After Hillary Left State, More Classified Emails Exchanged

Posted on August 31, 2016August 31, 2016 by Denise Simon

About to have HSS? It is a looming disease….Hillary Saturation Syndrome. Sheesh

Clinton emailed classified info after leaving State: report

NewYorkPost: Hillary Clinton continued sending classified information even after leaving the State Department, The Post has exclusively learned.

On May 28, 2013, months after stepping down as secretary of state, Clinton sent an email to a group of diplomats and top aides about the “123 Deal” with the United Arab Emirates.

But the email, which was obtained by the Republican National Committee through a Freedom of Information Act request, was heavily redacted upon its release by the State Department because it contains classified information.

The markings on the email state it will be declassified on May 28, 2033, and that information in the note is being redacted because it contains “information regarding foreign governors” and because it contains “Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources.”

The email from Clinton was sent from the email account — hrod17@clintonemail.com— associated with her private email server.

The email’s recipients were Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, diplomat Jeffrey Feltman, policy aide Jake Sullivan, diplomat Kurt Campbell, State Department chief of staff Cheryl Mills, and Clinton aide Huma Abedin.

The “123 Deal” was a 2009 agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the US on materials and technological sharing for nuclear energy production.

“Hillary Clinton’s mishandling of classified information was so pervasive, it continued after she left government,” Republican National Committee research director Raj Shah told The Post. “She clearly can’t be trusted with our nation’s security.”

Clinton is believed to have sent 2,101 emails that contained at least some classified information.

The Trump campaign said the latest revelation about Clinton’s email habits is more proof she can’t be trusted with national security.

“Hillary Clinton’s secret server jeopardized our national security and sensitive diplomatic efforts on more than 2,000 occasions, and shockingly, it now appears her reckless conduct continued even after leaving the State Department. Hillary Clinton’s terrible judgment shows she cannot be trusted with our national security,” said Jason Miller, Trump’s senior communications advisor, in a statement.

What was the ‘123 Deal’?

While the purpose of multilateral negotiations with Iran is to reduce proliferation concerns, successful talks may in fact accelerate nuclear plans in the Gulf states and Jordan.

In April 2009, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia famously told U.S. special envoy Dennis Ross that “if [the Iranians] get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons.” Such comments suggest that leaders in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals will closely study any deal reached with Iran, whether on or after the expiration of current nuclear talks next Monday. The message out of the kingdom, delivered repeatedly and recently in Washington by former intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, is that whatever Tehran gets, Gulf Arabs will want. U.S. wishes aside, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and perhaps even Jordan could make as plausible a case as Iran for building nuclear power plants. And from their perspective, if Iran is going to be allowed to enrich uranium and retain its nuclear-capable missiles — as they believe likely given Washington’s reported approach to the negotiations thus far — why shouldn’t they be permitted to acquire similar capabilities?

THE UAE’S NUCLEAR CALCULUS

The first challenge to even limited diplomatic success with Iran would likely come from Abu Dhabi, the lead sheikhdom of the United Arab Emirates. Despite having around 10 percent of the world’s oil, the UAE also has the region’s most advanced plans for domestic nuclear power. Its first two nuclear facilities are under construction and due to start up in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Abu Dhabi obtained the reactors from South Korea, but in order to secure access to U.S. technology, material, and equipment, it also agreed to forgo uranium enrichment by signing a so-called “123 Agreement” at Washington’s behest.

Yet the UAE’s continued commitment to eschew enrichment is hardly guaranteed. For one thing, the 123 Agreement itself may give Abu Dhabi an out. The “123” refers to the section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act that regulates U.S. nuclear cooperation with foreign countries. Depending on how one reads the “Agreed Minute” attached to that section, if Washington and its P5+1 partners (Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany) reach a deal with Iran, the UAE may have cause to renegotiate its enrichment rights. Of particular note is this passage from the Minute: “The fields of cooperation, terms and conditions accorded…shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded from time to time to any other non-nuclear weapons state in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.”

More important, if the UAE decides that pursuing enrichment — whether alone or with its Gulf partners — is in its interest, it would not need to ask Washington to renegotiate the 123 Agreement. Instead, it could simply abandon U.S. nuclear cooperation altogether and obtain the technological help it needs elsewhere. Whether it takes either route will depend on Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed, the effective ruler of Abu Dhabi, whose admiration for America is matched only by his disappointment with the Obama administration’s policies. Already infuriated when Washington allowed the initial euphoria of the “Arab Spring” to distract it from Iran, he is now said to be livid at the prospect that Tehran’s quasi-nuclear status will be confirmed by an agreement not worth, in his mind, the paper it is written on.

UAE officials have never stated publicly that they would pursue enrichment if Iran is permitted to do so. Yet it is uncertain whether they are silent because they do not plan to do so or because they do not wish to tip their hand.

SAUDI MINDSET

Saudi Arabia’s plans for nuclear power lag behind the UAE’s but are even more ambitious — sixteen plants are to be built over the next twenty years. Although the kingdom has nearly a quarter of the world’s oil reserves, its rapidly growing energy demand could drain much of its oil exports unless it finds ways to reduce consumption. Switching to an alternative fuel source for electricity generation and increasing energy efficiency are the two most promising routes.

The kingdom’s ambition will stretch its capabilities, however. So far it has only one nuclear institution up and running, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE). Despite the organization’s civilian-sounding name, a U.S. official noted last month that the kingdom’s perceived nuclear intentions were not straightforward or obvious, and that KA-CARE’s recent leadership transition could also be cover for a policy change.

OTHER GULF PLANS

Kuwait’s tentative nuclear moves have slowed of late, but they have not stopped. In 2009, the government formed the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). In addition, economic feasibility studies and site surveys have been conducted, and students have been sent abroad for specialist education. Although much of the nascent program was cancelled after the 2011 nuclear accident in Japan, KNNEC’s activities were transferred to the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, and there are plans to set up a nuclear research and training facility.

Qatar has investigated the viability of domestic nuclear power as well. In 2008, it announced that it was not proceeding with any such plans, yet two years later it raised the prospect of a regional nuclear project. Doha has also signed a cooperation agreement with Russia’s state-owned Rosatom nuclear corporation.

For its part, Jordan persists in talking ambitiously of nuclear power plans. In September, it signed an agreement with a Rosatom subsidiary aimed at reaching a final construction contract within two years. The projected power plant would cost $10 billion, with half being paid by Russia. Jordan also has plans to mine domestic uranium deposits and is working with South Korea on a project to build a small research and training reactor.

MISSILES, CENTRIFUGES, AND PAKISTAN

One of the clearest signals of how Gulf leaders view Iran diplomacy was Saudi Arabia’s decision to show off two of its nuclear-capable missiles at a military parade in April. The weapons were acquired from China in the 1980s but had hitherto never been put on display, so the timing was conspicuous. Gulf Arabs believe that Washington’s intended nuclear deal with Tehran is unlikely to include limits on the regime’s arsenal of long-range missiles capable of being modified to carry a nuclear warhead. UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) called for Iran to halt work on nuclear-capable missiles, but there is no indication it has done so.

Pakistan’s potential proliferation role remains troubling as well. Among the dignitaries at the Saudi parade last spring was Pakistan’s military chief Gen. Raheel Sharif (who, it should be noted, paid an official visit to Washington earlier this week). Even if the Obama administration hopes that an Iran deal will squash the prospect of Riyadh borrowing or buying nuclear warheads from Pakistan, it must also consider the distinct possibility that the Saudis will ask Islamabad for enrichment technology. Pakistan currently operates the P-2 centrifuge, equivalent to Iran’s IR-2m, which is causing so much concern because of its higher efficiency compared to Iran’s more numerous IR-1.

Saudi Arabia — along with the UAE — has been associated with Pakistan’s enrichment program since as early as the 1980s. This included hosting controversial nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who was placed under house arrest ten years ago when revelations emerged about his nuclear trading with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Well before his detainment and subsequent release, Khan was a frequent visitor to the kingdom — a 1998 brochure commemorating Pakistan’s first nuclear tests contained photos of him meeting former Saudi defense minister Prince Sultan, as well as the late Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince Muhammad’s father and founder of the UAE. And in 1989, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed — then the UAE minister of information and now foreign minister — visited Pakistan’s enrichment plant at Kahuta outside Islamabad.

The Obama administration appears to believe it can stop the proliferation of nuclear technology to Gulf allies by having suppliers insist on extremely tough inspection regimes such as that used for Iran. Yet long-time Gulf partners are unlikely to appreciate being told that they will be treated in the same manner as Iran, with its long track record of violating obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, it is by no means clear that all potential suppliers of enrichment technology — such as Pakistan — would impose such tough restrictions on Gulf states. In short, if an Iran deal is reached and Gulf leaders dislike it, preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology in the region will be a considerable challenge.

Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Previously, they coauthored Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms, a joint publication of the Institute and the Belfer Center.

Generational terror by Hamas and Islamic State

Posted on August 29, 2016August 29, 2016 by Denise Simon

DailyMotion

HuffingtonPost: Five children appear to shoot prisoners to death in a new video released by the self-described Islamic State.

The video identifies the kids as British, Egyptian, Kurdish, Tunisian and Uzbek, and the location as the ISIS-controlled province of Ar-Raqqa in Syria, according to a translation by SITE Intelligence, a terrorism analysis firm.

The Huffington Post is not providing the video here to avoid promoting the extremist group’s propaganda.

The Islamic State has a well-documented history of recruiting children into its ranks and enlisting them in brutal acts. As of February, CNN reported the group had eulogized 88 child soldiers killed in battle, the vast majority of them from Syria and Iraq.

A July story in Der Spiegel details the harrowing ordeal of two adolescent Iraqi brothers captured by ISIS and placed in a juvenile military training camp. They described being trained in the use of guns and other weapons, and beaten to harden them for combat. On one occasion, a fighter at the front demonstrated beheading on a real captive.

The brothers, who escaped after one of them was brutally beaten for secretly calling his mother on a mobile phone, said they found it easier to adjust to the violent lifestyle after they took certain pills they were given. The drug might have been fenethylline (sold under the brand name Captagon), a stimulant popular with ISIS that fosters energy and feelings of strength and invincibility.

There are currently 1,500 male children serving ISIS in Iraq and Syria, according to estimates cited by Der Spiegel. In the face of a U.S.-led campaign of airstrikes, the group escalated its use of children in propaganda videos in 2015, an expert told the German news source.

Away from its home base, the Islamic State appears to be laying the groundwork for juvenile forces as well. ISIS operatives who have taken over parts of Afghanistan can be seen in a November documentary by PBS’s “Frontline” instructing young children how to use weapons and kill those they consider infidels.

Iran Evaded Sanctions with Venezuela’s Help

Posted on August 26, 2016August 26, 2016 by Denise Simon

New evidence Iran evaded sanctions, continued nuclear weapons development with Venezuela

ForeignNewsDesk: New evidence suggests Iran received help from Venezuela with its nuclear program despite a decade of U.N.-mandated sanctions aimed at curbing the rouge regime’s controversial nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

A 2009 document obtained by Brazil’s leading weekly, Veja magazine, shows late dictator President Hugo Chavez signing off on the release of funds to help Iran with its nuclear ambitions.

Specifically, the document states the funds were to be designated for the import of equipment for a gunpowder factory and the development of production plants for nitroglycerin and nitrocellulose, elements used in rocket propulsion for Iran’s government. There is also the suggestion that Chavez may have helped Iran produce rocket motors.

The document provides written proof that Iran successfully continued with its weapons-building program, circumventing what were perceived as ‘watertight’ sanctions.

The revelation comes as Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif is currently touring South America visiting Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador Nicaragua and Venezuela, in what Iranian officials have billed as a “new chapter” in strengthening political and economic ties between Iran and South American countries.

“In my line of work, I can’t believe in coincidences. I can’t believe that $400 million was given to Iran in cash and now Zarif is running through Latin America. The Iranian regime understands that in Latin America corruption can be used to their advantage,” said Joseph M. Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society, who points to the long-standing relationship between Venezuela and Hezbollah, Iran’s terror proxy.

Humire is also the co-editor of Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America.

“Latin America is Hezbollah’s biggest cash cow. It would make sense that this is a very strategic visit by Zarif to continue some of Iran’s previous activities which were challenged because of sanctions,” Humire said, adding that Hezbollah has been deeply involved in drug trafficking in Latin America to offset any financial hardship brought about by the sanctions.

As a member state of the United Nations, Venezuela was obliged to cooperate with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 that unanimously called for a ban on arm sales to the Islamic republic.

But uncertainties were already high in 2009 when Turkey intercepted a suspicious shipment from Iran to Venezuela containing 22 containers of lab equipment capable of producing explosives but was labelled as “tractor parts.”

Humire, who has long analyzed Iran’s involvement in Latin America has studied twenty different transactions between the two countries in several areas, finding that even those dealings considered legal, were problematic due to the “dual use” that they could present.

“Iran’s secretive military programs go far beyond violating sanctions. It has to do with providing military and industrial support in these countries,” Humire said.

“At the far end of that, you can begin to speculate they are beginning to develop military assets.”

In a 2011 hearing at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, then head of U.S. Southern command General Douglas Fraser told the committee that the U.S. was concerned about weekly flights between Venezuela and Iran dubbed the “Axis of Evil Express,” that could potentially be used to transport terrorists and weapons.

“My concern, as I look at it, is the fact that there are flights between Iran and Venezuela on a weekly basis, and visas are not required for entrance into Venezuela or Bolivia or Nicaragua,” Fraser told the hearing.

Another discrepancy in Iran’s investments in Venezuela, according to Humire, is considering that if the Iranian regime was after economic growth, they would go to “viable countries like Brazil, Colombia, not the ones that are broke, particularly with the heavy instability in Venezuela.”

Congress knows:

Iran Latin America 1

Iran Latin America 2

Ben Rhodes, WH NSC Advisor an Employee of Iran Lobby?

Posted on August 25, 2016August 25, 2016 by Denise Simon

Primer:

A U.S. Navy coastal patrol ship fired three warning shots at an Iranian ship that sailed within 200 yards in the Northern Persian Gulf Wednesday after one of four close calls this week involving U.S. and Iranian vessels, a U.S. official confirmed to Fox News on Thursday.

The USS Squall fired the shots, according to the official.

On Tuesday, four Iranian small boats “harassed” the USS Nitze, sailing near the guided missile destroyer in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, a U.S. Navy official told Fox News.

and….

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned government officials not to trust the U.S. after alleged shortcomings in the nuclear deal’s implementation.

Khamenei criticized America’s “misconduct” in implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during a meeting with President Hassan Rouhani and his cabinet on August 24. Khamenei warned, “This experience teaches us that one cannot trust the promises of any administration in America.” As in his past criticisms of the nuclear deal, Khamenei fell short of calling for Iran to abandon the accord, however. More here.

Benjamin “Ben” Rhodes is President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting. From the beginning of his career, Rhodes has made a mark in policy, international relations, and writing. He worked as an assistant to Lee Hamilton at the Wilson Center, and then went on to the Iraq Study Group Report and the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations. He then went on to become President Obama’s foreign policy advisor during the 2008 Presidential Elections. He has worked with President Obama’s negotiating team for the JCPOA agreement and his outreach to the Iranian people, such as the President’s Nowruz Message in 2012.

Rhodes is a speaker at this conference.

NIAC LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

NIAC’s annual three-day Leadership Conference is the event of the year for supporters of peace and renewed friendship between the peoples of Iran and the United States. Participants will cultivate new leadership and advocacy skills, learn from some of America’s most influential thought leaders, interact with elected officials, and network with prominent Iranian American entrepreneurs and grassroots leaders.

Trita Parsi

President, NIAC
Trita Parsi is the 2010 recipient of the $200,000 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order. He is an award-winning author of two books, Treacherous Alliance – The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the US (Yale University Press, 2007) and A Single Roll of the Dice – Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (Yale University Press, 2012). Treacherous Alliance won the Grawemeyer award and Council of Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Award in 2008 (Silver medallion). A Single Roll of the Dice was selected as The Best Book on The Middle East in 2012 by Foreign Affairs. Dr. Parsi is the President of the largest Iranian-American grassroots organization in the US, the National Iranian American Council and has taught at Johns Hopkins University and George Washington University. He currently teaches at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. His forthcoming book on the Iran Nuclear Deal is tentatively titled Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy.

Go here to see the whole invitation, the speakers, the price and the agenda.

Hillary or Donald Ready for Iran in Iraq, Syria or Yemen?

Posted on August 24, 2016August 24, 2016 by Denise Simon

Iranian general: We formed Shiite army to fight in Iraq, Syria and Yemen

Retired General Mohammad Ali Falaki, who is currently one of the Iranian forces leaders in Syria, has recently revealed that Iran has formed a “Shiite Liberation Army” led by Quds Force commander, General Qassem Soleimani.

The Quds Force also known as Pasdaran in Persian is a special forces unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and is responsible for the Islamic Republic’s extraterritorial operation.

“The Shiite Liberation Army is currently fighting on three fronts – Iraq, Syria and Yemen,” he told Mashregh news agency, which is close to the IRGC, in an interview published on Thursday.

The retired general said “This army is not only composed of Iranians but it recruits locally from the regions witnessing fighting.”

Falaki, who is leading part of the IRGC fight in Syria to give support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, advised that it was “not wise to directly involve Iranian forces into the Syrian conflict.”

“The role of our personnel should be limited to training, preparing and equipping the Syrians to fight in their areas, ” he added.

Related reading: IRGC’s Plan to Destroy Israel

Eradicating Israel

Falaki said that the main objective behind the formation of the first nucleus of the ‘Shiite Liberation Army’ is to “eradicate Israel after 23 years, especially that these battalions are now on Israeli borders.”

The general, who is also an Iranian-Iraqi war veteran, also criticized Tehran for its failure to recruit Afghans and not creating a strong group with a tough leader for them on the lines of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement or militia group and its head Hassan Nasrallah.

“We’ve been considering Afghan refugees as dangerous offenders and mercenaries for the past 30 years,” he said. “We did not work on having Afghan groups and leaders like we did with the Shiites of Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain.”

The UN says there are about 950,000 registered Afghan citizens living in Iran but Tehran puts the total number at around 3 million.

However, Falaki praised sacrifices by the ‘Fatemiyon’ Afghan militias in Syria. He said that they only receive $100 for volunteering to fight there, dismissing reports that they expected to receive large sums of money.

He said the Afghan militias in Syria are “sacrificing their lives for nothing” especially that their government in Kabul has decided to arrest those who fought in Syria, with up to 18 years of jail sentence.

IRGC is still having “trouble when dealing with the Afghans in a friendly and brotherly way, because through Iranian eyes they are seen as inferior.”

He said Pakistanis have their ‘Zeynabioun’ militia group, Iraqis have their ‘Heydarioun’ while the Lebanese have Hezbollah.

Falaki also said there is another division for the Hezbollah, grouping both Iraqi and Syrian militias.

All of these militia groups are fighting under IRGC’s command, all wearing the “same uniform” under the same flag.

The article was first published in the Arabic-language website for Al Arabiya News Channel

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SoufanGroup: In mid-August, the U.S. Department of Defense released the summary of its annual report on Iran’s military strategy and capabilities. This year’s report was the first to account for the effects of the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. Though the summary is brief, it revealed a considerable amount about the strategic threat that Iran continues to pose to the U.S. and its allies, in spite of the nuclear deal.

The clearest conclusion the report reaches is that Iran is developing a wide variety of missiles—as well as an offensive cyber warfare capability—in order to project power far beyond its borders. Iran is developing a large arsenal of short-range missiles, both ballistic and cruise, to be able to deny an adversary control of the waters around Iran. When combined with what the report describes as Iran’s acquisition of naval attack craft—‘small but capable’ submarines, a large arsenal of ‘advanced naval mines,’ and armed unmanned aerial vehicles—Iran is positioned to threaten military and commercial shipping in the vital Strait of Hormuz. About one-third of all seaborne traded oil flows through the Strait daily. Iran’s capabilities call into question longstanding assertions by U.S. and allied naval commanders that Iran does not possess the capability to close the Strait of Hormuz for prolonged periods. The assessment has direct relevance; in mid-August, the IRGC reiterated its threat to close the waterway if Iran were attacked.

Iran’s long-range missiles could place a wide array of U.S. and allied targets within striking distance. Iran’s existing ballistic missile arsenal can already reach all of Israel, as well as U.S. bases in Turkey and southeastern Europe. The Pentagon report mentions Iran’s intent to conduct a launch of its Simorgh space vehicle later in 2016—a vehicle that could be capable of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) ranges (3,000 miles or more) ‘if configured as a ballistic missile.’ An Iranian ICBM would immediately put all of Europe, and perhaps even the U.S. mainland, within Iran’s reach. Still, given Iran’s shortfalls in missile accuracy, these missiles would mainly serve to terrorize civilian populations in targeted countries rather than destroy hardened military targets.

What is particularly noteworthy about Iran’s advances is that the gains have come primarily from within country. Iran’s missile programs began in the 1980s, largely with technology and skills provided by Russia, China, and North Korea. Missile assistance to Iran has been precluded by international sanctions since 2006, although there continue to be reports of Iran-North Korea missile cooperation in violation of these restrictions. Conventional arms sales and military training for Iran were banned in 2010, and remain so until 2020 under U.N. Resolution 2231, which implemented the Iran nuclear deal. While Iran-Russia military cooperation in Syria has deepened and the countries have discussed new arms sales to Iran, Russia has not shown any inclination to violate the resolution outright. The resolution does not prohibit joint military activities such as Russia’s use of Iran’s airbases for bomber strikes or Russia-Iran ground cooperation in Syria.

The Pentagon report also addresses a key question that has clouded the nuclear deal since its inception—how Iran’s regional strategy and activities might change as a consequence of the deal. The report assesses that ‘Iran’s covert activities also are continuing unabated. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF) remains a key tool of Iran’s foreign policy and power projection, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.’ This assessment contradicts more hopeful assessments that the nuclear deal would moderate Iran’s behavior and suggests that Iran is harnessing its expanding weapons arsenal in efforts to increase its regional influence. Iran’s weapons supplies to its regional allies and proxies have helped keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power; empowered Zaydi Shi’a Houthi rebels in Yemen against a Saudi-led coalition; supported 80,000 Shi’a militia fighters in Iraq; and enabled radical underground Shi’a factions in Bahrain to conduct successful improvised explosive device attacks on security forces. All of these activities have put military and political pressure on Iran’s foremost regional rival, Saudi Arabia, which is undertaking activities opposed to those of Iran in virtually all of these theaters. Iran has been known to provide advanced weaponry to its key proxy, Lebanese Hizballah, in the past. The transfer of even modest amounts of its most sophisticated missiles to Hizballah will likely ensure that any new Israel-Hizballah war could escalate into a regional, and potentially even global, conflagration.

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