Why Did Secretaries Gates, Hagel and Panetta Really Resign?

Posted on August 7, 2016August 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

What they were really saying is fighting a war under Baraq Obama became a behemoth bureaucracy and just as an added concept, so has local law enforcement. But to stay on topic and to understand why the enemies have the advantage whether on a battlefield or in any diplomatic efforts with other world leaders, the below text will blow your head off.

Bring in the lawyers, submit names for nomination as a militant or enemy, form a committee, have meetings, clear with more lawyers, challenge the evidence, seek advise from other agencies, get Obama off the golf course, meet again, see what the State Department has to say, collaborate with other world leaders, go back to the White House and hope the pen and phone are available and agree. Meanwhile, the high value target is where again?

(Please excuse the text formatting below, it is a conversion from a .pdf file)

The original document from the Justice Department is here.

May 22, 2013

PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS

LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES

From the Justice Department: This Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) establishes the standard operating procedures for when the United States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hosti lities.

Any direct action must be conducted lawfully and taken against lawful targets; wherever possible such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted]such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] such action will be done pursuant to a [redacted] plan. In particular, whether any proposed target would be a lawful target for direct action is a determination that will be made in the first instance by the nominating department’s or agency’s counsel (with appropriate legal review as provided below) based on the legal authorities of the nominating department or agency and other applicable law. Even if the proposed target is lawful, there remains a separate question whether the proposed target should be targeted for direct action as a matter of pol icy. That determination will be made pursuant to the interagency review process and policy standards set forth in this PPG. The most important policy objective. particularly informing consideration of lethal action, is to protect American lives.

Capture operations offer the best opportunity for meaningful intelligence gain from counterterrorism (CT) operations and the mitigation and disruption of terrorist threats. Consequently, the United States prioritizes. as a matter of policy. the capture of terrorist suspects as a preferred option over lethal action and will therefore require a feasibility assessment of capture options as a component of any proposal for lethal action. Lethal action should be taken in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat. Lethal action should not be proposed or pursued as a punitive step or as a substitute for prosecuting a terrorist suspect in a civilian court or a military commission. Capture is preferred even in circumstances where neither prosecution nor third-country custody are availab le disposition options at the time.

CT actions, including lethal action against designated terrorist targets. shall be as discriminating and precise as reasonably possible. Absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action against an identified high-value terrorist (HVT) will be taken only when there is near certainty that the individual being targeted is in fact the lawful target and located at the place where the action will occur. Also absent extraordinary circumstances, direct action will be taken only if there is near certainty that the action can be taken without injuring or killing non-combatants. For purposes of this PPG. non-combatants are understood to be individuals who may not be made the object of attack under the law of armed conflict. The term ·’non-combatant” does not include an individual who is targetable as part of a belligerent party to an armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual who is targetable in the exercise of national self-defense. Moreover, international legal principles. including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important constraints on the ability of the United States to act

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unilaterally-and on the way in which the United States can use force -in foreign territories.

Direct action should only be undertaken

As renected in the procedures contained in this PPG, whenever possible and appropriate, decisions regarding direct action will be informed by departments and agencies with relevant

expertise. knowledge, and equities . •••••••••••••••••••••••

•••••••••••

. as well as by coordinated interagc ncy intelligence analysis.

Such intcragency coordination and consultation will ensure that decisions on operational matters or such importance are well-informed and will racilitate de-confliction among departments and agencies addressing overlapping threat streams. uch coordination is not intended to interfere with the traditional command and control authority of departments and agencies conducting CT operations.

Lastly. when considering potential direct action against a U.S. person under this PPG, there are

additional questions that must be answered. The Depat1ment of Justice (DOJ ). for example.

must conduct a legal analysis to ensure that such action may be conducted against the individual

consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States.

Based on the principles and priorities described above. Section I sets forth the procedure for

establishing

plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets.

Section 2 sets forth the approval process for the capture and long-term disposition of suspected terrorists. Section 3 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for designating identified I IYTs for lethal action. Section 4 sets forth the policy standard and procedure for approving kthal

force aga in st terrorist targets other than identified HVTs.

1 Section 5 sets forth the procedures for approving proposals that vary from the policy guidance otherwise set forth in this PPG. Section 6 sets forth the procedure for arter-action reports. Section 7 addresses congressional notification.

ection 8 sets forth general provisions.

SECTION 1. Procedure for Establishing a

Plan for taking

Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

1.A Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets

Each of the operating agencies may propose a deta iled operational plan to govern their respective

direct action operations

against: (I) suspected terrorists who may

be lawfully detained: (2) identified HVTs who may be lawfully targeted for lethal action; or (3) lawful terrorist targets other than identilied I IYTs.

J.B lnteragency Review of Operational Plans

All operational plans to undertake direct action operations against terrorist targets···

•••••••••

must undergo a legal review b) the general counsel(s) or the operating

1 This PPG docs noL address ocherwise lawful and properly authorized activities !hat may have lethal effects. which are incidental to the primary purpose of the operation.

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agency executing the plan, and be submitted to the National Security Staff (NSS) for interagency review. All proposed operational plans must conform to the policy standards set forth in this

Section. All proposed operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets •••••••••••

along with the conc lus ions of the General Counsel, sha ll be referred

to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the proposing operating agency shall consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the proposed operational plan. AII proposed

operational plans to undertake direct action against terrorist targets···········

•l

will be reviewed by appropriate members of the Deputies and Principals Committees of

the National Security Council (NSC) (defined in Presidential Policy Directive-I or any successor directive) before presentation to the President for decision.

l.C Guidelines for Operational Plans

Any operational plan for taking direct action against terrorist targets·········

–

shall. among other things. indicate with precision:

I) The S. CT objectives to be achieved; 2) The duration of time for which the authority is to remain in force:

3) The international legal basis for taking action •••••

4) The strike and surveillance assets that may be employed when taking action against an authorized objective;

5)

6) Any proposed stipulation related to the operational plan, including the duration ofauthority for such stipulation;

7) Any proposed variations from the policies and procedures set forth in this PPG; and

8) The conditions precedent for any operation, which shall include at a minimum the following: (a) near certainty that an identified HVT or other lawful terrorist target other than an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that non-combatants wi ll not be inJured or

killed: (c)

and (d) ir

lethal force is being employed: (i) an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation: (ii) an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and (iii) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

: Operational disagreements

shall be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals .

..,

.)

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l.D Additional Requirements When Requesting Authority for Directing Lethal Force Against Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

When requesting authority to direct lelhal force against lerrorist targets other than identi ficd

HVTs, the

plan shall also inc lude the following:

I) The types of targets that would qualify as appropriate targets pursuant lo Section 4 (Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs) for purposes of the proposed operational plan: and

2) A description of the operating agency” s internal process for nominating and approving the use of lethal force aga inst terrorist targets other than identified HYTs.

t.E Policies and Procedures

The operating agencies shall estab lish harmonized policies and procedures for assessing:

I) ear certainty that a lawful target is present:

2) Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; and

3) With respect to a proposal to lake direct action against terrorist targets other than identified HVTs, whether the target qualifies pursuant to the policy standard set forth in Section 4.A of this PPG and in the specific operational plan.

1.F When Using Lethal Action, E mploy All Reasonably Available Resources to Ascerta in the Identity of the Target

When the use of lethal action is deemed necessary. departments and agencies of the United Slates Government must employ all reasonably available resources to ascertain the identity of the target so that action can be taken, for example. aga inst identified HVTs in accordance with

ection 3 of this PPG. Verifying a target·s identity before taking lethal action ensures greater certainty of outcome that lethal action has been taken against identified I IVTs who satisfy Lhe policy standard for lethal action in ection 3.A.

l.G Principals and Deputies Review of Operational Plans for Taking Direct Action

Against Terrorists Targets···············

When considering a proposed operational plan, Principals and Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, along with any others they deem appropriate:

I) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; and

2) For an operational plan that includes the option of lethal force against targets other than identified HVTs. an explanation of why authorizing direct action against targets other than identi fied HYTs is necessary to achieve U . . policy objectives.

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t.H Presentation to the President

I.H. I If Lhe Principal of the nominaling operating agency, after review by Principals and Deputies. continues to support Lhe operational plan, the plan shall be presented to the President for decision, along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the NSC process.

I.H.2 An appropriate NSS official will communicate, in writing, the Presidenl’s decision, including any Lerms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriale deparLmcnts and agencies.

1.1 Amendments or Modifications to Operational Plans

Excepl as described in Section 5, any amendments or modifications to an approved operalional

plan ror direct action

shall undergo the same review and approval

process oullined in this Section.

SECTION 2. Approval Process for Certain Captures and the Long-Term Disposition of Certain Suspects

This Section sets forth the approval process for nominating for capture suspected terrorists or individuals providing operational support to suspected terrorists (in this section, togeLhcr referred to as ·’suspects”): proposals to take custody of suspects, including pre-and post-capture

screening:

and

determining a long-term disposition for suspects.

Unless otherwise approved in an operational plan under Section I. the SS shal I coordinate for

interagency review under this PPG, as described below, the following: (I) operations intended to

result····································

(2) operations that result in United States Government personnel taking custody (through a capture or lransrer)3 of a suspect located overseas and outside areas oractive host ii ities; and (3) long-term disposition decisions wilh respect to such suspecls. The involvement of United Slates Government personnel in extraditions or transfers initiated for the purpose of prosecution in civi I ian court or those scenarios to which PPD-14 applies (i.e., circumslances in which an individual is arrested or otherwise taken into custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or another Federal law enforeemenl agency)4 are nol covered by this PPG.

Captures and Transfers by Foreign Governments: These procedures do not apply to U.S. law enrorcement requests for foreign governments to arrest or otherwise take into custody a suspecL

‘ ··custody:· as referred to here.

it is anticipated that the

United States Government will have temporar; or transitory custody ofthe individual(s) without the presence of officials ofthe foreign government maintaining custody of the detainee(s).

4 Consistent with existing policy and practice. DOJ will. as appropriate. continue to notify the SS. through the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). ofplans to arrest. or seek the extradition or transfer of. a suspected terrorist. and where appropriate (e.g .. to consider other potential disposition options) the SS. in consultation with DOJ, may arrange for interagency consideration ofa request for extradition or transfer.

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or lo United States Government provision of training. funds, or equipment to enable a foreign government to capture a suspect. These procedures also do not apply to non-law enforcement United States Government requests to capture a suspect who will remain in the custody of the foreign government or to the provision of actionable intelligence to enable such captures. Every 6 months, departments and agencies shall notify the NSS of any requests made of a foreign government to capture a suspect in the preceding 6 months. Unless covered by the exceptions above or otherwise included in an operational plan under Section I, if United States Government

personnel

capture a suspect.

or an operation is intended to result in United States Government personnel taking custody of a suspect. the department or agency must submit a proposal through the NS for interagency

review. Operational plans

may include additional conditions

requiring interagency review of capture operalions involving United Slates Government personnel, depending on the policy consideration of the panicular country or region in which the

operations would occur. If United tales Government personnel are expected·····

•••••••••••••••••

to capture or transfer suspects in a particular

country or region on an ongoing basis. the department or agency involved should seek to include

a proposed plan for such activities in the operational plan approved under Section I.

2.A Nomination Process

2.A. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 2.D may identify an individual for consideration, but only an operating agency or DOJ (“nominating agencies·· for purposes of Section 2 of this PPG) may forma lly request that a suspect be considered for capture or custody by U.S. personnel. Additionally, a department or agency that has captured a suspect, or that plans to capture or otherwise take custody of a suspect. shall, whenever practicable, propose a long-term disposition for such individual. Prior to requesling that an individual be considered for capture or custody by the United States, the nominating agency must confirm with its General Counsel that the operation can be conducted lawfully, but it i not neces ary to have resolved the long-term dispos ition plan prior to proposing a capture operation.

2.A.2 Whenever possible, the nominating agency shall notify the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group prior to such a request.

2.A.3 A nomination for custody, including capture, or a proposed long-term disposition under Section 2.A. I shall be referred to the NSS, which shall initiate the screening process described in Section 2.8.

2.A.4 In the event initial screening under Section 2.B has not taken place prior to U.S. personnel taking custody of a suspect. the process for screening after capture described in ection 2.C shall be initiated.

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2.B Screening Prior to a Capture Operation

2.8.1 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each suspect referred to the S for review of a proposal to capture or otherwise lake custody of the individual. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the Intelligence Community (IC), as well as any other information needed Lo present as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile should explain any difference of views among the IC and note. where appropriate. gaps in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each individual profile shall include the following in formation to the extent that such information exists:

2.B.2 Once the profile has been completed. the nominating agency shall provide the profile to the NSS Senior Director for Countcrterrorism.

2.B.3 Whenever time permits, the lnteragency Disposition Planning Group shall assess the availability. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential disposition options.

2.B.4 All nominations under this Section for capturing or otherwise taking a suspect into custody must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to determine that the suspect may lawfully be captured or taken into custody by the United States and that the operation can be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. The NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency sh al I consult with other department and agency counsels, as necessary and appropriate. In addition, in the event that the suspect who has been

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2.C.3

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nominated is a U.S. person. DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that the operation may be conducted consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the Deputies Committee to inform its consideration of the nomination.

2.B.5 The NSS shall convene a Restricted Countcrterrorism Security Group (RCSG/’ for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material and addressing any issues related to the nomination of an individual for capture. custody, or long-term disposition. Before forward ing to the Deputies the nomination of a suspect for capture or to otherwise be taken into custody, the RCSG shall identify whether any other material is needed for Deputies’ consideration of the nomination and issue taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the Swill request. and the ational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) shall conduct. an assessment of the suspect and provide that assessment to the SS prior to consideration of the nomination or proposed long-term disposition by the Depmies Committee. and where feasible. prior to RCSG review. The SS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nominating agency and th e CTC assessment, are included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

2.C Screening After Capture

2.C. I Whenever feasible. initial screening by the United States of suspects taken into U.S. custody should be conducted before the United States captures or otherwise takes custody of the suspect, as set out in Section 2.B.

2.C.2 In the event initial screening cannot be conducted before the United States takes custody of the individual. immediately after capturing or otherwise taking custody of the suspect, appropriate U.S. personnel shall screen the individual to ensure that the correct individual has been taken into custody and that the individual may be lawfully detained. Such screening shall be conducted consistent with the laws and policies applicable to the authorities pursuant to which

the individual is being detained. and

2.C.4 In the event that the suspect is detained pursuant to law of war authorities by the U. military and additional time is needed for purposes of intelligence collection or the development of a long-term disposition option. the Secretary of Defense or his designce, following appropriate intcragcncy consultations coordinated through the NSC process, may approve an extension of the

screening period

subject to the fo llowing:

~ The RCSG shall be chaired by the NSS Senior Director for Counterterrorism and shall include the following departments and agencies: the Department ofState, the Department of the Treasury. DOD. DOJ, the Department of

I lomeland Security (DHS) – .

Cir\. Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS).

and NCTC.

Additional departments and agencies may participate in the RCSG meetings. as appropriate.

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I) The suspect’s detention must be consistent with S. law and policy, as we ll as all applicable international law;

2)

3) The International Commillee of the Red Cross must be notified of. and prov ided timely access Lo. any suspect held by the U.S. military pursuant to law of war authorities; and

4) When po sible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence, intelligence will be collected in a manner that preserves the ava ilability of long-term disposition options. including prosecution.

2.D Deputies Review

2.D. I A nomination or disposition package for capture. custody, or long-term dispos ition forwarded to Lhe Deputies shall include the following:

I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant Lo Section B. l. for the suspect or suspects proposed for capture or long-term disposi tion;

2) Any assessment produced by NCTC pursuant to Section 2.B.5:

3) If appropriate. a description of the planned capture and screening operation and ••••

••••••

operational plan under which the capture would be conducted:

4) The deparLmenL(s) or agency or agencies that wou ld be responsible for carrying out the proposed operation. if nol already conducted:

5) A summary of the legal assessment prepared under ection 2.B.4: and

6) An assessment. including the strengths and weaknesses. of potential long-term disposition options.

2.D.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. the Treasury. DOD, DOJ, OHS. the Office of

the Director ofNational Intelligence (DNI) ••

, CIA, JCS, –

. NCTC. and any other

Deputies or officials a Deputy National Security Advisor (D SA) may invite to pa11icipate. shall promptly consider whether to reco mmend to the Principal of the nominating agency that a capture operation be conducted in the context of the proposed plan at issue, that the United States Government otherwise take custody of the indi vidual, or that a particular long-term dispos ition option be pursued.

2.D.3 When considering a proposed nomination. the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues, and any others deemed appropriate by the Deputies:

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I) Whether the suspect’s capture would further the U.S. CT strategy; 2) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States; 3) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise

any intelligence sources or methods: 4) The proposed plan for the detention and interrogation of the suspect; 5) The proposed plan to capture the suspect. including the feasibility of capture and the risk to

U.S. personnel; 6) In the event that transfer to a third party or country is anticipated, the proposed plan for

obtaining humane treatment assurances from any country; 7) The long-term disposition options for the individual: and

8)

2.D.4 When considering the long-term disposition of a suspect who is already in U.S. custody. or whom a department or agency has already been aUlhorized to capture or take into custody, the Deputies ‘ discussion shall be guided by the following principles:

I) Whenever possible, third-country custody options that are consistent with . national security should be explored:

2) Where transfer to a third country is not feas ible or consistent with U.S. national security interests. the preferred long-term disposition option for suspects captured or otherwise taken into custody by the United States will be prosecution in a civilian court or, where ava ilable, a military commission. Consistent with that preference. wherever poss ible and consistent with the primary objective of collecting intelligence. intelligence will be collected in a manner that allows it to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution: and

3) In no event wi ll additional detainees be brought to the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit the final positions of their Principals within a time frame consistent with operational needs.

2.E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

2.E. I If the nominating agency, on behalf of its Principal. continues to support taking action, a D A shall inform the President of the views expressed by departments and agencies. As appropriate, the nomination shall be presented to the Pres ident for a decision or the nomination will be provided to the Principal of the appropriate operating agency for a decision. along with any views expressed by the President.

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II

2.E.2 An appropriate SS official will communicate in writing the decision taken. including any terms or conditions placed on such decisions. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Comminee review of the nomination.

SECTION 3. Policy Standard and Procedure for Designating Identified HVTs for Lethal Action

3.A Policy Standard for the Use of Lethal Action Against HVTs

Where the use of lethal action against I IVTs has been authorized ••••••••••••

an individual whose identity is known will only be eligible to be targeted. as a policy matter.

COnSiStent \Vi th the requirements Of the approved Operational plan

. if

the individual’s activities pose a con ti nu ing. imm i ncnt threat to U.S. persons.

3.B Necessary Preconditions for Taking Lethal Action

Lethal action requires that the individual may lawfully be targeted under existing authorities and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan. including those set forth in eclion I .C.8, are met. The preconditions ct forth in Section I .C.8 for the use of lethal force are as fo llows: (a) near certainly that an identified HVT is present; (b) near certainty that nonc1o1m1b1a1ta1n1ts1w1

1i111 n?(tdb)e injured or kil k d: (c) . r “bl h . f I . J( )

l ; an assessment L1iat capture 1s not 1eas1 eat t e time o tic operation: e

an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is

contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons: and (f) an

assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist to effectively add ress the

threat to U.S. persons.

3.C lnteragency Review Process

3.C. I Any department or agency participating in the Deputies Committee review in Section 3.D may identify an individual for consideration. but only the operating agencies (also known as the ··nominating agencies .. for purposes of ection 3 of this PPG) may formally propose that an individual be nominated for lethal action following confirmation from the General Counsel of the nominating agency that the individual would be a lawful target.

3.C.2 The nominating agency shall prepare a profile for each individual nominated for lethal action. The profile shall be developed based upon all relevant disseminated information available to the IC. as well as any other information needed co prese nt as comprehensive and thorough a profile of the individual as possible. The profile shall note. where appropriate, gaps

7 Operational disagreements

are to be elevated to

Principals. The President will adjudicate any disagreement among or between Principals. ~ rhis process is designed to review nominations or individuals only where the capture or any individual at issue is not feasible. If. at any point during or after the approval process capture appears feasible. a capture option in

accordance with Section 2 of this PPG (or the relevant operational plan

) should be pursued.

If the individual has already been approved for lethal action when a capture option becomes feasible, the individual should be referred to the 155 Senior Director for Countcrterrorism and undergo an expedited Deputies review focused on idcmifying disposition options.

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in existing intelligence. as well as inconclusive and contradictory intelligence reports. At a minimum, each indi vidual profile shall include a summary of all relevant disseminated intelligence required to determine whether the policy standard set forth in Section 3.A for lethal action aga inst HYTs has been met, and include the following information lo the extent that such information is available:

3.C.3 The shall convene a meeting of the RCSG for the purpose of reviewing and organizing material. and addressing any issues. related to the nomination of an individual for lethal action.

3.C.4 Before forward ing the nom ination of an identified HVT for lethal action to Deputies. the RCSG shall identify other materials needed for Deputies· consideration of the nomination and shall issue such taskings to departments and agencies. as appropriate. For each nomination. the

SS will request. and NCTC shall conduct. an assessment of the nomination and provide that assessment to the NSS prior to consideration of the nomination by the Deputies Committee, and where feasible prior to RCSG review. The NSS will be responsible for ensuring that all necessary materials. including the profile developed by the nom inating agency and the NCTC assessment. arc included in the nomination package submitted to Deputies.

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3.C.5 All nominations for lethal action must undergo a legal review by the General Counsel of the nominating agency to ensure that the action contemplated is lawful and may be conducted in accordance with applicable law. The General Counsel’s conclusions shall be referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all events. the NSS Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall consult with DOJ. The S Legal Adviser and the General Counsel of the nominating agency shall also consult with other interagency lawyers depending on the particular nomination. In addition, in the event that the individual proposed for nomination is a U.S. person, DOJ shall conduct a legal analysis to ensure that lethal action may be conducted against that individual consistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States. The NSS Legal Adviser shall submit the relevant legal conclusions to the SS Senior Director for Counterterrorism for inclusion in the nom ination package to be submiued to Deputies.

3.C.6 If the proposal may be conducted lawfully, the nomination shall be referred to a DNSA. or another appropriate NSS official. to facilitate consideration by the Deputies Committee.

3.D Deputies Review

3.0.1 Upon completion of a nomination package, the NSS shall forward the nomination package to the Deputies Committee for consideration. A standard nomination package to be forwarded to the Deputies shall include, at a minimum, the following:

I) The profile, produced by the nominating agency pursuant to Section C.2, for the individual proposed for lethal action;

2) The assessment produced by CTC pursuant to Section 3.C.4;

3) A description

operational pl an to which the nomination would be

added. including the time frame. if any, in which the operation may be executed:

4) The operating agency or agencies that would be responsible for conducting the proposed lethal action;

5) A summary of the legal assessment: and

6) The determinations made by the nominating agency that capture is not currently feasible and that the relevant governmental authorilics in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons, as well as the underlying analysis for those determinations.

3.0.2 The Deputies of the Department of State. DOD, JCS, DOJ. DI IS. DNI, CIA, and CTC

shall promptly consider whether to recommend to the Principal of the nominating agency that

lethal action be taken against the proposed individual in the context··········

operational plan at issue. –

shall participate in the review process as

observers. A D SA may invite Deputies or other officials to participate as appropriate. Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies. departments and agencies shall submit to the NSS the final positions of their Principals within a timeframe consistent with operational needs.

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3.D.3 When considering each proposed nomination, the Deputies shall evaluate the following issues. and any oLhers deemed appropriate by the DepuLies:

1) WheLher the Deputies can conclude with confidence that che nominated individual qualifies under the policy standard in Section 3.A for lethal action, taking into account credib le information that may cast doubt on such a conclusion;

2) Whether the threat posed by the individual to U.S. persons can be minimized through a response short of lethal action;

3) The implications for the broader regional and international political interests of the United States:

4) Whether the proposed action would interfere with any intelligence collection or compromise any intelligence sources or methods;

5) Whether the individual, if captured, would likely result in the collection of va luable intelligence, notwithstanding an assessment that capture is not currently feasible; and

6)

E Presentation to the President and the Principal of the Nominating Agency

3.E.1 The Principal of the nominating agency may approve lethal action aga inst the proposed ind ividual if: ( 1) the relevant Principals unanimously agree that lethal action should be taken against the proposed individual. and (2) the Principal of the nominating agency has notified the Pres ident through a DNSA of his intention to approve lethal action and has received notice from a DNSA that the President has been apprised of that intention. The Principal of the nominating agency may not delegate his authority Lo approve a nomination.

3.E.2 ominations shall be presented to the President for decision. along with the views expressed by departments and agencies during the process, when: ( 1) the proposed individual is a

U.S. person, or (2) there is a lack of consensus among Principals regarding the nomination, but the Prine ipal of the nominating agency continues to support approving the nomination.

3.E.3 In either case, an appropriate NSS official will communicate in writing che decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approva l. to the Deputies who participated in the Deputies Committee review of the nomination.

3.F Annual Review;·········

3.F. I The NSS, in conjunction with the nominating agency. shall coordinate an annual review of •••I

individuals authorized for possible lethal action to evaluate whether the intelligence

continues to upport a determination that the individuals

qualify for lethal action under

the standard set forth in Section 3.A. The SS shall refer the necessary information for the

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annual review to the Deputies for cous1deration. Following Deputies re\·iew. the iufo1matio11. along with any recollllllendatious from Deputies. shall be forwarded 10 the Principal of the nominating agency for re\·iew. A separnre legal re\·iew will be conducted. as approp1iate. Au appropriate official from each nominating agency sl.iall inform a DNSA of what action. if any. the Principal of the norniuatiug agency takes in response to tlie re\·iew.

3.F.2

The Deputy of any clepcu1meut or agency pa11icipating in the Deputies Committee review

in Scctil)IJ ~.D may propo-,e at any time that an incli\”idunl be

for

lerhal action. 111 the en:>nt that such a propo:,al IS made. ~CTC :,hall updare the re -coordinated profile for the incli\·idual at issue and. as appropriate. the Deputies sball consider whether to propose that the indi\·idual be remo\”ed by lbe Principal of tbe nominating agency.

3.F.3 Following consideration and discussion by the Deputies in accordance with 3.F. l or 3.F.2. depa11ments and agencies sball submit tbe final pos1tio11s of tbeir Principals wirhin an appropriate timeframe detenniued by the NS .

. EC’TIO~ -t Policy Standard and Procedure for Approving Lethal Force Again’it Terrori<;t Targets Other Than Identified HYTs

-L\ Policy Standard for Directing Lethal Force Against Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified HVTs

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4.B ::\ece<.<.ary Precondition for Directing Lethal Force rnder Thi<> ection

Directing lethal force under this Section 1equires that: (I) tbe target may lawfully be taTgeted and that any conditions established in the appropriate operational plan, including those set fo11b in Section l.C.8. are met. The preconditions set fo11b in Sectiou l.C.8 for the use of letbal force are as follows: (a) uear ce11ai11ty tbat a lawful te1rnrist target other than an identified If\.T i:,

p1 esent: (b) ner11 certainty that non-comlrntanh will not be injmed or killed: ( c)

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threat lo U.S. persons: and (I) an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives to lethal action exist lo effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

4.C Nomination and Review of Terrorist Targets Other Than Identified High-Value Individuals

Where an operating agency has been authorized to direct force against terrorist targets (including

•••••

property) other than identified HVTs

may

nominate specific terrorist targets to largel with lethal force consistent with the requirements of

the approved operational plan

. including the process required by the

plan for nom inating and approving such targets.

SECTION 5. Procedures for Approving Proposals that Vary from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in th is PPG

5.A Already Authorized Targets: Variations from Operational Plan Requi rements When Fleeting Opportunities Arise

5.A. I

When direct action has been authorized under this PPG against identified HYTs or against

terrorist targets other than identified HYTs

, the operating agency

responsible for conducting approved operations. as a result of unforeseen circumstances and in the event of a nceting opportunity, may submit an individualized operational plan lo the NSS

that varies from the requirements of the operational plan

. In that event.

an appropriate official shall consult with other departments and agencies. as appropriate and a time permits. before submilling the proposal to the President for his decision.

5.A.2 All such variations from an operational plan must be reviewed by the General Counsel of the operating agency conducting the operation and the conclusions referred to the NSS Legal Adviser. In all cases. any operational plan must contemplate an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, these proposals shall:

I) Identify an international and domestic legal basis for taking action in the relevant country

2) Mandate that lethal action may only be taken if: (a) there is near certainty that the target is present: (b) there is near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; (c) it has been determined that capture is not feas ible; (d) the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U .. persons; and (e) no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.

5.A.3 Any variation from an operational plan shall be presented to the President for decision. and an appropriate NSS official shall communicate the President’s decision, including any terms or conditions placed on any approval, to appropriate agencies.

TOP SECR:ETi’l’40FOR:N 16

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5.B Extraordinary Cases: Variations from the Policy Guidance Otherwise Set Forth in this PPG

Nothing in this PPG shall be construed to prevent the Pres ident from exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, as we ll as his statutory authority, to consider a lawful proposal from operating agencies that he authorize direct action that would fall outside of the policy guidance conta ined herein. including a proposal that he authorize lethal force against an individual who poses a continuing, imminent threat to another country’s persons. In extraordinary cases. such a proposal may be brought forward to the President for consideration as fo llows:

I) A proposal that varies from the policy guidance contained in this PPG may be brought forward by the Principal of one of the operating agencies through the interagency process described in Section 1 of this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in acco rdance with applicable law.

2) Where there is a fleeting opportunity, the Principal of one of the operating agencies may propose to the President that action be taken that would otherw ise vary from the guidance contained in this PPG, after a separate legal review has been undertaken to determine whether action may be taken in accordance with applicable law.

3) In all cases, any proposal brought forward pursuant to this subsection must contemp late an operation that is in full compliance with applicable law.

SECTION 6. Procedures for After Action Reports

6.A The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide the following prel iminary information in writing to the NSS within 48 hours of taking direct action against any authorized target:

1) A description of the operation;

2) A summary of the basis for determining that the operation satisfied the applicable criteria conta ined in the approved operational plan;

3) An assessment of whether the operation achieved its objective;

4) An assessment of the number of combatants killed or wounded;

5) A description of any collateral damage that resulted from the operation;

6) A description of all munitions and assets used as part of the operation; and

7)

li8P SECREli/H8F8R?J 17

TOP SECRETffqQfORN

6.B The department or agency that conducted the operation shall provide subsequent updates LO the SS on the outcome of the operation, as appropriate, including any intelligence collected as a result of the operation. The information prov ided to the NSS under this Section shall be made available lo appropriate officials al the departments and agencies taking part in the review under Sections 1 and 3 of this PPG.

SECTION 7. Congressional Notification

A congressional notification shall be prepared and promptly provided to the appropriate Members of the Congress by the department or agency approved to carry out such actions when:

I) A new operational plan for taking direct action•••••••••••

is approved:

2) Authority is expanded under an operational plan for directing lethal force aga inst lawfully targeted individuals and against lawful terrorist targets other than individuals; or

3) An operation has been conducted pursuant to such approval(s).

In addition, appropriate Members of the Congress will be provided, no less than every 3 months. updates on identified HVTs who have been approved for lethal action under Section 3. Each department or agency required to submit congressional notifications under this Section shall inform the NSS of how it intends to comply with this Section prior to providing any such notifications to Congress.

SECTION 8. General Provisions

8.A This PPG is not intended to. and does not. create any right or benefit. substantive or procedural. enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States. its departments, agencies. or entities, its officers. employees. or agents. or any other person.

8.B

8.C Twelve months after entry into force of this PPG, Principals shall review the implementation and operation of the PPG. including any lessons learned from evaluating the information provided under Section 6. and consider whether any adjustments are warranted.

18

The Mafia, Cosa Nostra was Just Arrested 46

Posted on August 6, 2016August 6, 2016 by Denise Simon

6FBI rounds up nearly 50 mob suspects accused of litany of mafia crimes

The 46 defendants include alleged Philadelphia mob boss Joseph ‘Skinny Joey’ Merlino and New York crime figure Pasquale “Patsy” Parrello

Related reading: United States vs. JOSEPH MERLINO, FRANK GAMBINO, : RALPH ABRUZZI, STEVEN FRANGIPANI, : and ANTHONY ACCARDO criminal complaint

Joseph ‘Skinny Joey’ Merlino pictured in 2014. The alleged head of the Philadelphia mob was named in a federal indictment on Thursday charged with a range of crimes including extortion and fraud. Photograph: Yong Kim/AP

Guardian: Nearly 50 alleged mobsters have been charged by US prosecutors with being part of an east coast crime syndicate.

The 46 suspects include an old-school mafioso in New York and a reputed mob chieftain in Philadelphia who has been pursued by the government for decades.

The indictment, unsealed in New York City, accuses the defendants of a litany of classic mafia crimes, including extortion, loansharking, casino-style gambling, sports gambling, credit card fraud and health care fraud. It said the syndicate operated in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Florida and New Jersey.

Among those charged was Joseph “Skinny Joey” Merlino, the flamboyant alleged head of the Philadelphia mob who has repeatedly beat murder charges in past cases, but served nearly 12 years in prison for racketeering.

Also named in the indictment was Pasquale “Patsy” Parrello, identified as a longtime member of the Genovese organized crime family and the owner of an Italian restaurant in New York City.

There is Video of the $400 Million to Iran

Posted on August 5, 2016August 5, 2016 by Denise Simon

But Trump was telling a fib when he said he saw it…he has not had any intelligence briefings yet and likely will not until the end of August. Meanwhile, the Iranians are going at the United States with all propaganda they can muster. John Kerry and the White House not only look like fools, they ARE fools.

Another question for those investigative journalist: Were the 7 Iranian spies that also included in this transaction on that same plane as the money?

Other facts:

The United States is buying 32 metric tons of Iranian heavy water, a key component for one kind of nuclear reactor, The Associated Press reported.

The purpose of the transaction is to help Iran meet the terms of last year’s nuclear deal under which it agreed to curb its atomic program in exchange for billions of dollars in sanctions relief, according to the news agency.

The State and Energy departments said a sales agreement would be signed Friday in Vienna by officials from the six countries that negotiated the nuclear deal.

The agreement calls for the Energy Department’s Isotope Program to purchase the heavy water from a subsidiary of the UN atomic watchdog, for about $8.6 million, officials said. They added the heavy water will be stored at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and then resold on the commercial market for research purposes. More here.

Another nefarious fact:

In late May, Russian Envoy to International Organizations Vladimir Voronkov said that Russian nuclear agency Rosatom was considering the possibility of buying Iranian heavy water.

“Steps are to be finalized for sale of 40 tons of heavy-water reactor to Russia and the deal will be signed in the very near future,” Salehi said, as quoted by the IRNA news agency.

According to Salehi, deputy head of the organization Behrouz Kamalvandi may in the near future visit Moscow to discuss concluding the issue with the Russian side. There is also an option that a Russian delegation will arrive in Iran, he said.

According to the nuclear deal agreed last year, Iran must store no more than 130 tons of heavy water during the first year after signing the agreement. More here.

*****

The footage, which could not be independently verified, shows images of large stacks of hard currency and features claims that the Obama administration sent this money over as part of an effort to free several U.S. hostages. The White House vehemently denied these claims this week following new reports about the cash exchange.

BBC Persian reporter Hadi Nili posted the footage on Twitter, describing it as showing the “pallets of cash” and quoting officials as saying “this was just part of the ‘expensive price’ to release Americans.” More here from FreeBeacon.

Could Trump have been right? Propaganda film suggests Iran DID videotape cash-drop plane and photograph shipment of cash during January prisoner swap

February documentary that aired on Iranian state-run TV shows nighttime flight, pallet of cash matching prisoner-swap scenario reported this week
Donald Trump claimed three times this week that he had seen similar footage and that Iran had filmed the cash transfer to embarrass America
He walked back that claim Friday morning, saying he had only seen archival footage of a different plane delivering hostages safely to Geneva
He may have been right without knowing it: Propaganda broadcast shows the images and boasts the deal was great for Iran but terrible for the U.S.

DailyMail: Iranian state-run media in Tehran did indeed videotape the arrival of a January 17 flight carrying $400 million in cash from the United States – and the money itself – judging from a documentary that aired the following month in the Islamic republic.

Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has been in a firestorm of controversy since first claiming on Wednesday to have seen ‘secret’ footage of money being offloaded from an aircraft.

He admitted Friday morning on Twitter what his campaign had said more than a day earlier, that he had seen ordinary archival footage of a different plane, carrying American hostages freed from Iran arriving in Geneva Switzerland after the money changed hands.

But it turns out he may have been right without knowing it.

Iranian state television broadcast this image of a shipping pallet stacked with cash in February as part of a propaganda film framing a January U.S. prisoner swap as a victory for Tehran

The documentary described this plane as arriving in the dead of night with the money, exactly the scenario that Donald Trump was criticized for describing three times this week

The Iranian video was aired February 15 on the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting television network, as part of a documentary called ‘Rules of the Game.’

A narrator, speaking in Persian, describes a money-for-hostages transaction over video clips of a plane on an airport tarmac in the dead of night and a photo of a giant shipping pallet stacked with what appear to be banknotes.

The federal government shipped what many are calling a ransom payment in Euros and other non-U.S. currencies.

The copy of the documentary footage DailyMail.com obtained is not of high enough quality to determine which nation’s banknotes are depicted.

None of the footage is stamped with a date or time, making it impossible to know when it was shot.

And the broadcaster blurred out one portion of the screen, covering up something resting on top of the mountain of money.

But the documentary begins with a narration saying: ‘In the early morning hours of January 17, 2016 at Mehrabad Airport, $400 million in cash was transported to Iran on an airplane.’

The film describes the Obama administration’s prisoner swap and Iran’s cash windfall from Tehran’s point of view as ‘a win-lose deal that benefits the Islamic Republic of Iran and hurts the United States,’ according to two English-language translations DailyMail.com obtained.

Trump fell on his sword Friday on Twitter, conceding that he was describing a different plan when he said there was footage of the cash drop – an assertion that turned out to be right

It outlines what Iran’s mullahs promoted at the time as a one-sided transaction loaded with perks for Tehran.

‘The Islamic republic made an expensive offer to the equation: the release of seven Iranian prisoners in the United States, $1.7 billion, and the lifting of sanctions against 16 Iranians who were prosecuted by the U.S. legal system with the unjust excuse of sanctions violations,’ the narrator intones.

‘But this was not all the Iranians’ demands. Lifting sanctions against Sepah Bank was added to Iran’s list. All of this, in return for the release of only four American citizens: a win-lose deal that benefits the Islamic Republic of Iran and hurts the United States.’

Among the four freed Americans were Washington Post journalist Jason Rezaian, pastor Saeed Abedini and U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati.

The Trump campaign did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The White House was quick to insist on Thursday that the Obama administration had not paid for their release.

‘Let me be clear: The United States does not pay ransom, White House press secretary Josh Earnest said, questioning the motives of Republican who were ‘falsely accusing us of paying a ransom.

The propaganda film was shown a month after the January prisoner release in Iran but was unknown in the West until Friday. It described the swap as ‘a win-lose deal that benefits the Islamic Republic of Iran and hurts the United States’

Refugee Resettlement Agency Courtesy of Clinton/Obama Appointees

Posted on August 4, 2016August 4, 2016 by Denise Simon

Revolving Door Sends Millions to Refugee Resettlement Agency Run by Former Clinton and Obama Appointees

A revolving door in the Democratic administrations of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama has sent millions of dollars in federal funding to the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants [USCRI], which is led by two former directors of the Office of Refugee Resettlement [ORR], the federal office that selects the voluntary agencies [VOLAGs] who get lucrative federal contracts to resettle refugees.

Breitbart: President Bill Clinton appointed Lavinia Limon as director of ORR in 1993, a position she held until the end of his administration. After a brief interlude at the Center for New American Communities, a project of the left-leaning National Immigration Forum, Limon was named executive director of USCRI in August 2001, a position she still holds.

In 2009, President Barack Obama appointed Eskinder Negash, an Eritrean refugee on Limon’s USCRI staff, as director of ORR. When Negash resigned abruptly in December 2014, he went back to USCRI, where he now serves as Vice President of Global Development.

Revenues at USCRI, his once and future employer, increased significantly while Negash served as director of the ORR. In FY 2006, USCRI revenues were $19 million. By 2015, they had grown to $50 million, more than 90 percent of which came from “government grants.”

ORR’s budget grew from $492 million in FY 2006 to $1.5 billion in 2014.

During his tenure at ORR, Negash’s performance was spotty at best, particularly with regards to his failure to provide Congress with the statutorily required annual reports in a timely manner. As Ann Corcoran wrote at Refugee Resettlement Watch back in 2012, three years after Negash’s arrival:

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), is in complete disarray as regards its legally mandated requirement to report to Congress every year on how refugees are doing and where the millions of tax dollars are going that run the program. The last (and most recent) annual report to be sent to Congress is the 2008 report—so they are out of compliance for fiscal years 2009, 2010 and 2011. . . (The lack of reports for recent years signals either bureaucratic incompetence and disregard for the law, or, causes one to wonder if there is something ORR is hiding.)

To replace Negash as director of ORR, Obama selected another VOLAG executive, Bob Carey, Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the International Rescue Committee and “chair of Refugee Council USA, a coalition of NGOs working on issues affecting refugees, asylum seekers, displaced persons, victims of trafficking and victims of torture,” the Resettlement Industry’s Lobbying Group.

The twenty members of Refugee Council USA include all of the top VOLAGs whose main source of revenue comes from ORR grants, including Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, Episcopal Migration Ministries, Ethiopian Community Development Council, HIAS, International Catholic Migration Commission, International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops/Migration & Refugee Services, U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, and World Relief.

Now the same lobbying group that Carey once chaired, Refugees Council USA, recently announced it wants to more than double the number of refugees allowed in to the United States in 2017—to 200,000, from approximately 70,000 in FY 2015 and an Obama administration “targeted level” of 85,000 in FY 2016, with much of the increase driven by the hasty push to admit 10,000 Syrian refugees this year.

The budget impact of such an increase would be enormous, possibly doubling ORR expenditures from $1.5 billion in FY 2014 to $3 billion or more in FY 2017.

The International Rescue Committee, whose CEO is the former United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Miliband, had worldwide revenues in 2015 of $691 million, a $138 million increase from its $563 million revenues in 2014.

Most of that revenue (82 percent in 2015—or $572 million) came from “grants and contracts,” most from governments and related agencies around the world, including the federal government of the United States.

In contrast to the Bill Clinton and Barack Obama administrations, George W. Bush’s two appointed directors of ORR, Nguyen Van Nah and Martha E. Newton, did not participate in the revolving door back to lucrative employment at the VOLAGs they oversaw after they left ORR.

Van Nah, director from 2001 to 2006, became a professor of economics at Sacramento State University in California when he left ORR.

Newton, who succeeded Van Nah, went from ORR to become a consultant at her own firm, Health Strategies LLC.

Democratic appointees Limon, Negash, and Carey have worked tirelessly to expand both the budget of ORR and the party’s far-left, pro-refugee agenda.

It was during Limon’s tenure that the “Wilson Fish alternative program”was used as justification, without the corresponding statutory authority, to hire VOLAGS to operate resettlement programs in states that withdrew from the federal program. The enabling legislation made no mention of such a provision, but Limon and her colleagues pushed it through the HHS regulatory process without much public fanfare.

Currently, several USCRI operations–in Twin Falls, Idaho and Lowell, Massachusetts, for instance–are funded by ORR through this statutorily questionable Wilson Fish alternative program mechanism.

It was also during Limon’s tenure at ORR that the mix of nations of origin for refugees shifted dramatically.

In 1992, the year before Limon was named ORR director, the Near East Asia countries of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, and the African countries of Angola, Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia,Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda —many of them majority Muslim—accounted for only nine percent of all resettled refugees.

But by 2001, Limon’s last year at the helm of ORR, these African and and Near East Asia countries accounted for 46 percent of all resettled refugees.

Operationally, USCRI has had its share of problems under Limon’s leadership.

In 2008, before Negash was named ORR director, USCRI’s Waterbury, Connecticut field office had its resettlement contract there canceled:

The State Department has canceled its contract with the agency responsible for resettling 64 Burmese refugees to Waterbury. In response, Connecticut’s congressional delegation has sent a letter of protest to the state department, asking it to give the International Institute of Connecticut more time to settle its problems.

This follows months of reports of poor housing, fractious relationships with volunteers, missed immunizations for students and insufficient assistance with daily tasks. The State Department brought the refugees here to escape the tyranny in their native Myanmar.

“I’ve heard of agencies being under investigation and there being a threat of canceling a contract, but this is the first time I’ve known about a particular case being canceled,” said Stephanie J. Nawyn, a sociologist at Michigan State University who studies resettlement. “I do think this is unusual.”

In Lowell, Massachusetts last month, a 13-year-old girl was allegedly sexually harassed by a recently arrived Syrian refugee:

A 22-year-old Syrian refugee is behind bars after only two months in the United States after he was accused Thursday night of inappropriately touching a 13-year-old girl at a state-run swimming pool in Lowell.

In Twin Falls, Idaho, USCRI’s local subcontractor, the College of Southern Idaho, is dealing with a national controversy involving three refugees and the sexual assault of a five-year-old girl.

Chobani Yogurt, the company that owns and operates the largest yogurt manufacturing facility in the world in Twin Falls, thanks in part to $54 million in federal and state grants, relies heavily on refugees brought in by USCRI and the College of Southern Idaho as employees. In 2015, CNN reported that 600 of the company’s 2,000 employees are refugees.

Even the far-left Michelle Goldberg, reporting at Slate, concedes, “There had been an incident involving three boys, ages 7, 10, and 14, and a mentally disabled 5-year-old girl [in Twin Falls].”

[Twin Falls county prosecutor Grant] Loebs described it to me as a “very serious felony.” On June 2, an 89-year-old neighbor discovered the children in the laundry room at the Fawnbrook Apartments, a low-income housing complex. The youngest boy is from Iraq while the older ones, brothers, are from an Eritrean family that passed through Sudanese refugee camps. (Most news reports have identified the older boys as Sudanese.) Only the youngest boy, Loebs said, is alleged to have touched the girl, though investigators suspect the 10-year-old might have as well; the elder boys reportedly made a video.

Because everyone involved in the case is a minor, the records were sealed. Nevertheless, on the evening of June 20, Twin Falls Police Chief Craig Kingsbury appeared at the weekly City Council meeting to update the anxious public as best he could. He announced that police had arrested the two older boys the previous Friday and that they were being held in juvenile detention. (Loebs later told me that the 7-year-old was also charged with a felony but wasn’t taken into custody because of his age.)

Despite these operational problems, Limon’s hold on the reins of USCRI appears to be secure.

Her job security, as well as her status within the politically powerful refugee resettlement industry, is undoubtedly enhanced by her ties with the Clinton and Obama administrations, which run long and deep.

In 2015, Limon attended an event sponsored by the Clinton Global Initiative, where she served on the same panel as Hamdi Ulukaya, the founder and CEO of Chobani Yogurt.

Limon appears to have done well from her life time career advancing refugee rights.

A 1972 graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, with a degree in sociology, Limon served as director of the International Institute of Los Angeles prior to being picked by Bill Clinton to head up the ORR in 1993.

In 2012, the last year for which such data is readily available, Limon received over $289,000 in compensation for her job as executive director of USCRI.

Peter Limon, who appears to be Limon’s brother, is also employed by USCRI as director of Business Development.

$400M is but One Payment to Iran, from a 1996 Legal Case

Posted on August 3, 2016August 3, 2016 by Denise Simon

It is not ransom, it is not ransom…okay…well let’s go further shall we?

Justice Department Officials Raised Objections on U.S. Cash Payment to Iran

Some officials worried about message being sent, but were overruled, WSJ

Then, Obama violated his own Executive Order as noted here and dated February 5, 2012.

Why did we convert to cash in various currencies and not just wire the money into designated Iranian banks? Well the excuse is sanctions. And Iran demanded cash such that later purchases or transactions could not be monitored, so John Kerry was cool with that. The result was smuggling $400 million on pallets on an unmarked cargo plane that landed in the middle of the night. Smuggling?

What is bulk cash smuggling?

Bulk Cash Smuggling is a reporting offense under the Bank Secrecy Act, and is part of the United States Code (U.S.C.). The code stipulates:

Whoever, with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement, knowingly conceals more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary instruments on the person of such individual or in any conveyance, article of luggage, merchandise, or other container, and transports or transfers or attempts to transport or transfer such currency or monetary instruments from a place within the United States to a place outside of the United States, or from a place outside the United States to a place within the United States, shall be guilty of a currency smuggling offense.

What authorities govern bulk cash smuggling offenses?

Title 31 U.S.C. § 5332 (Bulk Cash Smuggling) makes it a crime to smuggle or attempt to smuggle more than $10,000 in currency or monetary instruments into or out of the United States, with the specific intent to evade the U.S. currency reporting requirements codified in Title 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 and 5317.

ICE HSI relies on other financial authorities granted under Title 31 U.S.C. (Money and Finance), specifically those related to violations of reporting requirements and structuring financial transactions, as well as criminal authorities, such as Title 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (Unlicensed Money Transporter/Transmitter), Title 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Money Laundering). These authorities allow ICE HSI to disrupt and dismantle criminal networks that move bulk cash, wherever they may operate.

What are monetary instruments?

Monetary instruments are financial instruments that can be used similarly to cash. Specifically, monetary instruments are defined on the second or reverse side of the FinCEN Form 105:

Coin or currency of the United States or of any other country.
Traveler’s checks in any form.
Negotiable instruments (including checks, promissory notes, and money orders) in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.
Incomplete instruments (including checks, promissory notes, and money orders) that are signed but on which the name of the payee has been omitted.
Securities or stock in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.

Monetary instruments do not include the following:

Checks or money orders made payable to the order of a named person which have not been endorsed or which bear restrictive endorsements.
Warehouse receipts
Bills of lading. More here.

****

Remember the plane was delayed for reasons no one was willing to declare but then John Kerry blamed it on a glitch with the passenger list.

There had been expectations that they would leave on Saturday, while the final round of talks on sanctions were taking place. But the Swiss plane carrying Jason Rezaian, the Washington Post’s Tehran bureau chief, Saeed Abedini, a pastor from Idaho and Amir Hekmati, a former Marine from Flint, Michigan as well as some of their family members did not leave until Sunday morning.

It had been reported when the plane took off that Nosratollah Khosravi-Roodsari, about whom little is known, was on board. But a senior U.S. official later said he was not traveling with the other released prisoners. More here.

It is also important to remember as Iran released 4 prisoners, the United States released 7. It is also important to remember that Obama had to issue a pardon for those 7 to be released.

Iran’s official state news agency, IRNA, named the Iranians set for release as Nader Modanlou, Bahram Mechanic, Khosrow Afghahi, Arash Ghahraman, Tooraj Faridi, Nima Golestaneh and Ali Saboonchi. Mechanic’s lawyer told Reuters that Mechanic, Faridi and Afghahi had been pardoned, but Mechanic and Faridi had not yet been freed from custody as their release was contingent on the four American prisoners leaving Iran. The U.S. government has yet to confirm the identities of the Iranians to be freed. All seven have the option of staying in the U.S. rather than returning to Iran. The U.S. State Department also dropped an international request to detain 14 Iranians on trade violations on Saturday, saying the extradition requests were unlikely to be successful. More here.

Okay, so with all of that, what about the rest of the money allegedly owed to Iran?

Well it seems someone needs to look at the lawsuit in clear detail as it was not filed until 1996. The U.S. response to the lawsuit is here in .pdf.

On August 12, 1996, the Islamic Republic of Iran filed aStatement of Claim (Doc . 1) in a new interpretive dispute againstthe United States, Case No . A/30, alleging that the United Stateshas violated its commitments under the Algiers Accords byinterfering in Iran’s internal affairs and implementing economicsanctions against Iran.

The Government of Iran, which has a long record of using terrorism and lethal force as an instrument of state policy, isseeking a ruling from the Tribunal that the United States hasviolated the Algiers Accords by intervening in Iran’s internalaffairs and enacting economic sanctions against it . Iran assertsthat the United States has violated two obligations under theAlgiers Accords : the pledge in Paragraph 1 of the GeneralDeclaration that it is and will be the policy of the UnitedStates not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs, and therequirement in Paragraph 10 of the General Declaration to revokeall trade sanctions imposed in response to Iran’s seizing the

U.S . Embassy and taking 52 American hostages on November 4, 1979.

To hear the State Department spokesperson, Admiral Kirby (ret), John Kerry and the White House spokesperson Josh Earnest tell it, the U.S. was about to be rendered a decision by The Hague that we lost the case. Really when it began over kidnapping, hostages and terrorism? C’mon….