Important Unreported Recent Aggressions of Russia

Posted on April 27, 2017April 27, 2017 by Denise Simon

It was just a few days ago that the United States deployed advanced fighter jets to Estonia as a rather ‘in-your-face’ tactic to Russia. Why not, Russia has a history of doing the same to the United States including the spy ship on our Atlantic coast line, buzzed our destroyers and the constant flying of bombers near U.S. airspace of Alaska. So…what is the full story of our F-35’s in Estonia?

On Apr. 25, two U.S. Air Force F-35As belonging to the 34th Fighter Squadron, from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, deployed to the UK since mid April, flew from RAF Lakenheath, UK, to Ämari, Estonia.

Based on the information gathered by aircraft spotters, airband listeners and ADS-B monitors, who tracked the mission to Estonia of the F-35s, the two 5th generation multirole combat aircraft , 14-5102 and 14-5094, using radio callsign “Conan 01” and accompanied by “Quid 89”, a 100ARW KC-135 from RAF Mildenhall, departed from RAF Lakenheath at 07.35z.

The trio landed in Estonia shortly before 11.00z and took part in a brief ceremony (at this link you can find some interesting photographs).

Noteworthy, the quick visit to Estonia was “accompanied” by a rather unusual activity of U.S. and British spyplanes in the Baltic region.

In fact, as the F-35s headed towards Amari in formation with their KC-135 tanker, as many as three RC-135s (including a RAF bird) operated in the airspaces over or close to Estonia.

The U.S. Air Force dispatched an RC-135W Rivet Joint 62-4139 “Haiti 79” and an RC-135U Combat Sent 64-14847 “Spool 06” to the Baltic states. The Rivet Joint positioned off Kaliningrad Oblast, where some of the most active Russian bases in the Baltic region are located, whereas the Combat Sent started a racetrack over Estonia, not far from the border of mainland Russia.

Shortly thereafter, even a RAF RC-135W “Airseeker,”one of the three ex-USAF KC-135 tanker converted to the Rivet Joint variant starting back in 2011, from RAF Waddington joined the scene. The British intelligence gathering plane that, just like the American “RJs” is equipped with all sorts of antennae and sensors, to eavesdrop enemy signals, transmissions, detect frequencies used by radio and radars and pinpoint sites of interest, mobile stations, SAM batteries, etc., maintained a racetrack off Kaliningrad

At 14.43Z, the two JSFs departed Ämari to return to the UK and shortly thereafter both the U.S. and RAF spyplanes headed back to their homebases.

Although we can’t but speculate here, it appears to be quite likely that the RC-135 missions to the Baltic were somehow related to the deployment of the F-35 so close to the Russian border. In fact, whilst Rivet Joint and Combat Sent aircraft regularly fly to the region and can be daily tracked online as they head towards the international airspace off Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, the presence of three such spyplanes not too far away from one another seems to suggest their missions were coordinated and probably related to something “big” happening there.

And the only “big thing” (Zapad 2017 preparation aside) we are currently aware of is the first presence of the JSF in Estonia. Moreover, not only was the type of racetrack flown by the Combat Sent unusual, but it was also located in a pretty interesting position: east of Ämari, as if the RC-135U, an aircraft designed to collect technical intelligence on adversary radar emitter systems, was there to detect emissions from Russian radars interested in the F-35.

However, there is another possibility: what if the American and British spyplanes were there to deter the Russian from using their radars?

Indeed, whilst three RC-135s flying at the same time in the same area is something unusual, it is quite weird that the three spyplanes had their ADS-B transponder turned on during their missions.

“If they wanted to hide, they would do” says the ADS-B / ModeS tracking enthusiast who runs the popular @CivMilAir and @ADSBTweetBot Twitter feeds. “The daily RC-135s flights over the Middle East very rarely show up and even the daily missions to the Baltics can usually be tracked during their transit to the area of operations, where often the transponder is turned off. That’s why I believe they remained trackable on purpose.”

Spyplanes, including the U-Boat (as the RC-135U Combat Sent is nicknamed in the pilot community), usually operate in “due regard” with transponder switched off, with no radio comms with the ATC control, using the concept of “see and avoid” where the pilot flying is responsible for avoiding all traffic conflicts. Even if RC-135s can be regularly tracked online, they tend to keep a low-profile when reaching the area of operations, turning off the ADS-B to avoid being detected at least by commercial ADS-B receivers like those feeding online flight tracking systems such as Flightradar24.com, PlaneFinder.net or Global ADS Exchange.

On Apr. 25, both RC-135s could tracked throughout their missions suggesting they did purposely broadcast their position for everyone to see, to let everyone know they were there.

Russian spyplanes have done pretty much the same in the past: the Tu-214R, Russia’s most advanced intelligence gathering aircraft deployed to Syria and flew along the border with Ukraine with its transponder turned on. In that case it was a sort of “show of force”; yesterday was likely a way to prevent some interesting details about the F-35 to be gathered by the Russians.

By the way, it’s not the first time U.S. stealth jets flying to the Baltics are directly or undirectly “accompanied” by Rivet Joints: on Apr. 27, 2016, two F-22s deployed to Siauliai Air Base Lithuania. Supported (so to say) by an RC-135W.

***

This site has often posted about the Gerasimov Doctrine. There is more with regards to ‘active measures’ which in modern day terms is chaos. With regard to Ukraine it looks like this:

Before the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian Federation Chief of General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, published an article explaining the General Staff’s view of modern military operations.[2] One key point of General Gerasimov’s views, later termed the Gerasimov Doctrine, is that non-military means to affect a target country or region such as “economic sanctions, disruption of diplomatic ties, and political and diplomatic pressure” are not means to reduce chaos or avoid war, but rather means to increase stress and support traditional military operations.[3]

The idea is that existing stressors in a target region combined with stressors introduced through military and non-military means shape the environment for follow-on decisive military operations. The doctrine features six stages.

Covert Origins

Escalations

Start of Conflict Activities

Crisis

Resolution

Restoration of Peace (Postconflict Settlement)

Descriptions of the early stages point to the existence or creation of chaos: “Emergence of differences of interest” are linked with “formation of political opposition,” which lead to “intensifying contradictions.”[4] These methods were clearly in action in Ukraine and to a lesser extent Georgia.[5] They also may already be at work in Belarus, as this article in Belarus Digest suggests.

Then we have the U.S. election intrusion:

General Director of Russia’s Political Information Center: The U.S. Influenced Russia’s 2016 Duma Elections

The General Director of Russia’s Political Information Center, Aleksei Mukhin, said there is evidence that the U.S. influenced Russia’s 2016 Duma elections. Mukhin said: “As my colleagues have pointed out quite fairly, the problem is far bigger than attempts at meddling in the 2016 election process. My center has identified direct traces of such interference and very serious and deep ones.

“As soon as Russia took the trouble of looking into the activity of some non-governmental organizations in its territory and adopted laws restricting that activity [it happened during preparations for the 2016 State Duma elections] it became clear that the United States had taken measures to create special units, including those within its armed forces, secret services, government agencies and also non-governmental organizations, for direct information confrontation with Russia. [In particular] the number of centers producing anti-Russian content, addressed mostly to the Russian-speaking audience, was increased [Mukhin refers to Voice of America, Radio Liberty radio stations, and the commercial U.S. television network CNN]. At the legislative level [in the United States] strategies of causing resistance to Russian information policies have been enhanced at the legal level. Their implementation is a sure way towards intervention in Russia’s internal affairs.”

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‘Izvestia’: Russia Will Never Join The Western Coalition Led By The U.S.

According to Pro-Kremlin daily Izvestia, Russia will never join the Western Coalition led by the U.S. in Syria. Quoting two unidentified diplomatic sources, Izvestia wrote: “Moscow will never join a coalition under American auspices. We have explained that to our partners behind closed doors. We argue that their actions in Syria are illegitimate. They indeed proposed that we join them, but under the main condition that the U.S. leads the cause of the fight against terror. We are likewise unwilling to do so… If some coalition receives UN Security Council [approval] for action in Syria, we’ll consider it, but it will be a completely different formation [as opposed to the current coalition].”

***

One more item:

This site has previously posted about the Russian annexing of the Arctic region with no rebuke from the Obama administration. Wanna see what the Russians are gloating about now?

UPI: The Russian Ministry of Defense has released a virtual tour showcasing a newly constructed military base located in a remote area in the Arctic.

The tour, presented on the defense ministry’s website, allows visitors to browse through various structures of the base. It does not depict or discuss any military hardware.

The release marks a notable departure from Kremlin tradition regarding military matters, which are typically highly classified. BBC News reports the facility is built to house 150 personnel for 18-month long deployments and that it is designed to withstand extremely cold temperatures.

The Kremlin considers the Arctic to be a strategic location for Russia’s air defenses.

Getty Images Image caption The large complex is permanent and has plenty of energy and storage capacity

The Arctic Trefoil permanent base is in Franz Josef Land, a huge ice-covered, desolate archipelago. The Russian military sees the resource-rich Arctic as a key strategic region. President Vladimir Putin visited the new base, on Alexandra Land, last month.

It is built on stilts – to help withstand the extreme cold – and will house 150 personnel on 18-month tours of duty. Winter temperatures typically plunge to minus 40C. See the tour here.

Russia Funds and Manages Conflict in Ukraine, 11,000 Dead

Posted on April 25, 2017April 25, 2017 by Denise Simon

Ukraine, the forgotten war:

The situation in the ATO area remains controlled by Ukraine’s Army. Russian occupation forces shelled Ukrainian positions 21 times during the past 24 hours.

The epicenter of confrontation was Prymorsky area. Militants shelled Shyrokyne from 122 mm light portable rocket system Partyzan and IFV weaponry. The enemy shelled Mariinka from IFV, grenade launchers of different systems and heavy machine guns. Krasnohorivka positions were shelled from anti-tank grenade launchers and Vodyane – from IFV and heavy machine guns. Hnutove was shelled from small arms. Snipers were shooting in Mariinka.

In Donetsk region militants shelled Avdivka and Verkhnyotoretske from 82 mm mortars, anti-tank grenade launchers and heavy machine guns. Ukrainian positions near Troitske and Pisky were hit from anti-tank grenade launchers and small arms. More here.

Russia Funds and Manages Conflict in Ukraine, Leaks Show

Hacked emails show that the Kremlin directs and funds the ostensibly independent republics in eastern Ukraine and runs military operations there. In late 2016, Ukrainian hacker groups released emails purportedly taken from the office of Kremlin official Vladislav Surkov, who oversees Ukraine policy for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Surkov leaks confirm what many have long suspected: the Kremlin has orchestrated and funded the supposedly independent governments in the Donbas, and seeks to disrupt internal Ukrainian politics, making the task of rebuilding modern Ukraine impossible. Russia has consistently denied accusations from Kyiv and the West that it is providing the separatists with troops, weapons, and other material support or meddling in Ukrainian affairs. The emails from Surkov’s office betray the official Kremlin line, revealing the extent of Russian involvement in the seizure of Ukrainian territory, the creation of puppet “people’s republics,” and the funding to ensure their survival.

There have been three tranches of information from Surkov’s account: a PDF document detailing plans to destabilize Ukraine, a dump of 2,337 emails, and a final dump of 1,000 emails. While the plot to destabilize Ukraine with its detailed plan to use energy tariffs to foment revolution has garnered attention, its veracity is disputed. The trove of 2,337 emails, released by the group called “Ukrainian Cyber Alliance,” including the hacker group Cyber Hunta and research collective InformNapalm, covers the period from September 2013 to November 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and deployed separatist proxies in eastern Ukraine to start a war. The final dump dates from September 2014 to September 2016. We have analyzed the overlooked second and third troves. Here’s what we found.

On May 16, 2014, a little-known Russian “political consultant” named Aleksandr Borodai was elected prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic. At the time, many noted that Borodai was a friend and former employee of Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeyev, the founder of Marshall Capital and, according to a separate set of leaked documents, a funder to far-right political organizations in Europe. While Malofeyev denied all connections to Borodai (“You can find a link between me and almost any Orthodox activist. But that doesn’t mean I’m paying them a salary or that we’re in the same business.”), the Surkov leaks show otherwise. Three days before the announcement of the government of the Donetsk People’s Republic, an employee from Malofeyev’s Marshall Capital emailed Surkov’s office a list of candidates for the separatist republic’s government. Some of these “candidates” had an asterisk by their name, signifying that they “are people who we have checked, and are especially recommended.”

A portion of the document sent from the office of Konstantin Malofeyev to Vladislav Surkov, aide to President Putin.

The Kremlin also had a hand in maintaining the puppet government. On June 16, 2014, one of the candidates with an asterisk by his name—the “elected” Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Denis Pushilin—sent Surkov’s office a spreadsheet with expenses for a new press center in Donetsk. The budget included estimated salaries for an editor, journalist, and other monthly expenses, along with the cost of a router and other pieces of office equipment. The Kremlin not just manages their puppet republic in eastern Ukraine, it is micromanaging and propping it up.

Part of the expense list sent by the Donetsk People’s Republic official Denis Pushilin to Surkov, including the cost of a laptop, router, camera, and other pieces of office equipment.

But that’s not all. The Kremlin actively works to disrupt and slow down the reform process in Ukraine by promoting pro-Russian candidates and proposals. For example, Surkov has met with and assisted pro-Russian activists and leaders who live in Crimea, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Slovyansk. The emails show that Surkov keeps lists of pro-Russian activists across the country that he can deploy when he needs a favor.

The leaks also show that Surkov actively monitors Ukraine’s reforms and works with editors to push a pro-Russian agenda in Ukrainian and Russian outlets. Surkov has significant influence on the media narrative in eastern Ukraine. For example, on August 25, 2014, he received an email asking for edits to a letter that was supposedly from local citizens living in eastern Ukraine; in it, they told of the horrors resulting from the Ukrainian military’s “Anti-Terrorist Operation” and its effect on women, the elderly, and children, supposedly from the perspective of a suffering civilian. The letter was published by Russian Reporter and RT a few days later with minor wording changes.

Comparison of the letter sent from the “public representatives of the Donbass” to the Ukrainian government, with the original version sent to Surkov (left) and the version that was later posted online (right), after suggested edits.

Predictably, Kremlin officials have refuted the authenticity of these emails. However, cyber experts have pronounced these leaked emails genuine based on the routing information and some individuals have confirmed the authenticity of individual documents. The hackers published a nearly one-gigabyte Outlook data file that included the inbox, outbox, drafts, deleted email, spam, and other folders from [email protected] ’s account. While it is easy to fake screenshots, PDF documents, and other files, faking email inboxes is difficult. Within the email files, every message in the second trove of emails contains the same header information — where it originated, which servers it moved through, and so on—which indicates the messages are likely genuine. Using basic digital forensics, which involves uncovering and examining electronic evidence located on digital storage, including computers, cell phones, and networks, we can verify specific details in the emails, suggesting that the leaks are authentic. A majority of the emails are copied and pasted information from news articles, brief summaries of current events in Abkhazia, Moldova, South Ossetia, and Ukraine, and emails related to business developments in Russia. This high ratio of “uninteresting to interesting” bolsters the authenticity of the leaks because nearly all genuine email account hacks have a similar profile. In other words, political officials’ inboxes look much like the average person’s work inbox: full of schedules and routine briefings, with only a handful of incriminating emails. Surkov’s inbox follows this pattern.

In his own words, the Surkov leaks show that the Kremlin directs and funds the ostensibly independent republics in eastern Ukraine and runs military operations there. Yet nearly all media in the West speak about the war in the Donbas as being run by Kremlin-backed separatists, but this isn’t a true characterization. Moscow is actively guiding and managing this breakaway state, down to paying invoices for office equipment. The leaks provides clear, irrefutable evidence that the Donetsk People’s Republic is not an independent actor; it is a creature of the Kremlin and should be treated as such. It’s time for the media and foreign governments to catch up and call it what it is: a Russian hybrid war.

New Chiquita Papers, Bankrolled Terror in Columbia

Posted on April 24, 2017April 24, 2017 by Denise Simon

Washington, D.C., April 24, 2017 – Ten years ago, Chiquita Brands International became the first U.S.-based corporation convicted of violating a U.S. law against funding an international terrorist group—the paramilitary United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). But punishment for the crime was reserved only for the corporate entity, while the names of the individual company officials who engineered the payments have since remained hidden behind a wall of impunity.

As Colombian authorities now prepare to prosecute business executives for funding groups responsible for major atrocities during Colombia’s decades-old conflict, a new set of Chiquita Papers, made possible through the National Security Archive’s FOIA lawsuit, has for the first time made it possible to know the identities and understand the roles of the individual Chiquita executives who approved and oversaw years of payments to groups responsible for countless human rights violations in Colombia.

Today’s posting features the first in a series of articles published jointly by the National Security Archive and Verdad Abierta highlighting new revelations from the Chiquita Papers, identifying the people behind the payments, and examining how the Papers can help to clarify lingering questions about the case.

* * *

The New Chiquita Papers: Secret Testimony and Internal Records Identify Banana Executives who Bankrolled Terror in Colombia

In the last few years of the 1990s, Chiquita Brands International, the U.S.-based fruit company, fell under a cloud of suspicion. An exposé in the Cincinnati Enquirer, the company’s hometown paper, revealed some of the banana giant’s dirtiest secrets—among them: the messy fallout from bribes paid to Colombian customs agents by officials at Banadex, Chiquita’s wholly-owned Colombian subsidiary.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—the U.S. financial crimes watchdog—was also looking into the bribery allegations. The agency subpoenaed thousands of Chiquita’s internal records and soon made a startling discovery. Tucked away in the same accounts where Chiquita concealed the bribes were millions of dollars in additional payments to a rogues’ gallery of armed groups, including leftist insurgents, right-wing paramilitaries, notorious army brigades, and the controversial, but government-approved, “Convivir” militias.

SEC Testimony of Robert Kistinger, January 6, 2000, p. 87.

With these documents in hand, the SEC deposed seven Chiquita executives, each of whom played a different role in administering the so-called “sensitive payments.” In secret testimony on January 6, 2000 Robert F. Kistinger, head of Chiquita’s Banana Group based in Cincinnati, Ohio, told the SEC he had direct knowledge about many of the payments to armed groups, especially when they began in the late 1980s, but claimed that he had become less and less involved with the specifics over time. In his view, the amounts of money paid to the groups—hundreds of thousands of dollars per year—were simply not large enough to affect the company’s bottom line.

Kistinger, who is a named defendant in a massive civil litigation case pending against former Chiquita executives in U.S. federal court, and a likely target of future investigations in Colombia, said it was “not realistic” to halt Chiquita’s Colombia operations over such insignificant amounts of money. “I’m sorry,” he said, “it doesn’t hit the scorecard.”

“We’re not going to stop doing business in Colombia, because, you know, we’re going to have to spend an extra $25,000. That’s not realistic. Right?”

In 2013, Chiquita brought a rarely-seen “reverse” Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against the SEC in an effort to block the agency from releasing transcripts of these depositions (and thousands of additional documents) to the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research group based in Washington, D.C. Two years later, a federal appeals court panel rejected Chiquita’s claim, clearing the way for the release of more than 9,000 pages of the company’s most sensitive internal records.

It’s easy to see why the company would want to keep them under wraps. The secret, sworn statements from the SEC probe are the de facto oral history of Chiquita’s ties to terrorist groups in Colombia—a unique and damning firsthand account of how one multinational corporation developed and routinized a system of secret transactions with actors on all sides of the conflict in order to maintain normal business operations—even thrive—in one of the most conflictive regions of the world, all the while treating the payments as little more than the “cost of doing business in Colombia.”[1]

Chiquita auditor’s notes, ca. 1997.

This article is the first in a series from the National Security Archive and Verdad Abierta, the award-winning Colombian news website, highlighting new revelations from the Chiquita Papers, identifying the people behind the payments, and examining how the Papers can help to clarify lingering questions about the case. What was behind Chiquita’s decision to wind down payments to guerrillas and increase payments to their right-wing rivals? Exactly how much money did Chiquita pay to the various armed groups? What was the role of the Colombian security forces in encouraging the tilt toward paramilitaries? Did Chiquita knowingly fund specific acts of violence? And at what point did employees and executives with knowledge of the payments understand that the company was dealing with paramilitary death squads and not a government-sponsored militia group?

* * *

The new set of Chiquita Papers has for the first time made it possible to know the identities and understand the roles played by individual Chiquita executives like Kistinger who approved and oversaw years of payments to groups responsible for countless human rights violations in Colombia. These records are of particular importance now that Colombian authorities have signaled that they are prepared to prosecute business executives for funding groups that committed war crimes and other atrocities during the conflict.

Ten years ago, Chiquita became the first major multinational corporation convicted of “engaging in transactions with a specially-designated global terrorist.” In a March 2007 sentencing agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Chiquita admitted transferring some $1.7 million[2] to the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) from September 10, 2001, when the group was first named on the U.S. State Department’s terrorist list, through June 2004, when the payments ceased.

Even after outside attorneys warned in February 2003 that it “[m]ust stop payments” to the outlaw paramilitary organization, Chiquita continued to pay the AUC for another 16 months. Until that point, Chiquita’s strategy, set forth by senior executives in Cincinnati, was to “just let them sue us, come after us.”[3]

The AUC was a loose federation of rightist militants and drug traffickers responsible for a terrible legacy of violent acts in Colombia going back to the 1980s. Chiquita began to pay the AUC sometime in 1996-1997, just as the group launched a nationwide campaign of assassinations and massacres aimed at unionists, political activists, public officials and other perceived guerrilla supporters, often working with the collaboration or complicity of Colombian security forces. Over the next several years, the AUC dramatically increased its numbers and firepower, raised its political profile, infiltrated Colombian institutions, drove thousands of Colombians from their homes, and for the first time challenged guerrilla groups for control of strategic areas around the country.

Chiquita agreed to pay a relatively modest $25 million fine as part of its deal with the DOJ, but not a single company executive has ever been held responsible for bankrolling the AUC’s wave of terror. Nor have any Chiquita officials faced justice for millions more in outlays to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), and practically every other violent actor in the region.

Efforts to hold individual Chiquita executives accountable for financing the groups are complicated by a deliberate decision on the part of the U.S. Justice Department to withhold the names of the people behind the payments scheme. At the September 2007 sentencing hearing in the terror payments case, U.S. government attorneys specifically argued against the public identification of the Chiquita officials “to protect the reputational and privacy interests of uncharged individuals.”

Instead, the Factual Proffer memorializing the plea agreement revolves around ten anonymous “Relevant Persons” identified only as “Individual A” through “Individual J.” The public version of a 2009 report by Chiquita’s Special Litigation Committee (SLC) likewise omits the names of most of the individuals identified in the report, replacing them with anonyms like “Chiquita Employee #2,” “Banadex Employee #1,” and “Chiquita lawyer.”

In 2011, the Archive published its first Chiquita Papers, posting, revealing, among other things, that the company appeared to have engaged in quid pro quos with guerrilla and paramilitary groups in Colombia, contrary to the Factual Proffer’s finding that Chiquita had not derived any benefit from the payments.

The original Chiquita Papers revealed the company had engaged in quid pro quos with guerilla and paramilitary forces in Colombia

The first Chiquita Papers collection offered some important new revelations, but lacked a coherent contextual narrative. There were few indications as to who had written the documents, and it was nearly impossible to say for sure how the named individuals related to one another. Handwritten notes, auditing records, legal memos, and accounting schedules—among thousands of pages of internal records released under FOIA by the DOJ—offered tantalizing clues, but few concrete conclusions could be drawn from them.

The key that unlocks many of the mysteries of the Chiquita Papers is the secret testimony given by Kistinger and six other Chiquita officials during the SEC’s expansive bribery investigation. Through a relatively simple, if laborious, process of cross-referencing among the three sources, it is possible to identify almost all of the individuals whose names were scrubbed from the Factual Proffer, the SLC Report, and the SEC testimony—effectively stripping away the redactions that have shielded Chiquita personnel from scrutiny and that have helped guarantee impunity for individuals linked to the payments.

Jeff Sessions/FBI and MS-13

Posted on April 20, 2017April 20, 2017 by Denise Simon

Four members of the violent, foreign MS-13 gang were convicted on federal racketeering charges, some of which involved murder.

Miguel Zelaya, 20-years-old, Luis Ordonez-Vega, 36-years-old, Jorge Sosa, 24-years-old and William Gavidia, 23-years-old, were all convicted on a count of conspiracy to commit racketeering, according to the Charlotte Observer:

Zelaya, who also goes by “Most Wanted” and “Ne Ne” is a member of MS-13’s “Coronados Little Cycos Salvatrucha” clique. On Dec. 18, 2013, he shot and killed Jose Orlando Ibarra, an associate of The Latin Kings, a rival gang, the release said.

Ordonez-Vega, also known as “Big Boy,” is a member of the Brentwood Locos Salvatrucha” clique, according to the news release. On June 6, 2013, Ordonez-Vega shot and killed Noel Navarro Hernandez in a strip mall parking lot in Charlotte, believing the victim was a member of a rival gang.

Sosa, who goes by “Koki” and “Loco” is a member of the “Charlotte Locotes Salvatrucha” clique. Prosecutors say he’s been involved in multiple gang-related crimes. In Feb. 2008, he flashed MS-13 gang signs at a rival gang member’s mother and pointed a gun at her while they were stopped in traffic. In June, 2013, he was involved in a gang-related shooting where he and another person followed victims in a neighborhood in Charlotte and opened fire with a high-caliber rifle, the release said.

All of the gang members are either immigrants or the children of immigrants in the U.S. and they are also facing state charges for their crimes.

“Today’s guilty verdicts underscore that even though gang membership may in some ways ‘protect’ gangsters from outsiders, it certainly won’t protect them from the vast reach of the US. Attorney’s Office and our law enforcement partners,” U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina Jill Westmoreland Rose said in a statement.

The MS-13 gang members were four of 37 who were charged with racketeering after an investigation into the criminal activity by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. Thirty of the other gang members charged with racketeering are either awaiting sentencing or have pleaded guilty to the charges.

According to the U.S. District Attorney, Ordonez-Vega and Zelaya were convicted on charges to murder in aid of racketeering. Those charges are connected to two separate murders. Meanwhile, Sosa was convicted for attempted murder in the aid of racketeering.

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InSightCrime

In 2015 the U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of three members of the gang who were funneling funds back to higher-ups in El Salvador from prison. These actions were an attempt “disrupt” MS-13’s financial network by cutting off profits from illegal activities in the United States, the Treasury Department said. In 2012 the Obama administration designated MS-13 a transnational crime organization and implemented sanctions against six members in 2013.

While the U.S. government attempts to target MS-13’s earnings, targeting its culture is proving more difficult. The fierce loyalty among members is unique, Ron Hosko, former assistant director of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, told FOX Business.

“They’re very cohesive and often directed by imprisoned bosses in El Salvador to recruit and expand in American communities. That tends to mean there’s an aggressive internal enforcement mechanism which equates to internal discipline involving physical violence and murder for disrespect or betrayal,” he said.

The FBI in El Salvador Because of MS-13:

Putin’s Think Tank Crafted 2016 U.S. election Interference – documents

Posted on April 19, 2017April 19, 2017 by Denise Simon

Reuters: A Russian government think tank controlled by Vladimir Putin developed a plan to swing the 2016 U.S. presidential election to Donald Trump and undermine voters’ faith in the American electoral system, three current and four former U.S. officials told Reuters.

They described two confidential documents from the think tank as providing the framework and rationale for what U.S. intelligence agencies have concluded was an intensive effort by Russia to interfere with the Nov. 8 election. U.S. intelligence officials acquired the documents, which were prepared by the Moscow-based Russian Institute for Strategic Studies [en.riss.ru/], after the election.

The institute is run by retired senior Russian foreign intelligence officials appointed by Putin’s office.

The first Russian institute document was a strategy paper written last June that circulated at the highest levels of the Russian government but was not addressed to any specific individuals.

It recommended the Kremlin launch a propaganda campaign on social media and Russian state-backed global news outlets to encourage U.S. voters to elect a president who would take a softer line toward Russia than the administration of then-President Barack Obama, the seven officials said.

A second institute document, drafted in October and distributed in the same way, warned that Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton was likely to win the election. For that reason, it argued, it was better for Russia to end its pro-Trump propaganda and instead intensify its messaging about voter fraud to undermine the U.S. electoral system’s legitimacy and damage Clinton’s reputation in an effort to undermine her presidency, the seven officials said.

The current and former U.S. officials spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the Russian documents’ classified status. They declined to discuss how the United States obtained them. U.S. intelligence agencies also declined to comment on them.

Putin has denied interfering in the U.S. election. Putin’s spokesman and the Russian institute did not respond to requests for comment.

The documents were central to the Obama administration’s conclusion that Russia mounted a “fake news” campaign and launched cyber attacks against Democratic Party groups and Clinton’s campaign, the current and former officials said.

“Putin had the objective in mind all along, and he asked the institute to draw him a road map,” said one of the sources, a former senior U.S. intelligence official.

Trump has said Russia’s activities had no impact on the outcome of the race. Ongoing congressional and FBI investigations into Russian interference have so far produced no public evidence that Trump associates colluded with the Russian effort to change the outcome of the election.

Four of the officials said the approach outlined in the June strategy paper was a broadening of an effort the Putin administration launched in March 2016. That month the Kremlin instructed state-backed media outlets, including international platforms Russia Today and Sputnik news agency, to start producing positive reports on Trump’s quest for the U.S. presidency, the officials said.

Russia Today did not respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for Sputnik dismissed the assertions by the U.S. officials that it participated in a Kremlin campaign as an “absolute pack of lies.” “And by the way, it’s not the first pack of lies we’re hearing from ‘sources in U.S. official circles’,” the spokesperson said in an email.

PRO-KREMLIN BLOGGERS

Russia Today and Sputnik published anti-Clinton stories while pro-Kremlin bloggers prepared a Twitter campaign calling into question the fairness of an anticipated Clinton victory, according to a report by U.S. intelligence agencies on Russian interference in the election made public in January. [bit.ly/2kMiKSA]

Russia Today’s most popular Clinton video – “How 100% of the 2015 Clintons’ ‘charity’ went to … themselves” – accumulated 9 millions views on social media, according to the January report. [bit.ly/2os8wIt]

The report said Russia Today and Sputnik “consistently cast president elect-Trump as the target of unfair coverage from traditional media outlets.”

The report said the agencies did not assess whether Moscow’s effort had swung the outcome of the race in Trump’s favor, because American intelligence agencies do not “analyze U.S. political processes or U.S. public opinion.” [bit.ly/2kMiKSA]

CYBER ATTACKS

Neither of the Russian institute documents mentioned the release of hacked Democratic Party emails to interfere with the U.S. election, according to four of the officials. The officials said the hacking was a covert intelligence operation run separately out of the Kremlin.

The overt propaganda and covert hacking efforts reinforced each other, according to the officials. Both Russia Today and Sputnik heavily promoted the release of the hacked Democratic Party emails, which often contained embarrassing details.

Five of the U.S. officials described the institute as the Kremlin’s in-house foreign policy think tank.

The institute’s director when the documents were written, Leonid Reshetnikov, rose to the rank of lieutenant general during a 33-year-career in Russia’s foreign intelligence service, according to the institute’s website [bit.ly/2oVhiCF]. After Reshetnikov retired from the institute in January, Putin named as his replacement Mikhail Fradkov. The institute says he served as the director of Russia’s foreign intelligence service from 2007 to 2016. [bit.ly/2os4tvz]

Reuters was unable to determine if either man was directly involved in the drafting of the documents. Reshetnikov’s office referred questions to the Russian institute.

On its website, the Russian institute describes itself as providing “expert appraisals,” “recommendations,” and “analytical materials” to the Russian president’s office, cabinet, National Security Council, ministries and parliament. [bit.ly/2pCBGpR]

On Jan. 31, the websites of Putin’s office [bit.ly/2os9wMr] and the institute [bit.ly/2oLn9Kd] posted a picture and transcript of Reshetnikov and his successor Fradkov meeting with Putin in the Kremlin. Putin thanked Reshetnikov for his service and told Fradkov he wanted the institute to provide objective information and analysis.

“We did our best for nearly eight years to implement your foreign policy concept,” Reshetnikov told Putin. “The policy of Russia and the policy of the President of Russia have been the cornerstone of our operation.”

(Reporting by Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay, additional reporting by Warren Strobel and Arshad Mohammed; Editing by David Rohde and Ross Colvin)

*** In part:

The wide range of scientific work is ensured by the structural subdivision of the

RISS into the Research Center of CIS countries, Center for Asia and the Middle

East Research, the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies (‘geographical departments’),

Center for Economic Research, Centre for Defense Studies as well as the Humanitarian

Research Center (functional departments).8 The latter represents a

new department, introduced almost simultaneously with the Presidential Decree

of 2009 and it is preoccupied with “the contentious issues of the foreign relations

history and the role of the religious factor.”9 Its introduction has added a new task

of “counteracting the falsification of history in the post-Soviet space”10 to RISS

scientific activities which are determined by the need of the Russian government

to provide strategic interests in the post-Soviet space. Here, there is a serious element

of propaganda for Russian state interests. Upon the whole, we can conclude

that the Presidential Decree of 2009 has turned the RISS into a useful tool providing

abundant data and research for an appropriate “articulation of the strategic

directions of the state policy in the sphere of national security.” Read more here.