Immigration: Morton, Johnson, Holder and the White House

Posted on November 7, 2014November 7, 2014 by Denise Simon

The Senate passed an immigration bill but it was such a lousy bill it failed to be considered by the House. The Dream Act failed in both Houses of Congress so Barack Obama initiated the DACA executive order. Now that a new Congress is about to be seated, Obama demands a new revolutionary immigration policy law or he is going to use his pen to sign executive action giving amnesty and refugee status to millions.

Examining some historical facts and political machinations are important for perspective on the immigration mindset of the White House.

The Border Patrol’s annual statistics were posted on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Web site for about five hours on Oct. 10, then taken down. But Customs and Border Protection spokesman Christopher O’Neil said in an e-mail that the decision to remove the briefly released data had nothing to do with the midterm elections. Rather, he said, it was an effort to provide all of the agency’s statistics — and not just the Border Patrol’s — “in one concise and comprehensive package.”

Using slides to illustrate his remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Oct. 9, Johnson announced that the Border Patrol had made 479,377 apprehensions last year on the border. He saluted CBP for recently making public an internal report and new policy on the agency’s use of force. And he underscored “a commitment to transparency.”

The new annual statistics were posted and taken down within hours the next day.

Then there are the Morton Memos and they include the edict for discretion on prosecuting criminal illegals and deportation going back 3-4 years.

A memo in full text is found here. Text in part is below demonstrating where immigration laws are not being enforced.

One of ICE’s central responsibilities is to enforce the nation’s civil immigration laws in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). ICE, however, has limited resources to remove those illegally in the United States. ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes represent, as much as reasonably possible, the agency’s enforcement priorities, namely the promotion of national security, border security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system. These priorities are outlined in the ICE Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities memorandum of March 2,2011, which this memorandum is intended to support.

Because the agency is confronted with more administrative violations than its resources can address, the agency must regularly exercise “prosecutorial discretion” if it is to prioritize its efforts. In basic terms, prosecutorial discretion is the authority of an agency charged with enforcing a law to decide to what degree to enforce the law against a particular individual. ICE, like any other law enforcement agency, has prosecutorial discretion and may exercise “it in the ordinary course of enforcement1.When ICE favorably exercises prosecutorial discretion, it essentially decides not to assert the full scope of the enforcement authority available to the agency in a given case.

When weighing whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be warranted for a given . alien, ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to

the agency’s civil immigration enforcement priorities;
the person’s length of presence in the United States, with particular consideration given to presence while in lawful status;
the circumstances of the person’s arrival in the United States and the manner of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the United States as a young child;
the person’s pursuit of education in the United States, with particular consideration given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high school or have successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate institution of higher education in the United States;
whether the person, or the person’s immediate relative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or national guard, with particular consideration given to those who served in combat;
the person’s criminal history, including arrests, prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants;
the person’s immigration history, including any prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior denial of status, or evidence of fraud;
whether the person poses a national security or public safety concern;
the person’s ties and contributions to the community, including family relationships;
the person’s ties to the home country and condition~ in the country;
the person’s age, with particular consideration given to minors and the elderly;
whether the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent;
whether the person is the primary caretaker ofa person with a mental or physical disability, minor, or seriously ill relative; ;
whether the person or the person’s spouse is pregnant or nursing;
whether the person or the person’s spouse suffers from severe mental or physical illness;
whether the person’s nationality renders removal unlikely;
Whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from removal, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident;
whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from removal, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other crime; . and .
whether the person is currently cooperating or has cooperated with federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, such as ICE, the U.S Attorneys or Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among others.

Behpajooh and John Kerry

Posted on November 7, 2014November 7, 2014 by Denise Simon

At least four secret letters have been dispatched from the White House and sent to Iran. The full contents of the letters are still unknown except the most recent was revealed by the Wall Street Journal containing two items, points of collaboration over the ISIS war in Iraq and striking a final deal on the Iranian nuclear program.

Denials have been made by the White House that the United States was not working with Iran on the matter of Iraq as noted here. ‘Appearing on NBC’s “Meet the Press” last month, National Security Adviser Susan Rice said the U.S. wasn’t working with Iran on the fight against the Islamic State. “We are not in coordination or direct consultation with the Iranians about any aspect of the fight against ISIL,” Rice said, using an alternate acronym for the jihadist group. “It is a fact that, in Iraq, they also are supporting the Iraqis against ISIL, but we are not coordinating. We are doing this very differently and independently.”

After doing some deep research, it was found that under SecState John Kerry, nothing else matters when it comes to Iraq, Syria, Russia or Iran except gaining a nuclear deal with the help of the P5+1, a deal that has excluded the U.S. Congress and ALL allies in the Middle East.

The United States under the G. W. Bush administration worked a stealthy mission to halt the Iran program in coordination with Israel by creating and infecting the Iranian nuclear program with an undetected virus into the computers controlling the spinning centrifuges. Outside companies were identified and sanctions and later targeted via a thumb drive to infect the computer network to bring a halt to the cascading centrifuge system.

One such company was Behpajooh and there are many more, but all of these associated firms have been ignored by the State Department, Treasury, the interagency and the envoy working in cadence with John Kerry giving freedom to Iran to continue their program.

The betrayal of the State Department and the White House of allies and Congress is epic in nature, when this could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, a long future of hostilities with Daesh and a much sooner launch of a nuclear weapon by Iran on their targeted enemies the little Satan and the big Satan, Israel and the United States.

Here is the story on how Stuxnet came to be. Clearly, the Bush administration and Israel were clandestine in this regard and the mission was successful. It now begs the question, will it happen again if a deal is reached by the November 24 deadline?

An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon

In January 2010, inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency visiting the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in Iran noticed that centrifuges used to enrich uranium gas were failing at an unprecedented rate. The cause was a complete mystery—apparently as much to the Iranian technicians replacing the centrifuges as to the inspectors observing them.

Five months later a seemingly unrelated event occurred. A computer security firm in Belarus was called in to troubleshoot a series of computers in Iran that were crashing and rebooting repeatedly. Again, the cause of the problem was a mystery. That is, until the researchers found a handful of malicious files on one of the systems and discovered the world’s first digital weapon.

Stuxnet, as it came to be known, was unlike any other virus or worm that came before. Rather than simply hijacking targeted computers or stealing information from them, it escaped the digital realm to wreak physical destruction on equipment the computers controlled.

Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, written by WIRED senior staff writer Kim Zetter, tells the story behind Stuxnet’s planning, execution and discovery. In this excerpt from the book, which will be released November 11, Stuxnet has already been at work silently sabotaging centrifuges at the Natanz plant for about a year. An early version of the attack weapon manipulated valves on the centrifuges to increase the pressure inside them and damage the devices as well as the enrichment process. Centrifuges are large cylindrical tubes—connected by pipes in a configuration known as a “cascade”—that spin at supersonic speed to separate isotopes in uranium gas for use in nuclear power plants and weapons. At the time of the attacks, each cascade at Natanz held 164 centrifuges. Uranium gas flows through the pipes into the centrifuges in a series of stages, becoming further “enriched” at each stage of the cascade as isotopes needed for a nuclear reaction are separated from other isotopes and become concentrated in the gas.

As the excerpt begins, it’s June 2009—a year or so since Stuxnet was first released, but still a year before the covert operation will be discovered and exposed. As Iran prepares for its presidential elections, the attackers behind Stuxnet are also preparing their next assault on the enrichment plant with a new version of the malware. They unleash it just as the enrichment plant is beginning to recover from the effects of the previous attack. Their weapon this time is designed to manipulate computer systems made by the German firm Siemens that control and monitor the speed of the centrifuges. Because the computers are air-gapped from the internet, however, they cannot be reached directly by the remote attackers. So the attackers have designed their weapon to spread via infected USB flash drives. To get Stuxnet to its target machines, the attackers first infect computers belonging to five outside companies that are believed to be connected in some way to the nuclear program. The aim is to make each “patient zero” an unwitting carrier who will help spread and transport the weapon on flash drives into the protected facility and the Siemens computers. Although the five companies have been referenced in previous news reports, they’ve never been identified. Four of them are identified in this excerpt.

The Lead-Up to the 2009 Attack

The two weeks leading up to the release of the next attack were tumultuous ones in Iran. On June 12, 2009, the presidential elections between incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi didn’t turn out the way most expected. The race was supposed to be close, but when the results were announced—two hours after the polls closed—Ahmadinejad had won with 63 percent of the vote over Mousavi’s 34 percent. The electorate cried foul, and the next day crowds of angry protesters poured into the streets of Tehran to register their outrage and disbelief. According to media reports, it was the largest civil protest the country had seen since the 1979 revolution ousted the shah and it wasn’t long before it became violent. Protesters vandalized stores and set fire to trash bins, while police and Basijis, government-loyal militias in plainclothes, tried to disperse them with batons, electric prods, and bullets.

That Sunday, Ahmadinejad gave a defiant victory speech, declaring a new era for Iran and dismissing the protesters as nothing more than soccer hooligans soured by the loss of their team. The protests continued throughout the week, though, and on June 19, in an attempt to calm the crowds, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sanctioned the election results, insisting that the margin of victory—11 million votes—was too large to have been achieved through fraud. The crowds, however, were not assuaged.

The next day, a twenty-six-year-old woman named Neda Agha-Soltan got caught in a traffic jam caused by protesters and was shot in the chest by a sniper’s bullet after she and her music teacher stepped out of their car to observe.

Two days later on June 22, a Monday, the Guardian Council, which oversees elections in Iran, officially declared Ahmadinejad the winner, and after nearly two weeks of protests, Tehran became eerily quiet. Police had used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, and most of them were now gone from the streets. That afternoon, at around 4:30 p.m. local time, as Iranians nursed their shock and grief over events of the previous days, a new version of Stuxnet was being compiled and unleashed.

Recovery From Previous Attack

While the streets of Tehran had been in turmoil, technicians at Natanz had been experiencing a period of relative calm. Around the first of the year, they had begun installing new centrifuges again, and by the end of February they had about 5,400 of them in place, close to the 6,000 that Ahmadinejad had promised the previous year. Not all of the centrifuges were enriching uranium yet, but at least there was forward movement again, and by June the number had jumped to 7,052, with 4,092 of these enriching gas. In addition to the eighteen cascades enriching gas in unit A24, there were now twelve cascades in A26 enriching gas. An additional seven cascades had even been installed in A28 and were under vacuum, being prepared to receive gas.

The performance of the centrifuges was improving too. Iran’s daily production of low-enriched uranium was up 20 percent and would remain consistent throughout the summer of 2009. Despite the previous problems, Iran had crossed a technical milestone and had succeeded in producing 839 kilograms of low-enriched uranium—enough to achieve nuclear-weapons breakout capability. If it continued at this rate, Iran would have enough enriched uranium to make two nuclear weapons within a year. This estimate, however, was based on the capacity of the IR-1 centrifuges currently installed at Natanz. But Iran had already installed IR-2 centrifuges in a small cascade in the pilot plant, and once testing on these was complete and technicians began installing them in the underground hall, the estimate would have to be revised. The more advanced IR-2 centrifuges were more efficient. It took 3,000 IR-1s to produce enough uranium for a nuclear weapon in one year, but it would take just 1,200 IR-2 centrifuges to do the same.

Cue Stuxnet 1.001, which showed up in late June.

The Next Assault

To get their weapon into the plant, the attackers launched an offensive against computers owned by four companies. All of the companies were involved in industrial control and processing of some sort, either manufacturing products and assembling components or installing industrial control systems. They were all likely chosen because they had some connection to Natanz as contractors and provided a gateway through which to pass Stuxnet to Natanz through infected employees.

To ensure greater success at getting the code where it needed to go, this version of Stuxnet had two more ways to spread than the previous one. Stuxnet 0.5 could spread only by infecting Step 7 project files—the files used to program Siemens PLCs. This version, however, could spread via USB flash drives using the Windows Autorun feature or through a victim’s local network using the print-spooler zero-day exploit that Kaspersky Lab, the antivirus firm based in Russia, and Symantec later found in the code.

Based on the log files in Stuxnet, a company called Foolad Technic was the first victim. It was infected at 4:40 a.m. on June 23, a Tuesday. But then it was almost a week before the next company was hit.

The following Monday, about five thousand marchers walked silently through the streets of Tehran to the Qoba Mosque to honor victims killed during the recent election protests. Late that evening, around 11:20 p.m., Stuxnet struck machines belonging to its second victim—a company called Behpajooh.

It was easy to see why Behpajooh was a target. It was an engineering firm based in Esfahan—the site of Iran’s new uranium conversion plant, built to turn milled uranium ore into gas for enriching at Natanz, and was also the location of Iran’s Nuclear Technology Center, which was believed to be the base for Iran’s nuclear weapons development program. Behpajooh had also been named in US federal court documents in connection with Iran’s illegal procurement activities.

Behpajooh was in the business of installing and programming industrial control and automation systems, including Siemens systems. The company’s website made no mention of Natanz, but it did mention that the company had installed Siemens S7-400 PLCs, as well as the Step 7 and WinCC software and Profibus communication modules at a steel plant in Esfahan. This was, of course, all of the same equipment Stuxnet targeted at Natanz.

At 5:00 a.m. on July 7, nine days after Behpajooh was hit, Stuxnet struck computers at Neda Industrial Group, as well as a company identified in the logs only as CGJ, believed to be Control Gostar Jahed. Both companies designed or installed industrial control systems.

electrical systems for the oil and gas industry in Iran, as well as for power plants and mining and process facilities. In 2000 and 2001 the company had installed Siemens S7 PLCs in several gas pipeline operations in Iran and had also installed Siemens S7 systems at the Esfahan Steel Complex. Like Behpajooh, Neda had been identified on a proliferation watch list for its alleged involvement in illicit procurement activity and was named in a US indictment for receiving smuggled microcontrollers and other components.

About two weeks after it struck Neda, a control engineer who worked for the company popped up on a Siemens user forum on July 22 complaining about a problem that workers at his company were having with their machines. The engineer, who posted a note under the user name Behrooz, indicated that all PCs at his company were having an identical problem with a Siemens Step 7 .DLL file that kept producing an error message. He suspected the problem was a virus that spread via flash drives.

When he used a DVD or CD to transfer files from an infected system to a clean one, everything was fine, he wrote. But when he used a flash drive to transfer files, the new PC started having the same problems the other machine had. A USB flash drive, of course, was Stuxnet’s primary method of spreading. Although Behrooz and his colleagues scanned for viruses, they found no malware on their machines. There was no sign in the discussion thread that they ever resolved the problem at the time.

It’s not clear how long it took Stuxnet to reach its target after infecting machines at Neda and the other companies, but between June and August the number of centrifuges enriching uranium gas at Natanz began to drop. Whether this was the result solely of the new version of Stuxnet or the lingering effects of the previous version is unknown. But by August that year, only 4,592 centrifuges were enriching at the plant, a decrease of 328 centrifuges since June. By November, that number had dropped even further to 3,936, a difference of 984 in five months. What’s more, although new machines were still being installed, none of them were being fed gas.

Clearly there were problems with the cascades, and technicians had no idea what they were. The changes mapped precisely, however, to what Stuxnet was designed to do.

Obama out of Iraq Due to WH, Maliki, Mahdi Army

Posted on November 3, 2014November 3, 2014 by Denise Simon

The White House knew better than anyone else when it came to Iraq. At all costs, Barack Obama wanted out and to declare hostilities over. He prevailed however, today Iraq is a battleground not seen before.

In Mosul, two army divisions also disintegrated as thousands of soldiers and police officers shed their uniforms, dropped their weapons and ran for their lives. Shehab, told that his commanders had deserted, tossed his rifle and ran away too.

“We felt like cowards, but our commanders were afraid of Daesh. They were too afraid to lead us,” said Shehab, 43, using the Arabic acronym for Islamic State. The military collapsed in Mosul even though Washington spent eight years and $25 billion to train, arm and equip Iraq’s security forces. The United States has now deployed 1,400 advisors to try to rebuild the shattered military into a force that can repel Islamic State.

So how did Iraq reach this point?

Behind the U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq

Negotiations were repeatedly disrupted by Obama White House staffers’ inaccurate public statements

By James Franklin Jeffrey

Updated Nov. 2, 2014 7:31 p.m. ET

The spectacular success in early 2014 of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, an offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq, is often blamed on the failure of the Obama administration to secure an American troop presence in Iraq beyond 2011. As the U.S. ambassador to Iraq in 2010-12, I believed that keeping troops there was critical. Nevertheless, our failure has roots far beyond the Obama administration.

The story begins in 2008, when the Bush administration and Iraq negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement granting U.S. troops in the country legal immunities—a sine qua non of U.S. basing everywhere—but with the caveat that they be withdrawn by the end of 2011.

By 2010 many key Americans and Iraqis thought that a U.S. military presence beyond 2011 was advisable, for security (training Iraqi forces, control of airspace, counterterrorism) and policy (continued U.S. engagement and reassurance to neighbors). The Pentagon began planning for a continued military presence, but an eight-month impasse on forming a new government after the March 2010 Iraqi elections delayed final approval in Washington.

In January 2011, once the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was formed, President Obama decided, with the concurrence of his advisers, to keep troops on. But he wasn’t yet willing to tell Prime Minister Maliki or the American people. First, Washington had to determine the size of a residual force. That dragged on, with the military pushing for a larger force, and the White House for a small presence at or below 10,000, due to costs and the president’s prior “all troops out” position. In June the president decided on the force level (eventually 5,000) and obtained Mr. Maliki’s assent to new SOFA talks.

The Obama administration was willing to “roll over” the terms of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement as long as the new agreement, like the first, was ratified by the Iraqi Parliament.

Iraqi party leaders repeatedly reviewed the SOFA terms but by October 2011 were at an impasse. All accepted a U.S. troop presence—with the exception of the Sadrist faction, headed by the anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, which held some 40 of Iraq’s 325 parliamentary seats. But on immunities only the Kurdish parties, with some 60 seats, would offer support. Neither Mr. Maliki, with some 120 seats, nor former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the leader of the largely Sunni Arab Iraqiya party with 80 more, would definitively provide support. With time running out, given long-standing U.S. policy that troops stationed overseas must have legal immunity, negotiations ended and the troop withdrawal was completed.

Given the success in winning a SOFA in 2008, what led to this failure? First, the need for U.S. troops was not self-evident in 2011. Iraq appeared stable, with oil exports of two million barrels a day at about $90 a barrel, and security much improved. Second, politics had turned against a troop presence; the bitterly anti-U.S. Sadrists were active in Parliament, the Sunni Arabs more ambivalent toward the U.S., and polls indicated that less than 20% of the Iraqi population wanted U.S. troops.

Could the administration have used more leverage, as many have asserted? Again, the main hurdle was immunities. The reality is that foreign troops in any land are generally unpopular and granting them immunity is complicated. In a constitutional democracy it requires parliament to waive its own laws. An agreement signed by Mr. Maliki without parliamentary approval, as he suggested, would not suffice. (The legal status of the small number of “noncombat” U.S. troops currently redeployed to Iraq is an emergency exception to usual SOFA policy.)

Some suggest that the U.S. could have made economic aid or arms deliveries contingent on a Status of Forces Agreement. But by 2011 the U.S. was providing relatively little economic aid to Iraq, and arms deliveries were essential to American and Iraqi security. Was the 5,000 troop number too small to motivate the Iraqis? No Iraqi made that argument to me; generally, smaller forces are more sellable. Could someone other than Mr. Maliki have been more supportive, and were the Iranians opposed? Of course, but with or without Mr. Maliki and Iranians we faced deep resistance from parliamentarians and the public.

Could President Obama have showed more enthusiasm? True, Mr. Obama seemed to feel he couldn’t force an unwanted agreement on the Iraqi people, and he didn’t work with Mr. Maliki as President Bush had. But Mr. Obama spoke or met with Mr. Maliki three times in 2011, and Vice President Joe Biden was constantly in touch. What counted most with Mr. Maliki was not rapport but the coldblooded calculus of pluses and minuses affecting his political fortunes. On the other hand, the negotiations were disrupted repeatedly by White House staffers with public statements inaccurately low-balling the troop numbers and misinterpreting Iraqi decisions.

The withdrawal of troops allowed President Obama to declare that he was “ending the war in Iraq”—oddly, since it was the Bush administration’s military victories and successful negotiation of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement that had set the timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal. Later, during the 2012 presidential debates, Mr. Obama inexplicably denied that he had even attempted to keep troops in Iraq.

Could a residual force have prevented ISIS’s victories? With troops we would have had better intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq and later ISIS, a more attentive Washington, and no doubt a better-trained Iraqi army. But the common argument that U.S. troops could have produced different Iraqi political outcomes is hogwash. The Iraqi sectarian divides, which ISIS exploited, run deep and were not susceptible to permanent remedy by our troops at their height, let alone by 5,000 trainers under Iraqi restraints.

Iraqis in Shiite-dominated greater Baghdad generally support the army, he said. But he also acknowledged that the army cannot defend the surrounding “Baghdad belt” without the help of thousands of Shiite militiamen Kamil calls “volunteers,” particularly because areas just to the north, west and south have a Sunni majority.

Officers in one of many units that collapsed in Mosul, the 2nd Battalion of Iraq’s 3rd Federal Police Division, said their U.S. training was useful. But as soon as their American advisors left, they said, soldiers and police went back to their ways.

Retired Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, in charge of Iraqi training in 2007 and 2008, said Maliki’s government intimidated and assassinated Sunni officers while Maliki seized personal control of the security forces from commanders. Human rights groups have accused Iraqi security forces of detaining and killing Sunnis.

Selected quotes from the text above is from By David Zucchino

Why Iraqi army can’t fight, despite $25 billion in U.S. aid, training

No Definition for Terror

Posted on November 3, 2014November 3, 2014 by Denise Simon

I have no connections to anyone currently employed by the FBI but I do have several with former FBI’ers. Our formal and non-formal discussions are chilling when it comes to operations, assignments and investigations at the agency.

So FBI, here is a tip, this website http://islamophobia.org/ has listed names and organizations they deem as a threat to Islam. Is this some kind of hit list? What criteria creates such a list and is this approved by the FBI?

But take note FBI, those that are paying attention don’t feel safe in America. Your agency is doing little to sway our fears. Share that same sentiment with Jeh Johnson at DHS please.

It was a few years ago after doing some research and gathering evidence that I attempted to have a dialogue with the local FBI office, the agent on duty asked me if I was an Islamophobe and them hung up on me. It was clearly the time when the FBI was given an edict to be politically correct when it comes to investigations on Islam and all the manuals were stripped from the operating and training systems.

FBI Director Robert Mueller in 2012 capitulated with the American Muslim and Arab American lobby groups and announced that more than 700 documents and 300 presentations from training materials. Abed Ayoub was able to take a meeting with Mueller who represented groups including the Islamic Society of North America, Muslim Public Affairs Council, MPAC and CAIR. Included in the dialogue was also Thomas Perez of the DoJ’s Civil Rights Division. It all goes a step further as law enforcement agencies around the country are required to do Muslim outreach in a robust campaign of political correctness. No one in America is allowed to have independent thought regarding Islam, Muslims or terror as it is deemed offensive to Islam.

So in the meantime, America sadly has endured domestic terror attacks but government refuses to apply the term ‘terrorism’ instead using ‘work place violence’ as is noted in the Ft. Hood shooting by Major Nidal Hasan and beheading of Colleen Hufford in Moore, Oklahoma at the hands of Alton Nolen. The mosques are connected by a network of imams that are devoted followers of Anwar al Awlaki killed by an American drone in Yemen a few years ago. We cannot overlook the Tsarneav brothers the killers of the Boston bombing.

While we do have many that have left the shores of America to join Daesh we also witness the black flags and ISIS graffiti in many locations around the country. America also has agreements with many countries in a VISA waiver program, making it easier to made round trip journeys to rogue states like Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan.

So terror is here America and yet what does the FBI have to say or do about it? Crickets…

So when it comes to defining terror, here is a formal summary of the term. We can only hope that the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice will take note and behave and investigate accordingly.

Terrorism Defies Definition

by Daniel Pipes and Teri Blumenfeld The Washington Times October 24, 2014

http://www.meforum.org/4877/terrorism-defies-definition

Defining terrorism has practical implications because formally certifying an act of violence as terrorist has important consequences in U.S. law.

Terrorism suspects can be held longer than criminal suspects after arrest without an indictment They can be interrogated without a lawyer present. They receive longer prison sentences. “Terrorist inmates” are subject to many extra restrictions known as Special Administrative Measures, or SAMs. The “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002” gives corporate victims of terrorism special breaks (it is currently up for renewal) and protects owners of buildings from certain lawsuits. When terrorism is invoked, families of victims, such as of the 2009 Ft. Hood attack, win extra benefits such as tax breaks, life insurance, and combat-related pay. They can even be handed a New York City skyscraper.

Despite the legal power of this term, however, terrorism remains undefined beyond a vague sense of “a non-state actor attacking civilian targets to spread fear for some putative political goal.” One study, Political Terrorism, lists 109 definitions. American security specialist David Tucker wryly remarks that “Above the gates of hell is the warning that all that who enter should abandon hope. Less dire but to the same effect is the warning given to those who try to define terrorism.” The Israeli counterterrorism specialist Boaz Ganor jokes that “The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself.”

This lack of specificity wreaks chaos, especially among police, prosecutors, politicians, press, and professors.

“Violence carried out in connection with an internationally sanctioned terrorist group” such as Al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, or Hamas has become the working police definition of terrorism. This explains such peculiar statements after an attack as, “We have not found any links to terrorism,” which absurdly implies that “lone wolves” are never terrorists.

The whole world, except the U.S. Department of the Treasury, sees the Boston Marathon bombings as terrorism.

If they are not terrorists, the police must find other explanation to account for their acts of violence. Usually, they offer up some personal problem: insanity, family tensions, a work dispute, “teen immigrant angst,” a prescription drug, or even a turbulent airplane ride. Emphasizing personal demons over ideology, they focus on an perpetrator’s (usually irrelevant) private life, ignoring his far more significant political motives.

But then, inconsistently, they do not require some connection to an international group. When Oscar Ramiro Ortega-Hernandez shot eight rounds at the White House in November 2011, the U.S. attorney asserted that “Firing an assault rifle at the White House to make a political statement is terrorism, plain and simple” – no international terrorist group needed. Similarly, after Paul Anthony Ciancia went on a shooting spree at Los Angeles International Airport in November 2013, killing a TSA officer, the indictment accused him of “substantial planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person and to commit an act of terrorism.”

This terminological irregularity breeds utter confusion. The whole world calls the Boston Marathon bombings terrorism – except the Department of the Treasury, which, 1½ years on “has not determined that there has been an ‘act of terrorism’ under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.” The judge presiding over the terrorism trial in January 2014 of Jose Pimentel, accused of planning to set off pipe bombs in Manhattan, denied the prosecution’s request for an expert to justify a charge of terrorism. Government officials sometimes just throw up their hands: Asked in June 2013 if the U.S. government considers the Taliban a terrorist group, the State Department spokeswoman replied “Well, I’m not sure how they’re defined at this particular moment.”

The U.S. Department of State has yet to figure out whether the Taliban are or are not terrorists.

A May 2013 shooting in New Orleans, which injured 19, was even more muddled. An FBI spokeswoman called it not terrorism but “strictly an act of street violence.” The mayor disagreed; asked if he considered it terrorism, he said “I think so,” because families “are afraid of going outside.” Challenged to disentangle this contradiction, a supervisory special agent in the FBI’s New Orleans field made matters even more opaque: “You can say this is definitely urban terrorism; it’s urban terror. But from the FBI standpoint and for what we deal with on a national level, it’s not what we consider terrorism, per se.” Got that?

This lack of clarity presents a significant public policy challenge. Terrorism, with all its legal and financial implications, cannot remain a vague, subjective concept but requires a precise and accurate definition, consistently applied.

After releasing the Taliban 5, matters are worse when it comes to Afghanistan, Syria Yemen, Qatar and Iraq. We witnessed carefully the hostilities between Israel and Hamas and then we watched the demonstrations in America and Europe of those standing in solidarity with Hamas. So, hey, FBI, if you are going to do outreach, it should be to those in America that don’t trust you or the lack of security we feel. Your agenda is misplaced and sadly I would think any agents would be demanding a pro-active objective against jihad in America have long memories. This is shameful.

Putin: Nyet on NATO

Posted on November 3, 2014November 3, 2014 by Denise Simon

Vladimir is getting a huge pass by the White House and John Kerry ignoring what he is doing. Seems the burden of dealing with Russia’s aggressions comes down to General Breedlove, the U.S. Commander of U.S. European and the 17th Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Russia seems to be pretty angry with its neighboring countries in the Baltic Sea—especially Sweden. A couple of weeks ago, on October 2, Sweden’s authority for signals intelligence (FRA) leaked a photo of a Russian fighter jet flying only about 30 feet away from a Swedish Armed Forces intelligence plane. Russian warships have threatened a Finnish research vessel in the Baltic Sea on two occasions—August 2 and September 2, and on October 7, armed NATO fighter jets followed Russian fighters above the Swedish island Öland in the Baltic Sea. Last year the country simulated a nuclear attack against Sweden, and Russian jets have been showing off their weapons by exposing their undercarriages when approaching Swedish aircraft.

Portuguese fighter jets intercepted seven Russian jets over the Baltic Sea. Simultaneously, Turkish fighters were scrambled to intercept two Russian bombers and two fighters over the Black Sea.

The English RAF also intercepted eight Russian aircraft over the North Sea. After the interception, the formation split, with the fighters and a tanker returning to Russia while two bombers continued towards the Atlantic. The bombers were later intercepted again by the Portuguese over the Atlantic. For a full list of Russian military aggression in the last year go here.

The Pentagon is well aware of these activities and has intelligence briefings daily with the NATO command. Then last week, it finally came out that Russia was responsible for hacking into the White House internet systems. On Tuesday came reports in the American media that Russian-based hackers had breached some computer networks at the White House earlier this month, triggering an investigation by the FBI, the National Security Agency and the Secret Service. No Obama administration official went on record over the alleged incident, preferring to feed anonymous anti-Russian comments to the Washington Post and many other press outlets.

Then there is Poland, Preparing for Invasion

But Poland is the real issue when it comes to defending NATO’s exposed Eastern frontier from Russian aggression. Only Poland, which occupies the Alliance’s central front, has the military power to seriously blunt any Russian moves westward. As in 1920, when the Red Army failed to push past Warsaw, Poland is the wall that will defend Central Europe from any westward movement by Moscow’s military. To their credit, and thanks to a long history of understanding the Russian mentality better than most NATO and EU members, Warsaw last fall, when the violent theft of Crimea was still just a Kremlin dream, announced a revised national security strategy emphasizing territorial defense. Eschewing American-led overseas expeditions like those to Iraq and Afghanistan that occupied Poland’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) during the post-9/11 era, this new doctrine makes defending Poland from Eastern aggression the main job of its military. Presciently, then-Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, contradicting optimistic European and NATO presumptions of our era that conventional war in Europe was unthinkable, stated in May 2013, “I’m afraid conflict in Europe is imaginable.”

Particularly in light of the fact that both NATO and the Obama administration rejected my advice to seriously bolster Alliance defenses in the East with four heavy brigades, including the two brigades that Warsaw explicitly asked NATO — meaning, in practice, the United States — for after this year’s Russo-Ukrainian War began in earnest, the issue of Poland’s military readiness is of considerable importance to countries far beyond Poland. Instead of creating a militarily viable NATO tripwire that would deter Russian aggression, the Alliance, and Washington, DC, have opted for symbolic gestures — speeches, military visits, small exercises — that impress the Western media but not the Russians.

Simply put: Can Poland defend itself if Putin decides to move his aggression westward? Even if NATO rides to the rescue, as they would be required to under Article 5 — that is now an “if” question to many in Warsaw — will the Polish military be able to buy sufficient time for the Alliance to come to their aid? Notwithstanding that Poland (and Estonia) are the only “new NATO” members that take their Alliance obligations fully seriously, spending more than the required two percent of GDP on defense — a standard almost all longstanding NATO members can’t manage to meet — there are serious doubts about the ability of Poland’s armed forces to defend against a major Russian move to the West.

There is good news. When it comes to resisting what I term Special War — that shadowy amalgam of espionage, terrorism, and subversion at which the Kremlin excels — Warsaw, with its long acquaintance with sneaky Russian games, is probably better equipped than any almost NATO country to deter and defeat Putin’s secret offensive. The recent arrests of two Polish agents of Russian military intelligence (GRU), one of them a Polish military officer assigned to the MoD, sent a clear message to Moscow that Special War will be countered with aggressive counterintelligence.

When it comes to conventional defense, however, the news from Poland appears less rosy. Despite the fact that no one questions the basic competence of the Polish armed forces, nor the impressiveness of their current defense acquisition program, there is a matter of size. The recent MoD announcement that it is moving thousands of troops closer to the country’s borders with Belarus and Ukraine, where any threat would emerge, is encouraging but not sufficient (thanks to the Cold War, when Poland’s Communist military was directed westward, most of its major military bases are closer to Germany than the East). Since the abandonment of conscription five years ago, a cumbersome process that caused readiness problems for some time, Warsaw’s armed forces come to only 120,000 active duty troops, with less than 48,000 in the ground forces (i.e. the army). That number is insufficient to man the army’s structure of three divisions with thirteen maneuver brigades (ten of them armored or mechanized).

A solution to this manpower shortfall was supposed to be found in the establishment of the National Reserve Forces (NSR), with 20,000 fully trained part-time volunteers who would flesh out the order of battle in a crisis. Yet the NSR, which was announced by the MoD five years ago with much fanfare, has had considerable teething problems, with shortages of recruits and inadequate training budgets. Recent reports indicate both morale and readiness are low among NSR soldiers, who feel poorly treated by the regular military, while none dispute that the force has only recruited and trained 10,000 troops, half the target figure.

Quality can compensate for deficient quantity to an extent, and Poland’s recent acquisition of more late-model Leopard II tanks from Germany, adding to the 124 it already has, means they will be able to replace most of their Soviet-model legacy armor, and meet any Russian incursion on an equal footing in terms of quality, if not quantity. By approximately 2020, the air force will have wholly replaced its Soviet-era helicopters, buying 150 modern airframes, while the MoD plans to purchase thirty-two late-model attack helicopters by 2022, which would pose a significant threat to Russian armor.

More interesting still are plans taking shape to give Warsaw asymmetric deep-strike capabilities to resist Russian aggression. The navy and the army intend to acquire long-range missiles to counter superior Russian numbers, but the cornerstone of the deterrence concept called “Polish Fangs” by Warsaw is the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), to be carried by the air force’s F-16 fleet (the wing of forty-eight F-16’s is the backbone of Polish airpower). Combined with drones and Poland’s excellent special operations forces, which are among the best in NATO, Warsaw believes that the American-made JASSM on the American-made F-16 will give them an important qualitative advantage over the Russians, including the ability to precisely hit targets up to 370 kilometers behind enemy lines.

Look up in the sky, you just may see Russian aircraft….then if you do, send a tweet to the White House, they are missing the memos.