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Iran, a known and proven state sponsor of terror has a history of stealing worldwide peace.
Below is the Congressional hearing of the money transfer transaction(s) to Iran, and the testimony reveals there are more coming and others not previously known.
There is an extensive al-Qaeda network feeding global branches based in the Islamic Republic.
Fifteen years on from the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the US, al-Qaeda is better-positioned than ever before. Its leadership held, and it has rebuilt a presence in Afghanistan. More importantly, al-Qaeda has built powerful regional branches in India, North Africa, Somalia, Yemen and Syria.
Rebranding itself away from the savagery of Iraq, al-Qaeda has sought to embed itself in local populations by gaining popular legitimacy to shield itself from retribution if, or when, it launches terrorist strikes in the West. This is proceeding apace, above all because of a failure to assist the mainstream opposition in Syria, sections of which were forced into interdependency with al-Qaeda to resist the strategy of massacre and expulsion conducted by the Assad regime.
The 9/11 massacre had not come from nowhere. In February 1998, Osama bin Laden, then-leader of al-Qaeda, plus Ayman al-Zawahiri and three others signed a document that said “kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim”.
Al-Qaeda attempted to blow up US troops in Yemen in December 1992. Three months later, al-Qaeda attacked New York’s World Trade Center, murdering six people. In November 1995, a car bomb in Riyadh targeted the American training mission for the Saudi National Guard, killing six people. In June 1996, Iran blew up the US military living quarters at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, murdering 19 people.
Al-Qaeda played “some role, as yet unknown” in the attack, according to the 9/11 Commission. The US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were levelled in August 1998, slaughtering 224 people and wounding 5,000, mostly Africans. And in October 2000, a skiff containing two suicide bombers struck an American Naval vessel, the USS Cole, in the port of Aden, killing seventeen sailors.
The conspiracy theories about 9/11 are now a feature of life today. Often proponents will hide behind the façade of “asking questions”. Instead of queries about jet fuel melting steel beams and nano-thermite, however, this inquisitiveness would be much better directed at the actual unanswered questions surrounding 9/11, which centre on the role of Iran.
In 1992, in Sudan, al-Qaeda and Iran came to an agreement to collaborate against the West “even if only training”, the 9/11 Commission records. Al-Qaeda members went to the Bekaa valley to be trained by Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy. Hezbollah’s military leader at that time, Imad Mughniyeh, personally met Bin Laden in Sudan to work out the details of this arrangement.
There is no doubt that training provided by Iran made the 1998 East African Embassy bombings possible, and after the bombing numerous al-Qaeda operatives fled unhindered through Iran to Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commission documented that over-half of the death pilots “travelled into or out of Iran” and many were tracked into Lebanon.
Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al-Qaeda
Senior Hezbollah operatives were certainly tracking some of the hijackers, in at least one case travelling on the same plane. The operational planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, lived in Iran for long stretches of the 1990s. To this day there is an extensive al-Qaeda network that feeds the global branches based in Iran, sheltered from US counter-terrorism efforts.
“Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al-Qaeda,” the 9/11 Commission noted. But the connections were there, and “this topic requires further investigation”. Sadly, such investigation has never occurred. Instead, the Islamic Republic has been brought into the fold, with billions of dollars released to it through the nuclear deal and a curious belief that Tehran can, or will, help stabilise the Middle East has taken hold.
Bin Laden had intended to drive the US out of the region with the 9/11 attack. “Hit them and they will run,” he told his followers. This was a theme of his 1996 fatwa first declaring war on America. In this, he miscalculated.
The Taliban regime had sheltered Jihadi-Salafists from all over the Arab world. Some left over from the fight against the Soviet occupation; others on the run from the security services of their native lands or just wanting to live in a land of “pure Islam”. Though the training and planning for global terrorism occurred in Afghanistan, most of al-Qaeda’s resources were directed more locally, toward irregular wars, notably in Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Al-Qaeda trained up to 20,000 jihadist insurgents before 9/11. This sanctuary was lost in the aftermath of 9/11, something lamented by jihadi strategist Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (Abu Musab al-Suri).
Bin Laden had worked with Ahmad al-Khalayleh (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), the Jordanian founder of what we now know as the Islamic State (Isis), to carve out a jihadi statelet in northern Iraq in the late 1990s led by a group called Ansar al-Islam.
Rice is thrown as Hezbollah members carry the coffin of top their commander Mustafa Badreddine on 13 May 2016Reuters/Aziz Taher
After the Taliban’s fall, al-Khalayleh moved into this area and into Baghdad in early 2002. After making preparations through Syria for the influx of foreign fighters, al-Khalayleh moved to the Ansar-held territory and waited for the US.led Coalition.
IS’s predecessor planned – with al-Qaeda’s blessing – to expel the Coalition forces and set up an Islamic state in Iraq that could then spread across the region, restoring the caliphate. But IS’s methods brought it into frequent conflict with al-Qaeda, and by 2008 IS had been strategically defeated after provoking a backlash among Sunnis in Iraq. The distinctions between IS and al-Qaeda hardened thereafter until their formal split in February 2014.
IS, post-2008, changed some tactical aspects so as to bring the tribes back on-board but remained remarkably consistent in its approach, including the celebration of violence, premised on the idea of building an Islamic state as quickly as possible, which would force the population into collaboration with it and ultimately acceptance over time. In contrast, al-Qaeda placed ever-more emphasis on building popular support that would culminate in a caliphate when it had a critical mass.
The discrediting of IS’s predecessor, operating under al-Qaeda’s banner, damaged al-Qaeda so much that Bin Laden considered changing the organization’s name. Events since then, above all allowing the Syria war to protract, allowed al-Qaeda to rebrand as “pragmatic”, using IS as a foil, and recover.
Al-Qaeda, vanguard-style, took on the local concerns, worked to solve them, and in turn claimed the protection of the local population. Al-Qaeda has tangled itself so deeply into local dynamics, in Yemen and Syria most notably, that it would require a substantial local effort to root them out.
Unfortunately, the Western approach is making the problem worse. A good example came on Thursday night (8 September 2016) when the US launched air strikes against some leaders of al-Qaeda in Syria, now calling itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS), which ostensibly disaffiliated from al-Qaeda in July in order to further this process of entanglement.
JFS claims it has no external ambitions and is working to break the siege of 300,000 people in the rebel-held areas of Aleppo city, yet it is attacked. Meanwhile, the US has done nothing about the thousands of Iranian-controlled Shia jihadists, tied into Iran’s global terrorist network, who are the leading element in imposing the siege, and conducted these strikes likely in furtherance of a deal with Russia, which also helped impose the siege. JFS thus claimed that it is serving the Syrian people, while the US opposes the revolution and supports the pro-regime coalition.
“It is a highly unfortunate reality that many Syrians living in opposition areas of Syria perceive JFS as a more determined and effective protector of their lives and interests than the United States and its Western allies,” wrote Charles Lister. The West has been unwilling to do anything to complicate the ability of the Bashar al-Assad regime to commit mass-murder for fear of antagonizing the Iranians and collapsing a “legacy-setting nuclear accord“. While that remains the case, al-Qaeda will continue to gain power and acceptance as a necessary-evil in Syria, and the ramifications of Syria are generational and global.
It is true that there is far too much optimism in current assessments of IS’s impending doom. The group will outlast the loss of its cities, and the misguided way the Coalition has conducted the war will provide conditions for a potential revival. Still, it is al-Qaeda that has the long-term advantage.
IS claimed sole legitimacy to rule, gained visibility and therefore followers. But as strategists like Setmariam understood, this made them visible to their enemies too, a toll that is beginning to tell, especially abroad. In Syria, formal al-Qaeda branches were never the organisation’s only lever and al-Qaeda was much more interested in shaping the environment than ruling it. In essence, al-Qaeda will give up the name and the public credit for the sake of the thing – whether that’s the popular understanding of the religion or the foundations of an Islamic emirate.
“IS wants the world to believe that it is everywhere, and … al-Qaeda wants the world to believe that it is nowhere.” That quip from Daveed Gartenstein-Ross neatly summarizes the trajectory of the two organisations. What can’t be seen is harder to stop – al-Qaeda’s counting on it.
Kyle W. Orton is associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society and a Middle East analyst and commentator.
The USS Firebolt is a sea patrol boat. This is the 31st ‘unsafe’ incident this year with the Iranians. Last year it was only 23 incidents. The U.S. Navy is extremely sensitive to these kinds of boats in adversarial waters due to the bombing of the USS Cole where 17 sailors died. The case is commencing once again tomorrow September 7, 2016 at Guantanamo.
USNI: Three of the FIACs maneuvered close to Firebolt, mirroring the ship’s course and speed at a distance of about 500 yards for about eight minutes before leaving. Separate from the regular Iranian Navy, the IRGCN answers directly to the Iranian sectarian government and is given blanket leave to act “boldly and courageously” in the performance of its duties, a former defense official told USNI News. Since 2007, the IRGCN has been in charge of Iran’s costal defense since then has precipitated several international maritime incidents in and around the Persian Gulf.
Iranian boats swarm US warship, force it to change course in Persian Gulf
Stripes: WASHINGTON – An American warship was forced off course after seven Iranian fast attack boats swarmed it Sunday in the central Persian Gulf, continuing a recent pattern of Iranian harassment of U.S. military ships, a Pentagon spokesman said Tuesday.
One of the small Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps watercraft stopped directly in the USS Firebolt’s path where it turned to face the American coastal patrol ship, said U.S. Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman. After several attempts at radio communication, the Firebolt was forced to maneuver to avoid a collision. The American ship came within about 100 yards of the boat.
It was at least the fifth time in the last two weeks the Revolutionary Guard boats, controlled by hard-line, anti-American clerics close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, harassed U.S. Navy ships. In one of those incidents, another American coastal patrol ship, the USS Squall, fired three warning shots before the Iranian boats fled. In the previous encounters, the closest the two sides had come was about 200 yards, military officials have said.
“This is clearly a pattern, and it is one we are not happy about,” Davis said on Tuesday. “We would like to see this type of behavior to stop.”
In Sunday’s incident, at least three of the Iranian boats sped within 500 yards of the Firebolt, tailed the ship in “an unsafe and unprofessional manner,” and left the area once it changed course. It was not immediately clear how long the incident lasted.
The Iranian boats were clearly armed, Davis added. Crewmembers aboard the vessels were manning machine guns, but the weapons were never aimed at the Firebolt.
“We would like all players operating in international waters to do so professionally,” Davis said. “When they don’t act professionally, there is risk of collision or accident, or risk of miscalculation or unnecessary escalation.”
Just last week, Gen. Joseph Votel, head of U.S. Central Command, called out the recent actions by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, and warned that continued provocations could cause “an international incident.”
“If they continue to test us, we are going to respond, and we are going to protect ourselves and our partners,” Votel said during a visit to the Pentagon. “Ultimately, we will prevail here. I’m very, very confident of that, and we certainly don’t want that to come to pass, and that’s why I call on them to act in the professional manner that they espouse to act, particularly in international waters.”
The Iranians have typically ignored the Americans’ stated concerns about such actions, saying they have the right to investigate or confront vessels near their shoreline.
The Navy estimates about 10 percent of all its interactions with Iranian military vessels since the beginning of 2015 have been unprofessional.
Iran ‘is running covert war in Syria costing BILLIONS from top secret spymaster HQ near Damascus airport’, with 60000 fighters
Iran is shoring up the Syrian regime from a secret HQ in Damascus nicknamed ‘the Glasshouse’ – and commanding a huge covert army in support of Assad, according to leaked intelligence passed by activists to MailOnline. The National Council of Resistance of Iran ( NCRI ) claims that the theocratic state’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has spent billions in hardware for its ally Bashar al-Assad in the last five years – and runs operations on the ground from a five-floor monolith near Damascus airport.
The Iranian HQ, which plays a pivotal role in supporting Assad’s regime alongside Russia, contains intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and has vaults packed with millions of dollars in cash flown in from Tehran, claims the NCRI. The allegations are contained in a dossier of reports apparently leaked by senior sources inside Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and collated by the dissident activists who oppose the Iranian regime.
The dossier – which was described as ‘credible’ by intelligence experts – makes the bold claims that Iran controls the biggest fighting force in Syria; has military bases throughout the splintered state; and has amassed a war-chest far greater than feared in support of Bashar Assad.
Six Key Unanswered Questions About the $1.7 Billion Ransom Payment to Iran
Over the past several weeks, the Obama administration has dodged questions, invented excuses, and misled the public to spin the apparent $1.7 billion ransom payment to Iran. So far this has left us with more questions than answers, particularly as it relates to the $1.3 billion “interest” payment.
As Speaker Ryan said earlier this month, “The president owes the American people a full accounting of his actions and the dangerous precedent he has set.”
1. Why was the $1.3 billion transferred through an unknown central bank while the $400 million was paid in cash?
2. Why were these payments made separately?
3. Why wasn’t the $400 million paid through the central bank?
4. Was the $1.3 billion wired or paid in cash?
5. Was there a license issued to the unnamed central bank to shield it from sanctions under the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations?
6. Is there a formal settlement agreement from the dispute at the Hague Tribunal?
The House will consider legislation later this month to address this dangerous ransom payment.
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Khamenei: We will develop our defensive and offensive capabilities. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the development of Iran’s “defensive and offensive capabilities” an “inalienable and clear right” during a meeting with officials from the Defense Ministry. Khamenei noted that developing weapons of mass destruction “including chemical and nuclear weapons” is prohibited but added that “besides these restrictions, there are no limitations on the development of our defensive and military capabilities. Advancing in these domains is our duty.”
President Hassan Rouhani called for enhanced defensive power through military and private sector collaboration; he also declared that Iran can purchase and sell weapons as it sees fit. The Defense Ministry unveiled an advanced short-range ballistic missile. The Iranian and British embassies reopened in Tehran and London after a four-year closure.
President Rouhani underlined the importance of integrating the military and private industry in order to advance the nation’s defensive capabilities. He also emphasized that Iran’s military doctrine is predicated on defense in an effort to allay concerns shared by some Arab states over the regime’s conventional capabilities. Rouhani reassured his domestic audiences that the nuclear deal will not limit Iran’s defense capacity, claiming: “We will sell and buy weapons whenever and wherever we deem it necessary… we will not wait for permission…or any resolution.” Defense Minister IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan stressed that Iran will not waver from its determination to strengthen its defense capabilities. The Defense Ministry, meanwhile, introduced the Fateh 313 precision-guided missile, which runs on solid fuel with a reported range of 500 kilometers.
National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari criticized the Rouhani administration for failing to strengthen the economy, claiming: “Mr. Rouhani made promises to the people regarding the improvement of the economic situation, but today, not much has emerged.” The former senior IRGC commander stated, “Unfortunately, the current government does not tolerate fair criticism…”
British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond traveled to Iran on August 23 to reopen his country’s embassy in Tehran. Hammond and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif held a joint press conference to mark the resumption of Tehran-London ties. The British Foreign Secretary also met with President Rouhani and other senior Iranian officials.
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Undersecretary for Strategic Affairs Ali Hosseini Tash rejected a recent Associated Press report alleging that he signed a secret agreement with the IAEA, which purportedly allows Iran to use its own inspectors to monitor the Parchin military site.
Note: Further side deals may occur and hat tip to Reuters. Expect immediate hearings when Congress returns. There is no shame with this administration including Barack Obama, John Kerry and Ben Rhodes.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed detailed limitations on facets of Iran’s nuclear program that needed to be met by Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016.1 Most of the conditions were met by Iran. However, we have learned that some nuclear stocks and facilities were not in accordance with JCPOA limits on Implementation Day, but in anticipation the Joint Commission had earlier and secretly exempted them from the JCPOA limits. The exemptions and in one case, a loophole, involved the low enriched uranium (LEU) cap of 300 kilograms (kg), some of the near 20 percent LEU, the heavy water cap, and the number of large hot cells allowed to remain in Iran. One senior knowledgeable official stated that if the Joint Commission had not acted to create these exemptions, some of Iran’s nuclear facilities would not have been in compliance with the JCPOA by Implementation Day.
1 The Institute for Science and International Security was neutral on whether or not the JCPOA should be implemented.
Recently the Joint Commission created a Technical Working Group to consider further exemptions to Iran’s stock of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium. This cap is set at 300 kg of LEU hexafluoride but Iran apparently has or could exceed the cap if no further exemptions are granted by the Joint Commission.
The decisions of the Joint Commission have not been announced publicly. The Obama administration informed Congress of key Joint Commission decisions on Implementation Day but in a confidential manner. These decisions, which are written down, amount to additional secret or confidential documents linked to the JCPOA. Since the JCPOA is public, any rationale for keeping these exemptions secret appears unjustified. Moreover, the Joint Commission’s secretive decision making process risks advantaging Iran by allowing it to try to systematically weaken the JCPOA. It appears to be succeeding in several key areas.
Given the technical complexity and public importance of the various JCPOA exemptions and loopholes, the administration’s policy to maintain secrecy interferes in the process of establishing adequate Congressional and public oversight of the JCPOA. This is particularly true concerning potentially agreement-weakening decisions by the Joint Commission. As a matter 2 | P a g e
of policy, the United States should agree to any exemptions or loopholes in the JCPOA only if the decisions are simultaneously made public.
Exemptions
The exemptions in effect on Implementation Day include:
1) Allowing more than 300 kg of about 3.5 percent low enriched uranium hexafluoride or equivalent mass if the LEU was in the following forms:
Low level solid waste;
Low level liquid waste; and
Sludge waste.
The amount of LEU hexafluoride equivalent involved in this exemption is unknown, although these amounts if not exempted would have placed Iran over the 300 kg cap, according to one knowledgeable senior official.
2) Near 20 percent LEU in “lab contaminant” that was judged as unrecoverable. Iran had agreed in the JCPOA that all near 20 percent LEU would be in fuel elements; subsequently modified to irradiated fuel elements, albeit in many cases only lightly irradiated. The amount of LEU in the lab contaminant is unknown. The basis for judging the near 20 percent LEU unrecoverable is not known.
3) A number of large hot cells. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed for 15 years to only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters.2 The reason is that hot cells with these dimensions could not in practical terms be used in plutonium separation efforts involving irradiated fuel. The JCPOA also stated that larger hot cells could be operated with the approval of the Joint Commission. However, prior to Implementation Day, the Joint Commission agreed to allow Iran to continue operating 19 large hot cells in three Tehran locations and one Karaj location which are in excess of the six cubic meter limitation. Although the hot cells are used in the production of medical radionuclides they can be misused for secret, mostly small-scale plutonium separation efforts and raise serious questions over the rigorousness of this JCPOA exemption on hot cells. A related question is whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly inspects all these exempted hot cells. Moreover, Iran is
2 According to the JCPOA, “For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.” 3 | P a g e
believed to be seeking to exploit this exemption as a precedent to further increase its number of hot cells with volumes greater than six cubic meters.
Heavy Water Loophole
The Joint Commission also decided on or prior to Implementation Day that Iran would be allowed to export heavy water in excess of the JCPOA’s 130 tonnes cap for sale on the open market even though Iran did not have a buyer for this heavy water. The Joint Commission allowed Iran to store large amounts of heavy water in Oman that remained under Iran’s control, effectively allowing Iran to exceed its cap of 130 tonnes of heavy water as it continues to produce heavy water at its Arak facility.3 As discussed in an earlier Institute report, this heavy water loophole in the JCPOA was poorly considered.4 As discussed in the report, the Institute learned that the Department of Energy’s purchase of 32 tonnes of this heavy water unfairly disrupted and negatively affected a nascent, needed North American supply chain of heavy water. The Institute warned that the loophole also risked legitimizing Iran as a nuclear supplier when it had done nothing yet to prove it would abide by international norms relating to nuclear trade or halt illicit nuclear procurements. Moreover, the deal will only encourage Iran to continue exceeding the JCPOA heavy water cap for financial gain. One surprising development is that the Arak heavy water production plant produced significantly more heavy water than expected during several months following Implementation Day. Arak produced at a rate exceeding 25 tonnes per year, compared to the expected rate of 16 tonnes per year expected prior to Implementation Day.
3 One reviewer raised the question of whether this precedent could be applied to LEU, where it would be located outside of Iran even though no buyer had been found.
4 Albright and Stricker, “U.S. Purchase of Iran’s Heavy Water: Discouraging a Dangerous Nuclear Supplier,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Heavy_Water_Purchase_23May2016_final.pdf
5 David Albright, “Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium: Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016, Rev. May 27, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Update_on_Irans_Stocks_of_35_Percent_LEU_May_23_2016_Final_rev_may_27_2016.pdf
Newly Formed LEU Exemption Working Group
In July 2016 the Joint Commission established a Technical Working Group to evaluate, apparently among other stocks, the fate of approximately 100-200 kg of less than 3.67 percent LEU in the Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP).5 This plant converted LEU hexafluoride into uranium oxide and has been mothballed under the JCPOA. Although almost all of the LEU oxide produced at this plant was shipped out of Iran, a fraction was left in the process lines and tanks on Implementation Day. This LEU was not exempted on Implementation Day and was counted as part of the 300 kg LEU cap.
Russian Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Vladimir Voronkov told TASS in July 2016 prior to an impending Joint Commission meeting: “There are two issues that need to be addressed. These are the difficulties with enriched uranium 4 | P a g e
accumulated during the enrichment in the pipes and other devices. What has been discovered exceeds the allowed limit of 300 kilograms. And the second issue is heavy water.”6
6 “Meeting of Iran-P5+1 commission on nuclear deal to be held in Vienna July 19,” TASS Russian News Agency, July 14, 2016. http://tass.ru/en/world/888165
7 With regard to domestic fuel fabrication, the JCPOA states: “Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group.”
It is unknown if the Joint Commission has decided to allow Iran to exceed the 300 kg cap while the Technical Working Group evaluates this issue. However, the pattern that appears to have emerged is that Iran will likely move to violate the cap if it is not granted an exemption.
The JCPOA is silent on the issue of exempting from the 300 kg cap already existing LEU that had been produced in Iran. In fact, US officials told Institute staff in the summer of 2015 that Iran was fully expected to empty the EUPP of LEU and send it all out of the country or dilute it to natural uranium.
Although the JCPOA explicitly created exemptions to the 300 kg cap, such as Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran, these exemptions do not appear to cover the exemption of any remaining LEU in the EUPP. According to the JCPOA, “All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran.”
The JCPOA envisions that Iran may make LEU fuel domestically in the future and contains a mechanism to exempt that LEU from the cap as long as Iran meets stringent conditions. To that end, the JCPOA states: “The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms).” However, the exemptions specified in the JCPOA are intended for future fuel fabrication, and do not appear applicable to LEU processed in the EUPP prior to Implementation Day.7 The JCPOA intended that existing, domestically produced LEU enriched up to 3.67 percent would be subject to the 300 kg cap and not exempted.
However, the Joint Commission has taken a different approach and has already exempted existing LEU as part of bringing Iran into compliance with the JCPOA on Implementation Day. Moreover, it did so without relying on the Technical Working Group as called for in the JCPOA. 5 | P a g e
Now, there is concern that the newly formed Technical Working Group will lay the basis to exempt more LEU from the cap. Moreover, the intention appears to be to conduct these discussions and the associated decision making about LEU exemptions in secret, without any public scrutiny.
These exemptions matter because the LEU may be recoverable by Iran in a breakout to produce highly enriched uranium, thereby lowering breakout times. Separating LEU from its chemical constituents in such products is typically straightforward.
While Iran and its allies may today view the LEU as non-recoverable, that view does not appear to be a sufficient standard to meet the JCPOA conditions or prevent the LEU’s use in a breakout. A country intent on breaking out and making highly enriched uranium as national priorities may make an entirely different calculation about the LEU’s worth and devote considerable effort to recovering the LEU, such as during a push to acquire nuclear weapons in a crisis.
Any discussion of such an important issue as exempting LEU from the 300 kilogram cap or from export should be public and subject to more rigorous oversight. The exemption process and the Joint Commission decisions should be transparent; the current arrangement has been overly secret and amounts to the generation of additional secret or confidential arrangements directly linked to the JCPOA that do not have adequate oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the process in general raises the question of whether Iran is exploiting the exemption mechanism, outside of any public oversight, to systematically weaken as many JCPOA limitations as possible. The US administration should insist that the exemption process and decisions be public and transparent.
Circuit Reverses $655M Award Against PLO for Terror Attacks
Hamblett/NewYorkLawJournal: A $655 million award against the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority for attacks that killed or wounded members of 11 American families in Israel has been thrown out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The circuit held this morning that there was no personal jurisdiction over the action, where a jury found after a seven-week trial in 2015 that the PLO and the Authority, acting through their employees, perpetrated the attacks or provided material support for those who did.
The decision was a big setback for lawyers who have been working for years to win damages for families under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §2333(a). The jury before Judge George Daniels in the Southern District of New York awarded the plaintiffs $218.5 million, an amount automatically tripled to $655.5 million under the Act.
Judges Pierre Leval and Christopher Droney and Southern District Judge John Koeltl, sitting by designation, said Daniels erred in finding personal jurisdiction in Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 15-3135.
The decision rejected the arguments of Arnold & Porter partner Kent Yalowitz, who told the circuit in April that jurisdiction should lie and justice be done for the “11 American families whose loved ones were murdered and maimed by the defendants” because the goal of the PLO and the Authority was to influence the foreign policy of the United States through coercion and intimidation—a key part of the Anti-Terrorism Act.
Yalowitz said the evidence was clear that the defendants were involved in the attacks, either through their own employees or through assistance to their allies within Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (NYLJ, April 13).
But Mitchell Berger, a partner at Squire Patton Boggs, got the better of the argument, telling the judges that case law was clear that “you have to find the brunt of the injury” in the United States to sue in an American courtroom.
The case was bought by 36 plaintiffs and four estates seeking compensation for death and injuries that occurred in a series of attacks, including the July 31, 2002, Hebrew University bombing carried out by Hamas that killed nine people, four of them U.S. citizens.
In 2004, the families of several deceased victims sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Southern District of New York under the Antiterrorism Act. The families claim the PLO and PA organizations financed and orchestrated the following seven attacks:
(1) The January 8, 2001 shooting attack on Varda Guetta and her son Oz;
(2) The January 22, 2002 shooting attack on Shayna Gould and Shmuel Waldman;
(3)The January 27, 2002 suicide bombing attack on the Sokolow family;
(4) The March 21, 2002 suicide bombing attack on Alan Bauer and his son Yehonatan;
(5) The June 19, 2002 suicide bombing attack on Shaul Mandelkorn;
(6) The July 31, 2002 Hebrew University Cafeteria bombing which killed David Gritz, Benjamin Blustein, Diane Carter and Janis Coulter;
(7) The January 29, 2004 suicide bombing attack on a bus which killed Yechezkel Goldberg.
The plaintiffs seek up to $3 billion in damages from attacks between January 2001 and February 2004 by the PLO. In September 2008, U.S. District Judge George Daniels rejected the PLO’s argument that the attacks were acts of war rather than terrorism. Trial began in January 2015 and on February 23, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The defense has been found liable for $218.5 million, an amount set to be tripled to $655.5 million.
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