Qatar Dictates Obama’s Policy on Syria

Posted on September 20, 2015September 20, 2015 by Denise Simon

It is not just money, it is that Doha is the center, the core, the hub of all Middle East policy machinery to which the White House has deferred. Smitten and starry-eyed and out of the strategic lead, Obama and his State Department barely intersect with Qatar except to bow at commands and spectate during the enduring chess-game.

More information about Qatar is available on the Qatar Page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet.

U.S.-QATAR RELATIONS

The United States established diplomatic relations with Qatar in 1972 following its independence from the United Kingdom. Bilateral relations are strong, with the United States and Qatar coordinating closely on a wide range of regional and global issues. . As a valuable partner to the United States, Qatar has played an influential role in the region through a period of great transformation. Together, we support progress, stability and prosperity in the region. The United States and Qatar also cooperate on security in the Persian Gulf region. Qatar hosts CENTCOM Forward Headquarters, and Qatar has supported North Atlantic Treaty Organization and U.S. military operations in the region. The United States welcomes hundreds of Qataris students in the United States every year, and six major U.S. universities have branch campuses in Qatar.

U.S. Assistance to Qatar

The United States provides no development assistance to Qatar.

Bilateral Economic Relations

The United States and Qatar have extensive economic ties. As Qatar’s largest foreign investor and its single largest source of imports, the United States has developed a robust trade relationship with Qatar, with over 120 U.S companies operating in country. For example, the U.S. is one of the major equipment suppliers for Qatar’s oil and gas industry, and U.S. companies have played a significant role in the development of the oil and gas sector and petrochemicals. U.S. exports to Qatar include aircraft, machinery, vehicles, optical and medical instruments, and agricultural products. U.S. imports from Qatar include liquefied natural gas, aluminum, fertilizers, and sulfur. The United States and Qatar have signed a trade and investment framework agreement.

Qatar’s Membership in International Organizations
Qatar and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Qatar is an observer to the Organization of American States and a member of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League.

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2014 Foreign Policy: ABU DHABI and DOHA — Behind a glittering mall near Doha’s city center sits the quiet restaurant where Hossam used to run his Syrian rebel brigade. At the battalion’s peak in 2012 and 2013, he had 13,000 men under his control near the eastern city of Deir Ezzor. “Part of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), they are loyal to me,” he said over sweet tea and sugary pastries this spring. “I had a good team to fight.”

Hossam, a middle-aged Syrian expat, owns several restaurants throughout Doha, Qatar, catering mostly to the country’s upper crust. The food is excellent, and at night the tables are packed with well-dressed Qataris, Westerners, and Arabs. Some of his revenue still goes toward supporting brigades and civilians with humanitarian goods — blankets, food, even cigarettes.

He insists that he has stopped sending money to the battle, for now. His brigade’s funds came, at least in part, from Qatar, he says, under the discretion of then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Khalid bin Mohammed Al Attiyah. But the injection of cash was ad hoc: Dozens of other brigades like his received initial start-up funding, and only some continued to receive Qatari support as the months wore on. When the funds ran out in mid-2013, his fighters sought support elsewhere. “Money plays a big role in the FSA, and on that front, we didn’t have,” he explained.

Hossam is a peripheral figure in a vast Qatari network of Islamist-leaning proxies that spans former Syrian generals, Taliban insurgents, Somali Islamists, and Sudanese rebels. He left home in 1996 after more than a decade under pressure from the Syrian regime for his sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of his friends were killed in a massacre of the group in Hama province in 1982 by then President Hafez al-Assad. He finally found refuge here in Qatar and built his business and contacts slowly. Mostly, he laid low; Doha used to be quite welcoming to the young President Bashar al-Assad and his elegant wife, who were often spotted in the high-end fashion boutiques before the revolt broke out in 2011.

When the Syrian war came and Qatar dropped Assad, Hossam joined an expanding pool of middlemen whom Doha called upon to carry out its foreign policy of supporting the Syrian opposition. Because there were no established rebels when the uprising started, Qatar backed the upstart plans of expats and businessmen who promised they could rally fighters and guns. Hossam, like many initial rebel backers, had planned to devote his own savings to supporting the opposition. Qatar’s donations made it possible to think bigger.

In recent months, Qatar’s Rolodex of middlemen like Hossam has proved both a blessing and a curse for the United States. On one hand, Washington hasn’t shied away from calling on Doha’s connections when it needs them: Qatar orchestrated the prisoner swap that saw U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl freed in exchange for five Taliban prisoners in Guantánamo Bay. And it ran the negotiations with al-Nusra Front, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, that freed American writer Peter Theo Curtis in August. “Done,” Qatari intelligence chief Ghanim Khalifa al-Kubaisi reportedly texted a contact — adding a thumbs-up emoticon — after the release was completed.

But that same Qatari network has also played a major role in destabilizing nearly every trouble spot in the region and in accelerating the growth of radical and jihadi factions. The results have ranged from bad to catastrophic in the countries that are the beneficiaries of Qatari aid: Libya is mired in a war between proxy-funded militias, Syria’s opposition has been overwhelmed by infighting and overtaken by extremists, and Hamas’s intransigence has arguably helped prolong the Gaza Strip’s humanitarian plight.

For years, U.S. officials have been willing to shrug off Doha’s proxy network — or even take advantage of it from time to time. Qatar’s neighbors, however, have not. Over the past year, fellow Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have publicly rebuked Qatar for its support of political Islamists across the region.Over the past year, fellow Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have publicly rebuked Qatar for its support of political Islamists across the region. These countries have threatened to close land borders or suspend Qatar’s membership in the regional Gulf Cooperation Council unless the country backs down. After nearly a year of pressure, the first sign of a Qatari concession came on Sept. 13, when seven senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figures left Doha at the request of the Qatari government.

Both Qatar and its critics are working to ensure that Washington comes down on their side of the intra-Gulf dispute. At stake is the future political direction of the region — and their roles in guiding it.

Late last week, on Sept. 25, Glenn Greenwald’s The Intercept documented how a Washington, D.C.-based firm retained by the United Arab Emirates made contacts with journalists that appear to have yielded articles detailing how fundraisers for groups such as al-Nusra Front and Hamas operate openly in Doha, Qatar’s capital. Foreign Policy also obtained documents from the Camstoll Group, run by former U.S. Treasury Department official Matthew Epstein. Although some of this open-source information is referred to in this article, the vast majority of the reporting comes from months of investigation in the region.

After several weeks of bad press, Qatar is also going on the offensive. “We don’t fund extremists,” Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour during his first interview as Qatar’s leader on Sept. 25. Just over a week earlier, Qatar instituted a new law to regulate charities and prevent them from engaging in politics. And on Sept. 15, Doha began a new six-month contract with Washington lobbying firm Portland PR Inc., which may include lobbying Congress and briefing journalists.

So far, Washington appears unwilling to confront Qatar directly. Aside from the U.S. Treasury Department, which last week designated a second Qatari citizen for supporting al Qaeda in Syria and elsewhere, no senior U.S. administration officials have publicly called out Doha for its troublesome clients.

The State Department said that nobody would be available to comment for this article, but released a fact sheet on Aug. 26 that describes Qatar as “a valuable partner to the United States” and credits it with “play[ing] an influential role in the region through a period of great transformation.”

The question is what the United States is prepared to do about Qatar if it fails to stem its citizens’ support for extremist groups, says Jean-Louis Bruguière, the former head of the EU and U.S. Treasury Department’s joint Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, now based in Paris. “The U.S. has the tools to monitor state and state-linked transfers to extremist groups. But intelligence is one thing and the other is how you react,” he told FP by phone. “What kind of political decision is the U.S. really able to make against states financing terrorism?”

Friends of Qatar

There is no more telling indication of Qatar’s ambitions than the fact that Doha taxi drivers are perpetually lost. With construction ongoing everywhere — part of a $100 billion infrastructure plan to prepare for hosting the 2022 World Cup — buildings open and projects come online so fast that the city’s cabbies can’t keep up.

On the world stage, Qatar sees its role as no less grandiose. Beneath the high-chandeliered ceilings of Doha’s five-star hotel lobbies, eager delegations from around the world make their case for support. Governments, political parties, companies, and rebel groups scurry in and out nervously, and then wait over hot tea to have their proposals considered by the relevant Qatari authorities. Which hotel the visitors stay in indicates their prospects for support. The Four Seasons and Ritz-Carlton are old favorites; Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has stayed at the former, the Syrian opposition at the latter. The W Hotel is a posh newcomer, mostly housing eager European delegations seeking investment or natural gas. The Sheraton — one of Doha’s first hotels — is by now passé; that’s where top Darfuri rebels stayed during negotiations with the Sudanese government. Everyone wants into the network, because as one Syrian in Doha put it, “Qatar has money and Qatar can connect money.”

The winners in this hustle have often been those with the longest ties to this tiny, gas-rich state — a menagerie of leaders from the global Muslim Brotherhood. Doha was already becoming an extremist hub by the early 2000s, as government-funded think tanks and universities popped up filled with Islamist-minded thinkers. The government-funded Al Jazeera was growing across the region, offering positive media attention to Brotherhood figures across the Middle East, and many of the ruling family’s top advisors were Brotherhood-linked expatriates — men like the controversial Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who heads the International Union of Muslim Scholars from Doha.

What Doha saw in the Muslim Brotherhood was a combination of religiosity and efficacy that seemed parallel to its own. Moreover, the Qatari ruling family sought to differentiate itself from competing monarchies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), both of which frown upon political Islam as dangerously power-seeking. It was pragmatism, argues Salah Eddin Elzein, head of the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, a think tank associated with the Qatar-owned satellite network. “Islamists came [to the region] in the 1980s, and Qatar was trying to ally itself with the forces that it saw as those most likely to be the dominant forces for the future.”

But the global Muslim Brotherhood isn’t Qatar’s only — or even its most important — network. Nor does the royal family subscribe to the Brotherhood’s ideals per se. Often overlooked is a second strand that tows closer to Qatar’s official sympathies: the Salafi movement.

Emerging in the 1990s, activist Salafists merged the purist ideology of Saudi Arabia’s clerical establishment with the politicized goals of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of these thinkers would become the first incarnations of al Qaeda, while others gained a strong foothold in liberated Kuwait, where the first activist Salafi political party was formed.

It was in Qatar that the activist Salafists found their benefactor. Over the last 15 years in particular, Doha has become a de facto operating hub for a deeply interconnected community of Salafists living in Qatar but also in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and elsewhere. Clerics have been hosted by ministries and called to talk for important events. Charities have touted the cause — charities like the Sheikh Eid bin Mohammad al Thani Charity, regulated by the Qatari Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which is “probably the biggest and most influential activist Salafi-controlled relief organization in the world,” according to a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

As early as 2003, the U.S. Congress was made aware that Qatari-based charities were helping move and launder money linked to al Qaeda, providing employment and documentation for key figures in the operation. At the same time, Qatar’s global influence was growing: State-backed Qatar Airways began an aircraft-buying spree in 2007 to fuel its vast expansion, linking the once far-flung emirate to every corner of the world. And by 2010, Al Jazeera had evolved into the Arab world’s most influential media operation, supported by a massive annual budget of $650 million.

Just as the Arab Spring invigorated opposition movements across the Middle East, so too did it electrify Qatar’s network of political clients.

Power projection by proxy
Qatar was the only Gulf country not to view with trepidation the changes that roiled the Arab world starting in 2011. Saudi Arabia was shaken by how quickly Washington dropped its decades-long ally in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. Bahrain convulsed when its majority Shiite population took to the streets to demand greater political influence. The UAE joined Qatar in backing NATO strikes in Libya but was considerably more reticent about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood there and in Egypt, fearing the group would invigorate Islamist-sympathizers among its own population.

Qatar, meanwhile, placed a long bet that political Islam was the next big thing that would pay off. “Qatar believes in two things. First, Doha doesn’t want the Saudis to be the major or only player in the Sunni region of the Middle East,” says Kuwaiti political scientist Abdullah al-Shayji. “Second, Qatar wants to have a role to play as a major power in the region.“

Yet mismatched with its grand ambitions, Qatar’s foreign policy faced a key limitation. The country is home to just under 300,000 nationals, and government decision-making is concentrated in the hands of just a few officials. Lacking their own infrastructure, Qatar sought to amplify its impact by working through its network of Brotherhood and Salafi allies.

“The Qataris usually work by identifying individuals who they think are ideologically on the same wavelength,” says Andreas Krieg, an assistant professor at King’s College London and an advisor to the Qatar Armed Forces. “There is no vetting process per se; it’s ‘these are people we can trust.’”

The first battlefield test of Qatar’s proxy chain was in Libya, where there was a broad regional consensus — as well as U.S. support — to oust then-leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. Qatar, together with the UAE, had signed on to Western airstrikes against the regime. But Doha also wanted to help build up rebel capacity on the ground.

“They had to literally go to their address book and say, ‘Who do we know in Libya?’” says Krieg. “This is how they coordinated the Libya operation.” Doha lined up a collection of businessmen, old Brotherhood friends, and ideologically aligned defectors, plying them with tens of millions of dollars and 20,000 tons of arms, the Wall Street Journal later estimated. After a months-long war, the rebels took Tripoli and Qaddafi was dead. Doha’s clients found themselves among the most powerful political brokers in the new Libya. And long after the NATO strikes had ended, some Qatari-backed militias continued to receive support, says Bruguière.

Amid the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring, many expected the nascent summer protests in Syria to quickly topple the Assad regime. Presidents in Tunisia and Egypt had lasted just weeks before resigning, after all, and the world had quickly rallied to oust a more persistent Qaddafi. By August, Washington was calling on Assad to step down as well. Not long thereafter, Qatar began its Syrian operation, modeled on the Libyan adventure.

Like the tendering of a contract, Doha issued a call for bidders to help with the regime’s overthrow. “When we started our battalion [in 2012], the Qataris said, ‘Send us a list of your members. Send us a list of what you want — the salaries and support needs,’” Hossam, the Syrian restaurant owner, remembers. He and dozens of other would-be rebel leaders submitted a pitch. He doesn’t say how much his brigade received, but says his own fundraising efforts for humanitarian goods have yielded hundreds of thousands of riyals.

Qatar’s friends abroad were also at work. Throughout 2012 and early 2013, activist Salafists in Kuwait teamed up with Syrian expatriates to build, fund, and supply extremist brigades that would eventually become groups such as al-Nusra Front and its close ally, Ahrar al-Sham. Using social media to tout their cause and a deep Rolodex of Kuwaiti business contacts, clerics and other prominent Kuwaiti Sunnis raised hundreds of millions of dollars for their clients. Using social media to tout their cause and a deep Rolodex of Kuwaiti business contacts, clerics and other prominent Kuwaiti Sunnis raised hundreds of millions of dollars for their clients. They were able to work essentially unhindered thanks to Kuwait’s lax counterterrorism financing laws and its freedoms of association and speech.

One such donor was the young Kuwaiti Salafi cleric Hajjaj al-Ajmi, who on Aug. 6 was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a funder of terrorism for backing al-Nusra Front. Ajmi runs the so-called People’s Commission for the Support of the Syrian Revolution, many of whose campaign posters on Twitter spoke of charity work — giving food or medicine to the needy and displaced. But back in June 2012, Qatar’s Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs invited the cleric to speak in the coastal city of Al Khor, 30 miles outside Doha, where he argued that humanitarian support alone would never topple the Syrian regime.

“Did you know that bringing down Damascus would not cost more than $10 million?” he intoned, wagging his fingers from his chair in front of the old Syrian flag adopted by revolutionaries. “The priority is the support for the jihadists and arming them.”

In the months that followed, many of Ajmi’s campaigns in Kuwait ran parallel collections in Qatar. Donations could be placed through a representative named Mubarak al-Ajji, according to campaign posters, which affirm he is under Ajmi’s “supervision.” Ajji’s Twitter bio describes him as loving Sunni jihadists who hate “Shiites and infidels.” His timeline is flush with praise for Osama bin Laden.

One of Ajmi’s Kuwaiti colleagues, a cleric named Mohammad al-Owaihan, also used Qatar as a base, calling it his “second country” in a tweet in August. As recently as April, Owaihan solicited Qataris to help prepare fighters for battle on the Syrian coast. “Our jihad is a jihad of Money in Syria,” one poster read, offering contact numbers in Kuwait and Qatar.

These fundraising efforts were well-honed appeals, for example placing donors in special categories for donations of varying sizes. A “gold” gift was 10,000 Qatari riyals ($2,750), while a “silver” donation came in at 5,000 riyals. When particularly generous donations arrived, Ajji and others reported them on Twitter, for example posting photos of jewelry turned over to fund the cause.

Among the grateful rebel brigades that released videos thanking the Kuwaiti cleric Owaihan is Ahrar al-Sham, a Salafi group that counted an al Qaeda operative as one of its top commanders until he was killed this year: “O the kind people of Qatar, O people of the Gulf, your money has arrived,” an October 2013 video from the brigade proclaims. Ajmi boasted of his proximity to Ahrar al-Sham on Sept. 9 in a tweet showing the private online message the group’s leader sent him when the Kuwaiti cleric was designated and sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department.

All of these fundraising activities were orchestrated by individuals — not the government — as Qatar has noted in its defense in recent weeks. But this is also exactly the point: By relying on middlemen, Doha not only outsourced the work but also the liability of meddling. And even where it wasn’t involved directly, Qatar is not unaware of what’s going on in its network.

Many clerics in the activist Salafi movement have, like Ajmi, been outspoken in their backing of groups like al-Nusra Front in Syria — views that have found a welcome audience among government-backed organizations in Doha. Saudi cleric Mohammad al-Arefe, who has called for arming jihadists in Syria and Palestine, was invited by Qatar’s Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs in March 2012 and January 2014 to deliver a Friday sermon and a lecture at Qatar’s Grand Mosque. Kuwaiti Salafist Nabil al-Awadhy — a known fundraiser for groups close to al-Nusra Front — was the featured lecturer in Qatar at a Ramadan festival on July 4, 2014, hosted by a charity and aid group closely linked with the government.

Hostage to proxies

Qatar’s Arab Spring strategy began to fail in the same place it was conceived, amid the masses of protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. On July 3, 2013, demonstrators cheered on the Egyptian military’s ouster of Islamist leader Mohamed Morsi, whose government Qatar had backed to the tune of $5 billion. Within days, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait welcomed the new military-backed government with combined pledges of $13 billion in aid. Days later, Saudi Arabia seized control of backing the Syrian opposition by installing its preferred political leadership. By early fall, Libya was also falling into utter disarray, exemplified by the temporary kidnapping of the country’s prime minister in October 2013. Doha, which had just seen the ascension of a new 33-year-old emir, meekly vowed to focus on internal affairs.

“One of the things about Qatar’s foreign policy is the extent to which it has been a complete and total failure, almost an uninterrupted series of disasters,” says Hussein Ibish, a senior fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine. “Except it’s all by proxy, so nothing bad ever happens to Qatar.”

In both Libya and Syria, Qatar helped fund internationally backed umbrella groups — but it also channeled support to individuals and militias directly. In Libya, for example, one of Qatar’s main conduits to the rebels, the Doha-based cleric Ali al-Sallabi, clashed furiously with Mahmoud Jibril, a Western-backed leader who served as interim prime minister until he resigned in October 2011, warning of “chaos” as various factions battled for control. Today, that warning seems prescient as Libya is mired in an accelerating battle between various rival militias split along regional and ideological lines. The UAE, using U.S.-made jets and operating out of Egypt, has reportedly undertaken several rounds of airstrikes to roll back Qatari-funded Islamists since mid-August.

But it is in Syria where Qatar’s network most spectacularly misfired. Competition between Qatari and Saudi clients has rendered the political opposition toothless, perceived on the ground as a vassal of foreign powers. Meanwhile throughout 2012 and 2013, the proliferation of upstart rebel groups bred competition for funding. Some of Qatar’s clients became key brigades — groups such as Liwa al-Tawhid, whose leader unified rebels in a fractious fight to control Aleppo. Others like Hossam’s, however, simply folded or lingered weakly, focusing on their own ideals and goals.

In other words, there was no one winner. Qatar and other international powers haphazardly backed dozens of different brigades and let them fight it out for who could secure a greater share of the funding.Qatar and other international powers haphazardly backed dozens of different brigades and let them fight it out for who could secure a greater share of the funding. They had few incentives to cooperate on operations, let alone strategy. Nor did their various backers have any incentive to push them together, since this might erode their own influence over the rebels.

Qatar’s bidding system for support also quickly incentivized corruption, as middlemen began to exaggerate their abilities and contacts on the ground to donors in Doha. “Often, groups would submit maybe 3,000 names, but in reality there would be only 300 or 400 people,” says Hossam, the restaurant owner. “The extra money goes in the wrong way. They would do the same thing with operations. If the actual needs were $1 million, maybe they say $5 million. Then the other $4 million disappears.”

The disarray helped push fighters increasingly toward some of the groups that seemed to have a stronger command of their funding and their goals — groups such as al-Nusra Front and eventually the Islamic State, which split from the al Qaeda affiliate in early 2014. The last year has seen a string of defections from more moderate groups into these extremist elements. In December 2013, for example, former Deir Ezzor Free Syrian Army commander Saddam al-Jamal announced in a video that he was joining the Islamic State because “as days passed, we realized that [the FSA] was a project that was funded by foreign countries, especially Qatar,” he said.

It’s unlikely that the Qatari government — or any Gulf state — ever backed the Islamic State, an organization that today has in its cross-hairs all of the U.S.-allied monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, and vice versa. But as in Jamal’s case, some of the individuals who benefited from Qatari funds did go on to join more radical brigades, taking their experience and arms with them.

“Qatar developed early on relations with rebel groups that later radicalized and joined the Salafi-jihadi universe, including Nusra and possibly [the Islamic State],” explains Emile Hokayem, senior fellow for Middle East security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The evolving nature of the Syrian rebellion created often unintended and problematic if at times beneficial entanglements.”

Even as the Syrian opposition gravitated toward the extreme, Qatar argued in late 2012 that the world should worry about radicals later. “I am very much against excluding anyone at this stage, or bracketing them as terrorists, or bracketing them as al Qaeda,” Khalid bin Mohammad Al Attiyah, then minister of state for foreign affairs, argued at a security conference in December of that year.

That sentiment was reiterated by Emir Tamim in his interview with CNN last week, arguing that it would be a “big mistake” to lump together all Islamist-leaning groups in Syria as extremists. Indeed, in all its recent statements rejecting extremism, Doha has mentioned the Islamic State but never al-Nusra Front by name.

Elzein, of the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, defends Qatar’s support for Islamists across the Middle East. He describes the spat between Doha and the other Gulf monarchies as a competition “between powers for the status quo and for change, where Qatar sided itself with change in the region.”

“Qatar’s foreign policy generated a lot of controversy, but perhaps that was part of its very nature,” he says. “When you try something new in a region known to be very conservative, it’s bound to bring that kind of criticism and misperception.”

And indeed, Qatar is far from the only Gulf country whose role in Syria and elsewhere has had negative repercussions. Saudi Arabia has also backed individuals and disparate rebel groups in Syria, and the UAE has sided with specific militias in Libya. In Egypt, a government strongly backed by both countries has overseen mass human rights abuses as it cracks down against the Muslim Brotherhood.

But it’s still hard to see what Qatar has changed for the better. Although its intentions to help the Syrian people were almost certainly genuine, a combination of haphazard methods and support for ideological proxies helped push the opposition toward both radicalization and disarray.
Washington and Doha
Qatar had such freedom to run its network for the last three years because Washington was looking the other way. In fact, in 2011, the United States gave Doha de facto free rein to do what it wasn’t willing to in the Middle East: intervene.

Libya was a case in point. When U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration began building a coalition for airstrikes in the spring of 2011, it took an approach later coined “leading from behind”: France and Britain took the lead in implementing the no-fly zone, while Qatar’s and the United Arab Emirates’ involvement demonstrated Arab support. When Doha stepped forward to help organize the rebels, they were broadly welcomed, former U.S. officials said in interviews with FP.

The same was true in Syria. Despite reticence among certain camps of the U.S. government, particularly those who had worked on Libya, it was still the least-worst option: Qatar, an ally of the United States, could help provide a regional solution to a conflict the White House had no interest in getting entangled in. Washington simply asked Doha not to send anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles to the rebels, which it occasionally did anyway.

On top of the political convenience was the logistical ease of working with the Qataris. Doha makes decisions quickly — and is willing to take risks. While the Saudis moved slowly getting arms into Syria, the Qataris sent planes to move an estimated 3,500 tons of military equipment in 2012 and 2013, reportedly with the CIA’s backing. “Their interagency process has about three people in it,” said one former U.S. official.

The same upsides meant that Washington turned to Doha when it sought to make contact with the Afghan Taliban in 2011 and 2012. The goal was to help smooth the exit of NATO troops from Afghanistan with a political solution. In on-and-off contacts, always made indirectly through the Qataris, the Taliban agreed to negotiate — but first they wanted an office. In June 2013, they got it: a large villa in the embassy district of Doha near a crowded traffic circle known as Rainbow Roundabout.

But Qatar’s advantages soon turned into liabilities. As Doha moved from crisis to crisis, the Qataris showed little ability to choose reliable proxies or to control them once resources had been pumped in. “My view is that Qatari policymaking was a bit amateur. When they got in, they showed no staying power,” the ex-U.S. official said.

In the Taliban case, Doha proved unable or unwilling to stop the Afghan militants from audaciously raising their flag over their new Qatari villa — an act of diplomatic symbolism that infuriated Kabul and scuppered talks before they began. All that could be salvaged from the process, it became clear a year later, was a prisoner exchange that traded U.S. Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl for five top Taliban commanders being held in Guantánamo Bay. Qatar gave its assurances that the five operatives would be under close watch in Doha — but given the country’s history, that doesn’t necessarily mean they won’t influence the Afghan battlefield.

In Syria, meanwhile, it wasn’t until the Islamic State gained prominence that Washington sat up and took notice. In March, David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, took the unprecedented step of calling out the Qataris in public for a “permissive terrorist financing environment.” Such stark criticism, counterterrorism experts say, is usually left for closed-door conversations. A public airing likely indicated Doha wasn’t responsive to Washington’s private requests.

This summer, the conflict between Israel and Hamas also shone fresh light on Qatar’s links to extremists in Palestine. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has been based in Doha since breaking with the Syrian regime in 2012, and Qatar has worked to rehabilitate the group politically and financially ever since. In October of that year, Qatar’s emir visited the Gaza Strip himself, pledging $400 million in aid.

Before and during the latest Gaza war, fellow Gulf states began to lobby in Washington to get tough with Qatar. In 2013, the UAE spent $14 million — more than any other country — on lobbying in Washington, according to data compiled by the Sunlight Foundation. The Camstoll Group, which has been linked to recent media coverage, has held a contract since 2012 that disclosure documents indicate can represent fees of up to $400,000 a month. In the first half of 2013, it earned $4.3 million for activities that disclosure documents describe as advising on matters of “illicit financial activities.” (Disclosure: Foreign Policy‘s PeaceGame program, presented in conjunction with the U.S. Institute of Peace, is underwritten in part by a grant from the UAE Embassy. All FP editorial content, however, is entirely independent.)

Heads have begun to in Washington. In a Sept. 9 hearing in the U.S. House of Representatives, witnesses and congressmen suggested measures that would dramatically recast the relationship between Washington and Doha. In testimony, Jonathan Schanzer, vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, proposed measures that could “send shock waves through the Qatari financial system”: designating charities and individuals in Qatar, putting a hold on an $11 billion arms deal, and even opening an assessment into the cost of moving the U.S. military base away from the emirate.

“Excellent ideas,” hearing chairman Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas) said in reply to the witnesses. “We ought to take them all and implement as many as we can.”

The U.S. Treasury Department is also stepping up efforts to crack down on al Qaeda and Islamic State funds; on Sept. 24, it designated several individuals with links to Qatar. In addition to a Qatari national alleged to have moved funds from Gulf donors to Afghanistan, the designations include Tariq Bin-Al-Tahar Bin Al Falih Al-Awni Al-Harzi, who gathered support from Qatar, including by arranging for the Islamic State “to receive approximately $2 million from a Qatar-based [Islamic State] financial facilitator, who required that Al-Harzi use the funds for military operations only,” the designation says.

Doha’s pushback in reply is just the latest iteration of a long-running bidding war among Gulf states for Washington’s favor. Qatar has increased its visibility in Washington in recent years, holding active contracts with lobbying groups Patton Boggs, Barbour Griffith and Rogers, and BGR Government Affairs. With its vast philanthropic arms, it has sponsored everything from student exchange programs to the congressional charity baseball game. Since the global financial crisis, various Qatari investment funds have also invested in property in Washington, Chicago, and elsewhere.
Qatar’s money runs even more obliquely as well, through the dozens of consultants, businessmen, and former officials whom it has hired at one point or another. Take the Soufan Group, for example, a well-regarded consultancy on counterterrorism and intelligence. Its founder, Ali Soufan, is also executive director of the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS) in Doha, a government-funded center that offers several-week courses to government and military employees. Several other Soufan Group employees are also listed as employees there — an affiliation they rarely disclose in U.S. media interviews. Reached by telephone, Lila Ghosh, communications specialist at the group, told FP that the firm did not do any work on behalf of Qatar within the United States.

QIASS also appears to have given former Obama White House spokesman Robert Gibbs’s new PR group, the Incite Agency, one of its first jobs. Just weeks after it opened, Incite handled RSVPs for an event co-hosted by the Soufan Group and QIASS on “countering violent extremism.” The Incite Agency did not return repeated calls from FP seeking to clarify its relationship with QIASS.

But the biggest reason that Qatar is likely to remain in good favor with Washington isn’t money or influence, but necessity. As the United States ramps up a coalition against the Islamic State militants, it will need first and foremost its air base in Qatar, which is serving as the command center for operations — and then once again, the cover of Arab support.

With Syria and Iraq in chaos, both countries are now populated by a range of extremist actors whom Washington won’t want to negotiate with. Doha’s up for that job. Most recently, Qatar was called in to help negotiate the release of 45 U.N. peacekeepers taken captive by al-Nusra Front — and on Sept. 12 it announced that it had successfully won the soldiers’ release. Qatar insists that a ransom was not paid; perhaps the network of Doha-based funders gave the government a certain leverage over the group. Or it just may be that the al Qaeda affiliate wants something even more valuable.

“I think what Qatar can give them is legitimacy,” suggests Krieg. In al-Nusra Front’s official demands regarding the peacekeeper hostages, for example, it had asked to be taken off the U.N. sanctions list. “Nusra wants to be seen as a legitimate partner against [the Islamic State]; Qatar might be able to offer them a platform in the future,” Krieg says.

That’s essentially what Qatar has long offered its friends: a platform, with access to money, media, and political capital. Washington has so far played along, but the question is whether the United States is actually getting played.

More Facts on Migrants in Europe

Posted on September 19, 2015September 19, 2015 by Denise Simon

SoS, John Kerry had a meeting with Hammond, the UK Foreign Minister. Among many topics, Syria was discussed:

Hammond: We have, of course, talked primarily this morning about the situation in Syria and the migration crisis that is affecting Europe, and we’ve talked about how to move forward with our partners in response to recent developments in Syria to tackle the growing threat from ISIL and to ensure that we’re joined up between our actions in Iraq and our actions in Syria.

Kerry:

With respect to Syria, obviously, we spent a significant amount of time and we covered a lot of territory today. As the foreign secretary said, we talked about Yemen, where we urged the parties to get to negotiations. We talked about Libya, where hope that the work of Bernardino Leon will bear fruit. But obviously, there are challenges, and we call on the house of representatives to return to that process and to recognize this is a critical moment. And ISIL and other extremist groups take advantage of a vacuum, and a vacuum is what is left if there is not an agreement. So we need for the sake of the 6 million citizens of Libya, where there is great opportunity and significant wealth available to be able to help that country bind its wounds and move forward. We hope that they will make the right choices in the days ahead.

With respect to Syria, the foreign secretary and I agreed completely on the urgency of nations coming together in order to resolve this war that has gone on for much too long. And it is clear that the challenge to continental Europe, but to everybody, of the migrant population of refugees seeking a better life cannot be properly addressed just by addressing the numbers of refugees coming into a country or providing more support to them; it has to be addressed by dealing with the root cause, which is the violence in Syria and the lack of hope and possibility of a future that so many people in that region feel as a consequence of the violence that’s taking place.

The full meeting readout is here.

*** Deeper facts:

In part: DailyMail, includes photo essay

Four out of five migrants are NOT from Syria: EU figures expose the ‘lie’ that the majority of refugees are fleeing war zone

Some 44,000 of the 213,000 refugees who arrived in Europe were from Syria
A further 27,000 new arrivals on the continent came from Afghanistan
Britain received one in 30 of all the asylum claims made by new applicants
David Cameron has offered to take in 20,000 refugees but none from the EU

Only one in every five migrants claiming asylum in Europe is from Syria.

The EU logged 213,000 arrivals in April, May and June but only 44,000 of them were fleeing the Syrian civil war.

Campaigners and left-wing MPs have suggested the vast majority of migrants are from the war-torn state, accusing the Government of doing too little to help them.

‘This exposes the lie peddled in some quarters that vast numbers of those reaching Europe are from Syria,’ said David Davies, Tory MP for Monmouth. ‘Most people who are escaping the war will go to camps in Lebanon or Jordan.

‘Many of those who have opted to risk their lives to come to Europe have done so for economic reasons.’

The figures from Eurostat, the EU’s official statistical agency, show that migration from April to June was running at double the level of the same period in 2014.

The number of Afghans lodging asylum claims is up four-fold, from 6,300 to 27,000. Another 17,700 claims were made by Albanians, whose country is at peace.

A further 13,900 applicants came from Iraq which, like Syria, is being torn apart by the Islamic State terror group.

Sample individual stories: From Voice of America

One is a sixth-grader who braved walks through Balkan forests to join his brother in England; another fought the Taliban while serving Afghan forces in Helmand; a third spent years working in Turkey to cover a human smuggler’s fee.

They are Afghanistan’s latest diaspora, refugees of raging war and shrunken economic prospects, swept up in the largest flood of migrants Europe has seen in more than 70 years.

Until their numbers were eclipsed by refugees from the Syrian war last year, Afghanistan had produced more refugees than any other nation thanks to more than three decades of intractable conflict.

While the majority of prior Afghan refugees made new lives in Pakistan and Iran, United Nations data say nearly 80,000 Afghans are now officially seeking asylum in Europe — the highest rate in 20 years.

Their exodus has only increased as a resurgent Taliban wages its bloodiest offensive in 14 years.

Drawn by the promise of a better life, many tapped into their life’s savings and money from family already in Europe to pay smugglers to spirit them across six countries. The less well-off risked the journey alone.

VOA Afghan Service anchor Ahmad Fawad Lami traveled to Hungary and Serbia where he caught up with many Afghan refugees just as Austria briefly opened its border.

These are just a few of their stories. A must read.

What Trump Should have Said During Townhall

Posted on September 19, 2015September 19, 2015 by Denise Simon

In his own words, the Muslim Brother:

“I will stand with the Muslims should the politicall winds shift in an ugly direction”, page 261 of his book: The Audacity of Hope

Written by Mike Gallagher, an American radio host and conservative political commentator. He is the host of The Mike Gallagher Show.

Many listeners have asked about the, “Obama: It Was You,” essay that someone sent me. Here it is:

President Obama: This is why you didn’t go to France to show solidarity against the Muslim terrorists:

It was you who spoke these words at an Islamic dinner – “I am one of you.”

It was you who on ABC News referenced – “My Muslim faith.”

It was you who gave $100 million in U.S. taxpayer funds to re-build foreign mosques.

It was you who wrote that in the event of a conflict -“I will stand with the Muslims.”

It was you who assured the Egyptian Foreign Minister that – “I am a Muslim.”

It was you who bowed in submission before the Saudi King.

It was you who sat for 20 years in a Liberation Theology Church condemning Christianity and professing Marxism.

It was you who exempted Muslims from penalties under Obamacare that the rest of us have to pay.

It was you who purposefully omitted – “endowed by our Creator” – from your recitation of The Declaration Of Independence.

It was you who mocked the Bible and Jesus Christ’s Sermon On The Mount while repeatedly referring to the ‘HOLY’ Quran.

It was you who traveled the Islamic world denigrating the United States Of America.

It was you who instantly threw the support of your administration behind the building of the Ground Zero Victory mosque overlooking the hallowed crater of the World Trade Center.

It was you who refused to attend the National Prayer Breakfast, but hastened to host an Islamic prayer breakfast at the WH.

It was you who ordered Georgetown Univ. and Notre Dame to shroud all vestiges of Jesus Christ BEFORE you would agree to go there to speak, but in contrast, you have NEVER requested that the mosques you have visited adjust their decor.

It was you who appointed anti-Christian fanatics to your Czar Corps.

It was you who appointed rabid Islamists to Homeland Security.

It was you who said that NASA’s “foremost mission” was an outreach to Muslim communities.

It was you who as an Illinois Senator was the ONLY individual who would speak in favor of infanticide.

It was you who were the first President not to give a Christmas Greeting from the WH, and went so far as to hang photos of Chairman Mao on the WH tree.

It was you who curtailed the military tribunals of all Islamic terrorists.

It was you who refused to condemn the Ft. Hood killer as an Islamic terrorist.

It is you who has refused to speak-out concerning the horrific executions of women throughout the Muslim culture, but yet, have submitted Arizona to the UN for investigation of hypothetical human-rights abuses.

It was you who when queried in India refused to acknowledge the true extent of radical global Jihadists, and instead profusely praised Islam in a country that is 82% Hindu and the victim of numerous Islamic terrorists assaults.

It was you who funneled $900 Million in U.S. taxpayer dollars to Hamas.

It was you who ordered the USPS to honor the MUSLIM holiday with a new commemorative stamp.

It was you who directed our UK Embassy to conduct outreach to help “empower” the British Muslim community.

It was you who embraced the fanatical Muslim Brotherhood in your quest to overthrow the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak.

It was you who funded mandatory Arabic language and culture studies in Grammar schools across our country.

It is you who follows the Muslim custom of not wearing any form of jewelry during Ramadan.

It is you who departs for Hawaii over the Christmas season so as to avoid past criticism for NOT participating in seasonal WH religious events.

It was you who was un-characteristically quick to join the chorus of the Muslim Brotherhood to depose Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, formerly America’s strongest ally in North Africa; but, remain muted in your non-response to the Brotherhood led slaughter of Egyptian Christians.

It was you who appointed your chief adviser, Valerie Jarrett, an Iranian, who is a member of the Muslim Sisterhood, an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The above provides the basis for virtually everything Obama does. There are more examples, but one deadly fact, the Obama administration called the murders of Nidal Hassan ‘work place violence’ and never uttered a word at the beheading of the woman in Oklahoma by a Muslim.

State Dept Knew Classified Emails in Hillary’s Server, Benghazi

Posted on September 17, 2015September 17, 2015 by Denise Simon

Judicial Watch: State Department Asked Hillary Clinton to Delete Copies of Classified Benghazi Emails Four Months Ago

Click here for the referenced document.

(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch today released Obama administration correspondence containing a letter from Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick F. Kennedy asking Hillary Clinton’s lawyer to destroy all electronic copies of a classified email found in records Clinton decided to turn over to the State Department six months before. Clinton’s attorney, David Kendall, rejected the request as Congress and other investigators had demanded electronic records be preserved. The correspondence also shows Hillary Clinton has ignored a demand to turn over all electronic copies of the approximately 55,000 pages of emails she previously returned in paper form. The correspondence was disclosed by the State and Justice Departments in a Judicial Watch Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit in which Judicial Watch is asking a court to issue a preservation order to protect any emails Clinton has yet to turn over, including those emails in which she and her lawyers unilaterally determined to be personal. (Judicial Watch v. U.S. Department of State (1:12-cv-02034))

The May 22, 2015, letter from Kennedy to Clinton attorney Kendall reads in part:

I am writing in reference to the following e-mail that is among the approximately 55,000 pages that were identified as potential federal records and produced on behalf of former Secretary Clinton to the Depa1tment of State on December 5, 2014: E-mail forwarded by Jacob Sullivan to Secretary Clinton on November 18, 2012 at 8:44 pm (Subject: Fw: FYI- Report of arrests -possible Benghazi connection).

Please be advised that today the above referenced e-mail, which previously was unclassified, has been classified as “Secret” pursuant to Section 1.7(d) of Executive Order 13526 in connection with a review and release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In order to safeguard and protect the classified information, I ask – consistent with my letter to you dated March 23 2015 – that you, Secretary Clinton and others assisting her in responding to congressional and related inquiries coordinate in taking the steps set forth below. A copy of the document as redacted under the FOIA is attached to assist you in your search.

****

Once you have made the electronic copy of the documents for the Department, please locate any electronic copies of the above-referenced classified document in your possession. If you locate any electronic copies, please delete them. Additionally, once you have done that, please empty your “Deleted Items” folder.

The Kennedy letter shows that the State Department knew that Clinton had classified material on her email system two months before it was disclosed publicly on July 23, when Congress was alerted to the issue by the inspector general of the intelligence community.

Clinton’s attorney responds several weeks later, on June 15 – saying it would not be “prudent” to delete the email. David Kendall writes:

This will also confirm that, pursuant to your request, we have deleted all electronic copies of this document, with the following exception. I have received document preservation requests pertaining to the 55,000 pages of e-mails from the House of Representatives Select Committee on Benghazi, the Inspector General of the State Department, and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (DNI). I have responded to each preservation request by confirming to the requestor that I would take reasonable steps to preserve these 55,000 pages of former Secretary Clinton’s e-mails in their present electronic form. I therefore do not believe it would be prudent to delete, as you request, the above-referenced e-mail from the master copies or the PST file that we are preserving.

Clinton’s attorney suggests the information may yet be deleted. Kendall’s June letter states:

Once the document preservation requests referenced above expire, we will proceed to make the requested deletions. This present arrangement would cover the single document recently classified “Secret”. Should there be further reclassifications during the Department’s FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] review of former Secretary Clinton’s e-mails, it also would cover any such additional documents.

The State Department also disclosed a July 2, 2015, letter from the chief records officer at National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Paul M. Wester Jr., to Margaret P. Grafeld, deputy assistant secretary for global information services at the State Department, that shows Clinton never turned over the records as requested. Webster again requests State Department action on the Clinton records:

I would like to reiterate our request that the Department contact the representatives of former Secretary Clinton to secure the native electronic versions with associated metadata of the approximately 55,000 hard copy pages of emails …

Despite this request, the State Department seems never to have followed up with Clinton for the data. On August 6, the State Department reported to the court in another Judicial Watch lawsuit that it had demanded that Mills and Abedin “return all copies of potential federal records in your possession.” The State Department did not provide any correspondence demanding Mrs. Clinton return all copies of potential federal records.

A letter by Kennedy on September 14, 2015, to FBI Director James B. Comey, shows that the State Department only recently again tried to obtain electronic copies of the Clinton records:

On May 22, 2015, the Department requested from former Secretary Clinton’s attorney, David Kendall, that he provide an electronic copy of the approximately 55.000 pages identified as potential federal records and produced on behalf of former Secretary Clinton to the Department of State on December 5, 2014. … On June 15, 2015, Mr. Kendall replied that, pursuant to my request, he would “copy onto a disc the electronic version of the emails previously produced in hard copy to the Department on December 5, 2014.” … Before Mr. Kendall could provide that disc to the Department, however, we understand that the FBI obtained the relevant electronic media. Accordingly, we request from the FBI an electronic copy of the approximately 55.000 pages identified as potential federal records and produced on behalf of former Secretary Clinton to the Department of State on December 5, 2014. This request is in accordance with counsel we have received from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Additionally, to the extent the FBI recovers any potential federal records that may have existed on the server at various points in time in the past, we request that you apprise the Depa11ment insofar as such records correspond with Secretary Clinton’s tenure at the Department of State. Because of the Department’s commitment to preserving its federal records, we also ask that any recoverable media and content be preserved by the FBI so that we can determine how best to proceed.

As with the email gaps uncovered by Judicial Watch this week, this latest find raises questions about whether Clinton told the truth last month when she declared, under penalty of perjury, “I have directed that all of my emails on clintonemail.com in my custody that were or potentially were federal records be provided to the Department of State….” Clinton made this statement in response to a court order Judicial Watch obtained in other FOIA litigation.

“Judicial Watch exposed a cover-up with criminal implications. Why on Earth would John Kerry’s State Department tell Mrs. Clinton to delete classified Benghazi records before finding out where and how this material had been disclosed?” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “That the State Department asked Clinton’s lawyer to destroy federal records shows a level of distain for the rule of law that goes beyond the pale. These letters should have been disclosed to more than one federal judge. The evident contempt and obstruction of justice by both Mrs. Clinton and the Obama administration will be brought to the attention the courts.”

As Obama Accepts More Migrants, Heed the Threat Lessons

Posted on September 17, 2015September 17, 2015 by Denise Simon

Syrian Refugees – Organised Crime’s New Market and Jihadis’ New Cover

TRAC: In an intense propaganda blitz, the Islamic State published eight videos pertaining to refugees and the refugee crisis. The media push by the Islamic State complimented the Caliphate’s recent written propaganda regarding hijrah and refugees fleeing the Middle East in the eleventh issue of Dabiq. Published from a wide cross-section of the Caliphate – Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The specific Islamic State provinces in the media campaign included:

Wilayat Ninawa
Wilayat al-Barakah
Wilayat Hadramawt
Wilayat Hims
Wilayat al-Khayr
Wilayat al-Furat
Wilayat al-Fallujah
Wilayat al-Janub
Wilayat Salahuddin

For complete access to each video and complete analysis

Introduction

Image: March -May 2015 Maritime and land based migrant routes

Click Image for larger view

Reported Cases of ISIS Migrant Incidents

After years of Syrian civil war, the refugee population en masse has finally reached beyond the borders of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan to reach the European Union (EU). The media has made much of the Islamic State taking advantage of the migrant community through traveling to Europe in their midst to avoid detection. To date, there are five media-reported incidents of Islamic State (ISIS) trying to infiltrate Europe by hiding among the refugees and two reported Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). (see cases below)

Not an Islamic State Priority Right Now

Islamic State operatives seem to be able to enter and leave Turkey nearly at-will. ISIS cell activity within Turkey is well documented and, until at least recently, was tolerated on some level. Evidence to this point includes pictures on social media posted throughout 2014 of ISIS fighters enjoying meals in popular restaurants and making shopping trips in Turkish cities. While the Islamic State is comfortable within Turkish borders, there will not be much need for hiding among the refugees. However, as soon as pressure becomes too intense to stay and operate within Turkey (i.e travel becomes inhibited or the need for attacking within Europe becomes a priority) the necessity to slip unnoticed into the migrant population will reach urgency for the Islamic State. One Islamic State smuggler claimed that IS was forced to use migrant paths to move people because as the world has gotten better at tracking jihadis returning from Syria, return plane travel from Turkey has just become too dangerous.It cannot be stressed enough that at this point in time the proportions of known Islamic State militants that have “passed” as refugees are minuscule compared to the legitimate number of urgent victims of tyranny. The fear that even a few IS operatives could attack soft targets in EU countries has sounded a great alarm within the right wing movement. So much so that some countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, are impeding the flow of immigrants into Western Europe.

Win/Win for ISIS

For the Islamic State hiding among the migrants is a win/win scenario. Either

the ruse will be successful and ISIS will have yet another way to travel into areas where they do not have an operational presence —or—
the few ISIS members who are caught will incite a backlash of popular opinion and a harsh over reaction from EU members which will radicalize more within their own borders.

The far right wing has already seized the opportunity to capitalize on the Islamic State threat within the migrant population and shifted popular opinion in many areas to distrust the group of people who are fleeing war.

Case Studies

Opportunity for Terrorist Organisations

Any terrorist organization, but most especially the Islamic State, will seek to exploit the current situation to their operational benefit. It is already well known that in both Libya and Turkey, ISIS often cooperates with organised criminal elements both on the individual and group level. To date, there are only five media-reported cases of Islamic State infiltrating migrant networks:

Image: September 17, 2015 Unverified photo of Abdel Majid Touil the Bardo Museum planner (Case Study I below) emerges.

Case I : Bardo Museum Planner

May 20, 2015 — Abdel Majid Touil, a Moroccan national and the planner of the attacks on Bardo Museum in Tunisia, utilised sea routes between Libya and Italy in order to reach the EU. He is also thought to be involved in recruitment for ISIS[1]. For More: TRAC Insight: Translation and Commentary on Islamic State: Adopting the Bardo Museum Operation in Islamic Tunisia

Case II : 5 Arrested at Macedonia-Bulgaria Border

September 03, 2015 — Five men linked to ISIS attempted to cross over the Macedonia–Bulgaria border and were promptly arrested after a failed attempt to bribe the border security officer. The five men aged from 20 to 24 years, traveling aboard a car registered in Kosovo, came to the border post Gyueshevo. The guard was suspicious after the group tried to bribe their way past the border with US Dollars. Upon searching their smartphones, beheadings videos as well as Islamic State propaganda material were discovered.[2]

Case III : Moroccan National

September 09, 2015 — An ISIS operative, a Moroccan national with a German passport, was detained by Bulgarian authorities and extradited to Germany. The 21 year old suspect was detained at the Hamzabeyali/Lesovo border between Turkey and Bulgaria, carrying forged documents. It is reported that the suspect insisted on being extradited to Germany where he faces a European Arrest Warrant. [3]

Case IV : Calais, France Refugee Camp

September 11, 2015 — A suspected terror operative is believed to be amongst the migrant camps in Calais, France, prompting a search by French authorities. Residing in one of the largest refugee camps within France, the suspect is believed to have left Syria at the end of August 2015 with the intention of traveling to Britain. To further complicate the search, the camp is also a ‘no-go’ zone for French authorities. [4]

CASE V : Stuttgart, Germany Refugee Center

September 09, 2015 — An ISIS operative was arrested in a refugee center in Stuttgart, Germany in possession of forged Syrian passports. Identified after police linked him to a European arrest warrant issued by the Spanish authorities, he was arrested for attempting to infiltrate under the guise of a refugee seeking asylum. [5]

Case I : JN Already in Germany

September 09, 2015 — Hungarian media outlets reported that a Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) member has also been reported to have made it all the way into the heart of Europe disguised as a refugee. [6]

Case II : JN En Route to Germany

September 9, 2015 An Estonian reporter recognizes an AQ operative whom he interviewed two years ago among refugees en route to Germany. (see image below)

Organized Crime

Image: September 16, 2015 Dutch journalist buys Syrian passport for $825 including picture of PM Mark Rutte.

Counterfeit Passports

The trade for counterfeit Syrian passports is at an all time high. German customs officers have reported seizing boxes containing Syrian passports being smuggled into Europe. Fake Syrian passports are being traded for at least $1,500 USD. Surprisingly many posing as migrants have been found to have multiple passports, which indicate some are not authentic refugees but rather buying their way to “asylum seeker” status.

Lucrative Human Trafficking into EU

From kidnapping refugees stuck at border crossings out of Syria to becoming a part of the human smuggling machine, the Islamic State is notorious for creating and then exploiting refugees, thereby taking full advantage of criminal economic activities.

From the Libyan route, Syrians count for the largest share of migrants taking the journey to Europe. Before the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libya had drastically limited the migration and trafficking in Europe, but with Gaddafi gone and despite the growing insecurity in Libya, the number of migrants risking the dangers of crossing the Mediterranean has soared. Just about anyone with access to a boat can draw substantial profit by transporting migrants from North African to Southern Europe. This includes the Islamic State.

Bulgaria acts as a predominant transit point of human trafficking within and into the EU. Organised crime syndicates in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have established links with Bulgaria at the centre. The routes from the South Caucasus to Bulgaria are sea and land based through the Black Sea and Turkey respectively, connecting the South Caucasus to the EU. Therefore, with Syrian refugees in Turkey, this paves way for organised crime syndicates to move with or define the direction of migration.

The Fixers

In January 2015, BuzzFeed had the rare interview with a self-proclaimed Islamic State human smuggler out of Turkey. His claim of sending small groups of Islamic State fighters hidden inside cargo ships filled with refugees cannot be independently verified by TRAC, but his story is nonetheless useful in understanding the overall mindset of the Islamic State. The unnamed smuggler claimed that the fighters smuggled into Europe were from many locations: some fighters were Syrian, others from various Middle Eastern states, yet others from European nations. He said that a minority claimed to be from the United States. He also claimed that they waited until the ship was filled to capacity (even over capacity) to send the fighters over.

Buzzfeed also interviewed two other “independent” smugglers who claimed to have also helped the Islamic State for a profit. One claimed to have smuggled at least 10 fighters on his ships, then backed out for fear of being caught when the Islamic State wanted him to send more. The other said he’d been sending ISIS fighters for months. The second smuggler claimed that some of the fighters’ intentions were merely to take leave from the battle front to visit their families back home, while others claimed that they were going back to Europe to be ready when the battle begun in the EU. [7]

Narcotics from Bulgaria

In May 2015 Syrian coastal province of Latakia seized about two tons of narcotics near the beach of Cape of Ras al-Bassit believed to have originated in Bulgaria. Nearly six million tablets of Captagon were contained in the seizure and suspected to be headed toward the Islamic State.

Captagon, known by its most active ingredient fenethylline, is a powerful psychotropic known for helping to overcome fear, fatigue and pain. (It is also known for increasing sexual performance). Industrial production in Bulgaria has been active since the communist regime and Bulgarian ‘experts’ have been reported to “travel the Arab world, selling their skills”. Since 2013, Captagon production within Syria has accelerated to such high levels that it has outpaced production in other countries such as Bulgaria. Though Syria started producing Captagon itself, “Bulgarian expertise in the matter persists.” Bulgarian exports are largely consumed by the fighters of the Islamic State and is rumored to be the “drug of choice” among its fighters. The implication is that Syrian and Bulgarian producers stay in touch, and Bulgarian experts not only continue to teach them how to produce a better product but also continue provide the Islamic State Capatgon in the form of small white pills. [8]

Additionally, heroin trafficking syndicates in the South Caucasus region and Turkey have established connections and conduits in Bulgaria which facilitate the movement of consignments into and within the EU. Routes through the Black Sea are often one part of a larger web of routes from Afghanistan through Central Asia and Iran. As with human trafficking, Turkey and the Black Sea act as channels towards the EU.

Images: September 9, 2015 An Estonian reporter recognizes an AQ operative whom he interviewed two years ago among refugees en route to Germany. Although this is not an Islamic State fighter, it should be noted that the threat remains the same.

Rationale

The increased momentum in the exodus of refugees/migrants towards the EU has put the spotlight on the role of organised crime. Organised crime elements would seek to capitalise upon the presence of a new market of Syrian refugees in using their logistical operations to facilitate the travel of migrants. This can also be extended to accommodate the expansion of their operations (drugs, arms and/ or contraband) under the cover of travelling migrants. In the broader scheme of the situation, terrorist organisations would utilise the circumstances of migrant influx into the European Union in order to mask their infiltration, where they will see benefit in cooperating with organised crime elements, defining a nexus. In turn this has put Turkey and Libya at the centre of the issue given its status of permitting the entry of Syrian refugees and access to the European mainland. Further, this sheds light on the possible routes migrants can take where the weighing factors are availability of journeys, financial feasibility, lower mortality risks and shorter travel time or distances. Additionally, this influences the choice of possible routes that can be taken by land, sea or air, discussed in the following section.

Image: Internal and External directional movement of displaced Syrians, January to June 2015

Air, Land & Sea Routes

Sea

Aegean and Mediterranean Sea (Turkey & Libya)

Turkish Coast

Identified routes used by organised crime elements include the Turkish coastal cities of Izmir in the north-west and Mersin in the south-east. Given their geographical proximity to the Aegean Sea, it makes sense that migrants using these boarding points would aim to disembark in Greece. These migrants often make their way to the north- Aegean Greek islands of Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Ikaria or Samos just off the north-eastern coast of Turkey. After spending an amount of time in a refugee camp, they are transferred to Athens. Often migrants seeking refuge then journey to countries such as Germany or Sweden with relatively liberal asylum laws. However, the weather conditions of the Aegean and Mediterranean make such a journey a risk to safety and security as cases of boats capsizing have been a prominent recurrence. Prices for boat journeys from Izmir are an estimated $5000.

Image: Greek Islands of Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria

Libya: Travel Through Egypt and Sudan

The role of organised crime elements also factor into this where militias and terrorist organisations cooperate with such elements in order to achieve infiltration into the EU. Libya in North Africa is also a prominent origin point for refugees fleeing conflict, to make their journey towards the EU. To reach Libya, Syrian refugees often go through Egypt and Sudan, two of the few countries that still do not require a visa to Syrian citizens. Inputs from a recent interview confirm these routes are also being used to smuggle ISIS operatives into the EU by assigned handlers. Prices for smugglers’ boat trips from Libya to Italy reportedly range from $400-$4000. Additionally, prices from Alexandria to Greece or Italy are $7000 plus.

Image: Routes from Sudan and Egypt to the Libyan ports of Benghazi, Tripoli and Zuwarah

Constantly Changing Port of Origin

In going to and from Syria, the operatives are provided fake Syrian passports to get into Syria or to increase the chances of a successful asylum application in the EU. Additionally, such handlers are required to constantly change their port of origin due to crackdowns by Turkish authorities. Due to this plus joint action from NATO nations in tracking ISIS movements, the use of air travel proves risky as well as land routes. Hence, the use of these routes to move ISIS operatives to and from Syria is paramount to their logistical operations.

Security concerns over the cooperation of terrorist organisations and organised crime syndicates in Libya towards facilitating the infiltration of ISIS operatives have led to increased focus in the region.

Capsizing leads to Alternative Routes

Furthermore, reports of capsizing refugee boats in the Mediterranean and the Aegean would compel would-be asylum seekers to find alternate routes towards Europe. Moreover, with the heightened discourse of the EU permitting asylum to refugees, the safety and economic security of the EU would also prompt refugees to journey towards Turkey; given its borders with the EU, the chances of gaining entry and asylum in the EU are higher.

Black Sea (Turkey to Bulgaria via Georgia)

An Alternative for Refugees

The Black Sea is a relatively unexplored avenue, known to be used for civilian and industrial maritime transport. These would serve as possible mechanisms for Syrian refugees to enter the EU. With a surge of refugees seeking journeys to the EU, the pressure on overland routes, adverse weather conditions in the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea and scarcity of civilian maritime transport journeys in the Black Sea, would present the Black Sea as an alternative transit point towards the EU. Domestic politics in the South Caucasus would also prompt refugees to capitalise upon this alternative if and when required. Organised crime syndicates trafficking heroin and human consignments would recognise these factors and hence, supply the alternative in the creation of a new market, trafficking Syrian refugees to the EU

Civilian Maritime Transport & Regional Politics

Examining the ferry route map below, it is clear that there are many points amongst the different nations along the Black Sea which serve as points for boarding and disembarking. The presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey places civilian maritime transport as a channel for passage into the EU from Turkey via Georgia to Bulgaria. Nations in the South Caucasus like Armenia, Georgia and its seceded breakaway, Abkhazia have all voiced their willingness to accept fleeing Syrians, although with different motives. Abkhazia has shunned ethnic Georgians in the past but wishes to repatriate those with Abkhaz roots to Abkhazia increasing their ethnic population. Therefore, domestic politics fuelled by ethno-nationalism acts as a motivator for Abkhazia to accept Syrian refugees. Georgia and Armenia have also opened their doors to Syrian Christians fleeing violence. Syrian refugees in Turkey if not meeting these criteria, would ideally use forged documents to demonstrate their Christian faith or Abkhaz roots, looking at cases of Syrian refugees’ conversions to Christianity to increase their chances of successful asylum applications in Germany.

Image: Map of UKR Ferry’s routes in the Black Sea

Therefore, the potential for directional movement towards these nations exist, moreover as a transit point towards the EU where desirable. In the Black Sea ferry route map below, it is evident that Batumi is the main port of departure from Georgia for journeys towards Bulgaria and Romania. The price for a passenger ticket using Navbulgar’s ferry service is ‎€100.

Image: Screenshots of UKR Ferry’s ferry routes and schedule details from Batumi, Georgia to Constanta, Romania

Image: Screenshots of Navibulgar’s ferry routes and schedule details from Batumi, Georgia to Varna, Bulgaria

Scarcity: Opportunity for Organised Crime

Although departures to the port of Varna in Bulgaria happen once a week, departures to Constanta in Romania occur just twice a month. Furthermore, some of these route schedules transit through Ukraine. The infrequency of civilian transport in the Black Sea as well as the non-directness of routes overall would prompt migrants to seek alternatives, particularly in the event of unavailable space on the ferry routes.

The presence of organised crime syndicates in the South Caucasus, Turkey and the Balkan Peninsula is not a new occurrence. Human trafficking from Georgia to Turkey and Bulgaria as well as drug trafficking from Georgia to Bulgaria, via the Black Sea are identified routes. This is owing to the high frequency of instances of human trafficking from Batumi, Georgia to Varna, Bulgaria. The number of Georgian nationals revealed in post-trafficking interviews and investigations as well as Armenian, Turkish and EU nationals indicate the presence of a land and maritime based human trafficking infrastructure. Additionally, land and maritime trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan through central Asia and Iran use Batumi, Georgia as a port of transit towards the EU via the Black Sea. Hence, the convergence of human and drug trafficking networks in the Black Sea constitute a concrete trafficking infrastructure. Ranging from the South Caucasus, through West Asia and the Balkan Peninsula, this acts as an alternative route for Syrian refugees.

Image: Map depicting heroin trafficking routes through the Black Sea and other locations

Stable weather conditions at this time of year in the Black Sea compared to the Mediterranean and Aegean reduce the operational risks of travel. Coupled with the finite number of conventional options available, the circumstances of migrants compels them to take advantage of sea based trafficking initiatives by organised crime syndicates, where it is seen as a mutually beneficial venture.

Land Routes

Hamzabeyli/Lesovo Border (Turkey to Bulgaria)

Image: Border between Turkey and Bulgaria at the Hamzabeyli/Lesovo crossing

Border Infrastructure

The land connectivity from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria present two entry routes to the EU for Syrian refugees. The economic circumstances in Greece makes it a transit point for refugees to the rest of the EU. Bulgaria however, does not have as much a robust land border infrastructure compared to its EU counter-part Greece. This gives incentive for refugees to reach the EU through Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s lack of a robust land border infrastructure can be attributed to its economic factors and internal corruption, particularly in recent cases of Bulgaria’s Interior Ministry where numerous officials have been sacked for involvement in facilitating human and drug trafficking into Bulgaria. Although it is important to note that circumstances have improved since Bulgaria’s entry into the EU in 2007, yet the legacy of these factors are felt on the ground today. Bulgaria is currently mulling strengthening its border security infrastructure with Turkey. Bulgaria is especially eager to do this to demonstrate itself as a responsible stakeholder in the EU, in ensuring border security. This also has much to do with its prospective acceptance into the Schengen Treaty and hence Bulgaria draws upon EU financial resources to implement these infrastructure changes.

Scarcity of Civilian Land Transport

Land travel has its advantage and provides greater flexibility in terms of the availability of alternatives, in the event of a border closing. The routes and the conditions of travel even if inconvenient, have a greater degree of certainty compared to turbulent weather conditions through sea travel in the Mediterranean or Aegean. The use of civilian transport such as buses are limited in capacity.

Organised Crime: Opportunities & Travel Conditions

Organised crime elements would capitalise on a now larger land based clientele, Syrian refugees. However, land based trafficking requires that the vehicle of transport be moving for most of the time in order to evade detection. It also requires refugees if in large numbers, to remain hidden in a concealed manner to achieve this which proves hazardous. Hence, if refugees prefer safety over desperation, movement would be restricted only to a handful of refugees at a time. With favourable weather conditions and compelling circumstances of conflict in the region, incidents of land based trafficking can be expected to rise. Additionally, the strengthening of security at Bulgaria-Turkey border would prompt refugees to take alternative routes through the sea into Varna, Bulgaria, Constanta, Romania or risk a short but dangerous trip across the Aegean. The reported price for land-based smuggling between Turkey to the EU ranges from $7,500-$12,500.

Air Routes

Turkey to the European Union

High Costs

Air travel is a direct route yet expensive and reserved for those Syrian refugees who come from wealthy backgrounds or those who have family in the EU who can sponsor their air travel. This is the most advantageous in terms of directness, safety and security as well as assurance of arriving at the intended destination, assuming stable conditions for air travel in the region. Although, this opportunity is limited due to financial constraints and possible barriers should EU policies turn towards restricting the entry of refugees.

Organised Crime: Facilitators

The role of organised crime syndicates is also limited in this. If not being responsible for the passage of refugees, they can facilitate the procurement of flight tickets for air travel by offering higher prices, factoring in the presumed wealth of their air fare customer base and desperation to reach the EU. Black market air fares for direct flights from Turkey to Germany are reportedly $10,000.

Intra-EU Travel

Image: Info-graph depicting refugee statistics (Source: CNN/UNHCR)

Whilst refugees may travel to certain entry points into the EU, these points may not be their final destination. As seen in recent trends of refugees fleeing to the EU, there are pushes towards those EU states whose policies and perceived attitudes towards refugees are friendlier. Hence, it would prompt travel towards countries such as Sweden and Austria. Although Germany has temporarily reinstate its border controls owing to a massive influx of refugees which can be attributed to Germany’s refugee-friendly policies amongst EU nations.

EU Nations (+Norway & Switzerland) Ranked by Syrian Asylum Applications

Image: Screen shot of Cumulative Syrian Asylum Applications in EU + Norway & Switzerland from April 2011 to August 2015 (Source UNHCR)

Germany: 108,897
Sweden, 64,685
Hungary: 54,125
Austria: 20,946
Netherlands: 15,254
Bulgaria: 15,197
Denmark: 12,277
Switzerland: 8,683
United Kingdom: 7,196
France: 6,895
Belgium: 6,334
Spain: 5,554
Norway: 5,210
Greece: 3,969
Cyprus: 2,622
Romania: 2,332
Italy: 2,143
Malta: 928
Poland: 718
Finland: 656
Croatia: 352
Czech Republic: 304
Luxembourg: 241
Portugal: 188
Slovenia: 187
Ireland: 101
Latvia: 89
Slovakia: 61
Estonia: 42
Lithuania: 28

The number of asylum applications towards individual EU nations act as individual scores of preference amongst refugees and indicate the direction of intra-EU movement. Coupled with attempted crossings from countries like Macedonia into Bulgaria or from Serbia into Hungary to reach refugee- friendly Austria, this indicates an intra-EU movement of the majority refugees from the east towards the north and west of the European Union.

It should be noted that Hungary closed its borders on September 16, 2015. This would prompt movement of refugees towards the EU state of Croatia. However, mortal risks would further alter the directional movement of a significant portion of migrants (See link below).

For More on First Migrants Enter Croatia After Hungary Seals Border

Final Note

The current issue of refugees fleeing to the EU incentivises organised crime elements to capitalise on the presence of a new market, the trafficking of refugees. The convergence of human and drug trafficking networks as a single whole, defines the presence of a vast trafficking infrastructure.

Limited resources and pressure on civilian transport for land routes, prices of air routes and limited availability of civilian maritime routes make organised crime elements a prominent stakeholder in enterprising land and maritime routes as a part of its trafficking infrastructure and facilitating access to air routes. Individuals may be willing to incur such risks; however, those with families may or may not have the emotional capacity to do so. It is also important to note that irrespective of whether refugees reach their final destination or not, the financial outcome for organised crime syndicates remains unaffected. This is even more so due to the interaction between the desperation of refugees and the financial gains for organised crime syndicates.

Terrorist organisations would additionally capitalise and avail the opportunities of infiltration. Under the guise of refugees through the routes discussed above in conjunction with organised crime syndicates, foreign fighters can pass virtually unnoticed. Additionally, the securing of borders opens up alternatives elsewhere, possibly where the terrain is favourable for infiltration, e.g. forests and mountains. This presents mounting challenges for the EU where it is compelled to find the thin line between allowing the entry of refugees whilst weeding out terror operatives or a blanket order of shutting its doors to refugees.

The data in this TRAC insight is deemed reliable although not independently confirmed by TRAC in all cases.

[1] Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3089046/Moroccan-believed-taken-gun-massacre-Tunisian-museum-left-21-tourists-dead-arrested-Italy.html (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[2] Available at http://www.dreuz.info/2015/09/03/arrestation-de-5-combattants-de-letat-islamique-infiltres-parmi-des-migrants/ (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[3] Available at http://www.novinite.com/articles/170738/Bulgarian+Court+Extradites+Suspected+IS+Affiliate+to+Germany

[4] Available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article4553674.ece (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[5] Available at http://newobserveronline.com/isis-terrorist-arrested-in-stuttgart-refugee-center-boxes-of-fake-syrian-passports-intercepted/ (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[6] Available at https://www.rt.com/news/314788-hungary-migrants-isis-terrorists/ (Access Date: September 15, 2015)

[7] ISIS Operative: This Is How We Send Jihadis To Europe

[8] Insight: War turns Syria into major amphetamines producer, consumer and Vu de Bulgarie. Aux origines de la potion magique de Daech – View from Bulgaria. The origins of the Islamic State’s magic potion and Bulgaria – Iraq – Syria: Islamic State Would Have Obtained Important Quantities of Captagon From Bulgaria