General Shelton Slams Iran

The summary below translates into a few questions. Why does Secretary of State John Kerry continue to legitimize Iran and to bring the country on equal footing globally as they are a rogue nation? The next question, will the White House continue to ignore Iran’s history of terrorism?

Iran is a dangerous ‘ally’ in Syria and Iraq

At the dawn of 2015, the U.S. has yet to articulate a comprehensive foreign-policy strategy to counter the influence and territorial gains of Islamic State, the terrorist group that emerged last year — and poses a dangerous and vexing threat to stability across the Middle East and North Africa. By the Pentagon’s admission, we neither understand the underlying ideology of the merciless group nor have a grasp of all the players in the region who have aggravated the crisis.

Indeed, the fog of war seems to have muddied Iran’s role in this dark chapter of regional affairs. Is Tehran an ally or a nemesis in the fight against Islamic State? At least initially, the U.S. believed that Iran could play a constructive role in combating a mutual adversary. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, touting the age-old axiom “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” suggested that Iran could be part of the solution.

The only trouble is that Iran is a major part of the challenges we face.

Islamic State, also known by the acronym ISIS, rose out of the sectarian conflict that exploded in Iraq in 2004, shortly after the U.S.-led occupation. Iran immediately backed Shiite Muslim militant factions with training, money, weapons and intelligence, sparking a vicious Sunni Muslim militant counter-reaction that nourished Al Qaeda and, later, ISIS. The rise to power of Nouri Maliki, an inept and corrupt Shiite prime minister with strong ties to Tehran, sealed Iraq’s fate not only as a breeding ground for Sunni extremism, but as an Iranian satellite state.

Iran now has more than 7,000 Revolutionary Guards and elite Quds Force members in Iraq, according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition organization. The killing of Iranian military advisor Hamid Taqavi, a brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guard, in December in Samarra put an exclamation point on the scope and significance of the Revolutionary Guard’s presence in Iraq. As the most senior commander of the Quds Force to die abroad since the Iran-Iraq war ended 26 years ago, Taqavi played a key role in Tehran’s training and control of Shiite militias in Iraq.

Amnesty International has pointed to the presence of Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq as a key source of instability and sectarian conflict there. In an October report called “Absolute Impunity, Militia Rule in Iraq,” Amnesty found that the growing power of Shiite militias has contributed to a “deterioration in security and an atmosphere of lawlessness” and that the Shiites “are ruthlessly targeting Sunni civilians … under the guise of fighting terrorism, in an apparent bid to punish Sunnis for the rise of the ISIS and for its heinous crimes.”

Iranian clerics’ paranoia over domestic discontent has made meddling in regional countries, Iraq in particular, a cornerstone of Tehran’s foreign policy and survival strategy. Speaking at Taqavi’s funeral, top Iranian security official Ali Shamkhani said, “Taqavi and people like him gave their blood in Samarra so that we do not give our blood in Tehran.”

Iran’s reasons for “fighting” ISIS diverge considerably from U.S. objectives. Whereas we seek a stable and nonsectarian government in Iraq, the mullahs’ interests are best served by the ascension of a subordinate Shiite leadership, enabling them to use the neighbor to the west as a springboard for their regional hegemonic, anti-Western designs. The Iranian government sees an opening in the turmoil in Iraq for consolidating its grip on that country, weakened by the ouster of Prime Minister Maliki.

Iran’s role in the civil war in Syria is following a similar dynamic: Through its proxy Hezbollah — the Shiite Muslim political and paramilitary organization — Iran has served as Syrian President Bashar Assad’s battering ram against his people, killing and enraging Sunnis and fueling ISIS’ exponential growth.

Aiding and abetting Iran’s destructive role in Iraq or Syria would be a strategic mistake for the U.S. that only exacerbates a profound crisis. It is a dangerous irony to even consider allying with Iran — which the U.S. State Department still considers the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism — to fight the terrorism inspired by ISIS.

Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, who is well versed in the agenda and ambitions of Tehran’s mullahs, rightly describes a potential Western alliance with Iran against ISIS as akin to “jumping from the frying pan into the fire.” The eviction of the Iranian government from the region, especially from Syria and Iraq, must be part of the U.S. strategy for countering ISIS and resolving the sectarian divides that drive extremism throughout the region, Rajavi says.

She’s right. The U.S. must think beyond ISIS to what kind of region will be left in its smoldering wake. As the U.S. weighs its policy options, any scenario that leaves Iran in control of large swaths of the region must be rejected outright.
Gen. Hugh Shelton served as the 14th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

 

The Fallout of Qatar’s Reputation

Qatar has had a long history of funding terrorism and taking in combatants as free refugees such as the Taliban 5. Qatar is denying funding terrorism and the Pentagon is playing stupid on the matter at the behest of the U.S. State Department all for the sake of nefarious diplomacy.

What is more, since the Arab Spring and the power shift in Egypt, al Sissi has moved to terminate the Muslim Brotherhood footprint once based in Cairo. Additionally, Egypt has moved to terminate al Jazeera media in Egypt.

Pressure has been applied to Qatar by several Gulf States recently including the United Arab Emirates as well as Saudi Arabia. Some pressure has also been applied by the U.S. Treasury which tracks terror funding.

Now comes the leader of Hamas.

Hamas leader Mashaal said deported from Qatar

Reconciling with key Arab countries against Brotherhood, Doha boots political chief; Israel welcomes news, Hamas denies it

Qatar has deported Hamas political leader Khaled Mashaal after hosting him for the past three years, Israel’s Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.

The move, first reported by a Turkish newspaper on Sunday, was swiftly denied by an official from the Islamist group.

According to a report in left-wing Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, Qatar has faced significant pressure from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to deport Mashaal, amid a diplomatic reconciliation process currently underway between the small Gulf state and the Arab world.

According to CNN, citing a Hamas-run news agency, Mashaal and other Muslim Brotherhood members were most likely to head to Turkey.

On December 20, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi met with Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdul Rahman, a special envoy of Qatari leader Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The meeting apparently ended the longstanding enmity between the two states over Qatar’s support for Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.

In a written message Tuesday, Israel’s Foreign Ministry congratulated Qatar for its decision to deport Mashaal.

“The Foreign Ministry, led by minister Avigdor Liberman, has advanced various moves to cause Qatar to carry out this step and stop aiding Hamas, directly and indirectly. To this end, minister Liberman and the ministry’s professional staff have acted in overt and covert tracks with Qatar and other states. We expect the Turkish government to now follow suit,” the Foreign Ministry’s message read.

But a Hamas official, Izzat al-Rishq, denied reports that Mashaal was in fact deported.

“There is no truth to reports by certain media concerning the departure of Khaled Mashaal from Qatar,” Rishq wrote on his Facebook page Tuesday afternoon.

According to Arab media reports, the deal between Egypt and Qatar included the closing of anti-Sissi Qatari news channel Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr on December 22; the extradition of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members from Qatar to Egypt; and a halt to Qatar’s funding of the Muslim Brotherhood.

If true, Mashaal’s departure from Qatar would mark the end of Hamas’s political presence in the Arab world. Expelled from Jordan in August 1999 and choosing to break ties with the Assad regime in Syria in January 2012, Mashaal has struggled — and failed — to foster political patrons in the tumultuous Arab Middle East.

Appearing before a gathering of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Konya December 27, Mashaal congratulated the people of Turkey “for having [Prime Minister Ahmet] Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” as heads of state, adding that “a strong Turkey means a strong Palestine … Inshallah, God is with us and with you on the road to victory.”

Qatar: “Worst” on Counterterroism in the Middle East?

On Sunday, WikiLeaks revealed a State Department cable last December that labeled Qatar, the tiny, oil-rich Gulf nation, as the Middle East’s “worst” participant in counterterrorism efforts, the New York Times reports. According to the cable, Qatari security was “hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.”

Another cable from December 2009 stressed increased counterterrorism efforts as a talking point for the Emir’s January 2010 visit.

The details offered in these cables are particularly strange when compared with a 2008 Congressional Research Service report for Congress.

The U.S. State Department called Qatar’s terrorism support since 9/11 “significant,” according to the CRS report. Since the attacks, Qatar established both a Combating Terrorism Law and the Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) in March of 2004. The QACA was meant to monitor the operations of all Qatari charity organizations and ostensibly make sure the charities weren’t funneling cash to terrorist organizations. But there was an asterisk: The Emir could stop the QACA from overseeing a particular organization’s activities whenever he wants.

“U.S. concerns regarding alleged material support for terrorist groups by some Qataris, including members of the royal family, have been balanced over time by Qatar’s counterterrorism and efforts and its broader, long-term commitment to host and support U.S. military forces being used in ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism,” wrote Christopher M. Blanchard, the Middle East affairs analyst who authored the CRS report.

So what changed between 2008 and 2009?

Probably not much. The discrepancy in rhetoric is likely more an issue of what the United States is willing to say in public, and in private.

“Keeping U.S. basing rights in Qatar and ensuring the stable flow of oil and LNG gas [liquefied natural gas] are both more important than Qatar’s willingness to deal seriously with its citizens involvement in terrorism,” says Toby Jones, an assistant Middle East history professor at Rutgers University. “The cost of [the United States] pressuring them publicly to take counterterrorism seriously, it seems, might come at too high an economic cost.”

But U.S. officials may have reason to be suspicious of Qatar. Members of the royal family reportedly hosted Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind, in the late ’90s and may have helped him evade U.S. capture. In 2005, officials discovered another link between Qatar and al Qaeda: Qatar paid al Qaeda (and some speculate it may still be paying) millions of dollars each year so al Qaeda wouldn’t attack it. Qatar struck the deal before the 2003 Iraq invasion and renewed it in March of 2005, when an Egyptian suicide bomber attacked a theater in Doha. Many believed the bomber was part of al Qaeda. “We’re not sure that the attack was carried out by al Qaeda, but we ratified our agreement just to be on the safe side,” a Qatari official said at the time. “We are a soft target and prefer to pay to secure our national and economical interests. We are not the only ones doing so.”

It’s true: Qatar is one of many nations that have allegedly funded Islamic movements to save their own citizens, and that funding was another topic of discussion slated for last January’s meeting. “Officials should make known USG concerns about the financial support to Hamas by Qatari charitable organizations and our concerns about the moral support Hamas receives from Yousef Al-Qaradawi,” the December, 2009 cable said. “It is also essential to stress that high-level Qatari political support is needed, if financial flows to terrorists are to stop.”

But in a region rife with secret terrorist ties and illicit deals, it may seem strange that the only nation to host a U.S. military base could earn the dubious-least-valuable player title.

Yet America’s chummy relationship with Qatar is a key reason for Doha’s hesitancy to comply with every U.S. demand and its apparent eagerness to appease threatening countries and organizations. That relationship is, partly, what makes Qatar such a ready target.

Because it hosts the Al Udeid airbase and Camp As Sayliyah, a pre-positioning facility of U.S. military equipment, Qatar is at greater risk of terrorist attacks than neighboring countries, whose ties to the U.S. are less tangible. Notably, Qatar pays for the upkeep of the American military bases in its borders; the U.S. pays no rent, and no utilities.

So while countries like Saudi Arabia and the emirate of Abu Dhabi have aligned themselves strongly with the U.S. counterterrorism strategy because they rely somewhat on U.S. power and protection, Qatar has no such dependence. “[Qatar isn’t] fully behind the United States in the same way that Abu Dhabi clearly is,” explains Dr. Christopher Davidson, a United Nations and Middle East Policy Council expert on the Gulf monarchies, and a professor at Durham University in England. “This explains why there’s been some criticism of Qatar not being tight enough on counterterrorism. ”

Beyond Qatar’s alleged funding of al Qaeda and its ties to Hamas and Iran, it has also tried to bolster its reputation by allowing money to flow freely through the country, no questions asked. Implementing more scrutiny would likely anger terrorist groups and put Qatar at greater risk.

“If the funding is cut, or if the Qatari authorities listen to America and try to tighten things up so money can’t flow as easily, then you have the real risk of jihad coming home to Qatar,” Davidson explains. “The smaller Gulf states have never really faced a stage of serious terror attacks like Saudi Arabia has, but they all certainly live in fear of that.”

 

 

 

2015, a Banner Year for Tax Hikes

It is Obamacare stupid. A full report is here.

 

Full List of Obamacare Tax Hikes: Listed by Size of Tax Hike

Complied by Americans for Tax Reform

WASHINGTON, DC — Obamacare contains 20 new or higher taxes on American families and small businesses. Arranged by their respective sizes according to CBO scores, below is the total list of all $500 billion-plus in tax hikes (over the next ten years) in Obamacare, their effective dates, and where to find them in the bill.

$123 Billion: Surtax on Investment Income (Takes effect Jan. 2013): A new, 3.8 percent surtax on investment income earned in households making at least $250,000 ($200,000 single). This would result in the following top tax rates on investment income:

Capital Gains Dividends Other*
2012 15% 15% 35%
2013+ 23.8% 43.4% 43.4%

*Other unearned income includes (for surtax purposes) gross income from interest, annuities, royalties, net rents, and passive income in partnerships and Subchapter-S corporations.  It does not include municipal bond interest or life insurance proceeds, since those do not add to gross income.  It does not include active trade or business income, fair market value sales of ownership in pass-through entities, or distributions from retirement plans.  The 3.8% surtax does not apply to non-resident aliens. (Bill: Reconciliation Act; Page: 87-93)

$86 Billion: Hike in Medicare Payroll Tax (Takes effect Jan. 2013): Current law and changes:

First $200,000
($250,000 Married)
Employer/Employee
All Remaining Wages
Employer/Employee
Current Law 1.45%/1.45%
2.9% self-employed
1.45%/1.45%
2.9% self-employed
Obamacare Tax Hike 1.45%/1.45%
2.9% self-employed
1.45%/2.35%
3.8% self-employed
Bill: PPACA, Reconciliation Act; Page: 2000-2003; 87-93

$65 Billion: Individual Mandate Excise Tax and Employer Mandate Tax (Both taxes take effect Jan. 2014):

Individual: Anyone not buying “qualifying” health insurance as defined by Obama-appointed HHS bureaucrats must pay an income surtax according to the higher of the following

1 Adult 2 Adults 3+ Adults
2014 1% AGI/$95 1% AGI/$190 1% AGI/$285
2015 2% AGI/$325 2% AGI/$650 2% AGI/$975
2016 + 2.5% AGI/$695 2.5% AGI/$1390 2.5% AGI/$2085
Exemptions for religious objectors, undocumented immigrants, prisoners, those earning less than the poverty line, members of Indian tribes, and hardship cases (determined by HHS). Bill: PPACA; Page: 317-337

Employer: If an employer does not offer health coverage, and at least one employee qualifies for a health tax credit, the employer must pay an additional non-deductible tax of $2000 for all full-time employees.  Applies to all employers with 50 or more employees. If any employee actually receives coverage through the exchange, the penalty on the employer for that employee rises to $3000. If the employer requires a waiting period to enroll in coverage of 30-60 days, there is a $400 tax per employee ($600 if the period is 60 days or longer). Bill: PPACA; Page: 345-346

(Combined score of individual and employer mandate tax penalty: $65 billion)

$60.1 Billion: Tax on Health Insurers (Takes effect Jan. 2014): Annual tax on the industry imposed relative to health insurance premiums collected that year.  Phases in gradually until 2018.  Fully-imposed on firms with $50 million in profits. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,986-1,993

$32 Billion: Excise Tax on Comprehensive Health Insurance Plans (Takes effect Jan. 2018): Starting in 2018, new 40 percent excise tax on “Cadillac” health insurance plans ($10,200 single/$27,500 family).  Higher threshold ($11,500 single/$29,450 family) for early retirees and high-risk professions.  CPI +1 percentage point indexed. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,941-1,956

$23.6 Billion: “Black liquor” tax hike (Took effect in 2010) This is a tax increase on a type of bio-fuel. Bill: Reconciliation Act; Page: 105

$22.2 Billion: Tax on Innovator Drug Companies (Took effect in 2010): $2.3 billion annual tax on the industry imposed relative to share of sales made that year. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,971-1,980

$20 Billion: Tax on Medical Device Manufacturers (Takes effect Jan. 2013): Medical device manufacturers employ 360,000 people in 6000 plants across the country. This law imposes a new 2.3% excise tax.  Exempts items retailing for <$100. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,980-1,986

$15.2 Billion: High Medical Bills Tax (Takes effect Jan 1. 2013): Currently, those facing high medical expenses are allowed a deduction for medical expenses to the extent that those expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income (AGI).  The new provision imposes a threshold of 10 percent of AGI. Waived for 65+ taxpayers in 2013-2016 only. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,994-1,995

$13.2 Billion: Flexible Spending Account Cap – aka “Special Needs Kids Tax” (Takes effect Jan. 2013): Imposes cap on FSAs of $2500 (now unlimited).  Indexed to inflation after 2013. There is one group of FSA owners for whom this new cap will be particularly cruel and onerous: parents of special needs children.  There are thousands of families with special needs children in the United States, and many of them use FSAs to pay for special needs education.  Tuition rates at one leading school that teaches special needs children in Washington, D.C. (National Child Research Center (link is external)) can easily exceed $14,000 per year. Under tax rules, FSA dollars can be used to pay for this type of special needs education. Bill: PPACA; Page: 2,388-2,389

$5 Billion: Medicine Cabinet Tax (Took effect Jan. 2011): Americans no longer able to use health savings account (HSA), flexible spending account (FSA), or health reimbursement (HRA) pre-tax dollars to purchase non-prescription, over-the-counter medicines (except insulin). Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,957-1,959

$4.5 Billion: Elimination of tax deduction for employer-provided retirement Rx drug coverage in coordination with Medicare Part D (Takes effect Jan. 2013) Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,994

$4.5 Billion: Codification of the “economic substance doctrine” (Took effect in 2010): This provision allows the IRS to disallow completely-legal tax deductions and other legal tax-minimizing plans just because the IRS deems that the action lacks “substance” and is merely intended to reduce taxes owed. Bill: Reconciliation Act; Page: 108-113

$2.7 Billion: Tax on Indoor Tanning Services (Took effect July 1, 2010): New 10 percent excise tax on Americans using indoor tanning salons. Bill: PPACA; Page: 2,397-2,399

$1.4 Billion: HSA Withdrawal Tax Hike (Took effect Jan. 2011): Increases additional tax on non-medical early withdrawals from an HSA from 10 to 20 percent, disadvantaging them relative to IRAs and other tax-advantaged accounts, which remain at 10 percent. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,959

$0.6 Billion: $500,000 Annual Executive Compensation Limit for Health Insurance Executives (Takes effect Jan. 2013): Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,995-2,000

$0.4 Billion: Blue Cross/Blue Shield Tax Hike (Took effect in 2010): The special tax deduction in current law for Blue Cross/Blue Shield companies would only be allowed if 85 percent or more of premium revenues are spent on clinical services. Bill: PPACA; Page: 2,004

$ Negligible: Excise Tax on Charitable Hospitals (Took effect in 2010): $50,000 per hospital if they fail to meet new “community health assessment needs,” “financial assistance,” and “billing and collection” rules set by HHS. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,961-1,971

$ Negligible: Employer Reporting of Insurance on W-2 (Took effect in Jan. 2012): Preamble to taxing health benefits on individual tax returns. Bill: PPACA; Page: 1,957

Early Solution to Islamic State was Ignored

 

Those people in Syria, those rebels that everyone thinks are all jihadis need to rethink the early days. The matter was ignored, dismissed and exploited. Now between Syria, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the enemy has won by doing their own exploitation.

The cost of life and treasure grows with no real end in sight as explained by the White House and the Pentagon.

Rebels: Obama administration ignored early plan to stop Islamic State

 ISTANBUL — Two months before Mosul and other cities in northern Iraq fell to the Islamic State last June, representatives of a Syrian rebel group called on the new U.S. special envoy for Syria with an outline of a plan to stop the extremists.

The group urged the U.S. to shift its focus to eastern Syria, where the Islamic State had emerged from Raqqa and other towns under its control and begun military operations to capture Deir el Zour province.

If Islamic State fighters seized the region’s oil and gas resources, they’d gain enough power to destroy the U.S.-backed rebel forces across northern Syria and link the swath of territory they held in Syria to that under their control in Iraq’s restive Anbar province

“Ultimately,” they said in a written memo, using a common abbreviation for the Islamic State, “this will lead to an expansion of ISIS to reach neighboring countries as well . . . bringing it closer to establish the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.”

But the presentation April 17 to special State Department envoy Daniel Rubinstein was stillborn. The plea for immediate financial support for moderate forces in the east, backing for a rebel offensive in Aleppo that would divert Islamic State forces, and relief and medical supplies in the east went unanswered.

“Two or three million dollars would have changed the whole thing,” said a rebel official who was at the meeting and spoke only on the condition of anonymity because he was discussing a diplomatic exchange. “But we never heard back from them.”

That’s been the pattern. Moderate rebels, despite their battlefield setbacks, have unique assets, such as ground-level intelligence about the locations and movements of the Islamic State, a grasp of local politics and the drive to expel foreign-led forces from their country. But they’ve failed to gain traction with the Obama administration for their plans to fight the terror groups, and recently they’ve had trouble even getting a hearing.

The Islamic State didn’t follow quite the path that Syrian rebel officials had predicted, conquering Mosul before Deir el Zour. But the rebels were right that the extremists’ takeover of eastern Syria would speed the demise of the moderates by radicalizing the battlefield, opening the border with Iraq to free movement of arms and manpower, and providing the Islamic State with income from the sale of oil and gas.

Syrian opposition leaders doubt that the U.S.-led intervention can defeat the extremists.

“You cannot defeat terrorism by airstrikes alone,” said Hadi al Bahra, the president of the Syrian Opposition Coalition. “There must be a strategy in place.”

It should entail “full coordination” between U.S.-led airstrikes and ground forces, military pressure on the Bashar Assad regime and a commitment to enable moderates to establish a governing system in Syria, Bahra said.

“They listen,” he said of U.S. officials. “But they do not respond.”

The State Department had no comment on the April meeting. “We do not discuss details of our diplomatic contacts and outreach,” said spokesman Michael Lavallee.

The administration also has tried to choke off complaints from rebel officials and commanders, threatening a total aid cutoff if they’re quoted in the news media, rebel officials said. For this reason McClatchy isn’t naming its rebel sources. (A State Department official told McClatchy: “We have not heard of such a warning.”)

The meeting with Rubinstein, an intelligence expert who took over from former Ambassador Robert Ford in March, was only one of numerous such efforts.

In early May, the then-president of the opposition coalition, Ahmad Jarba, made a presentation about fighting the Islamic State to Michael Lumpkin, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

Jarba emphasized that the battle for eastern Syria was “important to Iraq as well” and called for “real alliance . . . to fight this common cancer,” according to notes of the meeting made available to McClatchy.

“We need a strategic partnership to fight terrorism,” he said at the meeting. “We need logistical support and weapons to help the Free Syrian Army fight the Islamic State on the Iraqi border as well.” The Free Syrian Army is an umbrella group of moderate forces fighting the Assad regime.

Lumpkin replied that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was supportive of their efforts against the Syrian regime and al Qaida, and predicted there would be many more meetings “as we work together to end this challenge to us both,” according to the visitors’ notes.

The Pentagon confirmed that the meeting took place May 8 and addressed the “threat of extremists groups” such as the Islamic State. It said Lumpkin had affirmed U.S. support for Jarba’s efforts to build the capacity of the moderate opposition.

But there was no further response, Syrian opposition officials said.

One attendee at the meeting expressed surprise that Lumpkin didn’t ask about rebel strategy.

The former chief of staff of the Free Syrian Army – a post stripped of most power because the U.S. disburses covert aid to individual rebel commanders rather than through a general staff – said he’d taken maps and a five-page outline of the first phase of a strategic plan with him, as well as a separate file for the battle against the Syrian regime. “But no one asked me for any of these,” Gen. Abdul-Ilah Albashir said.

Interviewed in late September, he told McClatchy the Americans had shown no interest and that he didn’t volunteer his plans: “They don’t even say hello to us. How can we share these things with them?”

On May 14, Jarba and other rebel officials spent a half-hour with President Barack Obama at the White House, but the Islamic State threat didn’t appear to be a priority. The White House said they reviewed the “risks posed by growing extremism in Syria and agreed on the need to counter terrorist groups on all sides of the conflict.”

Even after the fall of Mosul on June 10, the U.S. showed little interest in rebel plans. Nour Kholouf, a defected Syrian army general who served as Syrian Opposition Coalition defense minister until recently, said in early July that he’d developed plans to expel the Islamic State in stages from Syrian territory but he couldn’t get an appointment with American officials.

The most detailed strategy proposal of all was produced by one of the most effective of the rebel groups during the summer and given in August to U.S. and other intelligence officials in the Turkish border town of Reyhanli. But it has yet to be presented formally to the rest of the U.S. government.

The 30-page plan, which centers on the use of mobile strike forces, proposes to clear the Islamic State from Syria within 12 to 18 months, rebel officials said. It calls for air, ammunition, logistics and other support, including intelligence.

It would require communications equipment to replace the walkie-talkies now obtained from Best Buy or Radio Shack. And it requires stepped-up support in the rebels’ battle to defend their control over much of Aleppo, Syria’s biggest city, from which they’d draw much of their manpower.

“It lays out city by city the force movements and the different tactics: which cities to enter first, how to enter each city, how to overcome the IS resistance at checkpoints and from suicide bombers,” said one rebel official.

Rebel officials said they hadn’t been able to get an appointment with U.S. defense officials.

One obvious candidate would be U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Michael Nagata, who’s in charge of training and equipping a force of 5,000 Syrian rebels under a $500 million program.

But Nagata has yet to meet a commander of the Free Syrian Army, according to a knowledgeable rebel official. White House spokesman Alistair Baskey said Nagata and his team were “free to meet with members of the moderate Syrian opposition as they deem fit in order to advance their train and equip program.”

Has any such meeting taken place? The U.S. Central Command task force that deals with the new program “is taking a deliberate and careful approach toward direct engagement with members of the Syrian opposition,” said Maj. Tiffany Bowens, a spokeswoman.

The Central Command turned down McClatchy’s request for an interview with Nagata.

Though Rubinstein is one U.S. official who’s always available to meet, rebel officials said they saw him as a dead end. Rubinstein, whom several rebel officials have nicknamed “the complaint box,” listens to all and never responds, they said. “I think they empty it into the trash at the end of every day,” said one rebel official.

In November, after the Nusra Front, the al Qaida affiliate in Syria, pushed rebel forces out of their bases in Idlib province, Rubinstein gave a cool reception to rebel officials, according to three who met with him.

“It was an absolutely horrifying meeting,” said one attendee.

“How did it happen?” this official quoted Rubinstein as asking. “The tone was not one of ‘This is an emergency,’ but more, ‘How did you guys get beat?’ ” the official added.

The official said an aide to the envoy then asked them: “So what’s your strategy now? Is everything lost?” When told that the forces needed to regroup and obtain more resources, “No, that’s not a smart strategy,” the aide was quoted as saying. “Your strategy is to look at what your resources are and plan accordingly.”

With even the most effective fighting groups saying they’re receiving one-tenth the ammunition they need to sustain their two-front battle, the message seemed to be that the rebels should prepare to abandon the fight.

In December, the U.S. government cut salaries for a large part of the rebel forces, McClatchy has reported. The U.S. government has refused to comment.

The State Department turned down McClatchy’s request for an interview with Rubinstein.

“Unfortunately, the current strategy being implemented results in the increase of terrorism,” said Bahra, the businessman who heads the Syrian Opposition Coalition. “Some battalions are not being supplied with anything: food, clothing, fuel, what they need for survival. You are pushing them to be the prey to any extreme terrorist organization that offers assistance.”

He added: “But no one is listening.”


															

A Top Challenge for the 114th: Immigration

It has been proven that the federal government does not do anything well by choice, by politics or out of cunningness. Immigration is no different. Below is a two track condition that speaks to all of the reasons above. This matter is in our hands to sound alarms for an immediate solution.

If you don’t feel safe, if you worry about the lack of law enforcement response due to the recent siege on police and if you are fretful about compliance with the existing law, below will cause real panic.

96% of Illegal Immigrant Families With Deportation Orders ‘Can’t Be Found’

By: Natalie Johnson     

Thousands of illegal immigrants who spilled into border states earlier this year have “disappeared” from government tracking, according to a recent investigation by a Houston TV station.

The wave of unaccompanied children and women illegally crossing into the United States between July and October was so large that Border Patrol had to release thousands on their own recognizance due to lack of detention space.

Now, many of those ordered to be deported “can’t be found,” says investigative reporter Robert Arnold.

The Obama administration has repeatedly reinforced these cases as a top priority, yet the Houston TV station found that only a sliver have been sent home.

After six months of requests, the Executive Office of Immigration Review told Houston’s KPRC that 96 percent of the more than 4,100 families released on recognizance and ordered deported did not show up to court, prompting the government to classify them “in absentia.”

A similar 92 percent of the more than 1,600 unaccompanied children to be deported did not show up.

The Executive Office of Immigration Review usually reports an 11 percent to 15 percent annual “in absentia” rate, far below this year’s jump. Among the thousands who were caught and detained by Border Patrol, the court process remains sluggish. A mere 22 percent of the more than 30,400 families and unaccompanied children caught have received a court decision.

This number could remain low for several months to years, as federal officials sift through the thousands of cases yet to be heard.

But hold on, it continues to get worse.

More than 600 Detained Immigrants Released From ICE Custody Due To Exec. Actions

By: Caroline May

Since the Obama administration altered the nation’s immigration enforcement policies in November with the president’s executive actions, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has released more than 600 detained immigrants from custody.

An ICE official explains to Breitbart News that, following Obama’s announcement, ICE instructed its field offices to ensure that the detention of those immigrants in custody remains in line with the updated enforcement priorities.

“That includes detainees who appear to qualify for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) or Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Legal Permanent Residents (DAPA), as well those individuals who, based on their case histories, no longer fall within DHS’ specified enforcement priorities,” the official said in a statement Breitbart News.

Those immigrants in custody who meet one or more of those apparent qualifications “are being released from ICE custody under an order of supervision pending a final determination in their cases.”

“Serious criminal offenders and other individuals who pose a significant threat to public safety remain a priority for ICE detention,” the official added.

Due to the new enforcement priorities, ICE has released 618 detained immigrants as of Dec. 27, the ICE official confirmed.

The Nov. 20 executive actions — in addition to providing legal status and work eligibility to millions of undocumented immigrants — further reworked the types of violations that would fall under the government’s enforcement priorities.

The highest priority for removal under the new guidelines are terrorists, gang members, convicted felons and people apprehended in the act of trying to illegally enter the U.S.

Undocumented immigrants who have not been convicted of a felony, three or more misdemeanors, or have not been issued a final order of removal after Jan.1, 2014 are not considered a priority.

The official added that ICE is also looking at the cases of immigrants who are scheduled for removal but are not detained.