Russia Deploys a Military Division Within 50 Miles of U.S.

Russia will deploy a division of troops about 50 miles from the US

Chukotka kuril islands Google Maps

BusinessInsider: At a recent event, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that a division of troops would be stationed in Chukotka, Russia’s far-east region, just slightly more than 50 miles from Alaska.

“There are plans to form a coastal defense division in 2018 on the Chukotka operational direction,” said Shoigu.

He said that the deployment was “to ensure control of the closed sea zones of the Kuril Islands and the Bering Strait, cover the routes of Pacific Fleet forces’ deployment in the Far Eastern and Northern sea zones, and increase the combat viability of naval strategic nuclear forces.”

Japan and Russia dispute ownership of the northern Kuril Islands, where Russia plans to deploy missile-defense batteries. The Bering Strait is the narrow waterway that separates Alaska from Russia.

Broadly, Russia has taken the lead in militarizing and exploring the Arctic region, as melting ice caps open up new shipping lanes between the East and West. In that context, the deployment of a division to the sparsely populated Chukotka region makes sense.

In the past, Russia has bemoaned NATO and US troop deployments near to its borders. How the US will respond to this deployment remains to be seen.

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 IBTimes

Has Putin stolen the Kuril Islands from Japan in the same manner he took over Crimea? You be the judge.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a new interview with Bloomberg News, was asked about the issue of the long-standing dispute between his country and Japan over the Kuril Islands–a series of small islets off the northern coast of Hokkaido, running up to the southern tip of the Kamchatka peninsula. Putin seemingly opened the door to a compromise with Tokyo on the dispute. “We’re not talking about some exchange or some sale,” he said. “We are talking about finding a solution where neither of the parties would feel defeated or a loser.”

Putin began by saying that there will be no trading of territories with Japan, but that Russia “would very much like to find a solution to this problem with our Japanese friends.” The Russian president also cautioned that compromise would likely have to be built on the back of trust; if Moscow “can reach a similarly high level of trust” with Tokyo “then we can find some sort of compromise.”

Are Putin’s latest comments a serious expression of diplomatic interest or a fleeting moment of optimism? After all, in the past two years, the prospects of a resolution to the long-standing Kuril Islands dispute–and Russia-Japan relations more generally–have ebbed and flowed. Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, expressed an interest in pursuing closer relations with Moscow after returning to office in 2012. However, his early overtures, while reciprocated by Russia, were derailed by Tokyo’s alignment with the West in the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and ensuing support for separatists in Ukraine. Tokyo, somewhat reluctantly, stood lockstep with the G7 powers against Russia and backed international sanctions.

On the Japanese side, interest in cooperation with Russia has far from evaporated. In fact, a day before Putin’s comments to Bloomberg became public, Abe established a new cabinet-level post for Hiroshige Seko, the minister of economy, trade, and industry, focused on economic cooperation with Russia. The post is meant to carry forward momentum from a brief and informal meeting between Abe and Putin earlier this year in Sochi, on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Abe’s current play with Putin is to position Japan as an enabler for Russian economic dynamism in the country’s far east. Tokyo appears to be betting that economic cooperation can build the sort of trust that Putin alluded to in his comments to Bloomberg.

There’ll be some indicators on whether we’re due for another period of bilateral warmth between Tokyo and Moscow. First of all, keep an eye out for the upcoming Abe-Putin meeting at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, which kicked off on Friday. The two leaders will be able to follow up on their deliberations in Vladivostok a few months down the line at the 2016 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, which will be held in Peru this year.

Finally, Russian military behavior in Japan’s airspace and nearby waters is a good indicator of Moscow’s feelings toward Tokyo. Russia regularly flies Tu-95 Bear strategic bombers around Japanese airspace, causing Japan’s Air Self Defense Force to scramble in response. (Moscow kicked off the year by having two Tu-95s circumnavigate Japan’s main islands.) Similarly, with tensions high in the East China Sea, any Russian involvement alongside Chinese Navy or Coast Guard vessels could be telling. (When a Chinese Navy frigate sailed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands earlier this summer for the first time, it was flanked by Russian naval vessels.)

Overall, the bilateral situation between the two countries remains precarious, but could be turning around. Putin’s comments and Abe’s determination to operationalize an “Eastern” strategy of sorts to build trust with Moscow might just restore the bonhomie that seemed to exist between the two countries in 2013, when the prospects for a resolution of the 71-year old Kuril Islands dispute appeared bright.

 

 

House DHS Chairman Releases Terror Threat Snapshot

September-Terror-Threat-Snapshot

TerrorThreatSnapshot_Sept_Social Media

House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Texas) has released his monthly Terror Threat Snapshot for September 2016. The current edition paints an ominous backdrop for one of the worst years on record for homegrown Islamist extremism.

166 Homegrown Terror Plots; 26 Arrests

According to the snapshot, FBI Director James Comey estimates that around 80 percent of his Bureau’s 1,000-plus active homegrown terrorist investigations can be traced to ISIS, and he calls that statistic “the greatest threat to the physical safety of Americans today.” Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 166 homegrown terror plots were uncovered in the United States; nearly 90 percent of U.S.-based ISIS supporters are male and close to 35 percent of them are recent converts to Islam.

The Terror Threat Snapshot states that 26 people have been arrested in 13 states so far in 2016. The offenses – all related to ISIS – include weapons charges, offering financial support to the Islamic State, and actual plots to attack U.S. targets and citizens. McCaul’s snapshot also points out 47 ISIS-linked plots to attack towns and cities in Europe, and 28 attacks targeting Westerners outside of the U.S. and Europe.

Recent ISIS-Related Arrests in the United States

Here is a breakdown of the recent major arrests, according to the snapshot:

Minnesota: U.S. citizen and Minneapolis resident Mohamed Amiin Ali Roble, 20, was charged for his role in a terror network that was dispatching its members to Syria in order to join ISIS.

North Carolina: 35-year-old U.S. citizen, Erick Jamal Hendricks of Charlotte, was arrested after attempting to hire a cell of terror operatives with a goal to ultimately launch attacks within the United States. Hendricks had also previously reached out – via social media – to the ISIS-linked group that targeted a cartoon competition in Garland, Texas in 2015.

Virginia: Nicholas Young, a 36-year-old U.S. citizen from Fairfax, Virginia, and a police officer for the Washington Metro Transit Police, was arrested for ISIS-related charges. Young is the first uniformed police officer in the U.S. ever charged with an ISIS-linked offense.

Michigan: Sebastian Gregorson, a U.S. citizen who recently converted to Islam, was arrested in Detroit for “possessing a destructive device and acquiring explosive materials without a license.” Gregorson is alleged to be a solid ISIS support and also possessed a CD entitled “Anwar al Awlaki” who was one of al-Qaida’s major recruiters.

Guantanamo Bay Detainees Released – Including Bin Laden’s Bodyguards

September’s Terror Threat Snapshot also states that a recent assessment performed by the Director of National Intelligence revealed that 30 percent of released Guantanamo Bay detainees have either returned to or are suspected of returning to jihadist activity. According to the snapshot, the Department of Defense announced that 15 detainees were handed over to the government of the United Arab Emirates. Of those 15, some were explosive experts, some were trained al-Qaida fighters and at least two of them were employed as Osama Bin Laden’s bodyguards.

Other highlights of this month’s Terror Threat Snapshot include the ongoing Iranian terror threat, foreign fighter statistics and a full report of foreign Jihadist networks and safe havens.

 

FBI Releases Hillary Server Investigation Documents

Signed on January 22, of 2009, Hillary declared by signature her compliance to classified material.

Hillary Non Disclosure This is the actual document with her signature.

FBI Releases Documents in Hillary Clinton E-Mail Investigation

Today the FBI is releasing a summary of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s July 2, 2016 interview with the FBI concerning allegations that classified information was improperly stored or transmitted on a personal e-mail server she used during her tenure. We also are releasing a factual summary of the FBI’s investigation into this matter. We are making these materials available to the public in the interest of transparency and in response to numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Appropriate redactions have been made for classified information or other material exempt from disclosure under FOIA.

FBI Background Investigation Hillary servers

FBI 302 Report on Hillary Interview

As a note, the FBI 302 report is shorter and frankly it tells us that Hillary told the FBI she cant remember sh*t. Hillary left all judgment to handling government material and security classifications to ‘her’ State Department professionals. The real background investigation report defines the best part of the whole scandal, it is 47 pages and quite chilling. Oh…there were several servers and 13 mobile devices. Her covert intelligence aide Sidney Blumenthal did receive at least 24 email exchanges with classified material. Redactions abound and avoiding FOIA was the underlying objective.

Yup, More Hillary Emails, Bigger Violations Surface

Another day of CSS….Clinton Saturation Syndrome…

Judicial Watch: New Abedin Emails Reveal Top Clinton Foundation Executive Doug Band Sought Diplomatic Passport from Clinton State Department

Abedin responded to Band request: ‘Ok will figure it out’

Emails also reveal Bill Clinton/Doug Band Sought State Department Favors for Foundation supporters Paul Liveris, Chris Ruddy, and Lynn de Rothschild

(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch today released 510 pages of new State Department documents, including a 2009 request by Clinton Foundation executive Doug Band for diplomatic passports for himself and an associate.  Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s aide Abedin responded to Band’s request positively, saying, “Ok will figure it out.”  The emails show Hillary Clinton forwarding classified information to Abedin’s unsecured, non-state.gov account. The emails also show Bill Clinton sought a meeting with Mrs. Clinton for a major Clinton donor with State Department officials and Hillary Clinton herself pushed for a joint event with the Clinton Global Initiative.  Band also pushed for and obtained special help from Abedin for seven-figure Clinton Foundation donor Chris Ruddy, of Newsmax.com.

Although an exchange sent from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Clinton concerning the “disastrous nature of the Obama trip” and the U.S. being “totally out of the loop in Berlin – no ambassador” with the expectation that “Germans and Russians will now cut their own separate deals on energy, regional security, etc….” had previously published by the State Department, it was unknown until now that Clinton forwarded this exchange containing classified information that was redacted for security reasons to Abedin’s unsecure non-state.gov account

The new documents included 37 Hillary Clinton email exchanges not previously turned over to the State Department, bringing the known total to date of such emails uncovered by Judicial Watch to 228 of new Clinton emails (not part of the 55,000 pages of emails that Clinton turned over to the State Department).  These records further appear to contradict statements by Clinton that, “as far as she knew,” all of her government emails were turned over to the State Department.

The Band request for a special diplomatic passport for himself and his associates – an unidentified “JD” and apparently Justin Cooper, formerly a key member of Bill Clinton’s personal office and the Clinton Foundation who has been linked to registration documents for and the shutting down of the email server at the center of Mrs. Clinton’s State Department emails controversy.

 

The Band-Abedin exchange went as follows:

From: Doug Band

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Jul 27, 2009 10:32 AM

Subject:

Need get me/ justy and jd dip passports

We had them years ago but they lapsed and we didn’t bother getting them

From: Huma Abedin [[email protected]]

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 10:38:39 PM

To: Doug Band

Subject: Re:

Ok will figure it out

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations strictly limits the granting of diplomatic passports to members of the Foreign Service, their family members, or those working on U.S. government contracts. According to 22 CFR 51.3:

A diplomatic passport is issued to a Foreign Service officer or to a person having diplomatic status or comparable status because he or she is traveling abroad to carry out diplomatic duties on behalf of the U.S. Government. When authorized by the Department, spouses and family members of such persons may be issued diplomatic passports. When authorized by the Department, a diplomatic passport may be issued to a U.S. Government contractor if the contractor meets the eligibility requirements for a diplomatic passport and the diplomatic passport is necessary to complete his or her mission.

The newly released Abedin emails also contain additional instances of the Clinton State Department’s granting special favors to major contributors to the Clinton Foundation. A July 27, 2009, exchange of emails begins with Abedin advising Clinton scheduler Lona Valmoro that “wjc” (William Jefferson Clinton) wants special treatment for high-dollar Foundation donor and Dow Chemical’s CEO Andrew Liveris. Dow donated between $1 million and $5 million to the Clinton Foundation, making it one of the largest corporate donors in Foundation history.

From: Huma Abedin [email protected]

To: Valmoro, Lona J

Sent: Monday, Jul 27 06:02:01 2009

Subject:

Wjc wants to be sure hrc sees Andrew Liveris, ceo of dow tomorrow night. Apparently he is head of us china business council. Is he definitely going to be there?

From: Valmoro, Lona J [[email protected]

Sent: July 27, 2009 6:03:54 AM

To: Huma Abedin

Subject: Re:

I will check. He declined our invitation to dinner tonight at State.

From: Valmoro, Lona J

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 9:24:08 AM

To: Huma Abedin; Narain, Paul F [Clinton aide]

Subject: Re: CEO of dow

Paul, Andrew Leveris, CEO of Dow Chemical, is going to be at the dinner tomorrow night. We would like HRC to see him, perhaps they can do a brief pull aside upon arrival. Huma, would that work for you?

From: Huma Abedin [[email protected]]

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 9:24:55 AM

To: Valmoro, Lona J, Huma Abedin, Narain, Paul F

Subject: Re: CEO of dow

Yes pull aside on arrival

From: Narain, Paul F

Sent, Monday, July 27, 2009 7:56 PM

To: Valmoro, Lona, Abedin Huma

Subject: RE: CEO of dow

Lona, I have arranged this pull aside for on the arrival in the Hold Room across the hall from the ballroom, immediately prior to the Secretary’s entrance and remarks.

The Abedin emails include a mid-August 2009, email exchange in which Band urges Abedin to follow up on a request from Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy to set up a meeting with then-Ambassador to Panama Barbara Stephenson on behalf of lobbyist Amb. Otto Reich, President Reagan’s ambassador to Venezuela who maintained high-level government positions during the tenure of both President George H.W. Bush and President George Bush.  In early September, Ruddy then was contacted by State Department Deputy Assistant for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta S. Jacobson, at the behest of Band and Abedin, in reference to Ruddy’s concerns about Wilson Lucom, whose estate was embroiled in a heated multi-million-dollar lawsuit.  Ruddy’s Newsmax Media Inc, made a contribution to the Clinton Foundation of between $1 million and $5 million. The emails show the responsible official was put in contact with Ruddy.

From: Christopher [Redacted]

To: Doug Band [Redacted]

Sent: Mon Aug 17 3:40:56 2009

Subject: Panama

Otto Reich is arriving in Panama tonite on the matter I discussed. He was hoping to meet with Barbara Stephenson or her Charge this week. He has not heard back from her. Any “air’ support you can give for this meeting would be helpful. Thanks! – Christopher Ruddy

From: Doug Band

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Aug 18, 2009 10:37 PM

Subject: Fw: Panama

Would be good to do quickly.

Even a call

From: Huma Abedin

To: Doug Band

Sent: Wed Aug 19 4:51:35 2009

Subject: Re: Panama

Both of our point people are out on vacation. I can ask someone junior to deal with this?

From: Doug Band

Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2009 5:20:13 PM

To: Huma Abedin

Subject: Re: Panama

Sure

From: Jacobson, Roberta S

Sent: Friday, September 04, 2009 7:32 AM

To: ruddy [Redacted]

Subject: Panama case

Mr. Ruddy: Your inquiry about the Lucom case has been passed to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs here at State. I apologize for not getting you a response on our position last evening, but we will get back to you as soon as possible today. Many thanks. Roberta Jacobson.

From: Christopher Ruddy

To: dband

Sent: Fri Sep 04, 08:01:20 2009 7:32 AM

Subject: FW: Panama case

From: Doug Band

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Fri Sep 04 08:18:43 2009

Subject: Fw: Panama case

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: Friday, September 04, 2009 8:37:21 AM

To: Doug Band

Subject: Re: Panama case

She’s the dep assistant secretary for the whole bureau.

The Panama desk guy is on leave so I asked that she at least reach out.

(Newsmax publishes a regular Judicial Watch column.)

The new Abedin emails also include an email exchange between Sidney Blumenthal and the then-Secretary of State in which Blumenthal proposes a Clinton Global Initiative meeting in Ireland. Hillary Clinton forwarded Blumenthal’s email to Abedin, Cheryl Mills, and Doug Band saying, “I think this is a good idea and see no conflict.” Band then responded that he and Bill Clinton think it is as “great idea.”

Again, Hillary Clinton’s involvement her ethics pledge to stay of out of Clinton Foundation and Clinton Global Initiative business.  Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton on January 5, 2009, in a letter to State Department Designated Agency Ethics Official James H. Thessin:

“For the duration of my appointment as Secretary if I am confirmed, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which The William J. Clinton Foundation (or the Clinton Global Initiative) is a party or represents a party….”

In an email exchange in late August 2009, billionaire businesswoman Lynn Forester de Rothschild intervened directly with then Hillary Clinton to set up a Parade magazine interview for journalist Les Gelb, assuring Clinton, “He said he would give you a veto over content and looked me in the eye and said, ‘she will like it.’” Abedin then instructed State Department aide Phillip Reines. Reines acquiesced responding, “Yes, we’re trying to find a date that works for Les, but he is a little, shall we say, picky.” Rothschild is a longtime Clinton Foundation supporter who in mid-May of this year held a $100,000-a-plate fundraiser for the presidential candidate.

Also in the documents is an August 2009 communication from Hillary Clinton to her aides Abedin and Lauren Jiloty asking for the phone numbers of Declan Kelly, Clinton’s former economic envoy to Northern Ireland who is co-founder and CEO of Teneo.

“The idea that the State Department would even consider a diplomatic passport for Clinton Foundation executive is beyond belief,” stated Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.  “These emails show various violations of national security laws and ethics rules and further confirm that Hillary and Bill Clinton are personally implicated in the Clinton Foundation pay to play scandal.”

This is the eleventh set of records produced for Judicial Watch by the State Department from the non-state.gov email accounts of Huma Abedin.  The documents were produced under a court order in a May 5, 2015, Freedom of Information (FOIA) lawsuit against the State Department (Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of State (No. 1:15-cv-00684)) requiring the agency to produce “all emails of official State Department business received or sent by former Deputy Chief of Staff Huma Abedin from January 1, 2009 through February 1, 2013, using a ‘non-state’.gov email address.”

On August 22, Judicial Watch released 725 pages of new State Department documents, including previously unreleased email exchanges in which Hillary Clinton top aide Huma Abedin provided influential Clinton Foundation donors special, expedited access to the secretary of state. In many instances, the preferential treatment provided to donors was at the specific request of Clinton Foundation executive Douglas Band.

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Secret Side Iran Deals Revealed and Confirmed

Note: Further side deals may occur and hat tip to Reuters. Expect immediate hearings when Congress returns. There is no shame with this administration including Barack Obama, John Kerry and Ben Rhodes.

JCPOA Exemptions Revealed

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT

By David Albright and Andrea Stricker

September 1, 2016

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed detailed limitations on facets of Iran’s nuclear program that needed to be met by Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016.1 Most of the conditions were met by Iran. However, we have learned that some nuclear stocks and facilities were not in accordance with JCPOA limits on Implementation Day, but in anticipation the Joint Commission had earlier and secretly exempted them from the JCPOA limits. The exemptions and in one case, a loophole, involved the low enriched uranium (LEU) cap of 300 kilograms (kg), some of the near 20 percent LEU, the heavy water cap, and the number of large hot cells allowed to remain in Iran. One senior knowledgeable official stated that if the Joint Commission had not acted to create these exemptions, some of Iran’s nuclear facilities would not have been in compliance with the JCPOA by Implementation Day.

1 The Institute for Science and International Security was neutral on whether or not the JCPOA should be implemented.

Recently the Joint Commission created a Technical Working Group to consider further exemptions to Iran’s stock of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium. This cap is set at 300 kg of LEU hexafluoride but Iran apparently has or could exceed the cap if no further exemptions are granted by the Joint Commission.

The decisions of the Joint Commission have not been announced publicly. The Obama administration informed Congress of key Joint Commission decisions on Implementation Day but in a confidential manner. These decisions, which are written down, amount to additional secret or confidential documents linked to the JCPOA. Since the JCPOA is public, any rationale for keeping these exemptions secret appears unjustified. Moreover, the Joint Commission’s secretive decision making process risks advantaging Iran by allowing it to try to systematically weaken the JCPOA. It appears to be succeeding in several key areas.

Given the technical complexity and public importance of the various JCPOA exemptions and loopholes, the administration’s policy to maintain secrecy interferes in the process of establishing adequate Congressional and public oversight of the JCPOA. This is particularly true concerning potentially agreement-weakening decisions by the Joint Commission. As a matter 2 | P a g e

of policy, the United States should agree to any exemptions or loopholes in the JCPOA only if the decisions are simultaneously made public.

Exemptions

The exemptions in effect on Implementation Day include:

1) Allowing more than 300 kg of about 3.5 percent low enriched uranium hexafluoride or equivalent mass if the LEU was in the following forms:

 Low level solid waste;

 Low level liquid waste; and

 Sludge waste.

The amount of LEU hexafluoride equivalent involved in this exemption is unknown, although these amounts if not exempted would have placed Iran over the 300 kg cap, according to one knowledgeable senior official.

2) Near 20 percent LEU in “lab contaminant” that was judged as unrecoverable. Iran had agreed in the JCPOA that all near 20 percent LEU would be in fuel elements; subsequently modified to irradiated fuel elements, albeit in many cases only lightly irradiated. The amount of LEU in the lab contaminant is unknown. The basis for judging the near 20 percent LEU unrecoverable is not known.

3) A number of large hot cells. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed for 15 years to only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters.2 The reason is that hot cells with these dimensions could not in practical terms be used in plutonium separation efforts involving irradiated fuel. The JCPOA also stated that larger hot cells could be operated with the approval of the Joint Commission. However, prior to Implementation Day, the Joint Commission agreed to allow Iran to continue operating 19 large hot cells in three Tehran locations and one Karaj location which are in excess of the six cubic meter limitation. Although the hot cells are used in the production of medical radionuclides they can be misused for secret, mostly small-scale plutonium separation efforts and raise serious questions over the rigorousness of this JCPOA exemption on hot cells. A related question is whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly inspects all these exempted hot cells. Moreover, Iran is

2 According to the JCPOA, “For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.” 3 | P a g e

 

believed to be seeking to exploit this exemption as a precedent to further increase its number of hot cells with volumes greater than six cubic meters.

Heavy Water Loophole

The Joint Commission also decided on or prior to Implementation Day that Iran would be allowed to export heavy water in excess of the JCPOA’s 130 tonnes cap for sale on the open market even though Iran did not have a buyer for this heavy water. The Joint Commission allowed Iran to store large amounts of heavy water in Oman that remained under Iran’s control, effectively allowing Iran to exceed its cap of 130 tonnes of heavy water as it continues to produce heavy water at its Arak facility.3 As discussed in an earlier Institute report, this heavy water loophole in the JCPOA was poorly considered.4 As discussed in the report, the Institute learned that the Department of Energy’s purchase of 32 tonnes of this heavy water unfairly disrupted and negatively affected a nascent, needed North American supply chain of heavy water. The Institute warned that the loophole also risked legitimizing Iran as a nuclear supplier when it had done nothing yet to prove it would abide by international norms relating to nuclear trade or halt illicit nuclear procurements. Moreover, the deal will only encourage Iran to continue exceeding the JCPOA heavy water cap for financial gain. One surprising development is that the Arak heavy water production plant produced significantly more heavy water than expected during several months following Implementation Day. Arak produced at a rate exceeding 25 tonnes per year, compared to the expected rate of 16 tonnes per year expected prior to Implementation Day.

3 One reviewer raised the question of whether this precedent could be applied to LEU, where it would be located outside of Iran even though no buyer had been found.

4 Albright and Stricker, “U.S. Purchase of Iran’s Heavy Water: Discouraging a Dangerous Nuclear Supplier,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Heavy_Water_Purchase_23May2016_final.pdf

5 David Albright, “Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium: Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016, Rev. May 27, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Update_on_Irans_Stocks_of_35_Percent_LEU_May_23_2016_Final_rev_may_27_2016.pdf

Newly Formed LEU Exemption Working Group

In July 2016 the Joint Commission established a Technical Working Group to evaluate, apparently among other stocks, the fate of approximately 100-200 kg of less than 3.67 percent LEU in the Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP).5 This plant converted LEU hexafluoride into uranium oxide and has been mothballed under the JCPOA. Although almost all of the LEU oxide produced at this plant was shipped out of Iran, a fraction was left in the process lines and tanks on Implementation Day. This LEU was not exempted on Implementation Day and was counted as part of the 300 kg LEU cap.

Russian Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Vladimir Voronkov told TASS in July 2016 prior to an impending Joint Commission meeting: “There are two issues that need to be addressed. These are the difficulties with enriched uranium 4 | P a g e

accumulated during the enrichment in the pipes and other devices. What has been discovered exceeds the allowed limit of 300 kilograms. And the second issue is heavy water.”6

6 “Meeting of Iran-P5+1 commission on nuclear deal to be held in Vienna July 19,” TASS Russian News Agency, July 14, 2016. http://tass.ru/en/world/888165

7 With regard to domestic fuel fabrication, the JCPOA states: “Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group.”

It is unknown if the Joint Commission has decided to allow Iran to exceed the 300 kg cap while the Technical Working Group evaluates this issue. However, the pattern that appears to have emerged is that Iran will likely move to violate the cap if it is not granted an exemption.

The JCPOA is silent on the issue of exempting from the 300 kg cap already existing LEU that had been produced in Iran. In fact, US officials told Institute staff in the summer of 2015 that Iran was fully expected to empty the EUPP of LEU and send it all out of the country or dilute it to natural uranium.

Although the JCPOA explicitly created exemptions to the 300 kg cap, such as Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran, these exemptions do not appear to cover the exemption of any remaining LEU in the EUPP. According to the JCPOA, “All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran.”

The JCPOA envisions that Iran may make LEU fuel domestically in the future and contains a mechanism to exempt that LEU from the cap as long as Iran meets stringent conditions. To that end, the JCPOA states: “The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms).” However, the exemptions specified in the JCPOA are intended for future fuel fabrication, and do not appear applicable to LEU processed in the EUPP prior to Implementation Day.7 The JCPOA intended that existing, domestically produced LEU enriched up to 3.67 percent would be subject to the 300 kg cap and not exempted.

However, the Joint Commission has taken a different approach and has already exempted existing LEU as part of bringing Iran into compliance with the JCPOA on Implementation Day. Moreover, it did so without relying on the Technical Working Group as called for in the JCPOA. 5 | P a g e

Now, there is concern that the newly formed Technical Working Group will lay the basis to exempt more LEU from the cap. Moreover, the intention appears to be to conduct these discussions and the associated decision making about LEU exemptions in secret, without any public scrutiny.

These exemptions matter because the LEU may be recoverable by Iran in a breakout to produce highly enriched uranium, thereby lowering breakout times. Separating LEU from its chemical constituents in such products is typically straightforward.

While Iran and its allies may today view the LEU as non-recoverable, that view does not appear to be a sufficient standard to meet the JCPOA conditions or prevent the LEU’s use in a breakout. A country intent on breaking out and making highly enriched uranium as national priorities may make an entirely different calculation about the LEU’s worth and devote considerable effort to recovering the LEU, such as during a push to acquire nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Any discussion of such an important issue as exempting LEU from the 300 kilogram cap or from export should be public and subject to more rigorous oversight. The exemption process and the Joint Commission decisions should be transparent; the current arrangement has been overly secret and amounts to the generation of additional secret or confidential arrangements directly linked to the JCPOA that do not have adequate oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the process in general raises the question of whether Iran is exploiting the exemption mechanism, outside of any public oversight, to systematically weaken as many JCPOA limitations as possible. The US administration should insist that the exemption process and decisions be public and transparent.