Steps of Screening Refugees

Posted on November 18, 2015November 18, 2015 by Denise Simon

WallStreetJournal: This week dozens of state governors said they would refuse Syrian refugees, citing national security concerns after the Paris attacks. The Obama administration pushed back on those announcements and stressed that the governors had little power to do so. But they also pledged to explain the program to those doubting it could screen out potential terrorists. Here’s a breakdown of how the program works.

* * *

Q: What kind of screenings do Syrian refugees go through?

A: Refugees from all countries receive “the most rigorous screening and security vetting of any category of traveler to the United States,” a senior administration official told reporters Tuesday. That process includes biographic and biometric security checks – i.e. checking records and doing fingerprinting. Law enforcement, the Pentagon and the intelligence community all vet information provided by and obtained about refugees to help make a determination about whether they will ultimately be allowed to come to the U.S. Syrian refugees go through an enhanced review process on top of that with extra national security checks. All Syrian refugees considered for resettlement in the U.S. are interviewed in person by specially trained staff, mostly in Amman and Istanbul, but also in Cairo and elsewhere. Refugees must also undergo health screenings and a cultural orientation before they arrive in the U.S.

Q: How long does it take?

A: The process usually takes between 18 to 24 months and generally begins with a referral from the U.N. refugee agency. Those referrals include biographic and other information that the Department of Homeland Security uses to determine if the cases meet the criteria for refugee status. If DHS decides a refugee qualifies on one of five protected grounds – race, religion, nationalist, political views or belonging to a certain social group, the extensive screening processes described earlier begin. For comparison, an international student seeking to study in the U.S., for example, usually schedules a consular interview three to five months in advance of beginning schooling.

Q: Who are the Syrian refugees coming to the U.S.?

A: Half of the Syrian refugees resettled in the U.S. so far are children, according to a senior administration official. Of the rest, 2.5% are adults over 60 and 2% are single men. The refugees are roughly half men and half women, with slightly more men.

Q: How many are here now?

A: Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, the U.S. has admitted about 2,200 Syrian refugees. That’s a very small chunk of the more than 332,000 refugees who have come to the U.S. during the same period. The Obama administration has pledged to take in at least 10,000 in fiscal year 2016, which began in October. Over 4 million people have fled Syria since the crisis began in March 2011. Most are located in countries in the region.

Q: Where are Syrian refugees living in the U.S.?

A: The top resettlement states for Syrian refugees are California, Texas, Michigan, Illinois and Arizona. Overall 36 states have taken in Syrians since 2011.

Q: What happens once a refugee arrives to the U.S.?

A: Refugees are required to adjust their status to become legal permanent residents within one year of arriving to the U.S. Each week the nine networks of nonprofits that work with the State Department to resettle refugees meet to decide where to send refugees arriving here. Those decisions are based on where their family members might be located, which states have low unemployment rates and what cities might be able to provide specialized medical treatment, for example. Officials usually try to resettle refugees in medium-size cities like Nashville, Tenn., and Buffalo, N.Y. that aren’t too expensive. But once refugees get here, they are free to live wherever they wish, officials said.

*** Then there is the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a division of Health and Human Resources.

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) gives new populations the opportunity to maximize their potential in the United States. ORR’s programs provide people in need with critical resources to assist them in becoming integrated members of American society, such as cash, social services, and medical assistance.

ORR benefits and services are available to eligible persons from the following groups:

Refugees

Asylees

Cuban/Haitian entrants

Amerasians

Victims of human trafficking

Unaccompanied alien children

Survivors of torture

ORR has five divisions and one major program area:

Refugee Assistance

Refugee Health

Resettlement Services

Children’s Services

Anti-Trafficking in Persons

Office of the Director

Division of Refugee Assistance:

The Division of Refugee Assistance (DRA) supports, oversees and provides guidance to State-Administered, Public Private Partnership and Wilson/Fish programs that provide assistance and services to refugees, asylees, certain Amerasian immigrants, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and Certified Victims of Human Trafficking (henceforth referred to collectively as refugees). DRA reviews and monitors state plans, budget submissions, service plans, and reports, while providing technical assistance to ensure that federal regulations are followed and adequate services and performance are maintained. The ultimate goal is to provide the types of assistance that will allow refugees to become economically self-sufficient as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States.

Program structures:

State Administered: Cash, medical, and social services are primarily managed by states as part of their social service or labor force programs. The program goal is to enable refugees become self-sufficient as soon as possible.

Public Private Partnership: This partnership provides States the option to enter into a partnership with local voluntary resettlement agencies to provide cash assistance to refugees. The objective is to create more effective resettlement, while maintaining state responsibility for policy and administrative oversight.

Wilson-Fish: The program is an alternative to the traditional state administered refugee resettlement program. This program provides cash, medical assistance, and social services to refugees. The purpose of the Wilson-Fish program is to increase refugee prospects for early employment and self-sufficiency, promote coordination among voluntary resettlement agencies and service providers, and ensure that refugee assistance programs exist in every state where refugees are resettled.

DRA is responsible for the following programs:

Cash and Medical Assistance: This program provides reimbursement to states and other programs for cash and medical assistance. Refugees who are ineligible for TANF and Medicaid may be eligible for cash and medical assistance for up to eight months from their date of arrival, grant of asylum, or date of certification for trafficking victims.

Refugee Social Services: This program allocates formula funds to states to serve refugees who have been in the United States less than 60 months (five years). Services are focused on addressing employability and include interpretation and translation, day care, citizenship, and naturalization. Services are designed to help refugees obtain jobs within one year of enrollment.

Targeted Assistance Formula: This program allocates formula funds to states that qualify for additional funds due to an influx of refugee arrivals that need public assistance. TAG service prioritize (a) cash assistance recipients, particularly long-term recipients; (b) unemployed refugees not receiving cash assistance; and (c) employed refugees in need of services to retain employment or to attain economic independence.

Cuban Haitian: This program provides discretionary grants to states and other programs to fund assistance and services in localities with a heavy influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants and refugees. This program supports employment services, hospitals, and other health and mental health care programs, adult and vocational education services, refugee crime or victimization programs, and citizenship and naturalization services.

Refugee School Impact: This program provides discretionary grants to state and other programs. Funds go to school districts to pay for activities that will lead to the effective integration and education of refugee children between the ages of 5 and 18. Activities include English as a second language; after-school tutorials; programs that encourage high school completion and full participation in school activities; after-school and/or summer clubs and activities; parental involvement programs; bilingual/bicultural counselors; interpreter services, etc.

Services to Older Refugees: This program provides discretionary grants to states to ensure that refugees aged 60 and above are linked to mainstream aging services in their community. ORR cooperates with the Administration for Community Living to reach this goal.

Targeted Assistance Discretionary: This program provides discretionary grants to states and other programs to address the employment needs of refugees that cannot be met with the Formula Social Services or Formula Targeted Assistance Grant Programs. Activities under this program are for the purpose of supplementing and/or complementing existing employment services to help refugees achieve economic self-sufficiency.

Technical Assistance Program: This program provides technical assistance grants to organizations with expertise in specific areas, such as employment, cultural orientation, economic development, and English language training.

Division of Refugee Health
ORR recently created the refugee heath program to address issues of health and well-being that are vital to refugees and other ORR-eligible populations. The refugee health program works on various projects including: collaborating with federal partners in the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA); administering the Survivors of Torture and Preventive Health programs; and providing technical assistance on medical screening guidelines, assessment and follow-up for contagious or communicable diseases, mental health awareness and linkages, suicide prevention, emergency preparedness and other health and mental health initiatives. It also coordinates with state and federal partners to advance ORR’s overall health initiatives.

DRH is responsible for the following programs:

Refugee Preventive Health: This program provides discretionary grants to states or their designated health agencies or other programs that facilitate medical screenings and support health services. The program aims to reduce the spread of infectious disease, treat any current ailments, and promote preventive health practices.

Services to Survivors of Torture Program: This program provides funding for a comprehensive program of support for survivors of torture. The Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998 recognizes that a significant number of refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers entering the United States have suffered torture. The program provides rehabilitative services which enable survivors to become productive members of our communities.

Division of Resettlement Services
The Division of Resettlement Services (DRS) provides assistance through public and private non-profit agencies to support the economic and social integration of refugees. DRS is responsible for the following programs:

Matching Grant Program: This is an alternative program to public assistance designed to enable refugees to become self-sufficient within four to six months from the date of arrival into the United States. Eligible grantees are voluntary agencies able to coordinate comprehensive multilingual, multicultural services for refugees at local sites; the same agencies are under cooperative agreements with the Department of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM).

Refugee Agriculture Partnership Program: The Refugee Agriculture Partnership Program (RAPP) involves refugees in the effort to improve the supply and quality of food in urban and rural areas. Refugees are potential farmers or producers of more healthful foods, as well as consumers whose health and well-being are affected by diet. RAPP has evolved into a program with multiple objectives that include: creating sustainable income; producing supplemental income; having an adequate supply of healthy foods in a community; achieving better physical and mental health; promoting community integration, and developing the capacity of organizations to access USDA and other services and resources. In cooperation with the USDA, ORR helps develop community gardens and farmers’ markets.

Preferred Communities Program: This program supports the resettlement agencies of newly arriving refugees by providing them additional resources to help refugees to become self-sufficient and to integrate into their new communities. The program also assists service providers that assist refugees with special needs that require more intensive case management.

Ethnic Community Self-Help Program: This program provides assistance to refugee ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs) that address community building and facilitate cultural adjustment and integration of refugees. The program’s purpose is to promote community organizing that builds bridges between newcomer refugee communities and community resources.

Microenterprise Development Program: This program enables refugees to become financially independent by helping them develop capital resources and business expertise to start, expand, or strengthen their own business. The program provides training and technical assistance in business plan development, management, bookkeeping, and marketing to equip refugees with the skills they need to become successful entrepreneurs.

Microenterprise Development – Home-Based Child Care Program: This program is designed to enable refugee women to become entrepreneurs while simultaneously caring for their own children.

Individual Development Accounts Program: Individual development accounts are matched savings accounts available for the purchase of specific assets. Under the IDA program, the matching funds, together with the refugee’s own savings from his or her employment, are available for one (or more) of the following: home purchase; microenterprise capitalization; post secondary education or training; and in some cases, purchase of an automobile if necessary to maintain or upgrade employment. Upon enrolling in an IDA program, a refugee signs a savings plan agreement, which specifies the savings goal, the match rate, and the amount the refugee will save each month. Refugees also receiving training in navigating the financial system, budgeting, saving, and credit.

Division of Children’s Services
The Division of Children’s Services (DCS) recognizes the importance of providing a safe and appropriate environment for unaccompanied alien children during the interim period between the minor’s transfer into ORR care and reunification with family or other sponsors or removal from the United States by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. DCS strives to provide the best care and placement for unaccompanied alien children (UAC), who are in federal custody by reason of their immigration status, while taking into account the unique nature of each child’s situation in making placement, case management, and release decisions. DCS also oversees the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors (URM) program, which connects refugee minors with appropriate foster care services and benefits when they do not have a parent or a relative available and committed to providing for their long-term care.

Unaccompanied Children’s Services: This program makes and implements placement decisions in the best interests of UAC to ensure that they are in the least restrictive setting possible while in federal custody. The majority of UAC are cared for through a network of state licensed ORR-funded care providers, which provide classroom education, mental and medical health services, case management, and socialization/recreation. ORR/DCS funds programs to provide a continuum of care for children, including foster care, group homes, and residential treatment centers. The division also coordinates a legal access project assuring that these children have information about their legal rights and receive an individual legal screening to assess their chances of legal relief. Finally, ORR/DCS provides family reunification services to facilitate safe and timely placement with family members or other qualified sponsors.

Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program: This program ensures that eligible unaccompanied minor populations receive the full range of assistance, care, and services available to all foster children in the state by establishing a legal authority to act in place of the child’s unavailable parent(s). Our programs encourage reunification of children with their parents or other appropriate adult relatives through family tracing and coordination with local refugee resettlement agencies. However, if reunification is not possible, each program works to design a case specific permanency plan for each minor or youth in care. Additional services ORR provides include: indirect financial support for housing, food, clothing, medical care, and other necessities; intensive case management by social workers; independent living skills training; educational supports including educational training vouchers; English language training; career/college counseling and training; mental health services; assistance adjusting immigration status; cultural activities; recreational opportunities; support for social integration; cultural and religious preservation.

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Division
The Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (ATIP) helps certify victims of a severe form of trafficking in persons, as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. These individuals are eligible to receive federally funded benefits and services to the same extent as refugees, and can begin to rebuild their lives in the United States. ATIP is committed to promoting public awareness and assisting in the identification of trafficking victims by educating the public and persons likely to encounter victims. These organizations or persons may include: social services providers; public health officials; legal organizations; as well as ethnic, faith-based, and community organizations.

ATIP is responsible for the following programs:

Victim Identification and Public Awareness

• Rescue and Restore Campaign: This program is a public awareness campaign that established Rescue and Restore coalitions in 24 cities, regions, and states. These community action groups are comprised of non-governmental organization leaders, academics, students, law enforcement officials, and other key stakeholders who are committed to addressing the problem of human trafficking in their own communities.

• Rescue and Restore Regional Program: This program serves as the focal point for regional public awareness campaign activities and intensification of local outreach to identify victims of human trafficking. Each Rescue and Restore Regional partner oversees and builds the capacity of a local anti-trafficking network, and sub-awards 60 percent of grant funds to local organizations that identify and work with victims. By acting as a focal point for regional anti-trafficking efforts, Rescue and Restore Regional partners encourage a cohesive and collaborative approach in the fight against modern-day slavery.

Assistance for Victims of Human Trafficking

Certifications and Eligibility Letters: HHS is the sole federal agency authorized to certify foreign adult victims of human trafficking. Similarly, it is the sole federal agency authorized to make foreign child victims of human trafficking eligible for assistance. ORR issues all certifications and eligibility letters. Certification grants adult foreign victims of human trafficking access to federal benefits and services to the same extent as refugees. Likewise, eligibility letters grant minor foreign victims of trafficking access to federal benefits and services to the same extent as refugees, including placement in the Unaccompanied Refugee Minors program.

National Human Trafficking Victim Assistance Program: This program provides funding for comprehensive case management services to foreign victims of trafficking and potential victims seeking HHS certification in any location in the United States. The grantees provide case management to assist a victim of trafficking to become certified, and other necessary services after certification, through a network of sub-awardees in locations throughout the country. These grants ensure the provision of case management, referrals, and emergency assistance (such as food, clothing, and shelter) to victims of human trafficking and certain family members. Grantees help victims gain access to housing, employability services, mental health screening and therapy, medical care, and some legal services, enabling victims to live free of violence and exploitation.

National Human Trafficking Resource Center: This program is a national, toll-free hotline for the human trafficking field in the United States. It is reached by calling 1-888-3737-888 or e-mailing [email protected]. The NHTRC operates around the clock to protect victims of human trafficking. It provides callers with a range of comprehensive services including: crisis intervention; urgent and non-urgent referrals; tip reporting; anti-trafficking resources; and technical assistance for the anti-trafficking field and those who wish to get involved. To perform these functions, the NHTRC maintains a national database of organizations and individuals, as well as a library of anti-trafficking resources and materials.

Office of the Director
The Office of the Director responds to overall ORR operations and special projects, including communications and outreach, media relations, and the federal government’s U.S. Repatriation Program. The Budget, Policy, and Data Analysis (BPDA) team is also located within the Office of the Director, and is responsible for the allocation and tracking of funds for refugee cash and medical assistance, as well as state administrative costs; forecasting and executing ORR’s annual budget; developing regulations and legislative proposals; and routinely interpreting policy. BPDA also coordinates preparation of the ORR Annual Report to Congress.

Last May, DHS Warned on Belgium ISIS Cell

Posted on November 18, 2015November 18, 2015 by Denise Simon

UNC L A S S I F I E D / / F O R O F F I C I A L US E O NL Y

(U//FOUO) Future ISIL Operations in the
West Could Resemble Disrupted Belg Plot

13 May 2015

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IA-0 -15
(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.

UN C L A S S I F I E D / / F O R O F F I C I A L US E O N L Y

13 May 2015
(U//FOUO) Future ISIL Operations in West Could Resemble Disrupted Belgian Plot

(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Coordinated with NPPD, the FBI, and NCTC.

(U) Key Judgments
(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that the plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more complex operations in the West. We differentiate the complex, centrally planned plotting in Belgium from other, more-simplistic attacks by ISIL-inspired or directed individuals, which could occur with little

to no warning.
(U//FOUO) I&A assesses the group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency information sharing about emerging and ongoing threats.
(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that items recovered by Belgian authorities suggest the group’s plotting may
have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers and underscores the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement of potential terrorist activity through suspicious activity reporting (SAR). (See Appendix A for details on the importance of SAR reporting.)

(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the security measures used by this group to avoid physical and technical collection highlight how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their behavior and the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to deflect scrutiny.
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that facilitation efforts by
the group were likely aided by members’ criminal
background and possible access to criminal groups underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.
(U//FOUO)  Awareness of some of the tactics and tradecraft used by the group in Belgium could assist with identifying and disrupting potential plots in the United States.

(U//FOUO) Belgian Plot Signals ISIL’s Interest
in Complex Plots Against the West
(U//FOUO) The plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more sophisticated

(U) Scope
(U//FOUO) This Assessment highlights the tactics, targets, and tradecraft allegedly used in a plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 that potentially could be used in the Homeland by individuals associated with or inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This Assessment is intended to support the DHS activities to assist federal, state, and local government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, first responders, and private sector security partners in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.

(U) Background
(U) On 15 January 2015, Belgian authorities raided multiple locations including a safe house in Verviers, a suburb of Brussels, where a firefight ended in the deaths of two individuals and the arrest of a third suspect. The raids disrupted an alleged plot involving an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group with at least ten operatives—some of whom were returning foreign fighters—possibly targeting police or the public. The group may have been acting under the direction of a member(s) of ISIL. There is no publically available information as to whether a specific target was selected. Since the initial raids, multiple individuals in several European countries have been arrested and charged in connection with the group’s activities. The investigation into this plot remains ongoing.1,2

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operations in the West. I&A judges that the threat from ISIL plots involving multiple operatives may grow, but are more likely to occur in Europe—where several recruitment networks have been disrupted, and several returning fighters have already demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks—than in the United States given the different operating environments, number of European foreign fighters currently in theater, and Europe’s
geographic proximity to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.3,4 While we assess the threat is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland. I&A notes that small-scale attacks using comparatively less sophisticated tactics—such as the 3 May attempted attack against a
“Draw the Prophet” event in Garland, Texas by
individuals inspired to act by ISIL-linked messaging, or by individuals taking direction from an oversea plotter after connecting through social media—could proceed with little to no warning.
(U//FOUO) Dispersed Activities and Remote Leadership Possibly Intended to Conceal

Activities
(U//FOUO) The group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency sharing information about emerging and ongoing threats. Even though the group likely planned to attack targets in Belgium, the
investigation into the group’s activities spans several
European countries, including France, Greece, Spain, and the Netherlands, as well countries where there is limited- to-no counterterrorism cooperation with the United States,

such as Syria.
» (U) The purported leader of the group, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, directed the operation from a safe house in Athens, Greece using a cell phone, while other group members operated in several other European countries, according to European media reporting citing a senior Belgian counterterrorism official.5,6
» (U) In addition to the 13 arrests made throughout Belgium, two operatives were arrested in France and police apprehended a cell member in Greece after tracing links to a second safe house in Athens, according to a Belgian news conference and Greek media reporting citing senior police officers.7,8,9
» (U) Multiple members of the cell appear to have been able to communicate and travel unimpeded across borders to facilitate attack planning. In addition to directing operatives from the safe house in Athens, Abaaoud boasted he was able to return to

Syria after the Verviers raid despite having international warrants for his arrest, according to an interview featured in the February release of ISIL’s

Dabiq magazine.10
» (U) The passport of an identified Dutch national—
possibly associated with the group—who likely traveled to Syria in late 2014 was found at the Verviers safe house, according to Dutch media reporting.11 Dutch officials conducted a search of his parents’ home and confiscated laptops and other media. As of early April, he was reportedly killed while fighting in Syria, according to unconfirmed Dutch media reporting.12

(U//FOUO) Material Acquisition Suggests Attacker’s Potential Tactics and Targets
(U//FOUO) Items recovered during searches of
residences affiliated with the cell suggest the group’s
plotting may have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers. There is no publicly available information about the acquisition of these items, but the amounts and types of materials acquired by the group highlights the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement through SARs of attempts to acquire or store a large cache of equipment or chemicals needed to support larger operations.
» (U) Belgian law enforcement discovered automatic firearms, precursors for the explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a body camera, multiple cell phones, handheld radios, police uniforms, fraudulent identification documents, and a large quantity of cash during the raid in Verviers, according to statements made by Belgian government officials.14,15,16 At the time

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) A picture, from ISIL’s Dabiq magazine, of Abdelhmaid Abaaoud (far right) with the two alleged cell members killed during the January 2015 raid in

Verviers, Belgium.13

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of the raid, the members of this cell were also searching for an ice machine to cool and transport the TATP, according to European press reporting.17
» (U) Belgian officials were reportedly concerned that the acquisition of police uniforms and discussion by group members of a Molenbeek police station—where members of the group had reportedly spent time—
suggests that they may have intended to target a police station or to impersonate officers to potentially gain access to a sensitive site. 18,19,20 While there is no confirmation the group was actually going to target police, such an attack would have been consistent with media reports about recent ISIL-linked plots in the West directed at law enforcement and ongoing messaging by ISIL since September 2014.21

(U//FOUO) Alleged Operational Security Measures Suggest Knowledge of Law Enforcement Methods
(U//FOUO) The steps group members reportedly took to avoid physical and technical collection of their preoperational activities suggest members were likely cognizant of the potential for scrutiny by Belgian authorities given their status as returning foreign fighters and had at least a rudimentary knowledge of law enforcement efforts to monitor social media and other communications. The countermeasures used by this group underscore how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their patterns of behavior and highlight the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to

deflect scrutiny.
(U//FOUO) Communications Security. The group made extensive efforts to prevent or limit law enforcement’s ability to conduct technical surveillance.
» (U) A group member reportedly changed his cell phone five times and urged operatives to change vehicles often and to search the vehicles for

microphones in an effort to thwart potential surveillance by police and intelligence officials, according to Belgian media reporting citing police

officials.23
» (U) According to an unverified Belgian media report, intercepted communications between cell members were conducted in French, Arabic, and a Moroccan dialect, and frequently used coded language to discuss attack planning to make translation problematic for law enforcement and intelligence services.24
» (U) Belgian authorities discovered that the incarcerated brother of one of the cell members may have acted as an intermediary to facilitate communications between Greece- and Belgian-based members after officials at a prison in Belgium notified law enforcement of the brother’s suspicious
communications, according to Belgian media reporting.25
(U//FOUO) Physical Security.  The group attempted to obscure their operational travel and material acquisition from Belgian officials.
» (U//FOUO) According to several media reports, the family of Abaaoud received a call in late 2014 that he had been killed while fighting in Syria. However, Abaaoud’s probable involvement in this plot implies this may have been done intentionally to deter efforts by Belgian officials to track his activities.26
» (U//FOUO) Belgian and Greek authorities recovered multiple identification documents, some of which may have been fraudulent, at safe houses reportedly used by the group, according to media reports. 27,28,29 Moreover, the use of false identity documents may have led to the misidentification of the two operatives killed during the raid in Verviers, according to a European media report, suggesting the group may have used fraudulent documents to conceal travel from Syria to Europe and to facilitate their attack planning. 30
» (U//FOUO) The large amount of cash recovered by Belgian authorities at the safe house in Verviers was likely intended to fund some of the group’s
procurement activities and to conceal purchasing patterns.31  Activities such as these highlight the importance of scrutinizing suspicious purchases of bulk quantities of precursor chemicals where individuals insist on paying only in cash.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Belgium investigators at scene following the raid in Verviers, Belgium on 15 January 2015.22

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UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Figure 1. Map of Group Activities

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(U//FOUO) Member’s Criminal Background Likely Aided Planning and Facilitation
(U//FOUO) Facilitation efforts by the group were likely aided by members’ criminal background and possible access to criminal groups, underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts. The nexus between terrorist preoperational planning and criminal activities may offer law enforcement opportunities to detect ongoing plotting, as investigations of intercepted illegal activities may present indicators of other nefarious

intentions.
» (U) At least one alleged cell member, Souhaib el Abdi, had previous experience with trafficking forged documents, according to comments from his lawyer reported in open source media.32 The groups’ purported leader Abaaoud spent time in prison for theft before departing Belgium for Syria, according to a US press report.33
» (U) The Belgian police uniforms, large cache of illegal weapons—including Kalashnikov rifles, handguns, ammunition, and materials to make explosives—that were seized by police during the raids, were likely acquired illegally, according to a media reporting coverage of Belgian police news conference.34 Cell members have subsequently been charged with violating Belgian weapons laws, according to statements made by Belgian officials.35

(U) Implications
(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that future Western complex attacks and plots could resemble the size and capabilities of this group and awareness of the tactics and tradecraft used by this group could assist with identifying and disrupting potential complex plots in the United States. Prior to the disruption of this plot, nearly all of the approximately one dozen ISIL-linked plots and attacks in the West to date involved lone offenders or small
groups of individuals, raising I&A’s concern that the
involvement of a large number of operatives and group leaders based in multiple countries in future ISIL-linked plotting could create significant obstacles in the detection and disruption of preoperational activities.*
* (U//FOUO) DHS defines a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve direction, assistance, or influence from a larger terrorist organization or foreign actor.

(U//FOUO) We assess that plots involving foreign fighters, who have returned from conflict zones, or foreign fighters based overseas, who have the ability to leverage violent extremists in their home countries, are more likely to plot an attack on this scale than are their less-experienced counterparts. While we assess that the threat of such an attack is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.

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(U//FOUO) Appendix A: Importance of Suspicious Activity Reporting
(U//FOUO) Given the range of targets and tactics of ISIL-associated plots since last year, we encourage reporting of suspicious activity to appropriate government authorities and encourage our security, military, and law enforcement partners to remain vigilant. We face an increased challenge in detecting terrorist plots underway by individuals or small groups acting quickly and independently or with only tenuous ties to foreign-based terrorists. Pre-operational indicators are likely to be difficult to detect; as such, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners play a critical role in identifying and reporting suspicious activities and raising the awareness of federal counterterrorism officials.

(U) Indicators
(U//FOUO) DHS encourages federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials, as well as first responders and private sector security partners, to remain alert and immediately report suspicious activity and potential behavioral indicators of pre-operational terrorism planning activities, to include suspicious acquisition of materials and construction of explosive devices. Some observed activities that may be suspicious include constitutionally protected activity. These activities should not be reported absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that
the observed behavior is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism. No single behavioral indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.
» (U//FOUO) New or increased advocacy of violence, including providing material support or recruiting others to commit criminal acts;
» (U//FOUO) Reports to law enforcement that a community member has adopted a new name, style of dress or speech, and/or other significant changes in presentation to others in association with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO) Communicating with known or suspected homegrown or foreign-based violent extremists using e-mail or social media platforms;
» (U//FOUO) Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, or barriers;
» (U//FOUO) Attempts to purchase all available stock of explosives precursors or to acquire materials in bulk without explanation or justification or making numerous smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of time—a possible sign of covert stockpiling;
» (U//FOUO) Theft of chemicals, hazardous substances, weapons, pre-cursor materials, or items that could compromise facility security, such as uniforms, identification, blueprints, vehicles (or components), technology, or access keys or cards;
» (U//FOUO) Internet research for target selection, acquisition of technical capabilities, planning, or logistics; » (U//FOUO) Insisting on paying in cash or using a credit card in another person’s name; » (U//FOUO) Participation in weapons training, paramilitary exercises, and reconnaissance and surveillance activities in
a manner that is reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism, particularly in conjunction with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO) Use of cover terms to mask the true meaning of events or nefarious activities combined with active advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO) Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition, or materials that could be used to produce explosives, such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer; and
» (U//FOUO) Activities that a reasonable person would deem as suspicious, indicating a storage facility or other areas are being used to construct an explosive device.

UN C L A S S I F I E D / / F O R O F F I C I A L US E O N L Y

Page 7 of 8

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.8

(U) Source Summary Statement
(U//FOUO) This Assessment is based on information drawn from a body of unclassified reporting, including open source media reports, public statements of senior foreign government officials, and public accounts of foreign law enforcement investigations from multiple law enforcement agencies. We have medium confidence in the press reports used in this product, some of which have been corroborated by public statements made by senior foreign law enforcement officials.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity
(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide

SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.

UN C L A S S I F I E D / / F O R O F F I C I A L US E O N L Y

Page 8 of 8

1 (U); “Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe”; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-

isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
2 (U); OSC; EUL2015041773002595; 17 April 2015. 3 (U); OSC; EUL2015021166933318; 11 February 2015. 4 (U); OSC; EUR2015022528575929; 24 February 2015.
5 (U); OSC; EUN2015020948731295; 31 January 2015. 6 (U); OSC; EUL2015020274740312; 1 February 2015. 7 (U); OSC: EUN2015020947629159; 30 January 2015. 8 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 9 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 10 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 11 (U); OSC; EUL2015012065248183; 19 January 2015.

12 (U); Teen with Connection to Verviers Deceased in Syria; http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20150403_01614138;

accessed 9 April 2015.
13 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 14 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 15 (U); “Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe”; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-

belgium-isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
16 (U); “Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers”; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
17 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
18 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying;
http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presume; accessed 6 April 2015.

19 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 20 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-

isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
21 (U); OSC; TRR2014092201178788; 22 September 2014. 22 (U); Belgian Operation Thwarted ‘Major Terrorist Attacks,’ Kills 2 Suspects; http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/
world/belgium-anti-terror-operation/; accessed 13 April 2014.
23 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/
verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
24 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/
societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.

25 (U); OSC; EUL2015012064970018; 20 January 2015. 26 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
27 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-

isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
28 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.

29 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 30 (U); Belgian Police Admit Seeking Wrong Man as Vervier Shooutout Jihadists Named; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11362093/Belgian-police-admit-seeking-wrong-man-as-Vervier-shooutout-jihadists-named.html; accessed 13 April 2015.

31 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 32 (U); Terrorist Threat – Dismantled Verviers Terrorist Cell: 4 Suspects Face Council Chamber;
http://www.thebrusselstimes.com/belgium/terrorist-threat-dismantled-verviers-terrorist-cell-4-suspects-face-
council-chamber/; accessed 1 April 2015.
33 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.

34 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 35 (U); OSC; EUR2015012167949567; 21 January 2015.

Govt Tools to Deter Terrorist Travel

Posted on November 17, 2015November 17, 2015 by Denise Simon

Legal Tools to Deter Travel by Suspected Terrorists: A

Brief Primer

11/16/2015

FAS: The terrorist attacks in Paris last week, for which the Islamic State (sometimes referred to as ISIS, ISIL, or IS) has claimed responsibility, have renewed concerns about terrorist travel. Following reports that at least one of the perpetrators of the attacks was carrying a Syrian passport, there has been heightened scrutiny and debate concerning the resettlement of refugees from war-torn Syria to Europe and the United States. This Sidebar provides a brief overview of some (but by no means all) of the tools the federal government employs to prevent individuals from traveling to, from, or within the United States to commit acts of terrorism. In some cases, the application of these tools may depend on different factors, including whether the suspected terrorist is a U.S. or foreign national.

Terrorist Databases and Screening

Decisions by the federal government as to whether to use a particular tool to deter an individual’s travel are often informed by information collected by various agencies that link that individual to terrorism. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—maintains the federal government’s Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), the government’s single source repository watch list record of known and suspected terrorists. TSC provides various federal agencies with subsets of the TSDB for use in combating and deterring terrorism. Some of the many screening systems supported by the TSDB include the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) for screening of passports and visas; the TECS system (not an acronym) administered by Custom and Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to screen and make eligibility determinations of arriving persons at U.S. ports of entry; the DHS’s Secure Flight system for air passenger prescreening; and the FBI’s National Crime and Information Center’s Known or Suspected Terrorist File. Of course, while the TSDB supplies these systems with information on the identity of suspected terrorists, these systems may also include information on individuals obtained independently from the TSDB consistent with the agency’s particular responsibilities.

No-Fly List and Selectee List

Information compiled by the TSDB may be used to deter suspected terrorists from using civil aircraft and other modes of transportation to travel to, from, or within the United States. The safety of air travel, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, is an important priority for the U.S. government. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and charged it with ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, including civil aviation. Two of the most prominent means by which TSA attempts to deter terrorist travel is via two watch lists comprised of information from the TSDB – the No-Fly List and the Selectee List. Persons on the No-Fly list are prohibited from boarding an American airline or any flight that comes in contact with U.S. territory or airspace. Those on the Selectee List are subject to enhanced screening procedures.

Criminal Sanctions

Perhaps the most severe means by which to prevent persons from traveling to, from, or within the United States for terrorist purposes is through the use of criminal sanctions. A wide range of terrorism-related conduct is subject to criminal penalty under U.S. law. Many of the most relevant criminal statutes are extraterritorial in reach, covering conduct which may occur partially or (in more limited cases) entirely outside the United States. Persons who aid and abet a criminal violation may typically be held criminally liable for the underlying offense to the same degree as the person who directly committed the violation. Attempts or conspiracies to commit proscribed conduct are also typically subject to criminal punishment. Several U.S. persons accused of attempting or conspiring to assist the Islamic State, including through either encouraging others to travel abroad to join the group or planning to join the group themselves, have been charged with terrorism offenses.

Probable cause is required to arrest a person for a criminal violation, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to sustain a conviction. Law enforcement’s suspicion that a traveler may be involved in terrorist conduct (or associated with others who have terrorist ties) may not be sufficient to warrant the traveler’s arrest. As a result, government officials may sometimes deploy tools other than criminal sanctions to deter travel by persons suspected of terrorist activity.

Passport Restrictions on Travel to Specific Countries

Through the revocation or denial of passports, U.S. authorities could potentially impede the international travel of U.S. citizens suspected of terrorist involvement or association with an enemy belligerency. Federal law provides that, except as authorized by the President, a U.S. citizen may not depart from the United States and travel to another country unless he bears a valid passport. The revocation of the passport of a U.S. citizen located abroad may also have implications for his ability to remain in a particular foreign country, or travel from there to a third country. While federal statute provides that U.S. citizens also may not reenter the country unless they bear a valid passport, U.S. citizens who travel abroad appear to enjoy a constitutional right to be readmitted back into the United States.

State Department regulations identify various grounds for which passport applications may be denied or a previously issued passport may be revoked. Several such grounds may be relevant to efforts to deter international travel by U.S. citizens suspected of involvement with terrorist groups, including those permitting the denial or revocation of passports to U.S. citizens who are the subject of outstanding felony arrest warrants or requests for extradition. The regulations also provide that a U.S. citizen’s passport application may be denied or revoked when the Secretary of State “determines that the applicant’s activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States.” However, the authority to deny or revoke passports on account of national security or foreign policy concerns is not absolute. The Supreme Court has recognized that the State Department lacks statutory authority to deny a passport solely on the basis of the applicant’s political beliefs; the denial must be based in part upon actual conduct that causes serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.

In addition to regulatory authority to deny or revoke passports, State Department regulations also permit the Secretary of State to restrict the usage of U.S. passports to travel to a country or area in certain cases – including when the Secretary has determined the country or area is a place where “armed hostilities are in progress” or there exists “an imminent danger to the public health or physical safety of United States travelers.” Such restrictions have been imposed on a number of occasions, including restricting the use of a U.S. passport to travel to Iraq from 1991 until late 2003, on account of hostilities occurring in that country and the potential dangers posed to U.S. travelers.

Immigration

Perhaps the most effective and commonly employed means to deter non-U.S. nationals (aliens) suspected of terrorist activity from traveling to the United States derive from federal immigration law. Rules governing whether and when aliens may be admitted into the United States, along with the conditions for their continued presence in the country, are primarily found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA establishes several grounds for which an alien suspected of terrorist activity may be barred from admission into the United States, including persons seeking to come to the United States as refugees. Under INA §212(f), the President is also conferred with broad authority to act, by means of proclamation, to bar the entry of an alien or class of aliens into the United States if he deems their entry detrimental to U.S. interests, though usage of this authority has been relatively rare. While programs like the No-Fly List may prevent suspected foreign terrorists from coming to the United States via a particular mode of transportation, federal immigration rules and requirements may prevent such persons from traveling to the United States using any mode of transport.

The INA generally provides that aliens who are seeking initial admission into the country bear the burden of proving they are admissible. Moreover, judicial review of a decision by a consular officer abroad to deny an alien a visa to come to the United States, or a determination made by customs and border officials at a U.S. port of entry that an arriving alien is inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds, may be quite circumscribed or virtually non-existent. Aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the country might also be removed from the United States for the same terrorism-related reasons as aliens seeking initial admission into the country. In the case of lawfully admitted aliens, however, federal immigration authorities bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating that the alien’s activities render him deportable before the alien may be ordered removed. There may also be greater availability of judicial review than in cases where an alien has not yet been lawfully admitted. Moreover, if a lawful permanent resident alien (sometimes described as an “immigrant”) travels briefly abroad and seeks to return to the United States, he may be afforded greater procedural and substantive protections than other aliens who attempt to travel to the United States.

Immigration rules and requirements do not apply to U.S. citizens. Whereas an alien suspected of terrorism-related travel to the United States may be barred from admission into the country, other methods would need to be employed (e.g., placement on the No-Fly List, criminal prosecution, passport restrictions) to deter U.S. citizens from traveling to, from, or within the United States for terrorist purposes.

Courtesy of Obama: Jihad Tourism

Posted on November 17, 2015November 17, 2015 by Denise Simon

Sure, not all immigrants or refugees are terrorists or connected to terrorism, but due to the fact there is no way to check and verify backgrounds from people out of the Middle East, especially Syria, it is irresponsible to even suggest all can be checked.

If one questions the pushback, then one must remember the Tsarnaev family and the Boston bombing or take a long look at Minneapolis and how that city has a history of Somalis that have left America to fight jihad.

Zacharia Yusuf Abdurahman, 19, Adnan Farah, 19, Hanad Mustafe Musse, 19, and Guled Ali Omar, 20, were arrested in Minneapolis. Abdirahman Yasin Daud, 21, and Mohamed Abdihamid Farah, 21, were arrested in San Diego after driving there in hopes of crossing into Mexico.

Barack Obama’s National Security Advisor, Ben Rhodes stated that the Federal government has robust methods to verify backgrounds. That is indeed in dispute. Per Ben Rhodes, he mentioned using the National Counterterrorism Center was one of the resources, yet upon a in depth review of the website, they don’t do background checks at all.

If there is any truth at all to be told, the United Nations controls the flow and background checks of the refugees. No one wants to admit that due to the fact, an outside bureaucratic organization has control over the flow on people into countries, including the United States. The United Nations coordinates with other organizations as well including the International Rescue Committee. The UN has a wing called the Human Rights that manages who is called a refugee or those called ‘stateless’ people. In turn, the U.S. State Department has its own bureau that has charitable organizations, paid by government to place refugees in locations across the Unite States, without notice or approval of governors or mayors.

For some testimony by the State Department on the Refugee Admission Program, click here.

There is not a single person within the Obama administration that can make guarantees with full confidence that all people admitted are without any questionable background, there in lies the issue.

The White House is so panicked about so many bi-partisan governors pushing back to stop the program into their states, there is a conference call with those governors and the White House on November 17. Perhaps some will ask why no Christians but further why in America when there are other locations across the globe more conducive the migrant needs.

U.S. ‘discriminates’ against Christian refugees, accepts 96% Muslims, 3% Christians
Less than 3 percent of the Syrian refugees admitted to the United States so far are Christian and 96 percent are Muslim, the result of a referral system that Republican Sen. Tom Cotton says “unintentionally discriminates” against Christians.

State Department figures released Monday showed that the current system overwhelmingly favors Muslim refugees. Of the 2,184 Syrian refugees admitted to the United States so far, only 53 are Christians while 2,098 are Muslim, the Christian News Service reported.
Mr. Cotton and Sen. John Boozman, both Arkansas Republicans, called Monday for a moratorium on resettlements, a White House report on vetting procedures, and a re-evaluation of the refugee-referral process.

“[T]he United States’ reliance on the United Nations for referrals of Syrian refugees should also be re-evaluated,” said Mr. Cotton in a statement. “That reliance unintentionally discriminates against Syrian Christians and other religious minorities who are reluctant to register as refugees with the United Nations for fear of political and sectarian retribution.”

The current system relies on referrals from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Syria’s population in 2011 was 90 percent Muslim and 10 percent Christian, CNS said.
At a news conference Monday in Turkey, President Obama described as “shameful” the idea of giving religious preferences to refugees, apparently referring to Texas Sen. Ted Cruz’s suggestion that the United States should accept Christian refugees while Muslim refugees are sent to majority-Muslim countries.
“That’s not American. That’s not who we are. We don’t have religious tests to our compassion,” Mr. Obama said.

Figures from the State Department Refugee Processing Center updated Monday showed that 96 percent of the Syrian refugees accepted so far are Muslim, while less than 3 percent are Christian. The other 33 identified as belonging to smaller religious faiths or said they had no religion.

Ben Rhodes, Obama deputy national security adviser, said Sunday that the White House still plans to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees despite last week’s deadly terrorist attack on Paris. Republicans have countered that it’s all but impossible to conduct background checks on those seeking refuge.
Mr. Cotton and Mr. Boozman called Monday for a temporary moratorium on resettlements and “a requirement that the President certify the integrity of the security vetting process as a condition of lifting the moratorium.”

“The American people have long demonstrated unmatched compassion for the world’s persecuted and endangered. But when bringing refugees to our shores, the U.S. government must put the security of Arkansans and all Americans first,” Mr. Cotton said. “No terrorist should be able to take advantage of the refugee process to threaten the United States.”

Governors Just Saying NO to WH and Refugees

Posted on November 16, 2015November 16, 2015 by Denise Simon

Growing Number Of States Say They Will Not Accept Syrian Refugees

Governors in 13 states have all said they will stop or otherwise oppose accepting additional Syrian refugees in their states.

At a glance: Governors in more than a dozen states have spoken out against the Obama administration allowing additional Syrian refugees to be resettled in their states at this time. They are:

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
North Carolina
Ohio
Texas

ID: 7356986

Several state governors announced on Monday that they will not accept Syrian refugees following the attacks in Paris, citing concerns for security.

The governors of North Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Ohio, Mississippi, Louisiana, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Texas, and Arkansas announced measures on Monday to stop or oppose any additional Syrian refugees from resettling in their states. Alabama and Michigan made similar announcements on Sunday.

The terrorist attacks in Paris have brought renewed attention on the U.S. refugee program, specifically the threat that ISIS could exploit the process to infiltrate and attack the United States. Several Republican lawmakers and presidential candidates have called on the administration to stop taking Syrian refugees, citing security concerns.

The governors of Connecticut and Vermont, meanwhile, have backed the Obama administration’s policy, voicing their support for accepting refugees in their states.

Refugees are extensively vetted — the process takes on average 18 to 24 months — but senior U.S. officials have said they are concerned there is a lack of on-the-ground intelligence in Syria that could be useful in the screening process.

Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal issued an executive order on Monday instructing agencies in his state to “utilize all lawful means” to stop Syrian refugees from resettling in the state.

“All departments, budget units, agencies, offices, entities, and officers of the executive branch of the State of Louisiana are authorized and directed to utilize all lawful means to prevent the resettlement of Syrian refugees in the State of Louisiana while this Order is in effect,” the order reads.

“The Louisiana State Police, upon receiving information of a Syrian refugee already relocated within the State of Louisiana, are authorized and directed to utilize all lawful means to monitor and avert threats within the State of Louisiana,” reads another provision of the order.

In a letter sent to President Obama on Monday, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott announced that his state will also refuse to resettle Syrian refugees.

“Given the tragic attacks in Paris and the threats we have already seen, Texas cannot participate in any program that will result in Syrian refugees — any one of whom could be connected to terrorism — being resettled in Texas,” Abbott wrote in the letter. “Effective today, I am directing the Texas Health & Human Services Commission’s Refugee Resettlement Program to not participate in the resettlement of any Syrian refugees in the state of Texas. And I urge you, as president, to halt your plans to allow Syrians to be resettled anywhere in the United States.”

“Neither you nor any federal official can guarantee that Syrian refugees will not be part of any terroristic activity,” Abbott continued. “As such, opening our door to them irresponsibly exposes our fellow Americans to unacceptable peril.”

Ohio Gov. John Kasich similarly sent a letter to Obama, requesting that the federal government stop resettling Syrian refugees in Ohio.

“The governor doesn’t believe the U.S. should accept additional Syrian refugees because security and safety issues cannot be adequately addressed,” Kasich communications director Jim Lynch said. “The governor is writing to the President to ask him to stop, and to ask him to stop resettling them in Ohio. We are also looking at what additional steps Ohio can take to stop resettlement of these refugees.”

Florida Gov. Rick Scott, while ending state support for resettlement efforts, wrote in a letter to congressional leaders that it was his “understanding” that “the state does not have the authority to prevent the federal government from funding the relocation of these Syrian refugees to Florida even without state support.” As such, Scott called on Congress to prevent the Obama administration from using federal funds to support Syrian resettlement efforts.

Governor Mike Pence of Indiana said in a statement on Monday, “Effective immediately, I am directing all state agencies to suspend the resettlement of additional Syrian refugees in the state of Indiana pending assurances from the federal government that proper security measures have been achieved. Unless and until the state of Indiana receives assurances that proper security measures are in place, this policy will remain in full force and effect.”

Mississippi Gov. Phil Bryant said in a statement on Monday that he would do “everything humanly possible” to stop the Obama administration from placing Syrian refugees in the state.

“I’m currently working with the Mississippi Department of Public Safety and Mississippi Office of Homeland Security to determine the current status of any Syrian refugees that may be brought to our state in the near future,” Bryant said in a statement. “I will do everything humanly possible to stop any plans from the Obama administration to put Syrian refugees in Mississippi. The policy of bringing these individuals into the country is not only misguided, it is extremely dangerous. I’ll be notifying President Obama of my decision today to resist this potential action.”

Arkansas Gov. Asa Hutchinson wrote in a tweet on Monday that he too would oppose Syrian refugees being relocated to his state.

According to the Boston Globe, Massachusetts Gov. Charlie Baker told reporters on Monday he was “not interested” in accepting Syrian refugees. “I would say no as of right now,” Baker said. “No, I’m not interested in accepting refugees from Syria.”

“My view on this is the safety and security of the people of the Commonwealth of Mass. is my highest priority,” Baker added. “So I would set the bar very high on this.”

Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey said in a statement, “Given the horrifying events in Paris last week, I am calling for an immediate halt in the placement of any new refugees in Arizona.” Specifically, he called for the Obama administration to provide “immediate consultation” under the United States Refugee Act.

In a news conference, North Carolina Gov. Scott McCrory took similar action, saying that he was requesting that the Obama administration “cease” Syrian refugee resettlement in the state immediately “until we are thoroughly satisfied” that concerns about safety that he expressed are resolved.

Of the governors’ actions and statements, McCrory added that some of the governors will be meeting later this week: “I’m sure all of us will be speaking, as a group, in the very near future.”

Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley and Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder announced on Sunday that they would attempt to block Syrian refugees from relocating to their states after the Paris terror attacks.

ID: 7354351