Syrian Refugees – Organised Crime’s New Market and Jihadis’ New Cover

TRAC: In an intense propaganda blitz, the Islamic State published eight videos pertaining to refugees and the refugee crisis. The media push by the Islamic State complimented the Caliphate’s recent written propaganda regarding hijrah and refugees fleeing the Middle East in the eleventh issue of Dabiq.  Published from a wide cross-section of the Caliphate – Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The specific Islamic State provinces in the media campaign included:

• Wilayat Ninawa
• Wilayat al-Barakah
• Wilayat Hadramawt
• Wilayat Hims
• Wilayat al-Khayr
• Wilayat al-Furat
• Wilayat al-Fallujah
• Wilayat al-Janub
• Wilayat Salahuddin

For complete access to each video and complete analysis

Introduction

Image: March -May 2015 Maritime and land based migrant routes

Click Image for larger view

Reported Cases of ISIS Migrant Incidents

After years of Syrian civil war, the refugee population en masse has finally reached beyond the borders of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to reach the European Union (EU).  The media has made much of the Islamic State taking advantage of the migrant community through traveling to Europe in their midst to avoid detection.  To date, there are five media-reported incidents of Islamic State (ISIS) trying to infiltrate Europe by hiding among the refugees and two reported Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). (see cases below)

Not an Islamic State Priority Right Now

Islamic State operatives seem to be able to enter and leave Turkey nearly at-will.  ISIS cell activity within Turkey is well documented and, until at least recently, was tolerated on some level. Evidence to this point includes pictures on social media posted throughout 2014 of ISIS fighters enjoying meals in popular restaurants and making shopping trips in Turkish cities.  While the Islamic State is comfortable within Turkish borders, there will not be much need for hiding among the refugees.  However, as soon as pressure becomes too intense to stay and operate within Turkey (i.e travel becomes inhibited or the need for attacking within Europe becomes a priority) the necessity to slip unnoticed into the migrant population will reach urgency for the Islamic State. One Islamic State smuggler claimed that IS was forced to use migrant paths to move people because as the world has gotten better at tracking jihadis returning from Syria, return plane travel from Turkey has just become too dangerous.It cannot be stressed enough that at this point in time the proportions of known Islamic State militants that have “passed” as refugees are minuscule compared to the legitimate number of urgent victims of tyranny.   The fear that even a few IS operatives could attack soft targets in EU countries has sounded a great alarm within the right wing movement.  So much so that some countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, are impeding the flow of immigrants into Western Europe.

Win/Win for ISIS

For the Islamic State hiding among the migrants is a win/win scenario. Either

• the ruse will be successful and ISIS will have yet another way to travel into areas where they do not have an operational presence —or—
• the few ISIS members who are caught will incite a backlash of popular opinion and a harsh over reaction from EU members which will radicalize more within their own borders.

The far right wing has already seized the opportunity to capitalize on the Islamic State threat within the migrant population and shifted popular opinion in many areas to distrust the group of people who are fleeing war.

Case Studies

Opportunity for Terrorist Organisations

Any terrorist organization, but most especially the Islamic State, will seek to exploit the current situation to their operational benefit. It is already well known that in both Libya and Turkey, ISIS often cooperates with organised criminal elements both on the individual and group level.  To date, there are only five media-reported cases of Islamic State infiltrating migrant networks:

Image: September 17, 2015 Unverified photo of Abdel Majid Touil the Bardo Museum planner (Case Study I below) emerges. 

Case I : Bardo Museum Planner

May 20, 2015 — Abdel Majid Touil, a Moroccan national and the planner of the attacks on Bardo Museum in Tunisia, utilised sea routes between Libya and Italy in order to reach the EU. He is also thought to be involved in recruitment for ISIS[1].  For More: TRAC Insight: Translation and Commentary on Islamic State: Adopting the Bardo Museum Operation in Islamic Tunisia

Case II : 5 Arrested at Macedonia-Bulgaria Border

September 03, 2015 — Five men linked to ISIS attempted to cross over the Macedonia–Bulgaria border and were promptly arrested after a failed attempt to bribe the border security officer. The five men aged from 20 to 24 years, traveling aboard a car registered in Kosovo, came to the border post Gyueshevo. The guard was suspicious after the group tried to bribe their way past the border with US Dollars.  Upon searching their smartphones, beheadings videos as well as Islamic State propaganda material were discovered.[2]

Case III : Moroccan National

September 09, 2015 — An ISIS operative, a Moroccan national with a German passport, was detained by Bulgarian authorities and extradited to Germany. The 21 year old suspect was detained at the Hamzabeyali/Lesovo border between Turkey and Bulgaria, carrying forged documents. It is reported that the suspect insisted on being extradited to Germany where he faces a European Arrest Warrant. [3]

Case IV : Calais, France Refugee Camp

September 11, 2015 — A suspected terror operative is believed to be amongst the migrant camps in Calais, France, prompting a search by French authorities. Residing in one of the largest refugee camps within France, the suspect is believed to have left Syria at the end of August 2015 with the intention of traveling to Britain. To further complicate the search, the camp is also a ‘no-go’ zone for French authorities. [4]

CASE V : Stuttgart, Germany Refugee Center

September 09, 2015 — An ISIS operative was arrested in a refugee center in Stuttgart, Germany in possession of forged Syrian passports. Identified after police linked him to a European arrest warrant issued by the Spanish authorities, he was arrested for attempting to infiltrate under the guise of a refugee seeking asylum. [5]

Case I : JN Already in Germany

September 09, 2015 —  Hungarian media outlets reported that a Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) member has also been reported to have made it all the way into the heart of Europe disguised as a refugee. [6]

Case II : JN En Route to Germany

September 9, 2015 An Estonian reporter recognizes an AQ operative whom he interviewed two years ago among refugees en route to Germany. (see image below)

Organized Crime

Image: September 16, 2015 Dutch journalist buys Syrian passport for $825 including picture of PM Mark Rutte.

Counterfeit Passports

The trade for counterfeit Syrian passports is at an all time high.  German customs officers have reported seizing boxes containing Syrian passports being smuggled into Europe.  Fake Syrian passports are being traded for at least $1,500 USD.  Surprisingly many posing as migrants have been found to have multiple passports, which indicate some are not authentic refugees but rather buying their way to “asylum seeker” status.

Lucrative Human Trafficking into EU

From kidnapping refugees stuck at border crossings out of Syria to becoming a part of the human smuggling machine, the Islamic State is notorious for creating and then exploiting refugees, thereby taking full advantage of criminal economic activities.

From the Libyan route, Syrians count for the largest share of migrants taking the journey to Europe.  Before the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya had drastically limited the migration and trafficking in Europe, but with Gaddafi gone and despite the growing insecurity in Libya, the number of migrants risking the dangers of crossing the Mediterranean has soared. Just about anyone with access to a boat can draw substantial profit by transporting migrants from North African to Southern Europe.  This includes the Islamic State.

Bulgaria acts as a predominant transit point of human trafficking within and into the EU. Organised crime syndicates in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have established links with Bulgaria at the centre. The routes from the South Caucasus to Bulgaria are sea and land based through the Black Sea and Turkey respectively, connecting the South Caucasus to the EU. Therefore, with Syrian refugees in Turkey, this paves way for organised crime syndicates to move with or define the direction of migration.

The Fixers

In January 2015, BuzzFeed had the rare interview with a self-proclaimed Islamic State human smuggler out of Turkey.  His claim of sending small groups of Islamic State fighters hidden inside cargo ships filled with refugees cannot be independently verified by TRAC, but his story is nonetheless useful in understanding the overall mindset of the Islamic State.  The unnamed smuggler claimed that the fighters smuggled into Europe were from many locations: some fighters were Syrian, others from various Middle Eastern states, yet others from European nations. He said that a minority claimed to be from the United States.  He also claimed that they waited until the ship was filled to capacity (even over capacity) to send the fighters over.

Buzzfeed also interviewed two other “independent” smugglers who claimed to have also helped the Islamic State for a profit.  One claimed to have smuggled at least 10 fighters on his ships, then backed out for fear of being caught when the Islamic State wanted him to send more.   The other said he’d been sending ISIS fighters for months.  The second smuggler claimed that some of the fighters’ intentions were merely to take leave from the battle front to visit their families back home, while others claimed that they were going back to Europe to be ready when the battle begun in the EU. [7]

Narcotics from Bulgaria

In May 2015 Syrian coastal province of Latakia seized about two tons of narcotics near the beach of Cape of Ras al-Bassit believed to have originated in Bulgaria.  Nearly six million tablets of Captagon were contained in the seizure and suspected to be headed toward the Islamic State.

Captagon, known by its most active ingredient fenethylline, is a powerful psychotropic known for helping to overcome fear, fatigue and pain.  (It is also known for increasing sexual performance).  Industrial production in Bulgaria has been active since the communist regime and Bulgarian ‘experts’ have been reported to “travel the Arab world, selling their skills”.   Since 2013, Captagon production within Syria has accelerated to such high levels that it has outpaced production in other countries such as Bulgaria.  Though Syria started producing Captagon itself,  “Bulgarian expertise in the matter persists.” Bulgarian exports are largely consumed by the fighters of the Islamic State and is rumored to be the “drug of choice” among its fighters.  The implication is that Syrian and Bulgarian producers stay in touch, and Bulgarian experts not only continue to teach them how to produce a better product but also continue provide the Islamic State Capatgon in the form of small white pills. [8]

Additionally, heroin trafficking syndicates in the South Caucasus region and Turkey have established connections and conduits in Bulgaria which facilitate the movement of consignments into and within the EU. Routes through the Black Sea are often one part of a larger web of routes from Afghanistan through Central Asia and Iran. As with human trafficking, Turkey and the Black Sea act as channels towards the EU.

Images: September 9, 2015 An Estonian reporter recognizes an AQ operative whom he interviewed two years ago among refugees en route to Germany. Although this is not an Islamic State fighter, it should be noted that the threat remains the same.

Rationale

The increased momentum in the exodus of refugees/migrants towards the EU has put the spotlight on the role of organised crime. Organised crime elements would seek to capitalise upon the presence of a new market of Syrian refugees in using their logistical operations to facilitate the travel of migrants. This can also be extended to accommodate the expansion of their operations (drugs, arms and/ or contraband) under the cover of travelling migrants. In the broader scheme of the situation, terrorist organisations would utilise the circumstances of migrant influx into the European Union in order to mask their infiltration, where they will see benefit in cooperating with organised crime elements, defining a nexus. In turn this has put Turkey and Libya at the centre of the issue given its status of permitting the entry of Syrian refugees and access to the European mainland. Further, this sheds light on the possible routes migrants can take where the weighing factors are availability of journeys, financial feasibility, lower mortality risks and shorter travel time or distances. Additionally, this influences the choice of possible routes that can be taken by land, sea or air, discussed in the following section.

Image: Internal and External directional movement of displaced Syrians, January to June 2015

Air, Land & Sea Routes

Sea

Aegean and Mediterranean Sea (Turkey & Libya)

Turkish Coast

Identified routes used by organised crime elements include the Turkish coastal cities of Izmir in the north-west and Mersin in the south-east. Given their geographical proximity to the Aegean Sea, it makes sense that migrants using these boarding points would aim to disembark in Greece. These migrants often make their way to the north- Aegean Greek islands of Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Ikaria or Samos just off the north-eastern coast of Turkey. After spending an amount of time in a refugee camp, they are transferred to Athens. Often migrants seeking refuge then journey to countries such as Germany or Sweden with relatively liberal asylum laws. However, the weather conditions of the Aegean and Mediterranean make such a journey a risk to safety and security as cases of boats capsizing have been a prominent recurrence. Prices for boat journeys from Izmir are an estimated $5000.

Image: Greek Islands of Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria

Libya: Travel Through Egypt and Sudan

The role of organised crime elements also factor into this where militias and terrorist organisations cooperate with such elements in order to achieve infiltration into the EU. Libya in North Africa is also a prominent origin point for refugees fleeing conflict, to make their journey towards the EU. To reach Libya, Syrian refugees often go through Egypt and Sudan, two of the few countries that still do not require a visa to Syrian citizens.  Inputs from a recent interview confirm these routes are also being used to smuggle ISIS operatives into the EU by assigned handlers. Prices for smugglers’ boat trips from Libya to Italy reportedly range from $400-$4000. Additionally, prices from Alexandria to Greece or Italy are $7000 plus.

Image: Routes from Sudan and Egypt to the Libyan ports of Benghazi, Tripoli and Zuwarah

Constantly Changing Port of Origin

In going to and from Syria, the operatives are provided fake Syrian passports to get into Syria or to increase the chances of a successful asylum application in the EU. Additionally, such handlers are required to constantly change their port of origin due to crackdowns by Turkish authorities. Due to this plus joint action from NATO nations in tracking ISIS movements, the use of air travel proves risky as well as land routes. Hence, the use of these routes to move ISIS operatives to and from Syria is paramount to their logistical operations.

Security concerns over the cooperation of terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates in Libya towards facilitating the infiltration of ISIS operatives have led to increased focus in the region.

Capsizing leads to Alternative Routes

Furthermore, reports of capsizing refugee boats in the Mediterranean and the Aegean would compel would-be asylum seekers to find alternate routes towards Europe. Moreover, with the heightened discourse of the EU permitting asylum to refugees, the safety and economic security of the EU would also prompt refugees to journey towards Turkey; given its borders with the EU, the chances of gaining entry and asylum in the EU are higher.

Black Sea (Turkey to Bulgaria via Georgia)

An Alternative for Refugees

The Black Sea is a relatively unexplored avenue, known to be used for civilian and industrial maritime transport.  These would serve as possible mechanisms for Syrian refugees to enter the EU. With a surge of refugees seeking journeys to the EU, the pressure on overland routes, adverse weather conditions in the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea and scarcity of civilian maritime transport journeys in the Black Sea, would present the Black Sea as an alternative transit point towards the EU. Domestic politics in the South Caucasus would also prompt refugees to capitalise upon this alternative if and when required. Organised crime syndicates trafficking heroin and human consignments would recognise these factors and hence, supply the alternative in the creation of a new market, trafficking Syrian refugees to the EU

Civilian Maritime Transport & Regional Politics

Examining the ferry route map below, it is clear that there are many points amongst the different nations along the Black Sea which serve as points for boarding and disembarking. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey places civilian maritime transport as a channel for passage into the EU from Turkey via Georgia to Bulgaria. Nations in the South Caucasus like Armenia, Georgia and its seceded breakaway, Abkhazia have all voiced their willingness to accept fleeing Syrians, although with different motives. Abkhazia has shunned ethnic Georgians in the past but wishes to repatriate those with Abkhaz roots to Abkhazia increasing their ethnic population. Therefore, domestic politics fuelled by ethno-nationalism acts as a motivator for Abkhazia to accept Syrian refugees. Georgia and Armenia have also opened their doors to Syrian Christians fleeing violence. Syrian refugees in Turkey if not meeting these criteria, would ideally use forged documents to demonstrate their Christian faith or Abkhaz roots, looking at cases of Syrian refugees’ conversions to Christianity to increase their chances of successful asylum applications in Germany.

Image: Map of UKR Ferry’s routes in the Black Sea

Therefore, the potential for directional movement towards these nations exist, moreover as a transit point towards the EU where desirable. In the Black Sea ferry route map below, it is evident that Batumi is the main port of departure from Georgia for journeys towards Bulgaria and Romania. The price for a passenger ticket using Navbulgar’s ferry service is ‎€100.

Image: Screenshots of UKR Ferry’s ferry routes and schedule details from Batumi, Georgia to Constanta, Romania

Image: Screenshots of Navibulgar’s ferry routes and schedule details from Batumi, Georgia to Varna, Bulgaria

Scarcity: Opportunity for Organised Crime

Although departures to the port of Varna in Bulgaria happen once a week, departures to Constanta in Romania occur just twice a month. Furthermore, some of these route schedules transit through Ukraine. The infrequency of civilian transport in the Black Sea as well as the non-directness of routes overall would prompt migrants to seek alternatives, particularly in the event of unavailable space on the ferry routes.

The presence of organised crime syndicates in the South Caucasus, Turkey and the Balkan Peninsula is not a new occurrence. Human trafficking from Georgia to Turkey and Bulgaria as well as drug trafficking from Georgia to Bulgaria, via the Black Sea are identified routes. This is owing to the high frequency of instances of human trafficking from Batumi, Georgia to Varna, Bulgaria. The number of Georgian nationals revealed in post-trafficking interviews and investigations as well as Armenian, Turkish and EU nationals indicate the presence of a land and maritime based human trafficking infrastructure. Additionally, land and maritime trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan through central Asia and Iran use Batumi, Georgia as a port of transit towards the EU via the Black Sea. Hence, the convergence of human and drug trafficking networks in the Black Sea constitute a concrete trafficking infrastructure. Ranging from the South Caucasus, through West Asia and the Balkan Peninsula, this acts as an alternative route for Syrian refugees.

Image: Map depicting heroin trafficking routes through the Black Sea and other locations

Stable weather conditions at this time of year in the Black Sea compared to the Mediterranean and Aegean reduce the operational risks of travel. Coupled with the finite number of conventional options available, the circumstances of migrants compels them to take advantage of sea based trafficking initiatives by organised crime syndicates, where it is seen as a mutually beneficial venture.

Land Routes

Hamzabeyli/Lesovo Border (Turkey to Bulgaria)

Image: Border between Turkey and Bulgaria at the Hamzabeyli/Lesovo crossing

Border Infrastructure

The land connectivity from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria present two entry routes to the EU for Syrian refugees. The economic circumstances in Greece makes it a  transit point for refugees to the rest of the EU. Bulgaria however, does not have as much a robust land border infrastructure compared to its EU counter-part Greece. This gives incentive for refugees to reach the EU through Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s lack of a robust land border infrastructure can be attributed to its economic factors and internal corruption, particularly in recent cases of Bulgaria’s Interior Ministry where numerous officials have been sacked for involvement in facilitating human and drug trafficking into Bulgaria. Although it is important to note that circumstances have improved since Bulgaria’s entry into the EU in 2007, yet the legacy of these factors are felt on the ground today. Bulgaria is currently mulling strengthening its border security infrastructure with Turkey. Bulgaria is especially eager to do this to demonstrate itself as a responsible stakeholder in the EU, in ensuring border security. This also has much to do with its prospective acceptance into the Schengen Treaty and hence Bulgaria draws upon EU financial resources to implement these infrastructure changes.

Scarcity of Civilian Land Transport

Land travel has its advantage and provides greater flexibility in terms of the availability of alternatives, in the event of a border closing. The routes and the conditions of travel even if inconvenient, have a greater degree of certainty compared to turbulent weather conditions through sea travel in the Mediterranean or Aegean. The use of civilian transport such as buses are limited in capacity.

Organised Crime: Opportunities & Travel Conditions

Organised crime elements would capitalise on a now larger land based clientele, Syrian refugees. However, land based trafficking requires that the vehicle of transport be moving for most of the time in order to evade detection. It also requires refugees if in large numbers, to remain hidden in a concealed manner to achieve this which proves hazardous. Hence, if refugees prefer safety over desperation, movement would be restricted only to a handful of refugees at a time. With favourable weather conditions and compelling circumstances of conflict in the region, incidents of land based trafficking can be expected to rise. Additionally, the strengthening of security at Bulgaria-Turkey border would prompt refugees to take alternative routes through the sea into Varna, Bulgaria, Constanta, Romania or risk a short but dangerous trip across the Aegean. The reported price for land-based smuggling between Turkey to the EU ranges from $7,500-$12,500.

Air Routes

Turkey to the European Union

High Costs

Air travel is a direct route yet expensive and reserved for those Syrian refugees who come from wealthy backgrounds or those who have family in the EU who can sponsor their air travel. This is the most advantageous in terms of directness, safety and security as well as assurance of arriving at the intended destination, assuming stable conditions for air travel in the region. Although, this opportunity is limited due to financial constraints and possible barriers should EU policies turn towards restricting the entry of refugees.

Organised Crime: Facilitators

The role of organised crime syndicates is also limited in this. If not being responsible for the passage of refugees, they can facilitate the procurement of flight tickets for air travel by offering higher prices, factoring in the presumed wealth of their air fare customer base and desperation to reach the EU. Black market air fares for direct flights from Turkey to Germany are reportedly $10,000.

Intra-EU Travel

Image: Info-graph depicting refugee statistics (Source: CNN/UNHCR)

Whilst refugees may travel to certain entry points into the EU, these points may not be their final destination. As seen in recent trends of refugees fleeing to the EU, there are pushes towards those EU states whose policies and perceived attitudes towards refugees are friendlier. Hence, it would prompt travel towards countries such as Sweden and Austria. Although Germany has temporarily reinstate its border controls owing to a massive influx of refugees which can be attributed to Germany’s refugee-friendly policies amongst EU nations.

EU Nations (+Norway & Switzerland) Ranked by Syrian Asylum Applications

Image: Screen shot of Cumulative Syrian Asylum Applications in EU + Norway & Switzerland from April 2011 to August 2015 (Source UNHCR)

• Germany: 108,897
• Sweden, 64,685
• Hungary: 54,125
• Austria: 20,946
• Netherlands: 15,254
• Bulgaria: 15,197
• Denmark: 12,277
• Switzerland: 8,683
• United Kingdom: 7,196
• France: 6,895
• Belgium: 6,334
• Spain: 5,554
• Norway: 5,210
• Greece: 3,969
• Cyprus: 2,622
• Romania: 2,332
• Italy: 2,143
• Malta: 928
• Poland: 718
• Finland: 656
• Croatia: 352
• Czech Republic: 304
• Luxembourg: 241
• Portugal: 188
• Slovenia: 187
• Ireland: 101
• Latvia: 89
• Slovakia: 61
• Estonia: 42
• Lithuania: 28

The number of asylum applications towards individual EU nations act as individual scores of preference amongst refugees and indicate the direction of intra-EU movement. Coupled with attempted crossings from countries like Macedonia into Bulgaria or from Serbia into Hungary to reach refugee- friendly Austria, this indicates an intra-EU movement of the majority refugees from the east towards the north and west of the European Union.

It should be noted that Hungary closed its borders on September 16, 2015. This would prompt movement of refugees towards the EU state of Croatia. However, mortal risks would further alter the directional movement of a significant portion of migrants (See link below).

For More on First Migrants Enter Croatia After Hungary Seals Border

Final Note

The current issue of refugees fleeing to the EU incentivises organised crime elements to capitalise on the presence of a new market, the trafficking of refugees. The convergence of human and drug trafficking networks  as a single whole, defines the presence of a vast trafficking infrastructure.

Limited resources and pressure on civilian transport for land routes, prices of air routes and limited availability of civilian maritime routes make organised crime elements a prominent stakeholder in enterprising land and maritime routes as a part of its trafficking infrastructure and facilitating access to air routes. Individuals may be willing to incur such risks; however, those with families may or may not have the emotional capacity to do so. It is also important to note that irrespective of whether refugees reach their final destination or not, the financial outcome for organised crime syndicates remains unaffected. This is even more so due to the interaction between the desperation of refugees and the financial gains for organised crime syndicates.

Terrorist organisations would additionally capitalise and avail the opportunities of infiltration. Under the guise of refugees through the routes discussed above in conjunction with organised crime syndicates, foreign fighters can pass virtually unnoticed. Additionally, the securing of borders opens up alternatives elsewhere, possibly where the terrain is favourable for infiltration, e.g. forests and mountains. This presents mounting challenges for the EU where it is compelled to find the thin line between allowing the entry of refugees whilst weeding out terror operatives or a blanket order of shutting its doors to refugees.

 

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