Letters Between Sharon and GW Bush

It is ten years later and still there is no peace for Israel. Why you ask? The Palestinians don’t want peace. Money flows in to the Palestinian Authority leadership, making them very wealthy. It is a very pricey cottage industry that has lasted decades. So going back ten years in a letter exchange would be a good lesson to understand how in earnest and full commitment Israel has worked to find peace while the Palestinians, Hamas and even Turkey continue hostilities on all fronts.

Exchange of letters between PM Sharon and President Bush

14 Apr 2004

MFASummaryNew

During their meeting in Washington, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and US President George Bush exchanged letters aimed at achieving a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians in the context of the Roadmap and the prime minister’s Disengagement Plan.

Letter from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon  to US President George W. Bush

The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

The vision that you articulated in your 24 June 2002 address constitutes one of the most significant contributions toward ensuring a bright future for the Middle East. Accordingly, the State of Israel has accepted the Roadmap, as adopted by our government. For the first time, a practical and just formula was presented for the achievement of peace, opening a genuine window of opportunity for progress toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, involving two states living side-by-side in peace and security.

This formula sets forth the correct sequence and principles for the attainment of peace. Its full implementation represents the sole means to make genuine progress. As you have stated, a Palestinian state will never be created by terror, and Palestinians must engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. Moreover, there must be serious efforts to institute true reform and real democracy and liberty, including new leaders not compromised by terror. We are committed to this formula as the only avenue through which an agreement can be reached. We believe that this formula is the only viable one.

The Palestinian Authority under its current leadership has taken no action to meet its responsibilities under the Roadmap. Terror has not ceased, reform of the Palestinian security services has not been undertaken, and real institutional reforms have not taken place. The State of Israel continues to pay the heavy cost of constant terror. Israel must preserve its capability to protect itself and deter its enemies, and we thus retain our right to defend ourselves against terrorism and to take actions against terrorist organizations.

Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being, there exists no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement and since the current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our shared goals, I have decided to initiate a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. It will enable us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that conditions in the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the Roadmap to resume.

I attach, for your review, the main principles of the Disengagement Plan. This initiative, which we are not undertaking under the roadmap, represents an independent Israeli plan, yet is not inconsistent with the roadmap. According to this plan, the State of Israel intends to relocate military installations and all Israeli villages and towns in the Gaza Strip, as well as other military installations and a small number of villages in Samaria.

In this context, we also plan to accelerate construction of the Security Fence, whose completion is essential in order to ensure the security of the citizens of Israel. The fence is a security rather than political barrier, temporary rather than permanent, and therefore will not prejudice any final status issues including final borders. The route of the Fence, as approved by our Government’s decisions, will take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

Upon my return from Washington, I expect to submit this Plan for the approval of the Cabinet and the Knesset, and I firmly believe that it will win such approval.

The Disengagement Plan will create a new and better reality for the State of Israel, enhance its security and economy, and strengthen the fortitude of its people. In this context, I believe it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. Additionally, the Plan will entail a series of measures with the inherent potential to improve the lot of the Palestinian Authority, providing that it demonstrates the wisdom to take advantage of this opportunity. The execution of the Disengagement Plan holds the prospect of stimulating positive changes within the Palestinian Authority that might create the necessary conditions for the resumption of direct negotiations.

We view the achievement of a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians as our central focus and are committed to realizing this objective. Progress toward this goal must be anchored exclusively in the Roadmap and we will oppose any other plan.

In this regard, we are fully aware of the responsibilities facing the State of Israel. These include limitations on the growth of settlements; removal of unauthorized outposts; and steps to increase, to the extent permitted by security needs, freedom of movement for Palestinians not engaged in terrorism. Under separate cover we are sending to you a full description of the steps the State of Israel is taking to meet all its responsibilities.

The government of Israel supports the United States efforts to reform the Palestinian security services to meet their roadmap obligations to fight terror. Israel also supports the American’s efforts, working with the International Community, to promote the reform process, build institutions and improve the economy of the Palestinian Authority and to enhance the welfare of its people, in the hope that a new Palestinian leadership will prove able to fulfill its obligations under the roadmap.

I want to again express my appreciation for your courageous leadership in the war against global terror, your important initiative to revitalize the Middle East as a more fitting home for its people and, primarily, your personal friendship and profound support for the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

Ariel Sharon

 

Letter from US President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

His Excellency
Ariel Sharon
Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter setting out your disengagement plan.

The United States remains hopeful and determined to find a way forward toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. I remain committed to my June 24, 2002 vision of two states living side by side in peace and security as the key to peace, and to the roadmap as the route to get there.

We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would withdraw certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military installations and settlements in the West Bank. These steps described in the plan will mark real progress toward realizing my June 24, 2002 vision, and make a real contribution towards peace. We also understand that, in this context, Israel believes it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. We are hopeful that steps pursuant to this plan, consistent with my vision, will remind all states and parties of their own obligations under the roadmap.

The United States appreciates the risks such an undertaking represents. I therefore want to reassure you on several points.

First, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan. Under the roadmap, Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel. The Palestinian leadership must act decisively against terror, including sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.

Second, there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until they and all states, in the region and beyond, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations. The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel’s security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.

Third, Israel will retain its right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions against terrorist organizations. The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means. The United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue.

The United States is strongly committed to Israel’s security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the State of Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the roadmap. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.

A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the State of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have described a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace. I commend your efforts and your courageous decision which I support. As a close friend and ally, the United States intends to work closely with you to help make it a success.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

Terrorists Among US

FEATURED: Youssef Qaradawi Says ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Was Once Muslim Brotherhood; First English Translation Of Statement

Anyone heard the Muslim community in the Unites States speak out yet against Daesh (Islamic States)? Me neither. But Barack Obama and crowd says Islamic State is not Islamic…..sheesh

 

For a complete Muslim Brotherhood organizational chart operating in the United States click here.

For the completed translation of the Muslim Brotherhood plan for the United States click here.

For a graphic of the Islamic organizations click here.

For a list of people that are implicated in Islamic criminal activity in the United States click here.

For a library on historical Muslim Brotherhood terror events click here.

The very liberal Council of Foreign Relations has a summary of the Muslim Brotherhood click here.

Events happen in your own backyard, are you paying attention?

Outside organizations associated with Islamic organizations are also important to understand like the ACLU.

The genesis of what we need to know begins with the Holy Land Foundation investigation and trial. Links are numerous yet a good one for reference is here, here  and here.

 

 

 

 

Amnesty, How Many Lawyers Does it Take?

Nothing happens in Washington DC without several conversations with lawyers. That is actually easy as there are lawyers all over DC and just about every powerbroker in the Obama administration is a lawyer. But these lawyers twist the law, find means to blur the spirit of the law, seek methods not to enforce the law and most of all use nefarious reasons on discretion of the law when it comes to enforcement.

So we have immigration. We have promises to illegals. We have refugees to deal with. We have amnesty. Honestly, none of this is necessary at all if DACA had never occurred and deportation and adherence to immigration law was enforced.

Once the 9-11 Commission Report was published, there was a serious chapter in that report on adherence to law with regard to immigration. Every lawmaker swore to compliance and actions of the reports recommendations for the single sake of national security. Today, that is all forgotten. There are countless reasons for this agenda and now we have to look at the Office for Legal Council and Eric Holder. Holder has likely learned to not put anything in writing given his past obfuscations and lies.

Be sure to read the comments to this article at the bottom.

The Missing Immigration Memo

Has Obama asked the Office of Legal Counsel for its legal opinion?

If the White House press corps wants to keep government honest, here’s a question to ask as President Obama prepares to legalize millions of undocumented immigrants by executive order: Has he sought, and does he have, any written legal justification from the Attorney General and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for his actions?

This would be standard operating procedure in any normal Presidency. Attorney General Eric Holder is the executive branch’s chief legal officer, and Administrations of both parties typically ask OLC for advice on the parameters of presidential legal authority.

The Obama Administration has asked OLC for its legal opinions on such controversial national security questions as drone strikes and targeting U.S. citizens abroad. It was right do so even though the Constitution gives Presidents enormous authority on war powers and foreign policy.

But a Justice-OLC opinion is all the more necessary on domestic issues because the President’s authority is far more limited. He is obliged to execute the laws that Congress writes. A President should always seek legal justification for controversial actions to ensure that he is on solid constitutional ground as well as to inspire public confidence in government.

Yet as far as we have seen, Mr. Obama sought no such legal justification in 2012 when he legalized hundreds of thousands of immigrants who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children. The only document we’ve found in justification is a letter from the Secretary of Homeland Security at the time, Janet Napolitano, to law enforcement agencies citing “the exercise of our prosecutorial discretion.” Judging by recent White House leaks, that same flimsy argument will be the basis for legalizing millions more adults.

It’s possible Messrs. Obama and Holder haven’t sought an immigration opinion because they suspect there’s little chance that even a pliant Office of Legal Counsel could find a legal justification. Prosecutorial discretion is a vital legal concept, but it is supposed to be exercised in individual cases, not to justify a refusal to follow the law against entire classes of people.

White House leakers are also whispering as a legal excuse that Congress has provided money to deport only 400,000 illegal migrants a year. But a President cannot use lack of funds to justify a wholesale refusal to enforce a statute. There is never enough money to enforce every federal law at any given time, and lack of funds could by used in the future by any President to refuse to enforce any statute. Imagine a Republican President who decided not to enforce the Clean Air Act.

We support more liberal immigration but not Mr. Obama’s means of doing it on his own whim because he’s tired of working with Congress. His first obligation is to follow the law, which begins by asking the opinion of the government’s own lawyers.

November 24, Deal or no Deal for Iran and Kerry

Tensions and meetings are mounting as the November 24 date approaches. If a deal is reached you can be the 114th session of the U.S. Congress will scrutinize every word as no one has trusted Barack Obama or John Kerry on this process. Allies have been sidelined in the process and betrayal is on the horizon if a deal is struck.

Meanwhile Iran demands that the West comply with their demands and such demands have not been spelled out or forthcoming. If no deal is reached the consequences are just as bad if not worse. This is a time to look cautiously at allies, territory, weapons, dates and sanctions.

Meanwhile there is Oman, a quiet and settled country that has been an interlocutor in the process.

US State Department spokeswoman Psaki said that the US remained “very focused” on making progress in talks with Iran and on signing an agreement by the November 24 deadline.

MOSCOW, November 10 (Sputnik) – The talks in Oman on Iran’s controversial nuclear program were “tough, direct and serious,” US Department of State spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Monday.

The talks involved EU diplomat Catherine Ashton, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Psaki said her country remained “very focused” on making progress in talks with the Islamic Republic and on signing the agreement by the November 24 deadline.

“There is still time to do so,” she told reporters.

The meeting between the three foreign policy chiefs wrapped up the second day of talks in the run-up to broader negotiations between Iran, EU’s Ashton and P5+1, which includes Russia, the United States, Britain, France, China, and Germany.

The trilateral meeting was called to address major differences that have been hindering a comprehensive agreement. On Sunday, the three envoys discussed Iran’s uranium enrichment program and the possibility of easing Western sanctions against Tehran.

The talks between Iran and the group of six powers will continue on Tuesday in the city of Muscat, Oman.

The West has accused Iran of attempting to build nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian nuclear program, while Tehran argues that its nuclear ambition is to meet the country’s growing energy needs and achieve other peaceful goals.

Last January the United States agreed to provide limited sanctions relief if Iran froze its nuclear program. Since then, Iran has halted production and opened the door to international inspectors.

In November 2013, during talks held in Geneva, the P5+1 group agreed to reach a deal with the Tehran delegation, guaranteeing the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program by July 2014. The deadline was later extended to November 24, 2014.

So what is in Oman’s future? One of my favorite analysts has published a soft alarm bell.

Could Oman be the Next Crisis?

by Michael Rubin Commentary November 14, 2014

http://www.michaelrubin.org/15656/oman-crisis

 

In 1970, with British help and support, Qaboos bin Sa’id overthrew his father and took the reins of powers in the Sultanate of Oman. Sultan Qaboos was an enlightened monarch, and firmly guided the xenophobic and isolationist state back into the modern world. Oman has since been a model of neutrality and tolerance, often acting as a bridge between regional adversaries (it is no coincidence that Oman served as the initial go-between for U.S.-Iran talks). Nevertheless, when push came to shove, Oman has done what is needed to combat terrorism. U.S. aircraft based in Oman launched some of the initial airstrikes against the Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Oman is also strategically important. For all Western policymakers fret about Iranian activities in the Strait of Hormuz, they often forget that Oman occupies one side of the important waterway. Should Iran gain a toehold on both sides of the Strait, the calculus of Persian Gulf security would change.

Alas, the status quo cannot last forever. Sultan Qaboos is aging. A “confirmed bachelor,” Qaboos has produced no offspring. Succession looms. And, perhaps never closer than now. ForeignPolicy.com today has an interesting piece speculating that Qaboos, who will turn 74 next week, may be on his deathbed. The Sultan has in recent weeks sought to dispel the rumors that he suffers from terminal colon cancer, but his frail appearance and his subsequent cancellation of his forthcoming national day appearance have added fuel to the fire.

In theory, when Qaboos dies, a new leader is supposed to be chosen by consensus among the leading factions of the royal elite. But if there is no consensus, then a letter that Qaboos will leave should help determine that successor. The problem is that surrounding countries have everything to gain and nothing to lose by disputing the authenticity of such a letter or by putting forward fraudulent copies favoring their own proxy. While it’s doubtful that Oman will make as radical a political shift as it did as a result of the last succession, the failure of the White House to adopt a proactive strategy toward the region does put its future in doubt. While Washington shouldn’t necessarily muck about in Omani royal politics, it is a vital interest to protect the integrity of the process and prevent Iran from doing so.

There are a few nightmare scenarios. One is that a pro-Iranian ruler will become Oman’s next leader. Another is an outbreak of fighting. This is farfetched, of course. Just as Saudi troops invaded Bahrain to prevent a Shi’ite triumph over the Khalifa ruling family, it would not sit idly while another friendly monarchy fell to what it considers hostile forces. Then again, Oman is neither Sunni nor Shi’ite, and so long as the monarchy isn’t threatened—and it won’t be—then Saudi Arabia might choose more subtle ways to interfere.

Herein lays another danger. Should both Iran and Saudi Arabia begin supporting proxy figures or movements, it might not be long before this undercut Omani stability in other ways. After all, Oman has been a pillar of stability for decades, but then again so was Syria; at least since Hafez al-Assad staged his 1970 coup. Oman could also face the resurgence of regional tension; it wasn’t too long ago in the scheme of things that it fought an insurgency against communist rebels in Dhofar.

Let us hope that Qaboos overcomes his current health crisis but, realistically, septuagenarian leaders do not last forever. The United States should hope for the best in Oman, but it’s long past time when U.S. officials should plan for the worst. Alas, planning for the worst case is something to which too often American strategists across administrations seem adverse. We should not be. Oman is too important to lose.

UAE Gets Aggressive on Terror Organizations

In late August, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al-Nahayan enacted federal law number 7, which mandated the list to be published and circulated by the media to further “transparency” and “increase awareness” of terrorist threats.

The move follows a similar step taken by Saudi Arabia in March.

The groups blacklisted by the UAE were as follows:

1- UAE’s Muslim Brotherhood called Al-Islah
2- UAE terrorist cells
3- Karama organization
4- Uma Parties in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
5- Al-Qaeda
6- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
7- Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
8- Yemen’s Ansar al-Sharia
9- Muslim Brotherhood, both the organization and movement
10- Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya in Egypt
11- Bait al-Maqdis group in Egypt
12- Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt group)
13- Majlis Shura Al-Mujahedin Fi Aknaf Bayt Al-Maqdis (Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, or MSC)
14- Yemen’s Houthi movement
15- Hezbollah party in Saudi Arabia’s Hijaz
16- Hezbollah in the Gulf region
17- Al-Qaeda in Iran
18- Badr organization in Iraq
19- Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, also known as the Khazali Network in Iraq
20- Fath al-Islam in Lebanon
21- Osbat Al-Ansar or Asbat an-Ansar (League of the Partisans) in Lebanon
22- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
23- Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya
24- Ansar Al-Sharia in Tunisia
25- Al-Shabab in Somalia
26- Boko Haram in Nigeria
27- Al-Murabitoon brigade in Mali
28- Ansar Al-Din movement in Mali
29- Haqani network in Pakistan
30- Lashkar Taiba in Pakistan
31- Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement headquartered in Pakistan
32- Mohammed Army in Pakistan
33- Mohammed Army in India
34- Indian mujahideen in India/Kashmir
35- The Caucasus Emirate by Chechen militants
36- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
37- Abu Sayyaf Islamist group in the Philippines
38- Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
39- Alleanza Islamic d’Italia or Islamic Alliance in Italy
40- Islamic Association in Finland
41- Islamic Association in Norway
42- Islamic Relief Organization in the UK
43- The Cordoba Foundation in Britain
44- International Islamic Relief Organization belonging to the international Muslim Brotherhood
45- Taliban movement in Pakistan
46- Abu Thur al-Fiqari battalion in Syria
47- Al-Tawheed and Iman battalion in Syria
48- The Green Battalion or Al-Khadraa battalion in Syria
49- Al-Tawhid Brigade in Syria
50- Abu Bakr brigade in Syria
51- Talha bin Ubaidallah in Syria
52- Al-Sarim Al-Batar brigade in Syria
53- Abdullah bin Mubarak brigade in Syria
54- Convoys of Martyrs brigade in Syria
55- Abu Omar brigade in Syria
56- Ahrar Shumar or Free Shumars brigade in Syria
57- Hezbollah brigades in Iraq
58- Brigade of Abu Al-Fadl al-Abbas in Syria
59- Brigades of Al-Yom Al-Mawood (Destined Day in Iraq)
60- Battalion of Omar bin Yasir in Syria
61- Ansar Al-Islam group in Iraq
62- Nusra Front in Syira
63- Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham Al Islami (Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant) in Syria
64- Jaish Al-Islam (Islam Army) in Palestine
65- Abdullah Azzam Brigades
66- Kanvaz in Belgrade, Serbia
67- The Muslim American Society (MAS)
68- Union of Muslim Scholars
69- Union of Islamic Organizations in Europe
70- Union of Islamic Organizations of France
71- Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)
72- Islamic Society of Germany
73- Islamic Society in Denmark
74- Islamic Society in Belgium
75- Sariyat Al-Jabal brigade in Syria
76- Al-Shahbaa brigade in Syria
77- Al-Qa’Qaa’ in Syria
78- Sufian Al-Thawri (Revolutionary Sufian brigade) in Syria
79- Abdulraham brigade in Syria
80- Omar bin Al-Khatab brigade in Syria
81- Al-Shayma brigade in Syria
82- Al-Haq brigade in Syria

 

There still remains a Gulf Coalition that appears to remain aggressive on fighting terror. This coalition does include Qatar and the al Thani monarchy is pushing back hard on the pressure to be more aggressive on harboring terrorists and funding terror networks. So this weekend, the UAE delegation was led by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice President and Ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was assembled to smooth out unique positions.

Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the emir of Qatar, and Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah, the emir of Kuwait, also attended the meeting.

The visitors were greeted by Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince, Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and the GCC secretary general Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani.

The GCC leaders had been expected to hold a meeting before their annual summit next month in Doha in an effort to overcome internal differences between Qatar and the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, who withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in March.

A GCC foreign ministers’ meeting scheduled on November 10 to prepare for the summit was postponed.

Kuwait’s parliamentary parliament speaker Marzouq Al Ghanem voiced optimism on the efforts by Sheikh Sabah, who has been leading a mediation effort, to end the differences.

“We hope the Riyadh meeting comes to a happy ending that strengthens the GCC,” he said.

It appears some differences were worked out as recalled ambassadors were deployed back to their respective assignments.

DUBAI (Reuters) – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on Sunday agreed to return their ambassadors to Qatar, the Gulf Cooperation Council said in a joint statement, signalling an end to a rift over Doha’s support for Islamist groups.

The announcement came after an emergency meeting in the Saudi capital Riyadh to discuss the dispute, which began in March and was threatening an annual summit scheduled to be held in December in Doha.

The question is now what will be the additional result and objectives with regard to Daesh (Islamic State), funding and providing safe havens to terror organizations? An even bigger question is just what will the U.S. State Department take from this meeting and will they follow suit? The last question is of the list of 82 above, how many have visited the White House and are those visitor logs even available or will they be redacted?