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Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID): KOMID is North Korea’s primary arms dealer and main exporter of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. KOMID, a North Korean state-owned entity, was previously listed in the annex to E.O. 13382 on July 1, 2005 for its role in North Korea’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was also sanctioned by the United Nations in April 2009. KOMID has offices in multiple countries around the world and facilitates weapons sales for the North Korean government.(Note this does specifically not mention chemical weapons but rather weapons of mass destruction)
Further there is Burma: the head of Burma’s Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI), Thein Htay, remains on the SDN list for arms deals with North Korea–presumably through KOMID which facilitates arms sales for North Korea. Several companies in Burma also are sanctioned for facilitating the import of materials to DDI from North Korea.
Additionally, KOMID is complicit with evidence here: Reportedly has assisted Syria in producing weapons, including reverse-engineered versions of the Kornet anti-tank guided missile originally supplied to Syria by Russia; in 2009, reportedly sought to procure equipment for transporter erector launchers (TELs) for Scud missiles intended for a ballistic missile project in Yemen; in 2008, reportedly sought, in cooperation with China-based New East International Trading Ltd., to transfer three Japanese-origin cylindrical grinding machines to Burma using false end-use statements; in 1999, reportedly supplied 12 missile engines to Iran. More here.
Now the United Nations has this additional report:
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) – Two North Korean shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for the country’s chemical weapons program were intercepted in the past six months, according to a confidential United Nations report on North Korea sanctions violations.
The report by a panel of independent U.N. experts, which was submitted to the U.N. Security Council earlier this month and seen by Reuters on Monday, gave no details on when or where the interdictions occurred or what the shipments contained.
“The panel is investigating reported prohibited chemical, ballistic missile and conventional arms cooperation between Syria and the DPRK (North Korea),” the experts wrote in the 37-page report.
“Two member states interdicted shipments destined for Syria. Another Member state informed the panel that it had reasons to believe that the goods were part of a KOMID contract with Syria,” according to the report.
KOMID is the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation. It was blacklisted by the Security Council in 2009 and described as Pyongyang’s key arms dealer and exporter of equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. In March 2016 the council also blacklisted two KOMID representatives in Syria.
“The consignees were Syrian entities designated by the European Union and the United States as front companies for Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), a Syrian entity identified by the Panel as cooperating with KOMID in previous prohibited item transfers,” the U.N. experts wrote.
SSRC has overseen the country’s chemical weapons program since the 1970s.
The U.N. experts said activities between Syria and North Korea they were investigating included cooperation on Syrian Scud missile programs and maintenance and repair of Syrian surface-to-air missiles air defense systems.
The North Korean and Syrian missions to the United Nations did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The experts said they were also investigating the use of the VX nerve agent in Malaysia to kill the estranged half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un in February.
North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its ballistic missile and nuclear programs and the Security Council has ratcheted up the measures in response to five nuclear weapons tests and four long-range missile launches.
Syria agreed to destroy its chemical weapons in 2013 under a deal brokered by Russia and the United States. However, diplomats and weapons inspectors suspect Syria may have secretly maintained or developed a new chemical weapons capability.
During the country’s more than six-year long civil war the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has said the banned nerve agent sarin has been used at least twice, while the use of chlorine as a weapon has been widespread. The Syrian government has repeatedly denied using chemical weapons.
Trump must decide if he wants to continue on the current course, which relies on a relatively small US-led NATO force to help Afghan partners push back the Taliban, or if he wants to try a new tack such as adding more forces — or even withdrawing altogether.
“Heading to Camp David for major meeting on National Security, the Border and the Military (which we are rapidly building to strongest ever),” Trump said on Twitter ahead of his Friday afternoon arrival.
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis had initially promised to provide a new plan for Afghanistan by mid-July.
But Trump appears dissatisfied by initial proposals to add a few thousand more troops, and the strategy has been expanded to include the broader South Asia region, notably Pakistan.
In a sign of Trump’s frustration, the president reportedly told Mattis and General Joe Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they should replace General John Nicholson, who heads up US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Mattis has come to his general’s defense, saying this week he “is our commander in the field. He has the confidence of NATO, he has the confidence of Afghanistan, he has the confidence of the United States.”
In the past year (6/30/2016 to 6/30/2017) 17 US service members died in Afghanistan, and 41 DOD contractors.
One big topic of discussion will be the recent proposals to privatize the war in Afghanistan presented by two different businessmen, Eric Prince and Stephen Feinberg.
Under Prince’s plan, the viceroy would be a federal official who reports to the president and is empowered to make decisions about State Department, DoD, and intelligence community functions in-country. Prince was vague about how exactly this would work and which agency would house the viceroy, but compared the job to a “bankruptcy trustee” and said the person would have full hiring and firing authority over U.S. personnel. Prince wants to embed “mentors” into Afghan battalions. These mentors would be contractors from the U.S., Britain, Canada, South Africa—“anybody with a good rugby team,” Prince quipped. Prince also wants a “composite air wing”—a private air force—to make up for deficiencies in the Afghan air capabilities.
“The adults hate it,” said a congressional aide who has seen the plan, referring to McMaster, Mattis, and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly. Mattis acknowledged that his analysis of the problems in Afghanistan is correct, Prince claimed, while disagreeing on his recommendations. On Monday, Mattis confirmed in a press gaggle that the contracting proposals were under consideration. A Pentagon spokesperson didn’t immediately return a request for comment.
Feinberg, on the other hand, has met with Trump, as well as with Kushner. One senior administration official said Feinberg has met more than once with Trump in the Oval Office. Through his investment firm Cerberus Capital, Feinberg controls the huge military contractor Dyncorp. He is also a confidant of Trump and has known him from business circles since before Trump became president. Feinberg was considered for a czar-type position overseeing an intelligence review earlier this year, but the idea was stymied by a vehement backlash from the intelligence community. Feinberg does not have an intelligence background.
Feinberg is proposing ideas similar to Prince’s; Prince said the two were 95 to 98 percent in agreement, though “he wrote his thing, I wrote mine.”
A source close to the situation said Feinberg had been asked to submit a “strategic recommendation” for Afghanistan that is “materially different with respect to the use of independent contractors from the plan Erik Prince proposed.”
Sean McFate, a Georgetown professor and former DynCorp contractor, described Feinberg’s plan for contractors as “more status quo. He wants to take the current mission and just make it bigger.”
One of the issues raised by Prince’s plan is that U.S. law prohibits using contractors for combat operations. The workaround is that instead of being categorized under Title 10 of the U.S. code, it will be housed under Title 50, making it subject to the same regulations as intelligence operations. This has sparked concerns about transparency, but appeals to some in the secretive intelligence community.
Critics say Prince’s plan will lead to a moral and legal quagmire, as contractors from around the world fighting in place of U.S. forces present a host of possible problems. What happens if a Canadian, for example, kills an Afghan civilian while fighting as a contractor under the leadership of the American “viceroy”? What if the contractors get in a real bind—does the U.S. send our military in to help them? Read the full text here for additional names and context.
The Taliban are watching all things Washington DC, especially Secretary of Defense Mattis and the White House.
Context: U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis told reporters on Monday that the Trump administration was “very, very close” to a decision on Afghanistan, adding that all options were on the table. However, U.S officials believe it could take weeks for a South Asia strategy to be approved.
CNN: President Donald Trump and his national security team are scheduled to meet next week to discuss US strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, according to two administration officials familiar with the latest thinking.
While the meetings could be delayed or rescheduled, the officials told CNN that the ongoing review appears to be drawing to a close.
On Friday the Pentagon announced that the US killed Abu Sayed, the leader of ISIS-Khorasan, the terror group’s Afghanistan affiliate in a drone strike on Tuesday.
But there are major challenges ahead, and Defense Secretary James Mattis has been framing the internal discussions inside the administration as a “South Asia strategy.” It encompasses a way ahead in Afghanistan, including the possibility of sending more troops, but also a look at new ideas for dealing with Pakistan, which the US believes is supporting or turning a blind eye to a number of terror groups operating inside the country. More here.
LWJ: The Taliban has published an “open letter” to President Donald Trump, urging him to “adopt the strategy of a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan instead of a troops increase.” The letter was clearly penned with the Trump administration’s ongoing debate over the war in Afghanistan in mind.
Senior administration officials have reportedly prepared several plans, ranging from a complete withdrawal to a small increase of several thousand American troops. Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser, favors the latter while alternative scenarios have also been presented to the president.
President Trump has been reticent to commit additional forces, as he would then take ownership of the longest war in America’s history. The Taliban obviously knows this and is trying to influence the debate inside the US.
But readers should keep in mind that the new letter is propaganda and should be read as such. The letter is laced with erroneous and self-serving statements. And some of its key points, crafted for Western readers, are contradicted by the facts.
Allied with al Qaeda, which exports terrorism around the globe
The Taliban describes itself as a “mercy for Afghanistan, [the] region and the world because the Islamic Emirate does not have any intention or policy of causing harm to anyone and neither will it allow others to use the Afghan soil against anyone.”
Although the Taliban does not explicitly mention al Qaeda, the group likely wants readers to assume that this sentence means there is a clear distinction between the Taliban’s operations inside Afghanistan and jihadist threats outside of the country. In reality, there is no such clear line of demarcation.
Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of al Qaeda, remains openly loyal to the Taliban’s overall leader. Zawahiri swore allegiance to Mullah Mansour in Aug. 2015. Mansour, the successor to Taliban founder Mullah Omar, described al Qaeda’s leaders as the “heroes of the current jihadist era” and Osama bin laden as the “leader of mujahideen.” Mansour publicly accepted the “esteemed” Dr. Zawahiri’s fealty shortly after it was offered.
After Mansour was struck down by an American drone strike in Pakistan in May 2016, Zawahiri quickly rehearsed the same oath to Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, who still presides over the Taliban. Akhundzada’s son carried out a suicide bombing in Helmand province in July. The attack was just the latest piece of evidence confirming that the Taliban emir is a committed ideologue, not a prospective peace partner.
Under Akhundzada’s leadership, the Taliban is hardly bashful about its continuing alliance with al Qaeda. The Taliban celebrated the relationship in a Dec. 2016 video, which contained images of Osama bin Laden alongside Mullah Omar. One such image from the production can be seen below:
“Groups of Afghan Mujahideen have emerged from the land of Afghans that will destroy the biggest idol and head of kufr of our time, America,” Batarfi said in the Taliban’s video. The “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was sacrificed and even vanished in support of our sacred religion, but they (the Taliban) did not trade off their religion.” Batarfi crowed that the jihadists can finally “see [the] light of victory,” as governance according to the “rule of Sharia” law is “even stronger in Afghanistan than before.”
While the Taliban is often portrayed as a nationalist group (this is the intended implication of the group’s letter to President Trump), the Dec. 2016 video portrayed the Taliban’s struggle as part of the global jihad and the effort to reclaim all Muslim lands.
Akhundzada’s top deputy is the aforementioned Sirajuddin Haqqani, a longtime al Qaeda ally. The Haqqanis have been in bed with al Qaeda since the 1980s. Sirajuddin’s father, Jalaluddin, was one of Osama bin Laden’s earliest and most influential backers. Files recovered during the May 2011 raid on bin Laden’s compound reveal that al Qaeda’s men have fought alongside Sirajuddin’s forces for years. This is especially significant because Haqqani oversees the Taliban’s military operations.
Just over two weeks before the 2016 presidential election, the US hunted down a top al Qaeda commander known as Farouq al-Qahtani in eastern Afghanistan. Qahtani not only commanded jihadists fighting alongside the Taliban, he was planning attacks inside the United States at the time of his demise.
All of these details, and more, belie the Taliban’s claim that it won’t “allow others to use the Afghan soil against anyone.”
State sponsors and enablers of the Taliban-led insurgency
The Taliban claims that the US government has concluded that the “mujahideen” are entirely self-sufficient and do not receive any foreign support. “Your intelligence agencies admit that our Mujahideen are not being supported by any country and neither can they produce any proof in the contrary,” the letter reads.
This is obviously false — Pakistan’s support for the Taliban is longstanding and well-known. Other countries, such as Iran and Russia, provide some level of assistance. Wealthy benefactors in the Gulf have contributed rich sums to the Taliban cause as well.
In July, the US State Department once again confirmed that Pakistan harbors the Taliban, including the so-called Haqqani Network (HQN), which plays an integral role within the organization. “Pakistan did not take substantial action against the Afghan Taliban or HQN, or substantially limit their ability to threaten US interests in Afghanistan, although Pakistan supported efforts to bring both groups into an Afghan-led peace process,” State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 reads. A “number” of attacks inside Afghanistan throughout 2016 “were planned and launched from safe havens in Pakistan.”
In a report submitted to Congress in June, the Defense Department also explained the enduring importance of the jihadists’ Pakistani safe havens. “Attacks in Afghanistan attributed to Pakistan-based militant networks continue to erode the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship,” the Pentagon noted. “Militant groups, including the Taliban and Haqqani Network, continued to utilize sanctuaries inside Pakistan.”
The Afghan Taliban is not operating under the radar in Pakistan, but instead receives assistance from parts of the government. “Afghan-oriented militant groups, including the Taliban and Haqqani Network, retain freedom of action inside Pakistani territory and benefit from support from elements of the Pakistani Government,” the report reads (emphasis added).
This is consistent with Pakistan’s “Good Taliban” vs. “Bad Taliban” policy, which favors jihadists who are focused on attacking the Afghan government and allied forces, including the US. Only the “Bad Taliban” — that is, those jihadists operating against the Pakistani state — are regularly targeted by Pakistani security. The effects of this policy are plain to see. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) earned its name because the group’s most senior leaders have been able to operate openly in the city. It is well-known, too, that the Haqqanis have cozy relations with the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. Sirajuddin Haqqani has been the Taliban’s top deputy leader since 2015.
Pakistan isn’t the only regional player supporting the Taliban-led insurgency. The Iranian government is as well.
“Iran provides some support to the Taliban and Haqqani Network and has publicly justified its relationships as a means to combat the spread of the ISIS-K threat in Afghanistan,” the Pentagon reported in June. Although the Iranians attempt to justify their policy as a form of realpolitik, a necessary consequence of fighting the Islamic State’s Wilayah Khorasan (Khorasan “province,” or ISIS-K), the reality is that they first forged a working relationship with their former foes in the Taliban immediately after the 9/11 hijackings. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Analysis: Iran has supported the Taliban’s insurgency since late 2001.]
A striking example of Iranian complicity in the Afghan insurgency was revealed in May 2016, when the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mansour, was killed in an American airstrike. The US followed Mansour from Iran, where he was holding meetings, across the Pakistani border into Baluchistan, where he was struck down. Mansour’s ability to travel freely inside Iran speaks volumes about the ongoing relationship.
At a minimum, Russia has rhetorically backed the Taliban. “Russian-Afghan relations suffered due to Russia’s public acknowledgment of communications with the Taliban and support of the Taliban’s call for coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan,” the Pentagon has said. Press reports continue to point to evidence that Russian-supplied weapons are helping to fuel the Taliban-led insurgency. Asked about these reports in April, Gen. John Nicholson, the Commander of Resolute Support and US Forces Afghanistan, refused to refute them.
There are other obvious problems with the Taliban’s letter. The group accuses President Trump’s generals of lying about the American casualties incurred. The “[g]enerals are concealing the real statistics of your dead and crippled however the Afghans can easily count the coffins being sent your way on a daily basis,” the letter reads. This is nonsensical, as American casualties are readily verified. Moreover, the Taliban frequently lies about the number of Americans killed or wounded in combat.
The Taliban says that it could “conquer many provincial capitals currently under siege,” if it “were not for fear of civilian casualties.” There is no question that the Taliban currently threatens multiple provincial capitals, but its concern about civilian casualties is mostly cosmetic. The United Nations has repeatedly documented the Taliban’s culpability in killing and wounding innocents. The group is responsible for more civilian casualties in Afghanistan than any other actor.
The US approach to the war in Afghanistan should be based on a rational assessment of the situation, not the Taliban’s misleading claims.
Sergey has many successes on his resume, all of which make him a possible candidate for President. Here are some:
– Russia’s military success in Crimea, East Ukraine, Syria, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and down the border of NATO countries, Sergey and Russia were viewed as force well protected that can show effectiveness and efficiency in military actions
– Shoigu was minister in the Ministry of emergency situations for almost 22 years. During that time, he efficiently used the advantages of Russian bureaucracy and legalism to gather power and popularity, all while not making a single enemy
– Sergey showed pragmatic approach in addressing former American defense secretary Chuck Hagel with his personal name, not with his surname, which was practice before
Militarization of Russia
Since 2013, Russia and Moscow were heavily criticized for spending large amounts of money on armed forces. Many Western leaders thought that Putin is the man pulling the strings, and that it was his idea to spend so much money, despite his weak economy that is too much oil-dependent. However, what few people outside of Russia knew until lately is that Sergey Shoigu, the Russian defense minister is the one responsible for the huge expansion. More here.
In April of this year, Maduro’s Defense Minister paid an interesting visit to Moscow. Vladimir Padrino Lopez the Defense Minister would meet his Russian counterpart, Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, at a conference of international defense.
“I have come (to Moscow) upon the orders of President Nicolás Maduro,” Padrino said in the video. He added: “I bring a very interesting, a very important point (to the conference), which is NATO’s projection in Latin America, its consequences and risks.”
Beyond the excuse of the conference, why is Maduro’s Defense Minister, the man who “pulls the strings of power behind the scenes” in Venezuela according to García Otero, visiting Moscow precisely when massive citizen protests are posing an existential threat to the Chavista regime? The answer may have to do with what is perhaps the least analyzed aspect of the Venezuelan crisis: the geostrategic implications of a failed state in Venezuela from the point of view of the world’s great powers.
There certainly has been a shift in Washington’s attitude toward the Venezuelan regime since Donald Trump arrived at the White House. As the PanAm Post explained in 2016, the Obama administration carried out a three-pronged strategy in Latin America, its aims being:
Achieving the dangerous pact between Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the communist FARC guerrillas.
Renewing diplomatic and commercial relations with the Castros’ Cuba after more than five decades since the Cuban embargo was put in place.
Appeasing the Maduro regime in Venezuela in order to guarantee the success of the Santos-FARC pact while preventing the implosion of the Cuban economy, which depends on Venezuelan oil for its survival (Obama wanted to avoid a Mariel Boatlift-type humanitarian crisis on the coasts of Florida).
Yes, there is some indication that NATO may begin cultivating members nations in Latin America, Putin is on the move using Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. Now you know why Vice President Pence is on a tour in Latin America.
When President Trump mentioned just a few days ago about a military option in Venezuela, he had something in mind due to the above meetings and building Russian influence in the region. Beginning in Columbia Pence discussions began this way:
Colombia is one of the United States’ closest allies in the Western Hemisphere, yet, as he stood next to Pence, Santos denounced Trump’s threat of military action, and told the visiting vice president that such a possibility “shouldn’t even be considered” and would be “unacceptable.”
“Every country in Latin America would not favor any form of military intervention, and that is why we are saying we are intent on looking into other measures, some of which are already underway and others to be implemented in the future,” Santos said.
The concerns build as Maduro’s Vice President, El Aissami has deep ties to Hezbollah of Iran and he was responsible for those tens of thousands of passports illegally issued for Syrians. Of course Putin is running Assad of Syria with the aid of Iran. Weapons abound globally. Vladimir Padrino Lopez is the mastermind and driver of the region.
The ideology of Venezuela’s minister of defense, Vladimir Padrino López, is captured in a 2015 photo of him kneeling before Fidel Castro. But he is reputed to be even closer to the Kremlin. This January, Venezuela launched a series of civil-military exercises around the country, dubbed Plan Zamora, under the guidance of advisers from Iran, Russia and Cuba.
Russia supplies arms to Venezuela. In November the Kremlin sent new aviation and air-defense technology to Caracas. Reuters reported in May that Venezuela now has “5,000 Russian-made MANPADS surface-to-air weapons,” representing “the largest known stockpile in Latin America.” More here from the WSJ.
For a comprehensive timeline and names, go here, excellent work going back to 2015 investigating the Russian, Cuban, Iranian and Venezuelan operation.
CIA Director Mike Pompeo said on Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace that the CIA provided accurate intelligence on the DPRK nuclear program and policymakers too, were well aware even before Pompeo took over the agency.
When you look closely enough you will find serial numbers belonging to Pakistan, China and Russia…
Looking back and open source information is that statement accurate? When investigative media does the job of investigating and informs, Pompeo is correct. Furthermore, Iran was and is part of all the variables such that Barack, Hillary and John overlooked it all. How so? That pesky JPOA. Then cultivating the original Wikileaks cables, there was more….
VIENNA, Sept 18 (Reuters) – It is one of the West’s biggest nuclear
proliferation nightmares — that increasingly isolated Iran and North
Korea might covertly trade know-how, material or technology that could be
put to developing atomic bombs.
“Such a relationship would be logical and beneficial to both North Korea
and Iran,” said Mark Hibbs, an expert of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Last year, a U.N. report suggested that impoverished, reclusive North
Korea might have supplied Iran as well as Syria and Myanmar with banned
atomic technology.
In what could be a sign of this, a German newspaper last month reported
that North Korea had provided Iran with a computer programme as part of
intensified cooperation that could help the Islamic state build nuclear
weapons.
“There are reports and rumours, which governments and the IAEA (the U.N.
International Atomic Energy Agency) have not denied, indicating that there
may be a track record of bilateral nuclear cooperation between North Korea
and Iran,” Hibbs said.
But while this could make sense for two states facing tightening sanctions
— and potentially earn Pyongyang some badly needed funds — the extent
and nature of any such dealings, if they take place at all, remain
shrouded in mystery.
“It seems to be very difficult to sort out what the relationship in the
nuclear world between DPRK (North Korea) and Iran is. We just simply do
not know,” prominent U.S. nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker said.
This was in contrast to missile cooperation between the two countries,
where North Korea has helped Iran both with the weapons and in building
related factories, he said.
Hecker, who has often visited the east Asian state, said possible
Tehran-Pyongyang atomic technology transfers would be a major concern for
everyone dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Iran’s nuclear programme is based on uranium enrichment, activity which
can have both civilian and military purposes.
North Korea has twice tested plutonium-based nuclear devices, drawing
international condemnation, although it last year revealed the existence
also of a uranium enrichment site, potentially giving it a second pathway
to bombs.
“They complement each other so well (in terms of their expertise). There
is just a lot of synergy in how they would be able to exchange
capabilities,” Hecker said at a seminar for diplomats in Vienna, the
IAEA’s headquarters, this month.
Citing Western intelligence sources, the Munich newspaper Sueddeutsche
Zeitung said in August that North Korea had this year delivered software,
originally developed in the United States, that could simulate neutron
flows.
Such calculations, which can help scientists identify self-sustaining
chain reactions, are vital in the construction of reactors and also in the
development of nuclear explosives.
With the help of the programme, Iran could gain important knowledge of how
to assemble nuclear weapons, the paper said.
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE HUNT
There has been no public confirmation or denial of the report in the West.
But Hecker did not rule it out, saying Pyongyang had demonstrated
experience in this field.
He said North Korea must have some “nuclear code capabilities” which they
would have been able to assess in comparison with the result of an atomic
test.
“So to some extent they have had an opportunity to verify or check their
codes,” Hecker said. “Iran has not had a chance to do that. So exchanging
that type of information … you could see as being very useful.”
North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009, but still has not
shown it has a working nuclear bomb.
Proliferation experts have said the country has enough fissile material
for up to 10 nuclear weapons. But they don’t believe Pyongyang is yet
capable of miniaturising the material to fit into the cone of a missile.
While North Korea has made no secret of its nuclear weapons ambitions,
Iran denies Western allegations that it is covertly seeking to develop an
atomic arms capability.
The Islamic Republic says its nuclear programme is for purposes of
electricity generation, but its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and its
stonewalling of a U.N. nuclear watchdog probe have stoked suspicions
abroad.
The Vienna-based U.N. nuclear watchdog said this month in a report that it
was “increasingly concerned” about possible work in Iran to develop a
nuclear missile.
For several years, the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence
reports indicating Iran has coordinated efforts to process uranium, test
high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a
nuclear warhead.
Iran says the allegations are baseless and forged.
In a separate report on North Korea, from which its inspectors were
expelled in 2009, the IAEA suggested past nuclear-related ties with Syria
and Libya, but it made no mention of Iran.
Proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick said it would not be hard for Tehran
and Pyongyang to put “well-practised trade deals and transfer routes” from
their ballistic missile cooperation to use also in the nuclear field.
Still, there were few signs of any nuclear cooperation between the two
countries.
“It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are
intensively targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North
Korea,” Fitzpatrick, a former senior U.S. State Department official, said.
“Yet finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial
needle in a haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms
of nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable.”
Hibbs said any nuclear dealings with North Korea would pose risks for
Iran: “Were this traffic to be confirmed, that would deepen the suspicion
that Iran is involved in nuclear activities which are clandestine and
military in nature.”
***
What about China selling weapons to Iran and operating groups being still worried about non-proliferation by North North Korea? Lots of chatter of that and left unresolved:
5. (S) Noting a decrease in the sales of Chinese conventional weapons to Iran, DASD Sedney expressed appreciation for China’s efforts to limit conventional arms sales to Iran. Sedney emphasized that Iran’s spreading of conventional BEIJING 00000058 002 OF 003 weapons to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon poses the serious problem of Chinese weapons killing U.S. soldiers. Sedney expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program. More on that cable here, of note is the distribution list.
***
So under Obama it seems we left the A.Q. Khan sanctions to the Export Import Bank and the IAEA: From Secretary of State to the United Nations/Vienna by method deliver of a telegram and SIPDIS
DE RUEHC #2552 0092353 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 092336Z JAN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000
4. (SECRET/rel IAEA) — I wanted to inform you of a legal process that has concluded in the U.S. — U.S. nonproliferation law requires that sanctions be imposed in certain circumstances; the activities of Dr. Khan and some of his associates fall under the requirements of this law. — The U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on individuals and companies listed in a media note that was released on January 12. — This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. — The U.S. sanctions laws and executive orders involved include the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the Export Import Bank Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 12938 and 13382. — This legal non-paper describes in more detail the specific sanctions and penalties involved. — The U.S. decision was announced on January 12 and will soon be printed in the Federal Register. — This U.S. decision is not directed at any country. In fact, as we highlight in our public statement, many countries contributed to international efforts to shut down and investigate the network. — The sanctions decision reflects the diverse and global nature of the network. — No sanctions were imposed on governments. — As IAEA knows, the actions of the A.Q. Khan network have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and will have lasting implications for international security. — These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. — It is imperative that all countries remain vigilant in order to ensure that Khan network associates or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. — If Asked: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. — If Asked: Will you share your findings with us? We can not share details of the sanction decision but don,t believe the information we have would contribute to a different understanding of the activities than you already have. End suggested talking points. ————– LEGAL NONPAPER ————– 5. (U) Begin non-paper: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. Once imposed, the sanction shall apply for a period of at least 12 months, but can thereafter be terminated if reliable information indicates that (1) the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device, and (2) the United States has received reliable assurances from the sanctioned person that such person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear explosive device. Export Import Bank Act (EXIM) The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. This sanction can be terminated if the U.S. determines and certifies in writing to the Congress that reliable information indicates that the sanctioned person has ceased to aid or abet any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire any nuclear explosive device or acquire un-safeguarded special nuclear material; and steps have been taken to ensure that the sanctionable activities will not resume. The sanction may also be terminated if the appropriate government has taken certain corrective actions. Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 These Executive Orders (E.O.) provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery. The sanctions under E.O. 12938 include: a ban on USG departments, and agencies, procurement from, or entering into contracts for procurement with, the sanctioned person or entity; a ban on providing any USG assistance to, and any participation in USG assistance programs by, the sanctioned person or entity; and a ban on the importation into the U.S. of goods, technology or services procured or provided by the sanctioned person or entity. The E.O. 12938 sanctions may be terminated if there is reliable evidence that the foreign person has ceased the activities that led to the imposition of sanctions. The sanction under E.O. 13382 is that all property and interests in property of the designated entity, that are in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. (i.e., U.S. persons anywhere) are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in. Sanctions under E.O. 13382 may be lifted when circumstances no longer warrant their imposition. End non-paper. ———- MEDIA NOTE ———— 6. (U) Post can draw from the following Media Note after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Media Note: For Immediate Release January 12, 2009 Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities Today, the Department of State announced that sanctions will be imposed on 13 individuals and three private companies for their involvement in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. This announcement comes after a multi-year U.S. government review of the available information pertaining to the activities of this network. We believe these sanctions will help prevent future proliferation-related activities by these private entities, provide a warning to other would-be proliferators, and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to using all available tools to address proliferation-related activities. Dr. A.Q. Khan led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear equipment and know-how that provided &one stop shopping8 for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. He and his associates provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. With the assistance of Khan,s network, countries could leapfrog the slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development programs. In 2004, following Libya,s welcome decision to renounce its nuclear program, the United States removed from Libya items it had received from the network. The network,s actions have irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and have had lasting implications for international security. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Malaysia, worked closely with the United States to investigate and shut down the network. Governments have also joined together to put in place United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to criminalize proliferation and have worked cooperatively to establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance international tools to interdict and prevent trade in sensitive technologies. Many of Dr. Khan,s associates are either in custody, being prosecuted, or have been convicted of crimes. Dr. Khan publicly acknowledged his involvement in the network in 2004, although he later retracted those statements. While we believe the A.Q. Khan network is no longer operating, countries should remain vigilant to ensure that Khan network associates, or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities, will not become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or equipment. Sanctions have been imposed under the following statutes as follows: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Export-Import Bank Act (EXIM): Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 12938: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain Executive Order 13382: Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Gerhard Wisser End media note. ————– Press Guidance —————– 7. (U) Post can draw from the ISN Press Guidance after 0900 EST January 12. Begin Press Guidance: ISN Contingency Press Guidance January 12, 2009 A.Q. Khan Network: Sanctions General Questions Q: What specifically did A.Q. Khan and his network transfer? What did these people do to trigger sanctions? These entities were sanctioned for engaging in nuclear-related proliferation activities as part of the international A.Q. Khan network. In particular, Dr. Khan and his associates in a number of countries provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges. The United States also believes that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to North Korea. Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs. These illicit transfers by the Khan network have been reported in the press for a number of years. I cannot comment on additional specific intelligence-related information. Today,s imposition of sanctions on private companies and individuals does not reflect recent proliferation activity by the network. Q: Why haven,t you sanctioned any countries? The authorities under which sanctions are being imposed do not target countries. Governments around the world, including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, Germany, Switzerland, the UAE, and Malaysia worked closely with the U.S. to investigate and shut down this international network. Q: Why has it taken four years to impose sanctions? This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of information and many people and companies across the globe. We have been working diligently for the past four years to assemble and properly evaluate the available information. Given the consequences of a sanctions decision, it is important that the information be thoroughly vetted and evaluated before a sanctions determination is made. Q: Why couldn,t you have sanctioned some entities earlier instead of waiting four years? Information continued to become available as other countries concluded their investigations or prosecutions and we believed in this case that it was important to sanction the group at one time. Q: Did you tell the affected governments prior to public announcement? Yes, governments were notified in advance that the United States intends to impose proliferation sanctions on these private companies and individuals. We applaud the actions that each of these countries took to shut down and investigate the network, and work cooperatively to implement new measures to prevent proliferation. Q: What sanctions authorities were used to impose penalties? There are two sanctions laws and two Executive Orders that provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions in this case. The sanctions laws are the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (the &NPPA8) and the Export Import Bank Act (&EXIM8). The two Executive Orders are 12938 and 13382. Q: What do these authorities require? The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any person who, after September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded material. The Executive Orders provide the authority to impose measures against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery, including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern. Q: What penalties can be imposed pursuant to these sanctions authorities? These sanctions are not being applied to any governments, but to private companies and individuals. In brief, the NPPA provides for a ban on USG procurement from the sanctioned person. EXIM provides for a ban on Export Import Bank credit, guarantees, or insurance in support of U.S. exports to the sanctioned person. Executive Order 12938 provides for a ban on USG procurement or imports from the sanctioned entity as well as a ban on U.S. assistance to the sanctioned entity. Executive Order 13382 freezes the assets of a sanctioned entity that are under U.S. jurisdiction. Q: What impact, if any, will these sanctions have? These sanctions will help prevent and deter future proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to other would-be proliferators. Q: What can companies and individuals do to have sanctions rescinded? Each law treats this issue differently. I refer you to the statutes. Q: Is the A.Q. Khan network still active? If so, what are we doing about it? We do not believe that the network run by A.Q. Khan is still functioning. Most of the key people involved with the network have been put out of business, are in jail and/or facing prosecution. We remain concerned that individuals associated with the network, once they are released from jail or are no longer being closely monitored, could re-engage in proliferation on their own in the future. It is important that countries continue to monitor their behavior closely and put in place laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent proliferation activities. Q: Do remnants of the network still exist? What are we doing about them? Saying the Khan network is no longer functioning does not mean that other proliferation-related networks and activity around the world has stopped. We know, for example, that Iran has utilized several different front and Iranian companies to purchase particular items of proliferation concern. Several of these entities and companies were identified in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in connection with their involvement in the Iranian nuclear or missile programs. The U.S. has taken action against many of these entities, including designations under E.O. 13382. More information on E.O. 13382 designations can be found on the State Department,s website under nonproliferation sanctions as well as the Treasury,s Office of Foreign Asset Control,s website. Country Specific Questions Pakistan Q: Wasn,t the Government of Pakistan involved or at least knew what was going on? The government of Pakistan assured us it had nothing to do with the network and we have no information to refute this. We applaud the actions Pakistan took to shut down and investigate the network. In the years since the public revelation of the Khan network, the government of Pakistan also has taken a number of positive steps to improve its export controls and promote international nonproliferation. Q: Why haven,t we had direct access to Khan? We appreciate the cooperation the government of Pakistan has provided the IAEA and the United States. We believe that Pakistan took seriously its commitment to dismantle the network. Pakistan has assured us that it will not be a source of proliferation in the future. The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in order to obtain information about his dealings. Q: Reports indicate that Pakistan is easing restrictions on Khan ) What is your reaction to this? We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the Khan network. We believe Dr. Khan is still a proliferation threat to the world and the proliferation support that he and his associates provided to several states of proliferation concern has had a harmful impact on international security and will for years to come. Q: Khan recently said he was forced to confess. If we haven,t had access to Khan then how do we know he was complicit? We have information from other sources indicating that Khan was complicit in nuclear-related transfers to several countries. Q: Any response to statements by Pakistan that it wants to put the A.Q. Khan issue to rest or that the U.S. has not passed questions on Khan,s activities for some time. The U.S. appreciates the cooperation Pakistan has provided the U.S. and IAEA. Such cooperation will continue to be important as we work toward a greater understanding of what the network provided to various countries. Q: Will there be any additional sanctions on these individuals? We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional sanctions related to these activities. Q: Why didn,t you sanction Khan Research Labs? I can,t comment on individual decisions. Q: What effect will these sanctions have on our relationship with Pakistan ) specifically, our counter-terrorism relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the Khan proliferation network as well as the cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the activities of the Khan network. The United States has a close partnership with Pakistan on counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and other issues. Q: Do you think these sanctions will have an effect on the India-Pakistan relationship? These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. Questions about India and Pakistan,s relationship are best answered by those countries. Switzerland Q: Is it true that the U.S. asked Switzerland to destroy nuclear documents? We have no comment. Q: Why aren,t you sanctioning any of the Tinners? Is it because they were spies for the U.S.? We have no comment. Sanctions Decisions: Q: Didn,t the Khan network include many more people and companies than you sanctioned, including the Tinner family, Henk Slebos, and companies in the UAE. Why aren,t you sanctioning them? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. While I cannot comment on individual decisions, I can note that we did not impose sanctions on companies that are no longer operating. Q: Why did you designate some people under E.O. 13382 but not others? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: Why did you sanction Lerch, Geiges, and Wisser under EXIM, but not under the NPPA? The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough review of all available information. I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. Q: What about Libya, Iran and North Korea? They bought these items ) why haven,t we sanctioned them? These sanctions focus on individuals and companies associated with the Khan network. As such, the governments that acquired these items are not subject to sanction under the NPPA or the EXIM Bank Act. Iran and the DPRK are subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1718 respectively. In addition, sanctions were imposed on the DPRK under the Glenn Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act following its October 2006 nuclear test. In the case of Libya, once it made the strategic 2003 decision to dismantle its WMD program, it then cooperated with the USG to facilitate that process. Libya also provided information about the A.Q. Khan network’s activities in Libya. Q: Aren,t these kinds of sanctions really toothless with little impact? Sanctions help signal strong U.S. opposition to the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, expose publicly those involved, and serve as a deterrent to others that might consider pursuing similar activities. Sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 will allow the U.S. to seize assets held under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby help prevent future proliferation. Q: What about North Korea ) are sanctions in the works for their nuclear transfers to Syria? The DPRK is subject to a wide array of sanctions, including UNSCR 1718 and a number of other U.S. sanctions related to its transfers of items proliferation concern. Furthermore, in the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK has reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist Iran,s nuclear program? The IAEA has detailed in various reports that Iran has admitted to a relationship with the Khan network ) the same network that provided nuclear weapons designs to Libya ) from 1987 to 1999. This network provided Iran with P1 centrifuge designs, centrifuges, and components; P2 centrifuge designs; other very sensitive information; and technical advice including a &hemispheres document8. The &hemispheres document8 contains instructions for casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which the IAEA,s January 2006 report noted are &related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.8 Beginning with the November 2003 report, the IAEA Director General confirmed that for almost 20 years, Iran had been pursuing undeclared work in some of the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and had systematically hidden that work from the IAEA. Iran,s failure to cooperate sharply limits the IAEA,s ability to know more about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and increases the international community,s concerns about Iran,s true intentions. Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist North Korea,s nuclear program? Former Pakistani President Musharraf has previously acknowledged that Dr. A.Q. Khan and his international network provided sensitive centrifuge technology, including about two dozen centrifuges, to North Korea. Q: Were there other customer of Khan,s network? Questions remain as to whether there were other customers. End Press Guidance. —————— REPORTING DEADLINE —————— 8. (U) Please report within ten working days of receipt of this cable. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses. —————- POINT OF CONTACT —————- 9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information is Caroline Russell and Chris Herrington, ISN/CPI, 647-5035. RICE
For a comprehensive timeline and names, 