Abu Hamza was Notified of the 9/11 Attacks 4 Days Earlier

Abu Hamza was once deeply affiliated with the Finsbury Park mosque including raising funds for jihad there. Born Mustafa Kamel Mustafa in Alexandria, Egypt, on 15 April 1958, Abu Hamza was the son of a naval officer and a primary school headmistress. He initially studied civil engineering before leaving for England in 1979. More here.

A trustee at one of London‘s best-known mosques is a senior member of ‘terrorist organisation’ Hamas’s political wing, it was reported.

Mohammed Sawalha holds the role of trustee at Finsbury Park Mosque in north London, which was formerly linked to extremism but which insists it has since undergone an ‘complete overhaul’.

It emerged today that Mr Sawalha represented the militant Palestinian organisation Hamas at recent talks in Moscow.

Sawalha, who lives in London, was appointed a trustee of the mosque in 2010 and is legally responsible for overseeing the mosque’s management, The Times reported. More here.

He was one of five senior figures from the Islamist organisation who were sent to Moscow in September, where they met Russia’s deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov and other Kremlin officials.

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ABU Hamza’s son, Sufyan Mustafa, has said he will fight to return to his life in Britain after the Government stripped him of his passport, leaving him in war-torn Syria. In 2012, Imran Mostafa, another of Hamza’s sons was jailed for his role in a jewellery heist in Norfolk.

Abu Hamza, Britain’s most notorious hate preacher, says militant contacts in Afghanistan called him four days before the 9/11 attacks to warn: “Something very big will happen very soon.”

The hook-handed cleric says he interpreted the message as being about an impending terrorist strike on America and believes the phone at his west London home was being “tapped” by police at the time.

Related reading: The Mustafa Indictment document

His claim raises questions about whether British authorities were aware of the warning and failed to pass it on to their American counterparts before al-Qaeda operatives flew hijacked jets into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in September 2001.

Details of the phone call are revealed in American court papers, seen by The Sunday Times, which also reveal that Abu Hamza acted as an agent for MI5 and Special Branch under the code name “Damson Berry”. The former imam of Finsbury Park mosque in north London is appealing against his conviction for terrorist offences and his “inhuman” incarceration at an American“supermax” prison.

Related reading: Finsbury Park Truck Attack

In a 124-page handwritten submission, Abu Hamza says he has been singled out and “punished” since 9/11. He writes in broken English: “What made pro-war governments and intelligence [agencies on] both sides of the Atlantic more furious about the defendant [Abu Hamza is] that defendant received a call from Afghanistan on Friday, Sept 7, 2001, from 2 of his old neighbours in his Pakistan time (1991-93) saying ‘Something very big will happen very soon’ (meaning USA).”

Abu Hamza denies the call came from al-Qaeda figures, but says he thought “this news is widely spread and everyone is phoning friends . . . the intelligence [agencies] of many countries must have had an earful about it”.

The preacher’s claim could not be independently corroborated this weekend, but his standing in extremist circles makes it plausible.

Syrians: “Barrel Bombs are More Merciful”…Russia?

In 2016, it was Russia dropping the barrel bombs on Aleppo and Homs.

Warplanes from Russia’s lone aircraft carrier and a missile frigate struck targets in Syria on Tuesday, bombing areas southwest of the embattled city of Aleppo, as Syrian government aircraft renewed barrel bomb attacks on the city itself.

The first-ever Russian strikes from the Mediterranean-based carrier Admiral Kuznetsov were described by the Kremlin on Tuesday as targeting extremists in Idlib and Homs provinces. More here.

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Now that Aleppo, Idlib and Homs are for the most part ghost towns, people that fled to Idlib and Ghouta are being killed by even more Russian barrel bombs.

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The war in Syria is forgotten by the West and that is shameful. What the media is ignoring is reporting on the never ending war and suffering. Why is this an issue? Because the United States is still in Syria.

The U.S.-led coalition is working with its Syrian militia allies to set up a new border force of 30,000 personnel, the coalition said on Sunday, a move that has added to Turkish anger over U.S. support for Kurdish-dominated forces in Syria.

A senior Turkish official told Reuters the U.S. training of the new “Border Security Force” was the reason that the U.S. charge d‘affaires was summoned in Ankara last week, and President Tayyip Erdogan’s spokesman said the development was worrying and unacceptable.

The force, whose inaugural class is currently being trained, will be deployed at the borders of the area controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – an alliance of militias in northern and eastern Syria dominated by the Kurdish YPG. More here.

Related reading: Russia’s Lavrov: US wants to slice up Syria

Meanwhile, as Russia has become a full time military occupier in Syria, Foreign Minister Lavrov is yelling squirrel and blaming the United States for destroying peace globally. Yup..imagine that. He has a full list of grievances against the United States.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the United States of destabilizing the world, airing a list of grievances over the Trump administration’s foreign policy.

Lavrov dedicated the opening of his annual press conference Monday to castigating the US, which is expected to soon issue a fresh round of sanctions against Russia over its interference in the 2016 US election. Russia has long denied meddling in the vote.
Lavrov criticized the US for issuing regular “threats” in relation to events in North Korea and Iran, saying they had “further destabilized” the global situation.
He did not mention President Donald Trump by name, but the US President has issued stern threats to North Korea and Iran, sending a series of fiery Twitter posts attacking the leadership in both nations.
Trump has openly ridiculed North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Twitter over Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear testing and threatened military intervention. He recently lambasted the Iranian leadership for being repressive, “brutal and corrupt,” and supported anti-government protesters challenging the government in six days of rallies.
Lavrov accused the US of provoking tensions on the Korean peninsula.
“The United States quite plainly says that the military confrontation is inevitable, however, everyone understands the catastrophic consequences of such recklessness,” he said.
He also criticized the US for expanding its military exercises around North Korea, “which provoked a new escalation of tensions,” while others were working through diplomatic channels to resume talks with Pyongyang.
Lavrov warned the US not to back out of the Iran nuclear deal. Trump had vowed to tear up the 2015 agreement, brokered by the Obama administration, alongside several European allies, Russia and China. The deal obliges Iran to restrict its nuclear program in exchange for eased sanctions.
Trump signed a waiver on Iran sanctions Friday under the deal, but signaled that he would not do so again. He has been under pressure from foreign allies and, according to US officials, his own national security team to stick to the deal.
The day he signed the waiver, however, Trump also announced new separate sanctions on 14 Iranian individuals and entities, in a move that has rattled Tehran.
Lavrov said that US threats to walk away from the deal would undermine any future agreement with North Korea.
“It’s sad that United States once again gives a reason to doubt their ability to be reliable contract partners,” he said.
“And if this agreement is being taken aside and Iran is being told — you stay within the frame of agreements but we will return the sanctions — well, put yourself in place North Korea’s place. They are being promised that sanctions will be lifted if they say no to their nuclear program, what if they do it but sanctions are still there?”
Relations between Moscow and Washington deteriorated in 2017, as several US investigations into alleged Russian meddling in the 2016 election got underway. The US tightened sanctions against Russia and closed several of its diplomatic compounds in the country, while Moscow forced the US to cut back on its diplomatic staff in Russia.
Lavrov laughed when CNN asked if he regretted Trump’s ascension to the presidency, given the diplomatic tumult, and whether he might now prefer it if Hillary Clinton had won the election.
“This is not what diplomats do — regret something that has happened. We work with facts, and facts are what we have today, so we just do what needs to be done to advance Russia’s interests under the current circumstances,” he responded.
US officials have not publicly responded to Lavrov’s comments.

 

 

How Iran is Competing with America in the Middle East

Reading through the summary below, it begs the question once again: Did Iran demand Obama remove troops from Iraq in order to advance the talks on the nuclear agreement? It also adds a similar question: Did Iran demand the same in Afghanistan?

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Related reading: Why Obama Let Iran’s Green Revolution Fail

Modern War Institute: In March 2017, the head of Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs stated, “Some 2,100 martyrs have been martyred so far in Iraq and other places defending the holy mausoleums.” These 2,100 Iranian deaths over the past five years of fighting in Iraq and Syria are nearly equivalent to the 2,400 American deaths in seventeen years of combat in Afghanistan. Yet, although initial domestic support for American intervention in Afghanistan was the highest of all such military action since Gallup started collecting data in 1983, by February 2014, as casualties mounted, a plurality of Americans viewed the war in Afghanistan as a mistake. In contrast, the Iranian government narrative that its soldiers are protecting Shi’a holy sites in Syria has driven consistently high public approval with 89 percent of Iranians supporting the defense of shrines in Syria and about 65 percent supporting the deployment of Iranian soldiers to do so.

With the relationship between military intervention and domestic public support in mind, the comparison of forces between Iran and the United States depends more on willingness to use those forces than the capabilities they represent. On the surface, Iran faces the overwhelming power projection of the United States, along with the conventional superiority of US and Gulf Cooperation Council military forces. Despite this disparity, Iran is able to use a suite of conventional, unconventional, and proxy forces to deter potential aggressors, compete with regional peers, and influence states it considers vital to its national security. Along these lines, Iran attempts to circumvent American military strengths against which the Iranian military would lose, in favor of asymmetric concepts including its ballistic missile program; anti-access, area denial tactics; and support to proxy groups.

These three methods hinge on a competition of resolve between Iran and its rivals to incur the costs of conflict: the former two affect the cost calculation of potential adversaries and the latter displays Iran’s willingness to assume more risk than its opponents in pursuit of its political ends abroad. Determining the interests for which Iran is willing to incur high costs is essential if the United States expects to “neutralize Iranian malign influence,” a priority identified in the 2017 National Security Strategy. This comes as the US public decidedly prefers intervention in the form of airstrikes and Tomahawk cruise missiles rather than ground troops who could actually influence partner forces determined to counter that Iranian influence.

Balance of Power in the Middle East

Kenneth Waltz quipped that “power begs to be balanced” while defending the notion that proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran would stabilize the Middle East. For Waltz and other theorists who espouse a realist view of international politics, the Middle East faces a two-pronged challenge to future stability based on the distribution of power among states therein. First, Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons under “strategic ambiguity” makes the relationship between Israel and other states in the region inherently imbalanced and therefore prone to conflict. Second, US abandonment of its “dual containment” strategy in favor of aggressive interventionist policies in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks destroyed Iraq as a major Middle East power and the regional bipolar balance between Iraq and Iran as a consequence.

According to realists’ view, even distributions of power promote stability and peace as the cost-benefit analysis of war yields little chance of positive gains against an adversary of similar strength, whereas uneven distributions of power increase the uncertainty of intentions between states who assess war as a likely result of a zero-sum security competition. In this latter scenario, weaker states tend to balance against stronger rivals by increasing political, military, and economic power through either internal means or alliance formation. As Stephen Walt further points out in his work “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” this balancing behavior is most likely when states assess a rival as having not only the capability of attacking, but also the intention of doing so. Furthermore, situations where states face an overwhelming power differential are particularly vexing because the prospects of successfully balancing are so grim.

There is, however, a difference between possessing military power and actually using it, especially when doing so involves risks to domestic political support and stability. Whereas William Wohlforth in his article on unipolarity predicts that no state would bother attempting to balance against the clear and unambiguous military and economic superiority of the United States, the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led potential rivals to reassess US willingness to use its insurmountable ability to project and sustain military force. Therefore, rather than competing with the entire US military, Iran must make foreign policy decisions based on the military forces it expects the United States and its partners to use regionally. When the fight is between proxies and special operations forces, Iran’s prospects for balancing against its regional rivals and expanding its influence are less daunting and even optimistic.

Iran’s Play in Syria

Iran has been on a trajectory of increasing commitment to Syria since an uprising nearly deposed the regime of Bashar al-Assad starting in 2011. Unwilling to lose a longstanding ally and mechanism of supporting proxy groups in Lebanon and Palestine, Iran has relied upon the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), especially the externally oriented Quds Force, to support the Syrian regime. Originally founded to defend the Islamic revolution in Iran from internal and external threats, the IRGC has expanded in scope as the political and military mechanism of choice for Iran to expand its influence in the Middle East. Beyond sending its own forces, Iran has used the IRGC to lead foreign fighters and has directed the deployment of Lebanese Hezbollah fighters to Syria by the thousands. Iran’s model for applying force in the Middle East plays to its asymmetric strengths, while exploiting the perceived weaknesses of the United States and its allies, which Iran regards as risk averse, sensitive to casualties, and reliant on technological superiority and regional bases from which to project power. Iran has displayed not only a willingness to assume risk by deploying IRGC operatives to contested and denied areas, but has also been sustaining casualties in its campaign in Syria.

These casualties have varied in number, nationality, and military unit since the beginning of Iranian intervention in Syria, which speaks to Iranian resolve to support the Assad regime. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has done extensive research on Iranian media reporting of casualties in Syria. At first, the majority of those killed under the direction of Iran were Lebanese and Afghan, due to extensive Hezbollah deployments and IRGC recruitment of Afghan Shi’a to fight in Syria. Iranian casualties however, tended to be high-ranking IRGC members such as its deputy commander, Gen. Hossein Hamedani, who was killed in October 2015 near Aleppo. This indicates that IRGC operatives were training, advising, and leading Syrian units and foreign fighters, rather than their own military formations of lower-ranking Iranian soldiers.

As the civil war continued and foreign fighters could no longer sustain the tempo of operations, Iran began committing its own forces in 2015, including lower-ranking soldiers from IRGC units like the 2nd Imam Majtaba Brigade, 7th Vali Asr Division, and 2nd Imam Sajjad Brigade. These units are from the IRGC Ground Forces, whose security mandate is more internally focused than that of the Quds Force. This indicates not only a shift from a training and advisory mission to a more direct role in the fighting, but also a commitment of a larger portion of the Iranian armed forces to the fight in Syria. As a result, Iranian fatalities skyrocketed. However, Iran has given no indication of war weariness in the face of mounting human and economic costs of its unconventional fight in Syria, with even the semiofficial Fars news agency openly reporting IRGC casualties.

Domestic Backlash in Iran

Iran is no stranger to internal protests over domestic politics and foreign affairs. The Green Movement of June 2009 protesting the disputed re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad showed that Iranian authorities cannot simply ignore public opinion and revealed a true power struggle between the government and the opposition. While the lasting effects of the Green Movement on the relationship between public opinion and Iranian decision-making are unclear, polling leading up to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action indicated vast public support in Iran for a deal, often in contrast with the public statements of Ayatollah Khamenei against it.

Recent massive public protests against Iranian macroeconomic conditions including high inflation and high unemployment have further displayed the Iranian government’s exposure to domestic political backlash for its policies. President Hassan Rouhani was reelected in 2017 by wide margins on a platform of economic hope in the wake of sanctions relief under the nuclear deal. However, inbound investment that results from improving economic relationships tends to benefit large conglomerates often owned by the IRGC like Khatam al-Anbiya, which has large stakes in the oil, transportation, and construction industries. Meanwhile, unemployment among youth and inflation remain high, as Iranian economic policies have not promoted growth that would create jobs for most Iranian citizens. As novelist Suzanne Collins’ character President Snow said in The Hunger Games: “Hope. It is the only thing stronger than fear. A little hope is effective. A lot of hope is dangerous. A spark is fine, as long as it’s contained.” Iranians have a lot of hope about their economic future; failure to deliver might lead to disaster, especially as Iran announces vast increases in military spending with an extra $7.5 billion to the IRGC (15 percent increase), $2.7 billion to the Iranian army (25 percent increase), and a separate $72 million subsidy directly to Khatam al-Anbiya.

Cost Calculation in Foreign Policy

Iran’s willingness to incur the costs of an aggressive foreign policy is not uniform across the Middle East. Iran views the outcome of the Syrian civil war as critical to its national interests and is therefore willing to expend physical and economic costs to sustain the Assad regime. However, Iran is reticent to suffer Syria-type casualties in places like Yemen, where Iran has limited its intervention to Lebanese Hezbollah fighters and high-ranking IRGC operatives leading Houthi militias. This is reminiscent of the “train, advise, and assist” mission that marked the initial phases of Iranian intervention in Syria. As a result, Iran has only sustained forty-four fatalities over the past two years of fighting in Yemen and has not publicized those deaths. This is problematic for Iran as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates show no signs of wavering in support of the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, despite international backlash against the air campaign.

Conflicts like those in Yemen and Syria display the gruesome truth of the competition between the United States and Iran in the Middle East; namely, it boils down to a question of who wants it more. While the United States has shown its willingness to incur human and economic costs in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past fifteen years, it is not clear whether the American people would support another effort of similar size and scope in the near term. In fact, according to Gallup, American support for the ongoing campaign in Syria has reached historic lows when compared to other conflicts over the past thirty-five years. Furthermore, US Central Command, charged with leading military operations across the Middle East and Central Asia, is preparing to shift its priority back to Afghanistan—this as Iran shows no intention of decreasing its presence in either Iraq or Syria.

This is not to say that the United States cannot achieve its foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Iran in the Middle East without incurring high costs; it means that the United States will need to enable partners who are willing to do so. However, merely funding and providing material support to partner forces does not guarantee that they will act according to US national interests. That more elusive objective depends on the influence that sponsors have over proxies and still involves accepting a degree of risk. Although varying in scope depending on the target country, Iran exposes its IRGC operatives to the inherent dangers of the battlefield and shares that risk with its partners. Combined with what is often an ideological connection with proxies, this shared danger does much to influence the forces with which Iran partners. In contrast, the United States rarely exposes its special operations forces in the same way. In Iraq and Syria especially, the United States has largely demanded that its proxies assume the vast majority of the tactical risk, which negatively affects the perception of American resolve to accomplish its stated objectives.

Even overwhelming military force is only a useful deterrent if adversaries believe a state has the resolve to use it. American reticence to use the breadth of its military strength to counter Iranian influence in the Middle East has reduced the competition to irregular forces and both state and nonstate partners. In this realm, displaying resolve is still vitally important. Although recent protests indicate Iran is not immune to domestic backlash, Iran has shown a willingness to use and lose its special operations forces in external operations. The United States risks losing influence in the Middle East and control of its partner forces if it is not willing to expose its own special operations forces in a similar way. In the end, the competition between the United States and Iran in the Middle East comes down to resolve.

N Korea Nuke Sites Go Further Underground

“Significant tunneling” excavation is underway at North Korea’s Punggye-ri nuclear test site and shows the regime’s continued efforts to maintain the site for potential future nuclear testing, a think tank specializing in tracking North Korean activities reported Thursday.

It follows reports in October that the test site is unstable and experienced tunnel collapses that have killed several hundred North Korean laborers.

The report on the 38 North website was based on an analysis of new commercial satellite images released of Punggye-ri, where the North Koreans have conducted the last six underground nuclear tests. It said throughout December 2017, there were “mining carts and personnel” as well as what appeared to be a “spoil pile” that had been greatly expanded at the test facility’s west portal.

The test site’s north portal, used in the last five nuclear tests, “remains dormant,” but there’s new activity at the west portal, according to the 38 North, a think tank at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Yet, it said there appears to be draining going on at the entrance to this portal.

The last nuclear test at Punggye-ri was conducted in September. Pyongyang claimed that blast was a miniaturized hydrogen weapon designed for an intercontinental ballistic missile.

On December 28, 2017, large numbers of personnel are observed at the Southern Support Area, located south of the Command Center Area.

DigitalGlobe | 38 North | Getty Images
On December 28, 2017, large numbers of personnel are observed at the Southern Support Area, located south of the Command Center Area.

In October, Japan’s Asahi TV reported that as many as 200 North Korean workers may have been killed in a tunnel collapse at the nuclear test site. Also, at least four defectors from North Korea have shown signs of radiation exposure, Reuters reported last month.

In Thursday’s report, 38 North said about 100 to 200 people were observed in satellite images taken Dec. 28 in a “Southern Support Area,” which it said rarely has such activity. And it said “the purpose of their activities is unknown.”

The new analysis of the Punggye-ri satellite imagery was done by Frank Pabian, Joseph Bermudez Jr. and Jack Liu, the 38 North website said. They concluded that the recent activity is a sign that the regime will maintain the facility.

The recent activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site comes on the heels of North and South Korean negotiators meeting Tuesday at the Demilitarized Zone. It was the first high-level talks between the two countries since late 2015.

The negotiations resulted in Pyongyang agreeing to send a delegation of athletes to the upcoming Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang, South Korea. The two sides also agreed to reinstate a military hotline and to hold future talks, although no deal was reached on denuclearization.

Also, South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported Thursday that Chinese President Xi Jinping had a 30-minute phone conversation with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and they jointly agreed “to continue working together to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.”

Anyone Interested in FBI Director Wray’s Cyber Concerns?

New York City, New York
January 9, 2018

Raising Our Game: Cyber Security in an Age of Digital Transformation

Remarks prepared for delivery.

Good morning. It’s great to be here with you, and great to be back here in my hometown. Thank you all for joining us. I want to thank Father McShane and Fordham for continuing to help us bring people together to focus on cyber security.

Let me start by saying how honored I feel to be here representing the men and women of the FBI. The almost 37,000 agents, analysts, and staff I get to work with at Headquarters, in our field offices, and around the world are an extraordinary, dedicated, and quite frankly, inspiring bunch. Not a day goes by that I’m not struck by countless examples of their patriotism, courage, professionalism, and integrity. And I could not be more proud, but also humbled, to stand with them as we face the formidable challenges of today—and tomorrow.

The work of the FBI is complex and hits upon nearly every threat facing our country. Today, I’d like to focus on the cyber threat.

Most of you have been thinking about the challenges in this particular arena for a long time. Before taking this job a few months ago, the last time I had to think seriously about cyber security through a law enforcement or national security lens was 12 years ago. Back then, I was head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, which included the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section and handled cyber investigations.

It’s safe to say that no area has evolved more dramatically since then, particularly given the blistering pace of technological change. And I’ve spent much of the past few months getting caught up on all things cyber. So maybe the most useful thing I can do today is to offer the viewpoint of someone who’s looking at this world with fresh eyes. I’d like to talk to you about what the cyber threat picture looks like today; what the FBI is doing about it; and most important of all, what’s the way forward? Where’s the threat going? And where do we need to be to meet that threat? And then if we have time, I hope to answer a few questions.

* * *

The cyber threat has evolved dramatically since I left DOJ in 2005. Back then, social media didn’t really exist as we know it today, and “tweeting” was something only birds did. Now…well, let’s just say it’s something that’s a little more on my radar. Today, we live much of our lives online, and everything that’s important to us lives on the Internet—and that’s a scary thought for a lot of people. What was once a minor threat—people hacking for fun or for bragging rights—has turned into full-blown economic espionage and lucrative cyber crime.

This threat now comes at us from all sides. We’re worried about a range of threat actors, from multi-national cyber syndicates and insider threats to hacktivists. We’re seeing an increase in nation-state sponsored computer intrusions. And we’re also seeing a “blended threat”—nation-states using criminal hackers to carry out their dirty work. We’re also concerned about a wide gamut of methods, from botnets to ransomware.

So what’s the FBI doing about the cyber threat? Realistically, we know we can’t prevent every attack, or punish every hacker. But we can build on our capabilities. We can strengthen our partnerships and our defenses. We can get better at exchanging information to identify the telltale signs that may help us link cyber criminals to their crimes. We can impose a variety of costs on criminals who think they can hide in the shadows of cyber space.

We can do all these things—and we are doing all these things.

We’re improving the way we do business, blending traditional investigative techniques with technical capabilities. We’re now assigning work based on cyber experience and ability, rather than on jurisdiction. We now have Cyber Action Teams of agents and experts who can deploy at a moment’s notice, much like our Counterterrorism Fly Teams. We also now have Cyber Task Forces in every field office—much like our Joint Terrorism Task Forces—that respond to breaches, conduct victim-based investigations, and collect malware signatures and other actionable intelligence.

So we’ve strengthened our investigative capabilities, but we need to do our best to actually lay hands on the culprits and lock them up. And even where we can’t reach them, we’re now using all the tools at our disposal—we’re “naming and shaming” them with indictments, and we’re seeking sanctions from the Treasury Department.

We’re also building on our partnerships. We’re working more closely with our federal partners, because this threat is moving so quickly that there’s no time for turf battles. It doesn’t matter if you call us, or DHS, or any other agency—we all work together, so your information will get where it needs to go and you’ll get the help you need. We care less about who you call than that you call, and that you call as promptly as possible.

We’re also working more closely with our foreign partners. We now have cyber agents embedded with our international counterparts in strategic locations worldwide, helping to build relationships and coordinate investigations.

We’re also trying to work better with our private sector partners. We’re sharing indicators of compromise, tactics cyber criminals are using, and strategic threat information whenever we can. I’m sure you can appreciate there are times when we can’t share as much as we’d like to, but we’re trying to get better and smarter about that.

The good news is, we’ve made progress on a number of important fronts. Just this past summer, we took down AlphaBay—the largest marketplace on the DarkNet. Hundreds of thousands of criminals were anonymously buying and selling drugs, weapons, malware, stolen identities, and all sorts of other illegal goods and services through AlphaBay. We worked with the DEA, the IRS, and Europol, and with partners around the globe, to dismantle the illicit business completely. But we were strategic about the takedown—we didn’t want to rush it and lose these criminals. So, we waited patiently and we watched. When we struck, AlphaBay’s users flocked to another DarkNet marketplace, Hansa Market, in droves—right into the hands of our Dutch law enforcement partners who were there waiting for them, and they shut down that site, too.

So we’re adapting our strategy to be more nimble and effective. But the bad news is, the criminals do that too.

I mentioned the “blended threat” earlier. Recently we had the Yahoo matter, where hackers stole information from more than 500 million Yahoo users. In response, last February we indicted two Russian Federal Security Service officers and two well-known criminal hackers who were working for them. That’s the “blended threat”—you have intelligence operatives from nation-states like Russia now using mercenaries to carry out their crimes.

In March, our partners in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested one of the hackers in Canada. The other three are Russian citizens living in Russia, but we made the judgment that it was worth calling them out, so now they’re also fugitives wanted by the FBI—so their vacation destinations are more limited.

So we’re making strides and we’ve had a number of successes—but the FBI still needs to do more to adapt to meet the cyber challenge.

For example, we want to do more to mitigate emerging threats as they spread. While we may not be able to stop all threats before they begin, we can do more at the beginning to stop threats before they get worse. We can share information, identify signatures, and stop similar attacks from happening elsewhere. But to do that, we need the private sector to work with us. At the FBI, we treat victim companies as victims. So, please: When an intrusion affects critical infrastructure; when there’s a potential for impact to national security, economic security, or public health and safety; when an attack results in a significant loss of data, systems, or control of systems; or when there are indications of unauthorized access to—or malware present on—critical IT systems, call us. Because we want to help you, and our focus will be on doing everything we can to help you.

Another thing driving the FBI’s work is that at some point, we’ll have to stop referring to all technical and digital challenges as “cyber.” Sophisticated intrusions and cyber policy issues are very much at the forefront of the conversation. But we also have to recognize that there’s a technology and digital component to almost every case we have now.

Transnational crime groups, sexual predators, fraudsters, and terrorists are transforming the way they do business as technology evolves. Significant pieces of these crimes—and our investigations of them—have a digital component or occur almost entirely online. And new technical trends are making the investigative environment a lot more complex. The Internet of Things, for example, has led to phenomena like the Mirai botnet—malware that uses all these connected devices to overwhelm websites, like the attacks that took down Netflix and Twitter last year.

The digital environment also presents new challenges that the FBI has to address—all kinds of twists for us in terms of what’s coming down the pike. Advances like artificial intelligence or crypto currencies have implications not only for the commercial sector, but for national security. Encrypted communications are changing the way criminals and terrorists plan their crimes—I’ll have more to say on that in a moment. And the avalanche of data created by our use of technology presents a huge challenge for every organization.

I’m convinced that the FBI—like a lot of other organizations—hasn’t fully gotten our arms around these new technologies and their implications for our national security and cyber security work. On our end, we know we need to be working with the private sector to get a clearer understanding of what’s coming around the bend. We need to put our heads together, in conferences like this and in other ways, so we’re better prepared, not just to face current threats, but the threats that will come at us five, 10, and 15 years from now.

When I was last in government, I saw how the 9/11 attacks spurred the FBI to fundamentally transform itself into a more intelligence-based national security organization. In the same way, I believe the new digital environment demands further fundamental transformation from us.

Over the years, FBI investigators have made huge strides in responding to the investigative challenges posed by the digital realm. We have pockets of excellence and talent that we’ve relied on to tackle our most complex technical challenges. But with the wholesale rise of digital challenges, this model won’t work for us anymore. As a big organization spread across 56 field offices and over 80 international offices, we need a new approach. We’ve got to increase our digital literacy across the board.

Some of our smartest people are looking at these challenges and thinking strategically about how the entire FBI can evolve in this rapidly changing environment. We’re focused on building our digital capabilities. We’re also focusing on our people, making sure we continue to attract the right skills and talent—and develop the right talent internally.

One issue I’m fixated on is whether we’re recruiting, hiring, and training now the kind of tech-savvy people we’ll need in five or 10 years. We know that we need more cyber and digital literacy in every program throughout the Bureau—organized crime, crimes against children, white-collar crime, just to name a few. Raising the average digital proficiency across the organization will allow all of our investigators to counter threats more efficiently and effectively, while freeing our true cyber “black belts” to focus on the most vexing attacks, like nation-state cyber intrusions.

We also need to focus more on innovation, approaching problems in new ways, with new ideas—which isn’t something, to be honest, that always comes naturally in government. We can’t just rely on the way we’ve always done things. And I don’t mean just technological innovation; I mean innovation in how we approach challenges, innovation in partnerships, innovation in who we hire, innovation in how we train, and innovation in how we build our workforce for the future.

So we need more innovation, and more of the right people. But the FBI can’t navigate the digital landscape alone. We also need to build stronger partnerships—with our counterparts in federal agencies, with our international counterparts, with the cyber research community, and with the private sector. And we need to do a better job of focusing our combined resources—trying to get our two together with your two to have it somehow equal more than four; to make it five or six or seven.

Finally, in some cases we may need lawmakers to update our laws to keep pace with technology. In some ways, it’s as if we still had traffic laws that were written for the days of the horse-and-carriage. The digital environment means we don’t simply need improved technical tools; we also need legal clarifications to address gaps.

* * *

I want to wrap up by talking about two challenges connected to the digital revolution. The first is what we call the “Going Dark” problem. This challenge grows larger and more complex every day. Needless to say, we face an enormous and increasing number of cases that rely on electronic evidence. We also face a situation where we’re increasingly unable to access that evidence, despite lawful authority to do so.

Let me give you some numbers to put some meat on the bones of this problem. In fiscal year 2017, we were unable to access the content of 7,775 devices—using appropriate and available technical tools—even though we had the legal authority to do so. Each one of those nearly 7,800 devices is tied to a specific subject, a specific defendant, a specific victim, a specific threat.

I spoke to a group of chief information security officers recently, and someone asked about that number. They basically said, “What’s the big deal? There are millions of devices out there.” But we’re not interested in the millions of devices used by everyday citizens. We’re only interested in those devices that have been used to plan or execute criminal or terrorist activities.

Some have argued that having access to the content of communications isn’t necessary—that we have a great deal of other information available outside of our smart phones and our devices; information including transactional information for calls and text messages, or metadata. While there’s a certain amount we can glean from that, for purposes of prosecuting terrorists and criminals, words can be evidence, while mere association between subjects isn’t evidence.

Being unable to access nearly 7,800 devices is a major public safety issue. That’s more than half of all the devices we attempted to access in that timeframe—and that’s just at the FBI. That’s not even counting a lot of devices sought by other law enforcement agencies—our state, local, and foreign counterparts. It also doesn’t count important situations outside of accessing a specific device, like when terrorists, spies, and criminals use encrypted messaging apps to communicate.

This problem impacts our investigations across the board—human trafficking, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, gangs, organized crime, child exploitation, and cyber. And this issue comes up in almost every conversation I have with leading law enforcement organizations, and with my foreign counterparts from most countries—and typically in the first 30 minutes.

Let me be clear: The FBI supports information security measures, including strong encryption. But information security programs need to be thoughtfully designed so they don’t undermine the lawful tools we need to keep this country safe.

While the FBI and law enforcement happen to be on the front lines of this problem, this is an urgent public safety issue for all of us. Because as horrifying as 7,800 in one year sounds, it’s going to be a lot worse in just a couple of years if we don’t find a responsible solution.

The solution, I’ll admit, isn’t so clear-cut. It will require a thoughtful and sensible approach, and may vary across business models and technologies, but—and I can’t stress this enough—we need to work fast.

We have a whole bunch of folks at FBI Headquarters devoted to explaining this challenge and working with stakeholders to find a way forward. But we need and want the private sector’s help. We need them to respond to lawfully issued court orders, in a way that is consistent with both the rule of law and strong cybersecurity. We need to have both, and can have both.

I recognize this entails varying degrees of innovation by the industry to ensure lawful access is available. But I just don’t buy the claim that it’s impossible.

For one thing, many of us in this room use cloud-based services. You’re able to safely and securely access your e-mail, your files, and your music on your home computer, on your smartphone, or at an Internet café in Tokyo. In fact, if you buy a smartphone today, and a tablet in a year, you’re still able to securely sync them and access your data on either device. That didn’t happen by accident. It’s only possible because tech companies took seriously the real need for both flexible customer access to data and cyber security. We at the Bureau are simply asking that law enforcement’s lawful need to access data be taken just as seriously.

Let me share just one example of how we might strike this balance. Some of you might know about the chat and messaging platform called Symphony, used by a group of major banks. It was marketed as offering “guaranteed data deletion,” among other things. That didn’t sit too well with the regulator for four of these banks, the New York State Department of Financial Services. DFS was concerned that this feature could be used to hamper regulatory investigations on Wall Street.

In response to those concerns, the four banks reached an agreement with the Department to help ensure responsible use of Symphony. They agreed to keep a copy of all e-communications sent to or from them through Symphony for seven years. The banks also agreed to store duplicate copies of the decryption keys for their messages with independent custodians who aren’t controlled by the banks. So the data in Symphony was still secure and encrypted—but also accessible to regulators, so they could do their jobs.

I’m confident that with a similar commitment to working together, we can find solutions to the Going Dark problem. After all, America leads the world in innovation. We have the brightest minds doing and creating fantastic things. If we can develop driverless cars that safely give the blind and disabled the independence to transport themselves; if we can establish entire computer-generated virtual worlds to safely take entertainment and education to the next level, surely we should be able to design devices that both provide data security and permit lawful access with a court order.

We’re not looking for a “back door”—which I understand to mean some type of secret, insecure means of access. What we’re asking for is the ability to access the device once we’ve obtained a warrant from an independent judge, who has said we have probable cause.

We need to work together—the government and the technology sector—to find a way forward, quickly.

In other parts of the world, American industry is encountering requirements for access to data—without any due process—from governments that operate a little differently than ours, to put it diplomatically. It strikes me as odd that American technology providers would grant broad access to user data to foreign governments that may lack all sorts of fundamental process and rule of law protections—while at the same time denying access to specific user data in countries like ours, where law enforcement obtains warrants and court orders signed by independent judges.

I just cannot believe that any of us in this room thinks that paradox is the right way to go. That’s no way to run a railroad, as the old saying goes.

A responsible solution will incorporate the best of two great American traditions—the rule of law and innovation. But for this to work, the private sector needs to recognize that it’s part of the solution. We need them to come to the table with an idea of trying to find a solution, as opposed to trying to find a way to build systems to prevent a solution. I’m open to all kinds of ideas, because I reject this notion that there could be such a place that no matter what kind of lawful authority you have, it’s utterly beyond reach to protect innocent citizens. I also can’t accept that anyone out there reasonably thinks the state of play as it exists now—and the direction it’s going—is acceptable.

Finally, let me briefly mention another issue that has a huge effect on the FBI’s national security work, including cyber—the re-authorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA.

The speed and scope of the cyber threat demands that we use every lawful, constitutional tool we’ve got to fight it. Section 702 is one of those tools.

I want to stress once again how vital this program is for the FBI’s national security mission. Section 702 is an essential foreign intelligence authority that permits the targeted surveillance of non-U.S. persons overseas. It’s especially valuable to the FBI, because it gives us the agility we need to stay ahead of today’s rapidly changing global threats.

I bring all this up today because unless renewed by Congress, Section 702 is set to expire later this month. Without 702, we would open ourselves up to intelligence gaps that would make it easier for bad cyber actors and terrorists to attack us and our allies—and make it harder for us to detect these threats.

We simply can’t afford for that to happen. So the FBI has spent an enormous amount of time, as have our partners in the intelligence community, working together with Congress to find a way to re-authorize Section 702 while addressing their concerns. My fervent hope is that before the extension expires, Congress will re-authorize Section 702 in a manner that doesn’t significantly affect our operational use of the program, or endanger the security of the American people.

* * *

So that’s a perspective on cyber from the new guy back on the block.

If one thing’s become clear to me after immersing myself again in this world for the past few months, it’s the urgency of the task we all face. High-impact intrusions are becoming more common; the threats are growing more complex; and the stakes are higher than ever.

That requires all of us to raise our game—whether we’re in law enforcement, in government, in the private sector or the tech industry, in the security field, or in academia. We need to work together to stay ahead of the threat and to adapt to changing technologies and their consequences—both expected and unexpected. Because at the end of the day, we all want the same thing: To protect our innovation, our systems, and, above all, our people.

Thank you all for everything you’re doing to make the digital world safer and more secure, and for joining us here in New York. I look forward to working with you in the years to come.

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The FBI’s mission in cybersecurity is to counter the threat by investigating
intrusions to determine criminal, terrorist, and nation-state actor identities, and engaging in activities
to reduce or neutralize these threats. At the same time, the FBI collects and disseminates information significant to those responsible for defending networks, including information regarding threat actor targets and techniques.
The FBI’s jurisdiction is not defined by network boundaries; rather, it includes all territory governed by
U.S. law, whether domestic or overseas, and spans individual citizens, private industry, critical
infrastructure, U.S. government, and other interests alike. Collectively, the FBI and its federal partners
take a whole-of-government approach to help deter future threats and bring closure to current threats
that would otherwise continue to infiltrate and harm our network defenses.
In July 2015, the FBI, in coordination with foreign law enforcement partners, dismantled a computer
hacking forum known as Darkode, which was a one-stop, high-volume shopping venue for some of the
world’s most prolific cyber criminals. This underground, password-protected online forum was a
meeting place for those interested in buying, selling, and trading malware, botnets, stolen personally
identifiable information, and other pieces of data and software that facilitated complex global cyber
crimes. As the result of this multi-year investigation, called Operation Shrouded Horizon, the FBI’s
Cyber Division and international partner agencies took down Darkode through coordinated law
enforcement action.
This international takedown involved Europol and 20 cooperating countries and is
believed to be the largest coordinated law enforcement operation to date against a forum based criminal
enterprise. Operation Shrouded Horizon resulted in charges, arrests, and searches of 70 Darkode
members and associates including indictments in the United States against 12 individuals associated
with the forum including the administrator. As part of the law enforcement action, the FBI seized
Darkode’s domain name and servers. This operation highlighted the FBI Cyber Division’s mission to
identify, pursue, and defeat cyber adversaries targeting global U.S. interests through collaborative
international partnerships. More here.