Category Archives: Libya Benghazi Muslim Brotherhood murder

UN Just Got the Memo on Ansar al Sharia

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The United Nations has something call Blue Sheets which are immediate notices of concern as they often reference threats. The UN also has their own list of terror cells, organizations and individual terrorists by name.

The State Department also authors a SETL, Security Environment Threat List and the United Nations is part of the distribution list. Libya has been included on more than one SETL. For reference, this is what action is required by virtue of a SETL.

While the United States was quite slow for unknown reasons to list Ansar al Sharia on the terror list until February of 2014, the United Nations did not add Ansar al Sharia until this month, November 2014. Why you ask? Ah, the short answer is diplomacy.

Alas, it appears that after years, Libya has been officially recognized by the United Nations, so now what is the solution? None on the horizon.

UN Security Council adds Libya Islamists to terror list

United Nations (United States) (AFP) – The UN Security Council on Wednesday added to its terror list a Libyan Islamist group accused of involvement in the 2012 attack on the US mission in Benghazi that killed the ambassador and three other Americans.

The council blacklisted Ansar al-Sharia for its ties to Al-Qaeda, slapping an arms embargo, assets freeze and global travel ban on the extremists at the request of Britain, France and the United States.

The measure targets Ansar al-Sharia Benghazi and its sister group Ansar al-Sharia Derna, which both have links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent radical outfits.

In October, Ansar al-Sharia Derna pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), the Islamist group that has seized control of territory in Iraq and Syria.

French Ambassador Francois Delattre said the decision would provide a boost to efforts by UN special envoy Bernardino Leon to broker a deal between Libya’s many militias and the government.

“This is an important decision because it draws a clear line between, on the one hand, jihadists with whom there can be no dialogue, and on the other, those Libyan groups — Islamist and others — that must take part in talks launched by special envoy Bernardino Leon,” Delattre told AFP.

Since 2012, the Benghazi wing has operated several training camps mainly to help armed groups in Iraq and Syria and to a lesser extent in Mali, according to the request filed by the three countries.

Twelve of the 24 jihadists who attacked the Algerian In Amenas gas complex in 2013 trained in the camps of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, Libya’s second city, documents said.

More recently, the group has conducted several attacks on Libyan security forces, it added.

Ansar al-Sharia Derna also took part in the September 2012 attack on the US mission and is operating camps in the northeastern Derna and Jebel Akhdar regions to train fighters for Iraq and Syria.

A third sister group, Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, was added to the UN terror list in September.

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September that the group should face sanctions as part of efforts to prevent Libya from sliding further into violence.

The UN effort to broker a deal with various militias and the government on restoring order in Libya led to a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire in Benghazi earlier on Wednesday.

Libyan authorities have struggled to assert control across a country awash with weapons and powerful militias after the ouster of longtime dictator Moamer Kadhafi in a 2011 revolt.

Libya’s internationally recognized government has been forced to take refuge in the country’s far east to escape a mainly Islamist coalition which seized control of Tripoli at the end of August.

***

Due in part to oil investments in Libya, the West takes extreme measures when it comes to Libya, while it is a failed state with no standing government.

So it takes experts to declare Libya is a rogue state? Just what experts exactly? Logical analysis is fleeting.

Islamic State has toehold in lawless Libya, experts say

TRIPOLI, Libya — With Libya engulfed in chaos, the town of Derna in the east of the largely lawless country is emerging as a new stronghold for the Islamic State jihadist group, experts say.

The North African state has been wracked by instability since the overthrow of autocratic leader Moamer Kadhafi in 2011, providing a fertile ground for Islamic extremists.

IS fighters have already swept across Iraq and Syria, and their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi recently boasted of vows of allegiance from militants in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Some Western observers consider Derna, a town of 150,000, to be the home of a third IS franchise in North Africa, after Jund al-Khilifa in Algeria and Egypt’s Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis declared their support earlier this year.

“The Islamic State is in Derna. It’s well documented. There’s no doubt,” said Othman Ben Sassi, a former member of the now-disbanded Transitional National Council, the political arm of the rebellion that overthrew Kadhafi.

The jihadist group is exploiting “the absence of state authority and porous borders,” he added.

Statements and images have for several weeks circulated on extremist forums claiming to depict gatherings of “Libyan jihadists” belonging to IS — prompting concern in Washington.

“We have seen reports that violent extremists (in Libya) have pledged allegiance to IS and are looking to associate themselves with it,” said State Department spokesman Jeffrey Rathke.

Libyan authorities have struggled to control militant groups as well as powerful militias which ousted Kadhafi, and the internationally recognized government has been forced to take refuge in the far east of the oil-rich country.

‘Ideological fight’
Derna and large areas of Benghazi, Libya’s second city, have served as strongholds for radical groups including Ansar al-Sharia, which is classified by the UN as a terrorist organization.

In April, an offshoot of the group announced it had implemented Islamic sharia law in Derna.

The self-proclaimed “Shura Council of Islamic Youth” has reportedly opened Islamic courts and established a religious police force in the town.

Dozens of masked members have appeared in military fatigues, regularly parading in pick-up trucks brandishing rocket launchers and heavy machine guns and toting the black and white flag used by jihadists.

In August the Shura Council posted a video online appearing to show the public execution in a Derna football stadium of an Egyptian man accused of murder.

But the group has yet to formally pledge allegiance to IS, and analysts say there are divisions within its ranks.

“Several extremists in Derna are attracted to IS. But the majority of senior jihadists in Libya are former al-Qaeda members and there is an ideological fight between IS and al-Qaeda partisans,” said a Libyan expert on jihadists who did not want to be named.

The UN this month branded Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization owing to its affiliation with al-Qaeda’s North African franchise.

“The decision was based on reliable intelligence,” the Libyan expert said. “Ansar al-Sharia has closer ties to al-Qaeda than to any other group.”

‘Islamic emirate’
According to Claudia Gazzini, Libya analyst at International Crisis Group, some Derna factions have pledged allegiance to IS, but it is unclear which ones and how much support they enjoy.

“There is a misguided tendency to automatically associate the establishment of Islamic courts and the killings of soldiers with an IS agenda,” she said.

Derna was already considered by many analysts to be a de-facto “Islamic emirate”, entirely free from state control, before the reported claims of allegiance to IS.

The town has long been suspected of harboring and training foreign fighters who then go on to fight in Iraq and Syria, where IS has declared a “caliphate” and imposed its harsh interpretation of Islamic law.

“There are factions in Derna who reportedly swore allegiance to IS in the search for a group that could unify the Muslim community,” said a former Libyan official who also asked not to be named for security reasons.

“But ideological differences between jihadist groups and the international coalition offensive against IS means these factions have so far opted for discretion, or have gone to fight in Iraq and Syria,” the former official added.

According to one resident of Derna, life in the town goes on largely as normal — for most people.

“You go out, you do your chores, you visit friends. No one bothers you,” the resident said.

“But if you are a policeman, a soldier or a lawyer, you’re dead.

 

Money, People, Bribes, Politicians and Islamic State

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The U.S. Treasury maintains a sophisticated global banking network that tracks money for laundering, destinations, use, recipients and interim banks. But why is the top person in charge of tracking dark money not using the tools when it comes to the increasing wealth of Islamic State? The answer is chilling.

Corruption Currents: Islamic State Receives Millions in Ransom Payments

Bribery:

Brazil’s bribery probe of Petrobras SA is threatening the firm’s debt financing. A suspect in the scandal turned himself in. (Bloomberg, AP)

The former chief executive of a Virginia defense contractor pleaded guilty to providing gratuities to a federal contracting official, and the company agreed to pay a $300,000 fine. (Washington Post)

Fewer Filipinos are giving bribes, according to a survey, but opposition politicians doubted the findings. (Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer, ABS-CBN News, Manila Standard-Today)

Tom Fox navigates resource reductions, spots the Chamber of Commerce defending the FCPA and discusses doing business in India. The FCPA Blog notes a purge of ad men in China and reports on recent remarks from the SFO director. The FCPAProfessor runs a guest post about challenges in pursuing bribe-takers.

Fraud:

A grand jury found that fraud persists in programs meant to bring New York contracts to businesses owned by women and minorities. (NY Times)

Money Laundering:

An Indian regulator tightened regulations targeting money laundering. (Economic Times)

The founder and former president of a community bank was sentenced to two years in federal prison for bank fraud and money laundering. (AP)

A senior executive FIFA’s ticketing and hospitality partner could be jailed if he returns to Brazil to await trial for charges including money laundering, racketeering and illegally selling World Cup tickets. The executive denies the charges. (Bloomberg)

Iran and China agreed to fight money laundering together, Iranian media reported. (FARS)

A Thai court extended detention for family members accused of helping their “big brother,” a former top police official, launder bribes. The two denied the allegations. Thai police say the “big brother” confessed to the charges, including soliciting bribes for job appointments and allowing illegal gambling and oil smuggling. (Bangkok Post, AP)

Sanctions:

Republicans are fuming about the Iran nuclear talks extension. Both sides are racing to sign a deal before the new, Republican-controlled Congress takes office. Oman has played a low-key but important role in the negotiations. (National Journal, NY Times, Guardian, ABC News, BuzzFeed)

The extension in talks leaves a U.N. atomic agency probe in limbo; it needs more money to continue the investigation. (Reuters, Reuters)

A European court awarded damages, for the first time, in a sanctions case. (European Sanctions)

Terrorism Finance:

The Islamic State has received between $35 million and $45 million in ransom payments in the past year, a U.N. report said. (AP)

How can a bank know if it’s holding money for a terrorist? (Top Broker)

General Anti-Corruption:

China’s corruption watchdog launched a series of inspections of state-owned enterprises and government bodies, state media reported. (Reuters)

FIFA’s general secretary said the body will need years to repair its reputation. (NY Daily News, AP, Reuters)

The first tennis official to be banned for life from the sport for corruption said he’s innocent and is being used as a scapegoat. (Bloomberg)

What do you do when corruption is treated as part of the business process? (HR Reporter)

Corrupt politicians only suffer when there are local media organizations to report on it. (Nieman Lab)

***

No Blacklist Yet for Islamic State Banks

Why the United States isn’t using its biggest financial weapon against banks in the Islamist militant group’s territory.

In June, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants inspired fear and awe when they swept into Iraq’s second-biggest city, Mosul, and reports spread that they looted the city’s banks and walked away with more than $400 million.

Those claims were later contested, but the group’s reputation for being not only savagely violent, but also incredibly wealthy, was already set. In July, the Financial Times reported that armed guards from the Islamic State, as the group later renamed itself, were stationed outside the banks, but that the banks’ coffers had not been pillaged.

Over the summer, the United States continued blacklisting members of the group and its supporters, but not the financial institutions in territory under Islamic State control. The Treasury Department traces its efforts against the group and its predecessor, al Qaeda in Iraq, back to 2004. In August, the United States froze the assets of three key terrorist financiers, one of whom allegedly helped funnel money through Kuwait to ISIL, as the U.S. government calls the group.

In September, 11 more names of individuals were added to the list for allegedly helping move funds and fighters to facilitate terrorist organizations from Iraq to Indonesia. Still, the banks that were so brazenly overrun in Mosul and those in the rest of Islamic State-controlled territory were never named. The reasoning behind that decision illustrates how fraught the U.S. fight to disrupt the Islamic State’s funding has been, as even the best U.S. tools for fighting terrorist financing are ill-suited to the task.

The Islamic State evolved out of earlier extremist groups in the region and improved upon their financial models as it grew. Instead of relying mostly on outside donations, the Islamic State earns most of its money through criminal activity — from oil smuggling to kidnapping — within the territory it controls, which makes it less reliant on the formal financial system. The group’s ability to make money in the illegal financial sector using cash for dealings in stolen oil and antiquities means it is less vulnerable to the biggest weapon the United States uses to go after its enemies’ finances: shutting down the banks, accountants, and middlemen that keep the money flowing.

On Thursday the Obama administration will face questions from Republican lawmakers about U.S. attempts to undercut the Islamic State’s funding. Treasury Department anti-terrorism finance chief David Cohen is set to testify before the House Financial Services Committee.

Texas Republican Jeb Hensarling, the committee chairman, said the hearing would “examine the adequacy of international banking policies to combat the new challenges that the Islamic State and groups like it present.”

In remarks prepared for Thursday’s hearing, Cohen states that the United States is working with “Iraqi authorities, Iraqi bank headquarters, and the international financial community to prevent ISIL from using the scores of bank branches located in territories where it operates.

“The results of this work have begun to show,” Cohen’s remarks state. “We’ve seen a decline in financial activity in areas where ISIL operates, and banks under ISIL influence are losing their access to the international financial system.”

Cohen is also expected to say that U.S.-led airstrikes are taking a toll on the Islamic State’s oil smuggling operations. Since mid-June, the group reportedly has been taking in $1 million a day in illicit oil revenue, but Cohen says that the bombing has lessened the haul to “several million dollars a week” — an imprecise figure, to be sure.

According to Cohen, the United States is also trying to improve its ability to track the extremist group’s money: “We are working with our counterparts in the intelligence community to ramp up collection on ISIL’s finances.”

In addition, the United States is combing through financial data for potential connections to the Islamic State. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is assisting in the effort by looking at the data the agency collects in the United States and through the agency’s connections with international financial intelligence-gathering institutions, a spokesman for the agency said Tuesday.

The risk of the Islamic State using the banks to move money internationally has to be weighed against the possible effect on the local population if Treasury tries to cut off those institutions. In a speech last month, Cohen acknowledged that the United States was not using its biggest weapon — shutting banks out of the financial system — against the institutions that had fallen into the hands of the extremists for exactly that reason.

“Our interest is not in shutting down all the economic activity in the areas where ISIL normally operates,” Cohen said. “They are subjugating huge swaths of the population, millions of people, who are still trying to live their lives. And banks, as everybody knows, are important lubricants for the economy.”

Vanda Felbab-Brown, an expert on illicit money at the Brookings Institution, said there are more than humanitarian factors to consider; the United States also doesn’t want to anger locals and push them closer to the extremists.

“At the end of the day what will make a difference in debilitating ISIL will be how much the local population turns against the group,” Felbab-Brown said. “This very tempting desire to shut down the financial system will tremendously worsen the lives of people that are already living in desperation.”

Felbab-Brown said that Somalia taught the United States that lesson. The United States sanctioned al-Shabab in 2010 as a terrorist group, but the move also scared humanitarian organizations out of the country just as a devastating famine was bearing down. Although many blamed the resulting suffering and starvation on al-Shabab, concerns grew that the anger and frustration would push more people toward the militant group.

Felbab-Brown praised the Treasury Department’s careful approach.

“The good thing about Shabab and ISIL is that they’re very heavy-handed and tend to really overplay their hand in terms of violence to the local population,” Felbab-Brown said. Without interference, that violence often becomes intolerable and eats away at the group’s local political support.

“One has to judge very carefully the likelihood of making a difference,” Felbab-Brown said. “And what are the political effects of any policy.”

Dennis Lormel, who led the FBI’s terrorism-financing investigations after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, said the United States doesn’t want to give the extremists an opening to demonstrate leadership.

“If they come out because they have the money to fund social programs that help the local economy and help the people, then they’re going to tout that and they’re going to demonstrate that they care and that the West doesn’t care,” Lormel said. “And they’ll use that as a recruitment tool.”

Perhaps acknowledging the importance of keeping the local economy going, if only so the group can continue extorting money from it, the Islamic State reportedly reopened the banks in Mosul in September, three months after it took control of them. Local reports said the Sunni militants allowed certain account holders to take out money, subject to the approval of an Islamic State committee and a hefty fee off the top.

Some analysts speculate that Treasury could also be keeping the banks open in order to glean intelligence that could help paint a clearer financial picture of the group.

“It’s considered to be more useful to try to watch what’s going on rather than to take some hard, punitive action right away and disrupt the process before you understand how it works and leverage your understanding,” said Patrick Johnston, a counterterrorism expert with the Rand Corp.

Even if the banks were blacklisted, though, it’s not clear that would keep the group from using them.

“They actually could be quite useful for ISIL without even having any real ability to transact with any foreign entity,” Johnston said.

Johnston said the conundrum for the United States is that even if they were to be cut off from the international financial system, the banks could be used to store and transfer money within the group’s territory for much the same reasons of efficiency and security that make banks a preferable way to move money in other countries.

“It really shows the challenge ahead of Treasury as much as anything else,” Johnston said.

 

Islamic State No Threat to the West? Think Again

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In America, we cannot know just in fact how many are under the influence is Islam or where they are across the country. We may never know how many travel to the Middle East to join Boko Harem, al Shabaab, al Qaeda, al Nusra or Daesh. We also cannot be confident that these self proclaimed jihadist have not traveled back to their home base in the United States. Relying on media, the State Department, the FBI or DHS to warn us is a fool’s errand.

In the event you are still not convinced, to examine this particular person in Great Britain who was a banker in the City of London, which is no different than New York City.

RT exclusive: From London banker to ISIS militant – one man’s terror trail

“I look forward to death with a smile.”

These words come from a British militant in western Iraq who is fighting for the Islamic State (ISIS) under the nom de guerre Abu A’ntaar.

But one thing separates him from the majority of his comrades; Before his life as a jihadist, A’ntaar claims to have been a business analyst working in the City of London.

For the past month, RT UK has been speaking exclusively to A’ntaar via an encrypted instant messenger popular amongst the social media savvy Western fighters in the region. A’ntaar’s penchant for propaganda made him no different than most western fighters ostentatiously trumpeting their messages via social media. But behind the standard ISIS rhetoric, he does provide glimpses into his daily life, what was expected of him as a fighter, and whether he would consider returning home in the future.

RT did request a video or audio interview with A’ntaar. He refused after the ISIS media department and his higher ranking Emirs (regional leaders) nixed the idea outright.

Reuters/Stringer

A’ntaar is among approximately 500-1000 other Britons currently fighting in the region, according to the British governments’ official estimates. Most Britons enter through the Turkish border into Syria and Iraq, where border guards are willing to ‘turn a blind eye’ for a small fee. In June this year, British intelligence service MI5 said that tracking British jihadis waging war in Syria was now its ‘top priority’ following a recruitment video released by ISIS in which British fighters urged Muslims to come join the fight.

More recently, British foreign fighters made headlines after slickly produced videos were published online, showing the beheading of US journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff. In both videos, a man dubbed ‘Jihadi John’ by the British media threatens Britain and the United States in what analysts believe is a distinctive London accent. The idea of relatively privileged American and European Muslims leaving home to fight and die under the ISIS flag in a foreign land has captivated the media and public alike. The question is always the same: what makes them do it?

Democracy, Palestine & tyranny

A’ntaar does not reveal too much about his personal life, cagily avoiding any revelatory comments which could have pointed towards his true identity. Answering to why he chose to join the Islamic State, he says he hated “being ruled by laws other than Allah’s” and that the territories currently controlled by ISIS are “the only place where the shari’a of Allah is applied fully.”

“I hate democracy and the self- indulgence of the rich….I hate inequality…I hate the corporations who are trying to destroy this world because of tyranny,” he tells us.

A’ntaar is derisive towards the notion of using the British democratic process to protest against injustices in the Muslim world. For him, peaceful protest is not an option. “I hate that Palestine was never freed for 70+ years whilst we ‘peacefully’ held placards on the street”. But now, according to A’ntaar’s sacred belief, “IS are leading the way as how we should have acted from the beginning.”

Reuters/Thaier Al-Sudani

A’ntaar refused to say whether he had been on any operations, but he did say that as well as being a “soldier,” he is a “suicide bomber” and could ‘destroy’ enemies “at will”.

“I am a walking device,” he told us.

As far as his experiences with combat, few details were forthcoming, apart from the fact that he was constantly armed, “even when in sleep.”

‘They’re not disposable’

Earlier this year, British born Abdul Waheed Majeed made headlines for apparently blowing himself up in an Aleppo Prison, allowing hundreds of detainees- many of whom were high ranking Al-Qaeda operatives, to flee. And while no Britons have been linked to further suicide bombings as of yet, the social media accounts of other suspected Britons such as ‘Usama-al-Britani’ indicate that more are willing to sacrifice their lives if ordered to do so.

The designation “suicide bomber,” however, could in fact be a means of establishing the pecking order of fighters.

“Britons don’t tend to be used on frontlines as suicide bombers” Mark Stephens, deputy director of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in Qatar told RT.

“They’re not disposable. They are mainly being used to do menial tasks [as] most of them don’t speak Arabic,” he said.

Stephens adds that foreign fighters may also be used to provide intelligence and infrastructure to ISIS, which has been as adamant about logistical structures and providing public services as it has been about conducting military operations.

“If one is educated for example and has an engineering degree, then he is not being used as a suicide bomber. You need educated people to run your organization. ISIS isn’t just a terrorist group, it runs cities in the area it controls.”

As more Brits heading to Syria, politicians are currently discussing how to deal with the fighters and the risks they pose to their home countries. In June, Prime Minister David Cameron said that foreign fighters posed ‘the biggest threat’ to Britain’s’ national security, warning that ISIS militants could conduct terror operations on home soil.

Other politicians are calling for jihadis to be offered amnesty like that offered in Denmark, or be subject to ‘deradicalization programs’. The British Home Office, however, has opted instead to take the most hard line approaches in all of Europe. It includes stripping suspected ISIS recruits of their passports, an all out travel ban, and freezing their assets and bank accounts if necessary.

“People seeking to travel to engage in terrorist activity in Syria or Iraq should be in no doubt we will take the strongest possible action to protect our national security, including prosecuting those who break the law,” a Home Office spokesperson told RT.

To A’ntaar, however, the warnings are meaningless. “I do not care for a passport of citizenship or living in the UK. I do not want it at all and the only way I’ll return to the UK is when they get into fight with us, and my leader sends me on a mission to cause destruction from within the enemy,” he says, adding that he would attack Britain only if commanded to do so.

“I want to fight for the khilafah (caliphate) and want to die protecting it so long as it is ruling by Allahs laws. Britain right now is the enemy but its not up to me when to strike them.

“It is up to our leaders how to decide when and how. But we are ready,” he warned.

A’ntaars attitude is similar to that of other ISIS fighters, who, despite pleas from their parents and relatives, express no desire to return home.

“Most fighters don’t want to go back,” Stephens says.

“Family pressure doesn’t do anything to change that. Foreign fighters will never be sent back. The moment he comes back into the country, he [A’ntaar] will be spotted in a second.”

Stephens also tells us that even if there are fighters who want to return home, they would find problems in doing so; “It is difficult to get out of Syria, to get across the border, so it’s unlikely that foreign fighters would go back,” he says.

‘More ruthless than Al-Qaeda’

ISIS is so hardline that it was expelled by al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in February this year. Led by an Iraqi called Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS was originally an al-Qaeda group in Iraq. Within just a few months, ISIS launched an aggressive expansion campaign, seized key territory, gained thousands of followers and spread fear and terror across Iraq and Syria, so that now experts argue that ISIS eclipsed al Qaeda and made it seem virtually irrelevant.

A’ntaar for his part believes that ISIS is now the global leader in Jihad and that “nothing, absolutely nothing can get rid of it.” He argues that ISIS is stronger than Al Qaeda, because it managed to achieve something the latter never could – establishing a ‘caliphate’.

Reuters/Stringer

“The Islamic State is more advanced, more sufficient in self-finance and more ruthless on enemies than AQ,” he says. While praising the group formerly led by Osama bin Laden, he argues that the group have ‘run out of ideas’ without their leader.

While the skill in which ISIS disseminate their propaganda through videos and social networks is well documented, foreign fighters also assist in spreading it, especially to potential new recruits. Most of the English speaking fighters tend to be active on social media sites including Twitter and ask.fm, where they praise the ‘just actions’ taken by militants, whom they refer to as ‘mujahideen’.

Fighters, both men and women, praise ISIS, citing examples in which it has allegedly rebuilt bridges and schools, and stopped activities including drinking and gambling, that they see as ‘Haraam’ or impermissible.

A’ntaar assures us that he has support from local Iraqis and Syrians, saying that “They hate the Americans, and have long been afraid of the Shi’a government” under former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He also rejects reports of forced conversions of Yazidis and other minorities, dismissing them as ‘lies’. According to A’ntaar, Yazidis converted out of “their own will,” despite claims made by the United Nations and a number of human rights NGOs.

“It is unquestionably the case that English speakers have a great amount of propaganda potential,” says Tom Keatinge, an associate fellow at RUSI.

Keatinge emphasises how effective English speaking is to Islamist ideology, citing the example of radical preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed by US drone strikes in 2011. By using familiar terminology and phrases, the English language “can be manipulated to make Jihad appear more appealing than it in reality is,” Keatinge suggests.

This tendency was clear throughout our interview with A’ntaar.

In our attempts to garner insight into his actual life as an ISIS fighter, much of what he imparted concealed in the all too familiar veil of propaganda.

Indeed, the extent to which ISIS is obsessively on point regarding its media message may also be evident in the videos depicting the murder of western hostages, such as James Foley and most recently, David Haines, by suspected British ISIS militant ‘Jihadi John’.

Stephens told us that despite claims that the individual killed the hostages, “Jihadi John was just put out for propaganda purposes, as a direct message to Obama”

“Islam breeds lions…..the West breeds rabbits”

As President Obama announces a new bombing campaign against ISIS fighters in Syria, A’ntaar seemed unfazed when asked whether such action could eliminate the organization. “No problem,” he said. “They can kill 95 percent of us if they are capable but this movement will breed new leaders every time and our enemy will never be [as] relentless as us in pursuing our goals.”

Reuters/Jason Reed

A’ntaar provided no answer when asked how ISIS would go about fighting American-led forces in the event of a strike.

Although few details were forthcoming regarding the groups ability to counter aerial assaults, he implied the militants were undergoing training to manage airstrikes.

Our conversation with A’antaar ended soon thereafter, following “orders” that he was no longer allowed to talk to journalists. Whether he was taking orders from the IS media department or in fact an integral part of it is a matter of pure speculation.

One thing, however, remains certain. Authorized to speak to us or not, he did not miss a beat in communicating a well formulated message- a message, incidentally, which foreign fighters like him have proved indispensable in providing.

In one of the last messages A’antaar sent to us, he says: “Islam breeds lions who can never be defeated in the fields, while the West breeds rabbits.”

“We want American and west to come to Syria and fight us. We want to strike the jugular vein of the kuffar (infidel) and the jugular vien [sic] of the kuffar is America.”

 

Charges Against Mubarak Dropped

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IN the last few days there have been deadly demonstrations in Cairo. Egypt and Israel appear to be the only two countries working to establish peace and stability in the Middle East.

Cairo (CNN) — Three people were killed, 20 others were injured and dozens were arrested during limited anti-government protests calling for the preservation of Egypt’s Islamic identity Friday, a Health Ministry spokesman told CNN.

Today there are more.

Egypt Court Drops Murder Charges Against Mubarak

Ousted Leader Remains in Jail on Separate, Three-Year Sentence

CAIRO—An Egyptian court dismissed murder charges against former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on Saturday in the killing of hundreds of protesters during a 2011 uprising against his autocratic rule, a decision that comes after the nation has shifted back toward authoritarianism.

The decision, read by the judge presiding over a panel of jurists who were considering the charges of culpability in the murder of the protesters, in addition to charges of corruption, caps a nearly four-year process that saw the former dictator sentenced to life in prison in 2012. The previous verdict, on the same charges, was overturned on a technicality in 2013.

Mr. Mubarak, 86 years old, is currently serving a three-year prison term after being found guilty on separate corruption charges this year. It was unclear Saturday if he would complete that sentence in a military hospital, where he is being held because of his frail health, or be released, officials said.

In addition to dismissing the charges against the former president on Saturday, the judge announced that Mr. Mubarak and his two sons, Alaa and Gamal, were found not guilty of corruption. Habib Al Adly, who served as interior minister under Mr. Mubarak, and six aides, were also found not guilty in the murder of protesters during clashes with police.

It was the final legal hurdle Mr. Mubarak faced after he was detained following his ouster on Feb. 11, 2012 after nearly 30 years in office. Legal experts said judicial authorities could rule that his detention could count as time served, raising the possibility that Mr. Mubarak could be freed in the coming weeks, despite his conviction on embezzlement charges in May.

Reaction to the court’s decision was muted. The courtroom erupted in cheers after chief judge Mahmoud al-Rashidi finished reading the verdicts. Mr. Mubarak smiled and embraced his sons inside the defendants’ cage.

Later, speaking to a private satellite news program by telephone, Mr. Mubarak was defiant, suggesting the criminal proceedings against him were politically motivated.

“I did not do anything at all,” he said.

In Tahrir Square, the telegenic epicenter of the 2011 revolt, a handful of supporters applauded the decision while others stood in silence holding placards denouncing the verdicts as a travesty of justice.

But in dozens of homes, families of the protesters who were killed expressed agony.

“Today, we were killed again,” Amal Shaker, the mother of Ahmed Zain El Abedin, who was killed during the 18 days of demonstrations against Mr. Mubarak, said through tears. “They acquitted the officers who followed the orders and killed our sons and now they acquit their superiors—the ones who gave the order to kill.”

As Egypt’s political transition stumbled under pressure from the military, families seeking justice for the deaths of their relatives have had no relief. Nearly 200 police officers who faced charges for killing of protesters were acquitted or had their cases dismissed for lack of evidence.

Mr. Mubarak’s 2012 conviction was thrown out on appeal because of a procedural error.

Once billed as the trial of the century in Egypt, public interest in Mr. Mubarak’s journey through the legal system has waned since the nation underwent seismic political changes after the January 2011 uprising that unseated him.

Egypt held its first democratic presidential elections in June 2012, which Mohammed Morsi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, won. He was then ousted by the military in July 2013, following large street demonstrations denouncing his rule.

Mr. Morsi was imprisoned and is currently facing a number of charges in separate trials, including treason and murder, which rights groups have characterized as politically motivated.

The former general who carried out the coup, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, nominated himself for president in March and months later won against a weak opponent—reviving draconian laws against dissent as he presided over a fierce crackdown on Islamists and many of the figures who drove the uprising against Mr. Mubarak.

Legal experts said Saturday’s verdicts relating to Mr. Mubarak and the other defendants could be appealed, but there was little political will to do so.

The case had been mired in confusion and lacked transparency. Though a government sanctioned study found that nearly 900 people were killed during the 2011 uprising, the judge said on Saturday only 239 of the victims had been named in the case.

Mr. al-Rashidi, the judge, suggested during his reading of the verdict that prosecutors had erred in bringing a criminal case against the former president and that a criminal court didn’t have legal jurisdiction, leading him to dismiss the charges of murder.

He also said because of Mr. Mubarak’s advanced age and years of “public service,” it would best be left for history and god to judge him. He denied that the decision had “anything do with politics.”

The corruption charges Mr. Mubarak and his sons, along with a longtime associate, fugitive businessman Hussein Salem, were acquitted for involved the illegal sale of natural gas to Israel at reduced rates and for allegedly receiving vacation homes in exchange for political favors.

Write to Tamer El-Ghobashy at [email protected]

Time Limit/1967 Lines/Jerusalem

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While the talks over Iran’s nuclear program have failed, negotiations have now been extended by seven more months. Eyes have now been turned back to the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Votes are flying, time limits are being attached and secret back-channel negotiations are no longer secret. Israel is failing to sell their position globally especially to the United Nations and to Europe. Allies of Israel, especially the United States are also working to make a deal to the detriment of the 1967 borders.

PARIS — France’s foreign minister Friday urged the international community to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within two years, as the French parliament debated whether to recognize a Palestinian state.

“At the United Nations, we are working with our partners to adopt a Security Council resolution to relaunch and conclude talks. A deadline of two years is the one most often mentioned and the French government can agree with this figure,” Laurent Fabius told MPs

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The Secret Back Channel That Doomed the Israel-Palestine Negotiations

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The latest wave of violence in the Holy Land has prompted influential centrist voices in Israel—including former intelligence chiefs and army generals—to call for new peace talks with the Palestinian Authority. But those calling for the revival of the eternal “peace process” admit that the most recent effort, which failed miserably earlier this year, offers some harsh lessons. Since the collapse of talks back in April, many have analyzed why Secretary of State John Kerry fell short of reaching any kind of agreement. One critical fact, however, has been kept hidden until now: a secret communication channel between the private attorney of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a confidante of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

The secret channel—reported here for the first time—created substantial progress toward an agreement. But it also had one fundamental flaw, which contributed to the collapse of Kerry’s entire process. Abbas’s supposed representative was in fact holding these talks without a real mandate from the Palestinian President; the concessions he discussed with Molho didn’t represent the President’s views. Parts of this story remain unsolved—most importantly, why this lack of a mandate was missed or ignored in real time. But what can be told is enough to raise some hard questions about Kerry’s effort, and offer important lessons for future attempts at reaching an agreement.

In 2010, Yitzhak (Itzik) Molho, Netanyahu’s attorney and his point man for negotiations with the Palestinians, began to hold secret talks with a person considered very close to Abbas. The New Republic has decided not to publish the identity of this person out of concern for this individual’s security. Peace process veteran Dennis Ross—at the time a special foreign policy adviser to President Obama—was brought into the discussions as well.

Since their first meeting in 2010, Molho and Abbas’s confidante focused on finding common ground—a basis for final status negotiations that both Abbas and Netanyahu could tolerate. Back then, they came up with a formula in which Israel would accept the 1967 borders (with land swaps that would allow it to annex some large “settlement blocs”). In return, the Palestinians would show flexibility regarding Netanyahu’s insistence on recognizing Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people (while clarifying that such recognition would not abridge the rights of Israel’s Arab citizens). This formula, which was discussed but not concluded or agreed upon, included a huge concession from each side—Netanyahu’s representative accepting the same borders Bibi had spent decades rallying against, and Abbas’s supposed representative coming to terms with an Israeli demand that the Palestinian president had rejected time after time, on every possible stage.

Ross tried to make these conversations more prominent with the Obama administration back in 2011, but met with little success. One source in the administration said that except for former national security adviser Tom Donilon, no one was truly interested in this backchannel at the time. Washington wasn’t the only city where the secret channel didn’t incite much excitement. Neither Netanyahu in Jerusalem nor Abbas in Ramallah gave any public sign of accepting the proposed formula. As it became clear no one was interested in their work, Molho and his counterpart reduced the frequency of their meetings.

Things changed in the spring of 2013, when Kerry began a serious push for new peace talks, visiting Jerusalem and Ramallah five times between March and July. As Kerry was laying the ground for an official negotiating track, Molho and his counterpart also renewed their backchannel, with Molho flying in and out of a European capital where the two would meet every few weeks.

Ross had officially quit the Obama administration late in 2011, but he remained involved in talks long after his resignation—even after Secretary Kerry appointed former ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk as his envoy to the official peace talks in July of 2013. Ross had no official mandate when the talks resumed in 2013, but used his personal relationships with Molho, Indyk, and Kerry to weigh influence.

In the early months of the Kerry talks, the official track, led by Indyk, stalled. As Ben Birnbaum and I detailed last summer, arguments, shouting matches, and other distractions dominated the negotiations during this period. Molho, who in addition to pursuing this backchannel was also representing Netanyahu in the official talks, showed little interest in what was being discussed there. His Israeli negotiating partner, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, and the official Palestinian negotiators, Saeb Erekat and Mohammed Shtayyeh, all expressed frustration over his behavior. “It was clear he thought this wasn’t where the important things were happening,” says a source involved in the talks.

Important things were happening, however, in the secret channel. Molho and his counterpart were busy reconstructing their understanding from 2010, and transforming it into an outline of the terms for serious final status negotiations. Building from the Israeli acceptance of the 1967 borders (with land swaps) and Palestinian flexibility on the “nation state of the Jewish people” (with equal rights for Arab citizens) demand, additional components were added. Molho and Abbas’s confidante discussed the Palestinian refugee problem in depth, and were close to finding a creative wording they thought both sides could accept. On the explosive issue of Jerusalem, the two couldn’t reach an understanding, thus postponing the discussion for later stages of the negotiations.

Kerry, Indyk, and Livni were all aware of the secret channel, and briefed regularly on progress. But Israeli officials believed that the official Palestinian negotiators had no idea about the backchannel. By December 2013, when Molho and his counterpart were finalizing their talks and working on a dramatic understanding that summed up everything they had discussed, a larger problem emerged: The Israelis began to realize that it wasn’t clear if Molho’s counterpart was truly negotiating on behalf of President Abbas.

Late that month, one of Israel’s top newspaper columnists, Nahum Barnea, reported that during Netanyahu’s prior term in office (2009–2012), Molho had a “secret Palestinian contact” with whom he exchanged messages between Abbas and Netanyahu. Barnea didn’t report on the fact that this channel was still active and important—at least in the eyes of senior people in Israel and the U.S.—but the essence of his report was correct. Netanyahu’s office refused to comment, but Abbas was quick to reply, saying in an interview that “there is no secret channel with Netanyahu, and never was one.” He added that the official negotiations led by Indyk are “the only channel of communication I have with Netanyahu.”

On the Israeli side, an argument erupted over the meaning of Abbas’s statement. Some officials started voicing concerns that Abbas truly had no idea about the state of the backchannel talks, or that he knew about them but didn’t consider them to be important. This concern was also shared by senior American officials, including Indyk, who had thought for some time that Abbas and Netanyahu did not see the backchannel in the same light. A Palestinian official close to Abbas claims that, from their very first day back in 2010, the Palestinian president had no interest in these talks: “He never took these talks with Molho seriously.”

The extent of Abbas’s detachment from the secret-channel’s product became clear in early 2014, when Kerry decided to merge the two negotiation tracks. The understanding that had developed through the secret channel was spilled into the discussions that Indyk’s team was holding with both sides over a “framework document.” Netanyahu was willing to work with the fruits of the secret channel (although he insisted on airing his reservations, and the negotiations his advisers held with Indyk over the exact wording were endless). But Abbas completely rejected what had already, supposedly, been accepted by his own negotiator. He wasn’t willing to show any flexibility on the Jewish state issue, and the idea of excluding any clear reference to a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem seemed like political suicide.

The anger Abbas expressed at the American framework caught Kerry by surprise: After all, these were all ideas his supposed negotiator was discussing with Molho. Realizing he had a problem with Abbas, Kerry tried to convince Netanyahu to tilt some of the provisions in Abbas’s direction. But the Israeli Prime Minister was not having it. “We already agreed on these issues in the secret channel,” he told the Secretary, according to a former senior U.S. official. “Bibi is angry at Kerry for opening up understandings that everybody considered a done deal, just because Abbas had changed his mind,” an Israeli Minister told me in February. But a Palestinian official rebuffed this criticism, saying that Abbas never changed his mind on anything: “He was presented with positions that no Palestinian leader could ever accept, and that he personally had spoken out against many times.”

For some, it was always clear that the positions presented by the supposed “Palestinian negotiator” in this secret channel were totally unacceptable for Abbas. Officials involved in the process admit in retrospect that there was too much wishful thinking regarding the backchannel.

A major reason for the skepticism of some people involved in the negotiations toward this backchannel, had to do with Abbas’s ostensible confidante. A number of Israeli, American, and Palestinian officials claimed that it was a miscalculation to assume this person would have authority to make concessions on delicate issues. One senior Palestinian official told me that those in the American and Israeli camps who thought otherwise were “fools.”

 

If Abbas really was unaware of, or not totally committed to, the backchannel negotiations, what was his “representative” telling Molho? And why did Kerry and Netanyahu treat this channel so seriously, if they had no proof that Abbas had any interest in the proceedings? Perhaps Netanyahu understood that Abbas didn’t know or didn’t care about the backchannel, but decided to keep it going, hoping to bring the negotiations to a point where he could say: “We were willing to make historical concessions, but have found out that we have no partner.” This could explain why some senior Obama administration officials have lately been saying that Netanyahu misled Kerry during the negotiations.

Then again, perhaps Abbas did know what was going on with Molho, but regretted it midway. There is historical precedent for this scenario: In 1993, Abbas held secret negotiations with Israel’s then–Deputy Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin. The negotiations gave birth to the “Beilin–Abu Mazen Understandings,” the first-ever draft of a final status agreement. But when the document was leaked to the press, Abbas tried to distance himself from it and to minimize its importance. Some Israeli officials believe something similar happened in the last round of negotiations—that after extracting territorial concessions from Israel, Abbas backtracked on any concessions from his side. (The irony of this claim is that Netanyahu had also retreated from the positions presented by Molho in the secret channel, first by insisting on having reservations and later by going back to hardliner positions in the recent months.)

Both scenarios could serve some beautifully written conspiracy theories, but the truth could very well be much simpler: that this blunder was just a terrible misunderstanding. Perhaps what the Israelis considered a serious backchannel, the Palestinians—including their man in the room—saw as merely an unofficial exchange of ideas. Only two people can really solve the mystery, Yitzhak Molho and his negotiating counterpart. Both of them refused to comment.