Category Archives: Presidential campaign

Have you Met Paul Manafort?

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Trump Just Hired His Next Scandal

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Bloomberg: Here is an irony of the 2016 election season. The candidate promising voters that he won’t be influenced by Washington lobbyists is counting on the influence of a Washington lobbyist to save his presidential campaign.

Late last month Donald Trump hired Paul Manafort — who has represented his organization in Washington — to make sure his delegates at this summer’s convention in Cleveland actually end up voting for him. And for this task, Manafort is well-qualified. He ran delegate operations for the campaigns of Gerald Ford in 1976 and Bob Dole in 1996.

But Manafort’s real specialty is in the netherworld of international lobbying. Trump has criticized both parties as selling out the U.S. to foreign interests. Now he is counting on a man who has represented many of them.

Manafort has offered his services to not one but two presidents driven from power through popular revolution — Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. He has lobbied for Saudi Arabia, a Bahamanian president suspected of narco-trafficking and a former Angolan rebel leader accused of torture.

For this work, Manafort has been well-compensated. He told a congressional oversight panel in 1989 that his firm normally accepted only clients who would pay at least $250,000 a year as a retainer.

Spy Magazine reported that his firm received $600,000 one year as compensation for his work for Angolan rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi. The Daily Beast reported that Manafort’s work for the Saudis netted him $250,000 for six months of work in 1984. A Justice Department form filed in 2008 from a subcontractor to Manafort’s firm said the PR work alone on behalf of Ukraine’s government was paid at $35,000 a month.

In 2013, Manafort surfaced in a French influence-peddling scandal involving Edouard Balladur, who was prime minister in the mid-1990s. Manafort acknowledged in a Virginia court that he was paid by an adviser to the Saudi royal court more than $200,000 for advice he provided on security issues. That adviser in turn funneled the profits of an arms sale back into Balladur’s political campaign.

Manafort did not respond to an e-mail seeking comment. When asked about his Ukraine lobbying on “Meet the Press” on Sunday, he said that Trump was now his only client.

Most lobbyists make their money from contracts with clients, like lawyers and other consultants. And Manafort does as well. But he has also branched out.

In 1989, Manafort was hauled before Congress for a classic example of Washington double-dealing. His firm received a $326,000 fee for securing for a client a $43 million Department of Housing and Urban Development subsidy for a block of low-income apartments in Seabrook, New Jersey. Manafort then purchased a 20 percent stake in the Seabrook subdivision that was to receive the federal subsidy for which he lobbied.

When a Republican congressman remarked that the whole deal was sleazy, Manafort replied: “We worked the system as it existed. I don’t think we did anything illegal or improper.”

This was not the last time Manafort explored real-estate deals connected to his lobbying work. Documents uncovered in 2014 from a lawsuit brought about by former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko show that Manafort attempted to set up a real-estate partnership with Dmitry Firtash, a notorious Ukrainian businessman who financed the party of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and who is wanted by the FBI on bribery and corruption charges.

The documents, first reported by the Washington Free Beacon, include a Nov. 6, 2008, letter to Manafort from Firtash’s holding company that says it had deposited $25 million in escrow for a plan to buy a tower in Manhattan and was prepared to invest $112 million for the project with the understanding that Manafort’s own Calister Investments LLC will be the project’s developer.

David Kramer, a former senior State Department official who worked on Russia and Ukraine and is currently a senior director for human rights and democracy at the McCain Institute in Washington, told me Manafort was “a persistent lobbyist” for Yanukovych when he was in government. “He was trying to paint Yanukovych as something he wasn’t,” Kramer said of his dealings with Manafort. “The Ukrainian president is a corrupt Soviet-style apparatchik who was interested in coming to power for the sake of serving his own interest and not his country. Manafort portrayed him as somebody who could reform.”

Given that Manafort cashed in on federally subsidized apartments and given that Firtash is accused of trying to bribe public officials, the attempted real-estate deal between the two men at the very least gives the appearance of wrongdoing — the kind of appearance that most presidential candidates would try to avoid.

“Someone who has had such close relations with notorious kleptocrats doesn’t belong anywhere near any of our presidential candidates,” Charles Davidson, executive director of Kleptocracy Initiative at Hudson Institute, told me.

Indeed, in 2008, the McCain campaign considered Manafort for the job of Republican convention manager and then dropped him because of his work with Ukraine and other shadows on his resume.

But Trump is an unconventional candidate. The real-estate mogul with a taste for politics has turned to a political operative with a taste for real estate. In this sense, Trump and his former lobbyist are a perfect match.

**** The Karachi Affair:

In part from Dawn:

French investigators suspect a web of corruption behind the sale of sub-marines from France to Pakistan, with illegal funds going to the Balladur campaign in a scandal known as the ‘Karachi affair’.

Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who was a cabinet minister and then prime minister Balladur’s spokesman at the time, is linked to the affair.

Mr Manafort, who was questioned in the US state of Virginia according to Liberation, admitted being paid by Abdul Rahman al Assir, one of two intermediaries along with businessman Ziad Takieddine, brought in at the last minute to sign arms deals with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Mr Takieddine admitted in June carrying briefcases stuffed with cash from Switzerland destined for the Balladur campaign, while his wife said Mr Manafort was a “close friend” of Mr Assir’s.

“In this regard, Ziad told me Paul Manafort was advising the Balladur presidential campaign,” she reportedly told police.

Mr Manafort confirmed her statements but said he was spurned by the Balladur campaign, while the former prime minister’s associates have repeatedly denied meeting him.

Investigators say Mr Manafort, his public relations company or his associates received a total of at least $200,000 between September 1994 and August 1995.

Three more transfers from an account of Mr Assir’s in Madrid to an account of Mr Manafort’s from October 2000 and June 2001 totalling more than $140,000 were later discovered.—AFP

Russian Provocation on U.S. Military, Pact Violation

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Earlier this week, the Russians buzzed a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea. This occurred 11 times over 2 days. It is an educated guess that this provocation was meant to be a classified occurrence but our military is angry and leaked it into the public domain. This is hardly the first time the Russians have behave outside the scope of international pacts and conditions against the West and allies.

The Russians did have a response to our complaints, that is if there were any from Washington:

NBC: A U.S. official said the maneuvers were “unsafe” and “unprofessional” — and that the jets were so low they left “wake in the water.” He said a Russian KA-27 helicopter also made seven passes above the destroyer and was believed to be photographing the ship.

Russian Ministry of Defense spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov hit back Thursday, saying that “upon visual contact, the Russian pilots have executed a turnaway from the ship, compliant to all safety regulations.”

Safety regulations? Whose regulations exactly? There is something called the IncSea that prevents as one of the issues THE exact type of incident that Russia is guilty of. Additionally, the Cold War Museum has an interesting story about this exact matter.

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972

Narrative
Treaty Text
Protocol

Narrative

 
In the late 1960s, there were several incidents between forces of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. These included planes of the two nations passing near one another, ships bumping one another, and both ships and aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In March 1968 the United States proposed talks on preventing such incidents from becoming more serious. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in November 1970, and the talks were conducted in two rounds — October 1, 1971, in Moscow and May 17, 1972, in Washington, D.C. The Agreement was signed by Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov during the Moscow summit meeting in 1972.

Specifically, the agreement provides for:

  • steps to avoid collision;
  • not interfering in the “formations” of the other party;
  • avoiding maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic;
  • requiring surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance from the object of investigation so as to avoid “embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance”;
  • using accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one another;
  • not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward, or illuminating the bridges of the other partys ships;
  • informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; and
  • requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party and not permitting simulated attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them.

The agreement also provides for: (1) notice three to five days in advance, as a rule, of any projected actions that might “represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight”; (2) information on incidents to be channeled through naval attaches assigned to the respective capitals; and (3) annual meetings to review the implementation of the Agreement.

The protocol to this agreement grew out of the first meeting of the Consultative Committee established by the agreement. Each side recognized that its effectiveness could be enhanced by additional understandings relating to nonmilitary vessels. In the protocol signed in Washington, D.C., on May 22, 1973, each party pledged not to make simulated attacks against the nonmilitary ships of the other.

Like other confidence-building measures, the Incidents at Sea Agreement does not directly affect the size, weaponry, or force structure of the parties. Rather, it serves to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis. In 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman cited the accord as “a good example of functional navy-to-navy process” and credited this area of Soviet-American relations with “getting better rather than worse.” In 1985, he observed that the frequency of incidents was “way down from what it was in the 1960s and early 1970s.”

 

Treaty Text

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and

Guided by the principles and rules of international law,

Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows:

 

Article I
For the purpose of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

1. “Ship” means:

 

(b) Naval auxiliaries of the Parties, which include all naval ships authorized to fly the naval auxiliary flag where such a flag has been established by either Party.

    (a) A warship belonging to the naval forces of the Parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline;

2. “Aircraft” means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, excluding space craft.

3. “Formation” means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships proceeding together and normally maneuvered together.

 

Article II
The Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of the Road. The Parties recognize that their freedom to conduct operations on the high seas is based on the principles established under recognized international law and codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

 

Article III
1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision.

2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other Party shall, while conforming to the Rules of the Road, avoid maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the formation.

3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect.

4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

5. When ships of both Parties maneuver in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals, shall be adhered to for signalling operations and intentions.

6. Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a passing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction of passing ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of passing ships of the other Party.

7. When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising ships shall show the appropriate signals prescribed by the International Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the area.

8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party conducting operations as set forth in Rule 4 (c) of the Rules of the Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft as well as ships engaged in replenishment underway, shall take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and shall remain well clear.

 

Article IV
Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.

 

Article V
1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper signals concerning their intent to begin launching or landing aircraft.

2. Aircraft of the Parties flying over the high seas in darkness or under instrument conditions shall, whenever feasible, display navigation lights.

 

Article VI
Both Parties shall:

1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.

2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the International Code of Signals to signify the intentions of their respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At night, or in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder the movements of others or involve a risk of collision.

3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International Code of Signals, submitting such signals to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the information of other States.

 

Article VII
The Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of collision, incidents which result in damage, or other incidents at sea between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington and the Soviet Navy shall provide such information through the United States Naval Attache in Moscow.

 

Article VIII
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of three years. It will thereafter be renewed without further action by the Parties for successive periods of three years each.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months written notice to the other Party.

 

Article IX
The Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this Agreement to review the implementation of its terms. Similar consultations shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the Parties may decide.

 

Article X
The Parties shall designate members to form a Committee which will consider specific measures in conformity with this Agreement. The Committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft. The Committee will meet within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its recommendations for decision by the Parties during the consultations prescribed in Article IX.

DONE in duplicate on the 25th day of May 1972 in Moscow in the English and Russian languages each being equally authentic.

 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

John W. Warner

Secretary of the Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Sergei G. Gorshkov

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

 

Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas Signed May 25, 1972

Signed at Washington May 22, 1973
Entered into force May 22, 1973

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on measures directed to improve the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas,

Recognizing that the objectives of the Agreement may be furthered by additional understandings, in particular concerning actions of naval ships and military aircraft with respect to the non-military ships of each Party,

Further agree as follows:

 

Article I
The Parties shall take measures to notify the non-military ships of each Party on the provisions of the Agreement directed at securing mutual safety.

 

Article II
Ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the other Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military ships of the other Party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation.

 

 

Article III
 

This Protocol will enter into force on the day of its signing and will be considered as an integral part of the Argument between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas which was signed in Moscow on May 25, 1972.

 

 
 

DONE on the 22nd of May, 1973 in Washington, in two copies, each in the English and the Russian language, both texts having the same force.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

J.P. Weinel

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Alekseyev, Admiral

 

 

Passing a Law to Enforce the Law and an App

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When George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security, one of the missions was to bring together the mobilize key agencies into one to force collaboration, cooperation and joint use of tools and technology to secure the country. Under Barack Obama, not only were executive orders signed to waive standing law and procedures, the security of the country has reached a tipping point as a result of adding in migrants, refugees and aliens. Mandates from the White House to other agencies include edicts to ignore policy and security standards but we are virtually giving sanctuary to criminals.

Now the House of Representatives is working on legislation to force compliance with law.

The Department of Homeland Security knows there are growing threats across the country so in December of 2015 the agency re-launched the warning system.

There is an app for that. The Department of Justice even published a 10 page handbook.

WASHINGTON — Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson activated the National Terrorism Advisory System for the first time Wednesday, warning the public of “self-radicalized actors who could strike with little or no notice.”

The bulletin, which marks the addition of a new level of public warning to the system, will be in effect for the next six months, or until events dictate otherwise, Johnson said.

The Department of Homeland Security is “especially concerned that terrorist-inspired individuals and homegrown violent extremists may be encouraged or inspired to target public events or places,” the bulletin stated.

“As we saw in the recent attacks in San Bernardino and Paris, terrorists will consider a diverse and wide selection of targets for attacks,” the DHS notice said.

House Acts to Keep America Safe

Passes Legislation to Enhance Overseas Traveler Vetting & Help Stem Flow of Foreign Fighters

Washington, D.C. – Today, the House of Representatives passed the Enhancing Overseas Traveler Vetting Act (H.R. 4403).  The legislation, introduced by Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX), works to improve the vetting of travelers against terrorist watch lists and law enforcement databases, enhances border management, and improves targeting and analysis.

On the House floor, speaking in support of the bipartisan legislation, Chairman Royce delivered the following remarks (as prepared for delivery):

The global threat of terrorism has never been as high as it is today.  In just the last 12 months, we’ve seen terrorists strike in my home state of California, and in France, Belgium, Turkey, India, Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Pakistan and Iraq – to name a few.  No country is immune.  The ideology of violent extremism knows no boundaries – allowing individuals to become radicalized by terrorists overseas without leaving their neighborhood.

I just returned from Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia, where I heard first-hand about the foreign fighter threat.  More than 35,000 foreigners from 120 countries have traveled to the Middle East to join ISIS, and many of these fighters are now looking to return to their homes and to the United States to carry out attacks.

That is why information sharing between countries is more critical than ever.

The bipartisan Task Force’s report highlighted the lack of any comprehensive, global database of foreign fighters and suspected terrorists.  In its absence, the U.S. and other countries rely on a patchwork system for exchanging extremist identities, which is weak and increases the odds that foreign fighters and suspected terrorists will be able to cross borders undetected.

H.R. 4403 will authorize the Secretaries of the Department of State and Homeland Security to develop open-source software platforms to vet travelers against terrorist watch lists and law enforcement databases.  It permits the open-source software to be shared with foreign governments and multilateral organizations, like INTERPOL.

This bill reflects the recommendations made by our colleagues on the Task Force, which we have worked together on.  I thank Mr. Hurd and Chairman McCaul for their leadership working to make our nation safer against terrorist threats.

Obamaphones Back in the News, the Scandal was a Secret

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Primer: Remember YOU, the taxpayer are subsidizing this program.

FNC/WSJ: The U.S. government spent about $2.2 billion last year to provide phones to low-income Americans, but a Wall Street Journal review of the program shows that a large number of those who received the phones haven’t proved they are eligible to receive them.

The Lifeline program—begun in 1984 to ensure that poor people aren’t cut off from jobs, families and emergency services—is funded by charges that appear on the monthly bills of every landline and wireless-phone customer. Payouts under the program have shot up from $819 million in 2008, as more wireless carriers have persuaded regulators to let them offer the service.

The FCC on the Lifeline program.

FCC Kept ‘Obamaphone’ Fraud Under Wraps Until After It Expanded Program

Commissioners were instructed not to reveal $5 million fine until day after controversial Lifeline expansion vote

 Tom Wheeler / APTom Wheeler / AP

Federal regulators were instructed to keep a massive fraud investigation under wraps until a day after a controversial vote to expand a program that was allegedly used to bilk taxpayers of tens of millions of dollars, one those regulators claims.

The Federal Communications Commission on Friday announced that it would seek $51 million in damages from a cell phone company that allegedly defrauded the federal Lifeline program of nearly $10 million.

The commission’s five members unanimously backed the Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), but Republican commissioner Ajit Pai parted from his colleagues in a partial dissent. According to Pai, he and other commissioners were told not to reveal the details of its investigation until April 1, a day after the FCC voted to expand the Lifeline program.

“Commissioners were told that the Notice of Apparent Liability could not be released or publicly discussed until April 1, 2016, conveniently one day after the Commission was scheduled to expand the Lifeline program to broadband,” Pai wrote. “That’s not right.”

Pai did not say who issued that directive. However, it had the effect of preventing public knowledge of widespread fraud in the Lifeline program ahead of a contentious vote on expanding it despite persisting concerns about a lack of internal safeguards.

FCC spokesman Will Wiquist insisted that the timing was completely coincidental. “The timing of the enforcement action was in no way related to the timing of the vote on the program modernization,” he said in an email.

Lifeline has faced controversy over enrollment requirements that its critics say are too lax and vulnerable to fraud. The service, which subsidizes cell phone plans for low-income Americans, allows beneficiaries to enroll using cards issued for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), a welfare program that has also faced fraud allegations.

Critics of the Lifeline program began calling its subsidized cell phones “Obamaphones” early in the Obama administration in response to viral YouTube videos of beneficiaries thanking the president for their free phones. The program was actually created under President Ronald Reagan.

The FCC’s NAL last week accused cell phone provider Total Call Mobile, which provides Lifeline services in 19 states, of “systematic and egregious misconduct” and “widespread enrollment fraud.”

According to the commission, Total Call employees enrolled tens of thousands of duplicate Lifeline beneficiaries and pocketed the extra subsidies. The FCC caught onto the scheme when the company enrolled an undercover FCC investigator in the program without asking for any eligibility documentation.

“Since 2014, Total Call has requested and received an estimated $9.7 million dollars in improper payments from the Universal Service Fund for duplicate or ineligible consumers despite repeated and explicit warnings from its own employees, in some cases compliance specialists, that company sales agents were engaged in widespread enrollment fraud,” the FCC said in a news release.

A common means of fraudulent enrollment was the repeated use of a single SNAP identification card, according to the FCC. That drew the ire of Commissioner Michael O’Reilly, who said the use of SNAP cards as Lifeline verification mechanisms is woefully inadequate.

“I must once again lodge my extreme frustration that the Commission continues to rely on SNAP as an entry point in the Lifeline program, and has the gall to claim that it is a highly accountable program, when it is painfully obvious to anyone paying attention that SNAP is riddled with waste, fraud, and abuse,” he wrote in a partial dissent in the Total Call case.

Despite those ongoing concerns, the FCC recently voted to expand the Lifeline program to include subsidies for 3G wireless broadband service.

That vote followed a contentious debate over the scope of the expansion and its accompanying price tag. The commission approved the expansion by a narrow 3-2 vote on March 31, a day before the FCC announced its Total Call NAL.

The existence of a massive ongoing Lifeline fraud investigation might’ve affected public perception of that vote, if not the vote itself, leading Pai to call the muzzling of commissioners on the Total Call investigation “conveniently” timed.

Pai also objected to commission delays that he said prevented it from sanctioning Total Call for the full scale of its apparent misconduct.

“Even though [the FCC] identified 32,498 intra-company duplicates, we pursue only 2,587. Even though we have evidence that Total Call Mobile bypassed federal safeguards to enroll 99.8% of its subscribers, we hold the company liable for only 16%,” Pai wrote.

“Under these circumstances, our precedent suggests that a forfeiture of at least $84,295,910 would have been appropriate. Yet the Commission settles for something much less.”

Even as the FCC was investigating this pattern of alleged fraud, Total Call was pouring money into its new Washington lobbying operation. According to disclosure forms, it hired lobbyists with the firm ML Strategies in June of last year, a month after the FCC subpoenaed the company.

ML Strategies has reported collecting $120,000 in fees from Total Call to lobby Congress and the FCC on “general issues related to the Lifeline program.”

The FCC’s investigation is not Total Call’s first time running afoul of federal regulators: the commission issued a $12,000 NAL in 2010 accusing the company of failing to abide by regulations on hearing aid compatibility.

Its sister companies have faced far larger fines for more egregious offenses.

Total Call Mobile is wholly owned by prepaid phone card company Total Call International, which is wholly owned by Japanese telecommunications giant KDDI. KDDI is also the sole shareholder of Locus Telecommunications.

The FCC has targeted Locus in numerous enforcement actions over the past decade, and sought fines reaching into the eight figures.

The FCC levied a $5 million penalty against the company in October “for deceptively marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards.” Previous Notices of Apparently Liability sought fines from the company of $5 million, $330,000, $25,000, $23,000, and $12,000.

Russia Flying Simulated Attacks on U.S. Destroyer

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A phone call or a strongly worded letter yet from the White House? nah

WASHINGTON, April 13 (Reuters) – The White House is aware of Russian planes flying dangerously close to a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea on Tuesday and continues to be concerned about such behavior, a spokesman said on Wednesday.

“The White House is aware of the incident,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters at a daily briefing. “This incident … is entirely inconsistent with the professional norms of militaries operating in proximity to each other in international water and international airspace.”

Russian attack aircraft just flew within 30 feet of a U.S. Navy ship

 

MilitaryTimes: In one of the most aggressive actions in recent memory, Russian warplanes conducted “simulated attacks” on the a U.S. Navy vessel in the Baltic Sea on Tuesday, repeatedly flying within 30 feet of the ship, according to a defense official.

Sailors aboard the destroyer Donald Cook said the aircraft flew low enough to create wake in the sea waters surrounding the ship, and the ship’s commanding officer said the incident was “unsafe and unprofessional,” the defense official said.

“This was more aggressive than anything we’ve seen in some time,” according to the defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because U.S. officials have not officially disclosed the incidents.

Sailors aboard the ship described the Sukhoi Russian Su-24 as “wings clean,” meaning there were no visible bombs or armaments on the aircraft, the defense official said.

The nature of the overflight as a “simulated attack” may violate a 1973 treaty between the U.S. and Russia that specifically prohibits this type of maneuver, the defense official said.

The maneuver was one of several aggressive moves by Russian aircraft on Monday and Tuesday.

Shortly after leaving the Polish port of Gdynia, near Gdansk, on Monday, the Donald Cook at was sea in international waters conducting flight operations with a Polish helicopter, part of routine joint training exercises with the NATO ally.

During those flight operations, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 combat aircraft appeared and conducted about 20 overflights, coming within 1,000 yards of the ship at an altitude of about 100 feet, the defense official said. In response, the commander of the Donald Cook suspended flight operations.

On Tuesday, the Donald Cook was underway in the Baltic Sea when a Russian helicopter —a Ka-27 Helix —made seven overflights and appeared to be taking photographs of the U.S. Navy ship, the defense official said.

Shortly after the helicopter left the area, an Su-24 began making “very low” overflights with a “simulated attack profile,” the defense official said. The aircraft made a total of 11 passes.

The ship’s commander repeatedly tried to make radio contact with the Russian aircraft but received no response, the defense official said.

After a formal investigation, the incident may prompt the U.S. government to formally lodge a complaint — or “demarche” — with Moscow, the defense official said.

While Russian aircraft during the past couple of years have conducted numerous aggressive overflights that Navy officials deemed “unprofessional,” the incident on Tuesday was the first to be deemed “unsafe,” the defense official said.

In 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty aimed at preventing incidents at sea. That treaty specifically prohibits “simulating attacks,” according to the U.S. State Department’s website.

The aircraft likely came from a Russian military installations in Kalingrad, an enclave of Russian territory on the Baltic Coast nestled between Poland and Lithuania.

This is the SU-24 up close in action.