Category Archives: Insurgency

From Space, China’s Cyber-Warriors, PLA

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Image result for pla china cyber  PLA Unit 61398  Operation Shady Rat

Primer: Xi Jinping to visit president Trump, hum…..will this be a topic?

China’s external strategies in cyberspace – as distinct from its internal social control policies – can be divided into two parts: the first, before late 2015; the second, after that point. The most notable transition, from the U.S. perspective, has been the agreement to foreswear commercial cyberespionage.

Less well noted, but of comparable importance, has been the formation of its Strategic Support Force, which has combined the cyber warriors of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), its electronic warriors, and a large chunk of those conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, notably from space.

 FreeBeacon

China Pivots its Hackers from Industrial Spies to Cyber Warriors

Levi Maxey:

China continues to deploy military equipment to contested islands in the South China Sea, raising concerns among regional players and U.S. forces stationed in the Pacific.

A Chinese government strategy document published last month by China’s state-owned news agency Xinhua signals that Beijing is building up its military cyber capabilities. It says that China will “expedite the development of a cyber force and enhance capabilities… to prevent major cyber crisis, safeguard cyberspace security and maintain national security and social stability.”

To be sure, the Chinese document acknowledges that its activities in cyberspace could aggravate tensions with the U.S. and other major powers. It says that “the tendency of militarization and deterrence buildup in cyberspace is not conducive to international security and mutual trust” – seemingly a direct response to the April 2015 Pentagon strategy report strongly emphasizing that the U.S. must build up its offensive capabilities to deter adversaries from engaging in malicious activity in cyberspace.

Given China’s past espionage in cyberspace, its move from economic theft towards militarization in the virtual domain represents a pivot that Washington could regard as threatening. While issues of trade and North Korea are likely to consume much of the discussion during this week’s summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump, the growth of cyberspace as a battlefield domain could also be a point of focus. What is China’s history in cyberspace in relation to the United States, and what has led to this change in policy?

Chinese leaders perceive cyberspace as a means of advancing economic growth, preserving the Chinese Communist Party, and maintaining stability and national security. Adam Segal, director of the digital and cyberspace policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Chinese state-sponsored hackers seek to steal foreign technology via cyber espionage, weaken domestic opposition to the regime, and offset U.S. conventional military supremacy.

Despite some instances of political and counter-intelligence collection – such as the 2015 breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and the alleged hacking into the 2008 presidential campaigns of former President Barack Obama and Sen. John McCain (R-Az) – Chinese cyber espionage has focused largely on the theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, and other sensitive commercial information. Its chief aim has been to boost Chinese economic competitiveness.

In 2010, Gen. Keith Alexander, then U.S. Cyber Commander and director of the National Security Agency, said that, “our intellectual property here is about $5 trillion. Of that, approximately $300 billion is stolen over the networks per year.” He called this theft “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” By 2013, U.S. officials had begun publically decrying China’s economic espionage, only to be faced with denial from Beijing. In 2014, the Department of Justice obtained indictments against five members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), charging them with using computer network operations to commit commercial espionage.

Not long after, the U.S. threated China with sanctions and potential cancellation of a planned summit in September 2015 between President Xi and then-President Obama. Negotiators were quickly dispatched and the event went forward. During the summit both countries announced an accord, commonly referred to as the Xi Agreement, in which they agreed that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”

The Xi Agreement was shocking in that China implicitly acknowledged having conducted economic espionage in the past and agreed to stop doing it. Many observers were skeptical that the Chinese would abide by the pact, but a report by Mandiant, now a branch of the American cyber security firm FireEye, found a notable decline in Chinese hackers targeting U.S. companies – which suggests that the Chinese were taking the accord seriously.

However, according to Chris Porter, manager of FireEye’s Horizons team, “while appearing as a significant diplomatic victory for the Obama administration, in reality China simply agreed to stop doing operations that it didn’t want to continue anyway.” He notes that Chinese hackers were often moonlighting as for-hire-hackers, sometimes even targeting Chinese companies. At the time, President Xi was in the midst of a robust anti-corruption campaign while also centralizing power, including in cyberspace, under his control.

Porter argues that “Chinese leaders are heeding a lesson about the limitations of cyber espionage that stems from the fall of the Soviet Union: you cannot steal your way to innovation.” China hopes eventually to become a world leader in cutting-edge research, he says, so it “wants to live in a world where patents are respected and its own claims are viewed as legitimate and untainted by accusations of intellectual property theft.”

Martin Libicki, the Keyser Chair of cybersecurity studies at the U.S. Naval Academy, says that ultimately, “A combination of declining returns and increasing risks on the one hand and the prospects of U.S. sanctions on the other led Chinese President Xi Jinping to agree to end Chinese commercial cyber espionage against first the United States, then the United Kingdom, and finally the other G-20 nations.” Chinese hackers are still conducting some business-focused espionage and recently have intensified their targeting of Russian officials and institutions. But they seem focused on gleaning intelligence on military capabilities and on government officials who interact with business executives.

Furthermore, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) elevated cyber operations under the Strategic Support Force in December 2015, placing the virtual domain on par with other branches of the military. “The best guess,” Libicki says, “is that Chinese cyber warfare will be focused on supporting conventional military operations as opposed to assuming an independent role in strategic warfare, as U.S. Cyber Command seems to be doing, or to bolster information operations, as Russia seems to be doing.”

The U.S. may use its cyber capabilities for “left-of-launch” missile defense against North Korea – meaning, sabotaging planned missile launches before they happen – and to disrupt ISIS communications.

By contrast, China is consumed by fears of a massive U.S. military intervention in Asia. Beijing is building up its anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) military strategy in the South China Sea by adding cyber and electronic warfare capabilities meshed into what is referred to as “Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare.” A report published by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn maintains that PLA units responsible for electronic warfare are taking on the role of running computer network operations as well.

China’s “strategy consists of neutralizing the logistics and communications infrastructure that permits U.S. forces to operate so far from home,” Libicki says, and is “pursuing the ability to corrupt U.S. information systems – notably, those for military logistics – and disrupt the information links associated with command and control.”

Such network and electronic attacks could target the U.S. military or regional allies’ early warning radar systems and could cause blind spots in U.S. command and control systems. The PLA could use these blind spots to deploy sorties or launch ballistic missile strikes. It could deliver these capabilities early in hostilities, integrated with technologies that could sabotage U.S. weapons systems, or even U.S. critical infrastructure, so that U.S. forces could not respond in a timely way.

To accomplish effective cyber attacks on U.S. command, control and communications platforms, or any advanced systems, the PLA would have to conduct cyber reconnaissance ahead of time. China has already begun to probe some potential targets, including elements of the U.S. power grid and review the designs of weapons systems such as the F-35 combat aircraft, the Patriot missile defense system, and U.S. Navy littoral combat ships.

“Because China, like other nations, has had far less practice at cyber warfare than cyber espionage, it is harder to anticipate its intentions and plans,” says Libicki. China’s efforts to augment kinetic assaults with cyber and electronic warfare could escalate a conflict by setting up a scenario in which adversaries might view espionage as a step toward war.

 

When is it Enough for Putin and Russia?

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Image result for russian hacking NBC

FBI: Russian Citizen Pleads Guilty For Involvement In Global Botnet Conspiracy

The summary below for the most part echoes the same testimony delivered by 6 panel members in two separate hearings before the Senate on March 30, 2017.

Two particular panel witness members were Clint Watts and Thomas Rid. (videos included)

There are several experts and those in media commentary that say there is no evidence of Russian intrusions. But there IS in fact evidence and attribution does required a long time to investigate, collaborate and convey, which is why the FBI has taken so long to provide. There are countless private corporations in the cyber industry, not tied to government in any form. They are hired to protect systems, investigate intrusions and research hacks and variations of interference both nationally and globally.

The United States is hardly the only victim of Russian intrusion, as Europe and the Baltic States are having the exact issues. But Americans rarely pay attention to anything outside the United States.

So, when is enough…enough for Putin? No one knows and due to the constant successes listed so far, there is very little reason for ‘active measures’ of asymmetric warfare tactics to cease….it is cheap ad effective and for the most part anonymous. The mission objective by the Kremlin is division, chaos, leaked propaganda and repeat….works doesn’t it.

Image result for russian hacking  DailyMail

Related reading: America Is Ill-Prepared to Counter Russia’s Information Warfare

Propaganda is nothing new. But Moscow is frighteningly effective—and worse is on the way.

***

What the Russians want: How Russia uses cyber attacks and hybrid warfare to advance its interests

What, exactly, do the Russians want? Their very active cyber operations obviously serve state goals, but what are those goals, and how can they inform a Western response?

ITSEF’s second day opened with a panel on Russian hybrid warfare—a combination of cyberattack and  information operations with both conventional and irregular military operations. Larry Hanauer, of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, chaired a discussion among the Hoover Institution’s Herb Lin, Lookout’s Mike Murray, and LIFARS CEO Ondrej Krehel.

Policy driven by resentment.

Hanauer’s opening question was open-ended: what are Russia’s policy goals, and how does it use hybrid warfare to advance them? The panel was in agreement that the key to understanding Russian actions in cyberspace is to recognize them as driven by resentment. Lin called that resentment “longstanding.” It stems from the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and Russia’s treatment internationally since then. Russian leaders and a substantial set of the Russian population views that treatment as disrespectful, contemptuous.

Russia has a very long tradition of using deception and propaganda, Lin said, and he added that the country doesn’t draw clear lines between peace and war. “It’s always war, even below the level of armed conflict.” The long-term goal is restoration of Russia’s place in the world. Creation of chaos through the dissemination of fake news and other information operations is simply battlespace preparation. Cyber, he added, gives you low-cost tools you didn’t have before. “It’s an attack on brainspace, and we’re all in the attack surface.”

Murray agreed, noting one current success of Russian information operations. We’ve been distracted from their intervention in Syria by news and fake news surrounding the US elections.

One of the more prominent features of the Russian way of cyber warfare is their willingness and ability to use criminal organizations for operational purposes. During the Cold War, Krehel explained, “if you did harm to the US, you were a hero.” Among other possibilities, that harm could be reputational or it could be economic, and criminals are well-adapted to inflicting those kinds of harm. There’s a view now, among Russian leaders, that they can expose personal information of essentially all Americans, and that this will yield a comprehensive picture of American finances down to the individual level. It’s very important to the Russian government, Krehel observed, to understand what the US can afford, and what capabilities we’re investing in, and all manner of data go into building up that picture. Lin: agreed that Russian espionage aggregates data in ways that render those data more valuable than the simple loss would impose on any single victim.

As a side note on the Russian President, the panel appeared to agree, as one member put it, that we now see one man, President Putin, who is able to use the resources of a modern nation-state to redress a deeply held personal grievance.

Chaos as statecraft.

This general orientation, according to Murray, can be encapsulated by noting that all war, to Russia, is about political ends. There’s no separation of politics from the economy or business. The increase in chaos we see in Western news, information, and political culture is, from a Russian point of view, a desirable thing.

And chaos serves tactical as well as strategic ends. Krehel expanded on this by asserting that Russia wants chaos because it doesn’t have the funding, the financial resources, of, say, the US. Thus Russian security services hand intelligence over to criminal groups. “A normal government doesn’t hand over its political agenda to criminal groups,” he said, but Russia’s does.

Murray offered an evocative story: “The number two guy in Russia has two pictures on his desk: one of Putin, and the other of Tupac Shakur.” So there’s a kind of gangster ethos at the highest levels. And whie using criminal gangs as cutouts also affords an obvious form of deniability, we shouldn’t be deceived.

In response to Hanauer’s question about who might be the leading cyber actors in the Russian government, Krehel said that they were the organizations one would expect, with the FSB and GRU occupying prominent positions. Different units within the government do cooperate—resource and manpower constraints make this inevitable—and in those services “loyalty is high, and rated very highly.”

You cheated them. Expect payback.

There’s also a common motivation, and Russian information operations play into it, especially domestically. “Russia believes all of you in this room cheated them,” Krehel said, and this theme is consciously exploited to the population as a whole, but particularly to the security services. “So the GRU’s big objective is to cripple you financially. And then they want to make you look ridiculous.”

Lin agreed. “That’s an accurate picture of how it works on the ground. Russia is a thugocracy, a state of organized crime.” He has seen reports (unconfirmed reports, he stressed, but he also clearly thought them plausible) that there are formal memoranda of understanding from the FSB to criminal gangs, outlining what the gangs can expect in return for services. “Other governments have done this, but it’s a way of life in Russia. The line between intelligence services and gangs is very vague.”

There’s no such thing as a win-win, Lin said, in the Russian worldview. “To Russia, it’s always win-lose.” Hanauer noted that this seemed a point of difference between Russia and China, and Lin agreed. Where there have been agreements of a sort between the US and China moderate conduct in cyberspace, Lin thinks there’s little evidence that such deterrent or confidence building agreements will have much effect in US-Russian relations.

Protect what’s important? Everything’s important (to the Russians).

Asked about defensive measures, Lin said that, “while there’s a logic to saying, ‘protect what’s important,’ to a good intelligence agency there’s never too much data.”

There are preferences for certain kinds of targets, which Krehel enumerated: first, oil, second, pharma, and a distant third, tech. Tech was less actively prospected because of Russian confidence that “they’re so much better at tech than we are.” Lin agreed, and said there was some basis for that confidence. “In the physics community, for example, we’ve long noted the sophistication of Russian physicists. They have great theoretical insight.”

Humiliation as statecraft, and the commodity tools used to do it.

Murray said he’d recently heard someone lamenting that he missed the Chinese, who just stole without embarrassing you. “That says a lot about Russian operations.”

Turning to the embarrassment inflicted during the US elections, Hanauer asked what kinds of tools the Russians were using for their attacks? Lin answered that the most consequential hack—Democratic Party operative John Podesta’s email—was phishing, a very basic approach.

Krehel said that, during the run-up to the election, he observed the Democratic and Republican National Committee networks being equally pressured by the Russians, the former more successfully than the latter. The approach in both cases focused on human engineering.

The Russian services, Murray explained, focus on engineering end-to-end systems. “‘PowerShell’ is the magic word for Russian coding.” There’s an emphasis on the least common denominator—phishing, PowerShell, darkside commodity tools—in effect a startup mentality. “All their tools are malleable and in motion, all the time.”

Critical infrastructure and acts of war.

Hanauer asked about the much-feared prospect of an attack on US critical infrastructure. Are we seeing, he asked, Russian attacks on US critical infrastructure? And if and when we do, would these be acts of war? “If they’re not trying [to hit US critical infrastructure]” Lin said, “then someone over there should be fired.” In Murray’s view, “Everyone’s trying to figure out the act-of-war line.” He reviewed briefly the history of Russian attacks (a coordinated mix of criminal and intelligence service attacks) on the Ukrainian power grid. He thought Russia would be more circumspect about doing such things to the US grid because, of course, the US is potentially a more dangerous adversary than Ukraine. But he also thought that if the Russians came to believe such attacks would be useful, they wouldn’t hesitate to undertake them.

– See more at: https://thecyberwire.com/events/sinet-itsef-2017/what-the-russians-want-how-russia-uses-cyber-attacks-and-hybrid-warfare-to-advance-its-interests.html#sthash.FnUREpYT.dpuf

U.S. Israel Facing Down Iran in Syria, Golan, Yemen

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Over the past six years, Iran has played a key role in propping up the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, by sending Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.) military personnel as well as recruiting, funding, training and leading an extensive network of Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani and Afghan Shiite militia forces. Now that Iran’s ally in Damascus is in control of Syria’s key population centers, the Islamic Republic and its regional proxies are already planning to consolidate their presence in Syria for the long haul to secure Tehran’s geopolitical interests in the broader region. This has alarmed the United States and regional countries – particularly Israel, which is increasingly worried about the presence and influence of the Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iran-backed forces along its northern border with Syria. One prominent Iran-controlled militia group, for example, announced earlier this month that it had created a new brigade of well-trained combatants to fight Israel and reclaim the strategic Golan Heights from the Jewish state.

Israel, the real enemy 

On March 29, Harakat al-Nujaba, an Iraqi militia group that fights under the I.R.G.C.’s leadership in both Iraq and Syria, said that Israel, not Sunni militants, is the real enemy and sought Damascus’s permission to fight Israeli forces stationed in the Golan region. “The Golan Liberation Brigade will fight shoulder to shoulder with its brothers in the Syrian Army. The axis of resistance is working on the main goal, which is the Palestinian issue. And these efforts have a great impact on reshaping the regional map by annihilating the occupying Zionist regime,” Nasr al-Shammari, the Nujaba’s deputy military chief said in an interview with Iran’s Mehr News Agency. “The weapons of the resistance and Islamic and Arab armies should target this regime. With this in mind, the Harakat al-Nujaba announced that a brigade should be set up to liberate Golan,” he added. “If this regime is destroyed, regional problems will be resolved completely.”

Shammari also claimed that Shiite militia groups forced the “occupying” U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq and are able to replicate that success against Israel. “We are waiting to confront the Zionist regime instead of combating Takfiri groups in the region and their evil arms.”

Golan Liberation Brigade 

The Nujaba movement announced three weeks ago that it had established a new brigade to seize the Golan Heights – claiming that “latest victories” against the Islamic State and Sunni rebels in Iraq and Syria have allowed the group and its allies to focus on Israel. Leaders of the group claimed that members of the new brigade are highly-trained, well-equipped and capable of fighting the Jewish state. “Israel is weaker than a spider web. Islamic resistance is capable of confronting the axis of evil and annihilating the occupying Zionist regime,” Nujaba’s Secretary-General Akram al-Kaabi told Lebanon-based Arabic-language al-Mayadeen news network.

Image result for Golan Liberation Brigade

The creation of the Golan Liberation Brigade further alarmed Israeli leaders about the increasing presence and influence of the Lebanese Hezbollah and other I.R.G.C.-supported groups in southwestern Syria. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his recent trip to Moscow sought assurances from Russian President Vladimir Putin to prevent Iran from taking advantage of the conflict in Syria to station its proxies permanently on Israel’s northern border. “I made it clear to President Putin our resolute opposition to the consolidation of Iran and its proxies in Syria,” he told reporters after the meeting. “We see Iran trying to build a military force, military infrastructure, with the intention to be based in Syria, including the attempt by Iran to build a seaport. All this has serious implications in terms of Israel’s security.”

Given Israel’s military superiority in the region, Iranian proxies cannot seize the strategic Golan region. Also, the regime of Bashar al-Assad is still fighting for its survival against a wide range of Sunni rebel groups and is unlikely to engage in a self-defeating war with Israel. But Israeli leaders are worried that Iran and its proxies are expanding the Southern Lebanon front to the Golan Heights – threatening Israel’s security and stability. The fact that Iranian-sponsored Iraqi militia groups and the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division fighting in Syria have close operational links with Hezbollah, has added to Israeli concerns. Moreover, senior I.R.G.C. commanders have recently visited the Syrian-controlled regions of the Golan Heights on military and reconnaissance missions.

I.R.G.C. commanders have talked about helping Damascus reclaim the Golan region from Israel for almost three decades. Last year, Brigadier General Ali Asghar Gorjizadeh, a senior I.R.G.C. commander and a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, claimed that the Syrian government had refused Tehran’s offer in the 1980s to send an I.R.G.C. battalion to help the Syrian Army to “liberate” the Golan Heights. But he explained that the I.R.G.C. has, over the past decades, used the Syrian territory to train anti-Israel “resistance forces,” particularly the Lebanese Hezbollah. And now that the six-year Syrian civil war has allowed the I.R.G.C. to gain a significant military footprint inside Syria, it is no surprise that the I.R.G.C. will seek to use its powerful Shiite proxies such as the Nujaba group to threaten the Israeli security.

Regional Threat 

The remarks by Nujaba leaders also indicate that the mission of Iran-sponsored Shiite militia groups will not remain limited to Iraq and Syria. Nor will the group only threaten the security of Israel in the future. I.R.G.C.-affiliated militia commanders in Iraq, for example, have already turned attention to their Iraqi rivals as the Islamic State is on the verge of collapse in Mosul. They have also made threats against regional Sunni states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Recent reports also suggest that the I.R.G.C. and Hezbollah are increasingly training and deploying Afghan and Arab Shiite militiamen to support Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iraqi Popular Mobilization (P.M.F) units with close ties with Iran have also stepped up anti-American propaganda in Mosul and across Iraq – posing threat to the safety of American military advisers that are helping the Iraqi security forces on the ground.

Image result for Harakat al-Nujaba SouthFront

Harakat al-Nujaba 

Harakat al-Nujaba – also known as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba – is a prominent Iraqi sectarian group that operates under the leadership of I.R.G.C. Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. It has been fighting in Syria since 2013. The leader of the group, Akram al-Kaabi, makes no secret of his allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or his close relationship with Soleimani. The I.R.G.C. uses the Nujaba group and other powerful Shiite units within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (P.M.F.) not just to fight the Islamic State, but also as a pressure tool against the Baghdad government, regional Sunni states, and the United States. Kaabi once famously stated that his forces would topple the Baghdad government if ordered by Khamenei. Unlike some other P.M.F. units that receive their political and religious guidance from Iraq’s top cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Kaabi has repeatedly made it clear that he only emulates Khamenei. Kaabi has recently declared that he will deploy more forces Syria to fight alongside the I.R.G.C. forces and Syrian Army once the Islamic State is defeated in Mosul.

Anti-American, anti-Israeli propaganda 

Recently, the I.R.G.C.-affiliated media outlets have raised the profile of the Nujaba group, and senior Iranian leaders have held meetings with its top commanders. Indeed, the press conference in which Nujaba announced the creation of  the Golan Liberation Brigade was organized by the Tasnim News Agency, which is a prominent I.R.G.C. media outlet. By focusing their propaganda against the U.S. and describing Israel as the “real enemy,” Iranian leaders are trying to justify their involvement in foreign conflicts and to convince the Iranian people and Muslims around the world that the Islamic Republic is the standard-bearer and true defender of Islam. But such claims ring hollow when most victims of the I.R.G.C.’s military adventurism and proxy wars are Muslims.

***

‘Al-Sharq Al-Awsat’ Report Specifies Locations Of Foreign Military Bases In Syria, Says Syria Is Turning Into Brittle Federation That Can Fall Apart At Any Moment

MEMRI: On March 14, 2017, the London-based daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published a report giving the location of military bases of various foreign forces in Syria, including the U.S., Russian and Turkish forces. According to the report, the locations of the bases reflect the influence-zone of each country, and that Syria is gradually becoming a loose federation of ethnic states that can fall apart at any moment.

The following are excerpts from the report:

Source: infopls.com

“In the lost time between the Geneva and Astana conferences, the superpowers turned to expand their influence-zones in Syria by establishing numerous military bases which, according to experts, effectively pave the way towards a political solution based on a federation and the division [of Syria]. Until now Moscow and Washington were the major players in this theatre alongside Iran, but recently Ankara decided to establish many military bases of its own in the region known as the Shield of the Euphrates, in order to ensure itself a front-row seat at the international negotiation table…

“Russia is the only [country] that has [openly] announced more than once that it has two bases [in Syria]: an airbase in Khmeimim in the Latakia area and a naval base in Tartus, which is its only [base] on the Mediterranean and is planned to be its biggest naval base… According to various sources, Moscow  recently expanded its presence in Damascus, in the rural area east of Homs and in the rural area [near] Aleppo, and there are [also] Russian headquarters in the Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria that are part of the American influence-zone.

“Washington is keeping mum about the location of [its forces] in Syria [that number] over 900 troops. Last week it announced it was dispatching 400 Marines to Syria in order to support local forces in the battle for Al-Raqqa, the stronghold of the ISIS organization. According to reports, the [U.S.] troops that arrived began establishing a military base from which artillery attacks will be made on ISIS positions 32 km away. The U.S. has established its military bases in northern Syria, mostly in the areas controlled by their allies, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units. The most prominent of these bases are Rmeilan Base in the northeastern tip [of the country], near the Iraqi border, and a base that has been established in the city of ‘Ain Al-Arab (Kobane). According to Kurdish sources, the Americans have other bases in Syria, one of them in Hassakah.

“The single British base in Syria is in near Al-Tanf on Syria’s border with Jordan and Iraq, in the Al-Hamad desert region in the southeast of Homs district, 240 km from Palmyra.

“Iran has two military bases [in Syria], one in the Damascus international airport, which is the headquarters of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary  Guards Corps (IRGC) [in Syria], and another in the Azzan Mountain [area] near Aleppo.”

Russia is a Threat, China Aggression is Under-Reported

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President Jimmy Carter gave away the Panama Canal which was officially transferred in 2000. Few know about the other canal project in Nicaragua, which is designed to be bigger and better. It was launched by a Chinese billionaire however, it appears the Chinese government is actually behind it.

Image result for china nicaragua canal

The whole matter is shrouded in secrecy while the Panama Canal is going through a huge expansion.

Image result for china militarize islands PBS

China has been creating islands in the South China Sea while other islands are a source of major dispute. China has been seen as militarizing the manufactured islands giving rise to concerns of major cargo and global shipping lanes. Could China be making a worldwide play to control commerce and sea transportation?

Chinese state firms have expressed an interest to develop land around the Panama Canal, the chief executive of the vital trade thoroughfare said, underlining China’s outward push into infrastructure via railways and ports around the world. China’s state firms have in recent years already chalked up investments in key logistics nodes, including Piraeus in Greece and Bandar Malaysia, a major development project that is set to be the terminal for a proposed high-speed rail link between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. More here from Reuters.

So is there more to this under reported threat by China? Yes. For instance:

HONG KONG — When the United States Air Force wanted help making military robots more perceptive, it turned to a Boston-based artificial intelligence start-up called Neurala. But when Neurala needed money, it got little response from the American military.

So Neurala turned to China, landing an undisclosed sum from an investment firm backed by a state-run Chinese company.

Chinese firms have become significant investors in American start-ups working on cutting-edge technologies with potential military applications. The start-ups include companies that make rocket engines for spacecraft, sensors for autonomous navy ships, and printers that make flexible screens that could be used in fighter-plane cockpits. Many of the Chinese firms are owned by state-owned companies or have connections to Chinese leaders.

The deals are ringing alarm bells in Washington. According to a new white paper commissioned by the Department of Defense, Beijing is encouraging Chinese companies with close government ties to invest in American start-ups specializing in critical technologies like artificial intelligence and robots to advance China’s military capacity as well as its economy. More here from the New York Times.

Humm, need more? Both China and North Korea are known for hacking. China may have some obscure agreement with North Korea to hack selected global sites. As we know, North Korea is a threat as they are continuing to advance their missile program and super thrust rocket engines which are tied to their nuclear weapons program. China provides that communications, telecom and internet platform and servers for North Korea.

Image result for china hacking BBC

North Korea relies on China for Internet connectivity, partially due to longstanding ties between the two nations and partly because it has few options. North Korea borders just three countries: South Korea, with which it is still technically at war, Russia and China. The Chinese Internet is well developed and the Russian border is far from Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, making China a good choice. Going back to 2014, the U.S. State Department was well aware of all these conditions between China and North Korea, still no solution by the Obama administration.

***

Hackers associated with the Chinese government have repeatedly infiltrated the computer systems of U.S. airlines, technology companies and other contractors involved in the movement of U.S. troops and military equipment, a U.S. Senate panel has found.

Cybersecurity expert Dmitri Alperovitch, chief technology officer with the security firm Crowdstrike, said China had for years shown a keen interest in th the logistical patterns of the U.S. military.

The investigation focused on the U.S. military’s ability to seamlessly tap civilian air, shipping and other transportation assets for tasks including troop deployments and the timely arrival of supplies from food to ammunition to fuel. U.S. authorities charged five Chinese military officers, accusing them of hacking into American nuclear, metal and solar companies to steal trade secrets.

Last month, Community Health Systems (CYH.N), one of the largest U.S. hospital groups, said Chinese hackers had stolen Social Security numbers and other personal data from some 4.5 million patients.

*** North Korea has an elite and secret hacking unit as well known as Bureau 121. The Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress on Bureau 121 using asymmetric warfare. North Korea also has an additional cyber unit known as Office 91.

Office 91 is thought to be the headquarters of North Korea’s hacking operation although the bulk of the hackers and hacking and infiltration into networks is done from Unit 121, which operates out of North Korea and has satellite offices overseas, particularly in Chinese cities that are near the North Korean border. One such outpost is reportedly the Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, a major city about 150 miles from the border. A third operation, called Lab 110, participates in much the same work.

There are also several cyberunits under North Korea’s other arm of government, the Workers’ Party of Korea.

Unit 35 is responsible for training cyberagents and is understood to handle domestic cyberinvestigations and operations. Unit 204 takes part in online espionage and psychological warfare and Office 225 trains agents for missions in South Korea that can sometimes have a cyber component. More here from PCWorld.

*** China is well aware of North Korea activities, while China has and is becoming more aggressive globally. There is clearly collusion, yet what is the West and in particular the United States prepared to do in response remains unclear. However, China did approve 38 Trump trademarks. President Trump meets with Xi Jinping, maybe we will know more in April.

 

 

Trump Excluded Iraq From Travel Suspension, BUT….

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I the original Executive Order Trump signed to suspend travel from a handful of countries, Iraq was included. When the Executive Order was legally challenged by several courts, yet another Executive Order was issued to excluded Iraq. This decision was made due to the increased security cooperation between the United States and Iraq. Okay so what is the problem? How about other Iraqis that already lied on immigration filings or committed crimes and lied? Fingerprints were the key after the kidnapping. Ever wonder who else is in Virginia? There are plenty….

President Trump should have taken several other preliminary steps prior to those Executive Orders including suspending the entire visa waiver program. But back to Iraq…. and the Al Mahdi Militia, which is still active and operations under variations of the name:

The Mahdi Army, also known as Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), was formed by Muqtada al-Sadr in June 2003 in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  [3] [4] Muqtada al-Sadr is the son of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who founded the prominent Sadrist Movement in the 1980s, a vehemently nationalist political movement popular among Iraq’s Shiite lower class. After Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr was assassinated in 1999, presumably by the Hussein regime, Muqtada al-Sadr succeeded him as the leader of the Sadrists as well as one of the most powerful and respected Shiite clerics in Iraq. [5] [6] [7] Following the U.S. invasion in 2003, Sadr called upon the Sadrist to join his new militia, the Mahdi Army, with the goal of expelling the U.S. coalition from Iraq and establishing an Iraqi Shiite government. Some of the group’s initial three hundred fighters were recruited in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and together with their Iraqi counterparts were sent to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon for training. [8] [9] More here.

*** Image result for mahdi army DailyMail

Department of Justice
U.S. Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of Virginia
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, March 28, 2017

Iraqi Refugees Arrested and Charged with Immigration Fraud

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – Two Iraqi refugees living in Northern Virginia were arrested this morning and charged along with another individual with immigration fraud.

The defendants arrested this morning are Yousif Al Mashhandani (“Yousif”), 35, of Vienna, and Adil Hasan, 38, of Burke, who are full biological brothers. The third individual charged is Enas Ibrahim, 32, also of Burke, who is the wife of Hasan. Each are charged with attempting to obtain naturalization contrary to law. The defendants will have their initial appearance today in front of Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis at 2 p.m. at the federal courthouse in Alexandria.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, on Nov. 1, 2004, a United States citizen, identified as R.H., was kidnapped in Iraq and held with other hostages for months in horrible conditions in an underground bunker. After a raid in 2005 freed the hostages, authorities detained Majid Al Mashhadani (“Majid”), who is a full biological brother of Yousif and Adil Hasan, and he admitted his complicity in the kidnapping of R.H.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, Yousif was admitted into the United States as a refugee in 2008. In May 2013, Yousif resided in Vienna and applied for naturalization as a United States citizen. In connection with Yousif’s applications for citizenship, his fingerprints were taken. According to an FBI fingerprint specialist, analysis conducted in November 2013 determined that Yousif’s fingerprints match those found on a document at the underground bunker where forces rescued R.H. and others in Iraq in 2005.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, Yousif, Hasan, and Ibrahim are lawful permanent residents and have applied to naturalize and become United States citizens. On various applications and forms throughout their respective immigration processes, each has provided and extensive list of family members and information of their respective family trees; however, none ever listed any reference to Majid.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, on March 4, 2016, FBI agents interviewed Yousif, Hasan and Ibrahim. When FBI agents asked Yousif why he failed to include reference to Majid on the family tree form, Yousif said he omitted reference to Majid because, when he was a refugee, he was told by others applying for refugee status that he would not be allowed into the United States if any immediate family members had a criminal background. Hasan admitted to FBI agents that Majid was his brother, and Hasan and Ibrahim each admitted they discussed not including Majid’s name on their applications for refugee status because their connection to Majid might delay their ability to gain such status.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, to justify his application for refugee status, Yousif reported that in 2006, while working as an anti-corruption investigator for the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity in Iraq, he started receiving threats from a Shiite militia known as the “Al Mahdi Militia,” in order to coerce Yousif to drop a particular corruption investigation. Yousif said that in May 2006 Adil was kidnapped by the Al Mahdi Militia, and only released after Yousif arranged to drop the investigation in question and helped pay a large ransom. Yousif said that after Adil was released, he reopened the corruption investigation, only to flee to Jordon in October 2006 after his parents’ house was burned down.

According to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, to justify his application for refugee status, Hasan provided sworn testimony that, in 2006, he had been kidnapped and tortured by members of the Al Mahdi Army and held for nearly a month. Hasan said he was released upon the payment of a ransom of $20,000. In an interview by FBI agents in April 2016, Hasan said he was threatened in Iraq on two occasions, but made no mention of being kidnapped, held hostage, and tortured for nearly a month. In a subsequent interview in October 2016, FBI agents confronted Hasan about the discrepancy in his stories and Hasan admitted to making false statements and creating his persecution story.

Each defendant faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison if convicted. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after taking into account the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Dana J. Boente, Acting Deputy Attorney General and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Andrew W. Vale, Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office; Patrick J. Lechleitner, Special Agent in Charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Washington, D.C., made the announcement. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, which includes ICE/HSI and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Gordon D. Kromberg and Colleen E. Garcia are prosecuting the case.

 

A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information is located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:17-mj-143.

A criminal complaint contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty in court.