No Rules of Engagement Leads to U.S. Humiliation by IRGC

Never fire unless fired upon, not even warning shots. It is alleged that 2 U.S. Navy ‘riverines’ had strayed into Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. Exactly how do 2 boats ‘drift’ when those waters are in fact well known to all U.S. naval vessels? Don’t believe the story…. The United States is humiliated by Iran and John Kerry says thank you. Additional statements from VP Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Ash Carter.

In part from NYT’s: The waters in question are a frequent site of intelligence collection by the United States, Iran and many gulf countries. The American and Iranian Navies frequently encounter each other there.

The detention and release of the sailors comes at a particularly delicate moment in the tense American-Iranian relationship, just days before a nuclear deal is to be formally put in place, and under which the United States is to unfreeze about $100 billion in Iranian assets.

That step is to be made after international nuclear inspectors verify that Iran has shipped 98 percent of its nuclear fuel out of the country, has disabled and removed centrifuges, and has taken a large plutonium reactor permanently offline.

Riverines are valued at $3.0 million each and are fast boats complete with very advanced communications gear and guns including .50 cal weapons.

At 12:30 PM, EST, word came into the Pentagon that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which reports directly to the Iranian mullahs had arrested 10 U.S. sailors near Farsi Island, a small island of several in the Persian Gulf. Farsi island is exclusively an IRGC base and is surrounded by mines in the water and gunboats. Drifting is the excuse but hardly likely while there were other naval vessels in those exact waters. The ten sailors were 9 males and 1 female. The female sailor was forced to cover her head.

Negotiation began as soon as the Pentagon was notified and further contacted the State Department Secretary, John Kerry and the White House situation room. The official statement was Iran was cooperating and the sailors were being treated with mercy.

In part from FreeBeacon: Iran asserts the sailors were released after the United States apologized, prompting a flurry of denials from senior Obama administration officials.

Ali Fadavi, commander of the IRGC Navy, said that Tehran had missiles locked on the United States at the time of the incident.

“They were in sight of our missiles,” Fadavi said in Persian, according to a statement carried by the IRGC’s official news outlet. “If this had happened, it would have led to their annihilation.

“We had high preparedness with coast-to-sea missiles, rocket-firing fast boats, and various capabilities,” he said. “We prevented their additional irresponsible movement with the statements we broadcasted internationally. It was proven to them that the IRGC Navy has the first and final word.”

The U.S. cannot stand up to Iran, according to Fadavi.

It appears our sailors were stripped of all communications gear as were the boats as the IRGC said the USS Truman, a carrier strike group was not behaving so a hostile arrest was made. John Kerry groveled, likely pledged other promises, offered profound apologies. Humiliating.

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Much more perspective from Michael Rubin:

AEI: There’s a common delusion out there that when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fires off ballistic missiles or kidnaps sailors it’s either hardline elements trying to embarrass moderates, or rogue actors. It may be a comforting conceit to believe that any element of the Iranian government is on “our side” but evidence suggests that at best, the Islamic Republic is playing a game of good cop-bad cop, and that outrages such as taking American sailors hostage are welcome, not rogue actions.

A riverine command boat operates during a maritime air support operations center exercise in the Arabia Gulf in this June 12, 2012 handout photo, provided by the U.S. Navy, January 12, 2016. U.S. Navy/Handout via Reuters .

A riverine command boat operates during a maritime air support operations center exercise in the Arabia Gulf in this June 12, 2012 handout photo, provided by the U.S. Navy, January 12, 2016. U.S. Navy/Handout via Reuters .

Let’s put aside the fact that Article 110 of the Iranian constitution (backed by practice and the statue of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) makes the Supreme Leader the “supreme commander of the armed forces” with the power to appoint and dismiss the chief of the general staff, IRGC commanders, and the commanders of the army, navy, and air force. In other words, if Supreme Leader wanted to make heads roll in response to such provocations, he could.

There’s a history here of Western diplomats excusing bad Iranian behavior out of a desire to exculpate “reformers” or to dismiss provocations as the action of rogues.

  • In 1989, for example, there was the Ghassemlou assassination, when Iranian officials — meeting an Iranian Kurdish leader and his aides to negotiate an end to strife between Iranian Kurds and the central government — ended up assassinating the Kurdish team at an apartment in downtown Vienna.
  • Then, in 1992, after the German foreign minister announced a policy to re-integrate Iran into the global community and increase trade, the Iranian government responded by assassinating another Kurdish delegation at a restaurant in Berlin.
  • In 1994, an Iranian terrorist team blew up the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.
  • Beginning in 2003, the IRGC (despite the promises of then UN ambassador and now Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif) began infiltrating Iraq and equipping militias to murder American soldiers.

In each case, Western diplomats sought to deny Iranian government responsibility. What they did not realize until later was that in each case, the gunman or chief planner ended up with a promotion. Mohammad Jaafari Sahraroudi, for example, the man behind Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou’s murder, subsequently became a brigadier-general in the Qods Force and was placed in charge of its intelligence directorate. Ahmad Vahidi, the mastermind of the 1994 Buenos Aires bombing, became President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s defense minister. Hassan Kazemi Qomi, a Qods Force operating serving as ‘ambassador’ to Iraq later won promotion to the Supreme Leader’s office, and Col. Amangah, the commander of the operation that seized the British sailors, later was decorated as soldier of the year. Promotions are hardly the punishment one would expect if the Iranian behavior really was not blessed, encouraged, and supported from the very top.

It’s time to stop deluding ourselves, and to judge Iran by what its actions are rather than what we would wish them to be.

 

ODNI Chief Clapper, Hacked Again

Teen Who Hacked CIA Email Is Back to Prank US Spy Chief

Motherboard: One of the “teenage hackers” who broke into the CIA director’s AOL email account last year hasn’t given up targeting government intelligence officials. His latest victim is the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Motherboard has learned.

A group of hackers calling themselves “Crackas With Attitude” or CWA made headlines in October, hacking into CIA Director John Brennan’s email account and apparently getting access to several online tools and portals used by US law enforcement agencies.The hackers’ exploits prompted the FBI to issue an alert warning government officials of their attacks.

One of the group’s hackers, who’s known as “Cracka,” contacted me on Monday, claiming to have broken into a series of accounts connected to Clapper, including his home telephone and internet, his personal email, and his wife’s Yahoo email. While in control of Clapper’s Verizon FiOS account, Cracka claimed to have changed the settings so that every call to his house number would get forwarded to the Free Palestine Movement. When they gained notoriety last year, Cracka and CWA claimed their actions were all in support of the Palestine cause.

“I’m pretty sure they don’t even know they’ve been hacked,” Cracka told me in an online chat.

But Brian Hale, a spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, confirmed the hack to Motherboard on Tuesday.

“We’re aware of the matter and we reported it to the appropriate authorities,” Hale said, declining to answer any other questions on the record. (The FBI declined to comment.)

Cracka, or whoever is pretending to be him, taunted authorities on Twitter (the hacker used a new Twitter account, not the same one he used at the time of the Brennan hack. But the hacker also is in control of a chat app account who’s been using to communicate with me since last October).
Cracka provided me with what he claimed to be Clapper’s home number. When I called it on Monday evening, I got an answer from Paul Larudee, the co-founder of the Free Palestine Movement. Larudee told me that he had been getting calls for Clapper for the last hour, after an anonymous caller told him that he had set Clapper’s number to forward calls to him. Larudee said that one of the callers said he was sitting in Clapper’s house next to his wife.

According to public records, the phone number does belong to James Clapper’s household. Cracka also provided another number, a cellphone, which he said belonged to either Clapper or Clapper’s wife, Susan. When I called, a woman picked up and I asked if this was Susan Clapper. The woman responded that Susan wasn’t there, but that she’d tell her to call me back. But nobody ever did.

Cracka also claimed to have gotten into Susan’s Yahoo email account, as well as Clapper’s email account. He provided a series of screenshots to prove he had control of their Verizon FiOS account, as well as Susan’s Yahoo account. Motherboard couldn’t independently verify the authenticity of the screenshots.

The hacker also sent me a list of call logs to Clapper’s home number. In the log, there was a number listed as belonging to Vonna Heaton, an executive at Ball Aerospace and a former senior executive at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. When I called that number, the woman who picked up identified as Vonna Heaton. When I told her who I was, she declined to answer any questions.

“A journalist? Oh my gosh” she said, laughing uncomfortably. “I have somebody on the line, I’m sorry, I have no insight into that. But that’s really unfortunate, have a great day.”

“I just wanted the gov to know people aren’t fucking around, people know what they’re doing and people don’t agree #FreePalestine.”
Michael Adams, an information security expert who served more than two decades in the US Special Operations Command, said that this looks “more of a social engineering hack than a real hack,” but also added that “every serious hack starts with social engineering.”

Adams also said that it’s “insane” that Clapper doesn’t do more to hide his home address and phone number (both can be found with a Google search).

“If I’m the Director of National Intelligence of the United States of America nobody is going to know where the fuck I live, nobody is going to have my goddamn phone number or address,” Adams told me in a phone interview.

On Tuesday, Cracka asked me not to name him in the article, saying he “doesn’t like the attention.”

“You Asked why I did it,” he added. “I just wanted the gov to know people aren’t fucking around, people know what they’re doing and people don’t agree #FreePalestine.”

 

Russia Invading NATO Air Space, Rising

NATO interception of Russian planes in Baltics rise

Lithuania says Russian incursions into the airspace of countries in the Baltics has increased 14 percent.

VILNIUS, Lithuania, Jan. 11 (UPI) — NATO fighters scrambled 160 times last year to intercept Russian aircraft violating the airspace of alliance members in the Baltics, which used to be part of the Soviet Union.

The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense said the number of interceptions in 2015 were a 14 percent rise from the previous year.

“The number of times jets were scrambled last year was up on the 140 occasions in 2014,” the ministry said. “Russian military aircraft activity over the Baltic Sea has significantly increased since 2014 amid a heightening of tensions between Moscow and Western countries over Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.”

NATO’s Baltic members — Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia — have no air forces of their own. Other NATO countries fill the defense vacuum by sending aircraft in rotating four-month deployments to the region. Aircraft from Spain and Belgium take up station in the Baltics this week, relieving those from Hungary and Germany.

NATO in 2016

WASHINGTON — As European countries scramble to buy new next-generation air and missile defense systems or upgrade existing systems, the battle for business between Raytheon and Lockheed is set to continue into 2016, even in countries where key decisions appear to have already been made.

Both Germany and Poland made major decisions this year to procure new missile defense systems. Germany chose Lockheed Martin and MBDA Deutschland to build its new system while Poland chose Raytheon’s Patriot.

But no signatures have been scrawled on a finalized contract in either case, and both companies are closely watching for any opening that could help them get back in the running.

Both Germany and Poland are expected to finalize contracts for a system in 2016 while it’s anticipated other countries will determine what they can afford to buy or develop alone, which will guide what type of role Raytheon or Lockheed could play in future procurement across NATO.

Patriot already has a robust international community with 13 international partners, but many of these countries are looking for upgrade opportunities or a newer replacement. Raytheon’s answer to that is its next-generation Patriot with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Gallium-Nitride (GaN) radar and an open command-and-control architecture.

Lockheed has built a Medium Extended Air Defense System with a 360-degree threat-detection capability that has gone through a challenging dual-intercept test in 2013 and is said to be about 85 percent fully developed.

The year ahead will carve a more defined path for NATO countries looking to upgrade or replace air and missile defense systems. Here’s a look at the state of play in several countries that are close to making critical procurement decisions in a missile defense market projected to be worth more than $100 billion in the next 15 years:

Poland

Poland announced this past spring that it chose Raytheon’s Patriot system for its new air and missile defense program called Wisla. The plan was to buy two Patriot systems in the current configuration, followed by next-generation systems that include the AESA GaN radar and an open architecture that would allow a variety of interceptors to plug into the system. The two initial Patriot systems would then be retrofitted with next-generation capabilities.

Poland and the US government began negotiations to purchase the first two Patriot batteries, expecting to sign a contract within a year.

Yet officials close to the project and outside experts were quick to note that Raytheon should not declare victory just yet.

Poland has expedited its missile system purchase due to escalating tensions in Russia. The country changed its requirements during the Wisla competition, declaring it could only consider already fielded systems. Originally, Poland considered MEADS, Israel’s David’s Sling and a French consortium’s offering. MEADS and David’s Sling were taken out of the running because they are still in development.

Also due to Poland’s need to procure something quickly, the country decided not to just wait for a next-generation system, but to buy something that could be deployed by 2019.

Poland would then buy two more batteries with the capabilities it wanted including a radar capable of seeing threats from 360 degrees and an open command-and-control system, which would be fielded by 2022. Four more systems would be procured by 2025 and the original systems would be upgraded.

But even back in the spring, Poland hinted that it would consider capabilities for its next-generation system outside of Patriot. Col. Adam Duda of Poland’s Armaments Inspectorate acknowledged the US is making changes to its own air and missile defense system, which includes a new command-and-control system built by Northrop Grumman – the Integrated Battle Command System – that Poland might explore in the future.

Such a comment gave new hope for earlier contenders like Lockheed that were hoping to be reconsidered.

Then there was a big election this year in Poland that upended major defense procurement decisions made by the former government. Poland’s new conservative government last month called into question the previous liberal cabinet’s choice of US-made Patriot missiles – an estimated €5 billion (US $5.5 billion) deal.

New Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz said during a November parliamentary defense commission meeting that the conditions of the potential contract to buy US missiles “have changed a lot since the public announcement.”

Macierewicz said he wasn’t happy with the price and “in no way makes it possible, even with the farthest-reaching promises, not confirmed by any documents or any international obligations, for such a defense before the years 2023 to 2030.

“The price is much higher, the delivery time much longer … in short, this contract is practically non-existent,” he said.

The new government will, at the very least, study the previous government’s decisions, sources close to the situation say. What that will amount to remains to be seen.

Several sources in Poland have theorized that the new government blasting the Patriot deal is a ploy to get Raytheon and the US government to drop the price and that no other systems are actually being considered.

Michal Jach, chairman of the Polish parliament’s defense committee, said in a Dec. 22 report in Polska Zbrojna, “It appears that with [the Americans’] back to the wall they are capable of putting forward a more favorable offer compared to the one presented so far. Let me recall that the first offer did not even meet operational requirements. Today it is difficult to say if we announce a new bid. It all depends on what Patriot’s manufacturer will propose to us.”

Others close to the issue believe Poland could ultimately decide to wind back the clock and re-examine the four systems, open an entirely new competition or model an indigenous development off of the US Army’s nascent plan to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense System (AIAMD).

A visit to Washington by representatives of Poland’s defense minister scheduled before Christmas is expected to be crucial, Marek Swierczynski, an analyst for Poland’s Polityka Insight, wrote in a recent report.

Deputy ministers in Poland have also suggested that the country pursue next-stage weapon projects like electromagnetic and laser weaponry and abandon Wisla, Swierczynski reports.

The country is also focused on developing a short-range air defense system it is calling Narew through a competitive process and may choose to prioritize that over Wisla, sources say. Lockheed Martin’s MEADS technology is in the running for the Narew competition.

The new year will determine whether Raytheon is able to sell Patriot to Poland and whether that sale will go beyond just the first two systems.

Also up for reconsideration is the old government’s plan to buy 50 Airbus helicopters worth €3 billion (US $3.3 billion). Macierewicz said he hoped US manufacturer Sikorsky and British-Italian group AgustaWestland – Airbus’ competitors for the chopper deal – would take part in any potential new tender.

And because Connecticut-based Sikorsky is now a Lockheed Martin company, Lockheed now has a chance to establish a larger footprint both in missile defense and in the helicopter business in Poland.

Germany

The fate of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) hung in the balance for more than a year before Germany announced in June it had decided to continue developing the system with Lockheed and MBDA Deutschland.

The decision was crucial for MEADS’ survival after the US government decided not procure it after co-developing the system with Germany and Italy. The US had planned to replace Patriot with MEADS. The missile defense system was essentially orphaned while Germany weighed all its options following the system’s proof-of-concept phase that culminated in a successful 2013 test.

But while Germany works toward signing a contract with Lockheed and MBDA to continue work on what it is calling the TLVS program, Raytheon and Lockheed continue to grapple for business.

Patriot is already in the German inventory and Raytheon continues to seek ways for the system to remain. Raytheon’s Vice President John Baird has said that if, at any point, MEADS doesn’t meet certain technological or schedule criteria over the next few years then the German government could discuss modernizing the Patriot systems it already has – perhaps with a next-generation system like Poland. The expectation is that Patriot will be around in Germany until 2030, while the country waits to bring MEADS online.

But according to Lockheed’s MEADS director, Marty Coyne, the system is 85 percent developed and the system will be ready for delivery four to five years after a contract is signed.

What’s left to do is integrate a German interceptor – the IRIS-T – and complete logistics planning, training materials and software qualification. The MEADS program will also need to ensure its battle manager network node can integrate with Germany’s Airbus-made Surface-to-Air Missile Operations Center (SAMOC).

Coyne recently told Defense News that he doesn’t see any of the upcoming work as a “risky endeavor.” The work “just needs to be done, the technical risk is behind us,” he said.

Even so, some question why a system supposedly 85 percent complete would need four to five years to be finished. The contract timeline will flesh out to something more concrete in 2016.

Germany’s call for tender for the TLVS program was expected in September but was not released until later this year. According to Coyne, Lockheed and MBDA are laser-focused on delivering a proposal by the spring. The expectation is still to sign a contract in fall 2016, meaning the program will stay on schedule despite the late release of the call for tender.

According to media reports in Germany earlier this month, Katrin Suder, the state secretary responsible for arms procurement, said MEADS is moving forward and the reason for the delayed tender was a careful legal assessment that included successfully driving down a tax risk of €600 million to €700 million, which has now been reduced to a less than €100 million.

And a spokesperson for the Bundestag’s Defence Committee added that the US and Germany reached an agreement to get complete transfer of data and software, and that the IRIS-T integration will be complete by the end of 2016.

But there is still some risk associated with the TLVS program, according to a letter outlining questions and answers posed from parliament to the Ministry of Defence printed in a September issue of the trade publication Griephan Briefe. The letter signed by Markus Grubel, the Ministry of Defence’s parliamentary state secretary, and addressed to Wolfgang Hellmich, the chairman of the Defence Committee, states much of the MEADS development data risk is already reduced significantly.

Grubel notes however that further risks are covered by the restrictions and termination criteria set by the inspector general of the Bundeswehr. “Sensor technology, communication tools, the competence of the contractor, target and threat databanks, as well as the amount of the import turnover tax are in the focus,” he writes, according to a translation.

The letter also lists a number of risks that if not reduced could lead to withdrawal from the contract, such as “technical feasibility of the Exciter built in the multifunction radar, availability of the long-range sensor, availability of the medium-range sensor, commencement regarding the feasibility of the short-range radio communication system” and “operability of the target and threat databank.”

The letter also outlines the cost of the TLVS development program through 2023 which amounts to a total of €963 million (US $1 billion). The procurement portion of the program will cost €3 billion (US $3.3 billion) starting in 2019 and continuing through 2027.

Turkey

Turkey sent shockwaves through the US and European missile defense communities when it picked a Chinese air and missile defense system not interoperable with NATO systems.

China Precision Machinery Import Export Corp. defeated a US partnership of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, offering Patriot; Russia’s Rosoboronexport, marketing the S-300; and Italian-French consortium Eurosam, maker of the Aster 30.

Then Turkey slowly walked back that decision over nearly two years amid complaints from other NATO countries that a Chinese system could not work within a NATO missile defense network. Turkey kept the lines open with both Eurosam and Raytheon as it mulled its options.

Turkey finally decided to scrap the $3.4 billion air and missile defense program called LORAMIDS last month. Now Turkey is looking to develop a system internally. Most likely, work will be given to two state-controlled companies, Turkey’s biggest defense firm military electronics specialist Aselsan and the missile maker Roketsan.

Lockheed, Raytheon and Eurosam are likely to look for ways into Turkey’s development program. Relationships with the US companies and Turkish companies already exist.

Lockheed and Roketsan, for instance, minted a contract in September to co-develop the SOM-J missile intended for integration into the US Air Force and Navy versions of the F-35 fighter jet.

Raytheon said in a recent statement that “as Team USA we remain prepared to collaborate and engage with the Turkish industry and the Turkish government to help ensure that our NATO partner is able to achieve their program objectives.”

According to Lockheed’s Coyne, “Turkey is actually similar to Poland in many respects. They seek a modern capability for a good price and on a reasonable timeline to counter an obvious threat posed by ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats that can attack from all directions. Like Poland, they also want their very capable defense industry to play a significant role in the development and production of this system, which is obviously understandable. This is the MEADS model.”

Coyne said that for Lockheed, Turkey and Poland would be a major focal point in 2016.

For several years Turkey has had to rely on other countries to loan air-and-missile defense systems to secure its border with Syria. The US, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany have all bolstered Turkey’s missile defense by loaning Patriot systems. However, the Netherlands, the US and Germany have all withdrawn their aging Patriot batteries out of Turkey in 2015, citing the need to upgrade them. Germany withdrew its systems in December.

Spain plans to keep its Patriots in Turkey and Italy may send its SAMP/T middle defense batteries to bolster Turkey’s border security as well.

Turkey has said it will likely need to purchase a bridge-gap solution to deal with the current threat while it builds its own system.

“The natural contenders in the new race will be the same US and European groups,” according to an industry source. “Delivery timetables will be crucial since Turkey consider this as an urgent buy.”

The US consortium commits to deliver the Patriot system within 40 months and the European group commits to deliver the SAMP/T (Aster 30) system in 18 months.

The Netherlands

While Lockheed was eyeing the Netherlands as a possible MEADS customer, a Dutch official said some discouraging things this fall during a parliament defense committee hearing.

Defense Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert said, according to translated testimony, that The Netherlands could afford to do nothing more to enhance its missile defense than upgrade its aging Patriot systems. The decision sounded like a blow to Lockheed Martin with aspirations to make MEADS the NATO system of choice.

Hennis-Plasschaert said the Patriot system is reaching the end of its lifespan and that upgrading the system was a better investment than replacing it with MEADS, which would be too costly, especially when considering upkeep of both systems until 2040.

According to an industry source, the Dutch are at the very preliminary stages of their budget process for the next fiscal year and the country has yet to review alternatives. So far, the Dutch are planning to spend a small amount on a life-extension program their Patriot batteries for upgrades such as a new touch screen.

Hennis-Plasschaert also argued the reason for upgrading Patriot was to align with Germany, which plans to keep its Patriot systems until at least 2025.

“The Dutch, like Germany have been leaders in AMD in Europe for years,” Lockheed’s Coyne said. “They have not yet made a long-term decision reference their AMD forces, only that they will spend a modest sum of money over the next few years to do basic life-extension repairs to their 30-year-old Patriots. Our goal is to show them a path to MEADS that is both affordable and maintains their leadership role and strong connection to Germany.”

Italy

While Italy was partnered with Germany and the US to co-develop MEADS, it has long been clear that it can’t afford to continue to develop the system alone. Italy was waiting for Germany to decide whether it would remain committed before considering how it might continue to invest.

“Now that Germany has chosen MEADS, we are seeing very positive signs on both the government and industry side,” Coyne said about Italy. “We are in discussions with both entities and are very optimistic a MEADS path forward for Italy will become a reality in 2016.”

The rest of NATO Europe

Several countries are interested in having a part in NATO missile defense, but these countries do not have budgets robust enough to buy complete systems.

“Even those with modest defense budgets see the opportunity to participate in AMD for the first time by adopting the MEADS open plug-and-fight architecture,” Coyne said.

For example, a country could initially invest in just the battle manager or the MEADS surveillance radar, he suggested, in order to tie into the NATO air picture.

Coyne said that smaller NATO countries like Romania, for example, are talking to the MEADS team about such an approach.

And since Raytheon’s next-generation Patriot will have an open architecture, it could likely compete with Lockheed with a similar approach.

“This is exciting for us as industry to play a small role in the development of a much needed NATO AMD umbrella,” Coyne said.

Saudi Arabia Reveals Iran Spy Ring and JPOA

Saudi Cites Iran Spy Ring

ABU DHABI [MENL] — Saudi Arabia, amid a propaganda war, has reported an Iranian espionage presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom.

Officials said authorities have launched prosecution of four Iranians on charges of espionage. They said at least one of the defendants was accused of working for Iranian intelligence and recruited Saudi nationals.

This marked the second alleged Iranian spy cell dismantled in Saudi Arabia over the last year. Officials said a fifth Iranian was also accused of being part of the cell and linked to attacks in the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom since 2003.

Officials said the fifth Iranian, sentenced to 13 years, was convicted of recruiting Saudis in Iran and sending them to fight in Afghanistan. The Iranian, who was not identified, was also charged with relaying funds for recruitment.

The Iranian espionage cell, reported in the Saudi-controlled media, was disclosed amid the crisis with Teheran fueled by Riyad’s execution of a leading Shi’ite cleric. The Saudi leadership has responded to Iranian condemnations by releasing information on Teheran’s executions of hundreds of dissidents over the last two years.

The Saudi media said the latest Iranian espionage cell stemmed from the arrival of an Iranian intelligence officer to the annual pilgrimage in the Saudi city of Mecca. The media said the cell, detected as early as 2014, also planned attacks but did not elaborate.

Riyad was said to have dismantled a previous Iranian cell in 2013. The Saudi media said the cell consisted of at least 27 alleged members, 24 of them Saudis and the rest nationals from Iran, Lebanon and Turkey.

Officials said Iran has sought to infiltrate Saudi Arabia from both the northern and southern border. On Jan. 8, the Saudi military battled hundreds of Iranian-backed Houthi fighters from neighboring Yemen, 35 of them were killed in the Raboua region.

“We are looking at additional measures to be taken if it [Iran] continues with its current policies,” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said on Jan. 9.

Meanwhile, there is little in the news about the JOPA, the P5+1 Iranian nuclear deal and there are good reasons…..lifting sanctions.

The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement

Congressional testimony by Mark Dubowitz

 

 

(1) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) major design flaws, which provide Iran with patient paths to nuclear weapons and greater ballistic missile, heavy weaponry, and economic capabilities;

(2) The interplay between the P5+1 economic sanctions “snapback” and Iran’s “nuclear snapback” in limiting the ability of the United States to impose sanctions (a) to address Iranian non-compliance with the JCPOA and, (b) to punish Iranian illicit conduct in a range of non-nuclear activities such as support for terrorism; and,

(3) How sanctions relief under the JCPOA benefits the most hardline elements in Iran including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

First, on so-called “Implementation Day,” Iran will receive substantial sanctions relief with which it can defend its economy against future sanctions pressure. Iran may also use sanctions relief to increase its support for terrorism and other rogue regimes and to expand its conventional military power. The JCPOA front-loads sanctions relief, providing Iran with access to around $100 billion in restricted oil revenues and reconnecting Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, back into the global financial system. Sanctions on Iran’s crude oil export transactions will be lifted, as will sanctions on key sectors of the Iranian economy including upstream energy investment and energy-related technology transfers, the auto industry, petrochemicals, and shipping, as well as the precious metals trade. This sanctions relief will enable Iran to build greater economic resilience against future pressure—both sanctions aimed at isolating other illicit financial conduct and so-called “snapback” sanctions in the event of Iranian nuclear non-compliance.

Then, after five years, or earlier if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaches a broader conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes, the international arms embargo will be lifted, meaning that Iran can also expand its conventional military capabilities and those of its proxies. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, one of the other witnesses at this hearing, noted one week before the announcement of the JCPOA that lifting the arms embargo “would be a great mistake. Iran is selling arms, giving arms, fueling civil wars in Yemen, in Lebanon, in Syria and Iraq, and so those arms prohibitions on Iran are very important.”1 He also has explained that the arms embargo was put in place “for very good reason.” He continued that it is not in the interest of the United States “to see these arms embargos lifted from Iran. It is an issue that should not be part of these negotiations. … I think we ought to maintain these U.N. embargos.”2 In five years, however, they will disappear, giving Iran access to combat aircraft, attack helicopters, battle tanks, among other advanced weapons systems. Read the full testimony here.

 

Secret Companies with Secret Objectives Near You

Is the nation’s largest online retailer part of a spy network? Have you given thought to the countless databases, harvesting data, human behavior, and all the interactions you have through the internet? Is Amazon now part of a larger incubation center for the federal government? You decide.

 Amazon network

Why Amazon’s Data Centers Are Hidden in US Spy Country

DefenseOne: Of all the places where Amazon operates data centers, northern Virginia is one of the most significant, in part because it’s where AWS first set up shop in 2006. It seemed appropriate that this vision quest to see The Cloud across America which began at the ostensible birthplace of the Internet should end at the place that’s often to blame when large parts of the U.S. Internet dies.

Northern Virginia is a pretty convenient place to start a cloud-services business: for reasons we’ll get into later, it’s a central region for Internet backbone. For the notoriously economical and utilitarian Amazon, this meant that it could quickly set up shop with minimal overhead in the area, leasing or buying older data centers rather than building new ones from scratch.

The ease with which AWS was able to get off the ground by leasing colocation space in northern Virginia in 2006 is the same reason that US-East is the most fragile molecule of the AWS cloud: it’s old, and it’s running on old equipment in old buildings.

Or, that’s what one might conclude from spending a day driving around looking for and at these data centers. When I contacted AWS to ask specific questions about the data-center region, how they ended up there, and the process of deciding between building data centers from scratch versus leasing existing ones, they declined to comment.

The fact that northern Virginia is home to major intelligence operations and to major nodes of network infrastructure isn’t exactly a sign of government conspiracy so much as a confluence of histories (best documented by Paul Ceruzzi in his criminally under-read history Internet Alley: High Technology In Tysons Corner, 1945-2005). To explain why a region surrounded mostly by farmland and a scattering of American Civil War monuments is a central point of Internet infrastructure, we have to go back to where a lot of significant moments in Internet history take place: the Cold War.

Postwar suburbanization and the expansion of transportation networks are occasionally overlooked, but weirdly crucial facets of the military-industrial complex. While suburbs were largely marketed to the public via barely concealed racism and the appeal of manicured “natural” landscapes, suburban sprawl’s dispersal of populations also meant increased likelihood of survival in the case of nuclear attack. Highways both facilitated suburbs and supported the movement of ground troops across the continental United States, should they need to defend it (lest we forget that the legislation that funded much of the U.S. highway system was called the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956).

Unlike Google and Facebook, AWS doesn’t aggressively brand or call attention to their data centers. They absolutely don’t give tours, and their website offers only rough approximations of the locations of their data centers, which are divided into “regions.” Within a region lies at minimum two “availability zones” and within the availability zones there are a handful of data centers.

I knew I wasn’t going to be able to find the entirety of AWS’ northern Virginia footprint, but I could probably find bits and pieces of it. My itinerary was a slightly haphazard one, based on looking for anything tied to Vadata, Inc., Amazon’s subsidiary company for all things data-center-oriented.

Facebook data-center

Google’s web crawlers don’t particularly care about AWS’ preference of staying below the radar, and searching for Vadata, Inc. sometimes pulls up addresses that probably first appeared on some deeply buried municipal paperwork and were added to Google Maps by a robot. It’s also not too hard to go straight to those original municipal documents with addresses and other cool information, like fines from utility companies and documentation of tax arrangements made specifically for AWS. (Pro tip for the rookie data-center mapper: if you’re looking for the data centers of other major companies, Foursquare check-ins are also a surprisingly rich resource). My weird hack research methods returned a handful of Vadata addresses scattered throughout the area: Ashburn, Sterling, Haymarket, Manassas, Chantilly. Much more of the report is here.

 Amazon’s Cloud center

CNBC: Palantir is notorious for its secrecy, and for good reason. Its software allows customers to make sense of massive amounts of sensitive data to enable fraud detection, data security, rapid health care delivery and catastrophe response.

Government agencies are big buyers of the technology. The FBI, CIA, Department of Defense and IRS have all been customers. Between 30 and 50 percent of Palantir’s business is tied to the public sector, according to people familiar with its finances. In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture arm, was an early investor.

Annual revenue topped $1.5 billion in 2015, sources say, meaning Palantir is bigger than top publicly traded cloud software companies like Workday and ServiceNow. It has about 1,800 employees and is growing headcount 30 percent annually, said the sources, who asked not to be named because the numbers are private.

Palantir serves up free meals for employees at 542 High Street, home to its cafeteria. A red sign reading “Private Company Meal” is attached to the window, and a neon blue sign on the inside says “Hobbit House.”

Other perks, according to people with knowledge of the company’s policies, include subsidized housing for employees who live in the neighborhood and help with monthly commuter Caltrain passes for those traveling down from San Francisco or up from San Jose. Employees who drive in get complimentary parking permits.

“They’re making a commitment here,” said Cannon.

“The idea is that it’s physically locked down and there’s no way you can take information out.” -Avivah Litan, Gartner analyst

For Palantir to stay, it has no choice but to spread out. Only one building in downtown Palo Alto even tops 100,000 square feet, and last year city officials limited total annual development in the commercial districts to 50,000 square feet.

There’s another benefit to having a disparate campus. In doing highly classified work for government agencies, some contracts require the use of particular types of units called Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs.

Avivah Litan, a cybersecurity analyst with Gartner, says qualities of a SCIF building include advanced biometrics for security, walls that are impenetrable by radio waves and heavily protected storage of both physical items and digital data.

“They have to make the walls so that no signals can be transmitted out of those walls,” said Litan, who is based in Washington, D.C. “The idea is that it’s physically locked down and there’s no way you can take information out.”

Having entirely separate facilities makes it easier to clear that hurdle, but even so, the vast majority of Palantir’s offices aren’t SCIFs. Read the full summary here.