Why Obama Retreated from Middle East Terror

Barack Obama has become the willing accomplice of Iran, giving the regime an open pathway to hegemony in the region. Shiite over Sunni power and a growing caliphate is in full operation. This is beyond the scope of Barack Obama to reconcile especially when the intelligence apparatus and the top military personnel under his command have forecasted with accuracy the future conditions beginning in 2011 in the region.

Why Obama’s retreat? Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and complicity. Assad continues to celebrate as do the Mullahs in Iran and nefarious middle east leaders.

A long read is below but the warnings were provided in 2012 in written form and Obama chose not to take the meeting much less read the intelligence estimate.

Officials: Islamic State arose from US support for al-Qaeda in Iraq

A former Pentagon intelligence chief, Iraqi government sources, and a retired career US diplomat reveal US complicity in the rise of ISIS

by Nafeez Ahmed

A new memoir by a former senior State Department analyst provides stunning details on how decades of support for Islamist militants linked to Osama bin Laden brought about the emergence of the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS).

The book establishes a crucial context for recent admissions by Michael T. Flynn, the retired head of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), confirming that White House officials made a “willful decision” to support al-Qaeda affiliated jihadists in Syria — despite being warned by the DIA that doing so would likely create an ‘ISIS’-like entity in the region.

J. Michael Springmann, a retired career US diplomat whose last government post was in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, reveals in his new book that US covert operations in alliance with Middle East states funding anti-Western terrorist groups are nothing new. Such operations, he shows, have been carried out for various short-sighted reasons since the Cold War and after.

In the 1980s, as US support for mujahideen fighters accelerated in Afghanistan to kick out the Soviet Union, Springmann found himself unwittingly at the heart of highly classified operations that allowed Islamist militants linked to Osama bin Laden to establish a foothold within the United States.

After the end of the Cold War, Springmann alleged, similar operations continued in different contexts for different purposes — in the former Yugoslavia, in Libya and elsewhere. The rise of ISIS, he contends, was a predictable outcome of this counterproductive policy.

Pentagon intel chief speaks out

Everyday brings new horror stories about atrocities committed by ISIS fighters. Today, for instance, the New York Times offered a deeply disturbing report on how ISIS has formally adopted a theology and policy of systematic rape of non-Muslim women and children. The practice has become embedded throughout the territories under ISIS control through a process of organized slavery, sanctioned by the movement’s own religious scholars.

But in a recent interview on Al-Jazeera’s flagship talk-show ‘Head to Head,’ former DIA chief Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Michael Flynn told host Mehdi Hasan that the rise of ISIS was a direct consequence of US support for Syrian insurgents whose core fighters were from al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, former Director of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in a lengthy interview with Al-Jazeera’s Mehdi Hasan

Back in May, INSURGE intelligence undertook an exclusive investigation into a controversial declassified DIA document appearing to show that as early as August 2012, the DIA knew that the US-backed Syrian insurgency was dominated by Islamist militant groups including “the Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda in Iraq.”

Asked about the DIA document by Hasan, who noted that “the US was helping coordinate arms transfers to those same groups,” Flynn confirmed that the intelligence described by the document was entirely accurate.

Telling Hasan that he had read the document himself, Flynn said that it was among a range of intelligence being circulated throughout the US intelligence community that had led him to attempt to dissuade the White House from supporting these groups, albeit without success.

Flynn added that this sort of intelligence was available even before the decision to pull out troops from Iraq:

“My job was to ensure that the accuracy of our intelligence that was being presented was as good as it could be, and I will tell you, it goes before 2012. When we were in Iraq, and we still had decisions to be made before there was a decision to pull out of Iraq in 2011, it was very clear what we were going to face.”

In other words, long before the inception of the armed insurrection in Syria — as early as 2008 (the year in which the final decision was made on full troop withdrawal by the Bush administration) — US intelligence was fully aware of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) among other Islamist militant groups.

Supporting the enemy

Despite this, Flynn’s account shows that the US commitment to supporting the Syrian insurgency against Bashir al-Assad led the US to deliberately support the very al-Qaeda affiliated forces it had previously fought in Iraq.

Far from simply turning a blind eye, Flynn said that the White House’s decision to support al-Qaeda linked rebels against the Assad regime was not a mistake, but intentional:

Hasan: “You are basically saying that even in government at the time, you knew those groups were around, you saw this analysis, and you were arguing against it, but who wasn’t listening?”

Flynn: “I think the administration.”

Hasan: “So the administration turned a blind eye to your analysis?”

Flynn: “I don’t know if they turned a blind eye. I think it was a decision, a willful decision.”

Hasan: “A willful decision to support an insurgency that had Salafists, Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood?”

Flynn: “A willful decision to do what they’re doing… You have to really ask the President what is it that he actually is doing with the policy that is in place, because it is very, very confusing.”

Prior to his stint as DIA chief, Lt. Gen. Flynn was Director of Intelligence for the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command.

Flynn is the highest ranking former US intelligence official to confirm that the DIA intelligence report dated August 2012, released earlier this year, proves a White House covert strategy to support Islamist terrorists in Iraq and Syria even before 2011.

In June, INSURGE reported exclusively that six former senior US and British intelligence officials agreed with this reading of the declassified DIA report.

Flynn’s account is corroborated by other former senior officials. In an interview on French national television , former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said that the US’ chief ally, Britain, had planned covert action in Syria as early as 2009 — after US intelligence had clear information according to Flynn on al-Qaeda’s threat to Syria:

“I was in England two years before the violence in Syria on other business. I met with top British officials, who confessed to me that they were preparing something in Syria. This was in Britain not in America. Britain was preparing gunmen to invade Syria.”

 

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the precursor to the movement now known as ‘Islamic State,’ was on the decline due to US and Iraqi counter-terrorism operations from 2008 to 2011 in coordination with local Sunni tribes. In that period, al-Qaeda in Iraq became increasingly isolated, losing the ability to enforce its harsh brand of Islamic Shari’ah law in areas it controlled, and giving up more and more territory.

By late 2011, over 2,000 AQI fighters had been killed, just under 9,000 detained, and the group’s leadership had been largely wiped out.

Right-wing pundits have often claimed due to this background that the decision to withdraw troops from Iraq was the key enabling factor in the resurgence of AQI, and its eventual metamorphosis into ISIS.

But Flynn’s revelations prove the opposite — that far from the rise of ISIS being solely due to a vacuum of power in Iraq due to the withdrawal of US troops, it was the post-2011 covert intervention of the US and its allies, the Gulf states and Turkey, which siphoned arms and funds to AQI as part of their anti-Assad strategy.

Even in Iraq, the surge laid the groundwork for what was to come. Among the hundred thousand odd Sunni tribesmen receiving military and logistical assistance from the US were al-Qaeda sympathisers and anti-Western insurgents who had previously fought alongside al-Qaeda.

In 2008, a US Army-commissioned RAND report confirmed that the US was attempting to “to create divisions in the jihadist camp. Today in Iraq such a strategy is being used at the tactical level.” This included forming “temporary alliances” with al-Qaeda affiliated “nationalist insurgent groups” that have fought the US for four years, now receiving “weapons and cash” from the US.

The idea was, essentially, to bribe former al-Qaeda insurgents to breakaway from AQI and join forces with the Americans. Although these Sunni nationalists “have cooperated with al-Qaeda against US forces,” they are now being supported to exploit “the common threat that al-Qaeda now poses to both parties.”

In the same year, former CIA military intelligence officer and counter-terrorism specialist Philip Geraldi, stated that US intelligence analysts “are warning that the United States is now arming and otherwise subsidizing all three major groups in Iraq.” The analysts “believe that the house of cards is likely to fall down as soon as one group feels either strong or frisky enough to assert itself.” Giraldi predicted:

“The winner in the convoluted process has been everyone who wants to see a civil war.”

By Flynn’s account, US intelligence was also aware in 2008 that the empowerment of former al-Qaeda insurgents would eventually backfire and strengthen AQI in the long-run, especially given that the Shi’a dominated US-backed central government continued to discriminate against Sunni populations.

Syriana

Having provided extensive support for former al-Qaeda affiliated Sunni insurgents in Iraq from 2006 to 2008 — in order to counter AQI — US forces did succeed in temporarily routing AQI from its strongholds in the country.

Simultaneously, however, if Roland Dumas’ account is correct, the US and Britain began covert operations in Syria in 2009. From 2011 onwards, US support for the Syrian insurgency in alliance with the Gulf states and Turkey was providing significant arms and cash to AQI fighters.

The porous nature of relations between al-Qaeda factions in Iraq and Syria, and therefore the routine movement of arms and fighters across the border, was well-known to the US intelligence community in 2008.

In October 2008, Major General John Kelly — the US military official responsible for Anbar province where the bulk of US support for Sunni insurgents to counter AQI was going — complained bitterly that AQI fighters had regrouped across the border in Syria, where they had established a “sanctuary.”

The border, he said, was routinely used as an entry point for AQI fighters to enter Iraq and conduct attacks on Iraqi security forces.

Ironically, at this time, AQI fighters in Syria were tolerated by the Assad regime. A July 2008 report by the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy at West Point documented AQI’s extensive networks inside Syria across the border with Iraq.

“The Syrian government has willingly ignored, and possibly abetted, foreign fighters headed to Iraq. Concerned about possible military action against the Syrian regime, it opted to support insurgents and terrorists wreaking havoc in Iraq.”

Yet from 2009 onwards according to Dumas, and certainly from 2011 by Flynn’s account, the US and its allies began supporting the very same AQI fighters in Syria to destabilize the Assad regime.

The policy coincided with the covert US strategy revealed by Seymour Hersh in 2007: using Saudi Arabia to funnel support for al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Islamists as a mechanism for isolating Iran and Syria.

Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas on French national television confirming information received from UK Foreign Office officials in 2009 regarding operations in Syria

Reversing the surge

During this period in which the US, the Gulf states, and Turkey supported Syrian insurgents linked to AQI and the Muslim Brotherhood, AQI experienced an unprecedented resurgence.

US troops finally withdrew fully from Iraq in December 2011, which means by the end of 2012, judging by the DIA’s August 2012 report and Flynn’s description of the state of US intelligence in this period, the US intelligence community knew that US and allied support for AQI in Syria was directly escalating AQI’s violence across the border in Iraq.

Despite this, in Flynn’s words, the White House made a “willful decision” to continue the policy despite the possibility it entailed “of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in Eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor)” according to the DIA’s 2012 intelligence report.

The Pentagon document had cautioned that if a “Salafist principality” did appear in eastern Syria under AQI’s dominance, this would have have “dire consequences” for Iraq, providing “the ideal atmosphere for AQI to return to its old pockets in Mosul and Ramadi,” and a “renewed momentum” for a unified jihad “among Sunni Iraq and Syria.”

Most strikingly, the report warned that AQI, which had then changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI):

“ISI could also declare an Islamic State through its union with other terrorist organisations in Iraq and Syria, which will create grave danger in regards to unifying Iraq and the protection of its territory.”

As the US-led covert strategy accelerated sponsorship of AQI in Syria, AQI’s operations in Iraq also accelerated, often in tandem with Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhut al-Nusra.

According to Prof. Anthony Celso of the Department of Security Studies at Angelo State University in Texas, “suicide bombings, car bombs, and IED attacks” by AQI in Iraq “doubled a year after the departure of American troops.” Simultaneously, AQI began providing support for al-Nusra by inputting fighters, funds and weapons from Iraq into Syria.

As the Pentagon’s intelligence arm had warned, by April 2013, AQI formally declared itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

In the same month, the European Union voted to ease the embargo on Syria to allow al-Qaeda and ISIS dominated Syrian rebels to sell oil to global markets, including European companies. From this date to the following year when ISIS invaded Mosul, several EU countries were buying ISIS oil exported from the Syrian fields under its control.

The US anti-Assad strategy in Syria, in other words, bolstered the very al-Qaeda factions the US had fought in Iraq, by using the Gulf states and Turkey to finance the same groups in Syria. As a direct consequence, the secular and moderate elements of the Free Syrian Army were increasingly supplanted by virulent Islamist extremists backed by US allies.

Advanced warning

In February 2014, Lt. Gen. Flynn delivered the annual DIA threat assessment to the Senate Armed Services Committee. His testimony revealed that rather than coming out of the blue, as the Obama administration claimed, US intelligence had anticipated the ISIS attack on Iraq.

In his statement before the committee, which corroborates much of what he told Al-Jazeera, Flynn had warned that “al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) also known as Iraq and Levant (ISIL)… probably will attempt to take territory in Iraq and Syria to exhibit its strength in 2014, as demonstrated recently in Ramadi and Fallujah.” He added that “some Sunni tribes and insurgent groups appear willing to work tactically with AQI as they share common anti-government goals.”

Criticizing the central government in Baghdad for its “refusal to address long-standing Sunni grievances,” he pointed out that “heavy-handed approach to counter-terror operations” had led some Sunni tribes in Anbar “to be more permissive of AQI’s presence.” AQI/ISIL has “exploited” this permissive security environment “to increase its operations and presence in many locations” in Iraq, as well as “into Syria and Lebanon,” which is inflaming “tensions throughout the region.”

It should be noted that precisely at this time, the West, the Gulf states and Turkey, according to the DIA’s internal intelligence reports, were supporting AQI and other Islamist factions in Syria to “isolate” the Assad regime. By Flynn’s account, despite his warnings to the White House that an ISIS attack on Iraq was imminent, and could lead to the destabilization of the region, senior Obama officials deliberately continued the covert support to these factions.

US intelligence was also fully cognizant of Iraq’s inability to repel a prospective ISIS attack on Iraq, raising further questions about why the White House did nothing.

The Iraqi army has “been unable to stem rising violence” and would be unable “to suppress AQI or other internal threats” particularly in Sunni areas like Ramadi, Falluja, or mixed areas like Anbar and Ninewa provinces, Flynn told the Senate. As Iraq’s forces “lack cohesion, are undermanned, and are poorly trained, equipped and supplied,” they are “vulnerable to terrorist attack, infiltration and corruption.”

Senior Iraqi government sources told me on condition of anonymity that both Iraqi and American intelligence had anticipated an ISIS attack on Iraq, and specifically on Mosul, as early as August 2013.

Intelligence was not precise on the exact timing of the assault, one source said, but it was known that various regional powers were complicit in the planned ISIS offensive, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey:

“It was well known at the time that ISIS were beginning serious plans to attack Iraq. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey played a key role in supporting ISIS at this time, but the UAE played a bigger role in financial support than the others, which is not widely recognized.”

When asked whether the Americans had attempted to coordinate with Iraq on preparations for the expected ISIS assault, particularly due to the recognized inability of the Iraqi army to withstand such an attack, the senior Iraqi official said that nothing had happened:

“The Americans allowed ISIS to rise to power because they wanted to get Assad out from Syria. But they didn’t anticipate that the results would be so far beyond their control.”

This was not, then, a US intelligence failure as such. Rather, the US failure to to curtail the rise of ISIS and its likely destabilization of both Iraq and Syria, was not due to a lack of accurate intelligence — which was abundant and precise — but due to an ill-conceived political decision to impose ‘regime change’ on Syria at any cost.

Vicious cycle

This is hardly the first time political decisions in Washington have blocked US intelligence agencies from pursuing investigations of terrorist activity, and scuppered their crackdowns on high-level state benefactors of terrorist groups.

According to Michael Springmann in his new book, Visas for al-Qaeda: CIA Handouts that Rocked the World, the same structural problems explain the impunity with which terrorist groups have compromised Western defense and security measures for the last few decades.

Much of his book is clearly an effort to make sense of his personal experience by researching secondary sources and interviewing other former US government and intelligence officials. While there are many problems with some of this material, the real value of Springmann’s book is in the level of detail he brings to his first-hand accounts of espionage at the US State Department, and its damning implications for understanding the ‘war on terror’ today.

Springmann served in the US government as a diplomat with the Commerce Department and the State Department’s Foreign Service, holding postings in Germany, India, and Saudi Arabia. He began his diplomatic career as a commercial officer at the US embassy in Stuttgart, Germany (1977–1980), before becoming a commercial attaché in New Delhi, India (1980–1982). He was later promoted to head of the Visa Bureau at the US embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1987–1989), and then returned to Stuttgart to become a political/economic officer (1989–1991).

Before he was fired for asking too many questions about illegal practices at the US embassy in Jeddah, Springmann’s last assignment was as a senior economic officer at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1991), where he had security clearances to access restricted diplomatic cables, along with highly classified intelligence from the National Security Agency (NSA) and CIA.

Springmann says that during his tenure at the US embassy in Jeddah, he was repeatedly asked by his superiors to grant illegal visas to Islamist militants transiting through Jeddah from various Muslim countries. He eventually learned that the visa bureau was heavily penetrated by CIA officers, who used their diplomatic status as cover for all manner of classified operations — including giving visas to the same terrorists who would later execute the 9/11 attacks.

CIA officials operating at the US embassy in Jeddah, according to Springmann, included CIA base chief Eric Qualkenbush, US Consul General Jay Frere, and political officer Henry Ensher.

Thirteen out of the 15 Saudis among the 9/11 hijackers received US visas. Ten of them received visas from the US embassy in Jeddah. All of them were in fact unqualified, and should have been denied entry to the US.

Springmann was fired from the State Department after filing dozens of Freedom of Information requests, formal complaints, and requests for inquiries at multiple levels in the US government and Congress about what he had uncovered. Not only were all his attempts to gain disclosure and accountability systematically stonewalled, in the end his whistleblowing cost him his career.

Springmann’s experiences at Jeddah, though, were not unique. He points out that Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted as the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, received his first US visa from a CIA case officer undercover as a consular officer at the US embassy in Khartoum in Sudan.

The ‘Blind Sheikh’ as he was known received six CIA-approved US visas in this way between 1986 and 1990, also from the US embassy in Egypt. But as Springmann writes:

“The ‘blind’ Sheikh had been on a State Department terrorist watch list when he was issued the visa, entering the United States by way of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Sudan in 1990.”

In the US, Abdel Rahman took-over the al-Kifah Refugee Center, a major mujahideen recruitment hub for the Afghan war controlled by Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He not only played a key role in recruiting mujahideen for Afghanistan, but went on to recruit Islamist fighters for Bosnia after 1992.

Even after the 1993 WTC attack, as Springmann told BBC Newsnight in 2001, “The attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 did not shake the State Department’s faith in the Saudis, nor did the attack on American barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia three years later, in which 19 Americans died.”

The Bosnia connection is highly significant. Springmann reports that alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad “had fought in Afghanistan (after studying in the United States) and then went on to the Bosnian war in 1992…

“In addition, two more of the September 11, 2001, hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, both Saudis, had gained combat experience in Bosnia. Still more connections came from Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who supposedly helped Mohammed Atta with planning the World Trade Center attacks. He had served with Bosnian army mujahideen units. Ramzi Binalshibh, friends with Atta and Zammar, had also fought in Bosnia.”

US and European intelligence investigations have uncovered disturbing evidence of how the Bosnian mujahideen pipeline, under the tutelage of Saudi Arabia, played a major role in incubating al-Qaeda’s presence in Europe.

According to court papers filed in New York on behalf of the 9/11 families in February, covert Saudi government support for Bosnian arms and training was “especially important to al-Qaeda acquiring the strike capabilities used to launch attacks in the US.”

After 9/11, despite such evidence being widely circulated within the US and European intelligence communities, both the Bush and Obama administrations continued working with the Saudis to mobilize al-Qaeda affiliated extremists in the service of what the DIA described as rolling back “the strategic depth of the Shia expansion” across Iraq, Iran and Syria.

The existence of this policy has been confirmed by former 30-year MI6 Middle East specialist Alastair Crooke. Its outcome — in the form of the empowerment of the most virulent Islamist extremist forces in the region — was predictable, and indeed predicted.

In August 2012 — the same date as the DIA’s controversial intelligence report anticipating the rise of ISIS — I quoted the uncannily prescient remarks of Michael Scheuer, former chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, who forecast that US support for Islamist rebels in Syria would likely to lead to “the slaughter of some portion of Syria’s Alawite and Shia communities”; “the triumph of Islamist forces, although they may deign to temporarily disguise themselves in more innocent garb”; “the release of thousands of veteran and hardened Sunni Islamist insurgents”; and even “the looting of the Syrian military’s fully stocked arsenals of conventional arms and chemical weapons.”

I then warned that the “further militarization” of the Syrian conflict would thwart the “respective geostrategic ambitions” of regional powers “by intensifying sectarian conflict, accelerating anti-Western terrorist operations, and potentially destabilizing the whole Levant in a way that could trigger a regional war.”

Parts of these warnings have now transpired in ways that are even more horrifying than anyone ever imagined. The continued self-defeating approach of the US-led coalition may well mean that the worst is yet to come.

Steps of Screening Refugees

WallStreetJournal: This week dozens of state governors said they would refuse Syrian refugees, citing national security concerns after the Paris attacks. The Obama administration pushed back on those announcements and stressed that the governors had little power to do so. But they also pledged to explain the program to those doubting it could screen out potential terrorists. Here’s a breakdown of how the program works.

* * *

Q: What kind of screenings do Syrian refugees go through?

A:  Refugees from all countries receive “the most rigorous screening and security vetting of any category of traveler to the United States,” a senior administration official told reporters Tuesday.  That process includes biographic and biometric security checks – i.e. checking records and doing fingerprinting.  Law enforcement, the Pentagon and the intelligence community all vet information provided by and obtained about refugees to help make a determination about whether they will ultimately be allowed to come to the U.S. Syrian refugees go through an enhanced review process on top of that with extra national security checks. All Syrian refugees considered for resettlement in the U.S. are interviewed in person by specially trained staff, mostly in Amman and Istanbul, but also in Cairo and elsewhere. Refugees must also undergo health screenings and a cultural orientation before they arrive in the U.S.

Q: How long does it take?

A:  The process usually takes between 18 to 24 months and generally begins with a referral from the U.N. refugee agency. Those referrals include biographic and other information that the Department of Homeland Security uses to determine if the cases meet the criteria for refugee status. If DHS decides a refugee qualifies on one of five protected grounds – race, religion, nationalist, political views or belonging to a certain social group, the extensive screening processes described earlier begin. For comparison, an international student seeking to study in the U.S., for example, usually schedules a consular interview three to five months in advance of beginning schooling.

Q:  Who are the Syrian refugees coming to the U.S.?

A:  Half of the Syrian refugees resettled in the U.S. so far are children, according to a senior administration official. Of the rest, 2.5% are adults over 60 and 2% are single men. The refugees are roughly half men and half women, with slightly more men.

Q:  How many are here now?

A:   Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, the U.S. has admitted about 2,200 Syrian refugees. That’s a very small chunk of the more than 332,000 refugees who have come to the U.S. during the same period. The Obama administration has pledged to take in at least 10,000 in fiscal year 2016, which began in October. Over 4 million people have fled Syria since the crisis began in March 2011. Most are located in countries in the region.

Q: Where are Syrian refugees living in the U.S.?

A: The top resettlement states for Syrian refugees are California, Texas, Michigan, Illinois and Arizona. Overall 36 states have taken in Syrians since 2011.

Q: What happens once a refugee arrives to the U.S.?

A:  Refugees are required to adjust their status to become legal permanent residents within one year of arriving to the U.S. Each week the nine networks of nonprofits that work with the State Department to resettle refugees meet to decide where to send refugees arriving here. Those decisions are based on where their family members might be located, which states have low unemployment rates and what cities might be able to provide specialized medical treatment, for example. Officials usually try to resettle refugees in medium-size cities like Nashville, Tenn., and Buffalo, N.Y. that aren’t too expensive. But once refugees get here, they are free to live wherever they wish, officials said.

*** Then there is the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a division of Health and Human Resources.

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) gives new populations the opportunity to maximize their potential in the United States.  ORR’s programs provide people in need with critical resources to assist them in becoming integrated members of American society, such as cash, social services, and medical assistance.

ORR benefits and services are available to eligible persons from the following groups:

  • Refugees
  • Asylees
  • Cuban/Haitian entrants
  • Amerasians
  • Victims of human trafficking
  • Unaccompanied alien children
  • Survivors of torture

ORR has five divisions and one major program area:

  • Refugee Assistance
  • Refugee Health
  • Resettlement Services
  • Children’s Services
  • Anti-Trafficking in Persons
  • Office of the Director

Division of Refugee Assistance:

The Division of Refugee Assistance (DRA) supports, oversees and provides guidance to State-Administered, Public Private Partnership and Wilson/Fish programs that provide assistance and services to refugees, asylees, certain Amerasian immigrants, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and Certified Victims of Human Trafficking (henceforth referred to collectively as refugees). DRA reviews and monitors state plans, budget submissions, service plans, and reports, while providing technical assistance to ensure that federal regulations are followed and adequate services and performance are maintained.  The ultimate goal is to provide the types of assistance that will allow refugees to become economically self-sufficient as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States.

Program structures:

  • State Administered: Cash, medical, and social services are primarily managed by states as part of their social service or labor force programs.  The program goal is to enable refugees become self-sufficient as soon as possible.
  • Public Private Partnership: This partnership provides States the option to enter into a partnership with local voluntary resettlement agencies to provide cash assistance to refugees.  The objective is to create more effective resettlement, while maintaining state responsibility for policy and administrative oversight.
  • Wilson-Fish: The program is an alternative to the traditional state administered refugee resettlement program.  This program provides cash, medical assistance, and social services to refugees.  The purpose of the Wilson-Fish program is to increase refugee prospects for early employment and self-sufficiency, promote coordination among voluntary resettlement agencies and service providers, and ensure that refugee assistance programs exist in every state where refugees are resettled.

DRA is responsible for the following programs:

  • Cash and Medical Assistance: This program provides reimbursement to states and other programs for cash and medical assistance. Refugees who are ineligible for TANF and Medicaid may be eligible for cash and medical assistance for up to eight months from their date of arrival, grant of asylum, or date of certification for trafficking victims.
  • Refugee Social Services: This program allocates formula funds to states to serve refugees who have been in the United States less than 60 months (five years).  Services are focused on addressing employability and include interpretation and translation, day care, citizenship, and naturalization.  Services are designed to help refugees obtain jobs within one year of enrollment.
  • Targeted Assistance Formula: This program allocates formula funds to states that qualify for additional funds due to an influx of refugee arrivals that need public assistance.  TAG service prioritize (a) cash assistance recipients, particularly long-term recipients; (b) unemployed refugees not receiving cash assistance; and (c) employed refugees in need of services to retain employment or to attain economic independence.
  • Cuban Haitian: This program provides discretionary grants to states and other programs to fund assistance and services in localities with a heavy influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants and refugees.  This program supports employment services, hospitals, and other health and mental health care programs, adult and vocational education services, refugee crime or victimization programs, and citizenship and naturalization services.
  • Refugee School Impact: This program provides discretionary grants to state and other programs.  Funds go to school districts to pay for activities that will lead to the effective integration and education of refugee children between the ages of 5 and 18.  Activities include English as a second language; after-school tutorials; programs that encourage high school completion and full participation in school activities; after-school and/or summer clubs and activities; parental involvement programs; bilingual/bicultural counselors; interpreter services, etc.
  • Services to Older Refugees: This program provides discretionary grants to states to ensure that refugees aged 60 and above are linked to mainstream aging services in their community.  ORR cooperates with the Administration for Community Living to reach this goal.
  • Targeted Assistance Discretionary: This program provides discretionary grants to states and other programs to address the employment needs of refugees that cannot be met with the Formula Social Services or Formula Targeted Assistance Grant Programs.  Activities under this program are for the purpose of supplementing and/or complementing existing employment services to help refugees achieve economic self-sufficiency.
  • Technical Assistance Program: This program provides technical assistance grants to organizations with expertise in specific areas, such as employment, cultural orientation, economic development, and English language training.

Division of Refugee Health
ORR recently created the refugee heath program to address issues of health and well-being that are vital to refugees and other ORR-eligible populations. The refugee health program works on various projects including: collaborating with federal partners in the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA); administering the Survivors of Torture and Preventive Health programs; and providing technical assistance on medical screening guidelines, assessment and follow-up for contagious or communicable diseases, mental health awareness and linkages, suicide prevention, emergency preparedness and other health and mental health initiatives. It also coordinates with state and federal partners to advance ORR’s overall health initiatives.

DRH is responsible for the following programs:

  • Refugee Preventive Health: This program provides discretionary grants to states or their designated health agencies or other programs that facilitate medical screenings and support health services.  The program aims to reduce the spread of infectious disease, treat any current ailments, and promote preventive health practices.
  • Services to Survivors of Torture Program: This program provides funding for a comprehensive program of support for survivors of torture.  The Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998 recognizes that a significant number of refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers entering the United States have suffered torture.  The program provides rehabilitative services which enable survivors to become productive members of our communities.

Division of Resettlement Services
The Division of Resettlement Services (DRS) provides assistance through public and private non-profit agencies to support the economic and social integration of refugees. DRS is responsible for the following programs:

  • Matching Grant Program: This is an alternative program to public assistance designed to enable refugees to become self-sufficient within four to six months from the date of arrival into the United States.  Eligible grantees are voluntary agencies able to coordinate comprehensive multilingual, multicultural services for refugees at local sites; the same agencies are under cooperative agreements with the Department of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM).
  • Refugee Agriculture Partnership Program: The Refugee Agriculture Partnership Program (RAPP) involves refugees in the effort to improve the supply and quality of food in urban and rural areas.  Refugees are potential farmers or producers of more healthful foods, as well as consumers whose health and well-being are affected by diet.  RAPP has evolved into a program with multiple objectives that include: creating sustainable income; producing supplemental income; having an adequate supply of healthy foods in a community; achieving better physical and mental health; promoting community integration, and developing the capacity of organizations to access USDA and other services and resources.  In cooperation with the USDA, ORR helps develop community gardens and farmers’ markets.
  • Preferred Communities Program: This program supports the resettlement agencies of newly arriving refugees by providing them additional resources to help refugees to become self-sufficient and to integrate into their new communities.  The program also assists service providers that assist refugees with special needs that require more intensive case management.
  • Ethnic Community Self-Help Program: This program provides assistance to refugee ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs) that address community building and facilitate cultural adjustment and integration of refugees.  The program’s purpose is to promote community organizing that builds bridges between newcomer refugee communities and community resources.
  • Microenterprise Development Program: This program enables refugees to become financially independent by helping them develop capital resources and business expertise to start, expand, or strengthen their own business. The program provides training and technical assistance in business plan development, management, bookkeeping, and marketing to equip refugees with the skills they need to become successful entrepreneurs.
  • Microenterprise Development – Home-Based Child Care Program: This program is designed to enable refugee women to become entrepreneurs while simultaneously caring for their own children.
  • Individual Development Accounts Program: Individual development accounts are matched savings accounts available for the purchase of specific assets.  Under the IDA program, the matching funds, together with the refugee’s own savings from his or her employment, are available for one (or more) of the following: home purchase; microenterprise capitalization; post secondary education or training; and in some cases, purchase of an automobile if necessary to maintain or upgrade employment.  Upon enrolling in an IDA program, a refugee signs a savings plan agreement, which specifies the savings goal, the match rate, and the amount the refugee will save each month.  Refugees also receiving training in navigating the financial system, budgeting, saving, and credit.

Division of Children’s Services
The Division of Children’s Services (DCS) recognizes the importance of providing a safe and appropriate environment for unaccompanied alien children during the interim period between the minor’s transfer into ORR care and reunification with family or other sponsors or removal from the United States by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  DCS strives to provide the best care and placement for unaccompanied alien children (UAC), who are in federal custody by reason of their immigration status, while taking into account the unique nature of each child’s situation in making placement, case management, and release decisions.  DCS also oversees the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors (URM) program, which connects refugee minors with appropriate foster care services and benefits when they do not have a parent or a relative available and committed to providing for their long-term care.

  • Unaccompanied Children’s Services: This program makes and implements placement decisions in the best interests of UAC to ensure that they are in the least restrictive setting possible while in federal custody.  The majority of UAC are cared for through a network of state licensed ORR-funded care providers, which provide classroom education, mental and medical health services, case management, and socialization/recreation.  ORR/DCS funds programs to provide a continuum of care for children, including foster care, group homes, and residential treatment centers.  The division also coordinates a legal access project assuring that these children have information about their legal rights and receive an individual legal screening to assess their chances of legal relief.  Finally, ORR/DCS provides family reunification services to facilitate safe and timely placement with family members or other qualified sponsors.
  • Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program: This program ensures that eligible unaccompanied minor populations receive the full range of assistance, care, and services available to all foster children in the state by establishing a legal authority to act in place of the child’s unavailable parent(s).  Our programs encourage reunification of children with their parents or other appropriate adult relatives through family tracing and coordination with local refugee resettlement agencies.  However, if reunification is not possible, each program works to design a case specific permanency plan for each minor or youth in care.  Additional services ORR provides include: indirect financial support for housing, food, clothing, medical care, and other necessities; intensive case management by social workers; independent living skills training; educational supports including educational training vouchers; English language training; career/college counseling and training; mental health services; assistance adjusting immigration status; cultural activities; recreational opportunities; support for social integration; cultural and religious preservation.

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Division
The Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (ATIP) helps certify victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.  These individuals are eligible to receive federally funded benefits and services to the same extent as refugees, and can begin to rebuild their lives in the United States.  ATIP is committed to promoting public awareness and assisting in the identification of trafficking victims by educating the public and persons likely to encounter victims.  These organizations or persons may include: social services providers; public health officials; legal organizations; as well as ethnic, faith-based, and community organizations.

ATIP is responsible for the following programs:

Victim Identification and Public Awareness

• Rescue and Restore Campaign: This program is a public awareness campaign that established Rescue and Restore coalitions in 24 cities, regions, and states. These community action groups are comprised of non-governmental organization leaders, academics, students, law enforcement officials, and other key stakeholders who are committed to addressing the problem of human trafficking in their own communities.

• Rescue and Restore Regional Program: This program serves as the focal point for regional public awareness campaign activities and intensification of local outreach to identify victims of human trafficking.  Each Rescue and Restore Regional partner oversees and builds the capacity of a local anti-trafficking network, and sub-awards 60 percent of grant funds to local organizations that identify and work with victims.  By acting as a focal point for regional anti-trafficking efforts, Rescue and Restore Regional partners encourage a cohesive and collaborative approach in the fight against modern-day slavery.

Assistance for Victims of Human Trafficking

  • Certifications and Eligibility Letters: HHS is the sole federal agency authorized to certify foreign adult victims of human trafficking.  Similarly, it is the sole federal agency authorized to make foreign child victims of human trafficking eligible for assistance.  ORR issues all certifications and eligibility letters.  Certification grants adult foreign victims of human trafficking access to federal benefits and services to the same extent as refugees.  Likewise, eligibility letters grant minor foreign victims of trafficking access to federal benefits and services to the same extent as refugees, including placement in the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors program.
  • National Human Trafficking Victim Assistance Program: This program provides funding for comprehensive case management services to foreign victims of trafficking and potential victims seeking HHS certification in any location in the United States.  The grantees provide case management to assist a victim of trafficking to become certified, and other necessary services after certification, through a network of sub-awardees in locations throughout the country.  These grants ensure the provision of case management, referrals, and emergency assistance (such as food, clothing, and shelter) to victims of human trafficking and certain family members.  Grantees help victims gain access to housing, employability services, mental health screening and therapy, medical care, and some legal services, enabling victims to live free of violence and exploitation.
  • National Human Trafficking Resource Center: This program is a national, toll-free hotline for the human trafficking field in the United States.  It is reached by calling 1-888-3737-888 or e-mailing [email protected].  The NHTRC operates around the clock to protect victims of human trafficking.  It provides callers with a range of comprehensive services including: crisis intervention; urgent and non-urgent referrals; tip reporting; anti-trafficking resources; and technical assistance for the anti-trafficking field and those who wish to get involved.  To perform these functions, the NHTRC maintains a national database of organizations and individuals, as well as a library of anti-trafficking resources and materials.

Office of the Director
The Office of the Director responds to overall ORR operations and special projects, including communications and outreach, media relations, and the federal government’s U.S. Repatriation Program.  The Budget, Policy, and Data Analysis (BPDA) team is also located within the Office of the Director, and is responsible for the allocation and tracking of funds for refugee cash and medical assistance, as well as state administrative costs; forecasting and executing ORR’s annual budget; developing regulations and legislative proposals; and routinely interpreting policy.  BPDA also coordinates preparation of the ORR Annual Report to Congress.

Last May, DHS Warned on Belgium ISIS Cell

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(U)  Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO).  It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).  It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.  
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(U//FOUO)  Future ISIL Operations in West Could Resemble Disrupted Belgian Plot
(U//FOUO)  Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).  Coordinated with NPPD, the FBI, and NCTC.  
(U)  Key Judgments
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more complex operations in the West.  We differentiate the complex, centrally planned plotting in Belgium from other, more-simplistic attacks by ISIL-inspired or directed individuals, which could occur with little
to no warning. 
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses the group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency information sharing about emerging and ongoing threats.  
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that items recovered by Belgian authorities suggest the group’s plotting may
have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers and underscores the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement of potential terrorist activity through suspicious activity reporting (SAR).  (See Appendix A for details on the importance of SAR reporting.)
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the security measures used by this group to avoid physical and technical collection highlight how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their behavior and the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to deflect scrutiny.  
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that facilitation efforts by
the group were likely aided by members’ criminal
background and possible access to criminal groups underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.  
(U//FOUO)  Awareness of some of the tactics and tradecraft used by the group in Belgium could assist with identifying and disrupting potential plots in the United States.  
(U//FOUO)  Belgian Plot Signals ISIL’s Interest
in Complex Plots Against the West
(U//FOUO)  The plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more sophisticated
(U)  Scope
(U//FOUO)  This Assessment highlights the tactics, targets, and tradecraft allegedly used in a plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 that potentially could be used in the Homeland by individuals associated with or inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  This Assessment is intended to support the DHS activities to assist federal, state, and local government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, first responders, and private sector security partners in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.   
(U)  Background
(U)  On 15 January 2015, Belgian authorities raided multiple locations including a safe house in Verviers, a suburb of Brussels, where a firefight ended in the deaths of two individuals and the arrest of a third suspect.  The raids disrupted an alleged plot involving an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group with at least ten operativessome of whom were returning foreign fighterspossibly targeting police or the public.  The group may have been acting under the direction of a member(s) of ISIL.  There is no publically available information as to whether a specific target was selected.  Since the initial raids, multiple individuals in several European countries have been arrested and charged in connection with the group’s activities.  The investigation into this plot remains ongoing.1,2  
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operations in the West.  I&A judges that the threat from ISIL plots involving multiple operatives may grow, but are more likely to occur in Europewhere several recruitment networks have been disrupted, and several returning fighters have already demonstrated the ability to conduct attacksthan in the United States given the different operating environments, number of European foreign fighters currently in theater, and Europe’s
geographic proximity to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.3,4  While we assess the threat is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.  I&A notes that small-scale attacks using comparatively less sophisticated tacticssuch as the 3 May attempted attack against a
“Draw the Prophet” event in Garland, Texas by
individuals inspired to act by ISIL-linked messaging, or by individuals taking direction from an oversea plotter after connecting through social mediacould proceed with little to no warning.    
(U//FOUO)  Dispersed Activities and Remote Leadership Possibly Intended to Conceal
Activities 
(U//FOUO)  The group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency sharing information about emerging and ongoing threats.  Even though the group likely planned to attack targets in Belgium, the
investigation into the group’s activities spans several
European countries, including France, Greece, Spain, and the Netherlands, as well countries where there is limited- to-no counterterrorism cooperation with the United States,
such as Syria.  
» (U)  The purported leader of the group, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, directed the operation from a safe house in Athens, Greece using a cell phone, while other group members operated in several other European countries, according to European media reporting citing a senior Belgian counterterrorism official.5,6
» (U)  In addition to the 13 arrests made throughout Belgium, two operatives were arrested in France and police apprehended a cell member in Greece after tracing links to a second safe house in Athens, according to a Belgian news conference and Greek media reporting citing senior police officers.7,8,9
» (U)  Multiple members of the cell appear to have been able to communicate and travel unimpeded across borders to facilitate attack planning.  In addition to directing operatives from the safe house in Athens, Abaaoud boasted he was able to return to
Syria after the Verviers raid despite having international warrants for his arrest, according to an interview featured in the February release of ISIL’s
Dabiq magazine.10 
» (U)  The passport of an identified Dutch national
possibly associated with the groupwho likely traveled to Syria in late 2014 was found at the Verviers safe house, according to Dutch media reporting.11  Dutch officials conducted a search of his parents’ home and confiscated laptops and other media.  As of early April, he was reportedly killed while fighting in Syria, according to unconfirmed Dutch media reporting.12  
(U//FOUO)  Material Acquisition Suggests Attacker’s Potential Tactics and Targets 
(U//FOUO)  Items recovered during searches of
residences affiliated with the cell suggest the group’s
plotting may have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers.  There is no publicly available information about the acquisition of these items, but the amounts and types of materials acquired by the group highlights the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement through SARs of attempts to acquire or store a large cache of equipment or chemicals needed to support larger operations.
» (U)  Belgian law enforcement discovered automatic firearms, precursors for the explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a body camera, multiple cell phones, handheld radios, police uniforms, fraudulent identification documents, and a large quantity of cash during the raid in Verviers, according to statements made by Belgian government officials.14,15,16  At the time
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)  A picture, from ISIL’s Dabiq magazine, of Abdelhmaid Abaaoud (far right) with the two alleged cell members killed during the January 2015 raid in
Verviers, Belgium.13
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of the raid, the members of this cell were also searching for an ice machine to cool and transport the TATP, according to European press reporting.17
» (U)  Belgian officials were reportedly concerned that the acquisition of police uniforms and discussion by group members of a Molenbeek police stationwhere members of the group had reportedly spent time
suggests that they may have intended to target a police station or to impersonate officers to potentially gain access to a sensitive site. 18,19,20  While there is no confirmation the group was actually going to target police, such an attack would have been consistent with media reports about recent ISIL-linked plots in the West directed at law enforcement and ongoing messaging by ISIL since September 2014.21
(U//FOUO)  Alleged Operational Security Measures Suggest Knowledge of Law Enforcement Methods
(U//FOUO)  The steps group members reportedly took to avoid physical and technical collection of their preoperational activities suggest members were likely cognizant of the potential for scrutiny by Belgian authorities given their status as returning foreign fighters and had at least a rudimentary knowledge of law enforcement efforts to monitor social media and other communications.  The countermeasures used by this group underscore how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their patterns of behavior and highlight the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to
deflect scrutiny.
(U//FOUO)  Communications Security.  The group made extensive efforts to prevent or limit law enforcement’s ability to conduct technical surveillance.
» (U)  A group member reportedly changed his cell phone five times and urged operatives to change vehicles often and to search the vehicles for
microphones in an effort to thwart potential surveillance by police and intelligence officials, according to Belgian media reporting citing police
officials.23   
» (U)  According to an unverified Belgian media report, intercepted communications between cell members were conducted in French, Arabic, and a Moroccan dialect, and frequently used coded language to discuss attack planning to make translation problematic for law enforcement and intelligence services.24    
» (U)  Belgian authorities discovered that the incarcerated brother of one of the cell members may have acted as an intermediary to facilitate communications between Greece- and Belgian-based members after officials at a prison in Belgium notified law enforcement of the brother’s suspicious
communications, according to Belgian media reporting.25  
(U//FOUO)  Physical Security.  The group attempted to obscure their operational travel and material acquisition from Belgian officials.
» (U//FOUO)  According to several media reports, the family of Abaaoud received a call in late 2014 that he had been killed while fighting in Syria.  However, Abaaoud’s probable involvement in this plot implies this may have been done intentionally to deter efforts by Belgian officials to track his activities.26 
» (U//FOUO)  Belgian and Greek authorities recovered multiple identification documents, some of which may have been fraudulent, at safe houses reportedly used by the group, according to media reports. 27,28,29  Moreover, the use of false identity documents may have led to the misidentification of the two operatives killed during the raid in Verviers, according to a European media report, suggesting the group may have used fraudulent documents to conceal travel from Syria to Europe and to facilitate their attack planning. 30
» (U//FOUO)  The large amount of cash recovered by Belgian authorities at the safe house in Verviers was likely intended to fund some of the group’s
procurement activities and to conceal purchasing patterns.31  Activities such as these highlight the importance of scrutinizing suspicious purchases of bulk quantities of precursor chemicals where individuals insist on paying only in cash.
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)   Belgium investigators at scene following the raid in Verviers, Belgium on 15 January 2015.22
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UNCLASSIFIED
(U)  Figure 1. Map of Group Activities
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(U//FOUO)  Member’s Criminal Background Likely Aided Planning and Facilitation  
(U//FOUO)  Facilitation efforts by the group were likely aided by members’ criminal background and possible access to criminal groups, underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.  The nexus between terrorist preoperational planning and criminal activities may offer law enforcement opportunities to detect ongoing plotting, as investigations of intercepted illegal activities may present indicators of other nefarious
intentions.
» (U)  At least one alleged cell member, Souhaib el Abdi, had previous experience with trafficking forged documents, according to comments from his lawyer reported in open source media.32  The groups’ purported leader Abaaoud spent time in prison for theft before departing Belgium for Syria, according to a US press report.33
» (U)  The Belgian police uniforms, large cache of illegal weaponsincluding Kalashnikov rifles, handguns, ammunition, and materials to make explosivesthat were seized by police during the raids, were likely acquired illegally, according to a media reporting coverage of Belgian police news conference.34  Cell members have subsequently been charged with violating Belgian weapons laws, according to statements made by Belgian officials.35
(U)  Implications
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that future Western complex attacks and plots could resemble the size and capabilities of this group and awareness of the tactics and tradecraft used by this group could assist with identifying and disrupting potential complex plots in the United States. Prior to the disruption of this plot, nearly all of the approximately one dozen ISIL-linked plots and attacks in the West to date involved lone offenders or small
groups of individuals, raising I&A’s concern that the
involvement of a large number of operatives and group leaders based in multiple countries in future ISIL-linked plotting could create significant obstacles in the detection and disruption of preoperational activities.*  
(U//FOUO)  DHS defines a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve direction, assistance, or influence from a larger terrorist organization or foreign actor.
(U//FOUO)  We assess that plots involving foreign fighters, who have returned from conflict zones, or foreign fighters based overseas, who have the ability to leverage violent extremists in their home countries, are more likely to plot an attack on this scale than are their less-experienced counterparts.  While we assess that the threat of such an attack is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.  
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(U//FOUO)  Appendix A: Importance of Suspicious Activity Reporting
(U//FOUO)  Given the range of targets and tactics of ISIL-associated plots since last year, we encourage reporting of suspicious activity to appropriate government authorities and encourage our security, military, and law enforcement partners to remain vigilant.  We face an increased challenge in detecting terrorist plots underway by individuals or small groups acting quickly and independently or with only tenuous ties to foreign-based terrorists.  Pre-operational indicators are likely to be difficult to detect; as such, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners play a critical role in identifying and reporting suspicious activities and raising the awareness of federal counterterrorism officials.
(U)  Indicators
(U//FOUO)  DHS encourages federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials, as well as first responders and private sector security partners, to remain alert and immediately report suspicious activity and potential behavioral indicators of pre-operational terrorism planning activities, to include suspicious acquisition of materials and construction of explosive devices.  Some observed activities that may be suspicious include constitutionally protected activity.  These activities should not be reported absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that
the observed behavior is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism.  No single behavioral indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action.  The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.
» (U//FOUO)  New or increased advocacy of violence, including providing material support or recruiting others to commit criminal acts;
» (U//FOUO)  Reports to law enforcement that a community member has adopted a new name, style of dress or speech, and/or other significant changes in presentation to others in association with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Communicating with known or suspected homegrown or foreign-based violent extremists using e-mail or social media platforms;
» (U//FOUO)  Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, or barriers;
» (U//FOUO)  Attempts to purchase all available stock of explosives precursors or to acquire materials in bulk without explanation or justification or making numerous smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of timea possible sign of covert stockpiling;
» (U//FOUO)  Theft of chemicals, hazardous substances, weapons, pre-cursor materials, or items that could compromise facility security, such as uniforms, identification, blueprints, vehicles (or components), technology, or access keys or cards;
» (U//FOUO)  Internet research for target selection, acquisition of technical capabilities, planning, or logistics; » (U//FOUO)  Insisting on paying in cash or using a credit card in another person’s name; » (U//FOUO)  Participation in weapons training, paramilitary exercises, and reconnaissance and surveillance activities in
a manner that is reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism, particularly in conjunction with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Use of cover terms to mask the true meaning of events or nefarious activities combined with active advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition, or materials that could be used to produce explosives, such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer; and
» (U//FOUO)  Activities that a reasonable person would deem as suspicious, indicating a storage facility or other areas are being used to construct an explosive device.
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(U)  Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.8
(U)  Source Summary Statement
(U//FOUO)  This Assessment is based on information drawn from a body of unclassified reporting, including open source media reports, public statements of senior foreign government officials, and public accounts of foreign law enforcement investigations from multiple law enforcement agencies.  We have medium confidence in the press reports used in this product, some of which have been corroborated by public statements made by senior foreign law enforcement officials.  
(U)  Report Suspicious Activity
(U)  To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement.  Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action.  For more information on the Nationwide
SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.
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1 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
2 (U); OSC; EUL2015041773002595; 17 April 2015. 3 (U); OSC; EUL2015021166933318; 11 February 2015. 4 (U); OSC; EUR2015022528575929; 24 February 2015.
5 (U); OSC; EUN2015020948731295; 31 January 2015. 6 (U); OSC; EUL2015020274740312; 1 February 2015. 7 (U); OSC: EUN2015020947629159; 30 January 2015. 8 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 9 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 10 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 11 (U); OSC; EUL2015012065248183; 19 January 2015.
12 (U); Teen with Connection to Verviers Deceased in Syria; http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20150403_01614138;
accessed 9 April 2015.
13 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 14 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 15 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europehttp://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-
belgium-isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
16 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
17 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
18 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying;
http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presume; accessed 6 April 2015.
19 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 20 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
21 (U); OSC; TRR2014092201178788; 22 September 2014. 22 (U); Belgian Operation Thwarted ‘Major Terrorist Attacks,’ Kills 2 Suspects; http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/
world/belgium-anti-terror-operation/; accessed 13 April 2014.
23 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/
    verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
24 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/
societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
25 (U); OSC; EUL2015012064970018; 20 January 2015. 26 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
27 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
28 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
29 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 30 (U); Belgian Police Admit Seeking Wrong Man as Vervier Shooutout Jihadists Named; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11362093/Belgian-police-admit-seeking-wrong-man-as-Vervier-shooutout-jihadists-named.html; accessed 13 April 2015.
31 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 32 (U); Terrorist Threat  Dismantled Verviers Terrorist Cell: 4 Suspects Face Council Chamber;
http://www.thebrusselstimes.com/belgium/terrorist-threat-dismantled-verviers-terrorist-cell-4-suspects-face-
council-chamber/; accessed 1 April 2015.
33 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
34 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 35 (U); OSC; EUR2015012167949567; 21 January 2015. 

ISIS Embedded in Urban Areas, Fake Passports

Reuters: Honduras detains 5 Syrians heading for U.S. with stolen Greek passports-police

Honduran authorities have detained five Syrian nationals who were trying to reach the United States using stolen Greek passports, but there are no signs of any links to last week’s attacks in Paris, police said.

 

Check out this interactive graphic on Syrian refugee arrivals in the U.S., by the Reuters Graphics team. http://reut.rs/1OfytDd

‘420 potentially dangerous Islamists live in Germany’

Berlin, Nov 17 (IANS/EFE) Around 43,000 people are part of Islamist circles in Germany and around 420 are considered potentially dangerous, the president of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (or BKA) has said.

In an interview with Die Welt newspaper after the attacks in Paris, Holger Munch recalled that Islamist terrorism attacks European values, with Germany also in its sight.

As he noted, the coordinated work of the security forces has prevented 11 attacks in the country, but Paris has shown that the risk of international terrorism is “high” and that Germany may also be affected.

The jihadists, he explained, are younger than they were a few years ago and radicalized much faster; sometimes they spend a few months or a few weeks until a person decides to travel to Syria.

Many have criminal records behind them and often, before travelling abroad to join the jihadists, come into contact with Salafist groups in Germany.

According to data from the BKA, more than 750 Islamists have left Germany bound for Iraq and Syria and there is information about 70 people who have returned after receiving military training or combat experience.

 

Govt Tools to Deter Terrorist Travel

Legal Tools to Deter Travel by Suspected Terrorists: A

Brief Primer

11/16/2015

FAS: The terrorist attacks in Paris last week, for which the Islamic State (sometimes referred to as ISIS, ISIL, or IS) has claimed responsibility, have renewed concerns about terrorist travel. Following reports that at least one of the perpetrators of the attacks was carrying a Syrian passport, there has been heightened scrutiny and debate concerning the resettlement of refugees from war-torn Syria to Europe and the United States. This Sidebar provides a brief overview of some (but by no means all) of the tools the federal government employs to prevent individuals from traveling to, from, or within the United States to commit acts of terrorism. In some cases, the application of these tools may depend on different factors, including whether the suspected terrorist is a U.S. or foreign national.

Terrorist Databases and Screening

Decisions by the federal government as to whether to use a particular tool to deter an individual’s travel are often informed by information collected by various agencies that link that individual to terrorism. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—maintains the federal government’s Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), the government’s single source repository watch list record of known and suspected terrorists. TSC provides various federal agencies with subsets of the TSDB for use in combating and deterring terrorism. Some of the many screening systems supported by the TSDB include the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for screening of passports and visas; the TECS system (not an acronym) administered by Custom and Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to screen and make eligibility determinations of arriving persons at U.S. ports of entry; the DHS’s Secure Flight system for air passenger prescreening; and the FBI’s National Crime and Information Center’s Known or Suspected Terrorist File. Of course, while the TSDB supplies these systems with information on the identity of suspected terrorists, these systems may also include information on individuals obtained independently from the TSDB consistent with the agency’s particular responsibilities.

No-Fly List and Selectee List

Information compiled by the TSDB may be used to deter suspected terrorists from using civil aircraft and other modes of transportation to travel to, from, or within the United States. The safety of air travel, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is an important priority for the U.S. government. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and charged it with ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, including civil aviation. Two of the most prominent means by which TSA attempts to deter terrorist travel is via two watch lists comprised of information from the TSDB – the No-Fly List and the Selectee List. Persons on the No-Fly list are prohibited from boarding an American airline or any flight that comes in contact with U.S. territory or airspace. Those on the Selectee List are subject to enhanced screening procedures.

Criminal Sanctions

Perhaps the most severe means by which to prevent persons from traveling to, from, or within the United States for terrorist purposes is through the use of criminal sanctions. A wide range of terrorism-related conduct is subject to criminal penalty under U.S. law. Many of the most relevant criminal statutes are extraterritorial in reach, covering conduct which may occur partially or (in more limited cases) entirely outside the United States. Persons who aid and abet a criminal violation may typically be held criminally liable for the underlying offense to the same degree as the person who directly committed the violation. Attempts or conspiracies to commit proscribed conduct are also typically subject to criminal punishment. Several U.S. persons accused of attempting or conspiring to assist the Islamic State, including through either encouraging others to travel abroad to join the group or planning to join the group themselves, have been charged with terrorism offenses.

Probable cause is required to arrest a person for a criminal violation, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to sustain a conviction. Law enforcement’s suspicion that a traveler may be involved in terrorist conduct (or associated with others who have terrorist ties) may not be sufficient to warrant the traveler’s arrest. As a result, government officials may sometimes deploy tools other than criminal sanctions to deter travel by persons suspected of terrorist activity.

Passport Restrictions on Travel to Specific Countries

Through the revocation or denial of passports, U.S. authorities could potentially impede the international travel of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist involvement or association with an enemy belligerency. Federal law provides that, except as authorized by the President, a U.S. citizen may not depart from the United States and travel to another country unless he bears a valid passport. The revocation of the passport of a U.S. citizen located abroad may also have implications for his ability to remain in a particular foreign country, or travel from there to a third country. While federal statute provides that U.S. citizens also may not reenter the country unless they bear a valid passport, U.S. citizens who travel abroad appear to enjoy a constitutional right to be readmitted back into the United States.

State Department regulations identify various grounds for which passport applications may be denied or a previously issued passport may be revoked. Several such grounds may be relevant to efforts to deter international travel by U.S. citizens suspected of involvement with terrorist groups, including those permitting the denial or revocation of passports to U.S. citizens who are the subject of outstanding felony arrest warrants or requests for extradition. The regulations also provide that a U.S. citizen’s passport application may be denied or revoked when the Secretary of State “determines that the applicant’s activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States.” However, the authority to deny or revoke passports on account of national security or foreign policy concerns is not absolute. The Supreme Court has recognized that the State Department lacks statutory authority to deny a passport solely on the basis of the applicant’s political beliefs; the denial must be based in part upon actual conduct that causes serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.

In addition to regulatory authority to deny or revoke passports, State Department regulations also permit the Secretary of State to restrict the usage of U.S. passports to travel to a country or area in certain cases – including when the Secretary has determined the country or area is a place where “armed hostilities are in progress” or there exists “an imminent danger to the public health or physical safety of United States travelers.” Such restrictions have been imposed on a number of occasions, including restricting the use of a U.S. passport to travel to Iraq from 1991 until late 2003, on account of hostilities occurring in that country and the potential dangers posed to U.S. travelers.

Immigration

Perhaps the most effective and commonly employed means to deter non-U.S. nationals (aliens) suspected of terrorist activity from traveling to the United States derive from federal immigration law. Rules governing whether and when aliens may be admitted into the United States, along with the conditions for their continued presence in the country, are primarily found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA establishes several grounds for which an alien suspected of terrorist activity may be barred from admission into the United States, including persons seeking to come to the United States as refugees. Under INA §212(f), the President is also conferred with broad authority to act, by means of proclamation, to bar the entry of an alien or class of aliens into the United States if he deems their entry detrimental to U.S. interests, though usage of this authority has been relatively rare. While programs like the No-Fly List may prevent suspected foreign terrorists from coming to the United States via a particular mode of transportation, federal immigration rules and requirements may prevent such persons from traveling to the United States using any mode of transport.

The INA generally provides that aliens who are seeking initial admission into the country bear the burden of proving they are admissible. Moreover, judicial review of a decision by a consular officer abroad to deny an alien a visa to come to the United States, or a determination made by customs and border officials at a U.S. port of entry that an arriving alien is inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds, may be quite circumscribed or virtually non-existent. Aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the country might also be removed from the United States for the same terrorism-related reasons as aliens seeking initial admission into the country. In the case of lawfully admitted aliens, however, federal immigration authorities bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the alien’s activities render him deportable before the alien may be ordered removed. There may also be greater availability of judicial review than in cases where an alien has not yet been lawfully admitted. Moreover, if a lawful permanent resident alien (sometimes described as an “immigrant”) travels briefly abroad and seeks to return to the United States, he may be afforded greater procedural and substantive protections than other aliens who attempt to travel to the United States.

Immigration rules and requirements do not apply to U.S. citizens. Whereas an alien suspected of terrorism-related travel to the United States may be barred from admission into the country, other methods would need to be employed (e.g., placement on the No-Fly List, criminal prosecution, passport restrictions) to deter U.S. citizens from traveling to, from, or within the United States for terrorist purposes.