U.S. Iran Strategy Announced by SecState Pompeo

Posted on May 21, 2018May 21, 2018 by Denise Simon

This speech/policy sets the table for the North Korea talks with President Trump. Further, it advances the mission on countering militant Islam not only in the region but globally. Europe has to decide on corporate business relationship with Iran versus human rights along with worldwide terrorism at the hands of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Since 2014, a broad range of organizations, from medical companies such as GE Healthcare to aerospace firms such as Lufthansa Technik, as well as educational institutions such as Harvard University, have obtained permission and waivers to operate in Iran.

Other U.S. institutions that were permitted to do business in Iran include: General Electric Medical and Aviation Divisions, Bausch & Lomb, Boston Scientific, Smithsonian Institute, HSBC, Philips North America, University of California San Diego, University of Wisconsin, Loyola University, New York University, BNP Paribas S.A., American Pulp and Paper and Intelsat Corporation to list a few. More here.

(Reuters) – The United States on Monday demanded Iran make sweeping changes — from dropping its nuclear program to pulling out of the Syrian civil war — or face severe economic sanctions as the Trump administration hardened its approach to Tehran.

Iran dismissed Washington’s ultimatum and one senior Iranian official said it showed the United States is seeking “regime change” in Iran.

Weeks after President Donald Trump pulled out of an international nuclear deal with Iran, his administration threatened to impose “the strongest sanctions in history,” and vowed to “crush” Iranian operatives abroad, setting Washington and Tehran further on a course of confrontation.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded sweeping changes that would force Iran effectively to reverse the recent spread of its military and political influence through the Middle East to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

If Washington sees tangible shifts in Iran’s policies, it is prepared to lift sanctions, Pompeo said.

“The sting of sanctions will only grow more painful if the regime does not change course from the unacceptable and unproductive path it has chosen for itself and the people of Iran,” Pompeo said in his first major speech since becoming secretary of state.

“These will be the strongest sanctions in history by the time we are done,” he added.

Pompeo took aim at Iran’s policy of expansion in the Middle East through support for armed groups in countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

He warned that the United States would “crush” Iranian operatives and proxies abroad and told Tehran to pull out forces under its command from the Syrian civil war where they have helped President Bashar al-Assad gain the upper hand.

Iran’s president summarily dismissed Pompeo’s demands.

“Who are you to decide for Iran and the world?,” the semi-official ILNA news agency quoted Hassan Rouhani as saying.

“The world today does not accept America to decide for the world, as countries are independent … that era is over … We will continue our path with the support of our nation.”

Tension between the two countries has grown notably since Trump this month withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement aimed at preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

A senior Iranian official said Pompeo’s remarks showed that the United States was pushing for “regime change,” a charged phrase often associated with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein.

Pompeo warned that if Iran fully resumed its nuclear program Washington would be ready to respond and said the administration would hold companies doing prohibited business in Iran to account.

“Our demands on Iran are not unreasonable: give up your program,” Pompeo said, “Should they choose to go back, should they begin to enrich, we are fully prepared to respond to that as well,” he said, declining to elaborate.

Pompeo said Washington would work with the Defense Department and allies to counter Iran in the cyberspace and maritime areas.

The Pentagon said it would take all necessary steps to confront Iranian behavior in the region and was assessing whether that could include new actions or doubling down on current ones.

NAMING NAMES

Pompeo said if Iran made major changes, the United States was prepared to ease sanctions, re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relations and support the country’s re-integration into the international economic system.

Any new U.S. sanctions will raise the cost of trade for Iran and are expected to further deter Western companies from investing there, giving hardliners, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an opportunity to cement their grip on power.

Iran’s ruling elite are mindful of recent protests sparked by economic hardship, which is, in part, their calculation for working with the Europeans on ways to salvage the nuclear deal.

Pompeo’s speech did not explicitly call for regime change but he repeatedly urged the Iranian people not to put up with their leaders, specifically naming Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

“At the end of the day the Iranian people will get to make a choice about their leadership,” Pompeo said.

Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Brooking Institution think tank’s foreign policy program, said Pompeo’s speech did indeed amount to a strategy of regime change.

“There is only one way to read it and that is that Trump administration has wedded itself to a regime-change strategy to Iran, one that is likely to alienate our allies. One with dubious prospects for success,” she said.

The administration’s approach “explicitly puts the onus on the Iranian people to change their leadership or face cataclysmic financial pressure,” said Maloney who has advised the State Department on Iran in the Bush administration between 2005-2007.

Lebanese analyst Ghaleb Kandil, who has close ties to the pro-Iran Hezbollah group, said Washington’s demands have previously not worked.

“These are conditions that were tested in previous phases of American pressures, before the nuclear deal, when Iran was in more difficult circumstances than it is in these days, and it did not surrender to these conditions or accept them,” said Kandil.

Pompeo outlined 12 U.S. demands for Iran including to stop uranium enrichment, never to pursue plutonium reprocessing and to close its heavy water reactor.

It also had to declare all previous military dimensions of its nuclear program and to permanently and verifiably abandon such work, he said.

Pompeo’s demand that Tehran stop uranium enrichment goes even further than the nuclear deal. Iran says its nuclear work has medical uses and will produce energy to meet domestic demand and complement its oil reserves.

Washington’s regional allies, the Gulf and Israel, who were strong critics of the deal, praised the administration’s position on Monday.

European parties to the nuclear deal – France, Britain and Germany – are working to find a way to keep the nuclear pact in effect after Washington’s exit.

Speaking ahead of Pompeo’s speech, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said it would be difficult for the United States and its allies to deal with all the issues they had with Iran at the same time.

“If you try to pull all of those into a giant negotiation, a new jumbo Iran negotiation, a new treaty…that seems to be what they envisage and I don’t see that being very easy to achieve in anything like a reasonable timescale, Johnson said in Argentina.

Gordon Chang is Right, Recall Chinese Diplomats

Posted on May 20, 2018May 20, 2018 by Denise Simon

Today, May 20, Steve Mnuchin, Treasury Secretary announced the tariffs are on hold, pending some kind of a tentative agreement. Really Steve? This as the North Korea Kim/Trump talks are on shaky ground. China wants North Korea to have nuclear weapons, period.

China is a Leninist state. I spent a month on the mainland, I saw it.

A threat to the United States? Yes. To allies? Yes

China has overtly weaponized those pesky island with a H-6 bomber aircraft landing on Woody Island. Did President Xi share any of this with President Trump at that confab at Mar A Lago? The matter of the South China Sea and those disputed waters and island is hardly any new threat. It goes back to at least 2014 and President Obama was briefed often on the building Chinese aggression. There was a temporary Asia Pivot by Obama but it was merely a gesture in retrospect. That Asia Pivot hardly raised any eyebrows in Beijing.

The reason to recall diplomats and expel others from the United States? At least the first one, laser attack on our U.S. airmen.

8 May 2018 — The two airmen reported symptoms of dizziness and seeing rings. Pointing lasers at aircraft is extremely dangerous. It can temporarily blind pilots, and in the United States it’s a federal offense. While the pilots are expected to make a full recovery, the incident raises questions about how far the United States will allow China to push it without pushing back.

But first let’s back up. What’s everyone doing in Djibouti, a tiny country in eastern Africa? America has a base in Djibouti because of its proximity to Yemen, a terrorist incubator. The 4,000 U.S. troops stationed there are tasked with conducting counter-terrorism operations in the region.

photo

What about China? Well, that’s a little more opaque. China opened its Djibouti base last August, claiming that its purpose is to help with anti-piracy patrols and other peacekeeping missions. It’s supposedly a logistics base, but here’s the thing: China doesn’t have foreign military bases anywhere in the world — except in Djibouti, eight miles from the U.S. base.

But is worse…anyone paying attention outside of Gordon Chang and Steven Mosher? Yes thankfully, Congress is. FINALLY

Suggest you watch this video, consider how much of it, if not all of it was stolen from the United States.

So, let us consider some of these items shall we?

Why are we giving China access to our defense contractors? Additionally, there are cyber part operations and hacks of the F-22 and F-35.
Who is challenging the BRI, Belt Road Initiative?
The South China Sea is part of the Blue Water Territory. China is building a navy to be twice the size of that of the United States. That includes up to 12 nuclear powered carrier battle groups.
No one challenged China on the Scarborough Shoal achievement, that is the new China model for hegemony.
China wants all telecom advances developed by the United States for it’s fiber-liked command centers and is getting them. China wants to lead on 5G, then there is outer-space.
China and Russia have an alliance on military, missile and hybrid tactics to alter the balance of global power.
Then there was the China Argentina issue with the Falklands, again.
China has instituted national re-education program. The program is a hallmark of China’s emboldened state security apparatus under the deeply nationalistic, hard-line rule of President Xi Jinping. It is partly rooted in the ancient Chinese belief in transformation through education – taken once before to terrifying extremes during the mass thought reform campaigns of Mao Zedong, the Chinese leader sometimes channeled by Xi.
A significant Chinese operation is debt-trapping. Sri Lanka and the Philippines are already falling due to this.
China forcing Venezuela to give up Blanquilla Island over debt.
If you look at the Qing Dynasty, that is President Xi’s vision and Taiwan is an important key to that achievement. China Wants to Build a Massive Underwater Tunnel to Taiwan and to own/control Taiwan by 2020.
OBOR, One Belt, One Road is a sophisticated trade strategy on a global scale and it threatens currency stability, port security, transportation channels and debt.

Jones Day Legal Counsel to European Corps, Iran Deal

Posted on May 20, 2018May 20, 2018 by Denise Simon

Let’s begin with Ploughshares, shall we? Make sure you check the credits at the end of the video. Those that contributed money to the effort are listed here.

Meanwhile, there is a meeting scheduled in Vienna where Germany, France, Britain, Russia and China are to discuss saving the Iran nuclear deal. It is being chaired by Helga Schmid. Will it soon be called the Vienna nuclear deal?

Impact of U.S. Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal

May 2018

In Short

The Situation: On Tuesday, May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States has withdrawn from the Iran Nuclear Deal and will fully reimpose its suspended sanctions targeting Iran.

The Result: All currently suspended U.S. sanctions in respect of Iran, including sanctions applicable to non-U.S. persons, will be reimposed by November 5, 2018.

Looking Ahead: The reimposition of U.S. sanctions will have limited impact on U.S. companies. However, foreign companies majority-owned or controlled by U.S. persons must now begin winding down any Iran-related activities. In contrast, the impact of the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on non-U.S. companies is less clear, and as the international response develops, non-U.S. companies will increasingly face a complex compliance landscape.

As reported earlier this week, on May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States will reimpose, after specified wind-down periods, all nuclear-related sanctions lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) (commonly known as the “Iran Nuclear Deal”). As a result, the U.S. sanctions regime will revert to its pre-JCPOA scope by November 5, 2018.

In light of the comprehensive U.S. primary sanctions that remained in place after implementation of the JCPOA, President Trump’s announcement will have little impact on U.S. companies. In contrast, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. organizations and their non-U.S. counterparts face a dramatically changed compliance landscape. With the reimposition of U.S. extraterritorial, or secondary, sanctions, non-U.S. companies must navigate increasingly complex terrain as they assess continued engagement with Iran, compliance with U.S. sanctions, and the pending response of the other JCPOA signatories.

Immediate Impact

The background of the JCPOA, the resulting international sanctions relief, and President Trump’s criticism of the deal are, at this point, well-known (see “Iran Nuclear Deal Reached; Sanctions Remain in Place,” “Implementation Day Triggers Significant Changes to International Sanctions Against Iran,” and “Potential Options for U.S. Sanctions on Iran Under the Trump Administration“). Although the policy implications of President’s Trump’s announcement may be subject to debate, the immediate impact is clear. In connection with the announcement, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued Frequently Asked Questions setting out a staged reimposition of U.S. sanctions over the next 90 to 180 days (subject to any extension that may be put in place by the United States at a later stage).

Following a 90-day wind-down period ending on August 6, 2018, the United States will reimpose its secondary sanctions targeting activities related to:

Iran’s automotive sector;
The sale, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals (such as aluminum and steel), coal, and software for integrating industrial processes to or from Iran; and
Certain financial and banking transactions related to Iranian sovereign debt, the acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran, the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, Iranian rial-denominated funds or accounts, and trade in gold or other precious metals.

During the same period, the United States will revoke the following authorizations:

The general license authorizing the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs (as well as certain related financial transactions);
All specific licenses (and subsequent wind-down authorizations) issued in connection with the Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services (“JCPOA SLP”); and
General License I, which authorized certain transactions related to negotiating and entering contingent contracts for activities covered by the JCPOA SLP.

Following a 180-day wind-down period ending on November 4, 2018, the United States will reimpose its secondary sanctions targeting activities related to:

Certain transactions by foreign financial institutions with, and provision of specialized financial messaging to, the Central Bank of Iran and/or designated Iranian financial institutions;
Certain categories of transactions related to Iran’s energy sector, including certain investments (such as participation in joint ventures); provision of goods, services, technology or technical support; the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products, and/or natural gas to or from Iran; and transactions with certain designated persons (such as the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, and National Iranian Tanker Company);
Certain transactions involving Iran’s port operators and/or related to Iran’s shipping and shipbuilding sectors, including activities involving the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, South Line Iran, or their affiliates; and
The provision of certain insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services.

Effective November 5, 2018, the United States will also revoke General License H (and any subsequent wind-down authorizations issued in connection with that general license), which previously authorized foreign entities majority-owned or controlled by U.S. persons to engage in most transactions involving Iran. It appears all other Iran-related general and specific licenses, including licenses issued under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”), issued by OFAC will remain unaffected.

Finally, no later than November 5, 2018, the United States will redesignate all persons who had been removed, through the JCPOA, from the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons and/or other U.S. sanctioned parties lists.

Consequently, by November 5, 2018, the United States is currently expected to have reimposed all sanctions that had been lifted pursuant to the JCPOA.

Near- and Long-Term Implications

As a practical matter, the reimposition of U.S. sanctions suspended under the JCPOA will have limited impact on U.S. companies. As noted in our prior Alerts and Commentaries, substantial U.S. sanctions in relation to Iran have remained in place and continued to prohibit U.S. persons from engaging, directly or indirectly, in virtually all transactions or dealings with Iran without authorization.

The reimposition of U.S. sanctions will, however, have immediate impact on non-U.S. organizations that are majority-owned or controlled by U.S. persons and on U.S.-linked aviation companies. As noted above, the United States intends to revoke all specific and general licenses issued in connection with the JCPOA “as soon as administratively feasible,” including General License H and aviation-specific licenses issued under the JCPOA SLP and General License I. In their place, OFAC intends to issue authorizations that will likely narrowly authorize only activities necessary to wind down previously authorized activities. Companies that rely on these authorizations should immediately reassess their existing Iran-related activities, including in-process and pending transactions, in order to prepare to wind down Iran-related activities and ensure compliance with U.S. sanctions during the wind-down period.

The near- and long-term implications of President’s Trump announcement for non-U.S. companies are less clear. Non-U.S. persons are not, with limited exceptions, subject to U.S. primary sanctions. However, U.S. secondary sanctions provide for an array of penalties that, in effect, foreclose access to U.S. markets—a meaningful deterrent for non-U.S. companies. The United States appears poised to rigorously enforce the renewed sanctions and has advised non-U.S. companies to begin winding up soon-to-be sanctionable activities to “avoid exposure to sanctions or an enforcement action when the applicable wind-down period ends.” Continued engagement with Iran will therefore become an increasingly fraught proposition for non-U.S. persons, and one that may be further complicated by the international community’s response to the United States’ withdrawal.

In that regard, following President Trump’s announcement, the European Union has reiterated its commitment to “the continued full and effective implementation of the JCPOA,” as long as Iran meets its nuclear-related obligations, adding that it “is determined to work with the international community” to preserve the deal. Although the European Union has not yet indicated any measures it may implement to preserve the JCPOA, it suggested earlier this year that it may expand its Blocking Regulation—Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of November 22, 1996—to protect EU-based organizations doing business in Iran following any U.S. withdrawal.

The Blocking Regulation was adopted in 1996 by the European Union (European Communities at the time) in response to the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and Libya. It prohibits EU companies from complying with blocked sanctions “whether directly or through a subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission.” The importance of the Blocking Regulation in the last decade has been limited. This would change if the scope of its application is expanded to cover the U.S. secondary sanctions in relation to Iran, possibly protecting EU companies from enforcement of U.S. judgments or administrative decisions giving effect to the secondary sanctions.

Historically, enforcement of the Blocking Regulation has generally been very limited, but expanding its scope now has the potential to lead to increased enforcement actions across Europe. An expanded Blocking Regulation would, however, place EU companies squarely between the competing demands of U.S. sanctions and EU and national requirements. The European Union may also try to negotiate an exemption for EU companies from the reimposition of the U.S. sanctions. The prospects of relief for EU companies under either approach remains uncertain.

China and Russia have likewise consistently reaffirmed their commitment to the JCPOA, and in a joint statement last month confirmed their “unwavering support” for the deal. In light of current tensions between the United States and Russia and China, it seems unlikely that the U.S. withdrawal will lead Russia or China to alter its commitment to the JCPOA or have a substantial impact on Russian and Chinese business interests in Iran.

As the international response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA develops, non-U.S. companies should take steps to protect their interests in light of the pending reimposition of U.S. sanctions. In particular, non-U.S. companies should reassess their Iran-related activities to determine their potential liability under the soon-to-be imposed U.S. secondary sanctions and/or any potential blocking statutes; open dialogues with their financial institutions, insurers, and other service providers regarding any Iran-related activities; and, significantly, prepare to possibly wind down any potentially sanctionable Iran-related activities in order to move promptly to comply with U.S. secondary sanctions, if warranted.

Jones Day will continue to monitor developments and provide updates.

Three Key Takeaways

The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement will result in the reimposition of sanctions that had been lifted as part of JCPOA, or, the “Iran Nuclear Deal.”
Because the comprehensive U.S. primary sanctions remained in place after implementation of JCPOA, the withdrawal and reimposition of sanctions hold few consequences for U.S. companies.
However, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. organizations and their non-U.S. counterparts face a markedly altered compliance situation, and those companies affected should take decisive and deliberate measures to protect their interests.

Anthony Weiner Hid his E-Devices with Granite Intelligence

Posted on May 20, 2018May 20, 2018 by Denise Simon

He knew what was coming and attempted to hide and store his electronic devices at Granite Intelligence. Lots of interesting stuff on those devices. There is always more to the story, right?

The serial sexter — whose online aliases included “Carlos Danger” — wanted to rid himself of the incriminating evidence and “facilitate transfer to the government” so he could avoid an FBI raid on the Union Square apartment he shared with his wife and young son, a source familiar with the matter said.

Granite Intelligence, which is based in Midtown Manhattan and was co-founded by a former New York City prosecutor, is “committed to resolving our clients’ problems with intelligence, integrity and discretion,” according to its Web site.

Federal agents got permission to seize the electronics on Sept. 26, 2016, and a search of the laptop turned up e-mails between Weiner’s wife, Huma Abedin, and her boss, then-Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

The discovery led the FBI to re-open its investigation into Clinton’s use of a private e-mail server while she served as secretary of state under former President Barack Obama.

Clinton has blamed the reopening of the probe, which then-FBI Director James Comey revealed to Congress 11 days before the 2016 election, for her loss to President Trump.

Last year, Weiner tearfully pleaded guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor, breaking down as he told the judge: “I knew that was morally wrong.”

Below is the other search warrant.

Weiner Warrant by Daniel S Levine on Scribd

Hat tip: District Judge Denise Cote unsealed the search warrant for the laptop and other devices of former Congressman Anthony Weiner on Wednesday, May 16.

Weiner was sentenced by Cote in September to 21 months in prison for sending obscene material—including sexually explicit images and directions to engage in sexual conduct—to a 15-year-old girl through messaging and video chat apps.

New York City Police obtained a search warrant on his laptop, iPad, and iPhone on Sept. 26, 2016, approved by Magistrate Judge Ronald Ellis.

The laptop soon became the center of a major controversy. However, the search warrant suggests the controversy may run deeper still.

On Nov. 4, 2016, former Navy SEAL and CIA contractor Erik Prince said “a very well-placed source” at the NYPD told him the NYPD found “damning criminal information” about then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton on Weiner’s laptop and threatened to release it if the FBI tried to sweep it under the rug.

The FBI later obtained its own search warrant and looked at the laptop in connection with its investigation into Clinton’s mishandling of classified information as State Secretary.

But there was a notable difference between the FBI warrant and the NYPD one.

The one obtained by NYPD read, in part: “Depending on circumstances, a complete review of the seized [electronically stored information] may require examination of all of the seized data to evaluate its contents and determine whether the data is responsive to the warrant.”

The FBI one read, in part: “Law enforcement personnel will make reasonable efforts to restrict their search to data falling within the categories of evidence specified in the warrant.”

That would suggest the NYPD could look at everything, while the FBI investigators worded its warrant in a way that restricted them to look only at data regarding the mishandling of classified information.

Here’s what we know about how Clinton’s emails ended up on Weiner’s laptop and what repercussions their discovery meant:

Weiner shared the laptop with his estranged wife, Huma Abedin, a close aide to Hillary Clinton since 2000.

Hundreds of thousands of emails were stored on the laptop, including thousands from Clinton.

“Huma Abedin appears to have had a regular practice of forwarding emails to [Weiner] for him,” then-FBI Director James Comey testified at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on May 3, 2017. “I think, to print out for her, so she could then deliver them to [Clinton].”

The existence of the emails was also confirmed in texts between senior FBI attorney Lisa Page and former head of counterintelligence at the FBI, Peter Strzok.

“Got called up to Andy’s earlier … hundreds of thousands of emails turned over by Weiner’s atty to sdny, indudes a ton of material from spouse,” Strzok texted (pdf) Page on Sept. 28, 2016, only two days after the search warrant: “Sending team up tomorrow to review … this will never end ….”

The text suggests that then-FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, referred to as Andy, knew of the emails. Strzok noted that a team would go to “review” the next day, Sept. 29, 2016.

But this timeline seems to conflict with a Chicago Tribune story, which said that law enforcement officers first seized the laptop on Oct. 3, according to “federal officials familiar with the investigation.”

The text suggests McCabe knew about the emails on Sept. 28 because Weiner’s attorney himself delivered the emails to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. It is not clear why.

It was McCabe who led a small group at FBI headquarters on the Clinton investigation. Both Strzok and Page were in that group. Comey announced the conclusion of the investigation on July 5, 2016.

The Hill reported on Nov. 6 that Strzok changed key language in that conclusion from “grossly negligent,” which would have been a crime, to “extremely careless.” Changing the phrase may have exonerated Clinton.

The Weiner laptop turned out to have a trove of Clinton’s emails containing classified information and emails from the first three months of her term as State Secretary—emails that the FBI had not obtained before, Comey said.

But, Comey said it took until Oct. 27, 2016, for their small team to come to him and tell him about the significance of the emails. The group was only looking at the emails’ metadata—such as subject, sent date, and addressee—according to Comey, and asked him whether they should get a search warrant to look at the emails themselves, which Comey approved.

Comey told Fox News’ Bret Baier he didn’t know why it took a month for McCabe to come to him, especially given the significance of the discovery only a few weeks before the presidential election.

“I think what actually drove it was the prosecutors in New York who were working the criminal case against Weiner called down to headquarters and said, ‘Are we getting a search warrant or not for this?’ That caused, I’m sorry, Justice Department Headquarters, to then call across the street to the FBI and poke the organization; and they start to move much more quickly. I don’t know why there was, if there was slow activity, why it was slow for those first couple of weeks,” Comey said on April 26.

Indeed, at least one high-ranking Justice Department official prodded the team about the Weiner trove.

On Oct. 21, 2016, Strzok texted, “[redacted] called [because] Toscas [is] now aware NY has [Clinton-Abedin] emails via [W]einer invest[igation]. Told him we knew. Wanted to know our thoughts on getting it.”

Strzok was referring to George Toscas, deputy assistant attorney general at the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

“George wanted to ensure info got to Andy,” Strzok wrote.

It was also Toscas, who, according to The New York Times, criticised Comey for caving to Attorney General Loretta Lynch in calling the Clinton probe a “matter” instead of an investigation back in 2015.

“I guess you’re the Federal Bureau of Matters now,” Toscas said.

But it’s not clear why the New York prosecutors would call Justice Headquarters about a search warrant. They’d had a search warrant for their investigation since Sept. 26. There’s no sign they had anything to do with the Clinton investigation because that was run by the team at the FBI headquarters.

It is also not clear whether Toscas’ call was motivated by the NYPD threat of disclosure Prince talked about. Prince said the NYPD received strong pushback from Obama’s Justice Department—a threat to push charges against the NYPD in an unrelated civil rights case.

Meanwhile, the Strzok texts reveal the team had another contingency on its hands. On Oct. 24, 2016, The Wall Street Journal reported that after the Clinton probe started in July 2015, McCabe’s wife, Jill, received some $675,000 for her Virginia State Senate campaign from Clinton associate Gov. Terry McCauliffe’s political entities.

On Jan. 29, 2016, Comey appointed McCabe deputy director, putting him in charge of the Clinton investigation.

On the day Comey was briefed by the team on Oct. 27, 2016, his chief of staff, Jim Rybicki, wanted McCabe to recuse himself, the Strzok texts suggest, apparently because the public learned McCabe’s wife was getting money from the Clinton camp.

The texts also suggest Page, who was McCabe’s legal counsel, was to recuse herself too, which she apparently wasn’t thrilled about.

“I obviously don’t have to tell you how completely INFURIATED I am with Jim [Rybicki] right now,” she texted.

Later that day she added, “I Just walked in on Jim to force the issue. Me: ‘I’m not recused, but I’m not sitting in on this meeting.’” It’s not clear which meeting she was referring to.

On Oct. 28, 2016, Comey sent a letter to Congress members sitting on oversight committees informing them the Clinton investigation had resumed. The information quickly reached the media, infuriating Democrats.

The team obtained a search warrant for the laptop on Oct. 30, 2016, allowing them to retrieve it from the FBI New York Field Office.

A day later, McCabe recused himself from the investigation, codenamed “Mid Year.”

“Thanks to the wizardry of our technology, we’ve only had to personally read 6,000 [of the emails],” the team told Comey on the night of Nov. 4, he later testified before Congress. “They said, ‘we found a lot on new stuff. We did not find anything that changes our view of [Clinton’s] intent.’”

The lack of intent in being “extremely careless” with classified information was Comey’s justification for not charging Clinton back in July, 2016.

On Nov. 5, 2016, Comey sent another letter to Congress saying all the newly discovered Clinton emails had been reviewed and the previous decision stood—no charges.

Law Firm Behind Dossier has Another Lawyer Resigning Ahead of IG Report

Posted on May 18, 2018May 18, 2018 by Denise Simon

Tag team or the whole firm?

So, we know Perkin Coie was the law firm that was hired by Hillary Clinton to pay for the work done on the Trump dossier. The lawyer pinpointed was Marc Elias. Letter of evidence is here. But could there have been another lawyer in the operation, once such Bob Bauer?

P050911PS-0060 | President Barack Obama walks through the ... Bauer on far right

Bauer was formerly the top White House lawyer under the Obama administration. His wife is Anita Dunn who was the White House Communications Director at the same time. She is known for giving a speech where she declared her admiration for Mao Zedong. What a pair eh? Anita by the way is a senior partner at SKDKnickerbocker, a strategic communications firm in DC. Just so you know, SKDKnickerbocker only represents Democrats including Andrew Cuomo and Sandra Fluke. Their favorite issues such as Center for Reproductive Rights, the Obama Presidential Library.

BLOCKBUSTER VIDEO: OBAMA'S ELIGIBILITY LAWYER BEHIND IRS ...

Okay, so meanwhile, her husband, Bob has resigned from Perkins Coie to continue teaching at NYU. He has been a the law firm for 40 years. Bauer served as counsel to the Senate minority leader during former President Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial of 1999, and took leave from the firm to work as Obama’s White House counsel from 2010 through July 2011.

Obama's Supreme Court point man low-key but tough photo

Bob Bauer is also the legal counsel for the Obama Foundation and the Biden Foundation as well as the Democratic National Committee, where Marc Elias served as chair. Elias was the lead counsel of record for the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign.

Bauer remains in full support of James Comey and his loyalty characteristics. In part from Bauer’s article on Comey is:

Comey writes that at an earlier point in the investigation, he raised with Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates the need for unusual transparency when the investigation was closed. She did not get back to him, he recalls, but soon two events persuaded him that further consultation or coordination was inadvisable. A still-classified email surfaced in the investigation that he believed that partisans would seize on to claim that the attorney general had committed to protect Clinton from legal harm. He did not credit the content of the communication, but feared the consequences of partisan distortions for the reputation of the Justice Department. Then the attorney general announced what Comey refers to as her “tortured half-in, half-out” quasi-recusal following the meeting with Bill Clinton at the Phoenix airport.

It was then that Comey concluded that he would go it alone—a course of action that, without explanation, he refers to as a “crazy idea of personally offering the American people unusual transparency, and doing it without the leadership of the Department of Justice.” To the extent that there was a deliberative process, it occurred entirely within the FBI: there, Comey drew on the advice of his management team. So, on an issue of this magnitude, the circle within which views could be expressed was tightly drawn. Comey addressed the process problem he faced through an ad hoc, closed process of his own. He might have thought he was left with no choice, the other principals having disqualified themselves from participation.

The full item that Bob Bauer wrote is quite the read and you can find it here.