ISIS Targets are Nominated, POTUS Refuses 75%

Is John Kerry at odds with the White House? Does Kerry even talk to the White House when it comes to the war against Islamic State? The White House is running the conflict against ISIS but refuses to prosecute it with conventional engagement rules.

Reuters: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said on Thursday the United States has the ability to “neutralize” Islamic State much faster than it was able to do with al Qaeda.

“We are going to defeat Daesh. We always said it will take time,” Kerry said, using an alternative name for the Islamist militant group.

“We began our fight against al Qaeda in 2001 and it took us quite a few years before we were able to eliminate Osama bin Laden and the top leadership and neutralize them as an effective force. We hope to do Daesh much faster than that and we think we have an ability to do that,” he told reporters.

U.S. Pilots Confirm: Obama Admin Blocks 75 Percent of Islamic State Strikes

FreeBeacon: U.S. military pilots who have returned from the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq are confirming that they were blocked from dropping 75 percent of their ordnance on terror targets because they could not get clearance to launch a strike, according to a leading member of Congress.

Strikes against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) targets are often blocked due to an Obama administration policy to prevent civilian deaths and collateral damage, according to Rep. Ed Royce (R., Calif.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The policy is being blamed for allowing Islamic State militants to gain strength across Iraq and continue waging terrorist strikes throughout the region and beyond, according to Royce and former military leaders who spoke Wednesday about flaws in the U.S. campaign to combat the Islamic State.

“You went 12 full months while ISIS was on the march without the U.S. using that air power and now as the pilots come back to talk to us they say three-quarters of our ordnance we can’t drop, we can’t get clearance even when we have a clear target in front of us,” Royce said. “I don’t understand this strategy at all because this is what has allowed ISIS the advantage and ability to recruit.”

When asked to address Royce’s statement, a Pentagon official defended the Obama administration’s policy and said that the military is furiously working to prevent civilian casualties.

“The bottom line is that we will not stoop to the level of our enemy and put civilians more in harm’s way than absolutely necessary,” the official told the Washington Free Beacon, explaining that the military often conducts flights “and don’t strike anything.”

“The fact that aircraft go on missions and don’t strike anything is not out of the norm,” the official said. “Despite U.S. strikes being the most precise in the history of warfare, conducting strike operations in the heavily populated areas where ISIL hides certainly presents challenges. We are fighting an enemy who goes out of their way to put civilians at risk. However, our pilots understand the need for the tactical patience in this environment. This fight against ISIL is not the kind of fight from previous decades.”

Jack Keane, a retired four-star U.S. general, agreed with Royce’s assessment of the administration’s policy and blamed President Barack Obama for issuing orders that severely constrain the U.S. military from combatting terror forces.

“This has been an absurdity from the beginning,” Keane said in response to questions from Royce. “The president personally made a statement that has driven air power from the inception.”

“When we agreed we were going to do airpower and the military said, this is how it would work, he [Obama] said, ‘No, I do not want any civilian casualties,’” Keane explained. “And the response was, ‘But there’s always some civilian casualties. We have the best capability in the world to protect from civilians casualties.’”

However, Obama’s response was, “No, you don’t understand. I want no civilian casualties. Zero,’” Keane continued. “So that has driven our so-called rules of engagement to a degree we have never had in any previous air campaign from desert storm to the present.”

This is likely the reason that U.S. pilots are being told to back down when Islamic State targets are in site, Keane said, citing statistics published earlier this year by U.S. Central Command showing that pilots return from sorties in Iraq with about 75 percent of their ordnance unexpended.

“Believe me,” Keane added, “the French are in there not using the restrictions we have imposed on our pilots.”

And the same goes for Russians, he said, adding, “They don’t care at all about civilians.”

The French have been selecting their own targets since beginning to launch strikes on the Islamic State earlier this week, according to a second Pentagon source who spoke to the Free Beacon earlier this week about the strikes.

France dropped at least 20 bombs on key Islamic State targets within two days after the terror attacks in Paris that killed 129. French strikes have killed at least 33 Islamic State militants in the past several days.

In the case of the initial French strikes, the “targets were nominated by the French whose strikes against them were supported by the coalition” fighting the Islamic State, the official explained.

Any coalition member can nominate a potential target.

“Once a target is validated, great care is taken—from analysis of available intelligence to selection of the appropriate weapon to meet mission requirements—to minimize the risk of collateral damage, particularly any potential harm to non-combatants,” the official said.

Since the beginning of the year, more than 22,000 munitions were dropped on Islamic State targets during more than 8,000 sorties, according to information provided to the Free Beacon by the Defense Department.

Some experts questioned whether the administration is handing off portions of the battle to other nations.

“The French airstrikes have been billed as a significant uptick in the battle against the Islamic State; preliminary data indicate that this is not the case,” said Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism expert at the U.S. Treasury Department. “It appears that the U.S. is simply allowing France to strike many of the targets that would usually be reserved for the U.S. and some of its coalition allies. In other words, this appears to be a redistribution of daily targets in the ongoing campaign, and not a significant change.”

These strikes have forced the Islamic State to evacuate at least 20 to 25 percent of the territories it held one year ago in both Iraq and Syria, according to the Pentagon.

Attacks have focused on the Islamic State’s “staging areas, fighting position, and key leaders,” as well as its “oil distribution chain,” according to the Pentagon.

Meanwhile, a poll released Thursday found that at least 70 percent of American support an expanded fight against the Islamic State, including sending U.S. troops to the region.

U.S., Allies Conduct 31 Air Strikes in Syria, Iraq: U.S. Military
The U.S. military said, U.S.-led forces targeted Islamic State militants in Syria with five air strikes from Sunday to Monday morning and conducted 26 strikes against the group in Iraq. Four of the strikes in Syria hit targets in Kobani, striking an Islamic State tactical unit, and destroying fighting positions and a heavy machine gun.The military said in a statement on Monday, that the coalition forces also hit eight fighting positions with a strike near Al Hasakah. In Iraq, eight air strikes near Fallujah destroyed Islamic State fighting positions, mortar tubes, an excavator and a vehicle, and hit seven tactical units.
Inform

What About Screening the TSA Employees for Terror?

TSA Says 73 Employees Were on Terror Watch List

Spectator: A few months ago, top TSA officials were forced to hand over their plastic badges and report for bin-stacking duty after it was discovered that 95% of the time, fake, planted “bombs” and “firearms” were able to make it swiftly through security at a bunch of American airports (just don’t wrap your face powder up in your underwear or they’ll spill out the contents of your luggage across the “security screening area” with abandon, before testing you and your laptop for explosives, because obviously you’re a terrorist, boarding a flight to that high-impact target Cleveland at an ungodly morning hour…not that I’m bitter).

Anyway, the malfeasance inside the TSA extends throughout the agency, apparently, from line workers, to top brass and even to HR. According to a report released this week, the TSA had 73 “aviation workers” on its payroll who also happened to be on the terror watchlist, something the TSA, in its extensive screening process, failed to discover.

A recent U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) report found that 73 aviation workers, employed by airlines and vendors, had alleged links to terrorism.

The report, published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General on June 4, blamed bureaucratic mistakes. Though the TSA says it frequently cross-checks applications and employee lists with the DHS’s “Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist,” both are incomplete.

The TSA’s employee lists, which consist of thousands of records, “contained potentially incomplete or inaccurate data, such as an initial for a first name and missing social security numbers,” the report found. The DHS Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist was also incomplete because “[TSA] is not authorized to receive all terrorism-related categories under current interagency watchlisting policy.”

Well, that’s weird: the TSA, which is supposed to be the front line in protecting American travelers from terrorists, but has no access to the full terror watch list. Granted, the terror watch list is also overly inflated and has a bunch of names of ‘persons of interst’ who are relatives, close friends, roommates and other associates of actual people being watched for terror-related activities, but still. If you’re that close to someone with designs on blowing parts of America sky high, you probably shouldn’t be running the bodyscanner at your local airport. No offense, it’s just a thing.

The best part of Newsweek‘s coverage of the incident is the final paragraph of the story, where the writers of a major publication throw up their hands and claim that they have no idea if anything will even be done to correct the situations, whether people will be fired, or if anyone actually cares.

*** In 2010, the terror watch list gets upgrades.

Now a single tip about a terror link will be enough for inclusion in the watch list for U.S. security officials, who have also evolved a quicker system to share the database of potential terrorists among screening agencies; a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official said that officials have now “effectively in a broad stroke lowered the bar for inclusion” in the list; the new criteria have led to only modest growth in the list, which stands at 440,000 people, about 5 percent more than last year; also, instead of sending data once a night to the Terrorist Screening Center’s watch list, which can take hours, the new system should be able to update the watch list almost instantly as names are entered

An upgraded, more comprehensive system // Source: wired.com

Now a single tip about a terror link will be enough for inclusion in the watch list for U.S. security officials, who have also evolved a quicker system to share the database of potential terrorists among screening agencies.

The master watch list of individuals with suspected links to terrorism is used to screen people seeking to obtain a visa, cross a U.S. border, or board a plane in or destined for the United States. Officials say they have made it easier to add individuals’ names to the watch list and improved the government’s ability to thwart terrorist attacks, the Washington Post reported.

Timothy Healy, director of the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, which maintains the master list, said the new guidelines balance the protection of Americans from terrorist threats with the preservation of civil liberties.

He said the watch list today is “more accurate, more agile,” providing valuable intelligence to a growing number of partners that include state and local police and foreign governments.

Another senior counter-terrorism official told the Post that officials have now “effectively in a broad stroke lowered the bar for inclusion.” The measure comes a year after a Nigerian man allegedly tried to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner. The U.S. government faced criticism for its failure to put Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on the watch list despite his father warning U.S. officials of Abdulmutallab’s radicalisation in Yemen.

Sify news quotes senior counter-terrorism officials to say that since then, they have altered their criteria so that a single-source tip, as long as it is deemed credible, can lead to a name being placed on the watch list, the daily said.

Civil liberties groups argued that the government’s new criteria has made it even more likely that individuals who pose no threat will be swept up in the nation’s security apparatus, leading to potential violations of their privacy and making it difficult for them to travel.

Officials insist, however, that they have been vigilant about keeping law-abiding people off the master list. The new criteria have led to only modest growth in the list, which stands at 440,000 people, about 5 percent more than last year. A vast majority are non-U.S. citizens.

Despite the challenges we face, we have made significant improvements,” Michael E. Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said in a speech this month at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “And the result of that is, in my view, that the threat of that most severe, most complicated attack is significantly lower today than it was in 2001.”

The names on the watch list are culled from a much larger catch-all database that is housed at the National Counterterrorism Center and that includes a huge variety of terrorism-related intelligence.

The database, the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), underwent a multimillion-dollar upgrade to streamline and automate the data so that only one record exists per person, no matter how many aliases that person might have.

Clinton Foundation Private Fund in Columbia

Document is here but it is in Spanish.

Clinton Foundation Running Private Equity Fund in Colombia

The Clinton Foundation is operating a $20 million private equity firm in Colombia, raising concerns from government and consumer watchdog groups who say the practice is unusual and could pose a significant conflict of interest.

The Bogota-based company, Fondo Acceso, could also lead to uncomfortable questions for Hillary Clinton as she criticizes the private equity industry on the campaign trail.

Fondo Acceso was founded by Bill Clinton, Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, and mining magnate Frank Giustra in 2010, financed with a $20 million joint contribution from the Clinton Foundation’s Clinton-Giustra Sustainable Growth Initiative and the SLIM Foundation.

According to the firm’s Spanish-language website, Fondo Acceso is “a Private Equity Fund that seeks investment opportunities in the small and medium Colombian compan[ies] with the purpose of obtaining economic and social returns.”

However, the line between the firm and the Clinton’s nonprofit world is hazy. Fondo Acceso is run out of the Clinton Foundation’s Bogota office and staffed by foundation employees, a representative at the office told the Washington Free Beacon on Tuesday.

The firm is managed by Carolina Botero, who is also chief financial officer at the Clinton-Giustra Enterprise Partnership. It lists various Clinton Foundation and CGEP officials as directors in its corporate filings. The Clinton Foundation’s tax returns list Fondo Acceso as a related corporation in which the foundation holds a 50 percent stake.

Colombian companies that want to apply for venture funding from the Fondo Acceso must also sign a contract turning over financial and internal information to both the private equity firm and the Clinton Foundation.

“The Company acknowledges that this letter of authorization or consent is given for the benefit of the FUND and of the CLINTON FOUNDATION and, therefore, cannot be repealed, or the authorization contained herein altered or modified, without the prior and written consent of the FUND and/or the CLINTON FOUNDATION,” says the contract on the Acceso website.

Fondo Acceso’s financial entanglements are also unclear. Vanessa Jimenez, chief administrator at the Clinton Foundation’s Bogota office, answered the phone number listed for the private equity fund on Tuesday. She said she was not allowed to talk about Fondo Acceso’s investments.

Jimenez said Fondo Acceso was based out of the office, but employees there technically worked for the Clinton Foundation.

“[Fondo Acceso] does not have any employees,” she said. “Nobody is hired by Acceso. … In Colombia, we work for the company, but only the Clinton Foundation is our employer.”

Jimenez directed questions to Fondo Acceso’s legal representative Monica Varela, who is also a Clinton Foundation official. Varela did not respond to request for comment.

Fondo Acceso director Christy Louth, who is also an official at the Clinton-Giustra Enterprise Partnership, declined to comment and directed questions to the partnership’s press office. A spokesperson for the Clinton Foundation also directed questions to the CGEP.

CGEP is a Canadian organization founded by Clinton and Giustra. The group contracts its economic development projects to the Clinton Foundation and does not disclose its donors.

The CGEP press office declined to provide the Free Beacon with a full list of companies that Fondo Acceso has invested in.

The group has been more willing to discuss some of Fondo Acceso’s projects privately and in the Colombian media.

Fondo Acceso managerBotero laid out the company’s strategy in July 2012 and disclosed some of its investments in a presentation to the Cartagena Chamber of Commerce.

The presentation said Fondo Acceso was looking to invest in local companies in the agriculture, production, and labor industries with “high growth potential” that had annual sales between $500,000 and $10 million. In exchange for financing, the firm would become a shareholder in the companies.

According to the presentation, Fondo Acceso’s portfolio included at least two companies at the time. It gave $1.5 million to a Barranquilla-based fruit pulping company Alimentos SAS in 2011 and $250,000 to the Bogota-based telecom company Fontel in 2012, in exchange for shareholding agreements.

These investments are a small fraction of the $20 million that Clinton, Giustra, and Slim committed to Fondo Acceso in 2010, and it is unclear where the rest of the money has gone.

The Clinton-Giustra Enterprise Partnership press office said Fondo Acceso has invested in various CGEP “enterprises” in Latin America, which are companies founded and co-owned by CGEP and the Clinton Foundation.

The lack of clear disclosure raises questions about Fondo Acceso’s transparency, according to watchdog groups.

A charitable foundation running a private equity fund is “not something one hears about commonly” and is “very concerning,” according to Craig Holman, the government affairs lobbyist at the watchdog group Public Citizen.

“Private equity firms invest and take over various companies as social services for a period of time and its intent and its purpose is to provide a reasonable return for shareholders,” said Holman. “If you’ve got a tax-free foundation getting involved in running a private equity firm, I just find that very troubling.”

Ken Boehm, chairman of the National Legal and Policy Center, a government watchdog group, said the lack of transparency was a troubling. He said the public has a right to know whether any of Fondo Acceso’s companies received U.S. government support while Hillary Clinton was secretary of state.

“At the minimum, the Clinton Foundation should disclose every company that received investment funds from them, because the public is entitled to know whether those companies benefited from any State Department foreign aid programs,” said Boehm.

The Clinton campaign did not respond to a request for comment.

Steps of Screening Refugees

WallStreetJournal: This week dozens of state governors said they would refuse Syrian refugees, citing national security concerns after the Paris attacks. The Obama administration pushed back on those announcements and stressed that the governors had little power to do so. But they also pledged to explain the program to those doubting it could screen out potential terrorists. Here’s a breakdown of how the program works.

* * *

Q: What kind of screenings do Syrian refugees go through?

A:  Refugees from all countries receive “the most rigorous screening and security vetting of any category of traveler to the United States,” a senior administration official told reporters Tuesday.  That process includes biographic and biometric security checks – i.e. checking records and doing fingerprinting.  Law enforcement, the Pentagon and the intelligence community all vet information provided by and obtained about refugees to help make a determination about whether they will ultimately be allowed to come to the U.S. Syrian refugees go through an enhanced review process on top of that with extra national security checks. All Syrian refugees considered for resettlement in the U.S. are interviewed in person by specially trained staff, mostly in Amman and Istanbul, but also in Cairo and elsewhere. Refugees must also undergo health screenings and a cultural orientation before they arrive in the U.S.

Q: How long does it take?

A:  The process usually takes between 18 to 24 months and generally begins with a referral from the U.N. refugee agency. Those referrals include biographic and other information that the Department of Homeland Security uses to determine if the cases meet the criteria for refugee status. If DHS decides a refugee qualifies on one of five protected grounds – race, religion, nationalist, political views or belonging to a certain social group, the extensive screening processes described earlier begin. For comparison, an international student seeking to study in the U.S., for example, usually schedules a consular interview three to five months in advance of beginning schooling.

Q:  Who are the Syrian refugees coming to the U.S.?

A:  Half of the Syrian refugees resettled in the U.S. so far are children, according to a senior administration official. Of the rest, 2.5% are adults over 60 and 2% are single men. The refugees are roughly half men and half women, with slightly more men.

Q:  How many are here now?

A:   Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, the U.S. has admitted about 2,200 Syrian refugees. That’s a very small chunk of the more than 332,000 refugees who have come to the U.S. during the same period. The Obama administration has pledged to take in at least 10,000 in fiscal year 2016, which began in October. Over 4 million people have fled Syria since the crisis began in March 2011. Most are located in countries in the region.

Q: Where are Syrian refugees living in the U.S.?

A: The top resettlement states for Syrian refugees are California, Texas, Michigan, Illinois and Arizona. Overall 36 states have taken in Syrians since 2011.

Q: What happens once a refugee arrives to the U.S.?

A:  Refugees are required to adjust their status to become legal permanent residents within one year of arriving to the U.S. Each week the nine networks of nonprofits that work with the State Department to resettle refugees meet to decide where to send refugees arriving here. Those decisions are based on where their family members might be located, which states have low unemployment rates and what cities might be able to provide specialized medical treatment, for example. Officials usually try to resettle refugees in medium-size cities like Nashville, Tenn., and Buffalo, N.Y. that aren’t too expensive. But once refugees get here, they are free to live wherever they wish, officials said.

*** Then there is the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a division of Health and Human Resources.

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) gives new populations the opportunity to maximize their potential in the United States.  ORR’s programs provide people in need with critical resources to assist them in becoming integrated members of American society, such as cash, social services, and medical assistance.

ORR benefits and services are available to eligible persons from the following groups:

  • Refugees
  • Asylees
  • Cuban/Haitian entrants
  • Amerasians
  • Victims of human trafficking
  • Unaccompanied alien children
  • Survivors of torture

ORR has five divisions and one major program area:

  • Refugee Assistance
  • Refugee Health
  • Resettlement Services
  • Children’s Services
  • Anti-Trafficking in Persons
  • Office of the Director

Division of Refugee Assistance:

The Division of Refugee Assistance (DRA) supports, oversees and provides guidance to State-Administered, Public Private Partnership and Wilson/Fish programs that provide assistance and services to refugees, asylees, certain Amerasian immigrants, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and Certified Victims of Human Trafficking (henceforth referred to collectively as refugees). DRA reviews and monitors state plans, budget submissions, service plans, and reports, while providing technical assistance to ensure that federal regulations are followed and adequate services and performance are maintained.  The ultimate goal is to provide the types of assistance that will allow refugees to become economically self-sufficient as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States.

Program structures:

  • State Administered: Cash, medical, and social services are primarily managed by states as part of their social service or labor force programs.  The program goal is to enable refugees become self-sufficient as soon as possible.
  • Public Private Partnership: This partnership provides States the option to enter into a partnership with local voluntary resettlement agencies to provide cash assistance to refugees.  The objective is to create more effective resettlement, while maintaining state responsibility for policy and administrative oversight.
  • Wilson-Fish: The program is an alternative to the traditional state administered refugee resettlement program.  This program provides cash, medical assistance, and social services to refugees.  The purpose of the Wilson-Fish program is to increase refugee prospects for early employment and self-sufficiency, promote coordination among voluntary resettlement agencies and service providers, and ensure that refugee assistance programs exist in every state where refugees are resettled.

DRA is responsible for the following programs:

  • Cash and Medical Assistance: This program provides reimbursement to states and other programs for cash and medical assistance. Refugees who are ineligible for TANF and Medicaid may be eligible for cash and medical assistance for up to eight months from their date of arrival, grant of asylum, or date of certification for trafficking victims.
  • Refugee Social Services: This program allocates formula funds to states to serve refugees who have been in the United States less than 60 months (five years).  Services are focused on addressing employability and include interpretation and translation, day care, citizenship, and naturalization.  Services are designed to help refugees obtain jobs within one year of enrollment.
  • Targeted Assistance Formula: This program allocates formula funds to states that qualify for additional funds due to an influx of refugee arrivals that need public assistance.  TAG service prioritize (a) cash assistance recipients, particularly long-term recipients; (b) unemployed refugees not receiving cash assistance; and (c) employed refugees in need of services to retain employment or to attain economic independence.
  • Cuban Haitian: This program provides discretionary grants to states and other programs to fund assistance and services in localities with a heavy influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants and refugees.  This program supports employment services, hospitals, and other health and mental health care programs, adult and vocational education services, refugee crime or victimization programs, and citizenship and naturalization services.
  • Refugee School Impact: This program provides discretionary grants to state and other programs.  Funds go to school districts to pay for activities that will lead to the effective integration and education of refugee children between the ages of 5 and 18.  Activities include English as a second language; after-school tutorials; programs that encourage high school completion and full participation in school activities; after-school and/or summer clubs and activities; parental involvement programs; bilingual/bicultural counselors; interpreter services, etc.
  • Services to Older Refugees: This program provides discretionary grants to states to ensure that refugees aged 60 and above are linked to mainstream aging services in their community.  ORR cooperates with the Administration for Community Living to reach this goal.
  • Targeted Assistance Discretionary: This program provides discretionary grants to states and other programs to address the employment needs of refugees that cannot be met with the Formula Social Services or Formula Targeted Assistance Grant Programs.  Activities under this program are for the purpose of supplementing and/or complementing existing employment services to help refugees achieve economic self-sufficiency.
  • Technical Assistance Program: This program provides technical assistance grants to organizations with expertise in specific areas, such as employment, cultural orientation, economic development, and English language training.

Division of Refugee Health
ORR recently created the refugee heath program to address issues of health and well-being that are vital to refugees and other ORR-eligible populations. The refugee health program works on various projects including: collaborating with federal partners in the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA); administering the Survivors of Torture and Preventive Health programs; and providing technical assistance on medical screening guidelines, assessment and follow-up for contagious or communicable diseases, mental health awareness and linkages, suicide prevention, emergency preparedness and other health and mental health initiatives. It also coordinates with state and federal partners to advance ORR’s overall health initiatives.

DRH is responsible for the following programs:

  • Refugee Preventive Health: This program provides discretionary grants to states or their designated health agencies or other programs that facilitate medical screenings and support health services.  The program aims to reduce the spread of infectious disease, treat any current ailments, and promote preventive health practices.
  • Services to Survivors of Torture Program: This program provides funding for a comprehensive program of support for survivors of torture.  The Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998 recognizes that a significant number of refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers entering the United States have suffered torture.  The program provides rehabilitative services which enable survivors to become productive members of our communities.

Division of Resettlement Services
The Division of Resettlement Services (DRS) provides assistance through public and private non-profit agencies to support the economic and social integration of refugees. DRS is responsible for the following programs:

  • Matching Grant Program: This is an alternative program to public assistance designed to enable refugees to become self-sufficient within four to six months from the date of arrival into the United States.  Eligible grantees are voluntary agencies able to coordinate comprehensive multilingual, multicultural services for refugees at local sites; the same agencies are under cooperative agreements with the Department of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM).
  • Refugee Agriculture Partnership Program: The Refugee Agriculture Partnership Program (RAPP) involves refugees in the effort to improve the supply and quality of food in urban and rural areas.  Refugees are potential farmers or producers of more healthful foods, as well as consumers whose health and well-being are affected by diet.  RAPP has evolved into a program with multiple objectives that include: creating sustainable income; producing supplemental income; having an adequate supply of healthy foods in a community; achieving better physical and mental health; promoting community integration, and developing the capacity of organizations to access USDA and other services and resources.  In cooperation with the USDA, ORR helps develop community gardens and farmers’ markets.
  • Preferred Communities Program: This program supports the resettlement agencies of newly arriving refugees by providing them additional resources to help refugees to become self-sufficient and to integrate into their new communities.  The program also assists service providers that assist refugees with special needs that require more intensive case management.
  • Ethnic Community Self-Help Program: This program provides assistance to refugee ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs) that address community building and facilitate cultural adjustment and integration of refugees.  The program’s purpose is to promote community organizing that builds bridges between newcomer refugee communities and community resources.
  • Microenterprise Development Program: This program enables refugees to become financially independent by helping them develop capital resources and business expertise to start, expand, or strengthen their own business. The program provides training and technical assistance in business plan development, management, bookkeeping, and marketing to equip refugees with the skills they need to become successful entrepreneurs.
  • Microenterprise Development – Home-Based Child Care Program: This program is designed to enable refugee women to become entrepreneurs while simultaneously caring for their own children.
  • Individual Development Accounts Program: Individual development accounts are matched savings accounts available for the purchase of specific assets.  Under the IDA program, the matching funds, together with the refugee’s own savings from his or her employment, are available for one (or more) of the following: home purchase; microenterprise capitalization; post secondary education or training; and in some cases, purchase of an automobile if necessary to maintain or upgrade employment.  Upon enrolling in an IDA program, a refugee signs a savings plan agreement, which specifies the savings goal, the match rate, and the amount the refugee will save each month.  Refugees also receiving training in navigating the financial system, budgeting, saving, and credit.

Division of Children’s Services
The Division of Children’s Services (DCS) recognizes the importance of providing a safe and appropriate environment for unaccompanied alien children during the interim period between the minor’s transfer into ORR care and reunification with family or other sponsors or removal from the United States by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  DCS strives to provide the best care and placement for unaccompanied alien children (UAC), who are in federal custody by reason of their immigration status, while taking into account the unique nature of each child’s situation in making placement, case management, and release decisions.  DCS also oversees the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors (URM) program, which connects refugee minors with appropriate foster care services and benefits when they do not have a parent or a relative available and committed to providing for their long-term care.

  • Unaccompanied Children’s Services: This program makes and implements placement decisions in the best interests of UAC to ensure that they are in the least restrictive setting possible while in federal custody.  The majority of UAC are cared for through a network of state licensed ORR-funded care providers, which provide classroom education, mental and medical health services, case management, and socialization/recreation.  ORR/DCS funds programs to provide a continuum of care for children, including foster care, group homes, and residential treatment centers.  The division also coordinates a legal access project assuring that these children have information about their legal rights and receive an individual legal screening to assess their chances of legal relief.  Finally, ORR/DCS provides family reunification services to facilitate safe and timely placement with family members or other qualified sponsors.
  • Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program: This program ensures that eligible unaccompanied minor populations receive the full range of assistance, care, and services available to all foster children in the state by establishing a legal authority to act in place of the child’s unavailable parent(s).  Our programs encourage reunification of children with their parents or other appropriate adult relatives through family tracing and coordination with local refugee resettlement agencies.  However, if reunification is not possible, each program works to design a case specific permanency plan for each minor or youth in care.  Additional services ORR provides include: indirect financial support for housing, food, clothing, medical care, and other necessities; intensive case management by social workers; independent living skills training; educational supports including educational training vouchers; English language training; career/college counseling and training; mental health services; assistance adjusting immigration status; cultural activities; recreational opportunities; support for social integration; cultural and religious preservation.

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Division
The Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (ATIP) helps certify victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.  These individuals are eligible to receive federally funded benefits and services to the same extent as refugees, and can begin to rebuild their lives in the United States.  ATIP is committed to promoting public awareness and assisting in the identification of trafficking victims by educating the public and persons likely to encounter victims.  These organizations or persons may include: social services providers; public health officials; legal organizations; as well as ethnic, faith-based, and community organizations.

ATIP is responsible for the following programs:

Victim Identification and Public Awareness

• Rescue and Restore Campaign: This program is a public awareness campaign that established Rescue and Restore coalitions in 24 cities, regions, and states. These community action groups are comprised of non-governmental organization leaders, academics, students, law enforcement officials, and other key stakeholders who are committed to addressing the problem of human trafficking in their own communities.

• Rescue and Restore Regional Program: This program serves as the focal point for regional public awareness campaign activities and intensification of local outreach to identify victims of human trafficking.  Each Rescue and Restore Regional partner oversees and builds the capacity of a local anti-trafficking network, and sub-awards 60 percent of grant funds to local organizations that identify and work with victims.  By acting as a focal point for regional anti-trafficking efforts, Rescue and Restore Regional partners encourage a cohesive and collaborative approach in the fight against modern-day slavery.

Assistance for Victims of Human Trafficking

  • Certifications and Eligibility Letters: HHS is the sole federal agency authorized to certify foreign adult victims of human trafficking.  Similarly, it is the sole federal agency authorized to make foreign child victims of human trafficking eligible for assistance.  ORR issues all certifications and eligibility letters.  Certification grants adult foreign victims of human trafficking access to federal benefits and services to the same extent as refugees.  Likewise, eligibility letters grant minor foreign victims of trafficking access to federal benefits and services to the same extent as refugees, including placement in the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors program.
  • National Human Trafficking Victim Assistance Program: This program provides funding for comprehensive case management services to foreign victims of trafficking and potential victims seeking HHS certification in any location in the United States.  The grantees provide case management to assist a victim of trafficking to become certified, and other necessary services after certification, through a network of sub-awardees in locations throughout the country.  These grants ensure the provision of case management, referrals, and emergency assistance (such as food, clothing, and shelter) to victims of human trafficking and certain family members.  Grantees help victims gain access to housing, employability services, mental health screening and therapy, medical care, and some legal services, enabling victims to live free of violence and exploitation.
  • National Human Trafficking Resource Center: This program is a national, toll-free hotline for the human trafficking field in the United States.  It is reached by calling 1-888-3737-888 or e-mailing [email protected].  The NHTRC operates around the clock to protect victims of human trafficking.  It provides callers with a range of comprehensive services including: crisis intervention; urgent and non-urgent referrals; tip reporting; anti-trafficking resources; and technical assistance for the anti-trafficking field and those who wish to get involved.  To perform these functions, the NHTRC maintains a national database of organizations and individuals, as well as a library of anti-trafficking resources and materials.

Office of the Director
The Office of the Director responds to overall ORR operations and special projects, including communications and outreach, media relations, and the federal government’s U.S. Repatriation Program.  The Budget, Policy, and Data Analysis (BPDA) team is also located within the Office of the Director, and is responsible for the allocation and tracking of funds for refugee cash and medical assistance, as well as state administrative costs; forecasting and executing ORR’s annual budget; developing regulations and legislative proposals; and routinely interpreting policy.  BPDA also coordinates preparation of the ORR Annual Report to Congress.

Last May, DHS Warned on Belgium ISIS Cell

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(U)  Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO).  It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).  It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.  
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(U//FOUO)  Future ISIL Operations in West Could Resemble Disrupted Belgian Plot
(U//FOUO)  Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).  Coordinated with NPPD, the FBI, and NCTC.  
(U)  Key Judgments
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more complex operations in the West.  We differentiate the complex, centrally planned plotting in Belgium from other, more-simplistic attacks by ISIL-inspired or directed individuals, which could occur with little
to no warning. 
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses the group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency information sharing about emerging and ongoing threats.  
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that items recovered by Belgian authorities suggest the group’s plotting may
have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers and underscores the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement of potential terrorist activity through suspicious activity reporting (SAR).  (See Appendix A for details on the importance of SAR reporting.)
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the security measures used by this group to avoid physical and technical collection highlight how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their behavior and the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to deflect scrutiny.  
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that facilitation efforts by
the group were likely aided by members’ criminal
background and possible access to criminal groups underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.  
(U//FOUO)  Awareness of some of the tactics and tradecraft used by the group in Belgium could assist with identifying and disrupting potential plots in the United States.  
(U//FOUO)  Belgian Plot Signals ISIL’s Interest
in Complex Plots Against the West
(U//FOUO)  The plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more sophisticated
(U)  Scope
(U//FOUO)  This Assessment highlights the tactics, targets, and tradecraft allegedly used in a plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 that potentially could be used in the Homeland by individuals associated with or inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  This Assessment is intended to support the DHS activities to assist federal, state, and local government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, first responders, and private sector security partners in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.   
(U)  Background
(U)  On 15 January 2015, Belgian authorities raided multiple locations including a safe house in Verviers, a suburb of Brussels, where a firefight ended in the deaths of two individuals and the arrest of a third suspect.  The raids disrupted an alleged plot involving an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group with at least ten operativessome of whom were returning foreign fighterspossibly targeting police or the public.  The group may have been acting under the direction of a member(s) of ISIL.  There is no publically available information as to whether a specific target was selected.  Since the initial raids, multiple individuals in several European countries have been arrested and charged in connection with the group’s activities.  The investigation into this plot remains ongoing.1,2  
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operations in the West.  I&A judges that the threat from ISIL plots involving multiple operatives may grow, but are more likely to occur in Europewhere several recruitment networks have been disrupted, and several returning fighters have already demonstrated the ability to conduct attacksthan in the United States given the different operating environments, number of European foreign fighters currently in theater, and Europe’s
geographic proximity to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.3,4  While we assess the threat is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.  I&A notes that small-scale attacks using comparatively less sophisticated tacticssuch as the 3 May attempted attack against a
“Draw the Prophet” event in Garland, Texas by
individuals inspired to act by ISIL-linked messaging, or by individuals taking direction from an oversea plotter after connecting through social mediacould proceed with little to no warning.    
(U//FOUO)  Dispersed Activities and Remote Leadership Possibly Intended to Conceal
Activities 
(U//FOUO)  The group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency sharing information about emerging and ongoing threats.  Even though the group likely planned to attack targets in Belgium, the
investigation into the group’s activities spans several
European countries, including France, Greece, Spain, and the Netherlands, as well countries where there is limited- to-no counterterrorism cooperation with the United States,
such as Syria.  
» (U)  The purported leader of the group, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, directed the operation from a safe house in Athens, Greece using a cell phone, while other group members operated in several other European countries, according to European media reporting citing a senior Belgian counterterrorism official.5,6
» (U)  In addition to the 13 arrests made throughout Belgium, two operatives were arrested in France and police apprehended a cell member in Greece after tracing links to a second safe house in Athens, according to a Belgian news conference and Greek media reporting citing senior police officers.7,8,9
» (U)  Multiple members of the cell appear to have been able to communicate and travel unimpeded across borders to facilitate attack planning.  In addition to directing operatives from the safe house in Athens, Abaaoud boasted he was able to return to
Syria after the Verviers raid despite having international warrants for his arrest, according to an interview featured in the February release of ISIL’s
Dabiq magazine.10 
» (U)  The passport of an identified Dutch national
possibly associated with the groupwho likely traveled to Syria in late 2014 was found at the Verviers safe house, according to Dutch media reporting.11  Dutch officials conducted a search of his parents’ home and confiscated laptops and other media.  As of early April, he was reportedly killed while fighting in Syria, according to unconfirmed Dutch media reporting.12  
(U//FOUO)  Material Acquisition Suggests Attacker’s Potential Tactics and Targets 
(U//FOUO)  Items recovered during searches of
residences affiliated with the cell suggest the group’s
plotting may have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers.  There is no publicly available information about the acquisition of these items, but the amounts and types of materials acquired by the group highlights the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement through SARs of attempts to acquire or store a large cache of equipment or chemicals needed to support larger operations.
» (U)  Belgian law enforcement discovered automatic firearms, precursors for the explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a body camera, multiple cell phones, handheld radios, police uniforms, fraudulent identification documents, and a large quantity of cash during the raid in Verviers, according to statements made by Belgian government officials.14,15,16  At the time
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)  A picture, from ISIL’s Dabiq magazine, of Abdelhmaid Abaaoud (far right) with the two alleged cell members killed during the January 2015 raid in
Verviers, Belgium.13
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of the raid, the members of this cell were also searching for an ice machine to cool and transport the TATP, according to European press reporting.17
» (U)  Belgian officials were reportedly concerned that the acquisition of police uniforms and discussion by group members of a Molenbeek police stationwhere members of the group had reportedly spent time
suggests that they may have intended to target a police station or to impersonate officers to potentially gain access to a sensitive site. 18,19,20  While there is no confirmation the group was actually going to target police, such an attack would have been consistent with media reports about recent ISIL-linked plots in the West directed at law enforcement and ongoing messaging by ISIL since September 2014.21
(U//FOUO)  Alleged Operational Security Measures Suggest Knowledge of Law Enforcement Methods
(U//FOUO)  The steps group members reportedly took to avoid physical and technical collection of their preoperational activities suggest members were likely cognizant of the potential for scrutiny by Belgian authorities given their status as returning foreign fighters and had at least a rudimentary knowledge of law enforcement efforts to monitor social media and other communications.  The countermeasures used by this group underscore how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their patterns of behavior and highlight the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to
deflect scrutiny.
(U//FOUO)  Communications Security.  The group made extensive efforts to prevent or limit law enforcement’s ability to conduct technical surveillance.
» (U)  A group member reportedly changed his cell phone five times and urged operatives to change vehicles often and to search the vehicles for
microphones in an effort to thwart potential surveillance by police and intelligence officials, according to Belgian media reporting citing police
officials.23   
» (U)  According to an unverified Belgian media report, intercepted communications between cell members were conducted in French, Arabic, and a Moroccan dialect, and frequently used coded language to discuss attack planning to make translation problematic for law enforcement and intelligence services.24    
» (U)  Belgian authorities discovered that the incarcerated brother of one of the cell members may have acted as an intermediary to facilitate communications between Greece- and Belgian-based members after officials at a prison in Belgium notified law enforcement of the brother’s suspicious
communications, according to Belgian media reporting.25  
(U//FOUO)  Physical Security.  The group attempted to obscure their operational travel and material acquisition from Belgian officials.
» (U//FOUO)  According to several media reports, the family of Abaaoud received a call in late 2014 that he had been killed while fighting in Syria.  However, Abaaoud’s probable involvement in this plot implies this may have been done intentionally to deter efforts by Belgian officials to track his activities.26 
» (U//FOUO)  Belgian and Greek authorities recovered multiple identification documents, some of which may have been fraudulent, at safe houses reportedly used by the group, according to media reports. 27,28,29  Moreover, the use of false identity documents may have led to the misidentification of the two operatives killed during the raid in Verviers, according to a European media report, suggesting the group may have used fraudulent documents to conceal travel from Syria to Europe and to facilitate their attack planning. 30
» (U//FOUO)  The large amount of cash recovered by Belgian authorities at the safe house in Verviers was likely intended to fund some of the group’s
procurement activities and to conceal purchasing patterns.31  Activities such as these highlight the importance of scrutinizing suspicious purchases of bulk quantities of precursor chemicals where individuals insist on paying only in cash.
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)   Belgium investigators at scene following the raid in Verviers, Belgium on 15 January 2015.22
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UNCLASSIFIED
(U)  Figure 1. Map of Group Activities
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(U//FOUO)  Member’s Criminal Background Likely Aided Planning and Facilitation  
(U//FOUO)  Facilitation efforts by the group were likely aided by members’ criminal background and possible access to criminal groups, underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.  The nexus between terrorist preoperational planning and criminal activities may offer law enforcement opportunities to detect ongoing plotting, as investigations of intercepted illegal activities may present indicators of other nefarious
intentions.
» (U)  At least one alleged cell member, Souhaib el Abdi, had previous experience with trafficking forged documents, according to comments from his lawyer reported in open source media.32  The groups’ purported leader Abaaoud spent time in prison for theft before departing Belgium for Syria, according to a US press report.33
» (U)  The Belgian police uniforms, large cache of illegal weaponsincluding Kalashnikov rifles, handguns, ammunition, and materials to make explosivesthat were seized by police during the raids, were likely acquired illegally, according to a media reporting coverage of Belgian police news conference.34  Cell members have subsequently been charged with violating Belgian weapons laws, according to statements made by Belgian officials.35
(U)  Implications
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that future Western complex attacks and plots could resemble the size and capabilities of this group and awareness of the tactics and tradecraft used by this group could assist with identifying and disrupting potential complex plots in the United States. Prior to the disruption of this plot, nearly all of the approximately one dozen ISIL-linked plots and attacks in the West to date involved lone offenders or small
groups of individuals, raising I&A’s concern that the
involvement of a large number of operatives and group leaders based in multiple countries in future ISIL-linked plotting could create significant obstacles in the detection and disruption of preoperational activities.*  
(U//FOUO)  DHS defines a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve direction, assistance, or influence from a larger terrorist organization or foreign actor.
(U//FOUO)  We assess that plots involving foreign fighters, who have returned from conflict zones, or foreign fighters based overseas, who have the ability to leverage violent extremists in their home countries, are more likely to plot an attack on this scale than are their less-experienced counterparts.  While we assess that the threat of such an attack is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.  
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(U//FOUO)  Appendix A: Importance of Suspicious Activity Reporting
(U//FOUO)  Given the range of targets and tactics of ISIL-associated plots since last year, we encourage reporting of suspicious activity to appropriate government authorities and encourage our security, military, and law enforcement partners to remain vigilant.  We face an increased challenge in detecting terrorist plots underway by individuals or small groups acting quickly and independently or with only tenuous ties to foreign-based terrorists.  Pre-operational indicators are likely to be difficult to detect; as such, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners play a critical role in identifying and reporting suspicious activities and raising the awareness of federal counterterrorism officials.
(U)  Indicators
(U//FOUO)  DHS encourages federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials, as well as first responders and private sector security partners, to remain alert and immediately report suspicious activity and potential behavioral indicators of pre-operational terrorism planning activities, to include suspicious acquisition of materials and construction of explosive devices.  Some observed activities that may be suspicious include constitutionally protected activity.  These activities should not be reported absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that
the observed behavior is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism.  No single behavioral indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action.  The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.
» (U//FOUO)  New or increased advocacy of violence, including providing material support or recruiting others to commit criminal acts;
» (U//FOUO)  Reports to law enforcement that a community member has adopted a new name, style of dress or speech, and/or other significant changes in presentation to others in association with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Communicating with known or suspected homegrown or foreign-based violent extremists using e-mail or social media platforms;
» (U//FOUO)  Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, or barriers;
» (U//FOUO)  Attempts to purchase all available stock of explosives precursors or to acquire materials in bulk without explanation or justification or making numerous smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of timea possible sign of covert stockpiling;
» (U//FOUO)  Theft of chemicals, hazardous substances, weapons, pre-cursor materials, or items that could compromise facility security, such as uniforms, identification, blueprints, vehicles (or components), technology, or access keys or cards;
» (U//FOUO)  Internet research for target selection, acquisition of technical capabilities, planning, or logistics; » (U//FOUO)  Insisting on paying in cash or using a credit card in another person’s name; » (U//FOUO)  Participation in weapons training, paramilitary exercises, and reconnaissance and surveillance activities in
a manner that is reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism, particularly in conjunction with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Use of cover terms to mask the true meaning of events or nefarious activities combined with active advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition, or materials that could be used to produce explosives, such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer; and
» (U//FOUO)  Activities that a reasonable person would deem as suspicious, indicating a storage facility or other areas are being used to construct an explosive device.
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(U)  Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.8
(U)  Source Summary Statement
(U//FOUO)  This Assessment is based on information drawn from a body of unclassified reporting, including open source media reports, public statements of senior foreign government officials, and public accounts of foreign law enforcement investigations from multiple law enforcement agencies.  We have medium confidence in the press reports used in this product, some of which have been corroborated by public statements made by senior foreign law enforcement officials.  
(U)  Report Suspicious Activity
(U)  To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement.  Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action.  For more information on the Nationwide
SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.
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1 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
2 (U); OSC; EUL2015041773002595; 17 April 2015. 3 (U); OSC; EUL2015021166933318; 11 February 2015. 4 (U); OSC; EUR2015022528575929; 24 February 2015.
5 (U); OSC; EUN2015020948731295; 31 January 2015. 6 (U); OSC; EUL2015020274740312; 1 February 2015. 7 (U); OSC: EUN2015020947629159; 30 January 2015. 8 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 9 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 10 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 11 (U); OSC; EUL2015012065248183; 19 January 2015.
12 (U); Teen with Connection to Verviers Deceased in Syria; http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20150403_01614138;
accessed 9 April 2015.
13 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 14 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 15 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europehttp://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-
belgium-isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
16 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
17 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
18 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying;
http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presume; accessed 6 April 2015.
19 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 20 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
21 (U); OSC; TRR2014092201178788; 22 September 2014. 22 (U); Belgian Operation Thwarted ‘Major Terrorist Attacks,’ Kills 2 Suspects; http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/
world/belgium-anti-terror-operation/; accessed 13 April 2014.
23 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/
    verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
24 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/
societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
25 (U); OSC; EUL2015012064970018; 20 January 2015. 26 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
27 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
28 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
29 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 30 (U); Belgian Police Admit Seeking Wrong Man as Vervier Shooutout Jihadists Named; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11362093/Belgian-police-admit-seeking-wrong-man-as-Vervier-shooutout-jihadists-named.html; accessed 13 April 2015.
31 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 32 (U); Terrorist Threat  Dismantled Verviers Terrorist Cell: 4 Suspects Face Council Chamber;
http://www.thebrusselstimes.com/belgium/terrorist-threat-dismantled-verviers-terrorist-cell-4-suspects-face-
council-chamber/; accessed 1 April 2015.
33 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
34 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 35 (U); OSC; EUR2015012167949567; 21 January 2015.