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CENTCOM Cmdr. Votel Explains What is Ahead in the World

CentCom commander Votel steels for next chapter in world’s most dangerous region

TAMPA — As the man in charge of U.S. Central Command, Army Gen. Joseph Votel oversees American military operations in 20 nations that comprise the world’s most dangerous and complex region.

Army Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command, sat down for an interview Wednesday with the Tampa Bay Times in his office at MacDill Air Force base. [MONICA HERNDON   |   Times]


Army Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of the U.S. Central Command, sat down for an interview Wednesday with the Tampa Bay Times in his office at MacDill Air Force base. [MONICA HERNDON | Times]

A Minnesota native and former commando chief with 37 years in the service, Votel helps develop plans to battle Islamic State, the Taliban and other jihadis. All the while, he must navigate challenges from the Russians and Iranians, political tensions among U.S. allies, and the regional fallout of the enduring Arab-Israeli strife.

On Wednesday, Votel, 59, sat down with the Tampa Bay Times in his office at MacDill Air Force Base for a rare one-on-one interview to talk about his 16 months on the job. He discussed a wide range of issues over nearly an hour.

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Among the highlights: Iraqi forces will need to shift from combat mode to security mode to protect against a shrinking ISIS, the military is expanding its work with the Russians against a common enemy, and the Iranian regime remains the most destabilizing influence in the CentCom region.

Talk about the new authorities you have been given under the Trump administration.

The president has granted authority down to the secretary of defense (allowing) us to be more agile and more responsive to a very complex, developing situation. We want to enable our people forward with all authorities and decision-making capability they have and I think we have done that. And that’s certainly been reinforced by the new administration but frankly it’s something we started under the old administration.

Can you offer an example of how that’s worked?

Sure, the most pertinent example is Mosul. We are advising, accompanying, assisting, enabling Iraqi forces all around that city. That means providing (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) support for them, fire support for them, and in order to provide that most effectively, you really have to allow our advisors that are with them to make those decisions, to be responsive, to take advantage of opportunities we see, to help forestall advances by the enemy. We can’t make that decision back at a centralized in Iraq and certainly not back at here in Tampa or Washington or anywhere else.

ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi — dead or alive? And does it matter anymore?

I have no idea. I have nothing to tell me one way or the other. I certainly have seen all the reporting on it. I guess in one extent it does matter. I hope that he is (dead), frankly. I think it could be viewed as another blow to them. That said, we’ve been doing this long enough to know that leaders are killed and we’ve killed plenty of them. And that there’s always somebody who is going to step up into those positions so we shouldn’t think that just killing Baghdadi is the key here. He can be replaced. So in that regard, it may not matter as much.

After the fall of Mosul and defeat of ISIS, how can Iraq come together with so many divergent interests?

In many ways this is the hard part of what we are doing here. The political aspect of this, the humanitarian aspect of this, is always more difficult than the military things, so this is the challenge before us. The political side always takes a bit longer. As we went into the fight in Mosul, we had very good cooperation between the government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government. Absolutely vital for success was the ability of leaders to come together and set aside their differences for a period of time to beat ISIS. I consider that to be a very successful approach here, and it has given the ability now, as we move into the more difficult political aspects, a way to address that. Certainly there are things that are going to have to be addressed. It won’t be easy, but there’s a basis for doing it.

On Sept. 27, the Kurds will hold a referendum about independence. How much of an additional challenge is that?

Being able to have the Kurdish Regional Government and the government of Iraq work together on Mosul was a key factor in the overall success of this, so I’m concerned the referendum could add a little friction into the remaining operations here that could effect things. But I am very trustful in our diplomatic efforts to address that I know there are things ongoing here. The timing may not be best for what we still have left to be done here but I am hopeful that with our engagement we will minimize that.

How concerned are you about ISIS 2.0 and what can be done to prevent that?

I think we should all be concerned about that. One thing we have learned about this organization is that they are adaptive. I think what we’ll see now is smaller cells, we’ll see stay-behind elements, we’ll see pockets that will begin to take on more of an insurgent-guerilla type approach as opposed to an Islamic army that we saw back in the beginning. We have to be prepared for that, so that some of the things that we will do as we look to that is we will look to adjust some of our coalition training efforts for the Iraqi security forces to ensure that can move from doing large-scale operations like they have been doing in places like Mosul to now doing wide-area security operations, where they have to go out and have to address a network, address small elements. We really need to return to that.

Classic Special Operations Forces missions?

More of what perhaps we have seen in the past, and an important point is keeping the pressure on. The people of Iraq should take great pride in what they have accomplished and the coalition should take great pride in what they’ve enabled, but we can’t rest on our laurels. There’s still a lot of fighting left to do, a lot left to be done in the city of Mosul. There’s certainly a lot more to be done in Ninewa and across the country and in Syria as well. So we should reflect on what we’ve accomplished but we have to stay on this more until its over.

How do you engage the Sunnis?

That has to come through the government of Iraq. I think the prime minster, a very good man, recognizes the importance of that and hopefully he will continue to do that. It is pretty noteworthy to watch him up in city of Mosul, which is largely a Sunni city, and how well he was received up there and how he reached out and did all that. These are all the earmarks of a leader at war. He was performing as the commander in chief. I would also highlight that one of the things again on this point of the prime minister as commander in chief, one of the things he was absolutely strident on throughout this, was as we conducted the operation in Mosul, was ensuring that we did everything we could to protect that population up there, a population that was largely Sunni. And this was a horrible, challenging fight up there, and certainly, there have been civilian casualties. But I will tell you, through the prime minister’s leadership and his direction to his leaders and our support for them, I think we should be very proud of the way we conducted ourselves.

The battle for Raqqa is now on. How long will that take?

We are not going to make any time estimates on this. You just watched what took place in (Mosul), a city of 1.6 million, 1.7 million people. It took nine months. Raqqa is probably 300,000 to 400,000 people, but it’s in an area that again has had a long time to prepare and the forces we are operating in Syria are different than the forces we are operating with in Iraq. We’re not talking about the Iraqi army that has ministries to lead it. Now we are talking about a much more indigenous force made up largely of Syrian Arabs and Kurds — and Kurds are part of that indigenous force. They don’t have all the trappings of a big army, so I think it is important for people to understand the context of what we are doing here. A large city, an indigenous force, a well-prepared enemy. And by the way, an enemy now that has suffered a significant defeat, so they are running out of space there. We would expect they are going to fight harder, and more aggressively than they are and a large part of that is going to be exploited again. So I think it is going to be a challenging fight and it will take months.

Talk about the cease fire in southern Syria. How’s that working and what do you have to do?

Obviously, I would tell you we are paying very, very close attention, but there are no immediate equities for CentCom or the Department of Defense. That’s still very much being worked out. We have not been told to do anything with respect to that.

What are your thoughts on working with the Russians?

The word we use is not cooperation, but it is deconfliction and that is principally what we are doing. I have characterized this interchange as being very professional military to military interchange and I think trust certainly has to be earned over time here. But I will tell you the deconfliction line that we have had in place and has become more robust over time, meaning that not only do our air components talk to each other but (Army Lt. Gen. Stephen) Townsend (in charge of the ground war against Islamic State) now has the ability to talk to his counterpart.

As the White House looks at other options for working with Russians in Syria, are you comfortable sharing intelligence with them?

We don’t share any intelligence with them. I’m not authorized to do that. That’s not the nature of the relationship.

If the White House said it wanted some sharing of intelligence with the Russians, would you be comfortable with that?

If we are directed, we certainly would.

Talk about Iran and your concerns about their influence in the region.

I think Iranian influence is significant in the region, and as I have said and others have said, Iran is perhaps the most destabilizing. I should say the Iranian regime, not the Iranian people. I want to make sure I call a distinction between that. The Iranian people are culturally rich and deep and have a place in the region here, but the Iranian regime and their activities, particularly those under the Qods Force (special forces) element I think are the most destabilizing factor in the region long-term.

As the battle space shrinks and so many groups are fighting over the same dirt, and nations outside your region get involved, like Turkey and Israel, how concerned are you about something going wrong?

This is always present and when you look at the layers of complexity in a place like Syria, you’ve got extremists, a civil war, you’ve got ethno-sectarian challenges, whether Arabs and Kurds or Sunni and Shia or Turks and Kurds. Then there is the influence of state actors like Russia and Iran and you have legitimate concerns from a country like Turkey, for example. They have a very legitimate concern about terrorism that emanates from organizations like the PKK and other things there that I think are a concern. The concern for us is that when we do things, they have second or third order of effects that trip over into these other layers of complexity and really make things much more difficult to work. And that’s why I think the importance of deconfliction lines, the ability to talk, to make sure that, hey, this is what we are doing, here’s where we are focused — it has allowed us to prevent escalation, escalatory events, in some situations. I think it has been very, very, very vital.

The situation with Syrian Kurdish allies must be particularly vexing given the Turkish feelings towards them and the fact that they are also among the best fighting forces as allies.

We certainly acknowledge the Turkish concern. I think as you’ve seen, (Defense) Secretary (James) Mattis and a variety of others do and we support it 100 percent. Our intention is to be as transparent and as clear in terms of what we are doing here as we can be and I think that is working for us and again that’s another way of helping work through this complexity.

What additional complexities do the Israelis, who’ve fired on Syrian regime targets, present?

You just highlighted the complexity. One of the underlying challenges of course has been not only the Israeli-Palestinian issue but the Israeli-Arab issue that is an underlying current for a long time in this particular theater, so it certainly adds another level of complexity on top of all the blankets of complexity we have here that we have to be cognizant of. And again, we have to communicate and make sure people understand what’s happening here so I think it does highlight it.

Given the shared concern about Iran, do you see greater cooperation between Israel and Sunni nations in the region?

I think there is an opportunity, certainly, for that and I think that’s probably a better question for Israel or the other nations there to answer. But we certainly would encourage that.

Lets talk about the situation between Qatar and the nations blockading it. You have to work with all those nations. How is it going?

There have been some impacts, they’ve been mitigable to this particular point, but it is concerning to us. I’d prefer as a military man to see these differences addressed in a different way than perhaps they are now, through dialogue and discussion as opposed to some of the approaches that have been chosen. Nonetheless, that’s been done and we are where we are here, so I am grateful to our Department of State to get out there and help us work through some of these things and do that and help minimize the impact of what’s going on.

You said there are some impacts. What are those impacts?

The impacts are it potentially takes people’s focus off the common things we really want to be working on, like Iran, for example. It creates a disunity among a group of people that we rely on here. And again, to this point, these have been very mitigable in terms of what we are doing, so it is not significantly impacting what we are doing. But over time I think perhaps it could.

In a worst case scenario, what could that be?

At the very extreme of this it could be more direct action between these parties. The other thing more probable is it could lead to more lack of cooperation. I mean, we rely on all these partners. It’s no surprise that we have a big airbase in Qatar that supports our operations across the region, so we rely on that to make sure we can pursue our objectives and the common objectives here. I am concerned long-term a rift like this can, I think, effect relationships.

Let’s shift to Afghanistan, where there are still nearly 9,000 U.S. troops with plans to send more. Can the Afghans handle the fight?

What you seen over last couple of years is that the Afghan security forces are in the lead. They have been able to deal with the situations they are dealing with (like) attempts by the Taliban to come in and take over major urban areas. We’ve seen the Afghans be able to get after that and to take areas back and to prevent some of that. Where they’ve tried to expand into areas that are of importance to the Afghan government, around the capital — to the north, on the south, out in the east and in some areas they’ve been able to do some operations to take that — they’ve had, I think some success against the ISIS elements that exist in Afghanistan so they’ve done that. The Afghans have taken a lot of casualties. They’ve paid a very, very heavy price for that and they are engaged every day. And so that toll that takes over time is significant and it’s resulted in a situation where there is a bit of a stalemate here and so what we have to look at is how we help them move forward over that

Can you talk about your recommendation to the president for new troop levels in Afghanistan and what do you want those troops to do?

A: I won’t talk about what my specific military advice was up the chain of command that is still under consideration, so it is really inappropriate for me to talk about my specific (recommendations). I am satisfied that both (Army) Gen. (John) Nicholson (commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan) and I have had our ability to have input into the process and I am confident that the chain of command will take that on board and make some decisions here in terms of that. But that’s still underway here right now.

Can you talk about what the additional troops should do?

I think what we have to do is look at how we optimize the successes that the Afghan security forces have achieved, so I think one of the bright spots that you see in the Afghan security forces is their special operations capability. I think we need to look at how do we enable that more in the future. They’ve been very good. They’ve been the principle response force They’ve been a key element here to the fight as we’ve moved forward. So how do we double down on that aspect? Another aspect of that has been the budding Afghan air force. It’s not very big. It’s not as capable as it needs to be. But it has demonstrated some capability. On one of my most recent visits was down to the south part of the country, I was able to talk among the corps commander and what he was telling me about was how some of the aircraft that we have been able to get to them, the A-29s, have been very, very successful at doing close air support. Afghan air force supporting Afghan forces. This is good. We need to double down on that. The Afghans are in the process of moving their border control forces from ministry of the interior over to the ministry of defense. That’s a good move. That’s a very positive move. We need to look at how we can support that. The Afghan police have certainly had challenges and so we have to look at how we help them perform more of their appropriate police functions in holding area.

The Taliban has made significant gains. How confident are you that the Afghans can defend themselves?

I think I am confident, with our sustained assistance, I think they can. I think a very good factor here has been President (Ashraf) Ghani, and he does have a long-term vision. He’s laid out a four-year approach here for how he kind of sees things he’s done for the coalition and I think the response from the NATO partner and others has been very, very good in terms of that. As I think I’ve commented to you, I’m a soldier who went to Afghanistan in as early as October of 2001. I was in the first wave. I went there, so I want to be hopeful for Afghanistan. I want to see them succeed. But it’s going to take something — we’re turning a big ship here and there are challenges. There are challenges of corruption, there are challenges with bad governments, challenges of disenfranchisement, all kinds of things that have to be addressed. And we have to stay focused on all of those things. It isn’t just about fire power, and advisors and things like that. It’s addressing all of these other things and making this a professional force and doing things we talked about with (non-commissioned officers) here. It really is about a very comprehensive approach. It is going to take time and we have to be able to sustain that over time. We’ll be able to mitigate the troop levels and other things based on the situation and stuff like that. I’m confident that we can make decisions on that, but what’s important is the sustained support.

Do you see sustained support in the form of continued U.S. troop presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq and for how long?

I think as long as it takes. But again, these enter into policy decisions so I don’t want to get out ahead of the policy makers. But from my perspective, as a military man and CentCom commander, I think when we provide assistance we have to be prepared to sustain that. We can’t just come in and do something and leave. You know we did that in Afghanistan in the past and we saw what happened as a result of that. We did that in Iraq and we saw what happened as a result of that. So I think we have to be cognizant of paying attention to the lessons of the past here and trying not to repeat those things.

Anything else you want to add?

I think in the wake of a great success like Mosul here, the thing I want the people of Tampa and the American people to recognize is that we are very, very proud of our partners in Iraq and all the coalition partners. They should continue to be proud of how our country is being represented. They should be very, very proud of the men and women we have out there, doing our nation’s bidding. I certainly am.

Mosul Liberation, Raqqa Next, A View in History

War is an ugly thing is clearly an understatement.

Then there is Aleppo, Syria.

WashingtonPost: In 1165, Benjamin of Tudela, a medieval Spanish Jewish traveler, approached the city of Mosul on the banks of the Tigris. A visitor, even a thousand years ago, could marvel at its antiquity. “This city, situated on the confines of Persia, is of great extent and very ancient,” he wrote in the chronicle of his journey. He gestured to the adjacent ruins of Nineveh, which had been sacked 15 centuries before his arrival.

Mosul, perched in Mesopotamia’s fertile river basin, was a walled trade city at the heart of the proverbial cradle of civilizations, linked to caravan routes threading east and other venerable urban centers like Aleppo to the west. It’s a city that has endured centuries of war and conflict, devastation and renewal. And even a millennium ago, though they couldn’t fathom its later uses, people were aware of Mosul’s great natural resource: Oil.

“To the right of the road to Mosul,” noted another 12th century Arab traveler, “is a depression in the earth, black as if it lay under a cloud. It is there that God causes the sources of pitch, great and small, to spurt forth.”

***

Mosul in the Middle Ages

In the wake of the First Crusade, which led to a string of Christian Crusader states taking root along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, Mosul became one of the main staging grounds for the Muslim riposte. At the time, the city was ruled by Seljuks, a Turkic tribe that had settled across swathes of the Middle East.

In 1104, an army led by the Seljuk “atabeg,” or governor, of Mosul marched west and routed a Crusader force on a plain close to what’s now the modern-day Syrian city of Raqqa, the de facto capital of the Islamic State. “For the Muslims, it was an unequaled triumph,” wrote one Arab chronicler. “The morale of the Muslims rose, their ardor in defense of their religion was enhanced.” In 1127, Imad ad-din Zengi became Mosul’s atabeg and went on to forge a regional empire that united Aleppo with Mosul and successfully took the Crusader fortress at Edessa.

Zengi’s dynasty, installed in Mosul, went on to rival both the Christian knights in the Levant and the Caliph in Baghdad. Even when the famed Kurdish general Salah ad-Din, the greatest Muslim hero in the history of the Crusades, took over a vast swathe of the Middle East toward the end of the 12th century, the Zengids of Mosul held out. Their resistance was broken in the following century — not by Crusaders or rival Muslim armies, but the conquering hordes of the Mongols.

Despite all the conflict, the city and its environs would preserve its diverse character and remain home to Muslims, Jews, Christians and other sects, as well as a busy commercial entrepot for all sorts of goods. Though produced much farther east in Bengal, the ultra-soft and light fabric known as “muslin” derives its name from Mosul, because that was the point from which this textile entered the European imagination.

An Ottoman province

By the mid-16th century, Mosul fell under Ottoman control following the successful campaigns of Turkish armies against those of Persia’s Safavid dynasty. Most of what we know as the Arabic-speaking Middle East now ruled by the Ottomans. The Ottoman-Persian rivalry, which included a dimension of Sunni-Shia strife, shaped the region’s geopolitics for centuries. The lands that now constitute Iraq, particularly its rugged north, would be the site of myriad border wars, skirmishes and sieges.

In the early 19th century, Mosul became the capital of an Ottoman vilayet, or province, that stretched over what’s now northern Iraq. After the empire’s collapse, British colonial rulers would stitch together the vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra — a sea port to the south whose environs were home to a mostly Shiite population — into the new nation of Iraq.

A legacy of Sykes-Picot

A British army marched into Mosul in 1918 toward the end of World War I, forever ending Turkish rule in Iraq. The map above, though, depicts a post-war settlement that never came about. The infamous Sykes-Picot agreement — a secret deal hatched in 1916 by the British and French diplomats whose name it still carries — carved up the lands of the Ottoman Middle East between rival spheres of British and French influence. In the initial scheme, Mosul would fall under a French protectorate; the city was seen as more closely linked to Aleppo in Syria than Baghdad at the time.

But the British coveted Mosul’s oil, while the French sought to maintain control of Syria, even though British forces had been the ones to take Damascus from the Ottomans during the war. A deal was struck that gave the British a mandate over Mosul and the French colonial rights over Syria and Lebanon. The Europeans reneged on assurances they had given Arab allies during World War I that they would allow an independent Arab state to emerge. Instead, the political map of the Middle East was shaped by British and French colonial concerns and “Sykes-Picot” became short-hand for a toxic legacy of foreign meddling and domination.

The integration of Mosul into the other vilayets to the south, writes Middle East historian Juan Cole, compelled the “British to depend on the old Ottoman Sunni elite, including former Ottoman officers trained in what is now Turkey. This strategy marginalized the Shiite south, full of poor peasants and small towns, which, if they gave the British trouble, were simply bombed by” the British air force.

The template was set. Iraq, under the rule of a British-installed monarchy, achieved independence in 1932. In a matter of decades, the monarchy would be abolished and, after a series of coups, the authoritarian Baathist party of Saddam Hussein took over. A cadre of Sunni political and military elites went on to dominate a majority Shiite nation until the 2003 U.S. invasion.

The Turkey that never was

In 1920, in its last session, a defeated Ottoman parliament declared in a six-point manifesto the conditions on which it would accept the end of World War I following the armistice in 1918. There are differing versions of the proposed borders of a shrunken Turkish state that the nationalists in the Ottoman parliament put forward — one of them is reproduced above. Some areas indicated would be allowed to hold referendums; others were considered integral Turkish territory. As you can see, though, Mosul was very much part of this vision.

Instead, the Ottoman court signed the withering Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which would have seen what’s now Turkey carved up into various spheres of influence controlled by the West, Kurds, Armenians and others. That never came to pass: Turkish nationalists in the Ottoman army mobilized and eventually forced out foreign forces. In the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey’s modern borders were set.

Mosul, though, was a sticking point, with Turkish nationalists laying claim to it and demanding Britain hold a plebiscite in the region that’s now northern Iraq. That didn’t happen, and after some fitful politicking at the League of Nations, Turkey and Britain eventually agreed to an arrangement in 1926 where Ankara dropped its claim to Mosul and the nearby cities of Kirkuk and Sulaimanyah in exchange for a portion of the region’s oil revenues over the next 25 years.

This history has bubbled up once more in the wake of the Mosul offensive: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, adamant that his country’s forces play a role in the mission, invoked the 1920 document when justifying his nation’s right to be “at the table.” Officials in Baghdad were not impressed.

The chaos of the moment

And here’s the current state of play. Mosul is now at the center of a regional conflagration: It’s occupied by an extremist Sunni organization that rose to power as the Iraqi and Syrian states imploded. An Iraqi government backed by pro-Iranian Shiite militias is seeking to retake the city with the aid of Kurdish peshmerga forces, whose fighters are well aware of their own people’s long, bitter quest for an independent Kurdish homeland. And it’s eyed by Turkey, wary of the growing aspirations of Kurdish nationalists in the region and eager to reassert its own influence in a part of the world that was once under its sway.

New G20 Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism

  1. We, the Leaders of the G20, strongly condemn all terrorist attacks worldwide and stand united and firm in the fight against terrorism and its financing. These atrocious acts have strengthened our resolve to cooperate to enhance our security and protect our citizens. Terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and terrorist safe havens eliminated in every part of the world.
  2. We reaffirm that all measures on countering terrorism need to be implemented in accordance with the UN Charter and all obligations under international law, including international human rights law.

    Implementing international commitments and enhancing cooperation

  3. We call for the implementation of existing international commitments on countering terrorism, including the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and compliance with relevant resolutions and targeted sanctions by the UN Security Council relating to terrorism. We commit to continue to support UN efforts to prevent and counter terrorism.
  4. We will address the evolving threat of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from conflict zones such as Iraq and Syria and remain committed to preventing FTFs from establishing a foothold in other countries and regions around the world. We recall UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), which requires a range of actions to better tackle the foreign terrorist fighter threat.
  5. We will facilitate swift and targeted exchanges of information between intelligence and law enforcement and judicial authorities on operational information-sharing, preventive measures and criminal justice response, while ensuring the necessary balance between security and data protection aspects, in accordance with national laws. We will ensure that terrorists are brought to justice.
  6. We will work to improve the existing international information architecture in the areas of security, travel and migration, including INTERPOL, ensuring the necessary balance between security and data protection aspects. In particular, we encourage all members to make full use of relevant information sharing mechanisms, in particular INTERPOL’s information sharing functions.
  7. We call upon our border agencies to strengthen cooperation to detect travel for terrorist purposes, including by identifying priority transit and destination countries of terrorists. We will support capacity building efforts in these countries in areas such as border management, information sharing and watch-list capability to manage the threat upstream. We will promote greater use of customs security programs, including where appropriate, the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) Security Programme and Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which focus on strengthening Customs administrations’ capacity to deal with security related issues and managing the cross-border flows of goods, people and means of transport to ensure they comply with the law.
  8. We will address in close coordination the evolving threats and potential vulnerabilities in aviation security systems and exchange information on risk assessments. We recall the UN Security Council’s Resolution 2309 (2016) which urges closer collaboration to ensure security of global air services and the prevention of terrorist attacks. We will promote full implementation of effective and proportionate aviation security measures established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in partnership with all its contracting states as necessary. We call to urgently address vulnerabilities in airport security related measures, such as access control and screening, covered by the Chicago Convention and will act jointly to ensure that international security standards are reviewed, updated, adapted and put in place based on current risks.
  9. We highlight the importance of providing appropriate support to the victims of terrorist acts and will enhance our cooperation and exchange of best practices to this end.

    Fighting terrorism finance    

  10. We underline our resolve to make the international financial system entirely hostile to terrorist financing and commit to deepening international cooperation and exchange of information, including working with the private sector, which has a critical role in global efforts to counter terrorism financing. We reaffirm our commitment to tackle all sources, techniques and channels of terrorist financing and our call for swift and effective implementation of UNSCR and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards worldwide. We call for strengthening measures against the financing of international terrorist organisations in particular ISIL/ISIS/Daesh, Al Qaida and their affiliates.
  11. There should be no “safe spaces” for terrorist financing anywhere in the world. However, inconsistent and weak implementation of the UN and FATF standards allows them to persist. In order to eliminate all such “safe spaces”, we commit to intensify capacity building and technical assistance, especially in relation to terrorist financing hot-spots, and we support the FATF in its efforts to strengthen its traction capacity and the effectiveness of FATF and FATF-style regional bodies.
  12. We welcome the reforms agreed by the FATF Plenary in June and support the ongoing work to strengthen the governance of the FATF. We also welcome the FATF intention to further explore its transformation into a legal person, which recognises that the FATF has evolved from a temporary forum to a sustained public and political commitment to tackle AML/CFT threats. We also appreciate FATF commencing the membership process for Indonesia that will broaden its geographic representation and global engagement. We ask the FATF to provide an update by the first G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in 2018. We call on all member states to ensure that the FATF has the necessary resources and support to effectively fulfil its mandate.
  13. We welcome that countering terrorist finance remains the highest priority of FATF, and look forward to FATF’s planned outreach to legal authorities, which will contribute to enhanced international cooperation and increased effectiveness in the application of FATF’s standards.
  14. We will advance the effective implementation of the international standards on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements for the purposes of countering financing terrorism.
  15. Low cost attacks by small cells and individuals funded by small amounts of money transferred through a wide range of payment means are an increasing challenge. We call on the private sector to continue to strengthen their efforts to identify and tackle terrorism financing. We ask our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to work with FATF, FSB, the financial sector, Financial Intelligence Units, law enforcement and FinTech firms to develop new tools such as guidance and indicators, to harness new technologies to better track terrorist finance transactions, and to work together with law enforcement authorities to bridge the intelligence gap and improve the use of financial information in counter-terrorism investigations.
  16. We call upon countries to address all alternative sources of financing of terrorism, including dismantling connections, where they exist, between terrorism and transnational organized crime, such as the diversion of weapons including weapons of mass destruction, looting and smuggling of antiquities, kidnapping for ransom, drugs and human trafficking.

    Countering radicalization conducive to terrorism and the use of internet for terrorist purposes

  17. Our counterterrorism actions must continue to be part of a comprehensive approach, including  combatting radicalization and recruitment, hampering terrorist movements and countering terrorist propaganda. We will exchange best practices on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, national strategies and deradicalisation and disengagement programmes, and the promotion of strategic communications as well as robust and positive narratives to counter terrorist propaganda.
  18. We stress that countering terrorism requires comprehensively addressing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit. It is therefore crucial to promote political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, to resolve armed conflicts, and to facilitate reintegration. We acknowledge that regional and national action plans can contribute to countering radicalisation conducive to terrorism.
  19. We will share knowledge on concrete measures to address threats from returning foreign terrorist fighters and home-grown radicalised individuals. We will also share best practices on deradicalisation and reintegration programmes including with respect to prisoners.
  20. We will work with the private sector, in particular communication service providers and administrators of relevant applications, to fight exploitation of the internet and social media for terrorist purposes such as propaganda, funding and planning of terrorist acts, inciting terrorism, radicalizing and recruiting to commit acts of terrorism, while fully respecting human rights. Appropriate filtering, detecting and removing of content that incites terrorist acts is crucial in this respect. We encourage industry to continue investing in technology and human capital to aid in the detection as well as swift and permanent removal of terrorist content. In line with the expectations of our peoples we also encourage collaboration with industry to provide lawful and non-arbitrary access to available information where access is necessary for the protection of national security against terrorist threats. We affirm that the rule of law applies online as well as it does offline.
  21. We also stress the important role of the media, civil society, religious groups, the business community and educational institutions in fostering an environment which is conducive to the prevention of radicalisation and terrorism.

Hey Hezbollah, the DNA Proves it…

Pay up Iran, the victim’s families deserve compensation. Obama and Kerry gave you billions.

ToI: Newly analyzed DNA evidence from the 1994 AMIA Jewish center bombing in Buenos Aires could provide a definitive link to suicide bomber Ibrahim Berro, the Hezbollah terrorist who carried out the attack and whose body was never found or identified until now.

NBC

The discovery was announced on Monday by the AMIA Special Investigation Unit of the Argentinian General Prosecution, two weeks before the 23rd anniversary of the bombing that killed 85 and injured hundreds.

The final report after two years of investigation by a forensics team, reveals for the first time the existence of a genetic profile among the preserved remains in the laboratory of the Federal Police that “doesn’t belong to any known victims.”

With this information prosecutors have taken steps “in the field of international cooperation to try to match the profile obtained with that of samples of relatives of the suspected individual.”

A man walks over the rubble after a bomb exploded at the Argentinian Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 18, 1994. (AFP/Ali Burafi)

A man walks over the rubble after a bomb exploded at the Argentinian Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 18, 1994. (AFP/Ali Burafi)

In 2005 special prosecutor Alberto Nisman identified Berro as the suicide bomber who carried out the attack. Berro’s brothers denied he was involved, claiming he was killed in fighting in Lebanon. Some Argentinian journalists also cast doubt on the assertion.

In May 2016, US Attorney General Loretta Lynch and FBI director James Comey met in Washington, DC, with Argentine Justice Minister Germán Garavano and offered to extend technical help to the Argentinean Justice Department regarding the AMIA attack and the death of Nisman.

Prosecutors Sabrina Namer, Roberto Salum and Leonardo Filippini have led the AMIA Special Investigatory Unit since their predecessor Nisman was discovered shot dead in his apartment in January 2015, hours before he was scheduled to appear in Congress. Nisman had been about to present allegations that then-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner orchestrated a secret deal to cover up Iranian officials’ alleged role in the AMIA bombing. Fernandez denied the allegations and judges threw out the case. It was reopened one year ago, though no conclusions have yet been announced.

Late Argentinean public prosecutor Alberto Nisman gives a news conference in Buenos Aires, May 20, 2009. (Juan Mabromata/AFP/Getty Images)

Late Argentinean public prosecutor Alberto Nisman gives a news conference in Buenos Aires, May 20, 2009. (Juan Mabromata/AFP/Getty Images)

The two years work on the DNA analysis was conducted by the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, the Forensic Medical Body and the University of Buenos Aires. The same team one year ago identified victim number 85 of the AMIA attack.

*** Clarin

Per documents posted on Wikipedia:

Berro grew up in Lebanon. According to his brothers, around 1989 he changed radically, leaving school and becoming interested in Hezbollah, where his brother Ali was an active member. His mother feared Berro would end up badly, and applied for a visa for him to go to Detroit — to where some of the family had emigrated — but the application was turned down because Berro was underage. He then traveled to Iran, where he presumably received training.

Berro is suspected of having entered Argentina near Ciudad del Este — a region known for smuggling, drugs, and other illegal activities — where Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina share a border, accompanied by a man named Ahmed Saad.

The bombing, in which a van full of explosives opposite the AMIA building was detonated, was similar to the March 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires, possibly also committed by Hezbollah. The attacks, it appears, occurred with the support of Iran,[3] though the Iranian government repeatedly denied these charges.[4]

Two months after the attack, Berro was reported by radio stations in Lebanon to have been killed by the Israeli army, apparently an attempt to cover up his role in the attack in Argentina. After the bombing, Berro’s wife received $300 a month from Hezbollah.[5]

In late 2005, Berro was identified as the bombing perpetrator after years of investigation and speculation into who committed the bombing. According to official Argentine government prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, Hussein’s two US-based brothers had testified that he had joined the radical Shia militant group Hezbollah. “The brothers’ testimony was substantial, rich in detail and showed that he was the one who was killed,” Nisman added.[6] A U.S. House resolution in July 2004 declared Berro was the suicide bomber,[7] but the identification was not declared positively until November 2005 after Berro’s relatives in Detroit identified his photograph. Berro was also recognized with “80 percent certain[ty]” [8] by eyewitness Nicolasa Romero, who saw the driver in the van near the AMIA building. Some Argentine journalists, however, have expressed reservations about these alleged findings; in an op-ed for La Nación, Jorge Urien Berri objected to those who “insist in taken hypotheses as proven when they not”, and contested Berro’s involvement in the incidents”.[9] Berro’s two brothers also had denied this version in April 2005 before a US prosecutor, stating that Berro had died on September 9, 1994 during combat in Lebanon. No proper autopsies or DNA tests were done. The police dumped in a bin the head thought to be that of the bomber.[6]

Berro’s brother, after apparently identifying Berro in a photograph, now denies that Berro had any role in the attack. “They changed the truth,” he said. “I gave them the photo [of Berro] at 17 years old, but when I saw photo in the news, I said, ‘How are they publishing the photo that I gave them a few months back? They said in the news that I identified the photo, and it’s not true. I gave them the photo of him at 17, but I don’t know who is in the others.”[8]

In a May 2007 interview, James Cheek, Clinton’s Ambassador to Argentina at the time of the bombing, told La Nación,[10] “To my knowledge, there was never any real evidence [of Iranian responsibility]. They never came up with anything.” The hottest lead in the case, he recalled, was an Iranian defector named Manoucher Moatamer, who “supposedly had all this information.” But Moatamer turned out to be only a dissatisfied low-ranking official without the knowledge of government decision-making that he had claimed. “We finally decided that he wasn’t credible,” Cheek recalled. Ron Goddard, then deputy chief of the US Mission in Buenos Aires, confirmed Cheek’s account. He recalled that investigators found nothing linking Iran to the bombing. “The whole Iran thing seemed kind of flimsy,” Goddard said.

Silk Way Airlines Smuggles Weapons on Diplomatic Flights

Primer: Customers of these flights are often the U.S., Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Silk Way Airlines offered diplomatic flights to private companies and arms manufacturers from the US, Balkans, and Israel, as well as to the militaries of Saudi Arabia, UAE, the military forces of Germany and Denmark in Afghanistan and of Sweden in Iraq, and finally US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The airline company transported thousand of tons of weapons for them.

*** Meet Purple Shovel:A multimillion-dollar deal with a minuscule arms dealer led to the death of a US citizen, delays in arming Syrian rebels, and the purchase of weapons from a pro-Russia dictatorship — all for a pile of defective 30-year-old weapons. Also meet Orbital ATK.

350 diplomatic flights carry weapons for terrorists

Azerbaijan’s Silk Way Airlines transports weapons with diplomatic clearance for Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Congo

In December of 2016 Dilyana Gaytandzhieva found and filmed 9 underground warehouses fullof heavy weapons with Bulgaria as their country of origin in Eastern Aleppo.

At least 350 diplomatic Silk Way Airlines (an Azerbaijani state-run company) flights transported weapons for war conflicts across the world over the last 3 years. The state aircrafts of Azerbaijan carried on-board tens of tons of heavy weapons and ammunition headed to terrorists under the cover of diplomatic flights.

Documents implicating Silk Way Airlines in arms supplies were sent to me by an anonymous twitter account – Anonymous Bulgaria.

%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%82

The leaked files include correspondence between the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of Azerbaijan to Bulgaria with attached documents for weapons deals and diplomatic clearance for overflight and/or landing in Bulgaria and many other European countries, USA, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, to name a few.

According to these documents, Silk Way Airlines offered diplomatic flights to private companies and arms manufacturers from the US, Balkans, and Israel, as well as to the militaries of Saudi Arabia, UAE, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the military forces of Germany and Denmark in Afghanistan and of Sweden in Iraq. Diplomatic flights are exempt of checks, air bills, and taxes, meaning that Silk Way airplanes freely transported hundreds of tons of weapons to different locations around the world without regulation. They made technical landings with stays varying from a few hours to up to a day in intermediary locations without any logical reasons such as needing to refuel the planes.

According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations, operators, transporting dangerous goods forbidden for transportation by air by civil aircrafts, must apply for exemption for transportation of dangerous goods by air.

According to the documents, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry has sent instructions to its embassies in Bulgaria and many other European countries to request diplomatic clearance for Silk Way Airlines flights. The embassies sent diplomatic notes to the Foreign Ministry of the relevant country to request such exemption. The Foreign Ministry sent back a note signed by the local civil aviation authorities giving exemption for the transportation of dangerous goods.

The requests for diplomatic clearance included information about the type and quantity of the dangerous goods – heavy weapons and ammunition. However, the responsible authorities of many countries (Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Turkey, Germany, UK, Greece, etc.) have turned a blind eye and allowed diplomatic flights for the transport of tons of weapons, carried out by civil aircrafts for military needs. Under IATA regulations, the transport of military cargo by civil aircrafts is not allowed. To get around this legality, Silk Way Airlines applied for diplomatic exemption through local agencies.

 

U.S. sends $1 billion worth of weapons

Among the main customers of the “diplomatic flights for weapons” service provided by Silk Way Airlines are American companies, which supply weapons to the US army and US Special Operations Command. The common element in these cases is that they all supply non-US standard weapons; hence, the weapons are not used by the US forces.

According to the register of federal contracts, over the last 3 years American companies were awarded $1 billion contracts in total under a special US government program for non-US standard weapon supplies. All of them used Silk Way Airlines for the transport of weapons. In some cases when Silk Way was short of aircrafts due to a busy schedule, Azerbaijan Air Force aircrafts transported the military cargo, although the weapons never reached Azerbaijan.

%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%823-1The documents leaked from the Embassy include shocking examples of weapon transport. A case in point: on 12th May 2015 an aircraft of Azerbaijan Air Forces carried 7,9 tons of PG-7V and 10 tons of PG-9V to the supposed destination via the route Burgas (Bulgaria)-Incirlik (Turkey)-Burgas-Nasosny (Azerbaijan). The consignor was the American company Purple Shovel, and the consignee – the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. According to the documents, however, the military cargo was offloaded at Incirlik military base and never reached the consignee. The weapons were sold to Purple Shovel by Alguns, Bulgaria, and manufactured by Bulgaria’s VMZ military plant.

%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%823-1 According to the federal contracts registry, in December of 2014 USSOCOM signed a $26.7 million contract with Purple Shovel. Bulgaria was indicated as the country of origin of the weapons.

On 6th June 2015, a 41-year old American national Francis Norvello, an employee of Purple Shovel, was killed in a blast when a rocket-propelled grenade malfunctioned at a military range near the village of Anevo in Bulgaria. Two other Americans and two Bulgarians were also injured. The US Embassy to Bulgaria then released a statement announcing that the U.S. government contractors were working on a U.S. military program to train and equip moderate rebels in Syria. Which resulted in the U.S. Ambassador in Sofia to be immediately withdrawn from her post. The very same weapons as those supplied by Purple Shovel were not used by moderate rebels in Syria. In December of last year while reporting on the battle of Aleppo as a correspondent for Bulgarian media I found and filmed 9 underground warehouses full of heavy weapons with Bulgaria as their country of origin. They were used by Al Nusra Front (Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria designated as a terrorist organization by the UN).

Another U.S. contractor involved in the same program for non-US standard military supplies is Orbital ATK. This company received $250 million over just the past two years. Information as to what type of weapons and to whom those weapons were supplied is classified.

According to the documents, Orbital ATK transported weapons on 6 diplomatic Silk Way Airlines flights in July and August of 2015 flying the route Baku (Azerbaijan)-Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina)-Baku-Kabul (Afghanistan). The weapons were exported by IGMAN j.j. Konjic, (Bosnia and Herzegovina) commissioned by Orbital ATK. The consignee was the National Police of Afghanistan. Interestingly, all these diplomatic flights with weapons had technical landings and a 7 h 30 min stop at Baku before their final destination – Afghanistan.

Military aircrafts of Azerbaijan transported 282 tons of cargo (PG-7VL and other grenades) on 10 diplomatic flights in April and May 2017 to the destination Baku-Rijeka (Croatia)-Baku. The consignor was the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, and the consignee – Culmen International LLC, USA. This same company has been awarded two contracts ($47 million each) along with other contractors for non-US standard weapon supplies on 18 February 2016 and 19 April 2017 respectively. Culmen International LLC has also signed a $26.7 million contract for foreign weapons with the Department of Defense and a $3.9 million contract for newly manufactured non-US standard weapons.

Chemring Military Products is another main contractor in the program for non-US standard weapon supplies to the US army through diplomatic Silk Way Airlines flights. This military supplier has 4 contracts for $302.8 million in total. The weapons were purchased from local manufacturers in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania and according to documents transported to Iraq and Afghanistan via diplomatic flights.

One of those flights in particular, on 18 October 2016, carrying 15.5 tons of 122 mm rockets bought by Chemring in Belgrade, Serbia, was diverted from its destination – Kabul, and instead landed in Lahore, Pakistan. After a 2-hour stop, the aircraft took off to Afghanistan. The only possible explanation for the extension of the flight by a thousand kilometers is offloading in Pakistan, even though documents stated that the cargo was destined for Afghanistan.

%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%825The largest non-US standard weapons supplier to the US army is Alliant Techsystems Operations-USA with contracts totalling $490.4 million. In December of 2016, this company transported tons of grenades (API 23×115 mm, HE 23×115 mm, GSH 23×115 mm) from Yugoimport, Serbia to the Afghani Defense Ministry on diplomatic flights to the destination Baku-Belgrade-Kabul.

 

Saudi Arabia – sponsor and arms distributor

Besides the USA, another country that has purchased huge quantities of Eastern-European weapons and exported them on Silk Way Airlines diplomatic flights is Saudi Arabia. In 2016 and 2017, there were 23 diplomatic flights carrying weapons from Bulgaria, Serbia and Azerbaijan to Jeddah and Riyadh. The consignees were VMZ military plant and Transmobile from Bulgaria, Yugoimport from Serbia, and CIHAZ from Azerbaijan.

The Kingdom does not buy those weapons for itself, as the Saudi army uses only western weapons and those weapons are not compatible with its military standard. Therefore, the weapons transported on diplomatic flights end up in the hands of the terrorist militants in Syria and Yemen that Saudi Arabia officially admits supporting.

The Arab Kingdom also distributes military cargo to South Africa – a region plagued by wars over the control of the wealth in gold and diamonds found in African countries.

On 28 April and 12 May this year, Silk Way carried out two diplomatic flights from Baku to Burgas-Jeddah-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo). The military cargo on-board of both flights was paid for by Saudi Arabia, according to the documents leaked from Azerbaijan’s Embassy to Bulgarian sources. The aircraft made a technical landing at Jeddah airport with a 12 h 30 min stop for the first flight and 14 h stop for the second one.

The aircraft was loaded with mortars and anti-tank grenades including SPG-9 and GP-25. These very same weapons were discovered by the Iraqi army a month ago in an Islamic State warehouse in Mosul. Islamic State jihadists are also seen using those heavy weapons in propaganda videos posted online by the terrorist group. Interestingly, the consignee on the transport documents, however, is the Republican Guards of Congo.

Coyote machine gun 12,7х108 mm appeared in videos and photos posted online by militant groups in Idlib and the province of Hama in Syria. The same type of weapon was transported on a diplomatic flight via Turkey and Saudi Arabia a few months earlier.
Coyote machine gun 12,7х108 mm appeared in videos and photos posted online by militant
groups in Idlib and the province of Hama in Syria. The same type of weapon was transported on
a diplomatic flight via Turkey and Saudi Arabia a few months earlier.

February and March of 2017, Saudi Arabia received 350 tons of weapons on Silk Way diplomatic flights flying to the route Baku-Belgrade-Prince Sultan-Baku. The cargo included 27 350 psc. 128-mm Plamen-a rockets and 10 000 pcs. 122 mm Grad rockets. The consignor was Tehnoremont Temerin, Serbia to order by Famеway Investment LTD, Cypruss.

On 5 March 2016, an Azerbaijan Air Force aircraft carried 1700 pcs. RPG-7 (consignor: Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan) and 2500 pcs. PG-7VM (consignor: Transmobilе Ltd., Bulgaria) for the Defense Ministry of Saudi Arabia. Diplomatic flights from Burgas Airport to Prince Sultan Airport on 18 and 28 February 2017 each carried a further 5080 psc. 40 mm PG-7V for RPG-7 and 24 978 psc. RGD-5. The weapons were exported by Transmobile, Bulgaria to the Ministry of Defense of Saudi Arabia. Such munitions and RPG-7 originating in Bulgaria can often be seen in videos filmed and posted by the Islamic State on their propaganda channels.

UAE is another Arab country that has purchased Eastern European weapons which are not compatible with its military standards and were apparently re-supplied to a third party. On three flights to Burgas-Abu Dhabi-Swaihan in March and April of 2017, Silk Way transported 10.8 tons of PG7VM HEAT for 40 mm RPG-7 on each flight with technical landing and a 2-hour stop in Abu Dhabi. The exporter is Samel-90, Bulgaria, the importer – Al Tuff International Company LLC. The latter company is involved with Orbital ATK LLC, which is the Middle East subsidiary of the American military company Orbital ATK. Although the ultimate consignee is the UAE army, the documents of the flight reveal that the sponsoring party is Saudi Arabia.

 

Cash Payments

%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%828On 26 February 2016, an Azerbaijan Air Force aircraft took off from Baku and landed in UAE, where it loaded two armored vehicles and one Lexus car. The request for diplomatic clearance indicated the payment as cash – US dollars. The aircraft landed in North Sudan and, the next day, in the Republic of Congo. The exporter was Safe Cage Armour Works FZ LLC, UАЕ and the receiving party was the Republican Guards of Congo. The sponsoring party, however, was Saudi Arabia.

 

Diplomatic Flights carry deadly white phosphorus

White Phosphorus is an incendiary weapon whose use is very controversial due to the deadly harms it can inflict. On 31 March 2015, Silk Way transported 26 tons of military cargo including white phosphorus from Serbia (exporter: Yugoimport) and 63 tons from Bulgaria (exporter: Arsenal). On 22 March, another 100 tons of white phosphorus were exported from Yugoimport, Belgrade to Kabul. No contract is attached to the documents of those flights.

On 2 May 2015, a Silk Way aircraft loaded 17 tons of ammunition, including white phosphorus, at Burgas airport. The exporter was Dunarit, Bulgaria. The aircraft made a technical landing and a 4-hour stop at Baku before reaching its final destination – Kabul. The consignee was the Afghani police. No contract is attached as proof.

 

Baku – international hub for weapons

Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense was repeatedly the consignee of weapons which it actually did not receive. On 6 May 2015, an Azerbaijani military aircraft flew to Burgas (Bulgaria)-Incirlik (Turkey)-Burgas. It carried aviation equipment from Bulgaria to Turkey with the consigner: EMCO LTD, Sofia, and consignee – Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. However, the cargo was offloaded in Turkey and never reached Azerbaijan.

Some of the weapons that Azerbaijan carries on diplomatic flights were used by its military in Nagorno-Karabakh against Armenia. In 2016, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of using white phosphorus. Armenia denied the allegations and in turn accused Azerbaijan of fabrication, as the only piece of evidence was based on a single unexploded grenade found by Azerbaijan’s soldiers. According to the documents from the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Sofia, white phosphorus munitions were carried on a diplomatic flight via Baku the previous year.

Baku plays the role of an international hub for weapons. Many of the flights make technical landings with stops of a few hours at Baku airport or other intermediary airports en-route to their final destinations. Moreover, these types of aircrafts flying to the same destinations do not typically make technical landings. Therefore, a landing for refueling is not actually required. Despite this, Silk Way aircrafts constantly made technical landings. A case in point: in December of 2015 Silk Way carried out 14 flights with 40 tons of weapons on each flight to the destination Ostrava (the Czech Republic)-Ovda (Israel)-Nososny (Azerbaijan). The exporter is not mentioned in the documents while the receiver is consistently the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan. Strangely, the aircraft diverted and landed at Ovda airport (a military base in Southern Israel), where it remained for 2 hours.

In 2017, there were 5 flights from Nish (Serbia) via Ovda (Israel) to Nasosny (Azerbaijan). Each flight carried 44 tons of cargo – SPG Howitzer, RM-70/85. The consignor is MSM Martin, Serbia, the consignee: Elbit Systems, Israel, and the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. All aircrafts landed in Israel and stayed for 2 hours en-route to Azerbaijan.

The same Israeli company Elbit Systems on a flight from Barno (the Czech Republic) via Tel Aviv (Israel) to Bratislava (Slovakia) re-exported armored vehicles (TATRA T-815 VP31, TATRA T-815 VPR9). They were sent by Real Trade, Prague to Elbit Systems. The ultimate consignee, however, was the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. The aircraft landed in Tel Aviv and then in Bratislava, where the cargo was imported by another company – MSM Martin, Slovakia. It is not clear why the plane flew from Europe to Asia and then back to Europe with the same cargo on-board. Ultimately, it did not reach its final destination – Azerbaijan. This type of aircraft, IL 76TD, can carry cargo of up to 50 tons. This one carried only 30 tons according to the documentation provided. Therefore, it could carry additional cargo of 20 tons. Since the flight was diplomatic, it was not subjected to inspection.

 

A military coup after a diplomatic flight to Burkina Faso

Some diplomatic flights carry weapons for different conflict zones crossing Europe, Asia and Africa. Such is the case with two Azerbaijan Air Forces flights to the destination Baku-Belgrade-Jeddah-Brazzaville-Burkina Faso on 30 August and 5 September 2015. The consignors were CIHAZ, Azerbaijan, and Yugoimport, Serbia. The consignee was the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo. The aircraft made two technical landings – in Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The 41.2-ton cargo from Baku and Belgrade included: 7, 62 mm cartridges, 12 pcs. sniper rifles, 25 pcs. М12 “Black Spear” calibre 12,7х108 mm, 25 psc. RBG 40×46 mm/6M11, and 25 pcs. Coyote machine gun 12,7х108 mm with tripods. The same heavy machine gun appeared in videos and photos posted online by militant groups in Idlib and the province of Hama in Syria a few months later. The aircraft also carried: 1999 psc. M70B1 7,62х39 mm and 25 psc. М69А 82 мм. On 26 February 2016, a video featuring the same М69А 82 mm weapons was posted to Youtube by a militant group calling itself Division 13 and fighting north of Aleppo.

%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%ba%d1%83%d0%bc%d0%b5%d0%bd%d1%8212Interestingly, the aircraft that carried the same type of weapons landed in Diyarbakir (Turkey), 235 km away from the border with Syria. Another type of weapon, RBG 40 mm/6M11, which was from the same flight and supposedly destined for Congo too, appeared in a video of the Islamic Brigade of Al Safwa in Northern Aleppo.

After Turkey, the aircraft landed in Saudi Arabia and remained there for a day. Afterwards it landed in Congo and Burkina Faso. A week later, there was an attempted military coup in Burkina Faso.

 

300 tons of RPG-s, machine guns and ammunition for the Kurds

In March of 2017, over 300 tons of weapons were allegedly sent to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Northern Syria. Six diplomatic flights transported 43 tons of grenades on each flight from VMZ Military Plant, Bulgaria, to the Defense Ministry of Iraq. There are no contracts applied, however. On 28 March, 82 tons of cargo (AKM 7,62×39 mm and AG-7) were sent from Otopeni (Romania) to Erbil (Iraqi Kurdistan). The consignor was Romtechnica S.A., the consignee – again the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad. No contracts are provided for this flight either.

On 16 March 2016, yet another Silk Way diplomatic flight carried 40 tons of military cargo from Slovenia to Erbil: the exporter is ELDON S.R.O., Slovakia, the importer – Wide City Ltd. Co, Erbil, the final consignee – the government of Kurdistan.

Wide City Ltd. Co has three offices – in Limassol (Cyprus), Sofia (Bulgaria) and Erbil. The office of the Bulgarian company Techno Defence Ltd is at the address in Sofia. On the website of the company, the owner of Techno Defense Ltd Hair Al Ahmed Saleh claims that he has an office in Erbil and that his company manufactures Zagros weapons in Azerbaijan (K15 zagros, 9×19 mm and automatic K16 zagros). These types of Zagros weapons appeared in propaganda footage posted by the military wing of the Kurdish PKK party, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkey. The President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev is also an ethnical Kurd.

I reached out to all sides concerned involving my investigation. However, I have not received any comment.