The Secret Back Channels to Putin

Posted on December 31, 2014December 31, 2014 by Denise Simon

Add sanctions. Remove sanctions. Amend sanctions. Call the old-timers, try anything. Why? Putin is on the rocks financially but remains defiant. Why is the White House attempting to reset relations again? Could it be that Russia has more clandestine missions planned that includes the Baltic States or Europe?

(Reuters) – Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a televised New Year’s address on Wednesday that the “return home” of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula to Moscow’s control would forever remain an important chapter in Russia’s history.

Putin is facing the biggest challenge of his 15-year rule as the Russian economy is sliding sharply into recession, hurt by Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis and falling prices for oil, Russia’s chief export.

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Inside Obama’s Secret Outreach to Russia

By Josh Rogin

President Barack Obama’s administration has been working behind the scenes for months to forge a new working relationship with Russia, despite the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown little interest in repairing relations with Washington or halting his aggression in neighboring Ukraine.

This month, Obama’s National Security Council finished an extensive and comprehensive review of U.S policy toward Russia that included dozens of meetings and input from the State Department, Defense Department and several other agencies, according to three senior administration officials. At the end of the sometimes-contentious process, Obama made a decision to continue to look for ways to work with Russia on a host of bilateral and international issues while also offering Putin a way out of the stalemate over the crisis in Ukraine.

“I don’t think that anybody at this point is under the impression that a wholesale reset of our relationship is possible at this time, but we might as well test out what they are actually willing to do,” a senior administration official told me. “Our theory of this all along has been, let’s see what’s there. Regardless of the likelihood of success.”

Leading the charge has been Secretary of State John Kerry. This fall, Kerry even proposed going to Moscow and meeting with Putin directly. The negotiations over Kerry’s trip got to the point of scheduling, but ultimately were scuttled because there was little prospect of demonstrable progress.

In a separate attempt at outreach, the White House turned to an old friend of Putin’s for help. The White House called on former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to discuss having him call Putin directly, according to two officials. It’s unclear whether Kissinger actually made the call. The White House and Kissinger both refused to comment for this column.

Kerry has been the point man on dealing with Russia because his close relationship with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov represents the last remaining functional diplomatic channel between Washington and Moscow. They meet often, often without any staff members present, and talk on the phone regularly. Obama and Putin, on the other hand, are known to have an intense dislike for each other and very rarely speak.

In several conversations with Lavrov, Kerry has floated an offer to Russia that would pave the way for a partial release of some of the most onerous economic sanctions. Kerry’s conditions included Russia adhering to September’s Minsk agreement and ceasing direct military support for the Ukrainian separatists. The issue of Crimea would be set aside for the time being, and some of the initial sanctions that were put in place after Crimea’s annexation would be kept in place.

“We are willing to isolate the issues of Donetsk and Luhansk from the issue of Crimea,” another senior administration official told me, naming two regions in Eastern Ukraine under separatist control. “If there was a settlement on Donetsk and Luhansk, there could be a removal of some sanctions while maintaining sanctions with regard to Crimea. That represents a way forward for Putin.”

Meanwhile, Kerry has been proposing increased U.S.-Russian cooperation on a wide range of international issues. Earlier this month, he invited Lavrov to a last-minute diplomatic confab in Rome to discuss the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

After one meeting with Lavrov in Paris in October, Kerry announced that he had discussed potential U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Yemen. But the apparent warming was overshadowed by Lavrov’s quick denial of Kerry’s claim that Russia had agreed to assist in the U.S.-led coalition against Islamic State in Iraq.

Kerry has seemed more enthusiastic about mending ties with Russia than Obama himself. After the president gave a blistering critique of Russian behavior in a major United Nations speech, saying that “Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition,” Kerry urged Lavrov to ignore his boss’s remarks, according to Lavrov. “Kerry said we have so many serious things to discuss that of course that was unfortunate, let’s not focus on that,” Lavrov told Russian reporters.

State Department officials insist that Kerry is clear-eyed about the challenges of trying to work with Russia, but that he believes there is no other responsible option than to see what can be accomplished.

“Secretary Kerry is not advocating internally or with Russia for a reset in the relationship, and in fact in meetings he has taken a strong and at times skeptical stance,” one senior State Department official told me. “As the nation’s chief diplomat he is simply always exploring ways to make relationships more productive.”

There is also a belief among many both inside the State Department and the White House that sanctions are working. The Russian economy is tanking, albeit due largely to collapsing oil prices and not targeted punishments. One senior administration official argued that absent the sanctions, Putin might have been even more aggressive in Ukraine. Moreover, this official said, the sanctions need time to work and might yet prove to have greater effect on Putin’s decision-making in the months ahead: “We’ll see how they feel as their economy continues to deteriorate and the Ukrainian economy refuses to collapse.”

If the Russians are getting ready to cave, they aren’t showing it. Putin remains defiant and Russian military assistance to the Ukrainian rebels continues. The Russian leadership has been rejecting Kerry’s overtures both in public and private. Diplomatic sources said that Lavrov has refused to even discuss Kerry’s conditions for partial easing of sanctions. And Putin has made a hobby of bashing the U.S. in public remarks.

To many of the administration’s critics, especially Republicans on Capitol Hill, pursuing engagement with Moscow is based on naivety and wishful thinking.

“It’s a strategy worthy in the finest tradition of Neville Chamberlain,” incoming Senate Armed Services Chairman John McCain told me. “I think the Russians are doing fine. Meanwhile, what price has Vladimir Putin paid? Very little.”

The legislative branch has also been active on Russia this year, but its efforts run counter to the administration’s policy and sometimes have the indirect effect of putting more roadblocks in front of the Obama-Kerry push to find a way forward.

On Dec. 18, Obama reluctantly signed a bill authorizing new Russia sanctions and military aid to Ukraine that was overwhelmingly passed by Congress. Afterward, the White House awkwardly said that the legislation did not signify any change in policy.

And this week, the State Department sanctioned four more Russian officials, but not over Ukraine. The officials were added to a list of human rights violators under the Sergei Magnitsky Act of 2012, named after the anti-corruption lawyer who died in a Russian prison. In response, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement saying that the Magnitsky Act sanctions “place in question the prospects for bilateral cooperation in resolving the situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, the Syrian crisis, and other acute international issues.”

These latest punishments show that it may be impossible to de-link the problems in the bilateral relationship from the opportunities, as the Obama administration wants to do. They also show that there will always be chances for those in Washington and Moscow who want to stoke the tensions to do so, jeopardizing any progress.

Some experts believe that any plan to warm U.S.-Russian relations is unlikely to succeed because it doesn’t have the full support of either president.

“It’s very clear that between the Putin Kremlin and the Obama White House there is a very bad chemistry. Its not a question of simply distrust, it’s a question of intense dislike between the two leaders,” said Dimitri Simes, president of the Center for the National Interest.

Also, some experts feel, placing the diplomacy in the Kerry-Lavrov channel dooms its outcome, because the Russians know that Kerry himself has no power to make major decisions and Lavrov has to be careful not to be seen as cozying up to the U.S.

“The more Kerry creates a perception he has a special relationship with Lavrov, the more he puts Lavrov in a difficult position with officials in his own capital, starting with Putin,” said Simes. “It’s clear that when Kerry deals with Lavrov and hopes that because they have overlapping interests, that would allow cooperation where useful, that is not a model of relationship that Putin is prepared to accept.”

Obama has made it clear that in his last two years in office he is prepared to make big moves on foreign policy even if they face political or legislative opposition, such as normalizing relations with Cuba or pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran. But when it comes to Russia, he is unwilling to place his own credibility behind any outreach to his nemesis Putin.

The administration’s cautious engagement with Moscow is logical: Why not seek a balance in a complicated and important bilateral relationship? But by choosing a middle ground between conciliation and confrontation — not being generous enough to entice Russia’s cooperation yet not being tough enough to stop Putin’s aggression in Eastern Europe — Obama’s policy risks failing on both fronts.

Diplomatic Suicide, Iran Celebrates

Posted on December 30, 2014December 30, 2014 by Denise Simon

WASHINGTON (AP) — While President Barack Obama hasn’t ruled out the possibility of reopening a U.S. Embassy in Iran, Republicans say the Senate will vote within weeks on a bill to impose more sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear program.

Obama was asked in an NPR interview broadcast on Monday whether he could envision opening an embassy there during his final two years in office.

“I never say never,” Obama said, adding that U.S. ties with Tehran must be restored in steps.

Washington and its partners are hoping to clinch a deal with Iran by July that would set long-term limits on Iran’s enrichment of uranium and other activity that could produce material for use in nuclear weapons. Iran says its program is solely for energy production and medical research purposes. It has agreed to some restrictions in exchange for billions of dollars in relief from U.S. economic sanctions.

Then…..

Iran Is Getting Away With Murder

Achieving a nuclear deal with Tehran is hugely important. But stopping Iran from slaughtering innocent Syrians is a worthy goal.

Jeffrey Goldberg

In an interview in late 2006, I asked then-Senator Barack Obama to talk about the challenges to rational deterrence theory posed by the behavior of rogue states. “Whatever you want to say about the Soviets,” Obama answered, “they were essentially conservative. The North Korean regime and the Iranians are driven more by ideology and fantasy.”

Earlier this year, I asked Obama the following question: “What is more dangerous: Sunni extremism or Shia extremism?”

His answer was revealing, suggestive of an important change in the way he has come to view the Iranian regime. He started by saying, as would be expected, “I’m not big on extremism generally.” And then he argued—in part by omission—that he finds the principal proponent of Shiite extremism, the regime in Tehran, more rational, and more malleable, than the main promoters of Sunni radicalism.

“I don’t think you’ll get me to choose on those two issues,” he said. “What I’ll say is that if you look at Iranian behavior, they are strategic, and they’re not impulsive. They have a worldview, and they see their interests, and they respond to costs and benefits. And that isn’t to say that they aren’t a theocracy that embraces all kinds of ideas that I find abhorrent, but they’re not North Korea. They are a large, powerful country that sees itself as an important player on the world stage, and I do not think has a suicide wish, and can respond to incentives. And that’s the reason why they came to the table on sanctions.”

Since becoming president, Obama has made the argument that Iran could be induced, cajoled, and pressured into compromise, a view that has been proven provisionally, partially, correct: Sanctions, plus Obama’s repeated (and, to my mind, at least, credible) threat of military action, convinced Iran to temporarily halt many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. But Obama and his international partners have been less successful at bringing Iran to permanent denuclearization.

A long-term, verifiable arrangement that keeps Iran perpetually a year or more from nuclear breakout is surpassingly important for the national security of the United States (as Obama noted in this interview); for the health and safety of America’s friends in the Middle East; and for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation in the world’s most volatile and dangerous region. Over the past year, the two sides of international nuclear negotiations have apparently moved somewhat closer to each other, and when the second round of talks came to an end without achieving a deal, both sides agreed that yet another negotiation extension was in order. As Iran and its interlocutors move into what stands to be the fateful year for these negotiations, a credible deal does not look to be achievable; so far, at least, the Iranians seem unwilling to make the truly creative concessions necessary to meet the West’s minimum requirements.

Especially if a deal is ultimately proven to be unachievable, another question will arise: Is the price the U.S. has paid to reach this elusive deal too high? An admirable aspect of Obama’s foreign-policy making is his ability to coolly focus on core issues to the exclusion of what he considers to be extraneous matters. This is also, however, a non-admirable aspect of his policymaking, in particular when the subject at hand is Iran’s role in supporting the killer Assad regime in Syria.

Obama seems to believe that a nuclear deal is, in a way, like Casaubon‘s key to all mythologies: Many good things, he believes, could flow from a nuclear compromise. In an interview last week with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, the president suggested that a nuclear agreement would help Iran become “a very successful regional power that was also abiding by international norms and international rules.” This, he said, “would be good for everybody. That would be good for the United States, that would be good for the region, and most of all, it would be good for the Iranian people.”

This is a wonderful notion, the idea that the end of Iran’s isolation could lead it to moderate its more extreme impulses. But there isn’t much in the way of proof to suggest that Iran’s rulers are looking to join an international order whose norms are defined by the United States and its allies. In fact, there is proof of something quite opposite: Iran seems as interested as ever in becoming a regional hegemon, on its own terms. And its supreme leader, and his closest confidants, have made it clear, over and over again, that he is not interested in normalizing relations with the United States.

Across the greater Middle East, Iran’s efforts to extend its influence have been blunt and brutal: It supports Shiite insurrections in Yemen and Bahrain; it attempts to manipulate Lebanese politics through its Beirut-based proxy, Hezbollah; it intervenes in Gaza and against the already-fading hope for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Arab crisis; and certainly its unceasing threats to eradicate a fellow member-state of the United Nations, Israel, suggest that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has a vision for Iran that differs from Obama’s.

But nothing underscores the Iranian regime’s imperialistic, hegemonic nature more than its support for the Assad regime in Damascus. Without Iran’s assistance, Assad would have fallen a long time ago. The death toll in Syria is more than 200,000; half of Syria’s population has been displaced. These dark achievements of the Assad regime would not have been possible without Iran. Thousands of Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps troops and advisers, plus Iranian weaponry, have made all the difference for Assad. As a recent study by the Middle East Institute states:

It is no longer accurate to describe the war in Syria as a conflict between Syrian rebels on the one hand and Bashar al-Assad’s regime forces “supported” by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias on the other. Most major battles in Syria—along the frontlines of regime-held areas—are now being directed and fought by the IRG and Hezbollah, along with other non-Syrian Shi‘i militias, with Assad forces in a supportive or secondary role. …

One result of this heavy Iranian involvement in the war in Syria has been a change in the nature of the relationship between the Syrian and the Iranian regimes. From historically being mutually beneficial allies, the Iranian regime is now effectively the dominant force in regime-held areas of Syria, and can thus be legally considered an “occupying force,” with the responsibilities that accompany such a role.

There was no commensurate effort made by opponents of Assad to help those Syrians who were trying to overthrow him. President Obama called on Assad to go, but kept the U.S. on the sidelines through the first years of the Syrian civil war, for reasons he has explained in many places, including here.

Today, the U.S. and its allies are fighting in the Syrian theater, but they are fighting Assad’s putative enemies, the Sunni extremists of ISIS, not Assad and his Iranian allies. And yet ISIS is a derivative problem of a larger crisis: Without Assad—which is to say, without Iran—there would be no ISIS “caliphate” in Syria in the first place. The midwives of ISIS are Assad, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, and Ayatollah Khamenei.

If Assad had been overthrown early in the civil war, a more moderate, multi-confessional Syrian government could have plausibly emerged to take its place. The early rebels, who frightened the Assad regime to its core, were not seeking to build a cross-border caliphate on a foundation of medieval cruelty; they were simply seeking to remove Assad’s boot from their necks. As the Assad regime, with Iran’s invaluable help, recovered from the first blows of the rebellion, many Sunni Syrians, seeking help everywhere but finding it mainly among radicals, became radicalized themselves. This was an explicable, if not justifiable, reaction to the mortal threat posed by what they saw as a massed Shiite threat.

Earlier this year, in a conversation about the Obama administration’s Middle East strategy, Senator John McCain brought me up short when he criticized the president for launching attacks on a symptom of the Syrian civil war, ISIS, rather than its root cause. He told me that the U.S. should be battling the Assad regime at the same time it attacks Sunni terrorists. I asked him the following question: “Wouldn’t the generals say to you, ‘You want me to fight ISIS, and you want me to fight the guys who are fighting ISIS, at the same time? Why would we bomb guys who are bombing ISIS? That would turn this into a crazy standoff.’”

McCain answered: “Our ultimate job is not only to defeat ISIS but to give the Syrian people the opportunity to prevail as well. … If we do this right, if we do the right kind of training and equipping of the Free Syrian Army, plus air strikes, plus taking out Bashar Assad’s air assets, we could reverse the battlefield equation.”

There is even less reason to believe today that the Free Syrian Army, such as it is, is capable of fighting the Assad regime (and ISIS) effectively. So at this late stage, McCain’s policy prescriptions may be unrealistic. But his diagnosis of the core problem seems tragically accurate.

“I don’t think ISIS would exist if Bashar al-Assad had been removed two or three years ago,” McCain told me when we revisited the question earlier this month. “He was on his way out until the Iranians brought in 5,000 Hezbollah fighters, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps came in, to train Assad’s troops and provide them with weapons, including the barrel bombs, which are horrible weapons of war.”

McCain argues that the Obama administration has avoided confronting Assad in part for fear that doing so would alienate Assad’s patrons in Tehran, the same men who are in charge of the nuclear file. “The whole theory hinges on a major breakthrough in the nuclear talks, that once they get their deal, Iran will stop funding Hamas, stop supporting Hezbollah, stop destabilizing Yemen, that they’ll join us in fighting extremism. So they have to get a nuclear deal at all costs, and not do anything in Syria. This is just so farfetched it’s delusional.”

I wouldn’t go so far as to call proponents of this theory delusional, but let’s say that they are not approaching the issue of leverage in an effective way. Gary Samore, a former Obama administration official who was in charge of the National Security Council’s Iran nuclear file, told me this month that he would use Iran’s deep exposure in Syria to U.S. advantage.

“Confronting Iran forcefully in Syria and Iraq increases chances for a nuclear deal because Iran will only meet our nuclear demands if it feels weak and vulnerable,” Samore wrote in an email. “Conversely, Iran’s sense that it is winning in Syria and that it is indispensable in Iraq decreases chances for a nuclear because the Supreme Leader won’t make nuclear concessions if he feels strong and ascendant.”

Is it likely that Obama will move toward a policy of containing Iran in Syria, and away from his more accommodationist stance? Arab states that count Iran as an enemy and the U.S. as a friend have asked him repeatedly over the past two years to treat Iran as a root cause of the Syrian catastrophe. But Obama appears focused solely on achieving a nuclear deal with Iran, in part because he seems to believe that Iran is ready to play the part of rational and constructive actor, rather than extremist would-be hegemon. I hope he’s right, and I hope he achieves a strong nuclear deal, but I worry that he is empowering an Iranian government that isn’t about to change in any constructive way. In the meantime, the Iranian regime continues to get away, quite literally, with murder.

Then there is the economic outlook for the Middle East and Iran and the tribal sects.

Likewise in Iraq, which like Iran has a Shiite majority, Tehran’s consolidated influence since the U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011 has contributed to sectarian polarization and left the government dependent on Iranian-backed militias to fight the Sunni extremist group Islamic State.

With Iran’s economy crippled by the double whammy of international sanctions and falling oil prices, Syria and Iraq will become even more of a burden in 2015.

In the end, Mr. Khamenei’s two big projects could merge into one during 2015 or diverge. A nuclear deal with world powers could open the door to further cooperation with the U.S. in Iraq and Syria. But failure to strike such a deal could spark new tensions on all fronts between Iran and the international community.

Anyone Paying Attention to Syria?

Posted on December 30, 2014December 30, 2014 by Denise Simon

Turkey a route for arms going to al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria: UN report

ISIL militants (Rear) stand next to an ISIL flag atop a hill near Kobane as seen from the Turkish-Syrian border, with Turkish troops in foreground, in the southeastern town of Suruç, Şanlıurfa province. AFP Photo / Aris Messinis

Turkey is being used as one of the primary routes for weapons smuggling to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Nusra, according to a United Nations report.

“Most [arms] supplies have either been seized from the armed forces of Iraq or (to a lesser extent) the Syrian Arab Republic, or have been smuggled to ISIL and [al-Nusra], primarily by routes that run through Turkey,” said a report penned by the U.N. al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

Turkey has been pressured by Western countries to beef up its measures at borders, which have been claimed to be a primary route for jihadists’ oil and weapons smuggling as well as foreign jihadists’ joining the war in Syria.

Turkey, for its part, denies the accusations of negligence in its border policies and insists that it is maintaining a close and firm watch on its borders.

It does not end there:

Syria turns to harsh recruitment measures to boost army ranks

BEIRUT — The Syrian regime has intensified efforts to reverse substantial manpower losses to its military with large-scale mobilizations of reservists as well as sweeping arrest campaigns and new regulations to stop desertions and draft-dodging.

The measures have been imposed in recent months because of soaring casualties among forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, as well as apparent increases in desertions and evasions of compulsory military service, analysts say. Some speculate that the moves also could be part of stepped-up military efforts to win more ground from rebels in anticipation of possible peace talks, which Russia has attempted to restart to end nearly four years of conflict.

But the government’s measures have added to already simmering anger among its support base over battlefield deaths. The anger may be triggering a backlash that in turn could undermine Assad’s war aims, Syrians and analysts say.

“These things have obviously angered core constituents, and they show just how desperate the regime is to come up with warm bodies to fill the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army,” said Andrew Tabler, a senior fellow and Syria expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

In October, the government boosted activations of reserve forces. Tens of thousands of reservists have been called up, and soldiers and militiamen have erected scores of checkpoints and increased raids on cafes and homes to apprehend those who refuse to comply. Similar measures target those who avoid regular military service, a compulsory 18-month period for men 18 and older.

In recent weeks, the regime also began stepping up threats to dismiss and fine state employees who fail to fulfill military obligations, according to Syrian news websites and activists. New restrictions imposed this fall, they say, have made it all but impossible for men in their 20s to leave the country.

Since the start of the uprising in 2011, authorities have used arrests and intimidation to halt desertions, defections and evasion of military service – but not to the extent seen recently, Syrians and analysts say. Men who are dragooned into the army appear to be deserting in larger numbers, they say, and the government’s crackdown is driving many of these men as well as more of the many draft-evaders into hiding or abroad.

“I can’t go back. All these things would make it certain that I’d be forced into the military,” said Mustafa, 25, a Syrian from Damascus who fled to Lebanon in September because of the new measures. Citing safety concerns, he asked that only his first name be used.

Joseph, a 34-year-old Christian from Damascus, learned two weeks ago that his name was on a list of thousands of people who would soon be activated for reserve duty. Having completed his compulsory military service in 2009, he wants to flee Syria.

“Of course I don’t want to return to the military,” Joseph said by telephone from the capital. He also requested that only his first name be used.

A report issued this month by the Institute for the Study of War says the number of soldiers in the Syrian military has fallen by more than half since the start of the conflict, from roughly 325,000 to 150,000, because of casualties, defections and desertions. Combat fatalities alone have surpassed 44,000, according to the report, which used data from Syrian activists, monitoring groups and media reports.

Christopher Kozak, a Syria analyst at the institute who wrote the report, said in an email that reservist mobilizations and efforts to stop desertions appear to be partly related to the departure in recent months of pro-regime militiamen. Scores of these largely Shiite fighters, who come from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement, left for Iraq in the summer to counter an offensive by the Islamic State, an extremist Sunni group.

Iranian fighters in particular have been crucial in helping the Syrian government restructure its forces. One such effort was the founding of the National Defense Force, a militia composed of paid volunteers. The foreign fighters helped Assad’s military win back strategic territory from rebels.

Kozak wrote that these supplemental militias “are no longer sufficient to meet the regime’s projected needs – spurring the regime to reinvigorate its conscription efforts” in the military.

Imad Salamey, a politics professor at the Lebanese American University, said that efforts to boost numbers in the military are partly driven by concern that Assad’s allies, Iran and Russia, appear increasingly interested in a negotiated settlement to the Syrian civil war. In recent weeks, Russia, with Iranian backing, has engaged in diplomatic efforts to restart the Geneva peace talks that collapsed in February.

“There is rising urgency in these countries for a settlement to the conflict and the regime senses this, so it’s trying to win as much ground as possible to strengthen its negotiating position,” he said.

Yezid Sayigh, a Syria expert and senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said economic crises in Iran and Russia because of falling oil prices could affect their support for the Assad government, which until now has prevented its collapse. “The question for me really is whether Iran and Russia are going to push the regime harder to engage in diplomatic efforts,” he said.

He added that a worsening problem for the government is anger among its supporters over mounting casualties. Rare protests over the issue have been held by the minority Alawite population, the backbone of the military.

Other minority groups, such as Syria’s Druze community, also show signs of dissent. In their villages in southern Syria, most Druze families have refused to allow their sons to join the military. In an incident this month, Druze villagers kidnapped government intelligence officers in an attempt to free a man apprehended for refusing to serve in the military.

“The people are turning on the regime here because they don’t want their children to die in this war. They don’t see the point of this war,” said Qusay, 22, a resident of the mostly Druze city of Suwayda and an engineering student at Damascus University who asked that only his first name be used.

“If the regime tries to push us to serve, there will be a fight.”

Nazi Underground is Seeing Daylight

Posted on December 30, 2014December 30, 2014 by Denise Simon

The Nazi’s had a well defined underground system in several countries for a complete infrastructure including foreign workers.

In 1944 the SS picked 300 workers from other camps, including Buchenwald 75 miles away, to hack out vast underground chambers. Out of reach of allied bombers, production equipment was lowered into the mine. Deep underground, the Polish, French and Russian workers – some Jewish – assembled parts for Germany’s war industry.

“We worked in three shifts, 6am-2pm, 2-10pm and 10pm-6am,” Geoffroy de Clercq, a French resistance fighter who arrived in Wansleben in March 1944, and survived the war, told the Guardian. “We slept above ground in bunks. Underground we didn’t suffer from the cold. The temperature was constant – about 24C (75F). Read more here.

But just a few weeks ago, yet another underground location was found and quite by accident in Austria.

Filmmaker says he uncovered Nazis’ ‘biggest secret weapons facility’ underground near concentration camp

An Austrian filmmaker believes he has discovered a huge Nazi “secret weapons facility” in an underground complex near the remains of the Mathausen-Gusen concentration camp in Austria, where thousands of Jews were killed.

“This was a giant industrial complex and most likely the biggest secret weapons production facility of the Third Reich,” documentary filmmaker Andreas Sulzer told the Sunday Times. The underground complex is connected to the B8 Bergkristall underground factory, where Germans produced the first jet fighters, the Messerschmitt Me 262.

Though the full scope of what occurred inside those reported chambers in the Austrian town of St. Georgen remains unclear and Sulzer’s conclusions are speculative, some analysts are already trumpeting the findings. The “filmmaker opened an important door that one has to go through,” Samuel Laster, editor of a Vienna newspaper, told the Jeursalem Post.

It was that facility where Nazi leadership possibly “aspired to create a combination of missiles and weapons of mass destruction,” historian Rainer Karlsch, who has long researched Hitler’s pursuit of an atomic bomb and worked with Sulzer on the project, told the Sunday Times. “They wanted to equip [a V-2] missile, or more advanced rockets, with poison gas, radioactive material or nuclear warheads.”

The reported findings, if corroborated by further inquiry, could add fresh fodder to an ongoing debate over the Third Reich’s ultimately failed attempt to secure an atomic weapon. The project, begun in the late 1930s, was called the “Uranium Society” or the “Uranium Club” by German scientists. It was inspired by a report by a pair of German chemists named Fritz Strassmann and Otto Hahn who detailed the mechanisms of nuclear fission.

Sulzer’s quest to discover what he called the Third Reich’s “biggest secret weapons facility” began years ago with the discovery of an off-hand remark buried in a letter written by a German scientist named Viktor Schauberger. Schauberger, Sulzer told the Sunday Times, “was involved, under the strictest secrecy, in research projects for the SS in St. Georgen. … In his letters he talks about splitting the atom,” Sulzer said. He added in an interview with the Sunday Times: “He warned colleagues in letters that he was involved in ‘atom-smashing.”

Sulzer then uncovered additional evidence suggesting the Nazis had perhaps conducted highly secretive weapon experiments in the same location, maybe even atomic experiments. In February of this year, after tests revealed unusually high radiation levels, drilling started near a vast network of tunnels constructed by concentration camp prisoners. The search for secret laboratories sought to answer a question that consumed the community: Did Hitler try to build an atomic bomb there?

“We just want to know whether a potential hazard exists,” the mayor of Perg in northern Austria told the Sunday Times. “We want hard facts.”

Then last week, the news broke in the German press. After heavy equipment cut through large granite plates Nazi troops used to seal an entrance shaft at the site, the team, using radar, found catacombs that coursed through an underground facility of roughly 75 acres.

It was already known that, as World War II raged, thousands of prisoners in the camp were used to construct massive underground facilities in St. Georgen that would be safe from the Allied bombing campaigns. In those facilities, workers produced rockets and fighter jets.

But perhaps other production was also quietly occurring. The head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, who had lots of biological weapon schemes, was a regular visitor to the St. Georgen. It was also frequented, according to the filmmaker, by the man who directed Hitler’s missile programs, Hans Kammler. What’s more, Sulzerunearthed blueprints that he said showed additional, undiscovered chambers underground.

Then the biggest clue emerged. He found testimony by a top American operative who kept tabs on Nazi scientists who said there was a major complex hidden underground near St. Georgen. “We found these very, very interesting documents that point out that there was a very secret project going on in St. Georgen,” Sulzer told Russia Today earlier this year. “It could also be associated with atomic research.”

But there was a problem: Austrian authorities had pumped the tunnels full of concrete at a cost of millions of euros. And now, just as Sulzer’s team, which is funded by German state television network ZDF, may be close to discovering what happened there, local Austrian authorities stopped further excavation, requesting additional permits. Sulzer, however, told the Sunday Times he thinks they’ll start up work again in the coming weeks.

“Prisoners from concentration camps across Europe were handpicked for their special skills — physicists, chemists or other experts — to work on this monstrous project,” the filmmaker said. “And we owe it to the victims to finally open the site and reveal the truth.”

The State of Palestine, Yes, No Maybe

Posted on December 30, 2014December 30, 2014 by Denise Simon

Update: As of 5:00 PM, EST

UN REJECTS PALESTINIAN RESOLUTION TO DEMAND ISRAEL WITHDRAW FROM WEST BANK, EAST JERUSALEM

A revised text in the resolution for Palestinian statehood has been presented to the United Nations. There are some interesting demands such that some global leaders are not in support including the United States and Britain. Sadly through all the years of debate over statehood, very few look at history and borders. The debate is a false one when it is understood where “Palestine” was/is.

The draft resolution by the Palestinians calling for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem within three years and revised to include language declaring East Jerusalem as the future capital of a Palestinian state was presented to the UN Security Council late Monday.
The draft resolution affirms the urgent need to achieve “a just, lasting and comprehensive peaceful solution” to the decades-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict within 12 months and sets a December 31, 2017 deadline for Israel’s occupation to end.

State Department Spokeswoman Jen Psaki, when asked today if the United States would support a proposed United Nations resolution that would set terms of a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians, said that “it is not something that we would support.”

The Times of Israel reports:

Washington has seen the text of a draft resolution circulating in the UN Security Council and “it is not something that we would support,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters.

“We wouldn’t support any action that would prejudge the outcome of the negotiations and that would set a specific deadline for the withdrawal of forces,” Psaki said.

Psaki’s answer indicates that the United States would veto the resolution if it came before the Security Council.

Psaki’s comments came shortly after Senators Chuck Schumer (D – N.Y.) and Lindsey Graham (R – S.C.) called on the administration “to make clear that the United States will veto any United Nations resolution … to bypass direct negotiations and impose peace terms on Israel through the United Nations Security Council and other international bodies,” earlier today.

(Reuters) – Britain joined the United States on Tuesday, declaring that it cannot support a new Palestinian draft proposal calling for peace with Israel within a year and an end of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories by late 2017.

Jordan on Tuesday circulated to the U.N. Security Council a draft resolution prepared by the Palestinians, who said they want it put to a vote before Thursday. Washington said it could not support the draft because it was not constructive and failed to address Israel’s security needs.

British U.N. Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant was asked by reporters whether his delegation could support the Palestinian draft.

“Well no,” he said. “There’s some difficulties with the text, particularly language on time scales, new language on refugees. So I think we would have some difficulties.”