U.S. Puts Former Gitmo Detainee on Terror List, Istanbul Attack

Posted on July 14, 2016July 14, 2016 by Denise Simon

What has he been doing since his release 10 years ago? Planning and recruiting for the Istanbul airport terror attack? And Obama released 3 detainees in 2 days and more to come. What about those ‘forever’ detainees like Khalid Sheik Mohammed? Hummmm

Ex-Gitmo detainee, Islamic State’s leader in Chechnya designated by State Department

The State Department announced today that two jihadists have been added to the US government’s list of designated terrorists.

One of the two, Ayrat Nasimovich Vakhitov, was once detained at Guantanamo and was recently arrested by Turkish authorities. According to Voice of America, Vakhitov is “among 30 people Turkish authorities say they have arrested in connection with” the terrorist attack at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport late last month. No terrorist organization has claimed responsibility for the assault on the airport, which left more than 40 people dead. But it is widely suspected to be the work of the Islamic State.

The second newly-designated terrorist is Aslan Avgazarovich Byutukaev, who leads the jihadists in Chechnya who are loyal to the Islamic State’s so-called Caucasus province.

Former Guantanamo Detainee

Vakhitov (pictured on the right) was held at Guantanamo for less than two years, from June 2002 until February 2004. He was then transferred to Russia. The State Department’s designation page does not say that Vakhitov was once detained at the American facility in Cuba, but The Long War Journal has confirmed that he is the same individual.

The details of his story, as recounted in a leaked Joint Task Force – Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment, are somewhat odd. Vakhitov was “arrested by the Taliban on suspicion of espionage, and incarcerated at the Sarpuza prison complex in Kandahar,” the leaked file reads. He was apparently transferred to Guantanamo because of “his possible knowledge of an American citizen killed” at that same prison “while he was there.”

JTF-GTMO ultimately concluded that Vakhitov was neither affiliated with al Qaeda, nor a Taliban leader. He was recommended for transfer. But JTF-GTMO also thought he would be remain imprisoned inside Russia.

“Because of the Russian government’s agreement to incarcerate this detainee upon his transfer, and provided that he remains incarcerated under the control of the Russian government, the detainee poses no future threat to the U.S. or its allies,” JTF-GTMO’s threat assessment reads.

The State Department says that Vakhitov “is associated with Jaysh al-Muhajirin Wal Ansar” (JMWA, or “the Army of the Emigrants and Helpers”). Part of the original JMWA organization joined the Islamic State, while the rest of the organization continued to operate independently before swearing allegiance to Al Nusrah Front in Sept. 2015. Al Nusrah is al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria and the Islamic State’s rival.

The State Department’s designation page does not mention Vakhitov’s reported arrest in Turkey, but does say he has “used the internet to recruit militants to travel to Syria.”

Islamic State leader in Chechnya

The State Department note Byutukaev was a “prominent leader” in the Islamic Caucasus Emirate (ICE). ICE is openly loyal to al Qaeda, but has suffered a string of defections to the Islamic State.

Russian security forces killed ICE’s top emir and his two successors in less than two years time, from late 2013 until mid-2015. The decapitation strikes likely helped the Islamic State win the loyalty of some of ICE’s most important remaining commanders, including Byutukaev.

Byutukaev, also known as Emir Khamzat, was a close confidant of Dokku Umarov and led ICE’s Riyad-us-Saliheen Martyr Brigade. But Umarov perished sometime in late 2013 or early 2014. His replacement, Aliaskhab Kebekov, more commonly known as Ali Abu Muhammad al Dagestani, was subsequently killed by Russian forces in April 2015.

Less than two months after Kebekov’s demise, Byutukaev officially broke with ICE, declaring himself to be one of Baghdadi’s men.

The pro-al Qaeda contingent in the Caucasus then suffered another blow when Abu Usman, Kebekov’s successor, was hunted down in August 2015. Both Kebekov and Abu Usman were vocal opponents of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s Islamic State, so much so that al Qaeda’s main propaganda arm continues to feature clips of their anti-Baghdadi lectures in its productions.

High value targeting, as it is commonly called, is an essential part of any government’s counterterrorism strategy. But it can lead to unintended consequences as well. In this instance, the deaths of ICE’s top leaders probably helped drive Byutukaev and his comrades into the Islamic State’s arms. The large contingent of fighters from the Caucasus region in the Islamic State’s ranks in Iraq and Syria most likely added to the pressure on the jihadists back home to flip as well.

The State Department notes that Byutukaev is “responsible for directing numerous deadly suicide bombing operations, including the January 2011 attack at the crowded international arrivals hall of Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport.” The bombing killed at least 35 people and wounded more than 100 others.

Umarov, who was ICE’s emir at the time, quickly claimed credit for the airport attack in a video released online.

Umarov also appeared in another video alongside Byutukaev (seen on the left in the photo included here) and a suicide bomber identified only as “Saifullah.” Umarov said that he had visited the Riyad-us-Saliheen Martyr Brigade’s base before sending Saifullah on a “special operation,” meaning the bombing at Domodedovo.

At the end of video, both Umarov and Byutukaev were shown embracing Saifullah. [See LWJ report, Caucasus Emirate leader threatens Russia with ‘a year of blood and tears.’]

“Since becoming an ISIL [Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant] leader in June 2015,” State reports, “Byutukaev has planned attacks on behalf of the group.” One of these operations took place in November 2015, when “Russian Special Forces discovered a large bomb hidden on the side of the road in Kantyshevo, Ingushetiya, Russia.”

The Caucasus “province” was announced in June 2015, after Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani publicly accepted the oaths of allegiance sworn by jihadists throughout the region. The Caucasus branch is reportedly led by Rustam Asilderov, a former ICE leader who defected to the Islamic State in late 2014. Asilderov’s defection set off a firestorm of controversy and bickering among the Caucasus jihadists.

In Sept. 2015, Foggy Bottom designated the Islamic State’s Caucasus “province” as a terrorist organization and also identified other ICE defectors who had joined its cause.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

*****

Aiat Nasimovich Vahitov, also spelled Ayrat Wakhitov or Vahidov (Tatar Cyrillic: Айрат Вахитов, Latin: Ayrat Waxitov) is an ethnic Tatar citizen of Russia who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camp, in Cuba.^[1] He was repatriated with six other Russians in February 2004. Fluent in Arabic, Pashto, Persian, Urdu and Russian, he also spoke basic English.^[2]

On May 15, 2006 the Department of Defense released its first full official list of all the Guantanamo detainees who were held in military custody.^[3] Airat Vakhitov’s name is not on that list. The list includes an individual named Aiat Nasimovich Vahitov.who was born on March 27, 1977, on Naberezhnye Chelny, Tatarstan, Russia.

Russian authorities released the detainees after investigations into whether they had broken any Russian laws.

Vakhitov spoke publicly on June 28, 2005 about torture in Guantanamo when he announced he was planning to sue the United States for his mistreatment.^[4] He was invited, by Amnesty International, to speak about Guantanamo torture, in London, on November 2, 2002.

Geydar Dzhemal, chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia, reported that he was hosting Vakhitov, and another former Guantanamo detainee, Rustam Akhmyarov, following threats by security officials.^[5] According to Dzhemal the security officials had visited Vakhitov, and warned him that he should only talk about torture in Guantanamo Bay, not Russian torture. Dzhemal reported that security officials subsequently seized Vakhitov and Akhmyarov from his apartment on August 29, 2005. He called their seizure a kidnapping because they refused to show their identification. He predicted that the pair would be arrested on trumped up charges, to curtail their human rights activities.

The pair were released from detention on September 2, 2005 More details here.

Leaked U.S. Proposal with Russia on Syria

Posted on July 14, 2016July 14, 2016 by Denise Simon

From the Washington Post For a shorter summary of which the Pentagon is noted to be rejecting and for which Russia denies exists, go here.

It calls for joint bombing operations, a command-and-control headquarters and other synchronized efforts. U.S. and Russian officials with expertise in intelligence, targeting and air operations will “work together to defeat” the extremist groups, the eight-page paper states. Such a partnership would undercut months of U.S. criticism of Russia’s military intervention in Syria. And it would put the U.S. alongside Syrian President Bashar Assad’s chief international backer, despite years of American demands for Assad to leave power.

Russia would be getting what it has wanted since intervening in Syria in late September: An international alliance of sorts. Washington previously rebuffed Moscow’s requests for military cooperation, accusing the Russians of using anti-terrorism objectives as a pretext for protecting Assad’s position. The U.S. also says Syria’s military and Russia’s air force have repeatedly violated truces with moderate rebel groups backed by the U.S. or its allies. More from ABC

Terms of Reference for the Joint Implementation Group

These terms of reference describe organization, functions, and procedures for

the Joint Implementation Group (JIG.)

The purpose of the JIG is to enable expanded coordination between the United

States and the Russian Federation beyond the established safety of flight

procedures. The participants, through the JIG, are to work together to defeat

Jabhat al Nusra and Daesh within the context of strengthening the Cessation of

Hostilities (CoH) and supporting the political transition process outlined in

UNSCR 2254. The United States and the Russian Federation, hereafter referred

to as “the participants”, intend to act in accordance with these terms of

reference. Unless otherwise stated, the participants will conduct their efforts

through the JIG.

The participants are to implement the provisions of the “Approach for Practical

Russian-American Efforts against Daesh and Jabhat al Nusra and Strengthening

the Cessation of Hostilities.”

The participants are to conduct all efforts consistent with the intent to take all

reasonable measures to eliminate non-combatant casualties.

The participants also commit to all efforts, including operations subject to

cooperation or otherwise addressed by these terms of reference, occurring in

compliance with international humanitarian law and the terms of the CoH.

1. JIG Location, Organization and Composition

a. Location. The JIG is to be located in the vicinity of Amman, Jordan.

Participants intend to negotiate their own support requirements with the host

nation.

b. Organization. The participants intend to maintain separate, national

headquarters in which they will install systems to exchange information with their

respective headquarters responsible for tactical actions against Nusra and

Daesh. The participants, through the JIG, intend to establish a coordination

center at which they are to exchange intelligence and operational information.

d. Composition. Participants intend to staff the JIG in numbers sufficient to

accomplish the JIG’s functions. The participants intend to match, as practicable,

the ranks of their counterparts.

i. Staffing. The participants intend to staff the JIG with subject matter

experts and professionals with expertise in intelligence, targeting and air

operations. Intelligence expertise includes knowledge of the disposition,

operations, and tactics of the relevant armed actors in Syria. Targeting

expertise requires familiarity with national procedures to choose, confirm

and prosecute deliberate targets.

ii. Language and Translation. The participants intend to provide

information to the JIG in their native language. Participants are

responsible for translating material received. Participants intend to staff

the JIG with a sufficient number of bilingual personnel familiar with military

intelligence and operational terminology, in order to enable the real-time

translation of conversations and documents.

iii. Senior National Representative. The participants intend to provide

the JIG with senior national representatives — Colonels (0-6) or civilian

employees of the equivalent ranks – with the authority to transmit, on

behalf of their respective operational commanders, their participants’

national decisions or positions.

iv. Intelligence Personnel. The participants intend to staff the JIG with

intelligence personnel who can exchange information and resolve

differences between how the participants represent information -grid

reference systems, place names and other such technical

details. Intelligence personnel are to include subject matter experts Nusra

and Daesh in Syria. The participants, through the JIG, should develop

mutually acceptable formats for information to be exchanged.

v. Operations Representatives. The participants intend to staff the JIG

with operations representatives with expertise in national procedures for

strike planning, targeting, weaponeering, operational law and other

functions. Operations representatives are to resolve differences in how

the parties present information. The participants, through the JIG should

develop mutually acceptable formats for how information is exchanged.

vi. Support Personnel. The participants may staff the JIG with

personnel, as required, to manage logistics, force protection,

communications and other requirements.

2. JIG Role in Military Operations. The participants, through the JIG, should

enable coordination between the participants for military operations against

Nusra. Participants, through the JIG, may work to maximize independent, but

synchronized, efforts against Daesh in Syria. Coordination should begin with

information exchange on both Nusra and Daesh. If national authorities determine

that integrated operations against deliberate targets is in the interest of both

participants, the participants should coordinate procedures to permit integrated

operations.

a. Nusra Targeting. The participants will commit to supporting deliberate

targeting of Nusra. Once senior representatives to the JIG decide that

information exchange has produced commonly understood information,

the participants, through the JIG, intend to begin coordinating the targeting

of Nusra. The participants are to develop target packages for Nusra

targets under their national targeting processes. The participants, through

the JIG, should coordinate on targets that have been developed. Once a

decision has been reached on targets, the participants should coordinate

the participants’ proposals on how these targets are to be addressed.

Initial efforts against mutually-decided-upon targets will be deconflicted by

geography or time. With the exception of imminent threats to the

participants where prior agreement on a target is infeasible, the

participants will only take action against Nusra targets that are agreed to

in advance, pursuant to procedures developed by the JIG and deconflicted

through existing channels.

i. Targeting. The participants are to select and prioritize targets, as

outlined in previous paragraph, at their respective operational

headquarters. The participants are to manage the exchange of

information between targeting organizations.

ii. Actionable Targets. The participants are to coordinate

agreement on Nusra targets that have been deemed “actionable”

through the participants’ respective national processes. National

headquarters are to provide information on actionable targets in a

format to be developed and decided upon by the participants.

Actionable targets are those that have been “vetted” – targets for

which participants have accurate supporting intelligence. The

participants may commit additional Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance resources to support vetting of potential targets

consistent with their respective national priorities. The participants

anticipate “validating” actionable targets under their respective

national processes to ensure they meet the appropriate

commander’s guidance, and may be targeted consistent with

international humanitarian law and applicable rules of engagement.

iii. Target Development. Only those targets that both participants

agree are actionable will be further developed for strikes. The

participants are to facilitate precision targeting by exchanging

mensurated target locations. Actionable targets, as decided

mutually by the participants, are to receive the same treatment as

do other national targets – there is no presumption of priority simply

because the participants mutually decided that a target is

actionable.

b. Daesh Targeting: The participants may communicate targeting

information for targets that permit independent, but synchronized,

operations against Daesh in Syria. The participants are to select and

prioritize targets at their respective operational headquarters. The

participants are to manage the exchange of information between targeting

organizations. Any decision to jointly validate and execute a Daesh target

should be made pursuant to procedures developed by the JIG and

deconflicted through existing channels. [Both participants reserve the right

to conduct unilateral strikes against Daesh targets outside of designated

areas].

c. Operational Deconfliction and Coordination. The JIG is a liaison

body; it is to expose portions of a participant’s targeting and airstrike

planning functions to the other participant. The United States and Russia

should inform one another through the JIG of final plans for operations

against a mutually selected target no later than the day before

execution. The JIG is to communicate assessments of national actions

against Nusra and to the participants. The JIG may communicate

assessments of national actions against Daesh in Syria to the participants.

i. Timelines. The JIG is to operate on timelines that permit the

participants to incorporate information developed by the JIG into

their normal, national procedures.

ii. Strike Details. The participants commit to developing a format

for the information about intended operations to be exchanged,

including the general time of the strike, the intended method of

target attack, general force composition, routing of the strike and

precise details of the target being struck. The participants commit to

ensuring that the intended actions are deconflicted by time and/or

geography. The participants commit to coordinating to ensure strike

packages are not targeted by air defenses of either party or by

those of the regime.

iii. Battle Damage Assessment. Each participant intends to

collect BDA on JIG-coordinated targets it strikes; participants may

choose to expose the details of the BDA they collect. Either

participant may collect BDA on targets the other participant strikes.

iv. Collateral Damage. The participants intend to facilitate the

consideration of any allegations that mutually-decided-upon strikes

caused unacceptable collateral damage or loss of life, and explore

additional measures to avoid such strikes in the future.

v. Coordination of Integrated Operations. At some point,

national authorities may authorize the participants to coordinate on

integrated operations. Should such a decision be taken, the

participants intend to host a conference of national representatives

to develop procedures for integrated operations.

d. Emergent Circumstances.

i. Imminent Threats. The participants can target imminent threats

to their respective personnel if prior agreement on a target is

infeasible. In addition, participants can target imminent threats

against their respective nationals by named senior Shura council

members of Nusra and active external plotters, as agreed by the

United States and Russia.

ii. Other Circumstances. The Syrian military can employ military

action, including air activities, against the Nusra Front outside of

designated areas if Nusra acquires territory there. Russia can use

airpower in defense of Syrian government forces in the event of

attack by Nusra from within a designated area, if agreed in advance

with the United States. All actions should be consistent with the

terms of the cessation of hostilities.

iii. Cessation of Hostilities Violations. The participants may

report information that could corroborate allegations of COH

violations to the Geneva Cell.

3. JIG Role in Monitoring the Grounding of Syrian Air Activities. The

participants intend to collect and report information on regime air activities in

support of monitoring the grounding of Syrian aircraft in designated areas.

a. Information to be Collected. The JIG is to be provided advance

notice of regime air operations that are permitted as exemptions to the

grounding of Syrian military aircraft. The JIG is to maintain a current

Syrian air order of battle; changes to the disposition of regime aircraft are

to be reported daily. The participants should develop measures to help

confirm the Syrian military’s compliance with the grounding. The JIG is to

report regime violations to the participants.

b. Prohibited Activities and Exemptions. The regime is prohibited from

flying in designated areas; designated areas include areas of most

concentrated Nusra presence, areas of significant Nusra presence, and

areas where the opposition is dominant, with some possible Nusra

presence. Exempted circumstances are:

• MEDEVAC

• Humanitarian Assistance

• Personnel recovery

c. Advance Notice of Regime Air Operations. The Russian Federation is to

provide the JIG advance notice of all regime air operations. For exempted

missions, the JIG is to be provided the general time of the Syrian mission,

general force composition and details of the routing of the package no later than

the day prior to execution. Routing for operations in areas under Daesh control

from areas under regime control is to be provided to the JIG in advance of such

operations taking place, no later than the day prior to execution

Approach for Practical Russian-American Cooperation against Daesh and

Jabhat al Nusra and Strengthening the Cessation of Hostilities

The following is designed to allow Russia and the U.S. to intensify joint and

mutual efforts to bring about the destruction of Nusra and Daesh in the context of

a strengthened COH with all COH parties adhering to COH terms.

To this end, Russia and the U.S. reconfirm their commitment to intensifying

support and assistance to regional allies to help them prevent the flow of fighters,

weapons, or financial support to UN designated terrorist groups across the

Syrian border.

Delineation of territories controlled by Daesh, Nusra, and moderate opposition

forces remains a key priority. Nusra shall enjoy no safe haven anywhere within

Syria.

Russia and the United States will also work in parallel to bring about the political

transition process as outlined in UNSCR 2254.

Mechanisms:

1) Russia and the United States will intensify their efforts to ensure full

compliance with the COH, including the suspension of all offensive ground

and air operations against signatories to the COH and civilians in Syria.

2) In the context of a strengthened COH, which will have been restored

with the target of reaching the level that had been achieved in late February

and maintained for a period of at least 7 days, the United States and Russia

will establish a Joint Implementation Group (JIG) comprised of subject matter

experts on Syria and professionals with expertise on targeting. The JIG is to

be established NLT [DATE] and located at [LOCATION].

3) The JIG is to take on the following tasks, in sequence:

a) Complete, to the extent possible, no later than five days after formation of

the JIG, a common map of territories with high concentrations of Nusra

formations, to include areas where Nusra formations are in close proximity to

opposition formations, for precise target development.

b) Share intelligence and develop actionable targets for military action against

Nusra, including, but not limited to, leadership targets, training camps, logistical

depots, supply lines, and headquarters.

c) Designate a set of targets for airstrikes by the Russian Aerospace Forces

and/or U.S. military forces related to Jabhat al-Nusra operations in designated

areas. Designated areas include areas of most concentrated Nusrah Front

presence, areas of significant Nusrah Front presence, and areas where the

opposition is dominant, with some possible Nusrah Front presence. Even prior to

the establishment of the JIG, technical experts from the U.S. and Russia will plot

the geo-coordinates of these designated areas.

d) Devise mechanisms to monitor and enforce the Syrian military’s cessation

of military air activity over the designated areas described in paragraph c, with

appropriate non-combat exceptions to be decided.

d) Decide on a date, shortly after the initial set of targets is agreed, to

simultaneously: 1) begin Russian and/or U.S. strikes against agreed Nusra

targets, and 2) stop all Syrian military air activities – fixed and rotary wing – in

agreed designated areas, with appropriate exceptions for non-combat purposes.

e) If Syrian military activity in conflict with paragraph 3.d or airstrikes in conflict

with paragraph 5 occur, either participant may pull out of the JIG.

4) The process of target development through the JIG and airstrikes

against Nusra targets by Russian Aerospace Forces and/or U.S. military

forces will be ongoing and continuous. The JIG is to exchange information on

the effects of targeting Nusra and the developing situation on the ground.

5) With the exception of imminent threats to the United States or Russia

where prior agreement on a target is infeasible, Russia and the United States

will only take action against Nusra targets that are agreed to in advance and

pursuant to appropriate procedures through existing de-confliction channels.

6) The JIG will also work to maximize independent but synchronized

efforts against Daesh.

7) All efforts outlined above will be conducted in a manner consistent with

the Laws of Armed Conflict and full implementation of the cessation of

hostilities.

8) Compliance with the CoH will be required for this understanding to

remain in effect.

9) Modalities for the mechanism described above will be further developed

in bilateral negotiations to be concluded as soon as possible given the

urgency expressed by both Russia and the U.S.

10) The steps outlined above are intended as steps toward a more

comprehensive understanding between the U.S. and Russia, with a target

date ofJuly 31, 2016, on three inter-related issues designed to produce a

durable end of the conflict and the defeat of Daesh and Nusrah:

a) military and intelligence cooperation between Russia and the U.S. to defeat

Daesh and Nusrah;

b) translation of the CoH into a durable, nationwide ceasefire, phased with

steps on the political transition, inclusive of provisions on the disposition and

separation of forces, control of heavy weapons, regulation of the flow of weapons

into Syria , independent monitoring and verification, and enforcement; and

c) a framework on political transition in Syria consistent with UNSCR 2254, to

include provisions on how and when a transitional government with full executive

authority formed on the basis of mutual consent will be established, security and

intelligence institutions will be reformed, and constitutional and electoral

processes will be conducted.

But John Kerry, Iran Does Support al Qaeda

Posted on July 13, 2016July 13, 2016 by Denise Simon

Primer:

The State Department confirmed that Iran continues to work with Al-Qaeda elements, despite
their expressed hostility towards one another. It stated: “Iran remained unwilling to bring to
justice senior Al-Qaeda (AQ) members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify
those senior members in its custody.
Iran allowed AQ facilitators Muhsin al-Fadhli and Adel Radi Saq al-Wahabi al-Harbi to operate a
core facilitation pipeline through Iran, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and
also to Syria.

Al-Fadhli is a veteran AQ operative who has been active for years. Al-Fadhli began working with the Iran-based AQ facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by Iranian authorities. He was released in 2011 and assumed leadership of the Iran-based AQ facilitation network.” Clarion Project

Top Intel Official: Al Qaeda Worked on WMD in Iran

New evidence of the bin Laden-Iran connection.

WeeklyStandard: Al Qaeda operatives based in Iran worked on and biological weapons, according to a letter written to Osama bin Laden that is described in a new book by a top former U.S. intelligence official.

The letter was captured by a U.S. military sensitive site exploitation team during the raid on bin Laden’s Abbottabad headquarters in May 2011. It is described in Field of Fight, out Tuesday from Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Michael Ledeen of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“One letter to bin Laden reveals that al Qaeda was working on chemical and biological weapons in Iran,” Flynn writes.

Flynn’s claim, if true, significantly advances what we know about al Qaeda’s activity in Iran. The book was cleared by the intelligence community’s classification review process. And U.S. intelligence sources familiar with the bin Laden documents tell us the disclosure on al Qaeda’s WMD work is accurate.

Flynn notes that only a small subset of bin Laden’s files have been released to the public. The “Defense Intelligence Agency’s numerous summaries and analyses of the files remain classified,” too, Flynn writes. “But even the public peek gives us considerable insight into the capabilities of this very dangerous global organization.”

It’s not just al Qaeda.

“There’s a lot of information on Iran in the files and computer discs captured at the Pakistan hideout of Osama bin Laden,” Flynn writes in the introduction. The authors note that the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda “has always been strained” and “[s]ometimes bin Laden himself would erupt angrily at the Iranians.” Previously released documents and other evidence show that al Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat in order to force a hostage exchange and bin Laden was very concerned about the Iranians’ ability to track his family members.

And yet the book makes clear that Flynn believes there is much more to the al Qaeda-Iran relationship than the public has been told. And that’s not an accident. Obama administration “censors have been busy,” Flynn writes, blocking the release of the bin Laden documents to the public and, in some cases, to analysts inside the U.S. intelligence community. “Some of it—a tiny fraction—has been declassified and released, but the bulk of it is still under official seal. Those of us who have read bin Laden’s material know how important it is…”

Not surprisingly, Obama administration officials bristle at Flynn’s characterization of their lack of transparency and lack of urgency on jihadists and their state sponsors. “Mike Flynn, in true Kremlin form, has been peddling these baseless conspiracy theories for years. Anyone who thinks Iran was or is in bed with al Qaeda doesn’t know much about either,” an Obama administration official told THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

It’s an odd line of attack, given the fact that the Obama administration has repeatedly accused Iran of directly aiding al Qaeda. The Treasury and State Departments publicly accused the Iranian regime of allowing al Qaeda to operate inside Iran in: July 2011, December 2011, February 2012,July 2012, October 2012, May 2013, January 2014, February 2014, April 2014, and August 2014. In addition, in congressional testimony in February 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper described the relationship as a “marriage of convenience.”

Asked about the administration’s own repeated statements pointing to the Iranian regime’s deal with al Qaeda, the administration official who dismissed Flynn’s claim as a “baseless conspiracy” theory declined to comment further.

The Flynn/Ledeen claim about al Qaeda’s WMD work in Iran comes with an interesting wrinkle. The authors preface their disclosure of al Qaeda’s work on “chemical and biological weapons in Iran” by suggesting that the revelation was included in documents already public.

But the only document released to date that seems to touch on the subject is a March 28, 2007, letter to an al Qaeda operative known as “Hafiz Sultan.” The letter, which discussed the possibility of Iran-based al Qaeda operatives using chlorine gas on Kurdish leaders and includes a likely reference to Atiyah ‘Abd-al-Rahman, was released by the administration via the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point in May 2012. President Obama’s Treasury Department has claimed that Rahman was appointed by Osama bin Laden “to serve as al Qaeda’s emissary in Iran, a position which allowed him to travel in and out of Iran with the permission of Iranian officials.” It is not, however, addressed to bin Laden and it does not include a reference to biological weapons.

And while the U.S. Treasury and State Department have repeatedly sanctioned al Qaeda’s operatives inside Iran and offered rewards for information on their activities, as noted, statements from Treasury and the State Department do not mention al Qaeda’s “chemical and biological weapons” work inside Iran.

The takeaway: It does not appear that the al Qaeda document referenced by Flynn has been released by the U.S. government.

Flynn and others who have seen the documents say there are more explosive revelations in the bin Laden files kept from the public. Those already released give us a hint. One document, released in 2015, is a letter presumably written by Osama bin Laden to the “Honorable brother Karim.” The recipient of the October 18, 2007, missive, “Karim,” was likely an al Qaeda veteran known Abu Ayyub al Masri, who led al Qaeda in the Iraq (AQI) at the time.

Bin Laden chastised the AQI leader for threatening to attack Iran. The al Qaeda master offered a number of reasons why this didn’t make sense. “You did not consult with us on that serious issue that affects the general welfare of all of us,” bin Laden wrote. “We expected you would consult with us for these important matters, for as you are aware, Iran is our main artery for funds, personnel, and communication, as well as the matter of hostages.”

That language from bin Laden sounds a lot like the language the Obama administration used in July 2011, when a statement from the U.S. Treasury noted that the network in Iran “serves as the core pipeline through which Al Qaeda moves money, facilitators and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia.”

David Cohen, who was then a top Treasury official and is now the number two official at the CIA, told us back then: “There is an agreement between the Iranian government and al Qaeda to allow this network to operate. There’s no dispute in the intelligence community on this.”

Why, then, is the Obama administration attempting to dismiss the cooperative relationship between Iran and al Qaeda as a “baseless conspiracy?” Good question.

And it’s one that releasing the rest of the documents could help answer.

Note: Flynn’s co-author Michael Ledeen is a colleague of Thomas Joscelyn at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

****

Most recently, in September, the Obama administration launched missile strikes against al Qaeda’s so-called Khorasan Group in Syria. The administration pointed to indicating that this cadre of “core” al Qaeda operatives was planning mass killings in the West, and possibly even in the United States. Two of the terrorists who lead the Khorasan Group formerly headed al Qaeda’s operations in Iran. Tellingly, Iran allowed this pair to continue their fight against the West, even as they have battled Iran’s chief allies in Syria.

Obama’s Treasury Department first publicly recognized the relationship between the Iranian regime and al Qaeda on July 28, 2011. Treasury added six al Qaeda operatives to the U.S. government’s list of designated terrorists. The principal terrorist among them is known as Yasin al-Suri, “a prominent Iran-based al Qaeda facilitator” who operates “under an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian government.” Treasury described al Qaeda’s presence in Iran as a “core pipeline” and “a critical transit point for funding to support al Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Treasury made it clear that other high-level al Qaeda members were actively involved in shuttling cash and recruits across Iran.

Facebook Faces $1 Billion Lawsuit, Aids Terror

Posted on July 12, 2016July 12, 2016 by Denise Simon

Privacy is one thing, but offering encrypted platforms with no oversight for terror communications is quite another. Since at least 2014, Islamic State, al Qaeda and al Nusra have all used Facebook and other social media platforms where Twitter has been especially uncooperative with security and investigation officials fighting against terrorist exploitation. Is it really a 1st Amendment protection when communications are generated by declared enemy combatants? Then there is the New Black Panthers and Black Lives Matters. The debate continues.

Due mostly to Edward Snowden revealing abilities of the United States to capture intelligence of terror networks, global terrorists have successfully sought other platforms.

Some popular social media platforms are seeing a drop in use by terror groups, yet there are countless others replacing them including apps like Telegram and WhatsApp. Islamic State has a robust program on these apps for their sex trade.

Facebook began rolling out a new end-to-end encryption feature on Friday called “secret conversations” with the goal of making users feel more comfortable chatting about sensitive subjects in the app.

“We’ve heard from you that there are times when you want additional safeguards — perhaps when discussing private information like an illness or a health issue with trusted friends and family, or sending financial information to an accountant,” the company said in a release announcing the new feature.

With the new feature, Facebook Messenger’s 900 million users can choose to encrypt specific conversations so that the messages can only be read on one specific device. Facebook is also giving users the option to determine how long each message can be read for. More from CNN

Families of Victims of Hamas Terror Sue Facebook for $1 Billion

PJMedia: Facebook is being hit with a $1 billion lawsuit after allegedly allowing the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas use its platform to plot attacks in Israel and the West Bank that killed and wounded Americans. According to Bloomberg News: “Plaintiffs include the families of Yaakov Naftali Fraenkel, a 16-year-old abducted and murdered in June 2014 after hitching a ride in the West Bank, and 3-year-old Chaya Braun, whose stroller was struck intentionally by a Palestinian driver in October 2014 at a train station in Jerusalem.”

“Facebook has knowingly provided material support and resources to Hamas in the form of Facebook’s online social network platform and communication services,” making it liable for the violence against the five Americans, according to the lawsuit sent to Bloomberg by the office of the Israeli lawyer on the case, Nitsana Darshan-Leitner.“Simply put, Hamas uses Facebook as a tool for engaging in terrorism,” it said.

Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S., European Union and Israel. The suit said the group used Facebook to share operational and tactical information with members and followers, posting notices of upcoming demonstrations, road closures, Israeli military actions and instructions to operatives to carry out the attacks.

Mushir al-Masri, a senior Hamas leader, said by phone that “suing Facebook clearly shows the American policy of fighting freedom of the press and expression” and is evidence of U.S. prejudice against the group and “its just cause.”

It’s not at all clear that Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg — an influential Obama ally — would disagree with al-Masri. It’s not clear that the president would either.

While Hamas has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State since 1997 President Obama and his national security team seem to have a far more favorable view of them. Rather than reject the Hamas and the Palestinian Authority unity government that was formed in 2014, the Obama administration continued to fund it to the tune of $500 million a year.

This alarmed American lawmakers so much, 88 senators from across party lines sent a message of “grave concern” to the White House, warning that the new PA unity effort might jeopardize direct negotiations with Israel. “Any assistance should only be provided when we have confidence that this new government is in full compliance with the restrictions contained in current law,” the letter read. More here.

Merkel of Germany Admits Terrorists Among Refugees

Posted on July 12, 2016July 12, 2016 by Denise Simon

Can she be impeached? Do they do that in Germany? Is Merkel concerned about the security of her citizens and country at all? She and Barack Obama have the same attitude…a free for all for migrants…

‘Terrorists’ smuggled into Europe with refugees, Merkel says

Reuters: Militant groups smuggled some of their members into Europe in the wave of migrants who have fled from Syria, German Chancellor Angela said on Monday.

“In part, the refugee flow was even used to smuggle terrorists,” Merkel told a rally of her Christian Democrats in eastern Germany.

More than 1 million migrants arrived in Germany last year, many of them Syrians.

***** Sure wish the study below polled the thoughts of Americans, but then the political elitist class in Washington DC would spin the results anyway….right? We are all citizens of the world now….

Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs

Sharp ideological divides across EU on views about minorities, diversity and national identity

PewResearch: The recent surge of refugees into Europe has featured prominently in the anti-immigrant rhetoric of right-wing parties across the Continent and in the heated debate over the UK’s decision to exit the European Union. At the same time, attacks in Paris and Brussels have fueled public fears about terrorism. As a new Pew Research Center survey illustrates, the refugee crisis and the threat of terrorism are very much related to one another in the minds of many Europeans. In eight of the 10 European nations surveyed, half or more believe incoming refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country.

But terrorism is not the only concern people have about refugees. Many are also worried that they will be an economic burden. Half or more in five nations say refugees will take away jobs and social benefits. Hungarians, Poles, Greeks, Italians and French identify this as their greatest concern. Sweden and Germany are the only countries where at least half say refugees make their nation stronger because of their work and talents. Fears linking refugees and crime are much less pervasive, although nearly half in Italy and Sweden say refugees are more to blame for crime than other groups.

Most of the recent refugees to Europe are arriving from majority-Muslim nations, such as Syria and Iraq. Among Europeans, perceptions of refugees are influenced in part by negative attitudes toward Muslims already living in Europe. In Hungary, Italy, Poland and Greece, more than six-in-ten say they have an unfavorable opinion of the Muslims in their country – an opinion shared by at least one-in-four in each nation polled.

For some Europeans, negative attitudes toward Muslims are tied to a belief that Muslims do not wish to participate in the broader society. In every country polled, the dominant view is that Muslims want to be distinct from the rest of society rather than adopt the nation’s customs and way of life. Six-in-ten or more hold this view in Greece, Hungary, Spain, Italy and Germany. Notably, the percentage saying that Muslims want to remain distinct has actually declined since 2005 in four out of five countries where trend data are available. The biggest drop has been in Germany, where the share of the public expressing this view has declined from 88% to 61%.

While most Europeans think the recent surge of refugees could lead to more terrorism, there is less alarm that Muslims already living on the Continent might sympathize with extremists. The percentage of the public saying that most or many Muslims in their country support groups like ISIS is less than half in every nation polled. Still, 46% of Italians, 37% of Hungarians, 35% of Poles and 30% of Greeks think Muslims in their countries are favorably inclined toward such extremist groups. On these and other questions included on the poll, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland often stand out for expressing greater concern and more negative views about refugees and minority groups.

Across the EU nations surveyed, the refugee crisis has brought into sharp relief deep ideological divides over views of minorities and diversity. On nearly all of the questions analyzed in this report, people on the ideological right express more concerns about refugees, more negative attitudes toward minorities and less enthusiasm for a diverse society.

For example, negative opinions about Muslims are much more common among respondents who place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum. In Greece, 81% of those on the right express an unfavorable view of Muslims, compared with 50% of those on the left. Significant right-left gaps in attitudes toward Muslims are also found in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, France and the United Kingdom.

Similarly, supporters of far-right political parties hold much more negative attitudes toward refugees and Muslims and are much more skeptical about the benefits of a diverse society. For instance, fears that the surge of refugees will lead to more terrorism and harm the economy are considerably more widespread among supporters of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK and the National Front in France.

Ideology is not the only dividing line in European attitudes, however. On many questions, education and age also matter, with older people and less-educated individuals expressing more negative opinions about refugees and minorities.

These are among the key findings from a new survey by Pew Research Center, conducted in 10 European Union nations and the United States among 11,494 respondents from April 4 to May 12, 2016, before the Brexit referendum in the UK and terrorist attacks at the Istanbul Atatürk Airport, both of which took place in late June. The survey includes countries that account for 80% of the EU-28 population and 82% of the EU’s gross domestic product.

Along with worries about refugees and minorities, the survey finds mixed views regarding the overall value of cultural diversity. When asked whether having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in their country makes their society a better place to live, a worse place or does not make much difference either way, over half of Greeks and Italians and about four-in-ten Hungarians and Poles say growing diversity makes things worse.

Relatively few Europeans believe diversity has a positive impact on their countries. At 36%, Sweden registers the highest percentage that believes an increasingly diverse society makes their country a better place to live. In many countries, the prevailing view is that diversity makes no difference in the quality of life.

Negative attitudes toward minorities common in many nations

Muslims are not the only minority group viewed unfavorably by substantial percentages of Europeans. In fact, overall, attitudes toward Roma are more negative than attitudes toward Muslims. Across the 10 nations polled, a median of 48% express an unfavorable opinion of Roma in their country. Fully 82% hold this view in Italy, while six-in-ten or more say the same in Greece, Hungary and France. Negative views of Roma have gone up since 2015 in Spain (+14 percentage points), the UK (+8) and Germany (+6). Greeks have also become increasingly unfavorable (+14 points) since 2014, the last time Greece was included in the survey.

Negative ratings for Muslims have also increased over the past 12 months in the UK (+9 percentage points), Spain (+8) and Italy (+8), and are up 12 points in Greece since 2014. In France – where coordinated terrorist attacks by ISIS at the Bataclan concert hall and elsewhere in Paris in November left 130 people dead – unfavorable opinions are up slightly since last year (+5 points).

Negative attitudes toward Jews are much less common. A median of only 16% have an unfavorable opinion of Jews in their country. Still, a majority of Greeks give Jews in their country a negative rating, and one-in-five or more express this view in Hungary, Poland, Italy and Spain. Unfavorable attitudes toward Jews have been relatively stable since 2015.

Language, customs and tradition seen as central to national identity

Opinions vary about the key components of national identity, but European publics clearly agree that language is fundamental. Across the 10 EU countries surveyed, a median of 97% think that being able to speak the national language is important for truly being able to identify with their nationality. A median of 77% say this is very important. Majorities believe it is very important in every nation polled.

There is also a strong cultural component to national identity. A median of 86% believe sharing national customs and traditions is important, with 48% saying this is very important. Fully 68% in Hungary say sharing national customs and traditions is very important for being truly Hungarian, and 66% express similar sentiments in Greece. In contrast, fewer than four-in-ten consider sharing these traditions and customs very important in the Netherlands (37%), Germany (29%) and Sweden (26%).

There is less agreement about the need to be born in a given country. Still, a median of 58% say it is important for someone to be born in a country to be truly considered a national of that country; a third think this is very important. Religion is generally seen as less central to national identity. However, it is an essential factor to many in Greece, where 54% say it is very important to be Christian to be truly Greek.

To further explore this topic, we constructed an index based on the four questions we asked regarding national identity (importance of speaking the national language, sharing customs, being native born and being Christian). The results highlight the extent to which exclusionary views vary across the EU. By far, restrictive views are most common in Hungary, Greece, Poland and Italy; they are least common in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands.

More to the study here.