CENTCOM Cmdr. Votel Explains What is Ahead in the World

Posted on July 14, 2017July 14, 2017 by Denise Simon

CentCom commander Votel steels for next chapter in world’s most dangerous region

TAMPA — As the man in charge of U.S. Central Command, Army Gen. Joseph Votel oversees American military operations in 20 nations that comprise the world’s most dangerous and complex region.

Army Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command, sat down for an interview Wednesday with the Tampa Bay Times in his office at MacDill Air Force base. [MONICA HERNDON | Times]

A Minnesota native and former commando chief with 37 years in the service, Votel helps develop plans to battle Islamic State, the Taliban and other jihadis. All the while, he must navigate challenges from the Russians and Iranians, political tensions among U.S. allies, and the regional fallout of the enduring Arab-Israeli strife.

On Wednesday, Votel, 59, sat down with the Tampa Bay Times in his office at MacDill Air Force Base for a rare one-on-one interview to talk about his 16 months on the job. He discussed a wide range of issues over nearly an hour.

Among the highlights: Iraqi forces will need to shift from combat mode to security mode to protect against a shrinking ISIS, the military is expanding its work with the Russians against a common enemy, and the Iranian regime remains the most destabilizing influence in the CentCom region.

Talk about the new authorities you have been given under the Trump administration.

The president has granted authority down to the secretary of defense (allowing) us to be more agile and more responsive to a very complex, developing situation. We want to enable our people forward with all authorities and decision-making capability they have and I think we have done that. And that’s certainly been reinforced by the new administration but frankly it’s something we started under the old administration.

Can you offer an example of how that’s worked?

Sure, the most pertinent example is Mosul. We are advising, accompanying, assisting, enabling Iraqi forces all around that city. That means providing (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) support for them, fire support for them, and in order to provide that most effectively, you really have to allow our advisors that are with them to make those decisions, to be responsive, to take advantage of opportunities we see, to help forestall advances by the enemy. We can’t make that decision back at a centralized in Iraq and certainly not back at here in Tampa or Washington or anywhere else.

ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi — dead or alive? And does it matter anymore?

I have no idea. I have nothing to tell me one way or the other. I certainly have seen all the reporting on it. I guess in one extent it does matter. I hope that he is (dead), frankly. I think it could be viewed as another blow to them. That said, we’ve been doing this long enough to know that leaders are killed and we’ve killed plenty of them. And that there’s always somebody who is going to step up into those positions so we shouldn’t think that just killing Baghdadi is the key here. He can be replaced. So in that regard, it may not matter as much.

After the fall of Mosul and defeat of ISIS, how can Iraq come together with so many divergent interests?

In many ways this is the hard part of what we are doing here. The political aspect of this, the humanitarian aspect of this, is always more difficult than the military things, so this is the challenge before us. The political side always takes a bit longer. As we went into the fight in Mosul, we had very good cooperation between the government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government. Absolutely vital for success was the ability of leaders to come together and set aside their differences for a period of time to beat ISIS. I consider that to be a very successful approach here, and it has given the ability now, as we move into the more difficult political aspects, a way to address that. Certainly there are things that are going to have to be addressed. It won’t be easy, but there’s a basis for doing it.

On Sept. 27, the Kurds will hold a referendum about independence. How much of an additional challenge is that?

Being able to have the Kurdish Regional Government and the government of Iraq work together on Mosul was a key factor in the overall success of this, so I’m concerned the referendum could add a little friction into the remaining operations here that could effect things. But I am very trustful in our diplomatic efforts to address that I know there are things ongoing here. The timing may not be best for what we still have left to be done here but I am hopeful that with our engagement we will minimize that.

How concerned are you about ISIS 2.0 and what can be done to prevent that?

I think we should all be concerned about that. One thing we have learned about this organization is that they are adaptive. I think what we’ll see now is smaller cells, we’ll see stay-behind elements, we’ll see pockets that will begin to take on more of an insurgent-guerilla type approach as opposed to an Islamic army that we saw back in the beginning. We have to be prepared for that, so that some of the things that we will do as we look to that is we will look to adjust some of our coalition training efforts for the Iraqi security forces to ensure that can move from doing large-scale operations like they have been doing in places like Mosul to now doing wide-area security operations, where they have to go out and have to address a network, address small elements. We really need to return to that.

Classic Special Operations Forces missions?

More of what perhaps we have seen in the past, and an important point is keeping the pressure on. The people of Iraq should take great pride in what they have accomplished and the coalition should take great pride in what they’ve enabled, but we can’t rest on our laurels. There’s still a lot of fighting left to do, a lot left to be done in the city of Mosul. There’s certainly a lot more to be done in Ninewa and across the country and in Syria as well. So we should reflect on what we’ve accomplished but we have to stay on this more until its over.

How do you engage the Sunnis?

That has to come through the government of Iraq. I think the prime minster, a very good man, recognizes the importance of that and hopefully he will continue to do that. It is pretty noteworthy to watch him up in city of Mosul, which is largely a Sunni city, and how well he was received up there and how he reached out and did all that. These are all the earmarks of a leader at war. He was performing as the commander in chief. I would also highlight that one of the things again on this point of the prime minister as commander in chief, one of the things he was absolutely strident on throughout this, was as we conducted the operation in Mosul, was ensuring that we did everything we could to protect that population up there, a population that was largely Sunni. And this was a horrible, challenging fight up there, and certainly, there have been civilian casualties. But I will tell you, through the prime minister’s leadership and his direction to his leaders and our support for them, I think we should be very proud of the way we conducted ourselves.

The battle for Raqqa is now on. How long will that take?

We are not going to make any time estimates on this. You just watched what took place in (Mosul), a city of 1.6 million, 1.7 million people. It took nine months. Raqqa is probably 300,000 to 400,000 people, but it’s in an area that again has had a long time to prepare and the forces we are operating in Syria are different than the forces we are operating with in Iraq. We’re not talking about the Iraqi army that has ministries to lead it. Now we are talking about a much more indigenous force made up largely of Syrian Arabs and Kurds — and Kurds are part of that indigenous force. They don’t have all the trappings of a big army, so I think it is important for people to understand the context of what we are doing here. A large city, an indigenous force, a well-prepared enemy. And by the way, an enemy now that has suffered a significant defeat, so they are running out of space there. We would expect they are going to fight harder, and more aggressively than they are and a large part of that is going to be exploited again. So I think it is going to be a challenging fight and it will take months.

Talk about the cease fire in southern Syria. How’s that working and what do you have to do?

Obviously, I would tell you we are paying very, very close attention, but there are no immediate equities for CentCom or the Department of Defense. That’s still very much being worked out. We have not been told to do anything with respect to that.

What are your thoughts on working with the Russians?

The word we use is not cooperation, but it is deconfliction and that is principally what we are doing. I have characterized this interchange as being very professional military to military interchange and I think trust certainly has to be earned over time here. But I will tell you the deconfliction line that we have had in place and has become more robust over time, meaning that not only do our air components talk to each other but (Army Lt. Gen. Stephen) Townsend (in charge of the ground war against Islamic State) now has the ability to talk to his counterpart.

As the White House looks at other options for working with Russians in Syria, are you comfortable sharing intelligence with them?

We don’t share any intelligence with them. I’m not authorized to do that. That’s not the nature of the relationship.

If the White House said it wanted some sharing of intelligence with the Russians, would you be comfortable with that?

If we are directed, we certainly would.

Talk about Iran and your concerns about their influence in the region.

I think Iranian influence is significant in the region, and as I have said and others have said, Iran is perhaps the most destabilizing. I should say the Iranian regime, not the Iranian people. I want to make sure I call a distinction between that. The Iranian people are culturally rich and deep and have a place in the region here, but the Iranian regime and their activities, particularly those under the Qods Force (special forces) element I think are the most destabilizing factor in the region long-term.

As the battle space shrinks and so many groups are fighting over the same dirt, and nations outside your region get involved, like Turkey and Israel, how concerned are you about something going wrong?

This is always present and when you look at the layers of complexity in a place like Syria, you’ve got extremists, a civil war, you’ve got ethno-sectarian challenges, whether Arabs and Kurds or Sunni and Shia or Turks and Kurds. Then there is the influence of state actors like Russia and Iran and you have legitimate concerns from a country like Turkey, for example. They have a very legitimate concern about terrorism that emanates from organizations like the PKK and other things there that I think are a concern. The concern for us is that when we do things, they have second or third order of effects that trip over into these other layers of complexity and really make things much more difficult to work. And that’s why I think the importance of deconfliction lines, the ability to talk, to make sure that, hey, this is what we are doing, here’s where we are focused — it has allowed us to prevent escalation, escalatory events, in some situations. I think it has been very, very, very vital.

The situation with Syrian Kurdish allies must be particularly vexing given the Turkish feelings towards them and the fact that they are also among the best fighting forces as allies.

We certainly acknowledge the Turkish concern. I think as you’ve seen, (Defense) Secretary (James) Mattis and a variety of others do and we support it 100 percent. Our intention is to be as transparent and as clear in terms of what we are doing here as we can be and I think that is working for us and again that’s another way of helping work through this complexity.

What additional complexities do the Israelis, who’ve fired on Syrian regime targets, present?

You just highlighted the complexity. One of the underlying challenges of course has been not only the Israeli-Palestinian issue but the Israeli-Arab issue that is an underlying current for a long time in this particular theater, so it certainly adds another level of complexity on top of all the blankets of complexity we have here that we have to be cognizant of. And again, we have to communicate and make sure people understand what’s happening here so I think it does highlight it.

Given the shared concern about Iran, do you see greater cooperation between Israel and Sunni nations in the region?

I think there is an opportunity, certainly, for that and I think that’s probably a better question for Israel or the other nations there to answer. But we certainly would encourage that.

Lets talk about the situation between Qatar and the nations blockading it. You have to work with all those nations. How is it going?

There have been some impacts, they’ve been mitigable to this particular point, but it is concerning to us. I’d prefer as a military man to see these differences addressed in a different way than perhaps they are now, through dialogue and discussion as opposed to some of the approaches that have been chosen. Nonetheless, that’s been done and we are where we are here, so I am grateful to our Department of State to get out there and help us work through some of these things and do that and help minimize the impact of what’s going on.

You said there are some impacts. What are those impacts?

The impacts are it potentially takes people’s focus off the common things we really want to be working on, like Iran, for example. It creates a disunity among a group of people that we rely on here. And again, to this point, these have been very mitigable in terms of what we are doing, so it is not significantly impacting what we are doing. But over time I think perhaps it could.

In a worst case scenario, what could that be?

At the very extreme of this it could be more direct action between these parties. The other thing more probable is it could lead to more lack of cooperation. I mean, we rely on all these partners. It’s no surprise that we have a big airbase in Qatar that supports our operations across the region, so we rely on that to make sure we can pursue our objectives and the common objectives here. I am concerned long-term a rift like this can, I think, effect relationships.

Let’s shift to Afghanistan, where there are still nearly 9,000 U.S. troops with plans to send more. Can the Afghans handle the fight?

What you seen over last couple of years is that the Afghan security forces are in the lead. They have been able to deal with the situations they are dealing with (like) attempts by the Taliban to come in and take over major urban areas. We’ve seen the Afghans be able to get after that and to take areas back and to prevent some of that. Where they’ve tried to expand into areas that are of importance to the Afghan government, around the capital — to the north, on the south, out in the east and in some areas they’ve been able to do some operations to take that — they’ve had, I think some success against the ISIS elements that exist in Afghanistan so they’ve done that. The Afghans have taken a lot of casualties. They’ve paid a very, very heavy price for that and they are engaged every day. And so that toll that takes over time is significant and it’s resulted in a situation where there is a bit of a stalemate here and so what we have to look at is how we help them move forward over that

Can you talk about your recommendation to the president for new troop levels in Afghanistan and what do you want those troops to do?

A: I won’t talk about what my specific military advice was up the chain of command that is still under consideration, so it is really inappropriate for me to talk about my specific (recommendations). I am satisfied that both (Army) Gen. (John) Nicholson (commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan) and I have had our ability to have input into the process and I am confident that the chain of command will take that on board and make some decisions here in terms of that. But that’s still underway here right now.

Can you talk about what the additional troops should do?

I think what we have to do is look at how we optimize the successes that the Afghan security forces have achieved, so I think one of the bright spots that you see in the Afghan security forces is their special operations capability. I think we need to look at how do we enable that more in the future. They’ve been very good. They’ve been the principle response force They’ve been a key element here to the fight as we’ve moved forward. So how do we double down on that aspect? Another aspect of that has been the budding Afghan air force. It’s not very big. It’s not as capable as it needs to be. But it has demonstrated some capability. On one of my most recent visits was down to the south part of the country, I was able to talk among the corps commander and what he was telling me about was how some of the aircraft that we have been able to get to them, the A-29s, have been very, very successful at doing close air support. Afghan air force supporting Afghan forces. This is good. We need to double down on that. The Afghans are in the process of moving their border control forces from ministry of the interior over to the ministry of defense. That’s a good move. That’s a very positive move. We need to look at how we can support that. The Afghan police have certainly had challenges and so we have to look at how we help them perform more of their appropriate police functions in holding area.

The Taliban has made significant gains. How confident are you that the Afghans can defend themselves?

I think I am confident, with our sustained assistance, I think they can. I think a very good factor here has been President (Ashraf) Ghani, and he does have a long-term vision. He’s laid out a four-year approach here for how he kind of sees things he’s done for the coalition and I think the response from the NATO partner and others has been very, very good in terms of that. As I think I’ve commented to you, I’m a soldier who went to Afghanistan in as early as October of 2001. I was in the first wave. I went there, so I want to be hopeful for Afghanistan. I want to see them succeed. But it’s going to take something — we’re turning a big ship here and there are challenges. There are challenges of corruption, there are challenges with bad governments, challenges of disenfranchisement, all kinds of things that have to be addressed. And we have to stay focused on all of those things. It isn’t just about fire power, and advisors and things like that. It’s addressing all of these other things and making this a professional force and doing things we talked about with (non-commissioned officers) here. It really is about a very comprehensive approach. It is going to take time and we have to be able to sustain that over time. We’ll be able to mitigate the troop levels and other things based on the situation and stuff like that. I’m confident that we can make decisions on that, but what’s important is the sustained support.

Do you see sustained support in the form of continued U.S. troop presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq and for how long?

I think as long as it takes. But again, these enter into policy decisions so I don’t want to get out ahead of the policy makers. But from my perspective, as a military man and CentCom commander, I think when we provide assistance we have to be prepared to sustain that. We can’t just come in and do something and leave. You know we did that in Afghanistan in the past and we saw what happened as a result of that. We did that in Iraq and we saw what happened as a result of that. So I think we have to be cognizant of paying attention to the lessons of the past here and trying not to repeat those things.

Anything else you want to add?

I think in the wake of a great success like Mosul here, the thing I want the people of Tampa and the American people to recognize is that we are very, very proud of our partners in Iraq and all the coalition partners. They should continue to be proud of how our country is being represented. They should be very, very proud of the men and women we have out there, doing our nation’s bidding. I certainly am.

Chinese Spy Ship, Alaska Coast During Missile Defense Test

Posted on July 14, 2017July 14, 2017 by Denise Simon

A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor is launched from the Pacific Spaceport Complex Alaska in Kodiak, Alaska, during Flight Test THAAD (FTT)-18 on July 11, 2017. During the test, the THAAD weapon system successfully intercepted an air-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) target. Grant Ferowich

Chinese spy ship lurks off coast of Alaska during missile defense test

(CNN) A Chinese spy ship has been sailing in international waters off the coast of Alaska for several days, having first arrived in the area shortly before the test of a US missile defense system, multiple US officials have told CNN.

US Navy Capt. Scott Miller, spokesperson for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, said the ship is believed to be a “communications” or “intelligence” vessel and confirmed it has been in the area for the last few days.

Miller would not speculate on the reason for the ship being there.

Army-Navy Type 815 Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) vessel. According to the PLA report cited by the China Daily, the PLA Navy now operates six electronic reconnaissance vessels. The report also gave specific information about the ships such as their capabilities and functions. The Tianlangxing arrived off the coast of Alaska shortly before the July 11 test of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system against an intermediate-range ballistic missile. More here.

Two US military officials told CNN that the ship is operating approximately 100 miles off the Alaska coast in international waters.

The officials pointed out that the Chinese ship is operating legally and said the US does not have security concerns about the vessel.

US ships also regularly operate in international waters near China.

The officials said it is possible the ship was there to observe the recent successful Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system test off Alaska, but the US has no way of confirming that intent.

However, one official told CNN that it was rare for China to operate this type of ship in that area and that it was reasonable to assume it was there to observe the test.

China has long protested the US-South Korea decision to deploy THAAD to the Korean peninsula, saying that it could be used to target Chinese missiles.

South Korean and US officials say the system would be used to intercept missiles coming from North Korea.

The same official said that the US had observed similar Chinese vessels in recent days sailing off the coast of Guam and shadowing a joint US-Australia military exercise named Talisman Sabre. The official added this level of activity was unusual.

Published on Jul 28, 2016

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational Test Agency, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Pacific Command conducted a complex operational flight test of the BMDS demonstrating a layered defense architecture.

The test, designated Flight Test Operational-02 Event 2a, was conducted in the vicinity of Wake Island and surrounding areas of the western Pacific Ocean. The test stressed the ability of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) weapon systems to negate two ballistic missile threats while Aegis BMD simultaneously conducted an anti-air warfare operation.
Video by Ben Listerman
Missile Defense Agency

Rick Perry: Corporate Espionage going by Russia and China

Posted on July 13, 2017July 13, 2017 by Denise Simon

Rick Perry: Russian, Chinese Corporate Espionage ‘Shouldn’t Surprise Anybody’

Russia and China are engaging in underhanded business practices involving American oil and gas companies, according to Energy Secretary Rick Perry.

During an appearance on Fox Business Tuesday morning, Perry said it “shouldn’t surprise anybody that there is corporate espionage going on” in Russia and China, particularly with U.S. companies that are involved in hydraulic fracturing or fracking.

The secretary also addressed a recent column from Fox Business contributor James Freeman, which detailed a congressional investigation into allegations of a Russian effort to undermine and “suppress our domestic oil and gas industry, specifically hydraulic fracking,” according to a statement from House Science Committee Chairman Lamar Smith.

“When you think about Russia and China a lot of the businesses there have direct links back to their government,” Perry said. “So the idea that there are people trying to manipulate, to put propaganda out on a particular type of fuel, that doesn’t surprise me.”

He added that his case highlights the importance of cybersecurity.

“We need to be sophisticated when it comes to how we deal with Russia, how we deal with China,” he said. “Those are our competitors out there and we know that they may play with a different set of rules and we just need to be smart enough to identify.”

***

Rick Perry is more than right.

Primer 2013:

China’s cyber espionage against the U.S. government and defense industrial bases poses a major threat to

U.S. military operations, the security and the well being of U.S. military personnel, the effectiveness of

equipment, and readiness. China apparently uses these intrusions to fill gaps in its own research

programs, map future targets, gather intelligence on U.S. strategies and plans, enable future military

operations, shorten research and development (R&D) timelines for military technologies, and identify

vulnerabilities in U.S. systems and develop countermeasures.

China’s cyber espionage against U.S. commercial firms poses a significant threat to U.S. business

interests and competiveness in key industries.

General Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency and commander of U.S. Cyber Command, assessed that the financial value of these losses is about $338 billion a year, including intellectual property losses and the down time to respond to penetrations, although not all those losses are to Chinese activity. Chinese entities engaging in cyber and other forms of economic espionage likely conclude that stealing intellectual property and proprietary information is much more cost

effective than investing in lengthy R&D programs.

***

Example/2015: WASHINGTON—Six Chinese citizens, including two professors who trained together at the University of Southern California, stole sensitive wireless technology from U.S. companies and spirited it back to China, the Justice Department charged.

Example/2014: In one of the most notable actions, Dongfan “Greg” Chung, a naturalized American citizen who worked on NASA’s space shuttle program, was convicted in 2009 after investigators found hundreds of thousands of sensitive papers under his California home. Prosecutors said he gave some of the documents to Chinese officials, revealing details of military and space-related technology. Chung, a former Boeing employee, was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison.

***

Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization provides the most thorough and insightful review to date of the covert and overt mechanisms China uses to acquire foreign technology. Delving into China’s “elaborate, comprehensive system for spotting foreign technologies, acquiring them by every means imaginable and converting them into weapons and competitive goods,” the book concludes that “there is nothing like it in the world.” (2-3) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is implementing “a deliberate, state-sponsored project to circumvent the costs of research, overcome cultural disadvantages and ‘leapfrog’ to the forefront by leveraging the creativity of other nations,” thereby achieving “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” (78, 216)

Although PRC espionage is global in scope, the most important target is the United States. Relying primarily on Chinese-language government and non-government sources, the coauthors intend to raise awareness of the threat nationally and alert decisionmakers to the gravity of the problem. Trained as Chinese linguists, with considerable experience dealing with Chinese affairs, they are uniquely qualified for the task. William C. Hannas has a Ph.D. in Asian languages, published two books on Asian orthography and served in various US government posts, including at the Joint Special Operations Command. James Mulvenon is a leading expert on Chinese cyber issues and has published widely on China’s military affairs and communist party-army relations. Senior analyst Anna B. Puglisi studied in Beijing and subsequently was a visiting scholar at Nankai University, where she studied China’s science and technology (S&T) policies and infrastructure development.

Download PDF for complete review. [PDF 264.1KB*]

New G20 Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism

Posted on July 8, 2017July 8, 2017 by Denise Simon

We, the Leaders of the G20, strongly condemn all terrorist attacks worldwide and stand united and firm in the fight against terrorism and its financing. These atrocious acts have strengthened our resolve to cooperate to enhance our security and protect our citizens. Terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and terrorist safe havens eliminated in every part of the world.
We reaffirm that all measures on countering terrorism need to be implemented in accordance with the UN Charter and all obligations under international law, including international human rights law.
Implementing international commitments and enhancing cooperation
We call for the implementation of existing international commitments on countering terrorism, including the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and compliance with relevant resolutions and targeted sanctions by the UN Security Council relating to terrorism. We commit to continue to support UN efforts to prevent and counter terrorism.
We will address the evolving threat of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from conflict zones such as Iraq and Syria and remain committed to preventing FTFs from establishing a foothold in other countries and regions around the world. We recall UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), which requires a range of actions to better tackle the foreign terrorist fighter threat.
We will facilitate swift and targeted exchanges of information between intelligence and law enforcement and judicial authorities on operational information-sharing, preventive measures and criminal justice response, while ensuring the necessary balance between security and data protection aspects, in accordance with national laws. We will ensure that terrorists are brought to justice.
We will work to improve the existing international information architecture in the areas of security, travel and migration, including INTERPOL, ensuring the necessary balance between security and data protection aspects. In particular, we encourage all members to make full use of relevant information sharing mechanisms, in particular INTERPOL’s information sharing functions.
We call upon our border agencies to strengthen cooperation to detect travel for terrorist purposes, including by identifying priority transit and destination countries of terrorists. We will support capacity building efforts in these countries in areas such as border management, information sharing and watch-list capability to manage the threat upstream. We will promote greater use of customs security programs, including where appropriate, the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Security Programme and Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which focus on strengthening Customs administrations’ capacity to deal with security related issues and managing the cross-border flows of goods, people and means of transport to ensure they comply with the law.
We will address in close coordination the evolving threats and potential vulnerabilities in aviation security systems and exchange information on risk assessments. We recall the UN Security Council’s Resolution 2309 (2016) which urges closer collaboration to ensure security of global air services and the prevention of terrorist attacks. We will promote full implementation of effective and proportionate aviation security measures established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in partnership with all its contracting states as necessary. We call to urgently address vulnerabilities in airport security related measures, such as access control and screening, covered by the Chicago Convention and will act jointly to ensure that international security standards are reviewed, updated, adapted and put in place based on current risks.
We highlight the importance of providing appropriate support to the victims of terrorist acts and will enhance our cooperation and exchange of best practices to this end.
Fighting terrorism finance
We underline our resolve to make the international financial system entirely hostile to terrorist financing and commit to deepening international cooperation and exchange of information, including working with the private sector, which has a critical role in global efforts to counter terrorism financing. We reaffirm our commitment to tackle all sources, techniques and channels of terrorist financing and our call for swift and effective implementation of UNSCR and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards worldwide. We call for strengthening measures against the financing of international terrorist organisations in particular ISIL/ISIS/Daesh, Al Qaida and their affiliates.
There should be no “safe spaces” for terrorist financing anywhere in the world. However, inconsistent and weak implementation of the UN and FATF standards allows them to persist. In order to eliminate all such “safe spaces”, we commit to intensify capacity building and technical assistance, especially in relation to terrorist financing hot-spots, and we support the FATF in its efforts to strengthen its traction capacity and the effectiveness of FATF and FATF-style regional bodies.
We welcome the reforms agreed by the FATF Plenary in June and support the ongoing work to strengthen the governance of the FATF. We also welcome the FATF intention to further explore its transformation into a legal person, which recognises that the FATF has evolved from a temporary forum to a sustained public and political commitment to tackle AML/CFT threats. We also appreciate FATF commencing the membership process for Indonesia that will broaden its geographic representation and global engagement. We ask the FATF to provide an update by the first G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in 2018. We call on all member states to ensure that the FATF has the necessary resources and support to effectively fulfil its mandate.
We welcome that countering terrorist finance remains the highest priority of FATF, and look forward to FATF’s planned outreach to legal authorities, which will contribute to enhanced international cooperation and increased effectiveness in the application of FATF’s standards.
We will advance the effective implementation of the international standards on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements for the purposes of countering financing terrorism.
Low cost attacks by small cells and individuals funded by small amounts of money transferred through a wide range of payment means are an increasing challenge. We call on the private sector to continue to strengthen their efforts to identify and tackle terrorism financing. We ask our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to work with FATF, FSB, the financial sector, Financial Intelligence Units, law enforcement and FinTech firms to develop new tools such as guidance and indicators, to harness new technologies to better track terrorist finance transactions, and to work together with law enforcement authorities to bridge the intelligence gap and improve the use of financial information in counter-terrorism investigations.
We call upon countries to address all alternative sources of financing of terrorism, including dismantling connections, where they exist, between terrorism and transnational organized crime, such as the diversion of weapons including weapons of mass destruction, looting and smuggling of antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, drugs and human trafficking.
Countering radicalization conducive to terrorism and the use of internet for terrorist purposes
Our counterterrorism actions must continue to be part of a comprehensive approach, including combatting radicalization and recruitment, hampering terrorist movements and countering terrorist propaganda. We will exchange best practices on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, national strategies and deradicalisation and disengagement programmes, and the promotion of strategic communications as well as robust and positive narratives to counter terrorist propaganda.
We stress that countering terrorism requires comprehensively addressing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit. It is therefore crucial to promote political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, to resolve armed conflicts, and to facilitate reintegration. We acknowledge that regional and national action plans can contribute to countering radicalisation conducive to terrorism.
We will share knowledge on concrete measures to address threats from returning foreign terrorist fighters and home-grown radicalised individuals. We will also share best practices on deradicalisation and reintegration programmes including with respect to prisoners.
We will work with the private sector, in particular communication service providers and administrators of relevant applications, to fight exploitation of the internet and social media for terrorist purposes such as propaganda, funding and planning of terrorist acts, inciting terrorism, radicalizing and recruiting to commit acts of terrorism, while fully respecting human rights. Appropriate filtering, detecting and removing of content that incites terrorist acts is crucial in this respect. We encourage industry to continue investing in technology and human capital to aid in the detection as well as swift and permanent removal of terrorist content. In line with the expectations of our peoples we also encourage collaboration with industry to provide lawful and non-arbitrary access to available information where access is necessary for the protection of national security against terrorist threats. We affirm that the rule of law applies online as well as it does offline.
We also stress the important role of the media, civil society, religious groups, the business community and educational institutions in fostering an environment which is conducive to the prevention of radicalisation and terrorism.

DPRK Missiles, China and Global Nuclear Footprint and Russia’s Veto

Posted on July 7, 2017July 7, 2017 by Denise Simon

Graphic on the estimated global atomic weapons stockpile

Primer:

After almost five years of difficult negotiations, Russia and China moved to a new level of arms trade in 2015. Russia finally agreed to sell China 24 Sukhoi‑35 (Su-35) combat aircraft and four S-400 SAM systems for approximately USD $7 billion. These are currently among the most advanced weapons Russia produces. This agreement marked a turning point. It was the first significant sale of Russian major weapons to China since the mid-2000s, representing a sizeable addition to Russia’s total annual value of arms exports, which has hovered between USD $13.5 billion and USD $15 billion in recent years.

The agreement could herald a new phase of large sales of Russia’s most sophisticated arms to China. However, it could also be viewed as a last chance for Russia to gain some income from arms sales to China before the latter becomes self-sufficient. The first scenario would fit the picture of warming Russian–Chinese relations, following the crisis in Ukraine. The second scenario is more tightly bound to Russian financial hardships and the difficulties in its arms industry since 2015. This sale could well be the last chance for Russia to engage in a major sale of military equipment to China. At the same time as the Su-35 and S-400 are due for delivery, China will be introducing its own more advanced Jian-20 (J-20) combat aircraft, as well as its own advanced jet engines, large transport aircraft, helicopters and long-range SAM systems—many of which are on a par with or even better than Russian systems.

When it comes to the arms trade, China has not only learned from Russia, but succeeded in challenging it. Given its financial and defence industrial base, China is likely to have more chances to develop new military technologies than Russia. China’s electronics, composites, advanced materials and shipbuilding industries are all more advanced than those in Russia. The size of the Chinese economy means that it has many more resources and much more manpower to invest in research and development. Thus, it is more than likely that China’s military technology will surpass that of Russia on all levels. More detail and history here.

SEOUL, July 7 (Yonhap) — South Korean President Moon Jae-in sought to rally support from other global leaders Friday in condemning North Korea for its recent missile provocation and ridding the communist state of its nuclear ambitions, his presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said.

“It is not a scheduled topic for discussion, but as president of the Republic of Korea I cannot but talk to you about another serious challenge that urgently requires the joint interest and action of the G20,” the South Korean president said in the Leaders’ Retreat on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit held in Hamburg, Germany, referring to South Korea by its official name.

“And that is North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations,” he added, according to a script of his remarks released by Cheong Wa Dae.

Moon’s remarks came after the communist North launched what it claimed to be its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) earlier in the week, prompting fresh condemnations from Seoul and its allies.

In a three-way meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Hamburg on Thursday, the South Korean leader was joined by his U.S. and Japanese counterparts in calling for stronger sanctions by the international community to bring North Korea to a dialogue table to discuss its denuclearization.

“To resolve the North Korean nuclear issue that has become a global threat, the international community will have to put enhanced pressure on North Korea,” partly by issuing a new U.N. Security Council resolution, Moon told other G20 leaders at their retreat.

“By doing so, we must make the North Korean regime realize that its nuclear arms and missiles will never guarantee its existence and come to the dialogue table,” he added.

The South Korean president also rallied support for what he called the “clear determination” of G20 leaders to jointly address the issue at their gathering this week, apparently seeking a joint reaction or a statement from the global leaders condemning the North’s missile provocations.

“I ask for you, G20 leaders’ full interest and support,” he said.

Kim Jong Un’s Big Nuclear Push Is Closing In on America

Bloomberg: Kim Jong Un has sped up North Korea’s nuclear program since he took power in late 2011, testing more powerful weapons and developing longer-range missiles to carry them.

On July 4, North Korea said it had successfully test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile called the Hwasong-14, a claim that brings the isolated state closer to its aim of building a device capable of hitting the U.S. mainland with a nuclear warhead. The United Nations Security Council will hold an emergency meeting later Wednesday after the U.S. confirmed North Korea’s rocket launch was its first intercontinental ballistic missile.

Still, the launch risks a serious escalation with North Korea’s neighbors and the U.S. over its weapons program. The regime is thought to possess rockets that can hit South Korea and Japan with as many as 20 atomic bombs. More here with graphics.

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Meanwhile:

Russia objected Thursday to a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launch because the Kremlin doesn’t agree with the U.S. that the rocket was an intercontinental missile.

According to Reuters, Moscow said it believes North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile on Tuesday.

The Trump administration has confirmed it was, in fact, a longer-range intercontinental missile that has the potential to reach the U.S.

“The rationale is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to its Security Council colleagues, Reuters reported.

“Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue,” the email said.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley criticized Russia’s reluctance to recognize North Korea launched an intercontinental missile capable of reaching the U.S. according to experts, a threshold North Korea has not reached before.

“If you need any sort of intelligence to let you know that the rest of the world sees this as an ICBM, I’m happy to provide it,” she told the Security Council on Wednesday.

Security Council resolutions have to be agreed to by all 15 members.

Reuters reported it’s uncertain if the U.S. will negotiate with Russia to adjust the resolution.