The First Refugee Resettlement Program, Medina

Medina—The First Muslim Refugee Resettlement Program

Kilpatrick ~CrisisMagazine: With all the talk about the Syrian refugees, one point is often overlooked. Much of the debate focuses on the question of whether or not the refugees can be reliably vetted. If they can be certified as one hundred percent terrorist-free, then, presumably, the resettlement can safely proceed.

But even if every terrorist could be excluded from the ranks of the refugees, a problem would remain. Many analysts are concerned that the resettlement program might facilitate the growth of terrorist-tolerant communities in America. By “terrorist-tolerant” I don’t mean that its members are thinking every minute about what they can do to support jihad, but rather that they have come to take for granted things that aren’t assumed in other societies.

Terror, for instance. Nonie Darwish, a former Muslim who grew up in Egypt, puts it this way:

One of the reasons that the so-called moderate Muslims have become irrelevant … is that over the centuries they have become tolerant of Islamic terrorism and considered it as part of normal life.

“Life under Sharia itself is a life under terror,” observes Darwish. And that daily low-level terrorism accustoms Muslims to view it as something “like a natural disaster or part of life that must be tolerated.”

So, although a Syrian refugee may have no personal taste for terror, he can be surprisingly tolerant of it. A 2007 public opinion poll of Syrians revealed that 75 percent of those polled supported financial aid for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and “Iraqi fighters” (at that time, mostly al-Qaeda). Need it be mentioned that all these groups are designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. government? A more recent poll of 1,365 Syrians found that one out of five considered ISIS to be a positive influence on the country. And living in the West doesn’t seem to change these attitudes. A 2014 opinion poll showed that 27 percent of the French population in the 18-24-year-old demographic supported ISIS. Assuming a random sample, and assuming that the majority of pro-ISIS respondents were Muslim, that would mean that the vast majority of young French Muslims support ISIS.

That kind of supportive environment is a factor that’s often overlooked in the debate over Syrian refugees. As defenders of the resettlement program like to point out, terrorists can get into the U.S. by other means than by mingling with refugees. But once here, they need a network to support them and give them cover. And the network itself can only function if the larger community is willing to look the other way.

Europe is now dotted with such networks—in the Paris suburbs, in the Brussels borough of Molenbeek, in the Neukölln district of Berlin, and in numerous other places. There is evidence that similar networks already exist in nascent form in the U.S. Beyond the question of whether terrorists will mix in with refugees lies a larger question about the refugee resettlement program. Will it contribute to a strengthening of our society, or will it lead instead to the strengthening and expansion of terror-supportive networks?

Whether or not a particular group of refugees has been infiltrated by ISIS, there remains the fact that many refugees subscribe to the same general worldview held by members of the Islamic State. After all, they’ve been steeped in the same cultural-religious milieu that produced the terrorists. Many of them will take it for granted that Islam is the supreme religion, that Muhammad was the perfect man, and that Jews and Christians are unclean. They may be averse to committing violence, but they may find it perfectly understandable if other Muslims resort to violence in order to avenge a real or perceived insult to Islam. Although that mindset is alien to us, it shouldn’t be incomprehensible. At the time that a death fatwa was issued against the author Salman Rushdie, I remember talking with several Catholics who felt quite sympathetic to the Ayatollah Khomeini (who issued the fatwa), and rather unsympathetic to Rushdie and his “blasphemous” attitude toward religion.

Given their cultural background, it’s reasonable to expect that Sunni Muslim refugees will bring with them a set of beliefs and attitudes conducive to the incubation of terrorism. Even if there were a foolproof method for excluding active terrorists from their midst, there is no way of vetting for future terrorists—young Muslims who at some point in their development decide that ISIS or some similar movement is the logical conclusion of all they have been taught.

This “conversion” to radical Islam can come quite suddenly. Mohamed Abdelslam, the brother of two of the Paris terrorists, told reporters that his brothers began to change roughly six months before the attack, when they, “stopped drinking and started praying.” Likewise, the radicalization of Mohammod Youssuf Abdulazeez, the Chattanooga jihadist who killed five servicemen, could not easily have been forecast. To his classmates and teachers, he seemed like a normal American boy, and if he had problems, they were of the normal young American male variety—pot-smoking, heavy drinking, and fast driving. Unlike other young Americans, however, he would have been exposed—either at home or on Islamist websites—to the belief that one can wipe out one’s sins by an act of martyrdom.

This “sudden conversion syndrome” to more radical forms of Islam is increasingly common among Muslim youth. But, as I said, it’s not easy to predict. If you’re a government official whose job it is to vet refugees, how can you know if the smiling fourteen-year-old boy standing in front of you and surrounded by his polite and pleasant family is going to go radical three years down the line?

Absent other information and unfair as it may seem, his family’s culture has to be taken into account. To some extent, we are all creatures of our culture, and Islamic cultures seem to produce a disproportionate number of terrorists. Contemporary Western culture, on the other hand, seems to produce a disproportionate number of naïve egocentrics who are incapable of imagining that other cultures may be radically different from their own. Their tendency is to automatically project their own values and attitudes on to all they see.

But, as should now be clear to anyone willing to look, Islamic culture is not simply a colorful variation of our own. In those places where traditional Islam is the governing principle—whether in the Islamic State, or in parts of Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria—the same disdain for non-Muslims and their religions can be found. This attitude is common not just among terrorists, but also among ordinary Muslims. By all accounts, the fifteen Muslim migrants who threw twelve Christians overboard during a Mediterranean crossing were not terrorists, they were simply Muslims who took offense when some of the Christians began to pray. Some of the Muslims who attacked Christians in European refugee camps appear to have been members of ISIS, but others were not. Blind to the differences in culture, European officials initially put Christian and Muslim migrants together in the same camps. With a bit more cultural awareness under their belts, they came to the politically incorrect conclusion that the two groups had to be housed separately. A less violent example of Islamic contempt for other cultures was provided by the Turkish soccer fans who booed and chanted when, during a Turkish-Greek soccer match, a moment of silence was requested for the victims of the Paris massacre.

As concerns the Syrian refugee crisis, Christians are regularly reminded that the Holy Family were once refugees in Egypt. Yes, but the culture brought into the world by the Holy Family is worlds apart from the one introduced six centuries later by Muhammad.

Let’s not forget that the Holy Family were once refugees. But in regard to the present crisis there’s another and perhaps more appropriate analogy to consider: Muhammad and his followers were also once refugees. He and his group of about 100 men, women, and children had long overstayed their welcome in Mecca. According to Muslim chroniclers, they had to flee in order to avoid persecution. Fortunately for Muhammad, the more “enlightened” citizens of Medina extended an invitation to the Muslims to come and live in their city. It is not recorded whether or not they held up large “welcome refugees” banners as is now the custom at European train stations, but they soon enough experienced the kind of regrets that Europeans are now having. Muhammad gradually acquired wealth and converts, and within a half-dozen years he was the master of Medina. Those Medinans who were not exiled or slaughtered were thoroughly subjugated. Muhammad then used Medina as the launching pad for his conquest of all Arabia. Within a century of his death, his followers had conquered nearly half of the civilized world.

The relevant analogy for our society is not the flight to Egypt, but the flight to Medina and the subsequent colonization of that city by the Muslims. A similar process of cultural conquest by migration is now underway in Europe. Citizens of the United States would be well-advised to monitor the situation over there before embarking on their own ill-considered experiment in welcoming the stranger.

Finally Listing ISIS Leaders Terrorists?

Treasury Sanctions Key ISIL Leaders and Facilitators Including a Senior Oil Official
2/11/2016

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designations of senior ISIL oil official Faysal al-Zahrani, foreign fighter facilitator Husayn Juaythini, and senior ISIL official Turki al-Binali pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.  These designations support President Obama’s strategy to degrade and destroy ISIL.  These designations also further Treasury’s efforts to attack ISIL’s finances and disrupt its ability to profit from illicit oil sales within its territory in Iraq and Syria by inhibiting these individuals from accessing the international financial system.  They also support work by the broader counter-ISIL Coalition, including Operation Tidal Wave II, which consists of deliberate targeting and precision airstrikes in Iraq and Syria to disrupt ISIL’s control of oil-related resources.  As a result of today’s actions, any property or interest in property of the individuals designated by Treasury within U.S. jurisdiction is frozen.  Additionally, transactions by U.S. persons involving the designated individuals are generally prohibited.
 al Binali
“Treasury and our partners worldwide are aggressively targeting ISIL’s ability to earn and make use of its money, and we are making progress on many fronts,” said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “Today’s action targets key ISIL leadership figures responsible for oil and gas production, foreign terrorist fighter recruitment and facilitation, and other financial facilitation.”
In a speech on Monday at Chatham House in London, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser highlighted the recent progress that the U.S. government has made in weakening ISIL’s ability to generate wealth and disrupt its ability to make use of the money it raises.
The Treasury Department announces this action in advance of the first-ever joint session of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL’s Counter ISIL Finance Group (CIFG), which is taking place on February 14 in Paris.  The CIFG is co-chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and has 37 participating member states and organizations.  The group focuses on enhancing international collaboration to disrupt the financial and economic activities of ISIL.  The FATF is the international standard-setting body for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.  It develops recommendations and promotes effective implementation of key anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures that deprive terrorist groups, like ISIL, of access to the international financial system.  The purpose of the FATF-CIFG joint session is to bring together the leading international bodies focused on ISIL financing to more effectively share information and coordinate efforts.  The session will focus on recent ISIL financial activity, ongoing efforts to deny ISIL access to the international financial system, strategies to prevent ISIL from financing its branches or foreign fighters, and recent United Nations Security Council Resolutions that facilitate efforts to disrupt ISIL’s finances.
Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali al-Zahrani
Treasury designated Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali al-Zahrani for acting for or on behalf of ISIL and for providing financial support to ISIL.  In July 2014, al-Zahrani joined ISIL’s natural resources ministry, which oversees ISIL’s trade in oil and gas.  As of May 2015, al-Zahrani was the ISIL oil and gas division official for Al Barakah Governorate, Syria, serving directly under ISIL oil and gas emir for Syria Fathi Awn’ al-Murad la Tunisi, also known as Abu Sayyaf, who was killed by Coalition special forces in a raid in eastern Syria that same month.  Prior to Abu Sayyaf’s death in May 2015, al-Zahrani regularly transferred funds to him.  As of June 2015, al-Zahrani supervised the daily activities of the workforce of an ISIL-managed oil production plant in Rukaybah, al-Hasakah Province, Syria, and by August 2015 was in charge of all ISIL oil and gas activities in al-Hasakah Province, which included supervising oil auctions to local merchants.  Following the May 2015 death of a separate ISIL oil official, who previously oversaw a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) production site on the Rukaybah oil production plant compound, al-Zahrani assumed control and oversight of VBIED production.  As of December 2015, al-Zahrani remained responsible for ISIL oil and gas activities in the areas around Shaddadi, al-Hasakah Province, Syria.
In his role as head of ISIL’s oil and gas division in Al Barakah, Syria, al-Zahrani oversaw the activities of seven ISIL oil and gas officials and, as of January 2015, held control of at least five oil fields.  Based on the profits generated from oil fields in Al Barakah governorate, al-Zahrani sent the ISIL treasury tens of millions of dollars in oil and gas revenues between September 2014 and March 2015.
Husayn Juaythini
Treasury designated Husayn Juaythini for providing support and services to ISIL by facilitating communications and the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and conducting financial activities in support of ISIL.  Juaythini travelled to Syria in September 2014 to pledge allegiance to ISIL and was tasked to return to Gaza and establish a foothold for ISIL there.  Juaythini was the link between ISIL leader and U.S.- and UN-designated Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and armed groups in Gaza, and had money that he was using to build an ISIL presence in Gaza.
Juaythini not only maintains ties with ISIL, but as of mid-2014 was deputy head of the extremist group and U.S.-designated SDGT Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC).  In 2013, Juaythini attempted to acquire supplies for the MSC in the environs of Jerusalem to conduct attacks against Israel and help the group overcome financial difficulties.  He also worked with a Libya-based facilitator, who served as the primary money and weapons facilitator for Juaythini’s activities in Gaza.  As of January 2015, Juaythini was instrumental in fostering connections between Gaza- and Libya-based terrorists, and facilitating their travel to Syria.
Turki Mubarak Abdullah Ahmad al-Binali
Treasury also designated Turki al-Binali for acting for or on behalf of ISIL as early as May 2015. Binali is a recruiter for ISIL foreign fighters, and provides literature and fatwas for ISIL training camps and has written several pamphlets to recruit more fighters to ISIL, including the first call for Muslims to pledge allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph.  As of March 2014, Binali led an ISIL support network actively recruiting Gulf nationals to join ISIL in Syria.
Further, in November 2014, Binali was appointed to the post of chief religious advisor for ISIL.  In late June 2015, Binali announced on social media that ISIL’s next attack, following its bombing of a Shia mosque in Kuwait days earlier, would be in Bahrain.
On January 31, 2015, the Bahraini government revoked Binali’s citizenship.
***
Counter Terrorism Designation
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OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Specially Designated Nationals List Update

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AL-BINALI, Turki Mubarak Abdullah Ahmad (a.k.a. AL BINALI, Turki Mubarak Abdullah; a.k.a. AL-BENALI, Turki; a.k.a. AL-BIN’ALI, Turki; a.k.a. AL-BIN’ALI, Turki Mubarak; a.k.a. “ABU DERGHAM”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu Human”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu Human Bakr ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu-Bakr”; a.k.a. “AL-BAHRAYNI, Abu Hudhayfa”; a.k.a. “AL-MUDARI, Abu Khuzayma”; a.k.a. “AL-SALAFI, Abu Hazm”; a.k.a. “AL-SULAMI, Abu Sufyan”); DOB 03 Sep 1984; POB Al Muharraq, Bahrain; nationality Bahrain; Passport 2231616 (Bahrain) issued 02 Jan 2013 expires 02 Jan 2023; alt. Passport 1272611 (Bahrain) issued 01 Apr 2003; Identification Number 840901356 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).
AL-ZAHRANI, Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali (a.k.a. AL ZAHRANI, Faysal Ahmad Bin Ali; a.k.a. ALZAHRANI, Faisal Ahmed Ali; a.k.a. “AL-JAZRAWI, Abu-Sara”; a.k.a. “AL-SAUDI, Abu Sarah”; a.k.a. “AL-ZAHRANI, Abu-Sarah”; a.k.a. “ZAHRANI, Abu Sara”); DOB 19 Jan 1986; alt. DOB 18 Jan 1986; nationality Saudi Arabia; Passport K142736 (Saudi Arabia) issued 14 Jul 2011; alt. Passport G579315 (Saudi Arabia) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).
JUAYTHINI, Husayn (a.k.a. ALJEITHNI, Hussein Mohammed Hussein; a.k.a. AL-JU’AITNI, Abu Mu’ath; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhamad Husayn; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad Husayn; a.k.a. JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad Husayn); DOB 03 May 1977; POB Al-Nusayirat refugee camp, Gaza; Passport 0363464 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).

Syria: Cessation of Hostilities? Huh?

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and U.S. State Department Secretary John Kerry announce an accelerated and expanded delivery of humanitarian relief in Syria and also a nationwide cessation of hostilities within a week.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, right, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attend a news conference after the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) meeting in Munich, Germany, Feb. 12, 2016.

It is complicated…..

The working group of 17 countries meeting in Munich agreed “to implement a nationwide cessation of hostilities to begin in a target of one week’s time,” he said.

They also agreed to immediately “accelerate and expand” humanitarian aid to the war-torn country.

“Sustained delivery will begin this week, first to the areas where it is most urgently needed… and then to all the people in need throughout the country, particularly in the besieged and hard to reach areas,” Kerry said.

He also said peace talks between rebels and the Syrian government would resume in Geneva “as soon as possible”.

VOA: Kerry told reporters early Friday in Munich that the cessation of hostilities will not apply to terrorist groups, including Islamic State, al-Nusra and others. He said the 17-nation International Syria Support Group has agreed that a task force co-chaired by the U.S. and Russia will work to “determine the modalities of a long-term reduction in violence.”

The top U.S. diplomat added on a cautionary note that the ISSG meeting has produced commitments on paper, but that the real test will be if all the parties honor their commitments.

The support group also agreed to “accelerate and expand” delivery of humanitarian assistance, starting with key troubled areas and then widening to provide increased humanitarian aid to the entire country. Read the full summary here.

 

Meanwhile, Assad has won and so has Islamic State….

If Assad Wins, Islamic State Wins

Bloomberg: The civilians fleeing Aleppo don’t prove definitively that, with Russian backing, President Bashar al-Assad will win the Syrian civil war. But it’s certainly time to game out that scenario and ask: What would victory look like to Assad? And what will happen to the other regional actors engaged in this fight?

The decisive element to consider is whether Assad needs to defeat Islamic State to be a winner. If the answer is yes — and if Assad could do it — the world would probably breathe a sigh of relief, and accept Assad’s victory, despite its extraordinary human costs and egregious violations of human rights.

But Assad will probably calculate that he doesn’t need to beat Islamic State, just contain it so that it doesn’t constitute an existential threat to his regime. That would put Islamic State well on its way to becoming a statelet, accepted by its neighbors for lack of will to defeat it. The long-term consequences for the world would be high, but Assad’s regime would be substantially better off.

For now, Assad appears to be moving toward at least a limited victory over the ill-organized Free Syrian Army forces around Aleppo. It isn’t rocket science. He’s combining intense air support from Russian planes with ground forces drawn from what remains of the Syrian army.

The Battle of Aleppo has been going on since 2012. What’s changed in this round is the intensity of Russian airstrikes. Republican presidential candidate Ted Cruz may have said that he wants to carpet bomb Islamic State to find out if sand can glow in the dark, but it’s Russian President Vladimir Putin who’s following a version of that strategy against the Syrian opposition.

It’s still conceivable that the Free Syrian Army could rally, but it doesn’t look likely. That would mean Assad could consolidate control over Aleppo and whatever number of people remains there. The population was some 2.5 million before the war, and it’s certainly much smaller now.

Over time, opposition fighters could in theory infiltrate back and attempt an insurgency. If Assad can’t spare sufficient troops to hold Aleppo, the Free Syrian Army might stage a comeback. But it would be doing so from a much reduced position, and the war-weary public might very well be unwilling to support  it.

Once the formula of intense Russian bombing plus Syrian ground troops has been shown to be a success, Assad and Putin will repeat it over whatever Syrian territory remains in Free Syrian Army or Syrian Kurdish hands. It is entirely reasonable to think it would succeed again.

That will lead to a major strategic crossroads. Assad and Putin will at least be tempted to try their winning formula against Islamic State.

Putin would love to show the world that he can succeed where the West has failed. Beating the Sunni militant group would significantly improve Russia’s global military prestige. Added to his taking of Crimea, it would make Putin the first Russian leader in more than a generation to win wars, which will also burnish his domestic reputation. It might be possible to achieve all this without Russian ground troops. And if airstrikes aren’t enough, Putin can simply blame the Syrian ground forces for being inadequate.

The upside for Assad would be a return to something not unlike the status quo before the Sunni uprising against him — but with a smaller national population with fewer Sunni Arabs, because many will remain in Turkey and Europe as refugees.

At one time, it seemed unimaginable that the Assad regime could return to national control. But that doesn’t seem quite as unrealistic now. Iran would favor and support Assad, as it always has. Now that Iran’s regional position has improved as a result of the nuclear deal with the U.S. and the lifting of economic sanctions, Iran would be better placed than ever to support Assad.

The Israelis have looked Islamic State in the face and concluded they’d rather have Assad than total chaos. Turkey had warm relations with Assad and was establishing open borders with Syria until the uprising broke those ties. As a geostrategic matter, Turkey would eventually take Assad back into the fold, whatever its continuing anger about the massacres he’s perpetrated. Even Saudi Arabia, which sees the Assad regime as the cat’s-paw of its rival Iran, would be prepared to live with Assad if it meant a return to regional stability.

The great risk for Assad in taking on Islamic State is the possibility of overreach. Even if he has enough troops to beat the militants, he might not be able to hold down the rest of the country. And if Islamic State forces flee Syria into Iraq, which would be the rational thing for them to do, they could come back and harass whatever forces Assad left behind. Unlike the Free Syrian Army, Islamic State would have a base from which to pursue an insurgency. It also has ideologically motivated troops with some combat experience. What’s more, Assad simply may not want to govern Sunnis area in Syria that have either sided with Islamic State or accepted its rule as a practical matter.

Assad therefore might decide that he’d be better off with a de facto border that Islamic State respects out of self-interest. If he leaves the group alone and is left alone in exchange, he can re-establish some semblance of sovereignty in much of Syria, surely his No. 1 priority. Essentially, Islamic State becomes everyone else’s problem, not Assad’s.

This scenario seems to me more likely than a serious Syrian countermilitant push. It would leave Islamic State as a threat to Iraq, to regional security and the rest of the world. The possibility of Islamic State as a long-term, de facto state looms.

Putin Demands a Stand-down or Escalation of War

As you read this, Obama is in California fundraising. Poor guy, he is sleeping at a Sheraton rather than his usual Fairmont….sigh.

Russia proposes Syria ceasefire but warns foreign troops risk ‘world war’

Munich (Germany) (AFP) – Moscow said Thursday it had made a “quite specific” ceasefire proposal for Syria as foreign ministers gathered in Munich, hoping to revive a floundering peace process amid warnings of a “new world war”.

With Syria peace talks derailed by the regime onslaught on Aleppo, the UN said 51,000 Syrians had fled the northern city this month as government forces backed by Russian bombers and Iranian fighters left the opposition there virtually surrounded.

“We made propositions for a ceasefire that are quite specific,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said as he sat down for talks with US counterpart John Kerry.

Moscow has refused to confirm reports that its ceasefire would take effect only on March 1, giving another three weeks to an offensive which the UN says could place 300,000 people under siege.

Observers say the bombardments on Aleppo have killed 500 people since they began on February 1.

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, meanwhile, warned that any move by Gulf nations to send in troops to support the rebels would risk a “new world war”.

“The Americans and our Arabic partners must think hard about this: do they want a permanent war?” he told Germany’s Handelsblatt newspaper.

US diplomats said that any ceasefire in the Syria conflict should be “immediate”.

“This is an issue of commitments we all took, and that we have to respect,” added EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini.

But Russia and Iran have repeatedly labelled the rebels in Aleppo as “terrorists” and suggested there can be no settlement until they have been militarily defeated.

“Those who are outside Syria should help the peace process and not seek to impose conditions on the Syrian people,” Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told Iran’s state TV after arriving for the talks.

– US ‘Plan B’ –

A first round of talks between the Syrian government and the opposition in Geneva collapsed earlier this month over the attacks on Aleppo.

The rebels say they will not return to talks, pencilled in for February 25, unless government sieges and air strikes end.

Hosted by Kerry and Lavrov, foreign ministers from the 17-nation Syria contact group came together late Thursday for a meeting billed as a moment of truth for the floundering peace process.

Washington has threatened an unspecified “Plan B” if talks fail, as tension mounts with Moscow over its air campaign.

The two sides traded accusations on Thursday about bombing in Aleppo, with the Pentagon claiming two hospitals had been destroyed, and Moscow saying US planes had struck the city — which was flatly denied by Washington.

– Weakening the West –

Analysts see little hope of reconciling differences.

Syria is a crucial ally and military staging post for Russia and Iran, while a growing number of observers say Moscow has benefited from the chaos created by the war, particularly the refugee crisis in Europe.

“The goal of Russian President Vladimir Putin is to destabilise and weaken the West,” Koert Debeuf, a research fellow at the University of Oxford, told the Carnegie Europe think tank.

But they also see little chance of a decisive victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

“The idea of a full reconquest… seems neither credible nor durable. It will simply turn into a terrorist or guerrilla situation,” said Camille Grand, of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.

Many have criticised the United States for not doing more to support the rebels.

Even outgoing French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius could not hide his frustration as he announced his resignation on Wednesday, saying: “You don’t get the feeling that there is a very strong commitment” by the US in Syria.

Washington has been reluctant to involve itself in another war after the quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, and has sought to focus more on combatting the Islamic State group than getting involved in the civil war between Syria’s regime and rebels.

“The US has given up the idea of toppling Assad,” said Grand. “Kerry seems willing to accept pretty much anything to resolve the crisis.”

The conflict has also strained relations between Turkey and its Western allies.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hit back at UN calls that his country, which is already hosting 2.5 million refugees, should do more for those fleeing Aleppo.

“We do not have the word ‘idiot’ written on our foreheads,” he said. “The United Nations should give advice to other countries. And then we can send the refugees to these countries.”

He has also slammed Washington’s increasingly close alliance with the Kurdish militias in the fight against IS, saying it was turning the region into “a pool of blood”.

*** A deeper dive on Putin

Mounting Evidence Putin Will Ignite WWIII

By letting Putin get away with whatever he likes in Syria, Obama has created a deeply dangerous situation

Schindler-Observer: Relations between Russia and Turkey have been dismal since late November, when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian bomber on the border with Syria, killing its pilot. That began a war of words between Moscow and Ankara that ought to concern everyone, since the former has several thousand nuclear weapons and the latter is a member of NATO.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin walks near a new Russian fighter jet Sukhoi T-50, after its flight in Zhukovksy, outside Moscow on June 17, 2010. AFP PHOTO / RIA NOVOSTI / POOL / ALEXEY DRUZHININ (Photo credit should read ALEXEY DRUZHININ/AFP/Getty Images)

Kremlin propaganda against Ankara has increased of late, setting the stage for further confrontation. As I explained here last week, Russian media outlets initially blamed the Sinai crash of Metrojet 9268 last autumn on the Islamic State, an atrocity which killed 224 innocents, nearly all of them Russians—a quite plausible claim. However, the Kremlin has abruptly shifted course and now blames the mass murder on Turkish ultranationalist terrorists, without any evidence provided to support that explosive assertion.

Where things may be going between Russia and Turkey, ancient enemies who have warred many times over the centuries, was evidenced this week, when the Kremlin announced large-scale surprise military exercises in the regions of the country that are close to Turkey. Troops were moved to full combat readiness, the last stage before a shooting war, with Sergei Shoygu, the Russian defense minister, announcing on TV: “We began our surprise check of the military preparedness in the Southwest strategic direction.”

That would be the direction of Turkey. These snap exercises involve the Southern Military District and the navy’s Black Sea Fleet, which are deeply involved in Russia’s not-so-secret secret war in eastern Ukraine. However, they also involve the navy’s Caspian Sea flotilla, which is nowhere near Ukraine.

It’s difficult to see how Turkey could stand idly by as an ancient city of two million is crushed just fifty miles from its frontier.

This implies that the snap exercises, which have been prominently featured in Kremlin media, are about Turkey, not Russia. This goes back to recent events on the ground in Syria, where the Kremlin-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad is slowly crushing its opponents, thanks to prodigious military help from both Russia and Iran. Regime forces are closing in on Aleppo, Syria’s biggest city, and 50,000 civilians have already fled the city in panic.

The Russian military displays scant regard for civilian casualties. Mr. Putin’s air force killed almost 700 Syrian civilians last month (to compare, the Islamic State killed less than a hundred Syrian civilians in January), and if the crushing of the Chechen capital of Groznyy in 1994-95, when Russian forces killed roughly 35,000 Chechens, mostly civilians, in just six weeks, is any guide, residents of Aleppo are wise to get as far away as they can.

Needless to add, such a bloody siege of Aleppo would set off a humanitarian crisis that the world could not fail to notice. It’s difficult to see how Turkey could stand idly by as an ancient city of two million is crushed just fifty miles from its frontier.

That is precisely the scenario that has seasoned analysts worried. In Pentagon circles, among those who are watching the budding war between Moscow and Ankara, citations of this famous movie clip are now commonplace. Distressingly, smart Russian analysts are thinking along similar lines.

Today Pavel Felgenhauer published his analysis under the alarming title, “Russia has begun preparations for a major war,” and he marshals a convincing case that the snap exercises in the country’s southwest are really a cover for a shooting war with Turkey—and therefore with NATO too, if Ankara is perceived as defending itself and can assert its right to Article 5, collective self-defense, which obligates all members of the Atlantic Alliance to come to Turkey’s aid.

‘It’s clear that there has to be some actual ‘redline’ for Mr. Obama, something that the United States cannot tolerate Russia doing – but where is it? If I don’t know, I’m sure the Kremlin doesn’t either.’

As The New York Times dryly noted of the Kremlin, “The [Defense] Ministry has ordered surprise maneuvers over the last three years as tensions between the East and West have worsened. The maneuvers have at times come as combat escalated in Ukraine and Syria.” In fact, using large-scale military exercises as a cover for aggression is old hat in Moscow. It was used during the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which explains why NATO always got jumpy when Moscow held military exercises anywhere NATO territory, while snap exercises like this week inevitably caused Cold War panic.

Mr. Felgenhauer paints an alarmingly plausible scenario. As rebel forces defend Aleppo in Stalingrad fashion, the Syrian military, with Russian help, commences a protracted siege of the city, employing massive firepower, which becomes a humanitarian nightmare of a kind not seen in decades, a tragedy that would dwarf the 1992-95 siege of Sarajevo. However, any Turkish move to lift that siege, even with international imprimatur, would quickly devolve into all-out war.

Mr. Felgenhauer minces no words about this: “Russia has begun the deployment of forces and resources for a major war with Turkey.” Mr. Putin has decided to let his client, the Assad regime, win its bloody civil war, first in the north around Aleppo, and any moves by Turkey or NATO to stop them will be met with force. So far, President Barack Obama has let Mr. Putin do whatever he likes in Syria, no matter the cost in innocent lives, so the Kremlin has no reason to think that will change.

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973, when the United States and the Soviet Union came alarmingly close to great power war, is cited as an ominous precedent by Mr. Felgenhauer—albeit one that ended happily when nuclear war was averted thanks to wise diplomacy. There is no reason to think the befuddled Obama administration is that diplomatically deft.

But who is Pavel Felgenhauer? Regrettably, he is not a guy in furry slippers in someone’s basement spouting weird conspiracy theories. Instead, he is one of Russia’s top defense analysts with solid connections in that country’s military. He is a frequent critic of the Russian military and the Putin regime; it’s noteworthy that he published his analysis in Novoe Vremya (New Times), a Ukrainian newsmagazine, not a Russian outlet, perhaps because this sort of truth-telling is unwelcome at home. His prognostications are often correct, for instance his prediction of the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, which he called two months before it happened.

That is NATO’s top concern right now: that after years of weakness and vacillation, the Obama administration may find itself backed into a corner by aggressive Russian action.

Is Mr. Felgenhauer’s alarmism warranted? Many Western insiders think along similar lines. By letting Mr. Putin get away with whatever he likes in Syria, Mr. Obama has created a deeply dangerous situation in the region. By abandoning his infamous Syria “redline” in September 2013, the White House in effect outsourced American policy there to Mr. Putin, as I warned you at the time, and which the Obama administration, powerless to influence terrible events in Syria, is slowly realizing.

“Are we heading for our ‘Sarajevo moment’?” a senior NATO official bluntly asked: “It’s clear that there has to be some actual ‘redline’ for Mr. Obama, something that the United States cannot tolerate Russia doing – but where is it? If I don’t know, I’m sure the Kremlin doesn’t either.”

That is NATO’s top concern right now: that after years of weakness and vacillation, the Obama administration may find itself backed into a corner by aggressive Russian action. Particularly if coupled with intemperate Turkish reactions, that could create a nightmare of historic proportions around Aleppo. Although the White House has foresworn any military intervention in Syria’s fratricide, it’s worth noting that Mr. Obama led NATO to war in Libya exactly five years ago to prevent possible slaughter in Benghazi, a far smaller humanitarian threat than the terrifying sword of Russian artillery and airpower that’s hanging over Aleppo right now.

For their part, the Russians are upping the ante, with regime media publishing claims by the Defense Ministry that air attacks on Aleppo yesterday that killed civilians, including the bombing of a hospital, were actually perpetrated by U.S. Air Force A-10s, a war crime that they say the Pentagon has tried to pin on Moscow. In fact, American intelligence knows this was the work of the Russian Air Force: “We have intercepts of the Russian pilots talking during the attack,” explained a Pentagon official, “as usual, the Russians are lying.” Yet this sort of dishonest Kremlin propaganda, what spies term disinformation, is exactly what the Obama administration has refused to counter, as I’ve explained in this column, in a futile effort to keep the Kremlin happy.

Mr. Putin instead has taken his measure of Mr. Obama and has doubled down, saving his client regime in Syria. Russia has won in Syria and NATO and the West are stuck with that outcome, as are the unlucky residents of Aleppo. “I hope Obama doesn’t decide to get a backbone now,” suggested a retired American general who knows the Russians well, “since the Kremlin is in ‘drive’ in Syria and isn’t about to do ‘reverse’.”

There seems to be little chance of this White House taking on the Russians in Syria. However, there are no guarantees that Ankara is equally inclined to let the Kremlin do whatever it wants on its southern border, and that is how NATO could get embroiled in World War III over the Levant. Cooler heads may prevail, and all sensible people should hope they do here.

 

 

KSM, Muslim Brotherhood Kuwait and 9/11

CTC: Nasir al-Wahayshi, AQAP’s Leader
Nasir al-Wahayshi is a tiny wisp of a man with a jutting beard and soft-spoken manner. Known by the kunya Abu Basir, he was born in 1976 in the region of Mukayras in what was then Abyan.[3] Redistricting in 1998 put Mukayras in al-Bayda and that same year al-Wahayshi left Yemen for Afghanistan.[4] He had just graduated from one of Yemen’s private religious institutes, which had been established in the 1970s and 1980s as a way to convince Yemeni tribesmen that a republican form of government was compatible with Islam. Staffed by Egyptian exiles and Saudi teachers, many of these institutes eventually gravitated toward the more radical works of Islamic theology.

Al-Wahayshi arrived in Afghanistan in the months after Usama bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa, declaring war on the United States and Israel, and he soon joined al-Qa`ida. Bin Laden made the young Yemeni his personal secretary, and for the next four years the two were nearly inseparable.[5] Al-Wahayshi spent all of his time with Bin Ladin, watching as the older man built and ran an international organization. He sat in on councils and helped with correspondence.

After the 9/11 attacks and the confused aftermath of the Battle of Tora Bora in late 2001, al-Wahayshi was separated from the al-Qa`ida commander. Bin Laden escaped into Pakistan, while al-Wahayshi moved south toward Iran, where he was eventually arrested and held for nearly two years.[6] In late 2003, al-Wahayshi was extradited back to Yemen. Apparently unaware of his close connections to Bin Ladin, Yemeni intelligence held him in the general prison population at a maximum-security facility in Sana`a.

AQAP publishes insider’s account of 9/11 plot

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TLWJ: Sometime before his death in a US drone strike in June 2015, Nasir al Wuhayshi recorded an insider’s account of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As the aide-de-camp to Osama bin Laden prior to the hijackings, Wuhayshi was well-placed to know such details. And al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which Wuhayshi led until his demise, has now published a version of his “untold story.”

A transcript of Wuhayshi’s discussion of the 9/11 plot was included in two editions of AQAP’s Al Masra newsletter. The first part was posted online on Jan. 31 and the second on Feb. 9. The summary below is based on the first half of Wuhayshi’s account.

Wuhayshi began by explaining al Qaeda’s rationale for attacking America. Prior to 9/11, the jihadists’ cause was not supported by the Muslim people, because the mujahideen’s “goals” were not widely understood. The jihadists were divided into many groups and fought “tit-for-tat” conflicts “with the tyrants.” (The “tyrants” were the dictators who ruled over many Muslim-majority countries.)

While the mujahideen had some successes, according to Wuhayshi, they were “besieged” by the tyrants until they found some breathing room in Afghanistan. The “sheikhs” studied this situation in meetings held in Kabul and Kandahar, because they wanted to understand why the jihadists were not victorious. And bin Laden concluded they should fight “the more manifest infidel enemy rather than the crueler infidel enemy,” according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal. Wuhayshi explained that the former was the “Crusader-Zionist movement” and the latter were the “apostates” ruling over Muslims.

While waging war against the “apostate” rulers was not likely to engender widespread support, no “two people” would “disagree” with the necessity of fighting “the Jews and Christians.” If you fight the “apostate governments in your land,” Wuhayshi elaborated, then everyone – the Muslim people, Islamic movements, and even jihadists – would be against you because they all have their own “priorities.” Divisions within the jihadists’ ranks only exacerbated the crisis, as even the mujahideen in their home countries could refuse to fight.

Wuhayshi then cited Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, a prominent pro-al Qaeda ideologue, who warned that the “capability” to wage “combat” in Muslim-majority countries did “not yet exist.” So, for instance, if al Qaeda launched a “jihad against the House of Saud,” then “many jihadist movements” would oppose this decision. Al Qaeda’s fellow travelers would protest that they were “incapable” of defeating the Saudi government. And these jihadists would complain they did not want to “wage the battle prematurely,” or become entangled “in a difficult situation.”

For these reasons and more, according to Wuhayshi, bin Laden decided to “battle the more manifest enemy,” because “the people” would agree that the US “is an enemy” and this approach would not sow “discord and suspicion among the people.” Bin Laden believed that the “Islamic movement” would stand with al Qaeda “against the infidels.”

Wuhayshi’s explanation of bin Laden’s reasoning confirms that attacking the US was not al Qaeda’s end goal. It was a tactic, or a step, that bin Laden believed could unite the jihadists behind a common purpose and garner more popular support from “the people.”

Not all jihadists agreed with bin Laden’s strategy. In February 1998, bin Laden launched a “Global Islamic Front for Waging Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.” Wuhayshi claimed that a “majority of the groups agreed to” the initiative, but some, like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), opposed it. (However, some senior LIFG members were folded into al Qaeda.)

Gamaa Islamiya (IG), an Egyptian group, initially agreed to join the venture, but ultimately rejected it. As did other groups in the Arab Magreb, according to Wuhayshi. (Some senior IG leaders remained close to al Qaeda and eventually joined the organization.)

Although Wuhayshi claimed that a “majority” of jihadist organizations agreed with bin Laden’s proposal, only three ideologues joined bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri in signing the front’s infamous first fatwa.

In August 1998, just months after the “Global Islamic Front” was established, al Qaeda struck the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to Wuhayshi, bin Laden held a series of meetings around this time, as he sought to convince as many people as possible that attacking America was the right course. Some jihadists objected, believing it would ensnare them in a trap. But bin Laden pressed forward, telling those who didn’t agree that they wanted to fight “lackeys” without confronting “the father of the lackeys.” Al Qaeda’s path “will lead to a welcome conclusion,” Wuhayshi quoted bin Laden as saying.

The “initiative against the Crusaders continued” after the US Embassy bombings, Wuhayshi said, and the number of people who supported it increased “dramatically.” During this period, the “Global Islamic Front” launched operations against the “Crusaders” on the ground and at sea, but the idea to strike “from the air with planes” had not yet been conceived.

The origins of the 9/11 plot

Wuhayshi traced the genesis of the 9/11 plot to both Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who would come to be known as the “mastermind” of the operation.

But he also credited Abdullah Azzam for popularizing the concept of martyrdom in the first place. Azzam was killed in 1989, but is still revered as the godfather of modern jihadism. After the mujahideen had defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan, they considered “hitting the Americans,” Wuhayshi claimed. Azzam “spoke harshly about the Western military camp.” Azzam also “introduced” the jihadists to a “new tactic.” Wuhayshi recommended that people listen to Azzam’s “final speech,” in which he reportedly said: “God gave me life in order to transform you into bombs.”

Years later, on Oct. 31, 1999, bin Laden watched as the co-pilot of EgyptAir Flight 990 crashed the jet into the Atlantic Ocean, killing more than 200 people on board. Bin Laden, according to Wuhayshi, wondered why the co-pilot didn’t fly the plane into buildings. After this, Wuhayshi claimed, the basic idea for 9/11 had been planted in bin Laden’s mind.

In reality, the EgyptAir crash came after the outline of the 9/11 plot had been already sketched. For instance, the 9/11 Commission found that KSM “presented a proposal for an operation that would involve training pilots who would crash planes into buildings in the United States” as early as 1996. “This proposal eventually would become the 9/11 operation.” In March or April 1999, according to the Commission’s final report, bin Laden “summoned KSM to Kandahar…to tell him that al Qaeda would support his proposal,” which was referred to as the “planes operation.”

Indeed, Wuhayshi recounted how KSM and his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, plotted to attack multiple airliners in the mid-1990s. In the so-called Bojinka plot, KSM and Yousef even conceived a plan to blow up as many as one dozen airliners. Wuhayshi recalled how Yousef placed a bomb on board one jet as part of a test run. Their plot failed and Yousef was later captured in Pakistan. Yousef has been incarcerated for two decades after being convicted by an American court for his role in Bojinka and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Wuhayshi prayed for his release.

Wuhayshi told a story that, if true, means KSM had dreamed of attacking the US since his youth. When he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, KSM wrote a play in which a character “ponders how to down an American aircraft.” Wuhayshi claimed to have searched for this play online, but he and another “brother” failed to find it.

Still, Wuhayshi insisted that KSM wrote the play, showing he was already thinking of ways to strike America as a young man.