The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda

Posted on January 13, 2016January 13, 2016 by Denise Simon

The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda: The War within the Jihadist Movement

WotR: The post-Arab Spring period has seen extraordinary growth in the global jihadist movement. In addition to the Islamic State seizing a vast swathe of territory spanning Syria and Iraq and al-Qaeda establishing itself as a potent military force in the Syrian civil war, instability and unfulfilled expectations in numerous countries — including Egypt, Libya, Mali, Tunisia, and Yemen — have presented jihadists with unprecedented opportunities.

But even as the jihadist movement experiences rapid growth, it has also endured unprecedented internal turmoil. The Islamic State’s emergence marks the first time that leadership over the global jihadist movement has been seriously contested. Since that group’s expulsion from the al-Qaeda network in February 2014, a fierce competition between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has defined the militant landscape. The United States has an opportunity to exploit and aggravate fissures within the jihadist community, but to do so successfully, it is essential to understand the differences in the modus operandi of these two rival jihadist groups.

Two Models of Revolutionary Warfare

Though al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share the same ultimate goal — establishing a global caliphate ruled by an austere version of sharia (Islamic law) — each group maintains a distinct approach to revolutionary warfare. Al-Qaeda has come to favor covert expansion, unacknowledged affiliates, and a relatively quiet organizational strategy designed to carefully build a larger base of support before engaging in open warfare with its foes. By contrast, the Islamic State believes that the time for a broader military confrontation has already arrived, and has loudly disseminated its propaganda to rally as many soldiers as possible to its cause. The group combines shocking violence with an effective propaganda apparatus in an effort to quickly build its base of support.

The Maoist and focoist schools of revolutionary thought provide a useful framework for understanding these groups’ differing strategies. Al-Qaeda exhibits a revolutionary strategy that is both implicitly and explicitly based on the works of Mao Tse-tung, while the Islamic State’s approach is more consonant with the focoist writings of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Régis Debray.

Interestingly, in 2010 Kenneth Payne published an article in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism arguing that al-Qaeda’s strategy was focoist in nature, based on a review of the group’s strategic literature and operations. Though al-Qaeda has exhibited both Maoist and focoist strands of thought, the fact that Payne’s argument was published in 2010 is significant: He wrote just on the cusp of the “Arab Spring” revolutions, which, as this article details, provided al-Qaeda the opportunity to make its Maoist-style turn that focused on the population more apparent. Ryan Evans’s argument, which was published in the CTC Sentinel the same year as Payne’s piece, has held up better over time. Evans discerned a shift in strategy between the efforts of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the later campaign of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and argued that AQAP’s more population-centric approach was forged by the group’s failures in Iraq. He noted that the shift in strategy in Yemen may herald “a larger turn for al-Qaeda globally toward a more Maoist attitude.”

Mao’s theory of revolution is rooted in the primacy of politics over warfare. In Mao’s view, a steadfast political foundation is necessary to allow guerrilla forces to create bases for logistics and operations and slowly build strength and momentum for the final conventional stage of warfare. Thus, according to Mao, before guerilla forces can initiate military action, they must first focus on “arousing and organizing the people,” and “achieving internal unification politically.” This stage is followed seamlessly by a stage of progressive expansion, followed by a third and final stage of decision — the destruction of the enemy.

Maoist revolutionaries continue to emphasize the political stage of organization and consolidation even as they pursue progressive expansion. Consistent with Maoist theory, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have focused on maintaining and expanding the group’s political support. Even in areas where al-Qaeda has engaged in open warfare, it has been somewhat restrained in its approach to civilian populations since the initiation of AQAP’s campaign in 2009 that Ryan Evans noted was a departure from the group’s Iraq model of insurgency. Thereafter, the group has adopted a phased implementation of its hardline version of sharia where it enjoys control or significant influence. The only one of al-Qaeda’s branches that explicitly did not fit this new model was AQI, which later was expelled from al-Qaeda’s network and adopted the new moniker of the Islamic State. (Al-Qaeda’s approach toward civilian populations can only be considered “restrained” in very relative terms, juxtaposed with the more oppressive and publicly violent tactics of the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda’s own previous approach.) Al-Qaeda’s adherence to a largely Maoist framework was shaped by its experience of being hunted by the United States and its allies for a decade and a half, and — as Evans argued — particularly by the defeat of its Iraqi affiliate. Al-Qaeda’s use of Maoist strategy is designed to be low-risk and to yield long-term results.

The focoist approach to revolutionary war contrasts sharply with the Maoist approach. First used successfully in Cuba in the early 1950s, focoism holds that the political foundation necessary for revolution can be crafted through violence. Guevara essentially flipped Mao’s theory by arguing that the use of violence against the state would inspire the peasants to rise up. Unlike Mao’s strategy, focoism accepts great risks in order to inspire support. The Islamic State has in many ways followed the focoist model; it believes in the power of violence to forge the political opinions of the Muslim masses. The Islamic State views al-Qaeda’s more deliberate approach as too slow. It appears happy to win today and lose tomorrow, as long as today’s win creates a large enough subject for propaganda.

This framework of Maoist versus focoist models of revolutionary warfare should not be seen as a complete explanation for either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State’s behavior. Neither group is perfectly Maoist or focoist, but using these models provides a useful paradigm for interpreting the strategic competition between the groups.

Al-Qaeda’s Population-Centric Approach

Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of two major opportunities driven by the unsuccessful revolution in Syria and the successful revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The first opportunity is that the regional upheaval created a growth environment for jihadism, and al-Qaeda has established a significant presence in places where it had previously been suppressed. The second opportunity is that as al-Qaeda expanded into new areas, it perceived an opening to repair its global image that had been badly damaged by AQI. Al-Qaeda has implemented a population-centric approach to increase its base of popular support by employing gradualism and cooperation with local actors. Al-Qaeda has also made use of popular front groups in its expansion. This is intended to reduce the organization’s exposure to counterinsurgent forces, including the United States and the Middle East’s Sunni regimes, and to avoid frightening or alienating local populations.

Popular support has become essential to al-Qaeda. While the group once conceptualized itself as exclusively a vanguard movement, it has come to view itself in recent years as a popular movement that needs the support or acquiescence of the populace. This transformation had begun prior to the Arab Spring. In 2005, then al-Qaeda deputy emir Ayman al-Zawahiri explained in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s reckless emir, that “the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy … is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it.” As previously noted, AQAP’s approach in its first year of operations reflected this paradigm. But the transformation of al-Qaeda into a more broad-based movement was supercharged by the Arab Spring, which provided a critical opening for jihadism.

In the wake of those revolutions, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership pushed hard to regain the trust and support of local populations and avoid the mistakes that marred AQI’s Iraq campaign. In an undated letter that al-Qaeda’s masul aqalim (head of regions) Atiyah Abd al-Rahman wrote to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s emir, he noted that “the people’s support to the mujahedin is as important as the water for fish,” referencing Mao’s famous adage that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” Wuhayshi in turn transmitted a similar message to the leadership of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, illustrating al-Qaeda’s coordinated efforts.

The most significant example of these changes came in September 2013, when Zawahiri, who became al-Qaeda’s emir following Osama bin Laden’s death in May 2011, released a document entitled “General Guidelines for Jihad” that made public al-Qaeda’s new population-centric approach. Zawahiri instructed affiliates to avoid conflict with Middle Eastern governments when possible, asserting that conflict with local regimes would distract from efforts to build bases of support. Zawahiri also instructed affiliates to minimize violent conflict with Shia and non-Muslim populations, and to abstain from attacks that could result in Muslim civilian casualties. Consonant with these changes to al-Qaeda’s operations, the organization has also launched a “rebranding” campaign (a subject we have addressed previously at War on the Rocks) designed to present the group as a more reasonable — and perhaps controllable — alternative to the Islamic State, and as a potential bulwark against Iranian encroachment.

Al-Qaeda’s strategy of covert expansion — its use of front groups and its embrace of a relatively low-key public profile — is another critical element in the group’s post-Arab Spring approach. In a letter recovered from his Abbottabad compound, bin Laden explained the rationale for preferring a low profile. He noted that when a branch’s affiliation with al-Qaeda “becomes declared and out in the open,” the group’s enemies escalate their attacks on it.

Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Tunisia exemplified its early post-Arab Spring strategy. Its expansion was spearheaded by a front organization called Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). Several high-profile salafi jihadists who had been released from prison when the regime of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown established the group. AST initially focused its resources on dawa (evangelism) by organizing dawa events, holding public protests, and dominating physical spaces near places of worship. AST also provided services, including food, clothing, and medical care, to impoverished communities, and developed a social media apparatus to publicize its dawa activities.

AST’s emphasis on dawa was characteristic of al-Qaeda’s early post-Arab Spring strategy. The group’s ideologues understood that they would have unprecedented opportunities to disseminate salafi jihadist ideology to the public. While the old dictators placed strict restrictions on religious expression, strategists foresaw fewer restrictions in post-autocratic environments. This strategic logic was expressed by Atiyah, who in February 2011 exhorted jihadists in post-revolutionary states to “spring into action and initiate or increase their preaching, education, reformation and revitalization in light of the freedom and opportunities now available in this post revolution era.”

As AST’s dawa gained traction, the group also began to engage in hisba violence targeting those who violated salafist religious norms. AST was initially methodical in its use of violence, striking targets such as prostitutes and establishments that served alcohol — which would be widely considered acceptable by those inclined toward religious fundamentalism. Moreover, AST refrained from claiming responsibility for these hisba attacks, creating the perception that this violence was organic to the Tunisian people. Through this approach, AST ensured that its use of violence did not cross a line that would provoke a government crackdown.

As it became more entrenched, AST eventually embraced jihadist violence, first facilitating Tunisians’ travel to foreign battlefields like Syria, Libya and Mali before eventually turning its guns against the Tunisian state. AST members were implicated in the 2013 assassinations of secularist politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohammed Brahmi. Less than a week after Brahmi’s July 2013 death, a jihadist ambush in Jebel el-Chaambi killed eight Tunisian soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit. These bloody incidents constituted a point of no return, and in August 2013 the government designated AST a terrorist organization and cracked down on the group.

It is not clear that AST’s leadership wanted the group’s violence to escalate so quickly. Indeed, it seems the group had not progressed far enough through Mao’s stages of revolutionary warfare by July 2013 to justify the initiation of open warfare. AST gave its local branches considerable autonomy, which may have contributed to violence escalating faster than the leadership wanted or anticipated. Despite this, al-Qaeda’s blueprint for Tunisia nonetheless demonstrates how its plans for the post-Arab Spring environment followed Maoist insurgent principles.

The Islamic State’s Bold, Boisterous Growth Model

The Islamic State’s strategy for supplanting al-Qaeda centers on two techniques. First, the group sought to portray al-Qaeda’s slower and more deliberate strategy as weakness and indecisiveness. Second, the Islamic State appealed to al-Qaeda’s affiliates by emphasizing its momentum and expansion with the aim of poaching groups, members, and potential recruits. In essence, the Islamic State’s approach is the opposite of al-Qaeda’s: While al-Qaeda has sought to minimize the amount of attention it receives in order to reduce its exposure to counterinsurgents, the Islamic State constantly seeks the spotlight, and touts its victories (real or invented) at every opportunity. The Islamic State is trying to transform al-Qaeda’s strategic methods into weaknesses.

One way the Islamic State has tried to distinguish itself from al-Qaeda is its approach to governance, particularly its implementation of sharia. The Islamic State’s ability to impose governance where it enjoys military power is essential to the caliphate’s legitimacy. Following its capture of territory in Iraq and Syria, the organization quickly set up governance structures and showcased its efforts to provide social services to local populations. Rather than building public support prior to fully enforcing its austere version of sharia, the Islamic State quickly implemented hudud punishments (sharia-prescribed corporal punishment). As such, coercive violence is a major component of the Islamic State’s governance. The organization has thrown people suspected of being gay off of roofs, beheaded those it deems traitors or apostates, cut off the hands of thieves, and stoned to death women accused of adultery.

By contrast, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have chosen a slower, more methodical imposition of sharia. The group’s guidelines emphasize a somewhat pragmatic approach aimed at winning over the population. Al-Qaeda leaders have instructed affiliates to tailor the implementation of sharia to local conditions, taking into consideration local customs and religious practices, and to implement sharia flexibly in its initial phases, forgiving minor transgressions during that period. Al-Qaeda’s gradualist approach has been on display in Syria, where its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has repealed bans on cigarette smoking, and has made public displays of punishing fighters who unjustly harm local residents. This approach should not be mistaken for moderation on Nusra’s part — there are compelling reports of the group’s continuing extremism, especially in its treatment of religious minorities — but Nusra has done a masterful job of concealing its atrocities and maintaining its local image as a populist entity.

Al-Qaeda’s population-centric approach has been a major target of derision for the Islamic State, which accuses al-Qaeda of abandoning true Islamic principles by giving “preference to popularity and rationalization.”

Overt and Covert Expansion

Military strategy is another area where the Islamic State and al-Qaeda differ. The Islamic State employs an aggressive approach to territorial conquest. The group’s willingness to employ force-on-force warfare enabled it to take major territory quickly: Overall, this tactic has borne fruit for the organization, but has also increased the Islamic State’s rate of attrition. As the Islamic State has experienced military setbacks, it has moved toward greater use of irregular warfare, a strategic shift that illustrates the group’s capacity for adaptation.

The Islamic State’s hybrid warfare strategy does not necessarily distinguish it from al-Qaeda, which has employed similar tactics in some theaters. What makes the Islamic State unique is the way it showcases its military operations, using virtually all of them as propaganda pieces. While one function of the Islamic State’s military actions is to showcase the group’s strength, al-Qaeda has systematically sought to conceal the size of its network and downplay its capabilities. The group has masked its involvement in emerging theatres of conflict and established covert relationships with unacknowledged affiliate organizations like AST.

Consequently, many analysts underestimate al-Qaeda’s strength, and counterinsurgent forces have allowed al-Qaeda front groups to thrive in some theaters. Concealing affiliates’ relationships with al-Qaeda allows these groups to gain public support and attract resources from individuals and entities that might otherwise be wary of assisting an overt al-Qaeda entity.

Al-Qaeda’s military approach and preference for more covert activities is shaped by its patient worldview. Ostentatious, tactical victories that expose the network to attack and undermine its long-term prospects are of little value to the organization from a strategic perspective. In an article published in al-Qaeda’s online magazine Resurgence, jihadist strategist Abu Ubaydah al-Maqdisi explained the rationale behind this policy of restraint:

A guerilla force may possess the capacity of inflicting huge blows on the enemy, but it may be better for it to restrain from doing so in situations when the reaction of the enemy may be overwhelming.

Essentially, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership wants the organization to slowly develop its capabilities and resources in preparation for a longer campaign. At the same time, al-Qaeda leadership instructs its affiliates to begin destabilizing state regimes. This two-pronged strategy of enhancing its capabilities and destabilizing enemy regimes positions al-Qaeda to capitalize on state weakness and collapse in the long term.

A New Jihadist Era

The Islamic State’s rise has reshaped the global jihadist landscape, which for nearly two decades was dominated by al-Qaeda. With the Islamic State seizing the world’s attention, the age of unipolarity within the jihadist movement is over, replaced by intense internal conflict. Each group is firm in the belief that its organizational model is superior to that of its opponent.

The transnational jihadist movement is likely to be shaped in the coming years by this competition. It is essential that the United States understand the two groups’ strategies and pay close attention as their approaches continue to evolve. The United States has tremendous opportunities to exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. But if we fail to understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses, and strategic and tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of competition stronger than before.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a consulting firm that focuses on violent non-state actors. Nathaniel Barr is the research manager at Valens Global, where Bridget Moreng is an analyst. This article was adapted from their report (co-authored with War on the Rocks senior editor Jason Fritz) Islamic State vs. Al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict, which was published by the New America Foundation in December 2015.

RapeFugee Operation Coordinated on Social Media

Posted on January 13, 2016January 13, 2016 by Denise Simon

It is a game and it has a name: ‘Taharrush gamea’

German Justice Minister: Cologne attacks planned in advance

Minister of Justice Heiko Maas has said he believes the sexual assaults in Cologne were ‘coordinated and prepared’ ahead of time. He also accused xenophobic groups of using the crimes to stir up hatred.

DW: Germany’s Justice Minister Heiko Maas was the latest high-profile politician to speak out about the string of sexual assaults in Cologne on Sunday. In an interview with the popular “Bild am Sonntag” newspaper, Maas voiced his suspicions that the crimes which have the whole country reeling were not the result of an opportunistic mob mentality but a thought-out, planned attack on the city’s women.

“No one can tell me that it wasn’t coordinated and prepared,” the minister said. “My suspicion is that this specific date was picked, and a certain number of people expected. This would again add another dimension [to the crimes].”

The newspaper provided details from official police reports citing the use of social networks by some north African migrant communities to encourage their fellows to join them in the square between the Cologne train station and the cathedral, where the now hundreds of incidents of molestation and pick-pocketing took place.

Maas was careful to echo his colleagues, however, when it came to warning the public against placing blame on the country’s immigrants, saying “to assume from somebody’s origin whether or not they are delinquent is quite reckless.” The minister added that it is “complete nonsense” to take these crimes as evidence that foreigners cannot be integrated into German society.

Maas lashes out at PEGIDA, AfD

In the interview, Maas also accused the far-right populists of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, along with the organizers of the xenophobic PEGIDA marches, of using Cologne for propaganda purposes.

“There is the only way they can explain how shamelessly they operate their sweeping campaign against foreigners,” Maas said, referring to Saturday’s PEGIDA demonstration at the Cologne train station, which was itself met with a flashmob of counter-protesters condemning racism and sexism.

All that being said, Maas added that “cultural background justifies or excuses nothing. There is no acceptable explanation [for the assaults]. For us, men and women have equal rights in all matters. Everyone who lives here must accept that.”

In the coming days, Maas’ Social Democrats (SPD) are expected to join coalition partners, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s (CDU) in presenting new laws to the Bundestag that would expedite the deportation of asylum seekers and migrants who commit crimes . The administration has received a hefty amount of criticism for ill-preparedness when dealing with the open-door policy it has adopted towards Europe’s migrant crisis.

Istanbul Suicide Bomber Entered Country as Syrian Refugee, Officials Say

Bomber identified as Nabil Fadli was fingerprinted, but information didn’t set off security alerts

WSJ: ISTANBUL—The Islamic State suicide bomber who killed 10 German tourists in the heart of Istanbul entered the country as a Syrian refugee without setting off security alerts, Turkish officials said Wednesday, highlighting concerns that extremists are using the migrant crisis to move around and carry out terrorist attacks.

Just to our North, comes 10,000 Syrian refugees in Canada.

Canada welcomes 10,000th Syrian refugee

Ottawa (AFP) – Canada has welcomed its 10,000th Syrian refugee, the government announced Wednesday, although almost two weeks behind schedule and far fewer than it had originally planned to resettle by now.

A planeload landed in Toronto late Tuesday, putting the number of arrivals of asylum seekers at 10,121 since November when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberals took office.

In a statement, Immigration Minister John McCallum called it a “significant milestone” on the way to meeting the Liberal’s overall pledge to take in 25,000 Syrians.

“Many people have worked day and night to bring these refugees to Canada,” he said, “and Canadians have opened their communities and their hearts to welcome them.

“Canada continues to set an international example with its response to the worst refugee crisis of our time.”

Trudeau had promised during an election campaign last year to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees by December 31.

But after assuming power the target date was pushed to the end of February, following criticism that the government was moving too fast amid security concerns in the aftermath of deadly attacks in Paris, as well as due to logistical issues.

A new interim target of taking in 10,000 by December 31 was set, but only 6,000 Syrians travelling from camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey made it onto Canadian soil by year’s end.

The UN refugee agency estimates that more than four million Syrians have fled the civil war ravaging their country. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights puts the total number of dead at more than 260,000 people.

No Rules of Engagement Leads to U.S. Humiliation by IRGC

Posted on January 13, 2016January 13, 2016 by Denise Simon

Never fire unless fired upon, not even warning shots. It is alleged that 2 U.S. Navy ‘riverines’ had strayed into Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. Exactly how do 2 boats ‘drift’ when those waters are in fact well known to all U.S. naval vessels? Don’t believe the story…. The United States is humiliated by Iran and John Kerry says thank you. Additional statements from VP Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Ash Carter.

In part from NYT’s: The waters in question are a frequent site of intelligence collection by the United States, Iran and many gulf countries. The American and Iranian Navies frequently encounter each other there.

The detention and release of the sailors comes at a particularly delicate moment in the tense American-Iranian relationship, just days before a nuclear deal is to be formally put in place, and under which the United States is to unfreeze about $100 billion in Iranian assets.

That step is to be made after international nuclear inspectors verify that Iran has shipped 98 percent of its nuclear fuel out of the country, has disabled and removed centrifuges, and has taken a large plutonium reactor permanently offline.

Riverines are valued at $3.0 million each and are fast boats complete with very advanced communications gear and guns including .50 cal weapons.

At 12:30 PM, EST, word came into the Pentagon that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which reports directly to the Iranian mullahs had arrested 10 U.S. sailors near Farsi Island, a small island of several in the Persian Gulf. Farsi island is exclusively an IRGC base and is surrounded by mines in the water and gunboats. Drifting is the excuse but hardly likely while there were other naval vessels in those exact waters. The ten sailors were 9 males and 1 female. The female sailor was forced to cover her head.

Negotiation began as soon as the Pentagon was notified and further contacted the State Department Secretary, John Kerry and the White House situation room. The official statement was Iran was cooperating and the sailors were being treated with mercy.

In part from FreeBeacon: Iran asserts the sailors were released after the United States apologized, prompting a flurry of denials from senior Obama administration officials.

Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, said that Tehran had missiles locked on the United States at the time of the incident.

“They were in sight of our missiles,” Fadavi said in Persian, according to a statement carried by the IRGC’s official news outlet. “If this had happened, it would have led to their annihilation.

“We had high preparedness with coast-to-sea missiles, rocket-firing fast boats, and various capabilities,” he said. “We prevented their additional irresponsible movement with the statements we broadcasted internationally. It was proven to them that the IRGC Navy has the first and final word.”

The U.S. cannot stand up to Iran, according to Fadavi.

It appears our sailors were stripped of all communications gear as were the boats as the IRGC said the USS Truman, a carrier strike group was not behaving so a hostile arrest was made. John Kerry groveled, likely pledged other promises, offered profound apologies. Humiliating.

Embedded image permalink

Much more perspective from Michael Rubin:

Iran seizing sailors and the rogue delusion

AEI: There’s a common delusion out there that when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fires off ballistic missiles or kidnaps sailors it’s either hardline elements trying to embarrass moderates, or rogue actors. It may be a comforting conceit to believe that any element of the Iranian government is on “our side” but evidence suggests that at best, the Islamic Republic is playing a game of good cop-bad cop, and that outrages such as taking American sailors hostage are welcome, not rogue actions.

A riverine command boat operates during a maritime air support operations center exercise in the Arabia Gulf in this June 12, 2012 handout photo, provided by the U.S. Navy, January 12, 2016. U.S. Navy/Handout via Reuters .

Let’s put aside the fact that Article 110 of the Iranian constitution (backed by practice and the statue of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) makes the Supreme Leader the “supreme commander of the armed forces” with the power to appoint and dismiss the chief of the general staff, IRGC commanders, and the commanders of the army, navy, and air force. In other words, if Supreme Leader wanted to make heads roll in response to such provocations, he could.

There’s a history here of Western diplomats excusing bad Iranian behavior out of a desire to exculpate “reformers” or to dismiss provocations as the action of rogues.

In 1989, for example, there was the Ghassemlou assassination, when Iranian officials — meeting an Iranian Kurdish leader and his aides to negotiate an end to strife between Iranian Kurds and the central government — ended up assassinating the Kurdish team at an apartment in downtown Vienna.

Then, in 1992, after the German foreign minister announced a policy to re-integrate Iran into the global community and increase trade, the Iranian government responded by assassinating another Kurdish delegation at a restaurant in Berlin.

In 1994, an Iranian terrorist team blew up the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.

Beginning in 2003, the IRGC (despite the promises of then UN ambassador and now Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif) began infiltrating Iraq and equipping militias to murder American soldiers.

And, finally, in 2007, there was the case of British sailors seized by the IRGC.

In each case, Western diplomats sought to deny Iranian government responsibility. What they did not realize until later was that in each case, the gunman or chief planner ended up with a promotion. Mohammad Jaafari Sahraroudi, for example, the man behind Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou’s murder, subsequently became a brigadier-general in the Qods Force and was placed in charge of its intelligence directorate. Ahmad Vahidi, the mastermind of the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, became President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s defense minister. Hassan Kazemi Qomi, a Qods Force operating serving as ‘ambassador’ to Iraq later won promotion to the Supreme Leader’s office, and Col. Amangah, the commander of the operation that seized the British sailors, later was decorated as soldier of the year. Promotions are hardly the punishment one would expect if the Iranian behavior really was not blessed, encouraged, and supported from the very top.

It’s time to stop deluding ourselves, and to judge Iran by what its actions are rather than what we would wish them to be.

Saudi Arabia Reveals Iran Spy Ring and JPOA

Posted on January 12, 2016January 12, 2016 by Denise Simon

Saudi Cites Iran Spy Ring

ABU DHABI [MENL] — Saudi Arabia, amid a propaganda war, has reported an Iranian espionage presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom.

Officials said authorities have launched prosecution of four Iranians on charges of espionage. They said at least one of the defendants was accused of working for Iranian intelligence and recruited Saudi nationals.

This marked the second alleged Iranian spy cell dismantled in Saudi Arabia over the last year. Officials said a fifth Iranian was also accused of being part of the cell and linked to attacks in the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom since 2003.

Officials said the fifth Iranian, sentenced to 13 years, was convicted of recruiting Saudis in Iran and sending them to fight in Afghanistan. The Iranian, who was not identified, was also charged with relaying funds for recruitment.

The Iranian espionage cell, reported in the Saudi-controlled media, was disclosed amid the crisis with Teheran fueled by Riyad’s execution of a leading Shi’ite cleric. The Saudi leadership has responded to Iranian condemnations by releasing information on Teheran’s executions of hundreds of dissidents over the last two years.

The Saudi media said the latest Iranian espionage cell stemmed from the arrival of an Iranian intelligence officer to the annual pilgrimage in the Saudi city of Mecca. The media said the cell, detected as early as 2014, also planned attacks but did not elaborate.

Riyad was said to have dismantled a previous Iranian cell in 2013. The Saudi media said the cell consisted of at least 27 alleged members, 24 of them Saudis and the rest nationals from Iran, Lebanon and Turkey.

Officials said Iran has sought to infiltrate Saudi Arabia from both the northern and southern border. On Jan. 8, the Saudi military battled hundreds of Iranian-backed Houthi fighters from neighboring Yemen, 35 of them were killed in the Raboua region.

“We are looking at additional measures to be taken if it [Iran] continues with its current policies,” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said on Jan. 9.

Meanwhile, there is little in the news about the JOPA, the P5+1 Iranian nuclear deal and there are good reasons…..lifting sanctions.

The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement

Congressional testimony by Mark Dubowitz

(1) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) major design flaws, which provide Iran with patient paths to nuclear weapons and greater ballistic missile, heavy weaponry, and economic capabilities;

(2) The interplay between the P5+1 economic sanctions “snapback” and Iran’s “nuclear snapback” in limiting the ability of the United States to impose sanctions (a) to address Iranian non-compliance with the JCPOA and, (b) to punish Iranian illicit conduct in a range of non-nuclear activities such as support for terrorism; and,

(3) How sanctions relief under the JCPOA benefits the most hardline elements in Iran including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

First, on so-called “Implementation Day,” Iran will receive substantial sanctions relief with which it can defend its economy against future sanctions pressure. Iran may also use sanctions relief to increase its support for terrorism and other rogue regimes and to expand its conventional military power. The JCPOA front-loads sanctions relief, providing Iran with access to around $100 billion in restricted oil revenues and reconnecting Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, back into the global financial system. Sanctions on Iran’s crude oil export transactions will be lifted, as will sanctions on key sectors of the Iranian economy including upstream energy investment and energy-related technology transfers, the auto industry, petrochemicals, and shipping, as well as the precious metals trade. This sanctions relief will enable Iran to build greater economic resilience against future pressure—both sanctions aimed at isolating other illicit financial conduct and so-called “snapback” sanctions in the event of Iranian nuclear non-compliance.

Then, after five years, or earlier if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaches a broader conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes, the international arms embargo will be lifted, meaning that Iran can also expand its conventional military capabilities and those of its proxies. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, one of the other witnesses at this hearing, noted one week before the announcement of the JCPOA that lifting the arms embargo “would be a great mistake. Iran is selling arms, giving arms, fueling civil wars in Yemen, in Lebanon, in Syria and Iraq, and so those arms prohibitions on Iran are very important.”1 He also has explained that the arms embargo was put in place “for very good reason.” He continued that it is not in the interest of the United States “to see these arms embargos lifted from Iran. It is an issue that should not be part of these negotiations. … I think we ought to maintain these U.N. embargos.”2 In five years, however, they will disappear, giving Iran access to combat aircraft, attack helicopters, battle tanks, among other advanced weapons systems. Read the full testimony here.

Secret Companies with Secret Objectives Near You

Posted on January 12, 2016January 12, 2016 by Denise Simon

Is the nation’s largest online retailer part of a spy network? Have you given thought to the countless databases, harvesting data, human behavior, and all the interactions you have through the internet? Is Amazon now part of a larger incubation center for the federal government? You decide.

Amazon network

Why Amazon’s Data Centers Are Hidden in US Spy Country

DefenseOne: Of all the places where Amazon operates data centers, northern Virginia is one of the most significant, in part because it’s where AWS first set up shop in 2006. It seemed appropriate that this vision quest to see The Cloud across America which began at the ostensible birthplace of the Internet should end at the place that’s often to blame when large parts of the U.S. Internet dies.

Northern Virginia is a pretty convenient place to start a cloud-services business: for reasons we’ll get into later, it’s a central region for Internet backbone. For the notoriously economical and utilitarian Amazon, this meant that it could quickly set up shop with minimal overhead in the area, leasing or buying older data centers rather than building new ones from scratch.

The ease with which AWS was able to get off the ground by leasing colocation space in northern Virginia in 2006 is the same reason that US-East is the most fragile molecule of the AWS cloud: it’s old, and it’s running on old equipment in old buildings.

Or, that’s what one might conclude from spending a day driving around looking for and at these data centers. When I contacted AWS to ask specific questions about the data-center region, how they ended up there, and the process of deciding between building data centers from scratch versus leasing existing ones, they declined to comment.

The fact that northern Virginia is home to major intelligence operations and to major nodes of network infrastructure isn’t exactly a sign of government conspiracy so much as a confluence of histories (best documented by Paul Ceruzzi in his criminally under-read history Internet Alley: High Technology In Tysons Corner, 1945-2005). To explain why a region surrounded mostly by farmland and a scattering of American Civil War monuments is a central point of Internet infrastructure, we have to go back to where a lot of significant moments in Internet history take place: the Cold War.

Postwar suburbanization and the expansion of transportation networks are occasionally overlooked, but weirdly crucial facets of the military-industrial complex. While suburbs were largely marketed to the public via barely concealed racism and the appeal of manicured “natural” landscapes, suburban sprawl’s dispersal of populations also meant increased likelihood of survival in the case of nuclear attack. Highways both facilitated suburbs and supported the movement of ground troops across the continental United States, should they need to defend it (lest we forget that the legislation that funded much of the U.S. highway system was called the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956).

Unlike Google and Facebook, AWS doesn’t aggressively brand or call attention to their data centers. They absolutely don’t give tours, and their website offers only rough approximations of the locations of their data centers, which are divided into “regions.” Within a region lies at minimum two “availability zones” and within the availability zones there are a handful of data centers.

I knew I wasn’t going to be able to find the entirety of AWS’ northern Virginia footprint, but I could probably find bits and pieces of it. My itinerary was a slightly haphazard one, based on looking for anything tied to Vadata, Inc., Amazon’s subsidiary company for all things data-center-oriented.

Facebook data-center

Google’s web crawlers don’t particularly care about AWS’ preference of staying below the radar, and searching for Vadata, Inc. sometimes pulls up addresses that probably first appeared on some deeply buried municipal paperwork and were added to Google Maps by a robot. It’s also not too hard to go straight to those original municipal documents with addresses and other cool information, like fines from utility companies and documentation of tax arrangements made specifically for AWS. (Pro tip for the rookie data-center mapper: if you’re looking for the data centers of other major companies, Foursquare check-ins are also a surprisingly rich resource). My weird hack research methods returned a handful of Vadata addresses scattered throughout the area: Ashburn, Sterling, Haymarket, Manassas, Chantilly. Much more of the report is here.

Amazon’s Cloud center

CNBC: Palantir is notorious for its secrecy, and for good reason. Its software allows customers to make sense of massive amounts of sensitive data to enable fraud detection, data security, rapid health care delivery and catastrophe response.

Government agencies are big buyers of the technology. The FBI, CIA, Department of Defense and IRS have all been customers. Between 30 and 50 percent of Palantir’s business is tied to the public sector, according to people familiar with its finances. In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture arm, was an early investor.

Annual revenue topped $1.5 billion in 2015, sources say, meaning Palantir is bigger than top publicly traded cloud software companies like Workday and ServiceNow. It has about 1,800 employees and is growing headcount 30 percent annually, said the sources, who asked not to be named because the numbers are private.

Palantir serves up free meals for employees at 542 High Street, home to its cafeteria. A red sign reading “Private Company Meal” is attached to the window, and a neon blue sign on the inside says “Hobbit House.”

Other perks, according to people with knowledge of the company’s policies, include subsidized housing for employees who live in the neighborhood and help with monthly commuter Caltrain passes for those traveling down from San Francisco or up from San Jose. Employees who drive in get complimentary parking permits.

“They’re making a commitment here,” said Cannon.

“The idea is that it’s physically locked down and there’s no way you can take information out.” -Avivah Litan, Gartner analyst

For Palantir to stay, it has no choice but to spread out. Only one building in downtown Palo Alto even tops 100,000 square feet, and last year city officials limited total annual development in the commercial districts to 50,000 square feet.

There’s another benefit to having a disparate campus. In doing highly classified work for government agencies, some contracts require the use of particular types of units called Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs.

Avivah Litan, a cybersecurity analyst with Gartner, says qualities of a SCIF building include advanced biometrics for security, walls that are impenetrable by radio waves and heavily protected storage of both physical items and digital data.

“They have to make the walls so that no signals can be transmitted out of those walls,” said Litan, who is based in Washington, D.C. “The idea is that it’s physically locked down and there’s no way you can take information out.”

Having entirely separate facilities makes it easier to clear that hurdle, but even so, the vast majority of Palantir’s offices aren’t SCIFs. Read the full summary here.