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Category Archives: ISIS ISIL Islamic State Caliphate
FBI director: The terrorism threat out of Syria is ‘an order of magnitude greater than anything we’ve seen before’
BusinessInsider:As a number of ISIS attacks have rocked Europe, it can be difficult to remember that the group is largely on the back foot.
“They are on the run,”US Secretary of State John Kerry said in an interview on CNN last week while addressing the spate of terror attacks by the group. “And I believe what we are seeing are the desperate actions of an entity that sees the noose closing around them.”
Through satellite photos and other data, it’s clear that the terror group has been steadily losing territory in its heartlands of Iraq and Syria.
Even now, major efforts are underway to reclaim Mosul, the largest city under ISIS control.
However, as ISIS does steadily lose ground through conventional warfare in the Middle East, the group’s attacks against civilians around the world will only likely increase — at least for the time being.
“At some point there is going to be a terrorist diaspora out of Syria like we’ve never seen before,” explained FBI Director James B. Comey at a cybersecurity conference at Fordham University on Wednesday, The New York Times reports. “Not all of the Islamic State killers are going to die on the battlefield.”
As the terror group’s territory shrinks, dedicated fighters within the group will travel to find new locations to conduct their operations — most likely in hiding. Comey continued by saying that many of these core fighters would migrate to Western Europe as ISIS loses ground. And there is always the risk that some of them would eventually reach the US. More here.
The intelligence community gathers evidence everyday from countless sources, but when actual documents from Islamic State have been retrieved, the threat level and investigations mount even higher.
US intelligence agents are studying files captured from ISIS in a bid to identify potential terrorists returning to the west.
The cache includes some 10,000 documents and 4.5 terabytes of information containing the identities and countries of origin of the terror group’s fighters.
Also contained in the intelligence files are details of the routes used to smuggle terrorists in and out of the warzone.
The information was captured in Manbij in Northern Syria after the terror group was pushed back from the city.
Brett McGurk, President Obama’s special envoy confirmed the details of foreign fighters was being shared among coalition allies.
McGurk told the New York Times: ‘We want to make sure that all that information is disseminated in a coherent way among our coalition partners so that we can track the networks from the core and all the way to wherever the dots might connect, whether that is in Europe or in North Africa or Southeast Asia.’
Intelligence agents hope the information will help them identify ISIS terrorist cells while also providing details of the group’s finances and might even lead to military strikes against senior terror leaders.
It is estimated that almost 43,000 terrorists from 12 countries have at least attempted to go to Iraq and Syria.
McGurk added: ‘The operation in Manbij is about shutting down the main corridor from Raqqa and then out, in which some of the attackers that launched the Paris attacks we know traveled through that route. By shutting that down, you make it harder for them to kind of plan the larger-scale, kind of more coordinated attacks.’
However, despite the successful operation against ISIS in the city, the coalition has been criticized over an airstrike which killed innocent civilians on July 19.
Colonel Chris Garver said there was credible evidence to support the complaint.
The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said at least 56 civilians, including 11 children, died as they fled from a village near Manbij, a strategic waypoint between Turkey and the jihadist stronghold of Raqa.
A death toll of that magnitude would appear to be the worst in nearly two years of coalition air strikes against ISIS targets.
Garver said Wednesday that death estimates from residents near Manbij ranged from a low of ’10 to 15′ to a high of 73.
Garver had earlier accused ISIS of using civilians as ‘human shields’.
Coalition officials often say theirs is the most precise air campaign in history.
Nearly all coalition air strikes use guided munitions, involving laser or GPS systems, or else missiles. Targets are often viewed at length using surveillance drones before the order to attack is issued.
After the Manbij bombardment, Amnesty International urged the coalition to redouble its efforts to prevent civilian deaths and to investigate possible violations of international humanitarian law.
The London-based nongovernmental organization Airwars has estimated that the roughly 14,000 coalition bombing attacks since August 2014 have claimed at least 1,513 civilian lives.
The coalition has officially acknowledged only a few dozen civilian victims.
After the air strikes of July 19, the main Syrian opposition group, the Istanbul-based National Coalition, called on the US-led forces to suspend bombardments.
The group’s president, Anas al-Abdeh, said civilian casualties could heighten a sense of desperation among Syrians and provide a recruiting tool for extremist groups like ISIS.
Garver said last week that the jihadists had been mounting exceptionally fierce resistance in Manbij.
He added: ‘It’s a fight like we haven’t seen before. More detail, photos and videos here from DailyMail.
Minister: Bavaria bomber in online chat before attack
BERLIN (AP) — A 27-year-old Syrian asylum seeker who blew himself up at a bar in the southern German town of Ansbach was chatting online with a still-unidentified person immediately before the explosion, Bavaria’s interior minister said Wednesday.
Attacker Mohammed Daleel died and 15 people were wounded when his bomb exploded in a wine bar Sunday night after he was denied entry to a nearby open-air concert because he didn’t have a ticket.
“There was apparently an immediate contact with someone who had a significant influence on this attack,” state Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann said on the sidelines of a party meeting in southern Bavaria, news agency dpa reported.
It wasn’t clear whether Daleel was in contact with the Islamic State group or where the other person in the chat was, Herrmann said. He said investigators checking the assailant’s cellphone came across the “intensive chat” and that “the chat appears to end immediately before the attack.”
“Because of witness testimony on what happened and also the course of the chat, there are indeed questions about whether he intended to set off the bomb at that moment,” Herrmann said.
On Tuesday night, the online magazine of the Islamic State group said the attacker spent months planning the attack, once even hiding his home-made bomb in his room in a state-supported asylum shelter moments before a police raid.
The weekly Al-Nabaa magazine’s report added that Daleel had fought in Iraq and Syria with a branch of al-Qaida and the IS group before arriving in Germany as an asylum seeker two years ago.
The Ansbach explosion was the last of four attacks in the country in the span of a week, two of which have been claimed by IS. Islamic extremism wasn’t the motive in the other two — including the deadliest of the series, Friday’s shooting in Munich in which nine people were killed.
The attacks have brought Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policy of welcoming refugees under renewed criticism.
Conservative lawmakers have called for an increased police presence, better surveillance and background checks of migrants — and new strategies to deport criminal asylum seekers more easily.
Al Nabaa’s Arabic-language report on the attacker said he initially fought against government forces with al-Qaida’s branch in Syria before pledging alliance to IS in 2013. He also helped the group with its propaganda efforts, setting up pro-IS accounts online.
In Germany, he started making the bomb, a process that took three months, al Nabaa wrote.
It added that German police once raided his asylum shelter in an unrelated case and searched Daleel’s room without noticing the bomb that he had hidden moments earlier.
IS earlier claimed the Ansbach attack, publishing a video it said was of Daleel pledging allegiance to the group and vowing that Germany’s people “won’t be able to sleep peacefully anymore.” It appears to be the same video as the one found by German investigators on the suicide bomber’s phone.
Daleel unsuccessfully sought asylum in Germany and was awaiting deportation to Bulgaria.
The recent attacks have heightened concerns about the government’s migration policy that saw more than 1 million people enter Germany last year.
A senior figure in the nationalist Alternative for Germany party, which has no seats in the national parliament but saw its popularity surge after last year’s migrant influx, suggested Wednesday that there should be “a halt to immigration for Muslims to Germany” until all asylum seekers now in the country have been registered, checked and had their applications processed.
“For security reasons, we can no longer afford to allow yet more Muslims to immigrate to Germany without control,” Alexander Gauland, a deputy party leader, said in a statement. “There are terrorists among the Muslims who immigrated illegally and their number is rising constantly.”
The Interior Ministry says Germany is not still seeing uncontrolled migration. Spokesman Johannes Dimroth said that “for some time” all new arrivals have been registered and checked against security databases.
As for whether people could be treated differently depending on their religion, “as I understand it that simply would be incompatible with our understanding of freedom of religion,” he said.
The bloodshed in Germany began July 18, when a 17-year-old from Afghanistan wielding an ax attacked passengers on a train near Wuerzburg, wounding five people before he was shot to death by police. The IS group claimed responsibility.
German train operator Deutsche Bahn said Wednesday it would invest heavily in increased security and hire hundreds of security staff to control trains and train stations across the country.
The city of Munich said it is re-evaluating its security concept for the annual Oktoberfest and is considering banning all backpacks from the popular beer fest.
Making a Killing: The 1.2 Billion Euro Arms Pipeline to Middle East
An unprecedented flow of weapons from Central and Eastern Europe is flooding the battlefields of the Middle East.
Lawrence Marzouk, Ivan Angelovski and Miranda PatrucicBIRNBelgrade, London, Sarajevo
BalkanInsight: As Belgrade slept on the night of November 28, 2015, the giant turbofan engines of a Belarusian Ruby Star Ilyushin II-76 cargo plane roared into life, its hull laden with arms destined for faraway conflicts.
Rising from the tarmac of Nikola Tesla airport, the hulking aircraft pierced the Serbian mist to head towards Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
It was one of at least 68 flights that in just 13 months transported weapons and ammunition to Middle Eastern states and Turkey which, in turn, funnelled arms into brutal civil wars in Syria and Yemen, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN, and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, OCCRP, has found. The flights form just a small part of €1.2 billion in arms deals between the countries since 2012, when parts of the Arab Spring turned into an armed conflict.
Belgrade Airport | BIRN
Meanwhile, over the past two years, as thousands of tonnes of weapons fly south, hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled north from the conflicts that have killed more than 400,000 people. But while Balkan and European countries have shut down the refugee route, the billion-euro pipeline sending arms by plane and ship to the Middle East remains open – and very lucrative.
It is a trade that is almost certainly illegal, according to arms and human rights experts.
“The evidence points towards systematic diversion of weapons to armed groups accused of committing serious human rights violations. If this is the case, the transfers are illegal under the ATT (United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty) and other international law and should cease immediately,” said Patrick Wilcken, an arms-control researcher at Amnesty International who reviewed the evidence collected by reporters.
But with hundreds of millions of euros at stake and weapons factories working overtime, countries have a strong incentive to let the business flourish. Arms export licences, which are supposed to guarantee the final destination of the goods, have been granted despite ample evidence that weapons are being diverted to Syrian and other armed groups accused of widespread human rights abuses and atrocities.
Robert Stephen Ford, US ambassador to Syria between 2011 and 2014, told BIRN and the OCCRP that the trade is coordinated by the US Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, Turkey and Gulf states through centres in Jordan and Turkey, although in practice weapon supplies often bypass this process.
BIRN and the OCCRP examined arms export data, UN reports, flight records, and weapons contracts during a year-long investigation that reveals how thousands of assault rifles, mortar shells, rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons, and heavy machine guns are pouring into the troubled region, originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.
Since the escalation of the Syrian conflict in 2012, these eight countries have approved the shipment of weapons and ammunition worth at least 1.2 billion euros to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, and Turkey.
The figure is likely much higher. Data on arms export licences for four out of eight countries were not available for 2015 and seven out of eight countries for 2016. The four recipient countries are key arms suppliers to Syria and Yemen with little or no history of buying from Central and Eastern Europe prior to 2012. And the pace of the transfers is not slowing, with some of the biggest deals approved in 2015.
Eastern and Central European weapons and ammunition, identified in more than 50 videos and photos posted on social media, are now in use by Western-backed Free Syrian Army units, but also in the hands of fighters of Islamist groups such as Ansar al-Sham, Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIS, in Syria, factions fighting for Syrian President Bashar-al Assad and Sunni forces in Yemen.
On April 7, 2016, twitter User @bm27_uragan, who monitors the spread of weapons in the Syrian conflict, posted a video apparently of Free Syrian Army rebel using Serbian made Coyote M02 heavy machine gun in Southern Aleppo in Syria. The Coyote M02 has been independently identified as a Coyote M02.
Markings on some of the weapons identifying the origin and date of production reveal significant quantities have come off production lines as recently as 2015.
Out of the 1.2 billion euros in weapons and ammunition approved for export, about 500 million euros have been delivered, according to UN trade information and national arms export reports.
The frequency and number of cargo flights – BIRN and the OCCRP identified at least 68 in just over one year – reveal a steady flow of weapons from Central and Eastern Europe airports to military bases in Middle East.
The most commonly used aircraft – the Ilyushin II-76 – can carry up to 50 tonnes of cargo or approximately 16,000 AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles or three million bullets. Others, including the Boeing 747, are capable of hauling at least twice that amount.
But arms and ammunitions are not only coming by air. Reporters also have identified at least three shipments made by the US military from Black Sea ports carrying an estimated 4,700 tonnes of weapons and ammunition to the Red Sea and Turkey since December 2015.
One Swedish member of the EU parliament calls the trade shameful.
“Maybe they –[Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia] – do not feel ashamed at all but I think they should,” said Bodil Valero, who also served as the rapporteur for the EU’s last arms report.“Countries selling arms to Saudi Arabia or the Middle East-North Africa region are not carrying out good risk assessments and, as a result, are in breach of EU and national law.”.
OCCRP and BIRN talked to government representatives in Croatia, Czech Republic, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovakia who all responded similarly saying that they are meeting their international obligations. Some cited that Saudi Arabia is not on any international weapons black lists and other said their countries are not responsible if weapons have been diverted.
A question of legality
The global arms trade is regulated by three layers of interconnected legislation — national, European Union, EU, and international – but there are no formal mechanisms to punish those who break the law.
Beyond the blanket ban on exports to embargoed countries, each licence request is dealt with individually.
In the case of Syria, there are currently no sanctions on supplying weapons to the opposition.
As a result, the lawfulness of the export approval hinges on whether countries have carried out due diligence on a range of issues, including the likelihood of the arms being diverted and the impact the export will have on peace and stability.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia are signatories of the UN’s Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force in December 2014, and lists measures to prevent the illicit trade and diversion of arms.
Member states of the EU are also governed by the legally-binding 2008 Common Position on arms exports, requiring each country to take into account eight criteria when accessing arms exports licence applications, including whether the country respects international human rights, the preservation of “regional peace, security and stability” and the risk of diversion.
As part of their efforts to join the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have already accepted the measures and have amended their national law. Serbia is in the process of doing so.
Weapons exports are initially assessed based on an end-user certificate, a key document issued by the government of the importing country which guarantees who will use the weapons and that the arms are not intended for re-export.
Authorities in Central and Eastern Europe told BIRN and the OCCRP that they also inserted a clause which requires the buyer to seek approval if they later want to export the goods.
Beyond these initial checks, countries are required to carry out a range of other risk assessments based on national and EU law and the ATT, although conversations with, and statements from, authorities revealed little evidence of that.
OCCRP and BIRN talked to government representatives in Croatia, Czech Republic, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovakia who all responded similarly saying that they are meeting their international obligations. Some cited that Saudi Arabia is not on any international weapons black lists and other said their countries are not responsible if weapons have been diverted. The three other countries did not respond to requests for comment.
The Czech Foreign Ministry was the only public body to directly address concerns about human rights abuses and diversions, saying it took into account both when weighing up an export licence and had blocked transfers on that basis.
The Central and Eastern European weapons supply line can be traced to the winter of 2012, when dozens of cargo planes, loaded with Saudi-purchased Yugoslav-era weapons and ammunition, began leaving Zagreb bound for Jordan. Soon after, the first footage of Croatian weapons in use emerged from the battleground of Syria.
According to a New York Times report from February 2013, a senior Croatian official offered the country’s stockpiles of old weapons for Syria during a visit to Washington in the summer of 2012. Zagreb was later put in touch with the Saudis, who bankrolled the purchases, while the CIA helped with logistics for an airlift that began late that year.
While Croatia’s government has consistently denied any role in shipping weapons to Syria, former US ambassador to Syria Ford confirmed to BIRN and the OCCRP the New York Times account from an anonymous source of how the deal was hatched. He said he was not at liberty to discuss it further.
This was just the beginning of an unprecedented flow of weapons from Central and Eastern Europe into the Middle East, as the pipeline expanded to include stocks from seven other countries. Local arms dealers sourced arms and ammunition from their home countries and brokered the sale of ammunition from Ukraine and Belarus, and even attempted to secure Soviet-made anti-tank systems bought from the UK, as a Europe-wide arms bazaar ensued.
Prior to the Arab Spring in 2011, the arms trade between Eastern Europe and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, UAE, and Turkey – four key supporters of Syria’s fractured opposition – was negligible to non-existent, according to analysis of export data.
But that changed in 2012. Between that year and 2016, eight Eastern European countries approved at least 806 million euros worth of weapons and ammunition exports to Saudi Arabia, according to national and EU arms export reports as well as government sources.
Jordan secured export licences worth 155 million euros starting in 2012, while the UAE netted 135 million euros and Turkey 87 million euros, bringing the total to 1.2 billion euros.
Qatar, another key supplier of equipment to the Syrian opposition, does not show up in export licences from Central and Eastern Europe.
Jeremy Binnie, Middle East arms expert for Jane’s Defence Weekly, a publication widely regarded as the most trusted source of defence and security information, said the bulk of the weapon exports from Eastern Europe would likely be destined for Syria and, to a lesser extent, Yemen and Libya.
“With a few exceptions, the militaries of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE and Turkey use Western infantry weapons and ammunition, rather than Soviet-designed counterparts,” said Binnie. “It consequently seems likely that large shipments of such materiel being acquired by – or sent to – those countries are destined for their allies in Syria, Yemen, and Libya.”
BIRN and the OCCRP obtained confidential documents from Serbia’s Ministry of Defence and minutes from a series of inter-ministerial meetings in 2013. The documents show the ministry raised concerns that deliveries to Saudi Arabia would be diverted to Syria, pointing out that the Saudis do not use Central and Eastern European stock and have a history of supplying the Syrian opposition. The Ministry turned down the Saudi request only to reverse course more than one year later and approve new arms shipments citing national interest. Saudi security forces, while mostly armed by Western producers, are known to use limited amounts of Central and Eastern European equipment. This includes Czech-produced military trucks and some Romanian-made assault rifles. But even arms exports destined for use by Saudi forces are proving controversial, given their involvement in the conflict in Yemen.
The Netherlands became the first EU country to halt arms exports to Saudi Arabia as a result of civilian deaths in Yemen’s civil war, and the European Parliament has called for an EU-wide arms embargo.
Supply Logistics: Cargo flights and airdrops
Weapons from Central and Eastern Europe are delivered to the Middle East by cargo flights and ships. By identifying the planes and ships delivering weapons, reporters were able to track the flow of arms in real time.
Detailed analysis of airport timetables, cargo carrier history, flight tracking data, and air traffic control sources helped pinpoint 68 flights that carried weapons to Middle Eastern conflicts in the past 13 months. Belgrade, Sofia and Bratislava emerged as the main hubs for the airlift.
Most frequent were flights operated from Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. The flights were either confirmed as carrying weapons, were headed to military bases in Saudi Arabia or the UAE or were carried out by regular arms shippers.
The Middle East Airlift
At least 68 cargo flights from Serbia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic have carried thousands of tons of munitions in the past 13 months to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, three key suppliers of the Syrian rebels.
These were identified through detailed analysis of airport timetables, cargo carrier history, flight tracking data, leaked arms contracts, end user certificates, and air traffic control sources.
Cargo flights from Central and Eastern Europe to the Middle East, and particularly military bases, were extremely uncommon before late 2012, when the upsurge in weapons and ammunition purchases began, according to EU flight data and interviews with plane-spotters.
The most commonly used aircraft – the Ilyushin II-76 – can carry up to 50 tonnes of cargo or approximately 16,000 AK-47 Kalashnikov rifles or three million bullets. Others, including the Boeing 747, are capable of hauling at least twice that amount.
Of the 68 flights identified, 50 were officially confirmed to have carried arms and ammunition:
Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate confirmed that 49 flights departing or passing through Serbia were carrying arms and ammunition from June 1, 2015 to July 4, 2016. The confirmation came following weeks of refusal to comment on grounds of confidentiality and after BIRN and the OCCRP presented its evidence, including photographs showing military boxes being loaded onto planes at Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla Airport on four different occasions.
An official at the Bulgarian National Customs Agency confirmed one flight, operated by Belarussian cargo carrier Ruby Star Airways, was carrying arms from the remote Bulgarian Gorna Oryahovitsa Airport to Brno–Turany Airport, the Czech Republic, and on to Aqaba, Jordan.
An additional 18 flights were identified as very likely to have been carrying arms and ammunition based on one of three variables: the air freight company’s history of weapons supplies; connections to earlier arms flights; or a destination of a military airport:
Ten flights were made to Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia and Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, indicating the likely presence of weapons or ammunition. Additionally, 14 flights to Prince Sultan and Al Dhafra air bases are confirmed as having carried weapons during the same period by Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate.
Seven flights were operated from Slovakia and Bulgaria by Jordan International Air Cargo, part of the Royal Jordanian Air Force, which were revealed to have carried weapons and ammunition from Croatia to Jordan in the winter of 2012. Bulgarian retired colonel and counter-terrorism expert Slavcho Velkov, who maintains extensive contacts with the military, told BIRN and the OCCRP that the Sofia-Amman flights “were transporting weapons to Saudi Arabia, mostly for the Syrian conflict.” Additionally, one other flight operated by this airline is confirmed as having carried weapons during the same period by Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate.
One flight was operated by a Belarussian cargo carrier TransAVIAexport Airlines, which has a long history of transporting weapons. In 2014, the airline was hired by Serbian arms dealer Slobodan Tesic to transport Serbian and Belarussian weapons and ammunition to air bases in Libya controlled by various militant groups. The United Nations, UN, Sanctions Committee investigated the case and found potential breaches of UN sanctions, according to a 2015 UN report. Additionally, five flights operated by this airline are confirmed as having carried weapons during the same period by Serbia’s Civil Aviation Directorate.
Many of these flights made an additional stop in Central and Eastern Europe – meaning they were likely picking up more weapons and ammunition – before flying to their final destination.
EU flight statistics provide further evidence of the scale of the operation. They reveal that planes flying from Bulgaria and Slovakia have delivered 2,268 tons of cargo – equal to 44 flights with the most commonly used aircraft – the Ilyushin II-76 – since the summer of 2014 to the same military bases in Saudi Arabia and UAE pinpointed by BIRN and OCCRP.
Distributing the weapons
Arms bought for Syria by the Saudis, Turks, Jordanians and the UAE are then routed through two secret command facilities – called Military Operation Centers (MOC) – in Jordan and Turkey, according to Ford, the former US ambassador to Syria.
These units – staffed by security and military officials from the Gulf, Turkey, Jordan and the US – coordinate the distribution of weapons to vetted Syrian opposition groups, according to information from the Atlanta-based Carter Center, a think tank that has a unit monitoring the conflict.
“Each of the countries involved in helping the armed opposition retained final decision-making authority about which groups in Syria received assistance,” Ford said.
A cache of leaked cargo carrier documents provides further clues to how the Saudi military supplies Syrian rebels.
According to the documents obtained by BIRN and the OCCRP, the Moldovan company AeroTransCargo made six flights in the summer of 2015 carrying at least 250 tonnes of ammunition between military bases in Saudi Arabia and Esenboga International Airport in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, reportedly an arrival point for weapons and ammunition for Syrian rebels.
Pieter Wezeman, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a leading organisation in tracking arms exports, said he suspects the flights are part of the logistical operation to supply ammunition to Syrian rebels.
From the MOCs, weapons are then transported by road to the Syrian border or airdropped by military planes.
A Free Syrian Army commander from Aleppo, who asked to remain anonymous to protect his safety, told BIRN and OCCRP that weapons from Central and Eastern Europe were distributed from centrally controlled headquarters in Syria. “We don’t care about the county of origin, we just know it is from Eastern Europe,” he said.
The Saudis and Turks also provided weapons directly to Islamist groups not supported by the US and who have sometimes ended up fighting MOC-backed factions, Ford added.
The Saudis are also known to have airdropped arms and equipment, including what appeared to be Serbian-made assault rifles to its allies in Yemen.
Ford said that while he was not personally involved in negotiations with Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania over the supply of weapons to Syria, he believes that the CIA is likely to have played a role.
“For operations of this type it would be difficult for me to imagine that there wasn’t some coordination between the intelligence services, but it may have been confined strictly to intelligence channels,” he said.
The US may not have just played a role in the logistics behind delivering Gulf-sponsored weapons from Eastern Europe to the Syrian rebels. Through its Department of Defense’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM), it has also bought and delivered vast quantities of military materiel from Eastern Europe for the Syrian opposition as part of a US$500 million train and equip programme.
Since December 2015, SOCOM has commissioned three cargo ships to transport 4,700 tons of arms and ammunition from ports of Constanta in Romania and Burgas in Bulgaria to the Middle East likely as part of the covert supply of weapons to Syria.
The shipments included heavy machine guns, rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons – as well as bullets, mortars, grenades, rockets and explosives, according to US procurement documents.
The origin of arms shipped by SOCOM is unknown and the material listed in transport documents is available from stockpiles across Central and Eastern Europe.
Not long after one of the deliveries, SOCOM supported Kurdish groups published an image on Twitter and Facebook showing a warehouse piled with US-brokered ammunition boxes in northern Syria SOCOM would not confirm or deny that the shipments were bound for Syria.
US procurement records also reveal that SOCOM secured from 2014 to 2016 at least 25 million euros (27 million dollars) worth of Bulgarian and 11 million euros (12 million dollars) in Serbian weapons and ammunition for covert operations and Syrian rebels..
A Booming Business
Arms control researcher Wilcken said Central and Eastern Europe had been well positioned to cash in on the huge surge in demand for weapons following the Arab Spring.
“Geographical proximity and lax export controls have put some Balkan states in pole position to profit from this trade, in some instances with covert US assistance,” he added. “Eastern Europe is rehabilitating Cold War arms industries which are expanding and becoming profitable again.”
Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic boasted recently that his country could produce five times the amount of arms it currently makes and still not meet the demand.
“Unfortunately in some parts of the world they are at war more than ever and everything you produce, on any side of the world you can sell it,” he said.
Arms manufacturers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are running at full capacity with some adding extra shifts and others not taking new orders.
Saudi Arabia’s top officials – more used to negotiating multi-billion-dollar fighter-jet deals with Western defence giants – have been forced to deal with a handful of small-time arms brokers operating in Eastern Europe who have access to weapons such as AK-47s and rocket launchers
Middlemen such as Serbia’s CPR Impex and Slovakia’s Eldon have played a critical role in supplying weapons and ammunition to the Middle East
The inventory of each delivery is usually unknown due to the secrecy surrounding arms deals but two end-user certificates and one export licence, obtained by BIRN and the OCCRP, reveal the extraordinary scope of the buy-up for Syrian beneficiaries.
For example, the Saudi Ministry of Defence expressed its interest in buying from Serbian arms dealer CPR Impex a number of weapons including hundreds of aging T-55 and T-72 tanks, millions of rounds of ammunition, multi-launch missile systems and rocket launchers. Weapons and ammunition listed were produced in the former Yugoslavia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic.
An export licence issued to a little-known Slovakian company called Eldon in January 2015 granted the firm the right to transport thousands of Eastern European rocket-propelled grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and almost a million bullets worth nearly 32 million euros to Saudi Arabia.
BIRN and OCCRP’s analysis of social media shows weapons that originated from the former states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and Serbia, Croatia and Bulgaria are now present on the battlefields of Syria and Yemen.
While experts believe the countries continue to shirk their responsibility, the weapons pipeline adds more and more fuel to a white hot conflict that leads to more and more misery.
“Proliferation of arms to the region has caused untold human suffering; huge numbers of people have been displaced and parties to the conflict have committed serious human rights violations including abductions, executions, enforced disappearances, torture and rape,” said Amnesty’s Wilcken.
Additional reporting by Atanas Tchobanov, Dusica Tomovic, Jelena Cosic, Jelena Svircic, Lindita Cela, RISE Moldova and Pavla Holcova.
This investigation is produced by BIRN as a part of Paper Trail to Better Governance project.
al-Arabiya: An audio message released recently by Osama Bin Laden’s son Hamza has signaled the “continuation of Iranian sponsorship” of terrorism within al-Qaeda, a report by a US-based think tank has found.
It is also important to note, Hamza has brothers.
In the message released on May 9 and titled “Jerusalem is but a bride, and her dowry is blood,” Hamza called on all Syrian militant groups to unite and “liberate Palestine.”
According to a report released this week by SAPRAC, the Saudi American Public Relations Affairs Committee, “Al-Qaeda observers believe the new message released by Hamza Bin Laden signals the continuation of Iranian sponsorship of Bin Laden’s son, which started after the tragic events of 9 / 11.
“Blatantly defying world powers, Tehran hosted Hamza Bin Laden and provided him with necessary security, according to many intelligence agencies across the world.”
Believed to be 24 or 25 years old, Hamza is expected by experts to potentially become the next al-Qaeda leader
The SAPRAC report added that on March 16, before the release of the audio message,” American intelligence declassified 113 hand written messages by Osama Bin Laden. These included instructions on how Al-Qaeda should deal with Iran.”
The messages also revealed that Bin Laden said Iran is ‘the chief pathway for our money, men, communiqué, and hostages”.
Bin Laden also urged his men “not to start a front against Iran.”
According to SAPRAC, “this confirms the strong and warming ties between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
Infographic: Who is Hamza Bin Laden. (Al Arabiya English)
Three senior al-Qaeda members linked to Iran
The United States recently imposed sanctions on three senior al-Qaeda members living in Iran, shining a brighter spotlight on Tehran’s involvement in violent extremism in the region.
The US Treasury department specifically designated Faisal Jassim Mohammed Al-Amri Al-Khalidi, Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” according to their findings published last week.
“Today’s action sanctions senior al-Qaeda operatives responsible for moving money and weapons across the Middle East,” Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said in a statement.
“The Treasury remains committed to targeting al-Qaeda’s terrorist activity and denying al-Qaeda and its critical support networks access to the international financial system.”
Infographic: Extremists with a presence in Iran. (Al Arabiya English)
Al-Khalidi is a senior al-Qaeda official who was an emir of a brigade and part of a new generation of al-Qaida operatives, according to the US Treasury report. In May 2015, as al-Qaeda Military Commission Chief, he participated in an annual council meeting with other al-Qaeda commanders to discuss weapons acquisition.
As of 2011, al-Khalidi was responsible for liaising between al-Qaeda associates and al-Qaeda Central Shura members and leaders within the US-designated terrorist group Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.
The US also designated Bayumi for acting for or on behalf of al-Qaeda. He is a veteran al-Qaeda member who has been located in Iran since 2014 and a member of al-Qaeda since at least 2006.
As of mid-2015, Bayumi was reportedly involved in freeing al-Qaeda members in Iran. As of early 2015, he served as a mediator with Iranian authorities.
The third named operative, Ghumayn, is a senior leader who has served in several financial, communications, and logistical roles for the group. As of 2015, Ghumayn assumed control of the financing and organization of al-Qaeda members located in Iran.
On Tuesday, Iran denied the claims by Washington that the three senior al-Qaeda figures are based in the country, the official IRNA news agency reported.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Ghasemi was quoted as saying that Iran doesn’t have “any information about their presence on its soil.”
Revealing more Iran links
The recent sanctions come on the heels of documents leaked in March that reveal the level of ties between al-Qaeda and Iran, particularly on the situation in Iraq where the two sides allegedly sought to reach a deal.
One of those leaked documents was a letter written by an al-Qaeda operative in which he tells a fellow operative named Taqfik that he had met with someone in Tehran and that the Iranians wanted to build contacts with someone representing the “mayor,” a codename for former al-Qaeda Chief Osama bin Laden.
The trove of letters also revealed Bin Laden ordered his al-Qaeda deputies not to attack Iran, which he called a “main artery” for his organization’s operations.
The order was part of a collection of 112 letters taken from bin Laden’s compound by US special ops forces after he was killed in 2011.
Those documents also revealed further names of operatives with links to Iran:
Abu Hafs the Mauritanian
Status: Returned to Mauritania in 2012
He was Bin Laden’s religious adviser and al-Qaeda in Iran’s expert on Islamic law. His official name is Mahfouz Ould al-Walid.
Abu al-Kayr al-Masri
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran. Released in prisoner exchange with al-Qaeda in 2015. Whereabouts unknown
He was the Chairman of al-Qaeda’s Management Council and former chief of foreign relations for al-Qaeda, including liaison to the Taliban. He is reported to have long-standing ties to current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Saif al-Adel
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran. Released in prisoner exchange with al-Qaeda in 2015. Whereabouts unknown
He was a member of al-Qaeda’s Management Council and was involved in planning operations and directing al-Qaeda propaganda efforts. He was a former chief of military operations and worked closely with Abu Muhammad al-Masri. There is currently a $5mln reward for information leading to his capture.
Abu Muhammad al-Masri
Status: Presumed to be in Iran. Released in prisoner exchange with al-Qaeda in 2015. Whereabouts unknown
He was a member of al-Qaeda’s Management Council and is considered the “most experienced and capable operational planner” not in US or allied custody. He is former chief of training and worked closely with Saif al-Adel. $5 million reward for information leading to his capture.
Sulaiman Abu Ghaith
Status: He was captured and tried in US federal court in New York. Sentenced to life in prison.
He was a member of al-Qaeda’s Management Council and official spokesman for al-Qaeda before detention
Abu Dahhak, aka Ali Saleh Husain al-Tabuki
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
He is an al-Qaeda facilitator and former representative of Chechen mujahideen in Afghanistan
Abu Layth al-Libi, aka Ali Ammar Ashur al-Rufayi’l
Status: Killed in US drone strike
He was a paramilitary commander and active in Eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. He is said to exercise significant autonomy and enjoys long-standing ties to senior managers.
Abd al-Aziz al-Masri, aka Ali Sayed Muhammad Mustafa Al-Bakri
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
Al-Qaeda associate; senior poisons and explosives expert; involved in nuclear research since late 1990s; had close relationships with Saif al-Adel and Khalid Sheik Muhammad.
Abu Dujana al-Masri
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
Explosives instructor before detention. He was a member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and is Zawahiri’s son-in-law
Muhammad Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambuli, aka Muhammad Ahmad Shawqi Islambouli
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
He was an al-Qaeda facilitator and senior member of Egyptian Al-Gamaat Al-Islamiyah. Has former ties to Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and is the brother of Anwar Sadat assassin Khalid al Islambuli.
Thirwat Shihata
Status: Has left Iran. Believed to have traveled to Libya
He is a former Zawahiri deputy and experienced operational planner. Considered as a respected among al-Qaeda rank and file with previous ties to Zarqawi.
Khalid al-Sudani
Status: Presumed to be in Pakistan, Jordan or Iran
Member of the al-Qaeda Shura Council.
Qassim al-Suri aka Yasin Baqush
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
Provides communications link between al-Qaeda leaders in Waziristan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Planning, coordinating attack plots in Europe with several al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-affiliated cells. There is a $10mln reward for information leading to his capture
Ali Mujahid Tekushir
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
Provides explosives, computer and Internet training to al-Qaeda recruits. Facilitates movement of senior-level extremists from Iran into Iraq. Reports link him to plots against the New York subway system in December 2005.
Abu Talha Hamza al-Baluchi
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
Iran-based al-Qaeda facilitator
Jafar al Uzbeki, aka Jafar the Uzbek
Status: Presumed to have at one point been in Iran
Representative of al-Qaeda senior leadership working to negotiate the release of al-Qaeda members held by Iran
Anas al Liby, aka Abu Anas al-Libi
Status: Captured by US commandos in Libya but died of liver cancer before he was able to stand trial in federal court in New York
Believed to have been involved in the 1998 East Africa bombings; senior member of al-Qaeda; member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group security committee
The FBI said on Monday that it was investigating the nature and scope of a cyberintrusion at the Democratic National Committee disclosed last month.
“A compromise of this nature is something we take very seriously, and the FBI will continue to investigate and hold accountable investigate and those who pose a threat in cyberspace,” the FBI said in a statement. More from BusinessInsider.
The FBI having any reach for prosecution in Russia is nil. Furthermore, the damage to America and American politics has already been done.
This site published an item as a primer of Russian aggression. Will the Obama administration address this condition with Russia? No, all deference has been given to both NATO with which to deal and further the deadly conflicts in Syria and Iraq have come under the management of Iran and Russia as decided by John Kerry and the White House National Security Council. How serious is this? Read on…
The above document describes the blurred lines between peace and war. This is an important condition and must be learned given the cyber hacks by Russia against the United States and most recently, the emails of the DNC. Russia has forged their way into American politics by which during the presidential election cycle, both nominees are ill prepared to address immediately.
General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation’s military, developed The Gerasimov Doctrine in recent years. The doctrine posits that the rules of war have changed, that there is a “blurring of the lines between war and peace,” and that “nonmilitary means of achieving military and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness.” Gerasimov argues for asymmetrical actions that combine the use of special forces and information warfare that create “a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state.”
An overview of Russian activity in Latin America shows an adherence to Gerasimov’s doctrine of waging constant asymmetrical warfare against one’s enemies through a combination of means. These include military or hard power as well as shaping and controlling the narrative in public opinion, diplomatic outreach, military sales, intelligence operations, and strategic offerings of intelligence and military technology. All are essential components of the Russian presence and Gerasimov’s view that the lines between war and peace are blurred, and that non-military means of achieving power and influence can be as effective or more effective than military force. Read more here.
On April 29, a Russian fighter jet in the Baltic Sea flew within 50 feet of a U.S. reconnaissance plane and conducted a highly dangerous barrel roll, drawing a sharp rebuke from the Pentagon. Within the past month, there have been at least two other provocations by Russian aircraft in the region, with many officials suggesting it is in response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) decision to hold large military exercises in Poland next month and significantly increase its troop presence within Allied countries bordering Russia.
Washington, perceived by Moscow as NATO’s puppeteer, has quadrupled its European defense budget for 2017, adding nearly $3.5 billion. The exhibitionism from both Russia and NATO has led experts to conclude that geopolitical tensions “are at the highest levels since the end of the Cold War.”
Perhaps. However, barring any egregious miscalculation by either side, a large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia is unlikely. While it is necessary to maintain modern militaries, their presence in the 21st century is more symbolic than practical—at least when considering the prospect of warfare between nuclear-armed adversaries. Any war that does take place will be far from conventional, requiring a skillful blend of military and non-military tools. Within this domain, it is Russia, shrewd and flexible, that will have the advantage, leaving NATO and its transnational bureaucracy to react and adapt effectively.
In a February 2013 issue of the Military Industrial Courier, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov discussed how the rules of war have changed and become more blurred. Whether called “hybrid war,” “ambiguous war,” “non-linear war,” or “special war,” this type of conflict is not new, but has been adopted and successfully updated by Russia to account for all the modern era’s technological complexities. As applied to Russia, it has been coined “The Gerasimov Doctrine,” and it is Russia’s new normal.
“Whether called “hybrid war,” “ambiguous war,” “non-linear war,” or “special war,” this type of conflict is not new, but has been adopted and successfully updated by Russia to account for all the modern era’s technological complexities.”
Russia has been aggressively exploiting its non-NATO “near abroad” as fertile testing ground for hybrid war. Through a calculated combination of disinformation campaigns, espionage, special operations forces, and the cultivation of a cadre of so-called “deniable agents,” Russia was able to successfully annex Crimea while Kiev was still recovering from its post-Euromaidan chaos.
These blatant violations of international law, while drawing substantial criticism and the economic sanctions that drove Russia into recession, have not been enough to deter continued belligerence. In fact, in many ways the sanctions have been counterproductive: Putin’s favorability increased significantly to nearly 90 percent following Crimea’s annexation; a similar spike in popularity was observed in 2008 following Russia’s military invasion of Georgia. Thus, Putin has been able to blame domestic woes on the West while simultaneously generating a patriotic rally-around-the-flag effect.
A March 2016 report from the prominent London-based think tank Chatham House asserts NATO is ill-prepared to handle these hybrid threats from Russia. The Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces, established at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, are “appropriate for addressing purely military threats, but hardly appear adequate when compared with the scale of Russian preparations for conflict.” Moreover, they only provide “a single dimension of reassurance to front-line states,” meaning “additional elements are required to protect against Russian tools of influence other than conventional military attack.”
“NATO should swiftly acknowledge it needs to focus its attention vis-à-vis Russia from conventional to hybrid threat readiness.”
It is strongly thought that the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are most vulnerable to Russian meddling. All three were previously part of the Soviet Union and border Russia directly. More worryingly, these three states have a relatively large percentage of ethnic Russians living within their borders that could be susceptible to Russian influence, just as the inhabitants of Crimea were.
Indeed, Russia is already dabbling in subversion within the Baltic and Nordic regions. Following a row in 2007 between Russian and Estonian officials over the removal of a Soviet monument in Tallinn, a host of Estonian government websites were subjected to persistent cyber-attacks for three weeks—although Moscow denies involvement. Furthermore, Sweden’s state security services have warned of an increased amount of Russian covert activity aimed at undermining closer collaboration between NATO and Sweden. Finally, Russian warships have been formerly accused by Lithuania, which receives nearly all of its gas from Russia, of disrupting the creation of power cables that would diversify its energy dependence.
NATO should swiftly acknowledge it needs to focus its attention vis-à-vis Russia from conventional to hybrid threat readiness. A good start would be to increase the number of NATO members meeting the defense expenditure requirements of 2 percent of gross national product. Only 5 of 28 Allied countries currently do so. This increased funding should then be allocated in ways that will address NATO’s greatest vulnerabilities, for instance, by precluding disinformation campaigns in the Baltics, increasing the number of experts on Russia, or solving the issue of weening Allied states off of Russian gas.
Already dealing with a raft of regional security concerns—the migrant crisis, terrorist threats, and sweeping nationalism—NATO must recognize Russia is doing everything it can to exploit Western disunity. But forget the tanks and planes: this conflict will be fought in the shadows.