Primer:
Stuart Madnick, who’s been professor of information technology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1972, tells Inverse that the FCC and ISPs are casting a double-edged sword in their rush to implement 5G.
“It’s like going from fireworks to dynamite sticks,” Madnick says. “5G encourages further evolution and expansion of Internet of Things related networks. All of the good news and bad news that comes along with this technology gets magnified.”
He’s especially concerned about the risk of denial of service attacks — or DDoS for short — becoming more powerful than ever before. One of the advertised benefits of 5G is that it will allow even more IoT devices, like refrigerators or light bulbs, to come online. This would allow users to remotely check the contents of their fridge or dim their bedroom lights using their phones, but these devices can also be harnessed for nefarious purposes.
One of the most notorious DDoS incidents in history — the 2016 Dyn cyberattack — was facilitated by unsecured IoT devices, like security cameras, printers, and baby monitors. Hacker groups Anonymous and New World Hackers allegedly took control of thousand of electronics that still had their default passwords to amass an army of zombie devices, known as a botnet.
This network was used to overwhelm the servers of internet performance management company, Dyn. Websites like Twitter, SoundCloud, Spotify, and Shopify were inaccessible for a day. Madnick believes this could happen again, to a degree that hasn’t even been imagined yet. Perhaps the biggest sites on the web will go down for days, including online blanks, or worse, the internet that controls a public utility like electricity. Perhaps the biggest sites on the web will go down for days, including online blanks, or worse, the internet that controls a public utility like electricity.
*** Related reading: Lessons Learned from WannaCry attack
Ex-security minister Admiral Lord West calls for urgent government action after Chinese firms are banned in Australia and the US.
Security threats from Chinese companies building 5G networks could end up “putting all of us at risk” if they are not tackled quickly, according to a former security minister.
Speaking to Sky News, Admiral Lord West, a former First Sea Lord who served under Gordon Brown as a security minister, urged the government to set up a unit reporting directly to the prime minister to monitor the risk posed by Chinese equipment in 5G.
5G has been hailed as the next great leap for mobile communications, enabling everything from smart cities to hologram calls.
However, the best 5G technology comes from Chinese companies, raising the fear that China’s government could have ground-level access to – even control of – the UK’s critical data infrastructure.
“We’ve got to see there’s a risk,” Lord West said. “Yes, we want 5G, but for goodness sake we need to do all of these things to make sure it’s not putting all of us at risk.”
In April, the United States banned Chinese multinationals Huawei and ZTE – both specialists in 5G – from selling equipment to the federal government.
In August, the Australian government banned the same two firms from supplying technology for its 5G network, a decision foreign minister Marise Payne described as necessary for “the protection of Australia’s national security”.
In a statement, Huawei called the decision “politically motivated, not the result of a fact-based, transparent, or equitable decision-making process,” adding that “there is no fundamental difference between 5G and 4G network architecture… 5G has stronger guarantees around privacy and security protection than 3G and 4G”.
Robert Hannigan, former director of GCHQ, told Sky News an outright ban in the UK would not make 5G safe.
“The best companies in 5G are probably the Chinese ones and there aren’t many alternatives,” he said, before warning that new measures were needed to test the security of the network.
“We do need to find a way of scrutinising what is being installed in our network, and how it is being overseen and how it is being controlled and how it’s being upgraded in the future. And we have to find a more effective way of doing that at scale.”
In April, GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre warned ZTE could pose a national security risk to the UK.
Two months later, the UK’s Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre, a group set up by the government to monitor the Chinese firm, announced that it had “only limited assurance” that Huawei posed no threat to national security
“It was a bit of a warning to Huawei,” said Mr Hannigan. “They needed to get better at cooperating and take this more seriously.”
The difficulty for the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre is knowing for certain that the code it vets and approves is the same code that is going into networks.
“That’s been a persistent problem,” said Mr Hannigan. “That needs more work.”
The government has put £200m into the development of 5G. Last month, the first 5G pilot centre launched in the West Midlands, testing the technology before a national roll-out.
BT, which uses Huawei to supply parts for its network, told Sky News that it would “apply the same stringent security measures and controls to 5G when we start to roll it out, in line with continued guidance from government”.
Category Archives: government fraud spending collusion
Items SecState Pompeo Manages in Dealing with N Korea
All is not so copacetic with North Korea. The United States has many channels of intelligence regarding North Korea and dealing with Kim Jung Un with many of the moving parts requires diplomatic artistry.
Below are but two examples and the prediction of a second summit between the United States and North Korea being noted, the logistics is a chess game.
FireEye has released a report stating the tools and techniques used by the group, “We believe APT38’s financial motivation, unique toolset, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed during their carefully executed operations are distinct enough to be tracked separately from other North Korean cyber activity. There are many overlapping characteristics with other operations, known as “Lazarus” and the actor we call TEMP.Hermit; however, we believe separating this group will provide defenders with a more focused understanding of the adversary and allow them to prioritize resources and enable defense.”
In their official blog, the company further explained the distinction of the group from any other hackers out there. Foremost, the malware tools used overlap or are similar indicating the similar developer behind the scenes.
The general pattern used by APT38 was observed to be this way –
- First, the information is gathered by targeting third-party vendors to understand the mechanics of their transactions.
- Then, initial compromise takes place followed by internal reconnaissance, pivot to victim servers used for swift transactions.
- After this, finally, the funds are transferred or stolen.
- This group does not stop just there but it removes all the evidence that might help the authorities trace them back or know the exact way or methodology of the fraud.
FireEye addressed the threat the group poses to its targeted sector by stating, “APT38 is unique in that it is not afraid to aggressively destroy evidence or victim networks as part of its operations. This attitude toward destruction is probably a result of the group trying to not only cover its tracks but also to provide cover for money laundering operations.” The full 32 page report is here.
Meanwhile:
The U.S. Treasury Department last week sanctioned a Turkish company, two Turkish individuals, and a North Korean individual for violating UN sanctions on Pyongyang. These sanctions came just before Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s fourth trip to North Korea in preparation for an anticipated second Trump-Kim summit.
Treasury targeted the Turkey-based company SIA Falcon International Group; the company’s chief executive officer, Huseyin Sahin; the company’s general manager, Erhan Culha; and North Korea’s economic and commercial counselor in Mongolia, Ri Song Un. The sanctions were issued pursuant to Executive Order 13551, which restricts trade in arms and luxury goods with North Korea. UN Security Council Resolution 1718 from 2006 also prohibits member states from conducting such trade.
In a press release, Treasury noted that SIA Falcon operates in Latvia. In February 2018, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) named ABLV Bank of Latvia an institution of primary money laundering concern. FinCEN noted that ABLV “institutionalized money laundering as a pillar of the bank’s business practices” and conducted illicit financial transactions for North Korean procurement or export of ballistic missiles. Treasury did not confirm, however, that SIA Falcon’s Latvian branch office used ABLV’s bank services.
Treasury’s latest sanctions came the same day as The Rodong Sinmun, a North Korean state-run newspaper, published an article lambasting U.S. sanctions policy. Just days earlier, North Korea’s foreign minister, Ri Yong Ho, implored the UN Security Council to lift sanctions in response to Pyongyang’s moves to freeze missile and nuclear testing and to destroy the Punggye-ri test facility. However, until North Korea agrees to denuclearization and a full declaration of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, facilities, and capabilities, Washington has confirmed it will not ease sanctions pressure
After Secretary Pompeo’s latest trip to North Korea, Pyongyang’s media outlets suggested U.S.-North Korea relations are improving. Of course, these latest designations, as well as ongoing U.S. diplomatic efforts to ensure international compliance with UN sanctions, could stir further tensions. Despite these risks, the sanctions send a useful message to Pyongyang that the Trump administration will not back down until the Kim regime meets its core demands. Hat tip FDD.
Well, the Report Declares 22 Million Not 11 Million Illegals
Foreign nationals are increasingly gaining the ability to influence American elections more directly. They’re being granted the right to vote.
From Boston, where the city council is debating the move, to San Francisco, where noncitizens gained the right earlier this month in school-board elections, jurisdictions are looking to expand the boundaries of the electorate beyond its citizens.
***
Primer: This was compiled by Yale and MIT. Have you considered how many U.S. House Representatives exist from districts where illegals and foreign nationals are the majority? 20? 10? 40?
Context: The Democrats on the Dreamer thing were and are willing to sacrifice the interests of 325 million Americans in order to gain unconditional amnesty for 3.4 million illegal aliens.
The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990 to 2016
In part: Our analysis has two main outputs. First, we generate what we call our conservative estimate, using parameter values that intentionally underestimate population inflows and overestimate population outflows, leading to estimates that will tend to underestimate the number of undocumented immigrants. Our conservative estimate for 2016 is 16.7 million, well above the estimate that is most widely accepted at present, which is for 2015 but should be comparable. Our model as well as most work in the literature indicates that the population size has been relatively stable since 2008; thus 2015 and 2016 are quite comparable. For our second step, recognizing that there is significant uncertainty about population flows, we simulate our model over a wide range of values for key parameters. These parameter values range from very conservative estimates to standard values in the literature. We sample values for each key parameter from uniform distributions over the ranges we establish. In our simulations, we also include Poisson population uncertainty conditional on parameter values, thus addressing the inherent variability in population flows. Our simulation results produce probability distributions over the number of undocumented immigrants for each year from 1990 to 2016. The results demonstrate that our conservative estimate falls towards the bottom of the probability distribution, at approximately the 2.5th percentile. The mean of the 2016 distribution is 22.1 million, which we take as the best overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants based on our modeling approach and current data. We also show the variability in our model based on the simulations for each year from 1990 through 2016.
***
Population inflows
Population inflows are decomposed into two streams: (I) undocumented immigrants who initially entered the country legally but have overstayed their visas; and (II) immigrants who have illegally crossed the border without being apprehended. We describe our approach for each source, explain the basis for our assumptions and why they are conservative, and list parameter ranges for the simulation.
(I) Visa overstays are estimated using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data for 2016, the first year for which visa overstays were comprehensively measured [5]. To apply this data in our context we also gather data for non-immigrant visas issued for all years from 1990 [6]. For our conservative estimate we assume that for each year the rate of overstays was equal to the 2016 rate. Calibration of our model shows that this assumption is in fact quite conservative. In particular, approximately 41% of undocumented immigrants based on the current survey data approach are visa overstayers [7], which translates to a visa overstay population of 4.6 million in 2015. Our model however predicts the number of overstayers to be less than this (even though our overall estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants is higher). That is, in our model most undocumented immigrants are not overstayers, and the model produces an estimate of the number of overstayers below the estimate produced in the conventional approach based on survey data. We compute that we would need to set the visa overstay rate above the DHS 2016 rate, specifically 1.1 times that rate, for our conservative estimate to generate as many overstayers as the 4.6 million in the 11.3 million estimate. Since many overstayers leave or adjust their status within a few months of their visa expiration date, we make a further conservative adjustment and count as overstayers only those individuals who have overstayed more than 1 year. For the simulation, we set the visa overstay rate equal to the 2016 rate multiplied by a uniform draw from the range [0.5,1.5]; consistent with the discussion above, this is a relatively conservative range.
(II) Illegal Border Crossers: We estimate illegal border crossers through application of the standard repeated trials (capture-recapture) model [8–10]. The model requires as inputs statistics on the total number of border apprehensions, the number of individuals apprehended more than once in a year (recidivist apprehensions), and estimates of the deterrence rate—the fraction of individuals who give up after being apprehended and do not attempt another crossing. Given these inputs, the repeated trials model generates estimates of: (i) the apprehension rate—the probability an individual is caught trying to cross the border; and (ii) the total number of individuals who are not apprehended (they may be caught one or more times but cross successfully on a later attempt) and enter the interior of the country illegally—the number of illegal border crossers in a year. We discuss data sources and potential weaknesses of this approach here; more information and mathematical details are provided in the Supporting Information.
DHS [10, 11] provide figures for the total number of border apprehensions for every year in our timespan. They also provide information on the number of recidivist apprehensions and estimates of the deterrence rate for every year from 2005. Based on these figures and estimates they provide an estimate of the apprehension rate for each year from 2005 to 2015. Their estimate is 35% for 2005 and increases steadily, to above 50% by the end of the sample period. From their estimates we are able to derive directly estimates of the number of illegal border crossers for each of these years. For earlier years (1990 to 2004) we must make further assumptions. Our assumptions are about the apprehension and deterrence rates, since these have been addressed in the literature; in turn we are able to generate estimates of the number of illegal border crossers in earlier years based on these assumptions (see the Supporting Information for analytic details).
Most experts agree that the apprehension rate was significantly lower in earlier years [12, 13]. A recent study [12] using data from the Mexican Migration Project estimates this rate for every year from 1990 to 2010; estimates in the 1990’s begin from the low twenties and range upwards to approximately 30%. A second study estimates the rate for 2003 at around 20% [13]. Given these estimates, and the general view that apprehension rates have risen, for our conservative estimate we assume that the apprehension rate in years 1990-2004 was equal to the average rate in years 2005-10 or 39%; this is well above the rates discussed in the literature for earlier years and thus tends to reduce our estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants since it implies a larger fraction are apprehended at the border. For our simulation we assume a uniform distribution over the range [0.25,0.40] for the earlier years, still above the average rates in the literature for these years.
Additional facts support the view that the apprehension rate has increased in recent years. The number of border agents has increased dramatically over the timespan of our analysis [14], and the number of hours spent by border agents patrolling the immediate border area has increased by more than 300% between 1992- 2004 [15]. Further, new infrastructure (e.g., fences) and technologies (e.g., night vision equipment, sensors, and video imaging systems) were also introduced during this period [15]. Thus the apprehension rate we use for earlier years almost certainly overstates the actual apprehension rate and therefore underestimates the number of successful crossings. However, we note that these additional border resources may have been concentrated in certain locations and it remains a possibility that apprehension rates were higher in earlier years. We note finally that in using data only on Southern Border crossings we again are conservative in our approach, not accounting for illegal crossings along other borders.
Notwithstanding our view that we make conservative choices in setting up our model and parameter values, we acknowledge that border apprehension rates for the 1990’s are not based on as well-developed data sources as estimates for more recent years. Thus it remains a possibility that these rates are higher than we believe. One aspect of this uncertainty concerns deterrence. When deterrence is higher border crossings will fall. Most researchers believe deterrence has increased in recent years [8, 12]. We note that reference [12] estimates that the probability of eventual entry after multiple attempts on a single trip in the 1990s is close to one, indicating almost no deterrence in the earlier period. One piece of evidence in support of this is data on the voluntary return rate, which refers to the percentage of individuals apprehended at the border who are released back to their home country without going through formal removal proceedings and not being subjected to further penalties. Voluntary returns are thus not “punished” and thus are less likely to be deterred from trying to cross the border in the future, compared with individuals who are subjected to stronger penalties. The voluntary return rate has fallen in recent years, from 98% between 2000 and 2004 to 84% between 2005 and 2010. Thus, at least based on this measure deterrence efforts have increased. However, this does not conclusively demonstrate that deterrence was lower in earlier years and it remains a possibility that it was higher, which would tend to reduce our estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants. In conclusion we note that although there is much uncertainty about the border apprehension rate, it would have to be very high, above 60% for earlier years, in order to generate estimates of the 2015 population of undocumented immigrants in the range of the current widely accepted estimate of just over 11 million (this is based on analyzing our model using the conservative estimate values for all other parameters). This seems implausible based on our reading of the literature.
Population outflows
Population outflows are broken into four categories: (I) voluntary emigration; (II) mortality; (III) deportation; and (IV) change of status from unauthorized to lawful.
(I) Voluntary emigration rates are the largest source of outflow and the most uncertain based on limited data availability. It is well accepted that voluntary emigration rates decline sharply with time spent in the country [16]; thus we employ separate emigration rates for those who have spent one year or less in the U.S., 2-10 years, or longer. We use the following values for our conservative estimate. First, for those who have spent one year or less we assume a voluntary emigration rate of 40%. This estimate is based on data for the first-year visa overstay exit rate (the fraction of overstayers who left the country within one year from the day their visa expired) for 2016 [17], which is in the lower thirty percent range (the rate for 2015 is similar). We note that the rate for visa overstayers is very likely a substantial overestimate for illegal border crossers, who are widely viewed as having a lower likelihood of exiting in the first year, especially in more recent years [12]. The 40% first-year emigration rate that we assume is well above the standard values in the literature [4, 12, 16, 18], which range from 1% to 25%. Hence this assumption contributes to making our estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants in the country a conservative one. For years 2-10 we assume a rate of 4% per year. This is the upper bound among estimates in the literature, which lie between 0.01 to 0.04 [4, 16, 18]. Lastly, for years 10 and above, published estimates of the emigration rate typically fall around 1%; we set this rate to 1% per year in line with these estimates. Note that given the extremely high 40% emigration rate that we assume for those who have only been in the country for one year or less, overall annual emigration rates in our model simulation are significantly higher than those found in the literature or government sources. To further enhance the conservatism of our model, we assume that all undocumented immigrants present at the beginning of 1990 have been here for only one year. Read the whole report here.
Senator Feinstein’s Loyalty to China First
Now, this is the woman that concocted the while Dr. Ford v. Brett Kavanaugh chaos event in Washington DC and refused to hand that pesky letter over to Chairman Grassley…
Personally, she should be brought up before the Senate Ethics Committee, it would be a gesture for sure but then we could have a Senate vote of no confidence in Di-Fi…another gesture, but tactics nonetheless.
Meanwhile:
Senator Cruz is not well liked by many Democrats in the Senate because he exposes them, that is if anyone is listening. It was not too long ago that Ben Shapiro published in his DailyWire that Senator Cruz proposed some legislation to rename a road and Feinstein earnestly objected. Hah, it is an interesting story found here.
Related reading: Chinese spy who defected tells all
Now, just before that, a scandal that went away real fast was that lil miss Dianne had an American aide working for the Chinese (read spy) on her payroll for years. BUT, that was not the first time the FBI came knocking on her door for much the same reason. Really you say? Yes….
Only back in 1997 as explained by the LATimes: federal investigators have detected that the Chinese government might attempt to seek favor with Feinstein. Last year, she was one of six members of Congress who received warnings from the FBI that China might try to improperly influence them through illegal campaign contributions.
The article has another interesting paragraph: At the same time, far from the spotlight, Feinstein’s husband, Richard C. Blum, has expanded his private business interests in China–to the point that his firm is now a prominent investor inside the communist nation.
For years, Feinstein and Blum have insisted that they maintained a solid “firewall” between her role as an influential foreign policy player and his career as a private investor overseas.
But such closely coinciding interests are highly unusual for major figures in public life in Washington. And now, as controversy heats up over improper foreign influence in the U.S. political process, the effectiveness of the firewall between those interests could be called into question.
Firewall eh?
Well there is this other thing in California called the ‘California Asia Business Council’. See Di-Fi’s husband in the photo?
back row in the middle
Recipients of Cal-Asia’s prestigious New Silk Road Award include: Ms. Weili Dai, President and Co-founder of Marvell Technology Group; Dr. Chong Moon Lee, Founder, Diamond Multimedia; The Asia Foundation (presented to Dr. David Arnold, President); Alexander D. Calhoun, Senior Counsel, Squire Sanders & Dempsey; Daniel K. H. Chao, Chairman of Bechtel Greater China (retired); John S. Chen, Chairman, CEO, and President of Sybase; Hon. Dianne Feinstein, US Senator; Dr. Ta-Lin Hsu founder and chairman of H&Q Asia Pacific; C. Richard Kramlich, chairman and co-founder of New Enterprise Associates; G. Paul Matthews, Founder, Matthews International Capital Management; Dr. William F. Miller, SRI International, Stanford, and Silicon Valley visionary; Hon. George P. Shultz, Former Secretary of State; Washington SyCip, Founder of SGV & Co. and “Asia’s Wise Business Owl”; Amb. Linda Tsao Yang, former US Director, Asian Development Bank.
(Senator Feinstein got an award….firewall?)
Cal-Asia’s Mission
…is to promote commerce between the U.S. and Asia. We are proud to have received two awards for our efforts from the US Department of Commerce.Other Cal-Asia News
–Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN
–APEC Meetings for 2015 started in January in Hanoi and will culminate with the Manila summit. Meeting locations and dates: APEC Events Calendar. General info on APEC outcomes, plans: http://www.apec.org/—EXIM BANKReport to the U.S. Congress on the Export-Import Bank of the United States and global export credit competition, 2014
–OECD list of export credit agencies
—Asian ExIm Banks
Ah, but there is more:
SAN FRANCISCO, May 4, 2017 — Richard C. Blum, founder and chairman of Blum Capital Partners, delivers remarks at Asia Society Northern California’s Fourteenth Annual Dinner.
Going back to 2009 and swell company here at this event:
April 23, 2009 – Blum Center Groundbreaking with Vice President Al Gore. (Peg Skorpinski)The groundbreaking ceremony for the new home of the Blum Center will take place on Thursday, April 23 at 1:30 pm PST – with Center Founder and UC Regents Chair Richard C. Blum joined by Former Vice President Al Gore, UC Berkeley Chancellor Robert Birgeneau, College of Engineering Dean S. Shankar Sastry, and University of California President Mark Yudof. The ceremony will be followed by a reception where faculty and students will present a wide range of innovations aimed at making lasting change for the nearly three billion people that live on less than two dollars a day.
That Center is for developing countries like China….really? Yup…interesting, there are more friends…
Four years ago, Mr. Blum founded the Global Economy and Development Center at The Brookings Institution and the Brookings Blum Roundtable Conference, to develop policy research and new strategies to alleviate poverty. He is also a trustee and a member of the executive committee of The Carter Center, founded by former President Jimmy Carter, and serves on the boards of William J. Clinton Foundation and The Wilderness Society.
More?
Feinstein and Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin reportedly visited each other regularly in the 1980s, with Jiang once spending Thanksgiving in San Francisco with Feinstein and her husband. Jiang supposedly danced with Feinstein during one such visit, which surely must have been a propaganda coup for the CCP a la Ted Kennedy and the Soviets.
The Federalist has an interesting summary, yet this stuck out:
In a June 2010 interview with the Wall Street Journal covering a trip to China in which she met with old pals Jiang and former premier Zhu Rongji, Feinstein seemed to further downplay and even alibi the Tiananmen Square massacre:
I think that was a great setback for China in the view of the world. And I think China has also – as we would – learned lessons from it.
It just so happens I was here after that and talked to Jiang Zemin and learned that at the time China had no local police. It was just the PLA [People’s Liberation Army]. And no local police that had crowd control. So, hence the tanks.
Clearly none of that made good sense. But that’s the past. One learns from the past. You don’t repeat it. I think China has learned a lesson.
That year, Feinstein also challenged the Obama administration’s $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan, calling it a “substantial irritant” to U.S.-China relations. Be sure and read all of Ben Weingarten’s piece here.
Massive Social Security Fraud, 40 Million Americans
Last week, the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI) revealed massive identity fraud by illegal aliens in the United States, potentially affecting nearly 40 million Americans.
In April of this year, IRLI filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against the Social Security Administration (SSA) seeking records related to the Obama-era decision to halt sending “no-match” letters to employers. According to the Justice Department’s website, a “no-match” letter is a “written notice issued by the SSA to an employer, usually in response to an employee wage report, advising that the name or Social Security number (SSN) reported by the employer for one or more employees does not “match” a name or SSN combination reflected in SSA’s records.” The long-held practice of sending the letters had been used to prevent fraud through the use of stolen SSN data by illegal aliens and other criminals.
Days after former President Obama implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) amnesty program, his administration announced the decision to stop sending “no-match” letters to employers. This decision led to a thriving SSN black market where illegal aliens are drawn to obtain an American’s information for employment. The SSN of children have proven to be especially valuable as they can be used undetected for years. However, when these children reach adulthood and begin to apply for college, car loans, credit cards, or other needs, many learn they have criminal records attached to their identities.
Specifically, IRLI’s investigation uncovered that from 2012 to 2016, there were a whopping 39 million instances where names and SSNs on W-2 tax forms did not match the legitimate Social Security records. Additionally, over $409 billion was added to the Earnings Suspense File (ESF), which holds any uncredited wages that cannot be correctly matched in the SSA’s database.
Previously, the SSA has estimated that seventy-five percent of illegal aliens possess a SSN— either one stolen from an American citizen, or legal resident, or one that has been made up entirely. Not only is this practice troublesome from an immigration law standpoint, but can actually be quite problematic for Americans, or legal residents, who have their SSNs stolen. In addition to receiving Internal Revenue Service (IRS) letters and audits accusing them of having income they are not claiming or having their benefits blocked, reconciling a compromised identifier is estimated to cost thousands of dollars and take years of effort.
The Trump administration did announce this summer that it would begin resuming notice letters to employers and third-part providers informing them of any mismatches. However, it is truly up to Congress to rectify this situation for all parties involved.
In July, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) introduced the bipartisan AG and Legal Workforce Act (H.R. 6417) – legislation that would mandate E-Verify, the effective web-based program that ensures a legal workforce. Furthermore, the legislation would protect against identity theft by requiring the Social Security Commissioner to notify individuals whose SSN demonstrates a pattern of unusual use; as well as assist Americans who believe their identity may have been stolen or used fraudulently.
Congress is required to protect American citizens and their interests above all else. It would be shrewd for them to remember that before the November midterms.
Meanwhile:
The Trump administration will admit no more than 30,000 refugees to the U.S. in the coming year, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said, down from the current cap of 45,000.
Pompeo announced the lowered ceiling during a press conference Monday at the Department of State headquarters in Foggy Bottom.
Pompeo said the 30,000 cap “must be considered in the context of the many other forms of protection and assistance offered by the United States” and should not be “sole barometer” to measure the country’s humanitarian efforts.
The hawkish turn demonstrates President Donald Trump’s willingness to push hard-line immigration policies in the run-up to the November midterm elections — even after his controversial “zero tolerance” border enforcement policy led to thousands of family separations and a court order to reunify parents and children.