North Korea and Iran Hint at Deeper Military Cooperation

WI: Pyongyang has emerged as a critical partner in Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ and officials warn that their joint efforts may extend to weapons of mass destruction.

High-level meetings between North Korean and Iranian officials in recent months are stoking concerns inside the U.S. government about the depth of military ties between the two American adversaries. In September, President Trump ordered U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct a fresh review of any potential bilateral nuclear collaboration. Yet officials in Washington, Asia, and the Middle East who track the relationship indicate that Pyongyang and Tehran have already signaled a commitment to jointly develop their ballistic missile systems and other military/scientific programs.

North Korea has vastly expanded its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities over the past year, developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could potentially target the western United States with nuclear warheads. Over the same period, U.S. intelligence agencies have spotted Iranian defense officials in Pyongyang, raising the specter that they might share dangerous technological advances with each other. “All of these contacts need to be better understood,” said one senior U.S. official working on the Middle East. “This will be one of our top priorities.”

SUSPICIOUS MEETINGS

In early August, Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s number two political leader and head of its legislature, departed Pyongyang amid great fanfare for an extended visit to Iran. The official reason was to attend the inauguration of President Hassan Rouhani, but the length of the visit raised alarm bells in Washington and allied capitals. North Korean state media said the trip lasted four days, but Iranian state media said it was ten, and that Kim was accompanied by a large delegation of other top officials.

Kim had last visited Tehran in 2012 to attend a gathering of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Cold War-era body composed of developing nations that strived to be independent of Washington and the Kremlin. Yet he skipped most of the events associated with that conference, instead focusing on signing a bilateral scientific cooperation agreement with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. According to U.S. intelligence officials, that pact looked very similar to the one Pyongyang inked with Syria in 2002; five years later, Israeli jets destroyed a building in eastern Syria that the United States and UN believe was a nearly operational North Korean-built nuclear reactor. Notably, one of the Iranian officials who attended the 2012 gathering with Kim was Atomic Energy Organization chief Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, who was sanctioned by Washington and the UN for his alleged role in nuclear weapons development.

Similarly, Kim’s latest trip focused on more than just lending support to Rouhani, according to North Korean and Iranian state media. Kim and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Hui-chol inaugurated their country’s new embassy in Tehran, a symbol of deepening ties between the two governments. They also held a string of bilateral meetings with foreign leaders, many from countries that have been significant buyers of North Korean weapons in recent decades (e.g., Zimbabwe, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Namibia). The Trump administration has been intensifying diplomatic pressure on all these countries to cut their economic and military ties with Pyongyang in response to the regime’s barrage of nuclear and missile tests this year.

Regarding missile development, Iran and North Korea presented a united front against Washington during Kim’s stay. Like Pyongyang, Tehran has moved forward with a string of ballistic missile tests in recent months, despite facing UN Security Council resolutions and condemnation by the Trump administration. After meeting with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani on August 4, Kim declared, “Iran and North Korea share a mutual enemy [the United States]. We firmly support Iran on its stance that missile development does not need to be authorized by any nation.”

COVERT CONTACTS

The meetings that have gone unreported in state media are even more worrisome for allied governments. In recent years, U.S. and South Korean intelligence services have tracked a steady stream of Iranian and North Korean officials visiting each other in a bid to jointly develop their defense systems. Many of the North Koreans are from defense industries or secretive financial bodies that report directly to dictator Kim Jong-un, including Offices 39 and 99 of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea.

Last year, U.S. authorities reported that missile technicians from one of Iran’s most important defense companies, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, had traveled to North Korea to help develop an eighty-ton rocket booster for ballistic missiles. One of the company’s top officials, Sayyed Javad Musavi, has allegedly worked in tandem with the Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. (KOMID), which the United States and UN have sanctioned for being a central player in procuring equipment for Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. For example, Shahid Hemmat has illegally shipped valves, electronics, and measuring equipment to KOMID for use in ground testing of space-launch vehicles and liquid-propellant ballistic missiles.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

North Korea has emerged as a critical partner in the alliance of states, militias, and political movements known as the “Axis of Resistance,” which Tehran developed to challenge U.S. power in the Middle East. Pyongyang has served as an important supplier of arms and equipment to Iran’s most important Arab ally, Syria’s Assad regime, during the country’s ongoing war. And Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have procured weapons from North Korea in their efforts to topple the internationally recognized government in Yemen, according to current and former U.S. officials.

Moreover, Kim Yong-nam’s August trip appeared to have official support from Russia and China. On his way to Iran, he first flew to Vladivostok on Air Koryo, the North Korean airline that the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned in December 2016 for financially aiding the Kim regime and its ballistic missile program. He then flew on to Tehran via Russia’s state carrier, Aeroflot, passing through Chinese airspace.

Going forward, the most pressing question is whether a smoking gun will emerge proving direct nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea. The U.S. government and the International Atomic Energy Agency say they have yet to see such conclusive evidence. But Iranian opposition groups allege that senior regime officials have visited North Korea to observe some of its six nuclear weapons tests. Chief among these officials, they add, is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian general whom the UN has accused of working closely with Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani on secret nuclear weapons research. Current and former U.S. intelligence officials say these accusations cannot be ruled out, so all known contacts between the two regimes need to be scrutinized closely.

Related image Abbasi-Davani

***Going back in history with evidence:

In 2010, the Assad regime transferred Scud-D missiles,[7] as well as a number of M-600 missiles (that have a 250Km range and carry a 500Kg warhead) – a clone of the Iranian Fateh-110. Syria provided Hezbollah operatives with training on using the Scuds at a base near Damascus.[8]

The Assad regime procured systems from Russia, which were to be partially or fully transferred to Hezbollah. Those included advanced Russian anti-air defense systems– such as the Pantsir S1-E and SA-17 BUK systems – as well as sophisticated anti-ship systems, like the Yakhont P-800.[9] It was believed that Hezbollah was the end user for some of these systems, which were kept in the group’s weapons depots on the Syrian side of the border.[10] Prior to the 2006 war, Syria also transferred Russian-made Kornet anti-tank weapons to Hezbollah, which then used these weapons against Israel.[11] As the war in Syria has intensified, Hezbollah began moving some of these advanced systems out of Syria. In January, according to media reports,[12] the Israeli Air Force struck a convoy inside Syria that was likely attempting to transfer SA-17 anti-aircraft systems to Hezbollah.

Cutout Arms Purchases from Russia

Such Syrian straw purchases, as well as other arms deals with Russia for the Syrian military itself, appear to have been bankrolled by Iran.[13] As part of this deal, some of the weapons that Damascus procured were then passed on to Tehran. This is an old practice dating back to the Iraq-Iran war, when the Assad regime purchased weapons from the Soviet bloc on Iran’s behalf and Iranian planes transferred them to Tehran.

For instance, in 2007, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that Syria agreed to send Iran at least 10 Pantsir air-defense systems that Damascus was buying from Russia. This deal was part of “the military and technological cooperation mechanism stipulated in a strategic accord signed by both countries in November 2005.”[14] Sources indicate that Syria may have received and installed the systems in August 2007, or one month before the Israeli attack on the Syrian nuclear facility at al-Kibar.[15]

Also in 2007, the Russian daily Kommersant revealed that Moscow’s Rosoboronexport arms export company was to deliver five MiG-31E fighter jets and an unspecified number of MiG-29M/M2 fighter bombers to Syria. Iran paid for the purchase may have been the intended end-user.[16] That particular deal seems never to have materialized. However it did reveal an important and dangerous aspect of the Iranian-Syrian partnership – one that extends well beyond cutout purchases of conventional weapons.

Aside from Russia, the principal strategic partner of the Iranian and Syrian regimes has been North Korea.

North Korean assistance has been instrumental in developing both Iran and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. Pyongyang’s cooperation with Tehran is particularly close, so much so that the two countries have been described as maintaining “in effect a joint missile development program.”[17] Iranian teams have regularly attended North Korea’s long-range missile tests, and Tehran has received North Korean technology. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile (1,300-1,500Kms), for example, is based on North Korea’s Nodong missile, the development program which was reportedly financed by Iran.[18]

In 2010, there was a debate on whether Pyongyang had sold Tehran BM-25 missiles that could hit Western Europe. At the time, a senior US intelligence official said that while he was unaware of any sale of a complete BM-25, there was probably a transfer of kits, made up of missile components. “There has been a flow of knowledge and missile parts” from North Korea to Iran, he said.[19] Iran’s quest for a first strike capability and delivery systems for its nuclear weapons program suggests that cooperation with North Korea will only grow.

Pyongyang and Iran have helped Syria develop its ballistic missile program. Syria relied on North Korean technology to upgrade its Scuds. In 2005, Syria tested Scud-D missiles, but the test ended in failure, as the missile fell apart over Turkey. Another test in 2007 was successful, thanks to technological assistance from North Korea that further improved the Scud-D and extended its range. In the early 1990’s, the North Koreans helped the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) construct missile complexes in Aleppo and Hama. The Aleppo facility was also used for fitting chemical warheads on Scud missiles. An explosion at the facility in July 2007 shed further light on the Syrian-Iranian-North Korean triangle.

The explosion took place as the Syrian regime was attempting to weaponize Scud-C missiles with chemical agents. According to a report in Jane’s Defence Weekly at the time, the explosion resulted in the death of “dozens” of Iranian engineers.[20] The Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun also claimed that three North Korean engineers were among the dead.[21]

Jane’s described the weaponization effort as part of a joint program with Iran. According to the weekly, Iran helped Syria in “the planning, establishment and management” of five facilities designed for the “indigenous production of CW [chemical weapons] precursors.” The presence of North Korean personnel at the site indicates that this was in fact a trilateral collaboration. More here.

Hey Harry Reid, Ken Salazar, Kislyak What About Uranium One?

Note the date of this article….

In 2009, Gregory B. Jaczko was appointed to head the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by Barack Obama and his previous position was working for Harry Reid as his appropriations advisor as well as his science advisor.

U.S. officials said Wednesday that they have proposed ending the Obama administration’s ban on new uranium mining leases on public land outside Grand Canyon National Park.

The Forest Service proposed the change in response to President Donald Trump’s executive order for federal agencies to eliminate restrictions on energy production. The Trump administration has moved to unravel former President Barack Obama’s environmental regulations aimed at curbing climate change.

“Adoption of this recommendation could reopen lands to mineral entry pursuant to the United States mining laws facilitating exploration for, and possibly development of, uranium resources,” according to a report last week by the Forest Service’s parent agency, the Department of Agriculture.

The Oct. 25 report also said it’s in the national interest “to promote the clean and safe development of America’s vast energy resources.” Nuclear power plants use uranium as fuel.

Conservationists are decrying the Forest Service’s move, saying that past uranium mining in the region has polluted soils, washes, aquifers and drinking water.

“The Forest Service should be advocating for a permanent mining ban, not for advancing private mining interests that threaten one of the natural wonders of the world,” said Amber Reimondo, energy program director of the Grand Canyon Trust based in Flagstaff.

In 2012, then-Interior Department Secretary Ken Salazar banned new hard rock mining for 20 years on more than 1 million acres of national forest and Bureau of Land Management land near the Grand Canyon. He said he was acting to protect a “priceless American landscape.”

The ban did not affect existing mining claims in the region.

***  photo

TheHill: After the Obama administration approved the sale of a Canadian mining company with significant U.S. uranium reserves to a firm owned by Russia’s government, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission assured Congress and the public the new owners couldn’t export any raw nuclear fuel from America’s shores.

“No uranium produced at either facility may be exported,” the NRC declared in a November 2010 press release that announced that ARMZ, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned Rosatom, had been approved to take ownership of the Uranium One mining firm and its American assets.

A year later, the nuclear regulator repeated the assurance in a letter to Sen. John Barrasso, a Wyoming Republican in whose state Uranium One operated mines.

“Neither Uranium One Inc. nor AMRZ holds a specific NRC export license. In order to export uranium from the United States, Uranium One Inc. or ARMZ would need to apply for and obtain a specific NRC license authorizing the exports of uranium for use in reactor fuel,” then-NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko wrote to Barrasso.

The NRC never issued an export license to the Russian firm, a fact so engrained in the narrative of the Uranium One controversy that it showed up in The Washington Post’s official fact-checker site this week. “We have noted repeatedly that extracted uranium could not be exported by Russia without a license, which Rosatom does not have,” the Post reported on Monday, linking to the 2011 Barrasso letter.

Yet NRC memos reviewed by The Hill show that it did approve the shipment of yellowcake uranium — the raw material used to make nuclear fuel and weapons — from the Russian-owned mines in the United States to Canada in 2012 through a third party. Later, the Obama administration approved some of that uranium going all the way to Europe, government documents show.

NRC officials said they could not disclose the total amount of uranium that Uranium One exported because the information is proprietary. They did, however, say that the shipments only lasted from 2012 to 2014 and that they are unaware of any exports since then.

NRC officials told The Hill that Uranium One exports flowed from Wyoming to Canada and on to Europe between 2012 and 2014, and the approval involved a process with multiple agencies.

Rather than give Rosatom a direct export license — which would have raised red flags inside a Congress already suspicious of the deal — the NRC in 2012 authorized an amendment to an existing export license for a Paducah, Ky.-based trucking firm called RSB Logistics Services Inc. to simply add Uranium One to the list of clients whose uranium it could move to Canada.

The license, reviewed by The Hill, is dated March 16, 2012, and it increased the amount of uranium ore concentrate that RSB Logistics could ship to the Cameco Corp. plant in Ontario from 7,500,000 kilograms to 12,000,000 kilograms and added Uranium One to the “other parties to Export.”

The move escaped notice in Congress.

Officials at RSB, Cameco and Rosatom did not return repeated phone calls or emails seeking comment.

Uranium One’s American arm, however, emailed a statement to The Hill on Wednesday evening confirming it did export uranium to Canada through the trucking firm and that 25 percent of that nuclear fuel eventually made its way outside North America to Europe and Asia, stressing all the exports complied with federal law.

“None of the US U308 product produced to date has been sold to non-US customers except for approximately 25% which was sold via book transfer at the conversion facilities to customers from Western Europe and Asia,” executive Donna Wickers said. “Any physical export of the product from conversion facilities to non-US destinations is under the control of such customers and subject to NRC regulation.”

The United States actually imports the majority of the uranium it uses as fuel. In 2016, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 24 percent of the imports came from Kazakhstan and 14 percent came from Russia.

The sale of Uranium One to a Russian state-owned firm, however, has created political waves that have led to multiple congressional investigations. Republicans say they want to learn how the sale could have been approved and whether there was political interference.

“The more that surfaces about this deal, the more questions it raises,” Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) said in a statement released after this story was published. Grassley, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has launched an investigation into Uranium One.

“It now appears that despite pledges to the contrary, U.S. uranium made its way overseas as a part of the Uranium One deal,” Grassley said in the statement. “What’s more disturbing, those transactions were apparently made possible by various Obama Administration agencies while the Democrat-controlled Congress turned a blind eye.

“Americans deserve assurances that political influence was not a factor in all this. I’m increasingly convinced that a special counsel — someone with no prior involvement in any of these deals — should shine a light on this ordeal and get answers for the American people.”

Government officials told The Hill that the NRC was able to amend the export license affecting Uranium One because of two other decisions previously made by the Obama administration as part of a Russian “reset” in President Obama’s first term.

First, Obama reinstated a U.S.-Russia civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement. President George W. Bush had signed the agreement in 2008, but withdrew from it before it could take effect after Russia became involved in a military conflict with the former Soviet republic of Georgia, a U.S. ally, and after new concerns surfaced that Moscow was secretly aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions.

Obama re-submitted the agreement for approval by the Democrat-controlled Congress in May 2010, declaring Russia should be viewed as a friendly partner under Section 123 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 after agreeing to a new nuclear weapons reduction deal and helping the U.S. with Iran.

“I have concluded: (1) that the situation in Georgia need no longer be considered an obstacle to proceeding with the proposed Agreement; and (2) that the level and scope of U.S.-Russia cooperation on Iran are sufficient to justify resubmitting the proposed agreement to the Congress,” Obama said in a statement sent to Congress.

Congress took no action, which allowed the deal to become effective 90 days later.

The other step that allowed uranium from the Russian-controlled mines in the United States to be exported came in 2011, when the Commerce Department removed Rosatom, Uranium One’s owner, from a list of restricted companies that could not export nuclear or other sensitive materials or technologies without special approval under the Export Administration Regulations.

“This final rule removes the Federal Atomic Power of Russia (Rusatom) now known as the Russian State Corporation of Atomic Energy (Rosatom),” the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security declared in a May 24, 2011, notice in the Federal Register that created few waves.

Rosatom had been on the list for a long time, so long in fact that it was still listed in the federal database under its old name, Rusatom. Officials said the effort to remove the Russian nuclear firm was a “policy decision” driven by the State Department, Energy Department, Commerce Department and other agencies with Russia portfolios designed to recognize that bilateral relations between Russia and the United States had improved slightly.

Nine months after Rosatom was removed from the export restrictions list, the NRC issued its license amendment to the trucking firm in March 2012 that cleared the way for Uranium One exports, making it effective for nearly five years, to the end of 2017. But the NRC also stipulated that Uranium One’s uranium should be returned to the United States.

“The uranium authorized for export is to be returned to the United States,” the NRC instructed in the export license amendment.

But that, too, didn’t happen. Officials told The Hill that the Energy Department subsequently gave approval for some of the American fuel to depart Canada and be exported to European enrichment centers, according to a 2015 letter the NRC sent to Rep. Pete Visclosky (D-Ind.).

The NRC explained to Visclosky that it had originally stipulated that after the American uranium was treated in Canada, it had to “then return the uranium to the U.S. for further processing.”

“That license stated that the Canadian Government needed to obtain prior approval before any of the U.S. material could be transferred to any country other than the U.S.,” the letter added. “Subsequently the U.S. Department of Energy granted approval for some re-transfers of U.S. uranium from the Canadian conversion facilities to European enrichment plants.”

The NRC added, however, it did not believe any of the American uranium made its way “directly” to Russia. And it added that the whole supply chain scenario was made possible by the resubmission of Obama’s Section 123 agreement in 2010.

“The transfer of the U.S.-supplied uranium from Canada to Europe noted above also was subject to applicable Section 123 agreements,” the NRC noted. Section 123 is the part of the Atomic Energy Act that allows for the U.S. to share civilian nuclear technology and goods with allies.

The Uranium One deal has been controversial since at least 2015, when The New York Times reported former President Bill Clinton received a $500,000 speech fee from a Russian bank and millions in donations to his charitable foundation from sources interested in the deal around the time the Uranium One sale was being reviewed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s State Department and eight other federal agencies.

Hillary Clinton has said she delegated the approval decision to a deputy on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and did not apply any pressure. Bill Clinton has said the monies he received had no bearing on his wife’s policymaking decisions.

The 2015 Times article included a single reference to Uranium One officials saying they believed some of its American uranium made its way to Europe and Japan without any reference to how that occurred.

NRC officials said the multiple decisions documented in the memos, including the 2012 amendment of the third-party export license, provide the most complete description to date of how Russian-owned uranium ended up getting exported from the United States.

The entire Uranium One episode is getting a fresh look after The Hill disclosed late last month that the FBI had gathered extensive evidence in 2009 — before the mine sale was approved — that Rosatom’s main executive in the United States was engaged in a racketeering scheme that included bribery, kickbacks, extortion and money laundering.

The probe was enabled by an undercover informant working for the FBI inside the Russian nuclear industry, court records show. But the Justice Department did not make that evidence public until 2014, long after Rosatom benefited from multiple favorable decisions from the Obama administration.

The Senate Judiciary, House Intelligence and House Oversight committees have all announced plans to investigate the new revelation, and the Justice Department has given approval for the undercover informant to testify for the first time about what he witnessed the Russians doing to influence Obama administration decisions favorable to Rosatom between 2009 and 2014.

Hillary Clinton and other Democrats have described the renewed focus on the Uranium One deal as simply a distraction from the current investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election, in which Donald Trump became the 45th president. She also says that concerns about the Uranium One sale have long ago been “debunked.”

But it’s not just Republicans who have said that the revelation the FBI had evidence that Rosatom was engaged in criminality during the time it was receiving favorable decisions from the U.S. government deserves fresh scrutiny.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary committees, told The Hill she would like to learn more about what the FBI knew.

Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md.) has criticized Republicans for investigating Clinton, but said on “Morning Joe” last month he has “no problem looking into” the Uranium One deal.

And Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) said Sunday on CNN that he believed it was appropriate for Congress to investigate the new information.

“One of the House committees has already begun an oversight committee hearing,” King said. “I always think oversight hearings are appropriate. I’ve been trying to understand this deal.”

King also repeated the oft-quoted narrative that the “company changed hands, but the uranium that is mined in the United States cannot leave the United States.” The NRC license now shows now that Uranium One was, in fact, allowed to export American uranium.

A legal expert on the CFIUS process told The Hill that the new revelation that the FBI knew that a Rosatom official was engaged in illegality on U.S. soil before the sale was approved could very well have affected the decision if that evidence had been made public in real time.

“Criminal behavior would be something the committee would take into consideration when evaluating a transaction with a foreign company,” said Stewart Baker, a foreign commerce law expert at the Steptoe Johnson firm. “It is a consideration, but it is not something that would guarantee a particular outcome.”

He said the committee board would need “to consider how serious the criminal behavior is, in the context of this transaction, how likely is it that someone acting against U.S. security interest would take action,” he added.

 

Read letter to Barrasso by kballuck1 on Scribd

 

Read NRC license amendment by kballuck1 on Scribd

Read Visclosky letter by kballuck1 on Scribd

Read Obama Section 123 statement by kballuck1 on Scribd

More here from The Hill

3rd Carrier in Region as Mattis is in Seoul v. N Korea

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — Pentagon boss Jim Mattis arrived in South Korea on Friday to meet with the nation’s top defense officials and American military commanders on the front line in countering North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Mattis is emphasizing the Trump administration’s push for a diplomatic solution to the problem. But he also has said the U.S. is prepared to take military action if the North does not halt its development of missiles that could strike the entirety of the United States, potentially with a nuclear warhead.

Making his second trip as defense secretary to the U.S. ally, Mattis will meet with South Korean officials as part of an annual consultation on defense issues on the Korean peninsula. He’ll be joined in Seoul by the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph Dunford. President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit the city next month.

Related reading: Breakdown in North Korea Talks Sounds Alarms on Capitol Hill

US Navy sends a 3rd aircraft carrier to the Pacific after it completes mission against ISIS

  • The US has three aircraft carriers in the Pacific amid soaring tensions with North Korea.
  • The US Navy says the deployment of the USS Nimitz, the third carrier, was previously planned, but the US Navy has been busy near Korea.
  • The US, South Korea, and Japan jus t wrapped up a missile-defense drill in the region, and North Korea remains quiet for now.

The USS Nimitz aircraft carrier and its accompanying strike group of destroyers have left the Middle East, where they had launched airstrikes against ISIS, to back up US forces in the Pacific, the US Navy announced on Wednesday.

The Navy says the Nimitz is heading to the Pacific on a previously scheduled visit, but it will be the third carrier in the region joining the USS Ronald Reagan, which stays in Japan year-round, and the USS Theodore Roosevelt, which is currently in the Pacific well east of Japan.

According to the Navy, the Nimitz just finished three months fighting ISIS, with over 903 bombs dropped. ISIS fighters are now surrendering en masse as US-back ed regional forces close in on them.

Gen. Jeong Kyeong-doo, chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, and US Forces Korea chief Army Gen. Vincent Brooks met aboard the Reagan after the drills, with Jeong saying that the carrier sent a “strong warning” to North Korea “amid an unprecedentedly grave security situation,” according to Yonhap news.

The US, South Korea, and Japan just concluded a missile-defense drill near Korea with their cutting-edge naval-defense platforms. The drill focused on improving situational awarene ss and readiness while North Korea threatens to send more missiles flying over Japan.

The guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon fires an SM-2 missile during a live-fire exercise. Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonathan Jiang/USN

Despite North Korea’s talk of firing missiles at Guam or into the Pacific, the country remains quiet. Pyongyang hasn’t launched a missile in over a month, marking the longest period of relative quiet since its first missile launch in February.

But a recen t report states that North Korea has remained resolute and unwilling to talk to the US. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump seems intent on hinting at the possibility of war whenever possible.

***

North Korean official: Take hydrogen bomb threat ‘literally’

A senior North Korean official has issued a stern warning to the world that it should take “literally” his country’s threat to test a nuclear weapon above ground.

The official, Ri Yong Pil, told CNN in an exclusive conversation in Pyongyang that the threat made by North Korea’s foreign minister last month should not be dismissed. North Korea “has always brought its words into action,” Ri said, visibly angry. More here.

UN/Harvard Comprehensive WMD Programs in N Korea/ISIS

Primer:

A North Korean mining firm, reputed to be a front for Pyongyang’s weapons development programs, attempted to ship materiel to Syrian officials tied to the country’s chemical weapons program, according to a confidential United Nations assessment of international sanctions against the North.

Details of the U.N. findings, first reported by Reuters, found officials from Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation {KOMID) had sent a pair of shipments of unknown contents to members of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre or SSRC. The Syrian government organization has been responsible for developing chemical and biological weapons for regime in Damascus since the 1970’s.

The shipments never arrived in Syria after being intercepted by international authorities from U.N. partner nations, Reuters reports. “Two member states interdicted shipments destined for Syria. Another member state informed the panel that it had reasons to believe that the goods were part of a KOMID contract with Syria,” the U.N. review states.

KOMID has repeatedly trafficked in materials associated with ballistic missile development and other conventional arms programs, and was blacklisted by the U.N. security council as a result of those activities, Reuters reports.

As a result, the U.N. “is investigating reported prohibited chemical, ballistic missile and conventional arms cooperation between Syria and [North Korea],” the report states. More here.

***    photo

Quoting the South Korean Defense Ministry, it said: ‘North Korea has 13 types of biological weapons agents which it can weaponize within ten days, and anthrax and smallpox are the likely agents it would deploy.’

***

Harvard produced a report with the summary in part that reads:

Amidst the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, the assas-
sination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother via VX nerve agent in February
2017 brought renewed interest in North Korea’s other weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs—chemical and biological weap-
ons. If used on a large scale, these weapons can cause not only tens of
thousands of deaths, but also create panic and paralyze societies. Nev-
ertheless, the vividness of the nuclear threat has overshadowed other
weapons programs, limiting the attention and policy input that they
deserve. This paper focuses on North Korea’s biological weapons (BW).
Accurately assessing the threat from North Korea’s biological weapons
is challenging. Whereas North Korea has publicly declared its will to
become a nuclear power many times, it has been less overt about its
intention or capability for biological weapons. BW capabilities are
inherently hard to detect and measure. While nuclear programs can
be monitored by the number of nuclear tests and the success of missile
tests, weaponizing and cultivating pathogens can stay invisible behind
closed doors. Moreover, equipment used for BW production are often
dual-use for agriculture, making external monitoring and verification
virtually impossible. Limited information on North Korea’s BW pro-
gram leads to a low threat perception that may undermine preparation
and response efforts. The full 46 page report is here.

A German newspaper reported last week that at least one European intelligence agency has already warned that the Islamic State is exploring the use of chemicals for attacks in Europe. Such an eventuality would be a radical departure from prior attacks by the Islamic State in the West. In the past, the militant group has shown a strong preference for low-tech means of dispensing violence, such as firearms, vehicles and knives. But it has utilized chemical substances in Iraq and Syria, and its technical experts have amassed significant knowledge about weaponized chemicals.

Last week, several European and American counter-terrorism experts participated in a bioterrorism preparedness exercise in Berlin. Codenamed WUNDERBAUM, the exercise was one of several anti-terrorism drills that have taken place in the German capital this year alone. But last week’s drill was the first with an exclusive focus on preparing for a bioterrorist attack. German authorities insisted that the drill was not sparked by concrete intelligence of a pending biological or chemical attack. But the Berlin-based national newspaper Die Welt claimed on Friday that it had information about at least one such warning by a European intelligence agency. The paper did not name the agency, but said that “a foreign intelligence agency” had warned European security authorities of a possible terrorist attack by the Islamic State using chemical weapons. According to Die Welt, the warning was “explicit” and cautioned that the Sunni militant group may be preparing to use improvised bombs utilizing chemicals, including toxic gasses. The warning was communicated to European intelligence agencies, including Germany’s said Die Welt.

How likely is such a scenario? Terrorist groups tend to be conservative in their use of lethal technologies. They typically opt for time-tested methods using explosives or firearms, because these have a higher of success in comparison to more sophisticated, hi-tech weapons. The latter are also more expensive to build and require scientific and technical capabilities that are not typically available to terrorist organizations. Militants are usually strapped for cash, and are not science-savvy, so exceptions to this general trend are rare. But the Islamic State is different. Ever since it made its eventful appearance in 2013, the group has experimented with a variety of chemicals, including nerve agents. It is known that it initiated a modest chemical weapons program, headed by Iraqi engineers who were trained under Iraq’s late ruler, Saddam Hussein. One of them, Abu Malik, was killed in an American airstrike in early 2015. Another, Sleiman Daoud al-Afari, who headed the Islamic State’s chemical weapons program, was captured by US Special Forces in northern Iraq in March of last year.

The Islamic State’s rapid loss of territory in the past year has delivered serious blows to the group’s military infrastructure. Its chemical weapons program, which was targeted early on by the US, Iran and other belligerents, is now almost certainly defunct. But many of its engineers and technical experts are still at large, as are those who were trained by them during the group’s heyday in Iraq and Syria. Despite its continuing retreat, the Islamic State is still capable of employing chemicals that are relatively easy to procure, such as chlorine, hydrogen sulfide, or even various fertilizers, to construct explosives or nerve agents. Last summer, members of a terrorist cell with connections to the Islamic State were arrested in Sydney, Australia. By the time they were arrested, they had already procured significant quantities of hydrogen sulfide and had even tested the chemical, in an apparent preparation for a large-scale attack.

The Australian case shows that the Islamic State is not averse to the tactical use of chemical weapons in terrorist attacks. As the militant group’s self-proclaimed caliphate is disintegrating, and its leaders feel like they have nothing left to lose, the deployment of unconventional terrorist technologies should not be excluded as a tactical option for the organization. Western counter-terrorism officials should actively and immediately prepare for such an eventuality.

***

IAEA not Allowed to Inspect Iran Sites per Moscow

But Obama and Kerry told us they could….is there more than one version of the JCOA?

As the Trump administration calls for stricter monitoring of the Iranian nuclear agreement, officials in Iran insist they are complying with its terms and will not allow international inspectors into military sites.

Iran, which agreed in 2015 to grant inspectors broad access to nuclear-related facilities in exchange for the removal of severe economic sanctions, accuses President Trump of trying to sabotage what he has called the United States’ “worst deal.”

Trump has argued that Iran is violating the agreement struck under President Obama, although he has offered no evidence to support his claim and his administration has twice certified to Congress that Iran is in compliance.

But Trump administration officials looking for a way to increase pressure on Iran have begun to zero in on military facilities that they say could be used for nuclear-related activities barred under the agreement.

The IAEA, in its most recent report in June, said Iran was meeting its obligations under the pact. Experts say inspectors rely on intelligence reports and other information to determine whether sites they have not visited are being used for potentially illicit purposes. More here.

*** What about those snapback sanctions Obama told us about? The NYT’s wrote that the snapback sanctions were easy. What is the response of those American lobby groups that Obama hired on behalf of the Iran deal.

photo

***

Map of Iran's nuclear sites photo and more on each location courtesy of BBC

Inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations organization tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear facilities, have not requested access to military sites since the agreement went into effect, according to experts monitoring the process.

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister refers to Section T – while ignoring that, as the Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Olli Heinonen notes, the IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T.

This resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA
to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s
nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under
the JCPOA.” In addition, the resolution states: “The International Atomic
Energy Agency will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary
nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA.”
An excerpt from his article follows the TASS item.]

Fuss around IAEA inspections of Iranian military facilities contrived –
Russian diplomat
If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, Sergei Ryabkov said
Russian Politics & Diplomacy
October 22, 0:10 UTC+3
http://tass.com/politics/971962

 

MOSCOW, October 22. /TASS/. Certain countries substitute notions in talks on
expanding inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at
the Iranian military facilities creating contrived fuss around the issue.
However, Russia says that the IAEA is not authorized to carry out such
inspections, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told TASS on
Saturday.

“I would like to say absolutely clear and directly that acquiring some false
topicality the theme of the IAEA work on Section T (about Iran’s military
facilities – TASS) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over
the Iran nuclear program has no topicality for us although it is a talking
point now,” he said.

In particular, Moscow says that the IAEA “has not been authorized to carry
out such inspections and cannot be tasked because Section T highlights the
issues out of the agency’s competence,” Ryabkov said.

“Nevertheless, we can hear another thing. As in the issue of the Iran
missile program, some of our counterparts prefer to call black white and
vice versa,” the high-ranking diplomat said. “We cannot get them to
understand this evident logic and obvious truth.”

“Since they are insisting, we say if you cannot do without discussions on
the theme, it should be raised at the Joint Commission when the next session
is convened,” Ryabkov said.

If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, he said.

JPCOA and US

On July 14, 2015, Iran and six international mediators (the United Kingdom,
Germany, China, Russia, the United States, and France) reached a deal on
Iran’s nuclear program. On January 16, 2016, the parties to the deal
announced beginning of its implementation. Under the deal, Iran undertakes
to curb its nuclear activities and place them under total control of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange of abandonment of the
sanctions imposed previously by the United Nations Security Council, the
European Union and the United States over its nuclear program.

Last week, US President Donald Trump announced Washington’s new strategy
against Teheran. Thus, it says that the United States will seek to offset
Iran’s destabilizing influence and will call on the international community
to get consolidated for exerting pressure on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC, Iran’s most powerful security and military organization). Apart
from that, the US blacklisted the IRGC as an organization supporting
terrorism. Donald Trump refused to confirm Iran observed the agreement on
the nuclear program and promised changes to the document.
========================
Verifying Section T of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Iranian Military Site Access
Essential to JCPOA Section T Verification
by David Albright and Olli Heinonen
August 31, 2017
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/verifying-section-t-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal

The IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to
request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T. This
resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the
necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments
for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” In addition,
the resolution states: “The International Atomic Energy Agency will be
requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as
detailed in this JCPOA.”

Recommendations

 

The United States should assemble, if it has not already done so, its own
lists of equipment and locations relevant to Section T. It should also
prepare lists suitable for sharing with the IAEA or Joint Commission.
Similarly, U.S. allies should share relevant information with the IAEA. If
it has not done so, the IAEA should create a baseline of Section T
activities and equipment.

The United States and its allies should press the IAEA to develop and
establish an effective, credible verification regime under Section T that
includes requests to access military sites. The United States and the EU3
should also raise Section T and the likely need for approvals of such
equipment and activities by Iran at the next Joint Commission meeting.
Toward that goal, Iran should declare to the IAEA its sites and equipment
subject to Section T verification and approvals.
========
Olli Heinonen is Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and head of its
Department of Safeguards. He is a Senior Advisor on Science and
Nonproliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.