Category Archives: government fraud spending collusion

Subpoena Tim Geithner About the Uranium One Deal for Starters

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Ever wonder where any Hillary emails are with regard to this case both as Secretary of State or through the Clinton Foundation? Perhaps Huma knows all…did Obama’s OFA take any kickbacks? What else is out there that the Obama administration hid from congress and oversight? Anyway read on for context and the people line-up.
Under the Treasury Department is also the responsibility of sanctions and where waivers to those sanctions occur.

The Secretary of the Treasury is the Chairperson of CFIUS, and notices to CFIUS are received, processed, and coordinated at the staff level by the Staff Chairperson of CFIUS, who is the Director of the Office of Investment Security in the Department of the Treasury.

The members of CFIUS include the heads of the following departments and offices:

  1. Department of the Treasury (chair)
  2. Department of Justice
  3. Department of Homeland Security
  4. Department of Commerce
  5. Department of Defense
  6. Department of State
  7. Department of Energy
  8. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
  9. Office of Science & Technology Policy

The following offices also observe and, as appropriate, participate in CFIUS’s activities:

  1. Office of Management & Budget
  2. Council of Economic Advisors
  3. National Security Council
  4. National Economic Council
  5. Homeland Security Council

The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Labor are non-voting, ex-officio members of CFIUS with roles as defined by statute and regulation.

Of note for the Uranium One transaction to happen, unless there was a waiver:

What steps can be taken with respect to information required by § 800.402 to further facilitate CFIUS review?

Suggestions include:

  1. Section 800.402(j)(1) requires submission of organizational charts showing control and ownership of the foreign person that is a party to the transaction.  CFIUS’s review would be aided if the parties provide such charts for the U.S. business and if the charts for the U.S. business and the foreign person diagram the ownership chains for the acquirer and target before and after the transaction being notified to CFIUS.  These should be as extensive and detailed as possible.
  2. Sections 800.402(c)(1)(iii) and (v) require submission of information related to the foreign person and its parents.  CFIUS’s review would be aided if the notice identifies whether the actual party in interest is the party to the transaction or one of the parents of the party to the transaction.  CFIUS does not consider special purpose vehicles, wholly-owned subsidiaries established for the sole purpose of the transaction, or other shell companies to be the actual parties in interest in a transaction.
  3. Sections 800.402(c)(3)(iii) and (iv) require information regarding certain United States Government contracts.  Parties are advised to update and verify United States Government contact information for such contracts. Private sector entities not party to the notice are not acceptable points-of-contact for contracts in question.
  4. Filers should ensure that all files in the electronic version of a notice are less than five megabytes (5MB) in size.

What steps, though not required for a notice to be determined complete, may facilitate CFIUS review?

  1. CFIUS agencies have found it very helpful in the past for filing companies to provide the following additional information, even if the activity is not the primary focus of their commercial operations.  CFIUS often requests this information after a voluntary notice has been accepted if it was not included in the initial filing.
    1. Cyber systems, products, services:  Identify whether the U.S. business being acquired develops or provides cyber systems, products, or services, including:
      • Business systems used to manage or support common business processes and operations (for example, enterprise resource planning, e-commerce, email, and database systems); control systems used to monitor, assess, and control sensitive processes and physical functions (for example, supervisory control, data acquisition, process and distributed control systems); safety, security, support, and other specialty systems (for example, fire, intrusion detection, access control, people mover, and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems); or
      • (ii) Telecommunications and/or Internet or similar systems, products or services.
    2. Natural resources:  Identify whether the U.S. business being acquired processes natural resources and material or produces and transports energy, and the amount processed, produced, or transported annually.
  2. Discussion in the notice of the business rationale for the transaction may be useful.
  3. The regulations require parties to provide information regarding any other applicable national security-related regulatory authorities, such as the ITAR, EAR, and NISPOM.  Some of the regulatory review processes under these authorities may have longer deadlines than the CFIUS process, and parties to transactions affected by these other reviews may wish to start or complete these processes prior to submitting a voluntary notice to CFIUS under section 721.

The FBI has a network of informants domestically and it did the job it is tasked to do, that is until the Holder Justice Department ensured it could no longer do the job with regard to the Uranium One Case.

Before the Obama administration approved a controversial deal in 2010 giving Moscow control of a large swath of American uranium, the FBI had gathered substantial evidence that Russian nuclear industry officials were engaged in bribery, kickbacks, extortion and money laundering designed to grow Vladimir Putin’s atomic energy business inside the United States, according to government documents and interviews.

Federal agents used a confidential U.S. witness working inside the Russian nuclear industry to gather extensive financial records, make secret recordings and intercept emails as early as 2009 that showed Moscow had compromised an American uranium trucking firm with bribes and kickbacks in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, FBI and court documents show.

They also obtained an eyewitness account — backed by documents — indicating Russian nuclear officials had routed millions of dollars to the U.S. designed to benefit former President Bill Clinton’s charitable foundation during the time Secretary of State Hillary Clinton served on a government body that provided a favorable decision to Moscow, sources told The Hill.

The racketeering scheme was conducted “with the consent of higher level officials” in Russia who “shared the proceeds” from the kickbacks, one agent declared in an affidavit years later.

When this sale was used by Trump on the campaign trail last year, Hillary Clinton’s spokesman said she was not involved in the committee review and noted the State Department official who handled it said she “never intervened … on any [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] matter.”

In 2011, the administration gave approval for Rosatom’s Tenex subsidiary to sell commercial uranium to U.S. nuclear power plants in a partnership with the United States Enrichment Corp. Before then, Tenex had been limited to selling U.S. nuclear power plants reprocessed uranium recovered from dismantled Soviet nuclear weapons under the 1990s Megatons to Megawatts peace program.

Vadim Mikerin was a director of Rosatom’s Tenex in Moscow since the early 2000s, where he oversaw Rosatom’s nuclear collaboration with the United States under the Megatons to Megwatts program and its commercial uranium sales to other countries. In 2010, Mikerin was dispatched to the U.S. on a work visa approved by the Obama administration to open Rosatom’s new American arm called Tenam.

The kickbacks were known by the FBI, they had to happen to advance the case and to allow them as evidence of wrong-doing.

His, Mikerin’s, illegal conduct was captured with the help of a confidential witness, an American businessman, who began making kickback payments at Mikerin’s direction and with the permission of the FBI. The first kickback payment recorded by the FBI through its informant was dated Nov. 27, 2009, the records show.

In evidentiary affidavits signed in 2014and 2015, an Energy Department agent assigned to assist the FBI in the case testified that Mikerin supervised a “racketeering scheme” that involved extortion, bribery, money laundering and kickbacks that were both directed by and provided benefit to more senior officials back in Russia. More here.

Mikerin indictment document here.

The plea deal and 2 associated cases here.

Mikerin was sentenced to 4 years and forfeited $2,126,622.36  :

According to court documents, Mikerin was the director of the Pan American Department of JSC Techsnabexport (TENEX), a subsidiary of Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation and the sole supplier and exporter of Russian Federation uranium and uranium enrichment services to nuclear power companies worldwide, and the president of TENAM Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary and the official representative of TENEX. Court documents show that between 2004 and October 2014, conspirators agreed to make corrupt payments to influence Mikerin and to secure improper business advantages for U.S. companies that did business with TENEX, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Mikerin admitted that he conspired with Daren Condrey, Boris Rubizhevsky and others to transmit approximately $2,126,622 from Maryland and elsewhere in the United States to offshore shell company bank accounts located in Cyprus, Latvia and Switzerland with the intent to promote the FCPA violations. Mikerin further admitted that the conspirators used consulting agreements and code words to disguise the corrupt payments.

Condrey, 50, of Glenwood, Maryland, pleaded guilty on June 17, 2015, to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Rubizhevsky, 64, of Closter, New Jersey, pleaded guilty on June 15, 2015, to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Condrey and Rubizhevsky await sentencing.

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Mikerin

 

Officials Potentially Influenced (Name; Title; Organization): 

  • Vadim Mikerin; President; TENAM Corporation
  • Vadim Mikerin; Director of the Pan American Department; JSC Techsnabexport (“TENEX”)

Defendant-Related Entities Involved in the Misconduct:    N/A

Third-Party Intermediary:   

  • Cypriot shell company , Shell Company
  • Latvian shell company , Shell Company
  • Swiss shell company , Shell Company
  • Vadim Mikerin , Agent/Consultant/Broker

 

Veterans Sue U.S. Firms’ Bribes Funded Iraq Militia

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Suit: U.S. Firms’ Bribes Funded Iraq Militia Attacks on Americans

WASHINGTON — A group of American veterans filed a federal lawsuit Tuesday against U.S. and European drug companies and medical device makers, accusing them of supporting an Iran-backed Iraqi militia that killed and wounded hundreds of Americans.

The suit is filed under a law that allows Americans injured by terrorism overseas to seek civil damages. The more than 100 plaintiffs include injured U.S. Iraq war veterans and their families. The defendants are either parent companies or subsidiaries of AstraZeneca plc (AZN); Johnson & Johnson (JNJ); Pfizer Inc. (PFE); Roche Holding AG (RHHBY); and the General Electric Company (GE).

The 203-page lawsuit accuses the companies of paying bribes to officials of Iraq’s health ministry that benefited the Mahdi Army, an Iranian-backed militia that the suit says worked closely with Hezbollah, a Lebanese group that has been designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. government.

Iraqi Shiites of the Mahdi Army militia loyal to cleric Moqtada al-Sadr vow to fight ISIS in a show of strength in a military parade on June 21, 2014 in the Sadr City district of Baghdad, Iraq.Scott Peterson / Getty Images file

The companies sold Iraq’s government-run healthcare system millions of dollars worth of drugs and medical devices, and paid the bribes, the suit alleges, as a cost of doing business.

Related reading: Mahdi Army

Related reading: By late 2006, at the height of sectarian violence, the Sadrists were a formidable military force. In the wake of the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra (one of the holiest Shi’a shrines) and frequent attacks by al Qaeda in Iraq, JAM positioned itself as a security guarantor for the Shi’a. However, the organization also spawned death squads responsible for sectarian cleansing.9  By mid-2006 these militias were engaged in a violent campaign of expansion into Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods. JAM soon controlled large areas of Baghdad and they increasingly relied upon corruption, intimidation, and extortion to enhance their wealth and power. More here.

After the U.S. invasion, Iraq’s political factions divvied up government departments under a political spoils system, and the Mahdi Army’s political wing took control of the health ministry. The state-owned drug purchasing monopoly, Kimadia, demanded a 20 percent “religious tax” from the vendors on every contract, the lawsuit said.

“That policy required, as a general matter, companies doing business with Kimadia to pay commissions of at least 20 percent on every contract, the lawsuit says. “This was sometimes paid in the form of in-kind bribes but was often paid in cash as well. Such cash payments were typically called ‘commissions’ — the Iraqi euphemism for bribes. From 2004-2013, it was standard practice for companies dealing with (the Ministry of Health) to pay ‘commissions’ on every major sales contract.”

The in-kind bribes were in the form of what were known as “free goods,” including drugs and medical devices, that Iraqi officials would sell on the black market, says the lawsuit, which specifically accuses each defendant of paying such bribes.

The suit says the defendants paid the bribes even though they knew or should have known that the money was going to a dangerous armed faction.

Image: Moqtada al-Sadr
Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr delivers a speech to his supporters following Friday prayers at the grand mosque of Kufa in the holy city of Najaf, on April 3, 2015.Haidar Hamdani / AFP/Getty Images file

“Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their transactions helped fund Jaysh al-Mahdi attacks on Americans,” the suit says, using an Arabic term for the Mahdi Army.

In a statement, Pfizer said it “categorically denies any wrongdoing.” Roche said it had not been served with the suit and could not comment. A GE spokesperson said the company became aware of the complaint Tuesday and is “thoroughly reviewing the allegations.” The other companies did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Mahdi Army, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, is an Iranian-backed militia that opposed the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. It was never designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., a fact that could pose a legal hurdle for the plaintiffs. The suit argues that it acted as a terrorist organization and worked closely with Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization.

Sadr posed a problem for the American war effort from the start, when he allegedly stabbed to death a U.S.-backed political opponent in 2003. American authorities issued a warrant for his arrest on murder charges but never executed it, fearful of the backlash it might cause among his Shiite supporters.

The U.S. thrice contemplated operations to kill Sadr but decided against doing so, a former CIA officer with personal knowledge told NBC News.

Sadr and his militia fought on and off for years against U.S. forces. In 2004, after the U.S. closed his newspaper, his forces seized control of Shiite areas around Iraq, leading to fighting that killed at least 19 Americans.

The lawsuit cites media and government reports asserting that the Mahdi Army worked closely with Hezbollah to attack American forces, including with sophisticated Iranian-build roadside bombs that penetrated U.S. armor.

Those bombs, known as explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, killed 196 Americans and wounded 861 from 2005 to 2011, according to a U.S. military study cited in the lawsuit.

The suit was brought by the Washington, D.C.-based law firms of Sparacino & Andreson PLLC and Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC.

One of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, David C. Frederick, represented NFL players in their suit against the NFL over brain injuries. That case resulted in a $765 million settlement fund for players.

Some of the defendants have been accused in the past of violating the U/S. law against bribing foreigners to secure business.

In 2010, GE paid $23.4 million to the federal government to settle allegations by the Securities and Exchange Commission that its subsidiaries had violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with alleged kickbacks paid in Iraq under the United Nations’ oil-for-food program. The GE subsidiaries were selling medical and water purification equipment to the Iraqi government.

The kickbacks were paid from 2000 to 2003 and consisted of cash, computer equipment, medical supplies, and services to the Iraqi Health Ministry or the Oil Ministry, the government said at the time.

In 2011, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay a $21.4 million penalty to resolve criminal FCPA charges with the Justice Department, and another $48.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to settle the SEC’s civil charges, in a case alleging improper payments to doctors in Greece by J&J subsidiary DePuy Inc.

Last year, AstraZeneca PLC agreed to pay more than $5 million in penalties after the SEC accused it of violating the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with allegedly illegal payments made by subsidiaries in China and Russia to boost drug sales. AstraZeneca settled the enforcement action without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings.

 

Scope of Russian Troll Operation Explained

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Information warfare = Troll warfare

Russian journalists publish massive investigation into St. Petersburg troll factory’s U.S. operations

A day after Dozhd television published an interview with a former member of Russia’s infamous Internet Research Agency, the magazine RBC released a new detailed report on the same organization’s efforts to meddle in U.S. domestic politics. Meduza summarizes RBC’s new report here.

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The Internet Research Agency, Russia’s infamous “troll farm,” reportedly devoted up to a third of its entire staff to meddling in U.S. politics during the 2016 presidential election. At the peak of the campaign, as many as 90 people were working for the IRA’s U.S. desk, sources told RBC, revealing that the entire agency employs upwards of 250 people. Salaries for staff working in the U.S. department apparently range from 80,000 to 120,000 rubles ($1,400 to $2,100) per month.

The head of the IRA’s U.S. desk is apparently a man originally from Azerbaijan named Dzheikhun Aslanov (though he denies any involvement with the troll factory).

In August and September this year, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter suspended 118 communities and accounts run by the St. Petersburg “troll factory,” disabling a network capable of reaching 6 million subscribers. In 2016, at the height of the U.S. presidential campaign, this network reportedly produced content that reached 30 million people each week.

A source also told RBC that the Internet Research Agency spent almost $80,000 over two years, hiring roughly 100 local American activists to stage about 40 rallies in different cities across the United States. The activists were hired over the Internet, communicating in English, without their knowledge that they were accepting money or organizing support from a Russian organization. According to RBC, internal records from the IRA verify its role in these activities.

The main activity in the troll factory’s U.S. desk was to incite racial animosity (playing both sides of the issue), and promoting the secession of Texas, objections to illegal immigration, and gun rights.

RBC estimates that the Internet Research Agency’s total salary expenses approach $1 million per year, with another $200,000 allocated to buying ads on social media and hiring local activists in the U.S.

According to RBC, the IRA still has a U.S. desk, though its staff has apparently dropped to 50 employees.

Note: Formally, the Internet Research Agency ceased to exist roughly two years ago, rebranding itself under different names, but sources say the organization continues to operate as before.

***

One part of the factory had a particularly intriguing name and mission: a “Department of Provocations” dedicated to sowing fake news and social divisions in the West, according to internal company documents obtained by CNN.

Prigozhin is one of the Kremlin’s inner circle. His company is believed to be a main backer of the St. Petersburg-based “Internet Research Agency” (IRA), a secretive technology firm, according to US officials and the documents reviewed by CNN. Prigozhin was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in December of 2016 for providing financial support for Russia’s military occupation of Ukraine. Two of his companies, including his catering business, were also sanctioned by Treasury this year.
CNN has examined scores of documents leaked from Prigozhin’s companies that show further evidence of his links to the troll factory.
One contract provided IRA with ways to monitor social media and a “system of automized promotion in search engines.”
Prigozhin has a colorful past. He spent nine years in prison in the 1980s for fraud and robbery, according to Russian media reports. After his release, he went into the catering business — renovating a boat and opening New Island, one of a half-dozen upscale restaurants he owns in St. Petersburg. Putin turned to him to cater his birthday parties as well as dinners with visiting leaders, including President Bush and Jacques Chirac of France. A headline in The Moscow Times referred to Prigozhin as Putin’s “Personal Chef.”
Prigozhin subsequently won lucrative catering contracts for schools and Russia’s armed forces. He escorted Putin around his new food-processing factory in 2010. By then he was very much a Kremlin insider with a growing commercial empire. More here.
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Trolling NATO? Yuppers

Seventy percent of Russian-language tweets targeting NATO military activities in Eastern Europe are generated by automated Russian trolls, according to a survey done by the military alliance.

“Two in three Twitter users who write in Russian about the NATO presence in Eastern Europe are robotic or ‘bot’ accounts,” the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence stated in a report made public this week.

The Russian bots sent 84 percent of all Russian language messages. English language tweets against the alliance also were found to be automated, with some 46 percent generated by automated Twitter accounts.

The report criticized the global social media platform for not doing enough to counter Russian bot activities on Twitter. “Our impression is that Twitter in Russian is policed less effectively than it is in English,” the report said.

A Twitter spokesman could not be reached for comment. Colin Crowell, Twitter’s vice president for public policy, stated in a recent post on the company website that “we strictly prohibit the use of bots and other networks of manipulation to undermine the core functionality of our service.” Read more here.

U.S. ready for Chinese and Iranian Drone Program?

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Can the U.S. and allies counter the Chinese program of armed drones or Iran’s?

Beijing has developed an arsenal of unmanned aerial systems ranging from stealthy combat drones to networked-drone swarms. While the U.S. military still remains superior in technology and in number of drones – with the U.S. military reportedly operating some 7,000 and Chinese military operating at least 1,300 – China is quickly gaining traction.

China’s CH-3 and Ch-4 are broadly modeled off variations of the U.S. Predator and Reaper drones. The next iteration, the CH-5, with a 4400-mile flight range over 60 hours – soon to be 12,000 miles over 120 hours – and payload of over one ton of weapons and sensors, including modules designed for electronic warfare and early warning radar to detect enemy aircraft, is the country’s most advanced drone to date. It can even communicate with other combat drones such as earlier CH-3 and CH-4 models to conduct joint missions. Similarly, the smaller CH-805 Stealth Target Drone, which can fly at near supersonic speeds to mimic Chinese fighters on air defense systems, would likely be used operationally as a wingman for manned aircraft.

Notably, however, China must tailor its military doctrine to engage a conventionally superior foe in the United States, who has prioritized expensive and highly advanced drone hardware such as the Global Hawk. For this reason China has sought to foster drones that will enable it an asymmetric capability – an inexpensive attack force operating together and capable of quick yet not decisive attacks. For this reason, Beijing has sought swarms of small, low-tech, possibly 3-D printable drones linked together through high-tech artificial intelligence to create a cognitive hive mind, or swarm.

For example, China’s SW-6 is a small “marsupial” drone with folding wings that can be dropped en mass from cargo chutes or helicopters to conduct persistent surveillance, jam enemy communications, or even relay friendly communications in contested airspace. While the drone is unarmed, it could network with other SW-6s to hunt, swarm, and even dive-bomb enemy targets. This would allow Beijing to project power within its sphere of influence with a lower probability of outright military confrontation – the presence of unarmed drones do not trigger escalation in the same way that fighter jets or aircraft carriers do.

“Should a U.S. warship all of sudden get swarmed by hundreds if not a thousand small unarmed drones, it could have disruptive and distracting effects – impacting electronics and target acquisition for U.S. weapons systems by blinding them,” says Doug Wise, former Deputy Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. “By having the nonlethal drone military capability, it also gives the Chinese a non-kinetic way to conduct military operations in the prosecution of the sovereign Chinese seas – expedite control of a disputed island or interdict maritime traffic to control the waters.”

Part of the reason the Chinese military has likely kept its drones near the mainland could be a lack of space-based communications for over-the-horizon flight control where there is not a direct line of sight between the Chinese-based ground control and the drone. But China has already displayed an ability to do conduct such operations in a limited fashion, and as Beijing’s constellation of satellites grows, so will its ability to conduct remote operations in far off places where it has national interests, such as Africa and the Middle East, where drones could be launched from its new military base strategically positioned in Djibouti.

While drones might play a narrow asymmetric roll in Chinese military doctrine at the moment, the prominence of Chinese drone technology in defense trade shows suggests Beijing is also seeking to incorporate the technology into its broader foreign policy. Besides the United States, who has sold armed drones to the British and Italian militaries, China is the only other exporter of lethal drones, providing them to governments with questionable human rights records, such as Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and possibly even the Somali military. China is even building factories for its drones outside of its borders, in places like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Myanmar, essentially bypassing plausible export restrictions all together.

But while China is becoming a true competitor of the U.S. in the provision of key weapons systems such as drones, it is also replacing Russia as the cheaper and less restricted alternative supplier. For example, a Chinese CH-4 drone costs a mere $4 million on the global market, while the MQ-1 Predator and ground station costs a reported $20 million. More here.

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On Oct. 5, 2017, Maghreb Confidentiel — a professional journal covering Africa’s intelligence services — revealed that the Libyan National Army has obtained Iranian-made Mohajer-2 drones.

War Is Boring’s own sources in Libya confirmed the claim. A photo provided by LNA militants shows one of the Iranian UAVs at an unspecified air base.

The Libyan engineer in the picture – his face obscured for security reasons – works with the LNA. But the provenance of the drone is unclear.

There are two sources plausible sources. Iran and Sudan.

The Mohajer-2 is powered by a 25-horsepower WAE-342 twin-cylinder piston engine. Generally unarmed, the Mohajer-2 is optimized for reconnaissance missions. It boasts a 50-kilometer range and a maximum speed of 200 kilometers per hour. Its ceiling around 3,350 meter. Its endurance — 90 minutes or so.

Iran, Sudan and Venezuela all use the Mohajer-2.

The first possibility is that Iran itself supplied the drones to the Tobruk-based Libyan regime, possibly via an intermediary such as Russia, which has also transferred MiG-23s and spare parts to the LNA.

The transfer could have occurred via the air cargo companies that regularly visit LNA bases, including Moldovan firms Sky Prim Air and Oscar Jet.

All that said, some of the LNA’s strongest backers are Sunnia-Arab countries — major opponents of Iran. In accepting drones from Tehran, even indirectly, Tobruk could risk alienating its most important backers.

That leaves Sudan. Khartoum has, in general, supported militants in Misrata and the Libyan Government of National Accord — a rival of the LNA. Sudan has provided ammunition, spare parts and technical maintenance and Sudanese crews for the pro-GNA Libya Dawn Air Force.

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But there are indications that Khartoum has occasionally aided the LNA.

The Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement are Sudanese Islamist opposition groups, most of whose members are Darfuris. They are part of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, an alliance of Sudanese factions opposed to the government of Pres. Omar Al Bashir.

Rebels from these two armed groups regularly enter Libyan territory, notably the Kufra region. In February 2016, JEM and SLM fighters attacked the city of Kufra, which was then under the control of the Tobruk-based House of Representative.

Since October 2015, the main armed group in the area has been the Subol Al Salam brigade – a Salafist militia – which is said to be operating in alliance with the LNA’s leader Khalifa Haftar.

In October 2016, this militia reportedly killed 13 JEM militants and destroyed two vehicles near the oasis town of Jaghboub. Despite this, Sudan regularly complains that Libya — that is to say, the Tobruk government — does nothing to prevent the various Darfuri rebel groups from crossing into Libya.

Lacking infrastructure in the south of Libya, the LNA can only use light armed-reconnaissance aircraft – SIAI Marchetti SF.260s – to monitor the Sudanese-Libyan border. One of these Italian-made small planes crashed south of Kufra in May 2017, killing the two crew members.

Khartoum has operated Iranian-made UAVs since 2008, as Africa Confidential reported. That year, the Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity Commanda shot down a Ghods Ababil-3 over Darfur. According to Africa Confidential editor Patrick Smith, the drone was probably controlled by Iranian technicians in Sudan.

The Sudanese air force has used many types of UAVs and lost at least six in combat – most of them shot down by rebels.

Despite past tensions between Tobruk and Khartoum due to Sudan’s support of the regime in Tripoli, an agreement between the Libyans and Sudanese may have facilitated Sudan’s supply of Mohajer-2s to Tobruk and the training of operators, all in order to monitor and prevent the crossing of the Libyan border by JEM and SLM militants.

Of course, it’s also possible that the LNA captured the drones from the GNA when the former seized Al Jufra air base in June 2017. The LNA could have grabbed Mohajer-2s along with the ex-Libya Dawn MiG-23UB fighter that LNA fighters found at the base.

Trump vs. Iran vs. Europe

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Primer: From BBC/

Iran has been blamed for a major cyber-attack on Parliamentary email accounts, including those of cabinet ministers.

Whitehall officials say Iran was behind a “sustained” cyber-attack on 23 June with hackers making repeated attempts to guess passwords of 9,000 accounts.

Up to 30 accounts are thought to have been compromised.

Security sources now believe the attackers came from Iran, although none of the information appears to have been used and the motive remains unclear.

BBC security correspondent Gordon Corera described the June attack as “not especially sophisticated” but told BBC Radio 4 it was a sign that Iran was becoming “more aggressive and capable as a cyber power”.

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And Britain still stands with the JCPOA?

Source: President Trump’s decision to decertify does not withdraw the U.S. from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA). Congress will now debate whether the U.S. should continue sanctions relief. Trump’s strategy also promised that the U.S. would focus more broadly on addressing Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region, among other aspects.

President Hassan Rouhani slammed Trump’s speech and new strategy, and claimed that Trump has only distanced himself from his European allies and unified Iran. UK Prime Minister Theresa May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Emmanuel Macron stressed their commitment to upholding the JCPOA in a statement following Trump’s speech.

  • European leaders issue statement following Trump’s speech. UK Prime Minister Theresa May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Emmanuel Macron issued a joint statement conveying their commitment to the JCPOA following President Trump’s announcement that he will not certify that the deal is in the national security interests of the U.S. The European leaders cautioned President Donald Trump and U.S. lawmakers to carefully consider the implications of taking actions that could undermine the JCPOA, such as “re-imposing sanctions [that were] lifted under the [JCPOA].” They also expressed their concern about Iran’s ballistic missile program and disruptive regional activities, stating that they “stand ready to take further appropriate measures to address these issues.” European leaders have voiced their continuous support for the JCPOA. Several European countries have signed a myriad of financial deals with Iran since the implementation of the JCPOA in January 2016. The imposition of new sanctions or the reintroduction of previously lifted sanctions could imperil existing and future deals reached between Europe and Iran. (GOV.uk)