U.S. Iran Strategy Announced by SecState Pompeo

This speech/policy sets the table for the North Korea talks with President Trump. Further, it advances the mission on countering militant Islam not only in the region but globally. Europe has to decide on corporate business relationship with Iran versus human rights along with worldwide terrorism at the hands of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Since 2014, a broad range of organizations, from medical companies such as GE Healthcare to aerospace firms such as Lufthansa Technik, as well as educational institutions such as Harvard University, have obtained permission and waivers to operate in Iran.

Other U.S. institutions that were permitted to do business in Iran include: General Electric Medical and Aviation Divisions, Bausch & Lomb, Boston Scientific, Smithsonian Institute, HSBC, Philips North America, University of California San Diego, University of Wisconsin, Loyola University, New York University, BNP Paribas S.A., American Pulp and Paper and Intelsat Corporation to list a few. More here.

(Reuters) – The United States on Monday demanded Iran make sweeping changes — from dropping its nuclear program to pulling out of the Syrian civil war — or face severe economic sanctions as the Trump administration hardened its approach to Tehran.

Iran dismissed Washington’s ultimatum and one senior Iranian official said it showed the United States is seeking “regime change” in Iran.

Weeks after President Donald Trump pulled out of an international nuclear deal with Iran, his administration threatened to impose “the strongest sanctions in history,” and vowed to “crush” Iranian operatives abroad, setting Washington and Tehran further on a course of confrontation.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded sweeping changes that would force Iran effectively to reverse the recent spread of its military and political influence through the Middle East to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

If Washington sees tangible shifts in Iran’s policies, it is prepared to lift sanctions, Pompeo said.

“The sting of sanctions will only grow more painful if the regime does not change course from the unacceptable and unproductive path it has chosen for itself and the people of Iran,” Pompeo said in his first major speech since becoming secretary of state.

“These will be the strongest sanctions in history by the time we are done,” he added.

Pompeo took aim at Iran’s policy of expansion in the Middle East through support for armed groups in countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

He warned that the United States would “crush” Iranian operatives and proxies abroad and told Tehran to pull out forces under its command from the Syrian civil war where they have helped President Bashar al-Assad gain the upper hand.

Iran’s president summarily dismissed Pompeo’s demands.

“Who are you to decide for Iran and the world?,” the semi-official ILNA news agency quoted Hassan Rouhani as saying.

“The world today does not accept America to decide for the world, as countries are independent … that era is over … We will continue our path with the support of our nation.”

Tension between the two countries has grown notably since Trump this month withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement aimed at preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

A senior Iranian official said Pompeo’s remarks showed that the United States was pushing for “regime change,” a charged phrase often associated with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein.

Pompeo warned that if Iran fully resumed its nuclear program Washington would be ready to respond and said the administration would hold companies doing prohibited business in Iran to account.

“Our demands on Iran are not unreasonable: give up your program,” Pompeo said, “Should they choose to go back, should they begin to enrich, we are fully prepared to respond to that as well,” he said, declining to elaborate.

Pompeo said Washington would work with the Defense Department and allies to counter Iran in the cyberspace and maritime areas.

The Pentagon said it would take all necessary steps to confront Iranian behavior in the region and was assessing whether that could include new actions or doubling down on current ones.

Related reading: 2015 France Opened Trade Office in Iran for 150 French companies

Related reading: May 2018 UK Updated the Trade Policy with Iran

Related reading: ‘Made in Germany’ has a very good reputation in Iran

NAMING NAMES

Pompeo said if Iran made major changes, the United States was prepared to ease sanctions, re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relations and support the country’s re-integration into the international economic system.

Any new U.S. sanctions will raise the cost of trade for Iran and are expected to further deter Western companies from investing there, giving hardliners, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an opportunity to cement their grip on power.

Iran’s ruling elite are mindful of recent protests sparked by economic hardship, which is, in part, their calculation for working with the Europeans on ways to salvage the nuclear deal.

Pompeo’s speech did not explicitly call for regime change but he repeatedly urged the Iranian people not to put up with their leaders, specifically naming Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

“At the end of the day the Iranian people will get to make a choice about their leadership,” Pompeo said.

Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Brooking Institution think tank’s foreign policy program, said Pompeo’s speech did indeed amount to a strategy of regime change.

“There is only one way to read it and that is that Trump administration has wedded itself to a regime-change strategy to Iran, one that is likely to alienate our allies. One with dubious prospects for success,” she said.

The administration’s approach “explicitly puts the onus on the Iranian people to change their leadership or face cataclysmic financial pressure,” said Maloney who has advised the State Department on Iran in the Bush administration between 2005-2007.

Lebanese analyst Ghaleb Kandil, who has close ties to the pro-Iran Hezbollah group, said Washington’s demands have previously not worked.

“These are conditions that were tested in previous phases of American pressures, before the nuclear deal, when Iran was in more difficult circumstances than it is in these days, and it did not surrender to these conditions or accept them,” said Kandil.

Pompeo outlined 12 U.S. demands for Iran including to stop uranium enrichment, never to pursue plutonium reprocessing and to close its heavy water reactor.

It also had to declare all previous military dimensions of its nuclear program and to permanently and verifiably abandon such work, he said.

Pompeo’s demand that Tehran stop uranium enrichment goes even further than the nuclear deal. Iran says its nuclear work has medical uses and will produce energy to meet domestic demand and complement its oil reserves.

Washington’s regional allies, the Gulf and Israel, who were strong critics of the deal, praised the administration’s position on Monday.

European parties to the nuclear deal – France, Britain and Germany – are working to find a way to keep the nuclear pact in effect after Washington’s exit.

Speaking ahead of Pompeo’s speech, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said it would be difficult for the United States and its allies to deal with all the issues they had with Iran at the same time.

“If you try to pull all of those into a giant negotiation, a new jumbo Iran negotiation, a new treaty…that seems to be what they envisage and I don’t see that being very easy to achieve in anything like a reasonable timescale, Johnson said in Argentina.

The Monies and Deals that Flowed into Iran, People Swap

  1. Why does France want to keep the Iran nuclear deal? Rohani et Macron au téléphone: promotion des relations ...French exports to Iran for the first 11 months of 2017 rose 120% to €1.29 billion ($1.6 billion) and imports grew 80 % to €2.16 billion,” Celestin-Urbain said.

    “The short-term priority was to keep trade simple and complete a scheme this year to offer euro-denominated credits to Iranian buyers of French goods,” he said, a move that would keep bilateral trade outside the reach of US sanctions.

    The head of state-owned investment bank Bpifrance, which is putting the plan together, said he was confident the scheme, which had a pipeline of deals worth €1.5 billion, could start operating by end-May or early-June. However, he warned that talks were ongoing on how to protect French firms if the US snapped back sanctions.

  2. The U.S. government wired $848,000 to Iran in July 2015 to settle a dispute over fossils and architectural drawings now in Iran’s possession.
  3. The U.S. also wired $9 million to Iran in exchange for 32 tons of heavy water.
  4. There is some chatter also about $400 million relating to the freedom of a U.S . spy. (likely part of #2) also came from the New York Federal Reserve and was converted to Swiss Francs.
  5. The $1.7 billion that went to Iran traveled through a network of the New York Federal Reserve and several European banks. This money was then transferred to the Swiss bank, converted to Swiss banknotes and moved to the Swiss National Bank. The U.S, government then transported them to Geneva via a flight bound for Iran. The transactions out of the U.S reserves were three separate transactions. At the same time there was a large hostage exchange. Iran released 4 American hostages. The Dutch Central Bank was also instrumental in facilitating the $1.3 billion into Euros. These monies appear to all be spent on the export of terror, supporting Bashir al Assad of Syria and keeping the Houthi rebels armed in Yemen.
  6. People:

    Khosrow Afghahi

    Afghahi, 72, was arrested in California in April and faced charges for allegedly violating the Iranian embargo and money laundering.
    He was the managing director and part owner of Tehran-based Faratel Corporation and the minority owner of Houston-based Smart Power Systems, according to a grand jury indictment filed in federal court in Texas in April.
    He was accused of participating in a scheme to illegally export high-tech microelectronics as part of an “Iranian procurement network operating in the United States,” the Justice Department said after his arrest.
    He had pleaded not guilty and the case had not yet gone to trial, attorney David Gerger said. A pardon was handed to him at 4:30 a.m. Sunday, allowing him to be released from prison after nine months behind bars, according to his attorney.
    Gerger described his release as “the right result,” adding that his client is now spending time with his family.
    “He is a good man,” Gerger said, “and we are glad to put this behind him.”

    Tooraj Faridi

    Faridi, of Houston, was vice president of Smart Power Systems and was accused of participating in the alleged scheme. In a statement released at the time of the indictment, an FBI official said such microelectronics shipments could put national security at risk.
    “The proliferation of sensitive U.S. technologies to Iran and the direct support to their military and weapons programs remains a clear threat to U.S. national security,” said Randall Coleman, assistant director of the FBI’s counterintelligence division.
    Faridi’s attorney told CNN affiliate KPRC that his client never posed a threat to the country.
    “He’s as American as anybody that was born in this country. He’s loved being here, he’s fought hard to be here and he’s going to stay here, so it’s been very stressful to him to be accused of being somebody who’s a threat to national security when he’s just as American and patriotic as anybody in this town,” attorney Kent Schaffer said.
    He faced charges for allegedly violating the Iranian embargo and money laundering. The case had not yet gone to trial. He was pardoned on Sunday as part of the deal.

    Bahram Mechanic

    Mechanic, the majority owner of Faratel and Smart Power Systems, also was accused in the same alleged scheme. He faced charges of violating the embargo and money laundering, among other counts.
    Attorney Joel Androphy told CNN that Mechanic, Faridi and Afghahi were met by their wives after their release and headed to their homes.
    “They were ecstatic to be out,” he said.
    The attorney told KPRC that his client eventually plans to return to Iran.
    Androphy told Forbes the accusations against his client were baseless and he believes they would have won if the case had gone to trial.
    Mechanic was pardoned on Sunday as part of the deal.

    Nima Golestaneh

    The 30-year-old Iranian national pleaded guilty in December to charges of wire fraud and unauthorized access to computers, the Department of Justice said.
    He was arrested in Turkey in November 2013 and extradited to the United States last February.
    According to a plea agreement, he conspired to hack the network and computers at Arrow Tech, an engineering consulting and software company in Vermont.
    His lawyer did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

    Nader Modanlo

    The naturalized U.S. citizen, who lived in Potomac, Maryland, was convicted in 2013 of conspiring to illegally provide satellite services to Iran, federal officials said at the time.
    He was a mechanical engineer with science and engineering degrees from George Washington University. Prosecutors argued he’d broken the law by helping Iran launch communications satellites.
    He was sentenced to eight years in prison in 2013. That sentence was commuted as part of the deal.
    His lawyer did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

    Arash Ghahreman

    A naturalized U.S. citizen, Ghahreman was convicted in April of violating U.S. export and money laundering laws as part of a scheme to buy marine navigation equipment and military electronic equipment for illegal export to Iran.
    He was sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison last August. That sentence was commuted Sunday as part of the deal.
    Attorney Ellis Johnson said Ghahreman and his family were extremely relieved after his release.
    “He plans to spend some time with his aunt and her family on the East Coast, reunite with his girlfriend who’s currently on the West Coast, and hopefully visit his elderly parents in Iran, whom he hasn’t seen in years since this case began,” Johnson said.
    Ghahreman, the attorney said, is a “kind, considerate man who poses no threat to the United States.”

    Ali Saboonchi

    A federal jury in convicted Saboonchi, who holds both Iranian and U.S. citizenship, in August 2014 of conspiracy and seven counts of exporting American manufactured industrial products to Iran.
    He was sentenced to 24 months in prison last February. That sentence was commuted Sunday as part of the deal.
    In a written statement, his attorneys described Saboonchi as a “hard-working family man and American” who poses no danger and “has a bright future ahead.”
    “He was born in the U..S and is proud to be raising his young family here. His arrest and incarceration were devastating to his many friends and family,” attorneys Elizabeth Oyer, Lucius Outlaw III and Meghan Skelton said. “Ali is thrilled and grateful for his release and return to his family.”

When Biden and Kerry Concocted a Shady Equity Firm

Keep this post in your bookmarks as we enter into the 2020 general election….

Primer:

1. China plants industrial espionage operatives in the U.S. that steal government contract secrets and sell them back to China. FBI caught at least one.

2. Through cyber espionage, China has stolen much of the F-35 technology, more than 50 terabytes.

3. John Kerry and Joe Biden did exactly the same thing as Hillary…sold access for money while exploiting it all as diplomatic missions with the title(s) of bi-lateral agreements.

4. Subpoena former Treasury Secretary Jack Lew and ask him about the CFIUS approvals of Chinese back enterprises. We may surely need to go back to former Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, did he set the table for all this with Obama’s approval creating that ‘Asia Pivot‘?

5. What does Congress know about foreign investments and when do they know it? They get reports, but who is asking questions, anyone?

http://commonsensenation.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Biden.jpg photo

NYP: Joe Biden and John Kerry have been pillars of the Washington establishment for more than 30 years. Biden is one of the most popular politicians in our nation’s capital.

His demeanor, sense of humor, and even his friendly gaffes have allowed him to form close relationships with both Democrats and Republicans. His public image is built around his “Lunch Bucket Joe” persona. As he reminds the American people on regular occasions, he has little wealth to show for his career, despite having reached the vice presidency.

One of his closest political allies in Washington is former senator and former Secretary of State John Kerry. “Lunch Bucket Joe” he ain’t; Kerry is more patrician than earthy. But the two men became close while serving for several decades together in the US Senate. The two “often talked on matters of foreign policy,” says Jules Witcover in his Biden biography.

So their sons going into business together in June 2009 was not exactly a bolt out of the blue.

But with whom their sons cut lucrative deals while the elder two were steering the ship of state is more of a surprise.

What Hunter Biden, the son of America’s vice president, and Christopher Heinz, the stepson of the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (later to be secretary of state), were creating was an international private equity firm. It was anchored by the Heinz family alternative investment fund, Rosemont Capital. The new firm would be populated by political loyalists and positioned to strike profitable deals overseas with foreign governments and officials with whom the US government was negotiating.

Hunter Biden, Vice President Joe Biden’s youngest son, had gone through a series of jobs since graduating from Yale Law School in 1996, including the hedge-fund business.

By the summer of 2009, the 39-year-old Hunter joined forces with the son of another powerful figure in American politics, Chris Heinz. Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania had tragically died in a 1991 airplane crash when Chris was 18. Chris, his brothers, and his mother inherited a large chunk of the family’s vast ketchup fortune, including a network of investment funds and a Pennsylvania estate, among other properties. In May 1995, his mother, Teresa, married Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts. That same year, Chris graduated from Yale, and then went on to get his MBA from Harvard Business School.

Joining them in the Rosemont venture was Devon Archer, a longtime Heinz and Kerry friend.

The three friends established a series of related LLCs. The trunk of the tree was Rosemont Capital, the alternative investment fund of the Heinz Family Office. Rosemont Farm is the name of the Heinz family’s 90-acre estate outside Fox Chapel, Pennsylvania.

The small fund grew quickly. According to an email revealed as part of a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, Rosemont described themselves as “a $2.4 billion private equity firm co-owned by Hunter Biden and Chris Heinz,” with Devon Archer as “Managing Partner.”

The partners attached several branches to the Rosemont Capital trunk, including Rosemont Seneca Partners, LLC, Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners, and Rosemont Realty.

Of the various deals in which these Rosemont entities were involved, one of the largest and most troubling concerns was Rosemont Seneca Partners.

Rather than set up shop in New York City, the financial capital of the world, Rosemont Seneca leased space in Washington, DC. They occupied an all-brick building on Wisconsin Avenue, the main thoroughfare of exclusive Georgetown. Their offices would be less than a mile from John and Teresa Kerry’s 23-room Georgetown mansion, and just two miles from both Joe Biden’s office in the White House and his residence at the Naval Observatory.

Over the next seven years, as both Joe Biden and John Kerry negotiated sensitive and high-stakes deals with foreign governments, Rosemont entities secured a series of exclusive deals often with those same foreign governments.

Some of the deals they secured may remain hidden. These Rosemont entities are, after all, within a private equity firm and as such are not required to report or disclose their financial dealings publicly.

Some of their transactions are nevertheless traceable by investigating world capital markets. A troubling pattern emerges from this research, showing how profitable deals were struck with foreign governments on the heels of crucial diplomatic missions carried out by their powerful fathers. Often those foreign entities gained favorable policy actions from the United States government just as the sons were securing favorable financial deals from those same entities.

Nowhere is that more true than in their commercial dealings with Chinese government-backed enterprises.

Rosemont Seneca joined forces in doing business in China with another politically connected consultancy called the Thornton Group. The Massachusetts-based firm is headed by James Bulger, the nephew of the notorious mob hitman James “Whitey” Bulger. Whitey was the leader of the Winter Hill Gang, part of the South Boston mafia. Under indictment for 19 murders, he disappeared. He was later arrested, tried, and convicted.

James Bulger’s father, Whitey’s younger brother, Billy Bulger, serves on the board of directors of the Thornton Group. He was the longtime leader of the Massachusetts state Senate and, with their long overlap by state and by party, a political ally of Massachusetts Senator John Kerry.

Less than a year after opening Rosemont Seneca’s doors, Hunter Biden and Devon Archer were in China, having secured access at the highest levels. Thornton Group’s account of the meeting on their Chinese-language website was telling: Chinese executives “extended their warm welcome” to the “Thornton Group, with its US partner Rosemont Seneca chairman Hunter Biden (second son of the now Vice President Joe Biden).”

The purpose of the meetings was to “explore the possibility of commercial cooperation and opportunity.” Curiously, details about the meeting do not appear on their English-language website.

Also, according to the Thornton Group, the three Americans met with the largest and most powerful government fund leaders in China — even though Rosemont was both new and small.

The timing of this meeting was also curious. It occurred just hours before Hunter Biden’s father, the vice president, met with Chinese President Hu in Washington as part of the Nuclear Security Summit.

There was a second known meeting with many of the same Chinese financial titans in Taiwan in May 2011. For a small firm like Rosemont Seneca with no track record, it was an impressive level of access to China’s largest financial players. And it was just two weeks after Joe Biden had opened up the US-China strategic dialogue with Chinese officials in Washington.

On one of the first days of December 2013, Hunter Biden was jetting across the Pacific Ocean aboard Air Force Two with his father and daughter Finnegan. The vice president was heading to Asia on an extended official trip. Tensions in the region were on the rise.

The American delegation was visiting Japan, China, and South Korea. But it was the visit to China that had the most potential to generate conflict and controversy. The Obama administration had instituted the “Asia Pivot” in its international strategy, shifting attention away from Europe and toward Asia, where China was flexing its muscles.

For Hunter Biden, the trip coincided with a major deal that Rosemont Seneca was striking with the state-owned Bank of China. From his perspective, the timing couldn’t have been better.

Vice President Biden, Hunter Biden and Finnegan arrived to a red carpet and a delegation of Chinese officials. Greeted by Chinese children carrying flowers, the delegation was then whisked to a meeting with Vice President Li Yuanchao and talks with President Xi Jinping.

Hunter and Finnegan Biden joined the vice president for tea with US Ambassador Gary Locke at the Liu Xian Guan Teahouse in the Dongcheng District in Beijing. Where Hunter Biden spent the rest of his time on the trip remains largely a mystery. There are actually more reports of his daughter Finnegan’s activities than his.

What was not reported was the deal that Hunter was securing. Rosemont Seneca Partners had been negotiating an exclusive deal with Chinese officials, which they signed approximately 10 days after Hunter visited China with his father. The most powerful financial institution in China, the government’s Bank of China, was setting up a joint venture with Rosemont Seneca.

The Bank of China is an enormously powerful financial institution. But the Bank of China is very different from the Bank of America. The Bank of China is government-owned, which means that its role as a bank blurs into its role as a tool of the government. The Bank of China provides capital for “China’s economic statecraft,” as scholar James Reilly puts it. Bank loans and deals often occur within the context of a government goal.

Rosemont Seneca and the Bank of China created a $1 billion investment fund called Bohai Harvest RST (BHR), a name that reflected who was involved. Bohai (or Bo Hai), the innermost gulf of the Yellow Sea, was a reference to the Chinese stake in the company. The “RS” referred to Rosemont Seneca. The “T” was Thornton.

The fund enjoyed an unusual and special status in China. BHR touted its “unique Sino-US shareholding structure” and “the global resources and network” that allowed it to secure investment “opportunities.” Funds were backed by the Chinese government.

In short, the Chinese government was literally funding a business that it co-owned along with the sons of two of America’s most powerful decision makers.

The partnership between American princelings and the Chinese government was just a beginning. The actual investment deals that this partnership made were even more problematic. Many of them would have serious national security implications for the United States.

In 2015, BHR joined forces with the automotive subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned military aviation contractor Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) to buy American “dual-use” parts manufacturer Henniges.

AVIC is a major military contractor in China. It operates “under the direct control of the State Council” and produces a wide array of fighter and bomber aircraft, transports, and drones — primarily designed to compete with the United States.

The company also has a long history of stealing Western technology and applying it to military systems. The year before BHR joined with AVIC, the Wall Street Journal reported that the aviation company had stolen technologies related to the US F-35 stealth fighter and incorporated them in their own stealth fighter, the J-31. AVIC has also been accused of stealing US drone systems and using them to produce their own.

In September 2015, when AVIC bought 51 percent of American precision-parts manufacturer Henniges, the other 49 percent was purchased by the Biden-and-Kerry-linked BHR.

Henniges is recognized as a world leader in anti-vibration technologies in the automotive industry and for its precise, state-of-the-art manufacturing capabilities. Anti-vibration technologies are considered “dual-use” because they can have a military application, according to both the State Department and Department of Commerce.

The technology is also on the restricted Commerce Control List used by the federal government to limit the exports of certain technologies. For that reason, the Henniges deal would require the approval of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which reviews sensitive business transactions that may have a national security implication.

According to BHR internal documents, the Henniges deal included “arduous and often-times challenging negotiations.” The CFIUS review in 2015 included representatives from numerous government agencies including John Kerry’s State Department.

The deal was approved in 2015.

Excerpted with permission from “Secret Empires: How the American Political Class Hides Corruption and Enriches Family and Friends,” by Peter Schweizer, published by Harper Collins. The book goes on sale March 20.

Secret Planes, Russia, China and the United States oh My

 

DPRK: What Barack/Hillary Knew and When

Hey China…what gives? France, you have a call holding on line 4.

None of this would have been in Obama’s, Hillary’s or John Kerry’s emails? Hillary did not use ANY official government email platform…just say’n.

John Kerry under the instruction of the Obama White House negotiated the Joint Plan of Action with Iran on the nuclear development program. Purposely many things were overlooked including the nefarious activities between Iran and North Korea.

Imagine the developments are cables since 2009.

Countries that were part of the long negotiations were the P5+1, which included:

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.

North Korean front companies operate inside China with impunity.

The extent of Chinese companies’ role in enabling North Korea’s evasion of sanctions is detailed deep in the fine print of the still unpublished 105-page report. For instance, North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank, both subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions, continue to operate in the Chinese cities of Dalian, Dandong, and Shenyang in violation of U.N. resolutions. The panel suspects that one of the banks, Daedong, may in fact be majority-owned by Chinese shareholders, citing July 2011 documents indicating the sale of a controlling stake, 60 percent, to a Chinese firm. More here.

So, when it comes to France, what did they know via the MTCR?

Background

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) to a range of 300 kilometers (km) or more. The G-7 States formally announced the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) on 16 April 1987.

Since then, membership has expanded to the present 34 States, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other States, including China, India, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

Regime Goal

The regime goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.

Regime Guidelines

The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex

Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited.

Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as the materials for the construction of missiles. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate. More here.

So, to answer the question in the title of this article, here is a WikiLeaks cable providing background:

***

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM
2009 October 6, 13:14 (Tuesday)
09STATE103755_a
SECRET
SECRET
In the metadata of the Kissinger Cables this field is called ‘Previous Handling Restrictions’.

Cablegate does not originally have this field. We have given it the entry ‘Not Assigned’.

Citations for acronyms used are available here.” data-hasqtip=”true” oldtitle=”Handling Restrictions” title=””>Handling Restrictions

— Not Assigned —
14817
— Not Assigned —
TEXT ONLINE
— Not Assigned —
TE – Telegram (cable)
— N/A or Blank —
— N/A or Blank —
— Not Assigned —
— Not Assigned —

Original cable: Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H). 1. (U)

This is an action request.

Please see paragraph 2. 2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper “North Korea,s Missile Program” in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.

Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) North Korea’s Missile Program Introduction North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic missile development efforts. We expect both the new Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle (SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. North Korea’s deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.

North Korea remains one of the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to provide assistance to both Iran’s and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. These sales have included complete Category I missile systems, as well as production technology and expertise.

North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic missiles and continues to market its systems to countries in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile technology.

North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues to make progress in its missile development efforts, it remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of missile-related raw materials and components. While most of these materials are for direct application to its missile program, North Korea may procure some items in support of its missile customers.

Program History North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- range Scud C in the mid-1980s.

These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.

North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is deployed as part of North Korea’s missile forces. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which could strike all of South Korea and Japan. Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North Korea’s TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North Korea had successfully developed many of the essential technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM development.

The DPRK has also developed the follow-on system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration, the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg.

In a three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.

The first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew only about 40 seconds. Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile IRBM –called the Musudan by the United States.

The Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants — unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) — than those used in Scud-type missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles — or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity — than would be possible using Scud-type technology. As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has started to develop its own solid-propellant missile systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM.

This new missile — called the Toksa by the United States — has a range of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a disturbing development since North Korea can apply its experience in producing this missile to other, longer- range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and shorter launch times, making them more survivable than liquid propellant missiles. North Korea,s advances — in both its liquid and solid propellant programs — have come despite a self-imposed missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea’s ability to verify new designs or modifications to its missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.

North Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. Program Activities On April 5, 2009, North Korea — despite UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic missile program — conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is making progress in developing technology that can directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No Dong MRBMs on July 4th.

The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range missile systems and that long range missile development probably remains a priority. North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world, without requiring the lengthy — and potentially vulnerable — launch preparation time required by the TD-2. Technology Supplier The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. North Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile-related raw materials from third-parties for customers through its extensive procurement network. Iran Iran is one of North Korea’s key missile customers.

Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, which is based on North Korea’s No Dong. North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.

This technology would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian missile and SLV designs. North Korea also provided assistance to Iran’s SLV program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program suggests that North Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Syria Syria is another of North Korea’s key missile customers. North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the “Scud D.”

The missiles came initially in either partially or completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic production capability, probably with extensive assistance from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of other missile-related services to Syria, including production technology, ground support equipment, raw material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.

North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria’s development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for its Scud ballistic missiles. Yemen In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.

Burma The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, probably was associated with North Korea’s primary arms export entity — suggesting that the cargo was most likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely Burma.

The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic missile production facility suggests that the two sides probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, and that the cargo may have been related to these discussions.

Foreign Assistance North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and materials needed to support both its own and its customers’ missile programs. Members of this network often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of controlled items. Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile program includes material North Korea finds too costly or too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and liquid-propellant precursors. Although important for its own program, North Korea also uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials for its missile export customers.

Conclusion North Korea will continue to develop missiles with increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers — most commonly China-based, given their proximity and access to technology that would be beneficial to North Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or technology associated with missile systems other countries — including MTCR Partners — have retired. International pressure against North Korea and its customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s missile sales.

However, despite such pressure, North Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, their production technology, and missile maintenance and support services to all interested customers. END TEXT OF PAPER.

4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR.

A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON