Category Archives: Russia

White House Signed a National Security Waiver for Iran Deal

Posted on by

On August 14, 2012, Barack Obama signed H.R. 1905 into law the’ Iran Threat Reduction and Syrian Human Rights Act of 2012′.

The he signed a National Security Waiver for the sake of the escalating talks with Iran seeking a deal defined early as the JPOA, the Joint Plan of Action. Sanctions of several key factors were lifted by his waiver signature.

While we cannot determine the date of the waiver, it was noted by Senator Marco Rubio in 2015, directly after the State of the Union address and picked up by CNN:

Republican presidential candidates have said they’d undo President Barack Obama’s Iran deal.

Florida Sen. Marco Rubio said Sunday on “State of the Union” that he’d revoke the national security waiver under which Obama is implementing the deal, effectively re-instituting U.S. sanctions against Iran.

“We will not use the national security waiver to hold back U.S. sanctions against Iran — especially not as a result of this flawed deal that he is pursuing,” Rubio said.

 

Due to the president having extraordinary authority, he took full advantage as noted below:

Revises Presidential Waiver Authority. The Act preserves the President’s general authority to waive sanctions against non-U.S. persons.  However, the Act revises and raises the standard under which the President may exercise the general waiver authority. First, energy-related sanctions can only be waived if the waiver is “essential to the national security interests of the United States.” Second, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related sanctions can only be waived if the waiver is “vital to the national security interests of the United States.” Furthermore, the President’s “permanent” waiver authority is removed and replaced with a one-year renewable waiver authority.

The full summary of the Act, the sanctions and details are found here.

The White House soon went into full pro Iran deal mode using the White House website to push the soon to be successful results of the work he deployed John Kerry along with the P5+1 team to accomplish.

Under the framework for an Iran nuclear deal Iran's uranium enrichment pathway to a weapon will be shut down

What Iran’s Nuclear Program Would Look Like Without This Deal

As it stands today, Iran has a large stockpile of enriched uranium and nearly 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create 8 to 10 bombs. If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly – if it so chose.
This deal removes the key elements needed to create a bomb and prolongs Iran’s breakout time from 2-3 months to 1 year or more if Iran broke its commitments. Importantly, Iran won’t garner any new sanctions relief until the IAEA confirms that Iran has followed through with its end of the deal. And should Iran violate any aspect of this deal, the U.N., U.S., and E.U. can snap the sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy back into place.
Here’s what Iran has committed to:

Under the framework for an Iran nuclear deal Iran's uranium enrichment pathway to a weapon will be shut down

Heck, check the White House website and read the rest of the mess.

There are so many details and caveats omitted that even the House of Representatives has begun listing them.

Speaker of the House, John Boehner’s office has been watching the new twitter handle established by the White House to address head on all the misconceptions of the Iran deal.

@TheIranDeal is throwing out some real whoppers
July 24, 2015|Cory Fritz
The White House launched a new Twitter handle this week to help sell President Obama’s proposed nuclear deal with Iran.  So far its effort to “set the record straight” is offering nothing more than baseless claims:

CLAIM: “Thanks to the #IranDeal, Iran has agreed to provide the IAEA with the information necessary to address PMD.”

FACTS:  Iran has consistently delayed, obstructed and denied inspectors access to key information, and the proposed nuclear agreement will not compel Iran to come clean about its past activities.

“Tehran should already have made a full declaration under its obligations that predated the [July 14] accord, but the IAEA has found that Iran repeatedly failed to do so… Now the new agreement calls again on Iran to cooperate, but it offers no reason to believe that the Iranian regime will end its recalcitrance,” William Tobey, a former deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security administration wrote in the Wall Street Journal. More from the Speaker’s office on the Iran deal is here.

 

Chemical Weapons Still in Syria

Posted on by

‘The road to Damascus is a road to peace.” Those were damning words. When Nancy Pelosi embraced Bashar al-Assad in April 2007, she wasn’t simply challenging the commander-in-chief during a war; she was propagandizing for a dictator who was killing Americans.

Years later, Syria is a failed nation with millions that have fled their home country and chemical weapons by the order of Bashir al Assad kills thousands of those remaining in the country.

Barack Obama and John Kerry made impassioned speeches about taking on Syria after the use of chemical weapons crossed the ‘red-line’ imposed by the president.

In typical style, the red-line threat fell flat and was deferred to Russia to handle. Announcements were made that the process was complete and Assad complied to the disposals, well….not so much.

Mission to Purge Syria of Chemical Weapons Comes Up Short

WSJ: Key excerpts
International inspectors rid nation of many arms, but Assad didn’t give up everything

In May of last year, a small team of international weapons inspectors gained entry to one of Syria’s most closely guarded laboratories. Western nations had long suspected that the Damascus facility was being used to develop chemical weapons.

Inside, Syrian scientists showed them rooms with test tubes, Bunsen burners and desktop computers, according to inspectors. The Syrians gave a PowerPoint presentation detailing the medical and agricultural research they said went on there. A Syrian general insisted that the Assad regime had nothing to hide.

As the international inspectors suspected back then, it was a ruse, part of a chain of misrepresentations by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime to hide the extent of its chemical-weapons work. One year after the West celebrated the removal of Syria’s arsenal as a foreign-policy success, U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded that the regime didn’t give up all of the chemical weapons it was supposed to.

An examination of last year’s international effort to rid Syria of chemical weapons, based on interviews with many of the inspectors and U.S. and European officials who were involved, shows the extent to which the Syrian regime controlled where inspectors went, what they saw and, in turn, what they accomplished. That happened in large part because of the ground rules under which the inspectors were allowed into the country, according to the inspectors and officials.

The West was unable, for example, to prevent Mr. Assad from continuing to operate weapons-research facilities, including the one in Damascus visited by inspectors, making it easier for the regime to develop a new type of chemical munition using chlorine. And the regime never had to account for the types of short-range rockets that United Nations investigators believe were used in an Aug. 21, 2013, sarin gas attack that killed some 1,400 people, these officials say.

Obama administration officials have voiced alarm this year about reports that Mr. Assad is using the chlorine weapons on his own people. And U.S. intelligence now suggests he hid caches of even deadlier nerve agents, and that he may be prepared to use them if government strongholds are threatened by Islamist fighters, according to officials familiar with the intelligence. If the regime collapses outright, such chemical-weapons could fall into the hands of Islamic State, or another terror group.

“Nobody should be surprised that the regime is cheating,” says Robert Ford, former U.S. ambassador to Syria under President Barack Obama. He says more intrusive inspections are needed.

The White House and State Department say last year’s mission was a success even if the regime hid some deadly chemicals. Western nations removed 1,300 metric tons of weapons-grade chemicals, including ingredients for nerve agents sarin and VX, and destroyed production and mixing equipment and munitions. U.S. officials say the security situation would be far more dangerous today if those chemicals hadn’t been removed, especially given recent battlefield gains by Islamists. Demanding greater access and fuller disclosures by the regime, they say, might have meant getting no cooperation at all, jeopardizing the entire removal effort.

“I take no satisfaction from the fact that the chlorine bombs only kill a handful at a time instead of thousands at a time,” says Thomas Countryman, the assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation. “But it is important to keep a perspective that the most dangerous of these inhumane weapons are no longer in the hands of this dictator.”

The following account of the inspectors’ efforts on the ground is based on interviews with people who were involved. Syrian officials in New York and Damascus didn’t respond to repeated requests for comment.

Inspectors from The Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, together with U.N. personnel, arrived in Damascus in October 2013 to an especially difficult work environment. They were in a war zone, and rebel forces viewed them with hostility because the inspection process forestalled U.S. airstrikes, which the rebels were counting on to weaken the Assad regime.

Suspected gaps
The new team flew into Damascus once a month to meet with Gen. Sharif and Syria’s leading scientists. As inspectors pressed the Syrians about suspected gaps in their initial weapons declaration, new details about the program began to emerge.
U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies had long suspected that there were research facilities in Damascus run by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, or SSRC. In a bombing run in early 2013, Israeli warplanes had struck a convoy of trucks next to one of them. Israel believed the trucks were carrying weapons for Hezbollah.


At first, the Syrians told the new team they had no research facilities at all because they had developed their weapons in the field using what they described as “pop-up” labs. The inspectors had seen intelligence that suggested otherwise.
During an informal dinner in April 2014, inspectors half-jokingly suggested that the Syrians should allow them to visit an SSRC facility.
“If you are so interested, why don’t you just come along?” a Syrian official responded, according to Mr. Smith.

One Saturday the following month, the inspectors’ motorcade entered one of the SSRC compounds in Damascus. The facility’s director told the inspectors that no chemical weapons had been developed there. The facility had done research on detecting chemical agents and on treating people exposed to toxins, he said.
Gen. Sharif attended the presentation, which included an Arabic-language PowerPoint. The slides explained the SSRC’s work in areas including oncology and pesticides. The skeptical inspectors urged the Syrians to come clean about all their research and development facilities.
Last October, the Syrian regime added several research facilities to its official declaration of chemical-weapons sites, including the one in Damascus visited by inspectors that May. That gave inspectors the right to visit them for examinations. Western officials say samples taken by inspectors at the sites found traces of sarin and VX, which they say confirms that they had been part of the chemical-weapons program.


Earlier this year, American intelligence agencies tracked the regime’s increasing use of chlorine-filled bombs. The weapons-removal deal didn’t curtail the work of Syria’s weapons scientists, allowing the regime to develop more effective chlorine bombs, say U.S. officials briefed on the intelligence. The regime denies using chlorine.
The CIA had been confident that Mr. Assad destroyed all of the chemical weapons it thought he possessed when the weapons-removal deal was struck. In recent weeks, the CIA concluded that the intelligence picture had changed and that there was a growing body of evidence Mr. Assad kept caches of banned chemicals, according to U.S. officials.
Inspectors and U.S. officials say recent battlefield gains by Islamic State militants and rival al Qaeda-linked fighters have made it even more urgent to determine what Syria held back from last year’s mass disposal, and where it might be hidden. A new intelligence assessment says Mr. Assad may be poised to use his secret chemical reserves to defend regime strongholds. Another danger is that he could lose control of the chemicals, or give them to Hezbollah.
The team that visited the SSRC facility in Damascus recently asked the regime for information about unaccounted for munitions. Officials say there has been no response from Damascus.
“Accountability?” asks Mr. Cairns, the inspector. “At this point in time, it hasn’t happened.” Full story is here.

Europe Spooling up Military Activities vs. Russia

Posted on by

When Putin took over Crimea and as he continues to do the same with Ukraine. it is important to know it shocked much of the world leaders but never should have if anyone is a student of history. Even the U.S. intelligence community declared it was a probability.

Operation Atlantic Resolve; Operation Hedgehog

Marines with Black Sea Rotational Force and service members from Bulgaria, Romania, the United Kingdom and Albania kicked- off Exercise Platinum Lion 15-3, July 6, 2015 at the Novo Selo Training Area. The two-week training exercise is designed to strengthen the partnerships between the NATO nations and share knowledge to help improve their military skill sets.

Ukraine/Crimea important to Putin and Russia

Sevastopol was the foundation of the Cold War headquarters for the Soviet Union. It was home to the Black Sea Fleet and was the base of the Soviet military with batteries built as layered levels deep into the earth. Sevastopol held back the German invasion during World War II due to the heavy fortifications.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Moscow refused to recognise Ukrainian sovereignty over Sevastopol as well as over the surrounding Crimean Oblast, using the argument that the city was never practically integrated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic because of its military status.

Today, Europe and the Baltics vs. Russia

Europe Puts Its Finger on the Trigger

Hedgehog. Seemingly innocent, this word takes on extraordinary significance in a tiny Northern European country, reminding their population of barely 1 million of the constant threat of invasion by their former conquerers. You see, Hedgehog is the code name of Estonia’s largest-ever military exercise, which took place in early May, where tanks and aircraft from around the world joined with some 13,000 Estonians to practice avoiding the same fate that has befallen Ukraine. Government video shows everyday volunteers, who make up about half of the Estonian Defense Forces, firing automatic weapons from wooded hideouts and tossing smoke grenades before calling out, “The battle is over, all are friends!” But the message to Russia is clear and backed by unprecedented force: We are not friends.

U.S. military photo essay here with Europe.

 

While Putin’s brazen land grab in Ukraine, perceived threats from the Islamic State group to the south and an influx of immigration understandably put European nations on high alert, it’s surprising that all of this is happening on the coattails of a crippling economic crisis that has made millions cringe at the mention of “debt” and “austerity.” With social services being slashed while unemployment skyrockets, some are far from thrilled that their governments are beefing up infantry units and spy networks.

Naturally, it’s in the countries nestled snug against Mother Russia’s borders, mostly the Baltic and Scandinavian states, where the biggest increases in defense are happening. In Lithuania, the government overwhelmingly voted to reinstate conscription in March, which will see some 3,500 citizens recruited to serve in the military each year. It also just approved a 30 percent increase in military spending and has plans for further increases in coming years. And just in case citizens weren’t convinced of the code-red threat, the national defense minister released a booklet titled “Things to know about readiness for emergency situations and warfare.”

Then there’s Poland, which is quickly becoming one of the continent’s most prominent military and economic powers. Its approximately $37 billion budget increase from 2012 to 2022 will include 70 drones, 70 helicopters, tanks and heavy artillery in a bid to become one of the region’s military powerhouses — meaning it wants a greater say on NATO policy and to build a homegrown industry that can export goods to other countries.

What is a bit more surprising than countries at Russia’s doorstep arming themselves is the fact that Western Europeans, like the war-averse Germans and economically strapped French, are doing the same. In March, Germany passed an $8.5 billion increase through 2019 on military spending. Over the same period, France will up its budget by about $3.5 billion. It could be seen as sending a message to the Kremlin that the NATO agreement holds weight, but remember: If Russia invades a NATO-member nation, other members must go to war.

In March, both European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen threw their weight behind a proposal for a European Union army, which would be in addition to existing NATO forces. The EU army would be a direct counter to the threat of Russia. But the proposal was called “fantasy” by a number of critics, particularly in the U.K.

So tanks and missiles on the border regions are sure to make Putin think twice about marching soldiers into European countries. But the big, bad shirtless horseman to the east isn’t the only thing making Europeans get defensive. From the south, the rise of the Islamic State group has sparked fears of extremism breeding on European soil, particularly from fighters who have traveled to Syria and Iraq, only to return radicalized, says Anthony Glees, director of the Center for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham.

Some of this funding is much more under the radar. Then there’s France, which has just passed an ambitious surveillance bill — the “French Patriot Act” — that allows for sweeping intelligence gathering in the wake of  extremist attacks in Paris in January, much like the Patriot Act did after the U.S. passed it following 9/11. In many ways, countries see intelligence as a cheaper and more effective way to safeguard from threats than conventional tanks and missiles, says Glees. But it does come at the cost of skeptical and often outraged members of civil society who doesn’t see the security benefits as outweighing their privacy rights.

Russian Bear is Growling, Who Hears it?

Posted on by

FreeBeacon:  Two Russian nuclear bombers flew within 40 miles of the California coast and one of the pilots relayed a veiled threat during the Fourth of July aerial incident, defense officials said.

 “Good morning American pilots, we are here to greet you on your Fourth of July Independence Day,” a Russian Tu-95 Bear bomber crew member stated over the emergency aircraft channel. 

Meanwhile, Russia’s across-the-board buildup of nuclear forces and revised doctrine are increasing the danger of a nuclear war, according to a think tank report on nuclear threats.

Defense officials and the Colorado-based U.S. Northern Command said this week that two U.S. F-15 jets intercepted the Russian bombers on July 4 as they flew as close as 39 miles from the coast of Mendocino County, north of San Francisco.

During the intercept, a crew member on one of the bombers issued a warning in a radio message, according to defense officials familiar with the incident this week.

Earlier the same day, the Bear bombers intruded on the U.S. air defense identification zone (ADIZ) near Alaska. The zone is a 200-mile controlled airspace patrolled by U.S. and Canadian jets under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

It was the second time the Russians conducted provocative bomber flights on the Fourth of July holiday. The last incident occurred on July 4, 2012, when two Bear bombers were intercepted off the California coast in what was then the closest such encounter near sovereign U.S. air space since the end of the Cold War.

***

Russia Presents Threat to U.S., Army General Says

By David Vergun and Lora Strum
Army News Service

WASHINGTON, July 22, 2015 – Russia is the only country on Earth that presents a nuclear existential threat to the United States, the commander of U.S. Army Forces Command told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee here yesterday.

Army Gen. Mark A. Milley addressed the committee regarding his nomination to become the next Army chief of staff.

The general said he couldn’t divine Russia’s intent going forward. But recent Russian actions have “been very, very stressful,” he added.

“They’ve attacked and invaded Georgia. They’ve [annexed] Crimea. They’ve attacked Ukraine. That’s very worrisome,” Milley said of Russian actions. “So, I’d put Russia right now, from a military perspective, as our No. 1 threat.”

One senator asked the general if he thought the United States should arm the Ukrainians with counter-battery systems, with which it could defend the nation from Russian artillery and rocket strikes.

“I’d be in favor of lethal, defensive equipment” in addition to nonlethal aid that’s already been provided to Ukraine, Milley said.

The general also responded to a question regarding how the United States might strengthen its position in Europe, in light of recent Russian activities.

“We need to increase ground forces” and deploy them on a rotational basis, Milley said, which would reassure allies and deter Russian aggression.

Already, he said, the Army is moving out on that, as well as placing activity sets and prepositioning equipment in Europe.

Besides Russia, he said, there are other countries that “each in their own different way represents security threats to the United States.”

Chattanooga Shootings

Regarding the July 16 shootings in Chattanooga, Tennessee, Milley extended his condolences to the families of the four Marines and a sailor who were killed in the “horrible tragedy.”

Citing other recent attacks on military personnel in the United States, including the attacks on Fort Hood, Texas, and the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., another lawmaker asked if Milley thinks military personnel should be armed so as to be able to defend themselves from such attacks.

Milley said force protection is a key task for commanders at all levels and steps should be taken to defend personnel. He noted that guidance on a variety of active and passive measures has been put out by U.S. Northern Command, but the details are sensitive and he could not go into them during an open hearing.

Without going into the specifics of the guidance, Milley said, there are a number of prudent steps that could be taken to protect service members, who work in public locations, such as at recruiting stations. One possible measure involves installing bullet-proof glass. Another includes working more closely with local law enforcement to anticipate or head off attacks.

But “as far as arming recruiters go[es], I think it’s complicated legally,” the general said.

A senator said that Congress could resolve any related legal issues and pressed Milley for his own thoughts on arming uniformed personnel, who work in high-profile venues such as at recruiting stations.

“Under certain conditions, both on military installations and recruiting stations, we should seriously consider it, and, in some cases I think it’s important,” Milley said.

Women in Ranger School

Asked about how women are doing in the Ranger Course, Milley noted that as of July 20, three women were in the second, or “mountain phase,” of the three-phase course. The Ranger Course is difficult, he added, whether the soldier is male or female. Less than half of those who enter the Ranger Course, he said, will eventually graduate from it.

Questioned as to why no woman has yet completed the course, Milley said that since combat arms units have traditionally been filled by males, females have had limited opportunities to do patrolling and other types of training that would be especially advantageous to completing the course.

Milley said that in time, as more women go into the combat arms specialties that were previously open only to men, he expects women will gain the experience necessary to successfully complete the course.

The general said the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command continues to evaluate opening up new positions for women in combat arms. He told lawmakers that when those positions are opened to women, the standards are not being lowered.

Allaying doubts about the capacity for women to perform in combat arms, the general pulled on his own experience leading men and women in combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

“They’ve been doing it for 10 years,” he said, of female soldiers being involved in combat.

Combating Sexual Assault

Milley told lawmakers that there are indications that the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault has decreased in the Army, while at the same time reporting of those crimes has gone up. This indicates increased trust in the chain of command, he said.

The important thing is to prevent an incident from occurring or intervene up front, and that means changing the culture and educating the force, he continued, referring to bystander intervention.

If an incident does occur, the responsibility is for leaders to protect the alleged victim, the general said. And then, he added, to fully investigate and hold perpetrators accountable.

“The key is using the chain of command, and all of us have to be fully engaged,” he said. “An engaged commander makes the difference between success and lack of success.”

Milley noted that despite a decline in incidents of sexual assault, there remains a problem of retaliation against victims.

“We have to literally be our brothers’ and sisters’ keeper,” he said.

Cost-saving Measures

One lawmaker said he was concerned about the number of highly paid contractors working alongside soldiers. He suggested that those positions should instead be given to those in the reserves and the National Guard.

Milley said he intends to reduce the number of government contractors. He said he also plans on streamlining bureaucracy, where his authorities allow him to do so. He noted that when he was commander of the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014, there were about one-and-a-half contractors for every soldier serving there.

A senator asked the general’s opinion on the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative. The ARI is a cost-cutting plan that, in part, moves AH-64 Apache helicopters from Army National Guard units to active-duty Army units. In return, Guard units will get Black Hawk helicopters from the active Army, which are deemed more appropriate for National Guard state-support missions.

The general said that ARI would result in significant savings to the service. He said Government Accountability Office documents show that ARI, once fully executed, would save $1.09 billion a year.

Despite steps that the Army has taken to cut costs, such as ARI, he said the prolonged implications of sequestration and the recent 40,000-member force reductions have had a severe impact on readiness.

Regarding acquisition, Milley said he intends to hold himself and his office “responsible and accountable” for more prudent spending habits.

“We need to link requirements to resources and acquisition,” he said.
Contact Author

Biographies:
Army Gen. Gen. Mark A. Milley

 

 

Iran Deal, Deviled Details White House is Avoiding

Posted on by

Iran Inspections in 24 Days? Not Even Close

Hillel Fradkin & Lewis Libby

The Obama administration assures Americans that the Iran deal grants access within 24 days to undeclared but suspected Iranian nuclear sites. But that’s hardly how a recalcitrant Iran is likely to interpret the deal. A close examination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action released by the Obama administration reveals that its terms permit Iran to hold inspectors at bay for months, likely three or more.

Paragraphs 74 to 78 govern the International Atomic Energy Agency’s access to suspect sites. First, the IAEA tells Iran “the basis” of its concerns about a particular location, requesting clarification. At this point Iran will know where the IAEA is headed. Iran then provides the IAEA with “explanations” to resolve IAEA concerns. This stage has no time limit.

Opportunities for delay abound. Iran will presumably want to know what prompted the IAEA’s concern. The suspect site identified by the IAEA is likely to be remote, and Iran will no doubt say that it must gather skilled people and equipment to responsibly allay IAEA concerns. Iran may offer explanations in stages, seeking IAEA clarifications before “completing” its response. That could take a while.

Only if Iran’s “explanations do not resolve the IAEA’s concerns” may the IAEA then “request access” to the suspect site. Oddly, the agreement doesn’t specify who judges whether the explanations resolve concerns. If Iran claims that it has a say in the matter, the process may stall here. Assuming Iran grants that the IAEA can be the judge, might Iran claim that the “great Satan” improperly influenced IAEA conclusions? Let’s assume that Tehran won’t do that.

Now the IAEA must provide written reasons for the request and “make available relevant information.” Let’s assume that even though the IAEA may resist revealing the secret sources or technical means that prompted its suspicions, Iran acknowledges that a proper request has been supplied.

Only then do the supposed 24 days begin to run. First, Iran may propose, and the IAEA must consider, alternative means of resolving concerns. This may take 14 days. Absent satisfactory “arrangements,” a new period begins.

During this period Iran, “in consultation with” the Joint Commission, will “resolve” the IAEA concerns “through necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.” The Joint Commission includes China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K, the U.S., the European Union and, of course, Iran. Not exactly a wieldy bunch.

The Iranians will likely claim that “consultation” with the Joint Commission doesn’t bind Tehran, just as the U.S. president isn’t bound by consultations with Congress. The agreement says the consultation process will not exceed seven days, but Iran can point out that the nuclear deal doesn’t specify when Iran and the IAEA must reach agreement and “resolve” IAEA concerns.

In the absence of Iran-IAEA agreement, a majority of the Joint Commission has seven days to “advise” on the “necessary means” to resolve the matter. Iran may fairly argue that the commission’s right to “advise” is not the same as a right to “determine” the “necessary means.” Lastly, the agreement provides that “Iran would implement the necessary means within 3 additional days.” But what “necessary means” are these? As noted, the agreement refers to “necessary means agreed between Iran and the IAEA.” So these additional three days don’t even begin until an agreement is reached.

Now what? Well, the U.S. may take a “Dispute” to the Joint Commission, on which Iran sits, which has 15 days to resolve the issue. Parties may or may not invoke a similar 15 days for foreign ministers to act. Parties may also request a nonbinding opinion within 15 days from an advisory board consisting of three members, one appointed by Iran, one by the complaining country and “a third independent member.”

But Iran may argue that nothing in the nuclear deal specifies how quickly a country must appoint its advisory-board member or even how the “independent member” is selected. In short, this stage may take at least 30 days and possibly 45 of consideration at the different levels, but Iran may argue that the last 15 days don’t start until an advisory board has been duly formed. Then we get another five days of Joint Commission deliberation, before a disappointed U.S. or other commission member seeking IAEA inspections can hobble off to the United Nations seeking resolutions reimposing sanctions.

In short, as Iran is free to interpret the agreement, 63 or even 78 days may pass, plus three potentially lengthy periods that Iran can stretch out: One of “explanations” before the clock starts, one to agree on necessary means and “resolve concerns,” and one for advisory-board selection near the end.

So from the moment the IAEA first tips its hand about what it wants to inspect, likely three or more months may pass. All along, the Joint Commission is required to act in “good faith,” and to make only “minimum necessary” requests limited to verification, not “interference.” Tehran could also cite these terms to challenge particular requests.

The description of this process is based on the English-language text of the nuclear agreement. The text lacks a provision that it is the entire agreement, so Iran may claim support in supposed side agreements or statements during negotiations.

Announcing this “comprehensive, long-term” deal, President Obama quoted President Kennedy’s 1961 call for negotiations with the Soviets. Kennedy reached two notable nuclear agreements. Mr. Obama didn’t mention that within a decade of Kennedy’s 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, Soviet nuclear forces—once a fraction of America’s—were at parity or had surpassed ours.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy reached secret agreements—undisclosed to Americans for decades—not to invade Cuba and to withdraw U.S. weapons from Turkey. By invoking Kennedy was President Obama signaling there is more to this “long-term” deal than we know?

He is a subtle man.