Russia’s long-term Agreement with Assad Published

It was only last August 2015 that:

The Syrian government has received six MiG-31 ‘Foxhound’ interceptor aircraft from Russia under a deal that was said to have been signed in 2007, a regional media source has reported.

The aircraft recently arrived at Mezze Airbase on the outskirts of Damascus, the Turkish BGN News agency reported on 16 August.

Syria was reported to have ordered eight MiG-31 combat aircraft as part of a wider defence deal with Russia in 2007. Although this deal was confirmed at the time by the head of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), Alexei Fyodorov, it was later denied by Anatoly Isaykin, director of state arms export bureau Rosoboronexport, who in 2010 described the sale as “a journalistic hoax”. Neither the Russian nor the Syrian authorities have so far commented publicly on the reported deliveries.

The MiG-31 first entered Soviet service in the early 1980s as a long-range, high-altitude, and high-speed interceptor. Although relatively old, it is still a highly capable platform that features some of the latest sensor and weapons fits.

In particular, the MiG-31’s NIIP N007 S-800 SBI-16 (RP-31) Zaslon or Zaslon-A electronically scanned phased-array fire-control radar (NATO codename ‘Flash Dance’) affords it an impressive beyond-visual range capability, enabling it to see airborne targets out to a range of 108 n miles (200 km; 124 miles) in a clutter-free forward sector, or 48 n miles (90 km; 56 miles) to the rear. It is capable of tracking 10 targets and attacking four simultaneously. Coupled with this radar, the MiG-31’s R-33 (NATO codename AA-9 ‘Amos’) or R-37 (AA-X-13/AA-13 ‘Arrow’) long-range air-to-air missiles afford it a highly potent beyond-visual range (BVR) air-to-air capability.

According to IHS Jane’s World Air Forces , Russia has approximately 200 MiG-31s in service that it is currently in the process of upgrading to keep them operational through to the 2030s. With the exception of Russia and now possibly Syria, only Kazakhstan flies the type.

COMMENT

Until the arrival of the MiG-31s in Damascus is confirmed, it should be treated with an element of scepticism. With the regime of Bashar al-Assad finding itself increasingly hard-pressed on the ground, it has to be noted that a state-of-the-art high-altitude interceptor is probably of limited use right now.

The delivery has been linked to Western proposals for a no-fly buffer zone to be established over Syria, but while the MiG-31s would certainly give NATO planners pause for thought, their small number and single basing location would mean that they would likely be destroyed in the early hours of any alliance effort to establish air dominance over the country ahead of implementing such a no-fly zone.

This surely keeps the United States out of the Syria Islamic State, Jabhat al Nusra war theater.

MOSCOW (AP) —Russian warplanes in Syria have flown their first joint combat mission with the Syrian air force, Russia’s Defense Ministry said Thursday.

The Defense Ministry said that a pair of Syrian MiG-29 fighter jets escorted two Russian Su-25 ground attack aircraft during Thursday’s mission.

The ministry said that Syrian pilots had previously visited the Russian base to discuss details of the mission. It released a video showing the Russian planes taking off from Hemeimeem air base and being joined in flight by the Syrian jets.

Russia has conducted an air campaign in Syria since Sept. 30. Moscow has insisted that Russian warplanes are focusing their strikes on the Islamic State group and other extremists, but the U.S. and its allies say they also hit moderate groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad‘s army.

Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on the stationing of an aviation unit of the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic on August 26, 2015 year (temporarily applied with August 26, 2015 onwards)

Reuters: Russia is allowed to deploy its air force in Syria for an open-ended period under the terms of an agreement signed between Moscow and Damascus in August, the RIA news agency said today, citing the text of the document.Russian planes flying out of a base in Syria’s Latakia province have been bombing Islamic militants since September 30 as part of a push to help Syrian President Bashar al-Assad defeat his opponents on the battle field.REUTERS SHS AN2241

Bloomberg: Russia’s military is operating in Syria without a time limit under an accord between the two governments, which also agreed to a one-year notice period for either side to terminate the pact, according to the text of the deal dated Aug. 26 and published Thursday.

The document also states that Russia bears no responsibility for any damage it causes during the operation and that the Syrian government will have to settle any disputes against the Russian aviation group from third parties, according to the agreement, signed in Damascus last year and now published by the Kremlin.

Russian personnel have diplomatic immunity under the deal and Syrian authorities can’t enter their base without the permission of its Russian commander. They are also not allowed to inspect Russian shipments into the country or search Russian planes, it says.

President Vladimir Putin launched the air campaign on Sept. 30 and doubled the fleet of warplanes involved in bombing missions to about 70 in November. Russian bombers made more than 5,500 sorties since the strikes began, according to the Defense Ministry in Moscow.

More historical data on Jabhat al Nusra is found here.

What did WH Give Oman to Take 10 Gitmo Detainees?

There is always the pledge or promise of something, money, weapons, fighter jets or people….some or all of this went with those ten detainees from Gitmo to Oman. Will the White House or the Pentagon tell us? Nah….

Barack Obama bragged that al Qaeda has been decimated but with this release and the growing threat of al Qaeda once again in Afghanistan, this is no longer the case.

In his final State of the Union address, President Barack Obama said the terrorist groups al-Qaeda and Islamic State pose a “direct threat” to Americans but don’t threaten “our national existence.”

“Both al-Qaeda and now ISIL pose a direct threat to our people, because in today’s world, even a handful of terrorists who place no value on human life, including their own, can do a lot of damage,” he said, referring to the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria, or ISIS, also known as ISIL. “They use the Internet to poison the minds of individuals inside our country; they undermine our allies.”

Hat tip to Zelin of Jihadology:

al Qaeda in the Magrib most recent message

New video message from Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī: “The Islamic Spring #8: The Sun of Victory Shines From Nusantara”




In part from FNC: The Omani Foreign Ministry reportedly described the move as a “temporary stay.”  The administration is banned by law from transferring Guantanamo detainees to Yemen, given the risk in that country. Yemen is not only racked by civil war, but is the home of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. At least three previously released Guantanamo detainees have gone on to become leaders with AQAP in Yemen after leaving the camp.

The transfer also coincides with a recent weapons deal. The terms are classified, but the State Department a week ago approved the proposed sale of TOW 2B missiles and supporting equipment to the government of Oman – valued at about $51 million.

U.S. sends 10 Yemeni Guantanamo detainees to Oman

Reuters: Ten Yemeni men held at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. military prison were sent to Oman on Thursday, bringing the detainee population below the symbolically important milestone of 100 as President Barack Obama steps up efforts to close the facility before he leaves office.

Their transfer to the Gulf Arab state marked the largest group of prisoners shipped out of the detention center at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, since Obama began his presidency in 2009 pledging to quickly shutter a prison that has drawn international condemnation.

The Yemenis, all held for more than a decade without charge or trial, were part of a wave of releases that the Obama administration signaled would take place early this year as it prepares to give Congress a plan for closing the facility. Four other detainees were moved out already this month.

Obama, whose term in office ends in January 2017, has vowed to push ahead with his efforts but faces opposition in the Republican-led Congress. Lawmakers have created obstacles to moving any Guantanamo prisoners to facilities in the United States.

In Oman’s, Muscat, an Omani official was cited by the state news agency as saying the Yemenis had arrived and would remain there for humanitarian reasons until conditions in Yemen, gripped by civil war, allow them to be sent home. Oman, a close U.S. ally, had accepted earlier groups of Guantanamo prisoners.

U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter said the transfer followed a “deliberate and careful review.”

“We completed the transfer of 10 Yemenis – roughly 10 percent, that is, of the total remaining Gitmo population – to the government of Oman,” Carter told an audience at the U.S. military’s Southern Command, which oversees the military detention facility.

The 93 prisoners remaining at Guantanamo mark the lowest number since 2002, shortly after then-President George W. Bush opened the facility to house foreign terrorism detainees after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Obama administration officials have said they will focus on repatriating or resettling the 34 Guantanamo prisoners, most of them Yemenis, cleared for release long ago by U.S. authorities.

The United States has ruled out sending the Yemenis home due to Yemen’s chaotic security situation.

Obama campaigned for the presidency in 2008 vowing to close the Guantanamo prison. In his final State of the Union address on Tuesday, he again urged Congress to help him achieve that goal.

“It’s expensive, it’s unnecessary and it only serves as a recruitment brochure for our enemies,” Obama said of the prison.

The White House has not said that Obama could use executive powers to shut the prison, bypassing Congress. Some lawmakers have vowed legal action if he does that.

Carter said he had proposed to Obama establishing an alternative location that would bring some detainees – those deemed too dangerous to be transferred – “to an appropriate, secure location in the United States.”

“Congress has indicated a willingness to consider such a proposal,” Carter said.

The Pentagon, in a statement, named the released detainees as: Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi, Samir Naji al-Hasan Muqbil, Adham Mohamed Ali Awad, Mukhtar Yahya Naji al-Warafi, Abu Bakr Ibn Muhammad al-Ahdal, Muhammad Salih Husayn al-Shaykh, Muhammad Said Salim Bin Salman, Said Muhammad Salih Hatim, Umar Said Salim al-Dini and Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi.

From the Department of Defense and shame on Secretary Ash Carter, at least former Secretary Chuck Hagel slow walked approvals, eventually costing him his job.

Detainee Transfers Announced

The Department of Defense announced today the transfer of Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi, Samir Naji al-Hasan Muqbil, Adham Mohamed Ali Awad, Mukhtar Yahya Naji al-Warafi, Abu Bakr Ibn Muhammad al-Ahdal, Muhammad Salih Husayn al-Shaykh, Muhammad Said Salim Bin Salman, Said Muhammad Salih Hatim, Umar Said Salim al-Dini, and Fahmi Abdallah Ahmad Ubadi al-Tulaqi from the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to the Government of Oman.  As directed by the president’s Jan. 22, 2009, executive order, the interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of these cases. As a result of those reviews, which examined a number of factors, including security issues, Ghazi, Muqbil, Awad, al-Warafi, al-Ahdal, al-Shaykh, Salman, Hatim, al-Dini, and al-Tulaqi were unanimously approved for transfer by the six departments and agencies comprising the task force. In accordance with statutory requirements, the secretary of defense informed Congress of the United States’ intent to transfer these individuals and of the secretary’s determination that these transfers meet the statutory standard. The United States is grateful to the Government of Oman for its humanitarian gesture and willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. The United States coordinated with the Government of Oman to ensure these transfers took place consistent with appropriate security and humane treatment measures. Today, 93 detainees remain at Guantanamo Bay.

EW, Jamming GPS by IRGC vs. U.S. Navy

EW = Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of the EM spectrum to include directed energy (DE) to control the EM spectrum or to attack an enemy. This is not limited to radio or radar frequencies but includes IR, visible, ultraviolet, and other less used portions of the EM spectrum. This includes self-protection, standoff, and escort jamming, and anti-radiation attacks. EW is a specialized tool that enhances many air and space functions at multiple levels of conflict.

Tuesday, October 4, 2011
Iran Develops GPS jammer
Iran Unveils Major Achievements in Electronic Warfare

TEHRAN (FNA)- Iran on Tuesday displayed three of its latest and most
important achievements in the field of electronic warfare.

The country’s achievements were unveiled in a ceremony attended by
Khatami-ol-Anbia Air Defense Base Commander General Farzad Esmayeeli.

The hi-tech products which went on display included Shahed Electronic
Warfare Simulator, an electronic warfare tester of Radar systems called
‘Sabah’, and a GPS jamming system all designed and produced by Iranian
experts inside the country.

Electronic warfare is amongst the most crucial elements in air defense and
military observers believe that Iran enjoys an excellent capability in
electronic warfare technology and in designing and manufacturing electronic
warfare systems.

Farsi island is an exclusive IRGC base likely with very sophisticated and advanced systems to gain access to communications regardless of platform in the region, all of the Persian Gulf and land based infrastructure. (Just keep in mind, when Iran got their hands on a U.S. drone, where they likely reversed engineered our  systems)

On 4 December 2011, an American Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was captured by Iranian forces near the city of Kashmar in northeastern Iran. The Iranian government announced that the UAV was brought down by its cyberwarfare unit which commandeered the aircraft and safely landed it, after initial reports from Western news sources inaccurately claimed that it had been “shot down”. The United States government initially denied the claims but later President Obama acknowledged that the downed aircraft was a US drone and requested that Iran return it.[2][3]

General Dynamics will deliver Block 1B3 system upgrades over the next five years. The upgrades will be integrated into new and existing Navy ships providing significantly improved situational awareness of the tactical environment surrounding the ship, the company said in a statement Monday.

General Dynamics has been involved with the SEWIP Block 1 program since 2003 and received a low-rate initial production contracts for the SEWIP Block 1B3 in 2014. Work on the contract will take place in Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

SEWIP is comprised of capability improvements divided into production blocks. This contract is part of Block 1, which provides enhanced electronic warfare capabilities to Navy ship combat systems improving anti-ship missile defense, counter targeting and surveillance. The block 1B3 system is the final upgrade for Block 1, providing high-gain/high-sensitivity electronic capability.

Electronic warfare system provides greater detection and identification of threats to Navy combat ships.

Military Jamming GPS document is here.

Broken Navigation System Led U.S. Navy Boats Into Iranian Waters

Published 13 January 2016

RFE: The top naval commander for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, has told the Tasnim news agency that an internal investigation found a broken navigation system was to blame for leading two U.S. Navy patrol boats into Iranian waters. The vessels and 10 sailors were seized by Iran on January 12. The U.S. Department of Defense has released file video showing the type of Navy boats that were seized. (U.S. Department of Defense file, Reuters)

The Pentagon Is Worried About Hacked GPS

GPS is a two-edged sword. The Global Positioning System has been the foundation of a revolution in warfare that enables highly accurate smart bombs and navigation systems. With all the furor over civilian casualties caused by smart bombs, imagine what the toll would be without GPS weapons.

On the other hand, GPS is the device that allows civilian drivers to follow its directions while driving off a cliff. Which raises the question: what happens when GPS isn’t available?

It’s a question the U.S. military is taking very seriously. The advent of cheap GPS jammers allows terrorists as well as hostile nations to block navigation signals. Hackers can disrupt the system, while the GPS satellites themselves—even at 12,500 miles high—are potentially vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons. And that’s assuming that America doesn’t wreck its own GPS system; the U.S. Air Force’s plan to develop the next generation of GPS ground control stations has been described by the Pentagon as a “disaster.”

So it is no surprise that the U.S. military is pursuing several backup technologies for GPS. The Air Force and Navy are asking the defense industry to come up with alternatives for when GPS isn’t available.

The Navy, for example, wants a Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) system that allows users to navigate from radio signals when GPS is down. Ironically, one alternative the Navy is proposing is LORAN-C, the radio navigation system that the United States shut down in 2010 because GPS supposedly rendered it obsolete. “Since then, the government has realized that GPS represents a single point of failure which can be denied through unintentional and intentional interference,” explains the Navy, which also notes that the technology can be used by civilian airliners when their GPS navigation has been disrupted.

The Air Force is also looking for a PNT system. Their approach is focusing on pseudo-satellites (pseudolites), ground or airborne transmitters that perform the same function as GPS satellites, but can overpower jamming because they are a lot closer to the user’s location than an orbital GPS station.

Not to be outdone are the people who get themselves into situations where accurately knowing your location is more than a luxury. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which oversees America’s commandos, wants a GPS alternative for its aircraft.

SOCOM does not paint an optimistic picture of current GPS technology. “Some of the issues with the current GPS include blind spots as well as spoofing and jamming of the GPS signal,” states the research proposal. “Additionally, many GPS satellites are outside of their designed lifetime and are likely to become less reliable in the future. Finally, it is uncertain whether current budget cuts will allow the funding needed to launch new GPS satellites.”

No doubt the Pentagon will find alternative technologies, perhaps something that will replace GPS. But the larger question is technological dependence. If the U.S. military, not to mention civilian airliners and ships, are that helpless when GPS is down, then perhaps the problem is with the user as well as the technology.

This should answer some questions when it comes to the IRGC activities on Farsi Island and why 2 riverine boats came into the possession of the IRGC along with 10 sailors. Is it any wonder why Defense Secretary Ash Carter asked Iran to be merciful to our sailors and John Kerry begged forgiveness?

Military: NO RoE’s vs. Pentagon vs. White House

U.S. Forces Tied by Old Rules in Afghanistan

Lake, Bloomberg:Current and former U.S. military officials tell me that the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan is almost entirely focused on the re-emergence of al Qaeda and that strikes against Islamic State leaders are scarce.

Afghan news media reported one such strike over the weekend in the province of Nangarhar.  In July U.S. airstrikes reportedly killed Hafez Saeed, an Islamic State leader in what the group has called its Khoresan Province. But U.S. officials tell me the rules of engagement in Afghanistan are highly restrictive.

“There are real restrictions about what they can do against the ISIS presence in Afghanistan,” Mac Thornberry, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told me about the rules of engagement for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Thornberry said that the rules of engagement, combined with what he called micro-management from the White House, have led military officers to tell him they have to go through several unnecessary and burdensome hoops before firing at the enemy. More here.

More from Thornberry:

WASHINGTON ~ DefenseNews — US House Armed Services Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry outlined his plans in the coming year to focus on the Pentagon’s strategy to maintain American dominance for the next 25 years, cyber, nuclear modernization and special operations.

“Our committee has spent more time over the last year on the issue of our eroding technological superiority than it has spent on any other issue,” the Texas Republican told an audience at the National Press Club today.

The chairman said while he applauded the Pentagon’s efforts “no one should be under the illusion that a handful of technology breakthroughs, even if they come, are going to guarantee our dominant position for many years ahead.” Technology changes too quickly, information moves too fast and the threats are too diverse. Therefore, “bigger change is required,” he added.

On cyber as a new domain in warfare, Thornberry acknowledged that technology is not the primary problem that needs to be solved to operate effectively in such a domain.

“Organizations, people are the most fruitful things,” he said. “We have to be able to fight and win in cyberspace so the committee is pushing issues related to people, organization, rules of engagement in that domain to try to make sure we close the gap between the threat and the policies we now have to deploy.”

Thornberry said “it may seem a little bit odd” to have nuclear deterrence listed as a priority. “But as events over the last week have shown nuclear know-how is spreading. Our own nuclear deterrent is the foundation for all our other defense efforts.”

Last week, North Korea claimed it successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. The US and its allies are working to determine within weeks whether North Korea’s nuclear test did in fact involve a hydrogen bomb or a far less powerful atomic bomb.

But while North Korea works to boost the capability of its weapons and Russia continues to advance its nuclear technology, “unfortunately our warheads and our delivery systems have all been neglected and are all aging out at about the same time,” Thornberry said.

“We have to put the resources, which studies show would never be more than 5 percent of the total defense budget, but we have to put the resources as well as the focused effort and the willpower into making sure that we have a nuclear deterrent that will continue to protect this country in the future,” he said, “not just a nuclear deterrent that was designed for a different age.”

Thornberry said he’d focus on how to best use special operations forces in the future.

“The world, including our enemies, has gotten a pretty good look at the enormous capability that our special operations forces brings,” he said.

Special operations forces have deployed most recently to Syria as part of a major overhaul of the US government’s strategy against the Islamic State group last November. President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of fewer than 50 special operations troops to northern Syria.

Also signaling the important role special operations will play in the Middle East in the coming years, it has been reported that Obama plans to tap Special Operations Command head Army Gen. Joseph Votel as the next leader for US Central Command.

“I have no doubt that we will continue to rely on them heavily in the future but there is a temptation, and we’ve seen it in other nations, to use SOF forces for everything,” Thornberry said, likening the use of such forces to “taking a sharp knife and raking it across the concrete. You keep doing that and it’s not so sharp anymore.”

The committee, Thornberry said, “will be both supportive but also protective of our SOF capabilities because some of them are absolutely vital for the security of our nation.”

One way the US Special Operations Forces excel, Thornberry noted, is its ability to work with other security forces.

“We will also be examining ways to help strengthen that capability because obviously we will be doing more of that in the future,” he said.

Thornberry, who pushed through many acquisition reform policies in his first year as HASC chairman, said he would build upon his efforts in acquisition reform this year.

The plan, he said, is to introduce a stand-alone bill on reform, most likely in late March. Following the release of the bill, feedback will be solicited and comments will be taken into account, according to Thornberry. Then the reform provisions will be folded into the fiscal 2017 defense authorization bill.

“One goal I have this year is to encourage more experimentation and prototyping,” Thornberry added.  Experimentation is at the heart of all successful military innovations, he said.

Fostering more experimentation will help ensure that technology is mature before the start of production thus reducing the odds of running over budget during a program of record to try to get the technology right, which can often end in a canceled program.

Thornberry acknowledged that today it’s hard to get money for experimentation without it being attached to a program of record.

“Programs of record seems to be sacrosanct because once they get started they hardly ever get stopped. I want to look for ways to foster experimentation and  prototyping both in developing technology and in their application and ensure that only mature technology goes into production,” he said.

“To do that a cultural shift is needed not only at DoD but within Congress. We have to accept regular small failures in order to have greater successes.”

 

 

 

 

The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda

The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda: The War within the Jihadist Movement

WotR: The post-Arab Spring period has seen extraordinary growth in the global jihadist movement. In addition to the Islamic State seizing a vast swathe of territory spanning Syria and Iraq and al-Qaeda establishing itself as a potent military force in the Syrian civil war, instability and unfulfilled expectations in numerous countries — including Egypt, Libya, Mali, Tunisia, and Yemen — have presented jihadists with unprecedented opportunities.

But even as the jihadist movement experiences rapid growth, it has also endured unprecedented internal turmoil. The Islamic State’s emergence marks the first time that leadership over the global jihadist movement has been seriously contested. Since that group’s expulsion from the al-Qaeda network in February 2014, a fierce competition between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has defined the militant landscape. The United States has an opportunity to exploit and aggravate fissures within the jihadist community, but to do so successfully, it is essential to understand the differences in the modus operandi of these two rival jihadist groups.

Two Models of Revolutionary Warfare

Though al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share the same ultimate goal — establishing a global caliphate ruled by an austere version of sharia (Islamic law) — each group maintains a distinct approach to revolutionary warfare. Al-Qaeda has come to favor covert expansion, unacknowledged affiliates, and a relatively quiet organizational strategy designed to carefully build a larger base of support before engaging in open warfare with its foes. By contrast, the Islamic State believes that the time for a broader military confrontation has already arrived, and has loudly disseminated its propaganda to rally as many soldiers as possible to its cause. The group combines shocking violence with an effective propaganda apparatus in an effort to quickly build its base of support.

The Maoist and focoist schools of revolutionary thought provide a useful framework for understanding these groups’ differing strategies. Al-Qaeda exhibits a revolutionary strategy that is both implicitly and explicitly based on the works of Mao Tse-tung, while the Islamic State’s approach is more consonant with the focoist writings of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Régis Debray.

Interestingly, in 2010 Kenneth Payne published an article in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism arguing that al-Qaeda’s strategy was focoist in nature, based on a review of the group’s strategic literature and operations. Though al-Qaeda has exhibited both Maoist and focoist strands of thought, the fact that Payne’s argument was published in 2010 is significant: He wrote just on the cusp of the “Arab Spring” revolutions, which, as this article details, provided al-Qaeda the opportunity to make its Maoist-style turn that focused on the population more apparent. Ryan Evans’s argument, which was published in the CTC Sentinel the same year as Payne’s piece, has held up better over time. Evans discerned a shift in strategy between the efforts of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the later campaign of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and argued that AQAP’s more population-centric approach was forged by the group’s failures in Iraq. He noted that the shift in strategy in Yemen may herald “a larger turn for al-Qaeda globally toward a more Maoist attitude.”

Mao’s theory of revolution is rooted in the primacy of politics over warfare. In Mao’s view, a steadfast political foundation is necessary to allow guerrilla forces to create bases for logistics and operations and slowly build strength and momentum for the final conventional stage of warfare. Thus, according to Mao, before guerilla forces can initiate military action, they must first focus on “arousing and organizing the people,” and “achieving internal unification politically.” This stage is followed seamlessly by a stage of progressive expansion, followed by a third and final stage of decision — the destruction of the enemy.

Maoist revolutionaries continue to emphasize the political stage of organization and consolidation even as they pursue progressive expansion. Consistent with Maoist theory, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have focused on maintaining and expanding the group’s political support. Even in areas where al-Qaeda has engaged in open warfare, it has been somewhat restrained in its approach to civilian populations since the initiation of AQAP’s campaign in 2009 that Ryan Evans noted was a departure from the group’s Iraq model of insurgency. Thereafter, the group has adopted a phased implementation of its hardline version of sharia where it enjoys control or significant influence. The only one of al-Qaeda’s branches that explicitly did not fit this new model was AQI, which later was expelled from al-Qaeda’s network and adopted the new moniker of the Islamic State. (Al-Qaeda’s approach toward civilian populations can only be considered “restrained” in very relative terms, juxtaposed with the more oppressive and publicly violent tactics of the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda’s own previous approach.) Al-Qaeda’s adherence to a largely Maoist framework was shaped by its experience of being hunted by the United States and its allies for a decade and a half, and — as Evans argued — particularly by the defeat of its Iraqi affiliate. Al-Qaeda’s use of Maoist strategy is designed to be low-risk and to yield long-term results.

The focoist approach to revolutionary war contrasts sharply with the Maoist approach. First used successfully in Cuba in the early 1950s, focoism holds that the political foundation necessary for revolution can be crafted through violence. Guevara essentially flipped Mao’s theory by arguing that the use of violence against the state would inspire the peasants to rise up. Unlike Mao’s strategy, focoism accepts great risks in order to inspire support. The Islamic State has in many ways followed the focoist model; it believes in the power of violence to forge the political opinions of the Muslim masses. The Islamic State views al-Qaeda’s more deliberate approach as too slow. It appears happy to win today and lose tomorrow, as long as today’s win creates a large enough subject for propaganda.

This framework of Maoist versus focoist models of revolutionary warfare should not be seen as a complete explanation for either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State’s behavior. Neither group is perfectly Maoist or focoist, but using these models provides a useful paradigm for interpreting the strategic competition between the groups.

Al-Qaeda’s Population-Centric Approach

Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of two major opportunities driven by the unsuccessful revolution in Syria and the successful revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The first opportunity is that the regional upheaval created a growth environment for jihadism, and al-Qaeda has established a significant presence in places where it had previously been suppressed. The second opportunity is that as al-Qaeda expanded into new areas, it perceived an opening to repair its global image that had been badly damaged by AQI. Al-Qaeda has implemented a population-centric approach to increase its base of popular support by employing gradualism and cooperation with local actors. Al-Qaeda has also made use of popular front groups in its expansion. This is intended to reduce the organization’s exposure to counterinsurgent forces, including the United States and the Middle East’s Sunni regimes, and to avoid frightening or alienating local populations.

Popular support has become essential to al-Qaeda. While the group once conceptualized itself as exclusively a vanguard movement, it has come to view itself in recent years as a popular movement that needs the support or acquiescence of the populace. This transformation had begun prior to the Arab Spring. In 2005, then al-Qaeda deputy emir Ayman al-Zawahiri explained in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s reckless emir, that “the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy … is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it.” As previously noted, AQAP’s approach in its first year of operations reflected this paradigm. But the transformation of al-Qaeda into a more broad-based movement was supercharged by the Arab Spring, which provided a critical opening for jihadism.

In the wake of those revolutions, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership pushed hard to regain the trust and support of local populations and avoid the mistakes that marred AQI’s Iraq campaign. In an undated letter that al-Qaeda’s masul aqalim (head of regions) Atiyah Abd al-Rahman wrote to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s emir, he noted that “the people’s support to the mujahedin is as important as the water for fish,” referencing Mao’s famous adage that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” Wuhayshi in turn transmitted a similar message to the leadership of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, illustrating al-Qaeda’s coordinated efforts.

The most significant example of these changes came in September 2013, when Zawahiri, who became al-Qaeda’s emir following Osama bin Laden’s death in May 2011, released a document entitled “General Guidelines for Jihad” that made public al-Qaeda’s new population-centric approach. Zawahiri instructed affiliates to avoid conflict with Middle Eastern governments when possible, asserting that conflict with local regimes would distract from efforts to build bases of support. Zawahiri also instructed affiliates to minimize violent conflict with Shia and non-Muslim populations, and to abstain from attacks that could result in Muslim civilian casualties. Consonant with these changes to al-Qaeda’s operations, the organization has also launched a “rebranding” campaign (a subject we have addressed previously at War on the Rocks) designed to present the group as a more reasonable — and perhaps controllable — alternative to the Islamic State, and as a potential bulwark against Iranian encroachment.

Al-Qaeda’s strategy of covert expansion — its use of front groups and its embrace of a relatively low-key public profile — is another critical element in the group’s post-Arab Spring approach. In a letter recovered from his Abbottabad compound, bin Laden explained the rationale for preferring a low profile. He noted that when a branch’s affiliation with al-Qaeda “becomes declared and out in the open,” the group’s enemies escalate their attacks on it.

Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Tunisia exemplified its early post-Arab Spring strategy. Its expansion was spearheaded by a front organization called Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). Several high-profile salafi jihadists who had been released from prison when the regime of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown established the group. AST initially focused its resources on dawa (evangelism) by organizing dawa events, holding public protests, and dominating physical spaces near places of worship. AST also provided services, including food, clothing, and medical care, to impoverished communities, and developed a social media apparatus to publicize its dawa activities.

AST’s emphasis on dawa was characteristic of al-Qaeda’s early post-Arab Spring strategy. The group’s ideologues understood that they would have unprecedented opportunities to disseminate salafi jihadist ideology to the public. While the old dictators placed strict restrictions on religious expression, strategists foresaw fewer restrictions in post-autocratic environments. This strategic logic was expressed by Atiyah, who in February 2011 exhorted jihadists in post-revolutionary states to “spring into action and initiate or increase their preaching, education, reformation and revitalization in light of the freedom and opportunities now available in this post revolution era.”

As AST’s dawa gained traction, the group also began to engage in hisba violence targeting those who violated salafist religious norms. AST was initially methodical in its use of violence, striking targets such as prostitutes and establishments that served alcohol — which would be widely considered acceptable by those inclined toward religious fundamentalism. Moreover, AST refrained from claiming responsibility for these hisba attacks, creating the perception that this violence was organic to the Tunisian people. Through this approach, AST ensured that its use of violence did not cross a line that would provoke a government crackdown.

As it became more entrenched, AST eventually embraced jihadist violence, first facilitating Tunisians’ travel to foreign battlefields like Syria, Libya and Mali before eventually turning its guns against the Tunisian state. AST members were implicated in the 2013 assassinations of secularist politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohammed Brahmi. Less than a week after Brahmi’s July 2013 death, a jihadist ambush in Jebel el-Chaambi killed eight Tunisian soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit. These bloody incidents constituted a point of no return, and in August 2013 the government designated AST a terrorist organization and cracked down on the group.

It is not clear that AST’s leadership wanted the group’s violence to escalate so quickly. Indeed, it seems the group had not progressed far enough through Mao’s stages of revolutionary warfare by July 2013 to justify the initiation of open warfare. AST gave its local branches considerable autonomy, which may have contributed to violence escalating faster than the leadership wanted or anticipated. Despite this, al-Qaeda’s blueprint for Tunisia nonetheless demonstrates how its plans for the post-Arab Spring environment followed Maoist insurgent principles.

The Islamic State’s Bold, Boisterous Growth Model

The Islamic State’s strategy for supplanting al-Qaeda centers on two techniques. First, the group sought to portray al-Qaeda’s slower and more deliberate strategy as weakness and indecisiveness. Second, the Islamic State appealed to al-Qaeda’s affiliates by emphasizing its momentum and expansion with the aim of poaching groups, members, and potential recruits. In essence, the Islamic State’s approach is the opposite of al-Qaeda’s: While al-Qaeda has sought to minimize the amount of attention it receives in order to reduce its exposure to counterinsurgents, the Islamic State constantly seeks the spotlight, and touts its victories (real or invented) at every opportunity. The Islamic State is trying to transform al-Qaeda’s strategic methods into weaknesses.

One way the Islamic State has tried to distinguish itself from al-Qaeda is its approach to governance, particularly its implementation of sharia. The Islamic State’s ability to impose governance where it enjoys military power is essential to the caliphate’s legitimacy. Following its capture of territory in Iraq and Syria, the organization quickly set up governance structures and showcased its efforts to provide social services to local populations. Rather than building public support prior to fully enforcing its austere version of sharia, the Islamic State quickly implemented hudud punishments (sharia-prescribed corporal punishment). As such, coercive violence is a major component of the Islamic State’s governance. The organization has thrown people suspected of being gay off of roofs, beheaded those it deems traitors or apostates, cut off the hands of thieves, and stoned to death women accused of adultery.

By contrast, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have chosen a slower, more methodical imposition of sharia. The group’s guidelines emphasize a somewhat pragmatic approach aimed at winning over the population. Al-Qaeda leaders have instructed affiliates to tailor the implementation of sharia to local conditions, taking into consideration local customs and religious practices, and to implement sharia flexibly in its initial phases, forgiving minor transgressions during that period. Al-Qaeda’s gradualist approach has been on display in Syria, where its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has repealed bans on cigarette smoking, and has made public displays of punishing fighters who unjustly harm local residents. This approach should not be mistaken for moderation on Nusra’s part — there are compelling reports of the group’s continuing extremism, especially in its treatment of religious minorities — but Nusra has done a masterful job of concealing its atrocities and maintaining its local image as a populist entity.

Al-Qaeda’s population-centric approach has been a major target of derision for the Islamic State, which accuses al-Qaeda of abandoning true Islamic principles by giving “preference to popularity and rationalization.”

Overt and Covert Expansion

Military strategy is another area where the Islamic State and al-Qaeda differ. The Islamic State employs an aggressive approach to territorial conquest. The group’s willingness to employ force-on-force warfare enabled it to take major territory quickly: Overall, this tactic has borne fruit for the organization, but has also increased the Islamic State’s rate of attrition. As the Islamic State has experienced military setbacks, it has moved toward greater use of irregular warfare, a strategic shift that illustrates the group’s capacity for adaptation.

The Islamic State’s hybrid warfare strategy does not necessarily distinguish it from al-Qaeda, which has employed similar tactics in some theaters. What makes the Islamic State unique is the way it showcases its military operations, using virtually all of them as propaganda pieces. While one function of the Islamic State’s military actions is to showcase the group’s strength, al-Qaeda has systematically sought to conceal the size of its network and downplay its capabilities. The group has masked its involvement in emerging theatres of conflict and established covert relationships with unacknowledged affiliate organizations like AST.

Consequently, many analysts underestimate al-Qaeda’s strength, and counterinsurgent forces have allowed al-Qaeda front groups to thrive in some theaters. Concealing affiliates’ relationships with al-Qaeda allows these groups to gain public support and attract resources from individuals and entities that might otherwise be wary of assisting an overt al-Qaeda entity.

Al-Qaeda’s military approach and preference for more covert activities is shaped by its patient worldview. Ostentatious, tactical victories that expose the network to attack and undermine its long-term prospects are of little value to the organization from a strategic perspective. In an article published in al-Qaeda’s online magazine Resurgence, jihadist strategist Abu Ubaydah al-Maqdisi explained the rationale behind this policy of restraint:

A guerilla force may possess the capacity of inflicting huge blows on the enemy, but it may be better for it to restrain from doing so in situations when the reaction of the enemy may be overwhelming.

Essentially, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership wants the organization to slowly develop its capabilities and resources in preparation for a longer campaign. At the same time, al-Qaeda leadership instructs its affiliates to begin destabilizing state regimes. This two-pronged strategy of enhancing its capabilities and destabilizing enemy regimes positions al-Qaeda to capitalize on state weakness and collapse in the long term.

A New Jihadist Era

The Islamic State’s rise has reshaped the global jihadist landscape, which for nearly two decades was dominated by al-Qaeda. With the Islamic State seizing the world’s attention, the age of unipolarity within the jihadist movement is over, replaced by intense internal conflict. Each group is firm in the belief that its organizational model is superior to that of its opponent.

The transnational jihadist movement is likely to be shaped in the coming years by this competition. It is essential that the United States understand the two groups’ strategies and pay close attention as their approaches continue to evolve. The United States has tremendous opportunities to exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. But if we fail to understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses, and strategic and tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of competition stronger than before.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a consulting firm that focuses on violent non-state actors. Nathaniel Barr is the research manager at Valens Global, where Bridget Moreng is an analyst. This article was adapted from their report (co-authored with War on the Rocks senior editor Jason Fritz) Islamic State vs. Al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict, which was published by the New America Foundation in December 2015.