60 as stipulated in Resolution 2231. However, as noted, U.S. sanctions on foreign entities that assist Iran with such programs will remain in place, as will specific U.N. Security Council Resolutions that prohibit weapons shipments to Lebanon and to Yemen.

 Ban on Reimposing those Sanctions that are Lifted or Suspended. The JCPOA contains language requiring that the parties to the agreement not reimpose the sanctions that will be suspended, as long as Iran is complying. The agreement states that if U.S. sanctions are reimposed (other than through reimposition on the grounds of Iranian noncompliance), Iran would not be bound by its nuclear commitments. An Iranian letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council, dated July 20, interprets the provision to bar the reimposition of those sanctions that are being suspended under “non-nuclear” justifications such as Iranian support for terrorism or armed factions in the Middle East, or for human rights violations. Iran interprets reimposition to be those sanctions that target the same sectors of Iran’s economy on which sanctions are being lifted or suspended (energy, financial, auto, shipping). However, there does not appear to be a prohibition on enacting further U.S. sanctions (other than those being suspended under the JCPOA) on arms sales to Iran, human rights violations and Iranian support for terrorism or armed factions in the region .

Automatic Reimposition of Sanctions (“Snap-Back”)

The JCPOA (paragraph 36 and 37) contains a mechanism for the “snap back” of U.N. sanctions if Iran does not satisfactorily resolve a compliance dispute. According to the JCPOA, the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council) would be able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran’s refusal to resolve the dispute. In that case, “… the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be reimposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.” These provisions are included in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231.61 The total time for this “dispute resolution” mechanism –between the time of the complaint of Iranian non-compliance and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions, is 65 days.

A related question is whether the effect of sanctions currently realized could ever be reconstituted if U.N. sanctions are lifted but U.S. sanctions are reimposed. The effect of all sanctions has depended on the substantial degree of international compliance and cooperation with the sanctions regime that has taken place since 2010. A wide range of countries depend on energy and other trade with Iran and might be reluctant to resume cooperating with reimposed U.S. sanctions unless Iran commits egregious violations of its commitments. Countries that do not wish to reimpose their sanctions on Iran could argue that, because U.N. Security Council sanctions are lifted, they are no longer bound to cooperate with U.S. sanctions.

Implications for Iran of the JCPOA Sanctions Relief

The suspension of sanctions on Implementation Day would likely have significant implications for Iran’s economy, including the following:

 Crude Oil Exports. Iran will be able to export crude oil without restriction. Iranian energy officials estimate that Iran could double its oil exports from the 1.1 mbd level of the JPA period within about six months. Significant quantities of Iranian oil will likely hit the market immediately after sanctions suspension because Iran reportedly has about 30 million -50 million barrels of oil stored, and therefore available for immediate release onto the market.

 Access to Restricted Foreign Exchange Reserves. Upon the suspension or lifting of sanctions on Implementation Day, Iran will have access to about $120 billion in foreign exchange assets currency that it has been unable to repatriate to its Central Bank. However, according to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew in testimony on the JCPOA in late July, about $65 billion of those funds are obligated. About $20 billion is owed to China for infrastructure projects performed in Iran by Chinese firms. About $45 billion is owed to cover loans to Iranian energy companies and other Iranian firms. The Treasury Department says that only about $56 billion would be available for Iran to use at its discretion, after these obligations are paid. The funds consist of some assets deposited before restrictions on the movement of the funds was imposed in February 2013 (Iran Threat Reduction Act), but the bulk of the assets are oil sales proceeds deposited since that restriction went into effect.

 According to the Treasury Department, Iran’s foreign exchange reserves are held by many banks around the world, and particularly in those of Iran’s five remain oil customers: China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey.62 Some funds might be held in EU banks as well. Other banks said to hold Iranian foreign exchange funds are, according to a determination of waiver provided to Congress on June 17, 2015, in Oman, Switzerland, and South Africa.63 And, banks in the United Arab Emirates, a major trading partner of Iran, might hold some of the monies as well.

 Post-Sanctions Economic Growth. Economists estimate that Iran’s economy could grow as much as 7% after sanctions are suspended.64 Iran’s energy sector, automotive production sector, and other industrial sectors are likely to rebound strongly as importation of parts becomes easier to finance. Some assert that Iran will use the additional economic resources generated by the deal to enhance its regional position. The Administration acknowledges Iran might steer some extra funding to regional allies but argues that Iran will use the great bulk of the additional funds to invest in its domestic economy which has been starved by sanctions for several years.

 Commercial Aircraft Sales. Iran is likely to seek to purchase significant quantities of commercial aircraft because of the advanced age of most of the aircraft used by its airlines. The deal commits the United States to license commercial aircraft sales to Iran, including U.S.-made aircraft. If such sales are consummated, U.S.-Iran trade in dollars, which has been highly limited by sanctions for many years, could expand significantly. The importation to the United State of U.S. luxury goods is likely not to boost bilateral trade significantly because of the low-volume and low dollar-figure nature of these imports by U.S. buyers.

Iran Does Not Need to Cheat, Lying Works

Posted on September 12, 2015September 12, 2015 by Denise Simon

TEHRAN, Sep. 12 (MNA) – AEOI Deputy Zarean says no inspections of Iran’s military sites are on the agenda of a Tuesday visit by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Iran. Deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Asghar Zarean said on Saturday that IAEA inspectors are scheduled to arrive in Tehran on Tuesday for talks.

He added that during this round of negotiations, inspections of Iran’s military sites are not on the agency’s agenda. The Iranian nuclear official maintained that the visit is within the framework of the JCPOA and the sides will hold talks for further coordination and practical measures in the future. On July 14, Iran and the IAEA signed a road map for “the clarification of past and present issues” regarding Iran’s nuclear program in the Austrian capital Vienna. The deal came on the same day Iran and the 5+1 group of countries reached an agreement over Tehran’s nuclear program.

And the timing of this announcement is beyond suspicious:

FNC: Iran has reportedly found an unexpectedly high reserve of uranium, following assessments that the country is running low on the nuclear raw material and just days after President Obama essentially secured an international nuclear deal with the country’s leaders.

The discovery was reported first by Reuters and based on comments made by Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi to the state news agency IRNA.

“I cannot announce (the level of) Iran’s uranium mine reserves,” Salehi was quoted as saying. “The important thing is that before aerial prospecting for uranium ores we were not too optimistic, but the new discoveries have made us confident about our reserves.”

The international deal with Iran, largely brokered by the Obama administration, slows the country’s nuclear development for nearly a decade in exchange for the lifting of billions of dollars worth of crippling economic sanctions.

World leaders think Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon, despite Tehran’s denial.

However, Iran under the deal will still be able to pursue a nuclear-development program, for which the uranium could be used.

The remarks by Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, could not be found Saturday morning on the IRNA website. But another story had him as saying the deal — reached in July and officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — will not slow the pace of Iran’s nuclear program.

“The official said the restrictions which the JCPOA entails are by no means the ones which would restrict Iran in its nuclear activities,” reads one line in the story.

Several other news-gathering agencies have either picked up the Reuters’ story or cited it in their own version.

That Obama would win congressional approval of the deal became apparent in recent weeks, but not without a fight from the GOP-controlled Congress and other critics including conservative groups and pro-Israel organizations.

However, the president worked all summer to garner support from Senate Democrat, who on Thursday block chamber Republicans from disapproving of the deal and from forcing Obama to resort to a presidential veto to win approval for what will likely be considered his biggest foreign policy achievement.

Salehi reportedly said uranium exploration had covered almost two-thirds of Iran and would be complete in the next four years.

Uranium can be used for energy production and scientific purposes but is also a key ingredient in nuclear weapons.

Some Western analysts have previously said that Iran was close to exhausting its supply of yellowcake — or raw uranium — and that mining it domestically was not cost-efficient, according to Reuters.

A report published in 2013 by U.S. think-tanks Carnegie Endowment and the Federation of American Scientists said the scarcity and low quality of Iran’s uranium resources compelled it “to rely on external sources of natural and processed uranium,” the wire service also reported.

Iran has repeatedly denied overseas media reports that it has tried to import uranium from countries like Kazakhstan and Zimbabwe.

Even Russia is Cheating When it Comes to Gold

Posted on September 12, 2015September 12, 2015 by Denise Simon

In 2012, a Russian agent (spy) who worked for a bank as cover was arrested in New York. The criminal complaint is here.

Then there were the Russian gangs (mafia) in New York in the last decade.

A former correspondent for the venerable emigre newspaper “Novoye Russkoye Slovo,” Grant has cultivated convicted murderers and extortionists as sources and landed interviews with notorious reputed crime kingpins like Ukrainian-born Semion Mogilevich, listed by the FBI on its “10 Most Wanted” list of fugitives.

When bodies began piling up in the turf wars that rocked Russian-speaking New York neighborhoods like Brighton Beach in the 1990s, it was Grant that U.S. journalists turned to to make sense of the murky motivations and underworld machinations behind the bloodshed.

Putin’s agents in America have been very busy.

Ever since Putin reclaimed the presidency last year, the trampling of the rule of law has only accelerated. It is now being used to stifle the last remnants of political opposition. There are lots of recent examples, like the bogus charges brought against Alexei Navalny, the heroic investigative blogger, and the posthumous case currently being prosecuted against, believe it or not, Sergei Magnitsky. And then there’s the case of Dmitry Gudkov and his father, Gennady.
Both men were opposition politicians in Russia’s Duma. Both supported the Sergei Magnitsky Act, which President Obama signed in December and which freezes the U.S. assets of Russian government officials who are labeled “gross human rights violators.” Putin and his underlings are understandably threatened by the new law. They have retaliated by passing a bill banning the adoptions of Russian children by Americans. (That’s right. The Putin government is getting back at the United States by punishing Russian orphans.) Gennady Gudkov, a former K.G.B. official, had built a security company, Oskord, with some 4,000 employees. Last summer the government conducted an “inspection” and found the company to have committed numerous violations. It quickly put Oskord out of business. Two months later, a committee of the Duma charged Gudkov with violating Duma rules and tossed him out of Parliament. More details here.

Would those Russian diamonds be fake by chance in New York?

Zerohedge: Over the past several years, incidents involving fake gold (usually in the form of gold-plated tungsten) have emerged every so often, usually involving Manhattan’s jewerly district, some of Europe’s bigger gold foundries, or the occasional billion dealer. But never was fake gold actually discovered in the form monetary gold, held by a bank as reserve capital and designed to fool bank regulators of a bank’s true financial state. This changed on Friday when Russia’s “Admiralty” Bank, which had its banking license revoked last week by Russia’s central bank, was reportedly using gold-plated metal as part of its “gold reserves.”

According to Russia’s Banki.ru, as part of a probe in the Admiralty bank, the central bank regulator questioned the existence of the bank’s reported quantity of precious metals held in reserve. Citing a source, Banki.ru notes that as part of its probe, instead of gold, the “regulator found gold-plated metal.”

The Russian website further adds that according to “Admiralty” bank’s financial statements, as of August 1 the bank had declared as part of its highly liquid assets precious metals amounting to 400 million roubles. The last regulatory probe of the bank was concluded in the second half of August, said one of the Banki.ru sources. Another source claims that as part of the probe, the auditor questioned the actual availability of the bank’s precious metals and found gold-painted metal.

The website notes that shortly before the bank’s license was revoked, the bank had offered its corporate clients to withdraw funds after paying a commission of 30%. This is shortly before Russia’s central bank disabled Admiralty’s electronic payment systems on September 7.

Admiralty Bank was a relatively small, ranked in 289th place among Russian banks in terms of assets. On August 1 the bank’s total assets were just above 8 billion roubles, while the monthly turnover was in the order of 40-55 billion rubles. The balance of the bank’s assets was poorly diversified: two-thirds of the bank’s assets (4.9 billion rubles) were invested in loans. The rest of the assets, about 30%, were invested in highly liquid assets.

Or at least highly liquid on paper: according to Banki.ru the key reason for the bank’s license revocation was the central bank’s insistence that the bank had insufficient reserves against possible loan losses.

The Russian central bank has not yet made an official statement.

The first question, obviously, is if a small-to-mid level Russian bank was using gold-plated metal to fool the central bank about the quality of its “gold-backed” reserves, how many other Russian banks are engaged in comparable fraud. The second question, and perhaps more relevant, is how many global banks – especially among emerging markets, where gold reserves remain a prevalent form of physical reserve accumulation – are engaging in comparable fraud.

Finally, what does this mean for gold itself, whose price on one hand is sliding with every passing day (thanks in part to what is now a record 228 ounces of paper claims on every ounce of physical gold as reported before), even as it increasingly appears there is a major global physical shortage. If the Admiralty bank’s fraud is found to be pervasive, what will happen to physical gold demand as more banks are forced to buy the yellow metal in the open market to avoid being shuttered and/or prison time for the executives?

CyberCaliphate Hacks Govt Emails of the Brits

Posted on September 12, 2015September 12, 2015 by Denise Simon

Just a few weeks ago, a Brit who was head of the ISIS cyber-hacking team was killed by a drone. Without much news or fanfare, there is coordination and key reasons why some are targets while others are not. Such is the case with Junaid Hussain.

Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently

Hussain Junaid posts on Twitter, was not just words, they were messages to ISIS fighters around the world, giving them orders on how to move against the targets. His job was not only to send encrypted messages, but he was one of the largest financiers of ISIS through hacking bank accounts and stealing its money for ISIS.
Junaid Hussein AKA British nicknamed Abu Hussein, is of Pakistani origin, He was a young man in his 20’s who descended from the British city of Birmingham. He was a former detainee, arrested in 2012 after stealing private information from the Internet and hacking British ex Prime Minister Tony Blair account.
Hussain posted in the past several Tweets that preceded ISIS operations in Europe and America, and adopted few minutes after they have occurred, as happened on the 3rd of May when the attack on the Prophet Muhammad exhibition in Texas.
The Independent British newspaper, revealed that “Abu Hussein” is responsible for the deployment ISIS ideas in his homeland «Britain» and all Western countries, through posting jihadi slogans constantly online specially on social networking sites, like saying: “someday ISIS flag will be held over Downing Street and the White House.”
Hussain was also responsible of the training of electronic army of ISIS, in order to expand their activity in the cyberspace and gain new financial resources.
His first lesson given to his trainees was t hacking Central Command of the US Army social networking site “Twitter”, and video sharing site on the Internet, “YouTube”, in January 2015.
The hackers published tweets though the hacked accounts declaring that the electronic Khilafa was responsible for the attack, and sent messages to the American soldiers. Also, they published lists of names of ISIS commanders includes personal information.
Hussain was known to have high capability of changing his position and hide well, to escape the coalition air strikes. He used to move very carefully with 4 cars, each going to a different place. He didn’t spend more than 6 hours in one place, and stayed underground.
All this didn’t allow him to stay alive serving ISIS, because the coalition forces managed yesterday to kill him after attacking a group of cars near Abu Al Haif gas station in the city of Raqqa. According to our correspondent in the city ”The air forces targeted a car near the gas station, which killed 3 people, one of them is a high profile”. They our source confirmed that the person who died is in fact Junaid Al Hussain, with two of his men, one of them is European.
ISIS has not declared His death, despite all the services he provided to them. Rumors inside Al Raqqa says that Hussain managed to get ISIS a huge amount of money, through hacking, but yet, no statements from ISIS were issued to announce his death.

ISIS hackers violated top secret British Government emails

According to an investigation by the GCHQ intelligence agency ISIS hackers targeted information held by some of David Cameron’s most senior ministers.

According the experts at the British Intelligence GCHQ, ISIS hackers intercept top secret British Government emails.

The investigation conducted by the GCHQ allowed the British intelligence to uncover a serious breach, terrorists linked to the ISIS have been targeting email accounts held by some of David Cameron’s most senior ministers, including the Home Secretary Theresa May.

The hack could have exposed confidential information related to the British Government and members of the Royal family, at the Time I’m writing there aren’s information related to the data accessed by the ISIS hackers.

“It is understood that at least one of the plot’s ringleaders was killed by a drone strike in an operation disclosed by the Prime Minister this week.” reported the Mirror.

The news doesn’t surprise media, Government entities, politicians and military organizations are privileged targets for the ISIS sympathizers that use the web for intelligence gathering on potential targets. In May Pro-Isis Hackers belonging to Cyber Caliphate hacking team threaten ‘Electronic War’ on US and Europe.

In May, GCHQ warned Whitehall security officials about ISIS plans to attack British targets.

Although no security breach occurred to the Government email systems, officials were told to tighten security procedures.

The Mirror makes explicit reference to the “changing passwords,” not referring the adoption of further defense mechanisms to protect the email accounts, such as two-factor authentication.

Unfortunately, the ISIS is continuing ti develop its cyber capabilities, in the past they demonstrated a mastery of technology for both propaganda and hacking purposes. In June, ISIS supporters were spreading online a collection of tutorial titled the Book of Terror to teach how Hack a Wi-FI network and which are main spying tools.

Among the group of hackers that claim to be affiliated with the ISIS there is a collective of hackers calling themselves the “Islamic State’s Defenders in the Internet,” also known as Cyber Caliphate. The group, which was involved in the hijacking of social media accounts belonging to the US CENTCOM, released a propaganda video threatening cyber attacks anticipating the operation of the terrorists in the Internet.

At the end of August, one of the most popular ISIS hackers, Junaid Hussain, was killed in a US targeted air strike in Syria. The hacker was actively recruiting ISIS sympathizers and according to the British intelligence he directed a plot to kill the Queen.

Obama Applying Every Nasty Political Tactic to Close Gitmo

Posted on September 12, 2015September 12, 2015 by Denise Simon

Bypass Congress, throw in the Iran deal, sanctions, vetoes and more. The White House may even threaten Secretary of Defense Ash Carter with his job as he did with former Secretary Hagel.

A sample detainee:

Bid to Shutter Gitmo Roils Pentagon, White House, Congress

WASHINGTON (AP) – The Obama administration’s struggling quest to close the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is mired in state and federal politics. Frustrated White House and Pentagon officials are blaming each other for the slow progress releasing approved detainees and finding a new prison to house those still held.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter is facing criticism from some administration officials who complain that he has not approved enough transfers, even though 52 Guantanamo detainees are eligible. Carter’s predecessor, Chuck Hagel, was forced from the Pentagon job in part because the White House felt he was not moving quickly enough to send detainees to other countries.

Two officials said the White House is frustrated because President Barack Obama discussed the issue with Carter when he was hired this year to lead the Defense Department, and they believed Carter was on board with the White House’s plans to act faster.

Other U.S. officials note that Carter has approved some transfers and is pushing his staff to move quickly to get more to his desk. But many other proposed transfers are slogging through the bureaucracy, under review by a long list of defense, military, intelligence and other administration offices. The transfers cannot be approved unless officials believe the detainees will not return to terrorism or the battlefield upon release and that there is a host country willing to take them.

During his two years as Pentagon chief, Hagel approved 44 detainee transfers. Carter, in his first seven months, has transferred six.

Obama has promised to close the facility since he was a presidential candidate in 2008. He said it ran counter to American values to keep people in prison, many without criminal charges or due process.

Opponents have argued the detainees are essentially prisoners of war.

From a peak of 680 prisoners, 116 remain. Finding acceptable places for them has been an intractable problem.

“Finding a solution for these individuals involves complicated negotiations with international partners, extensive consultations with the leaders of the national security and legal organizations and final approval by me,” Carter told reporters.

A key player in the process is Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dempsey, who spent more than three years as a commander in Iraq, continues to be very cautious in his recommendations for transfers. His opinions carry a lot of weight.

According to U.S. officials familiar with the process, Carter recently notified Congress of two transfers, and has four whose files are ready to go to Capitol Hill, likely later this month. Congress has 30 days to review the transfers before they are made public.

A number of U.S. officials familiar with the ongoing discussions spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk about the subject publicly.

The movement of detainees is only part of the challenge. A greater hurdle will be finding a U.S.-based prison to house the 64 detainees considered too dangerous to be sent to another country. Congress has opposed any effort to bring detainees to America, so Obama’s long-stated goal of closing Guantanamo before he leaves office in January 2017 is more likely to die on the steps of Capitol Hill.

Aware of those objections, the White House last month stalled Pentagon efforts to send a plan to Congress outlining several U.S. prisons that could be upgraded and used for the detainees. Early drafts of the plan included some rough estimates of the costs and the time needed for renovations.

U.S. officials said the administration was worried that sending the plan to Congress could affect the crucial vote on the Iran nuclear deal by infuriating lawmakers who do not want the detainees moved to the U.S. or who adamantly oppose having them in a prison in their state or district. The resolution of disapproval of the Iran deal failed in the Senate, handing Obama a victory on that issue.

Three to five civilian facilities are being eyed as potential sites, officials said. A Pentagon team has gone to military facilities in South Carolina and Kansas to develop better estimates of construction and other changes that would be needed to house the detainees as well as conduct military commission trials for those accused of war crimes.

The visits to the Navy Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, and the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas triggered immediate outrage from lawmakers and governors there.

Republican Govs. Nikki Haley of South Carolina and Sam Brownback of Kansas have threatened to sue the administration if detainees are brought to either state.

Both the House and Senate have pending legislation that would maintain prohibitions on transferring detainees to U.S. facilities. The Senate legislation allows the restrictions to be lifted if the White House submits a plan to close the facility and it’s approved by Congress.

GOP Sen. John McCain of Arizona, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has made it known he would consider a comprehensive plan to close Guantanamo, but said it must include answers to a number of tough legal and policy questions, including whether detainees held in the U.S. would have additional rights.

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., has opposed using the Charleston brig because it is in a populated area.

Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., has said flatly that, “Not on my watch will any terrorist be placed in Kansas.”

Carter has acknowledged the challenge of getting a U.S. facility approved by Congress, but has insisted that some lawmakers have indicated a willingness to consider a plan.

“This would be a good thing to do if – if we can all come together behind a plan to do it,” Carter told reporters. “Our responsibility is to provide them with a plan that they can consider that is a responsible one.”