The Chinese Spy at Mar-a-Lago

Posted on April 8, 2019April 8, 2019 by Denise Simon

It was not so much about the lies she told to get on the grounds and through the first layer of security at Mar-a-Lago, or about the spy stuff she had on her at the time she was arrested at Trump’s club but there was some interesting things in her hotel room. How about $8000 in cash, an unknown amount of Chinese currency, a signal detector, additional cell phones, a dozen or so credit cards, 9 USB cards, 5 SIM cards and 9 thumb drives that immediately began corrupting files in a test (cold)computer.

The 10 page criminal complaint is found here.

MiamiHerald: Yujing Zhang — the Chinese woman arrested Saturday after allegedly trying to bring an unusual number of electronic devices into President Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club — identified herself at a court hearing earlier this week as an investor and a consultant for a Shanghai private-equity firm who appears to have amassed considerable wealth.

Speaking through a Mandarin interpreter, Zhang told a magistrate judge that she owns a $1.3 million house in China and drives a BMW, according to an audio recording of her first appearance at the federal courthouse in West Palm Beach.

A federal prosecutor at the hearing said Zhang poses an “extreme risk of flight” from the United States if she is released from custody.

“She has no ties to the United States in general or to the Southern District of Florida in particular,” said the prosecutor, John McMillan.

McMillan also claimed there were “security implications” that should prevent Zhang from making phone calls while detained.

The FBI is investigating whether Zhang — who told U.S. Secret Service agents she had traveled to Mar-a-Lago from Shanghai to attend a social event — was working as a Chinese intelligence operative, sources familiar with the inquiry told the Miami Herald. Her arrest at the president’s private club revitalized a wider ongoing federal investigation, first reported by the Herald, that had for several months examined potential Chinese espionage activities in South Florida. An affidavit attached to a criminal complaint said she was carrying four cellphones, a laptop, an external hard drive and a thumb drive containing “malicious malware.” Details of the hearing were first reported by CNN.

Zhang is charged with lying to a federal officer and entering restricted property. She has not been charged with any counts related to espionage. Chinese diplomatic officials in the United States say they are aware of Zhang’s arrest and offering assistance.

During the April 1 hearing, Zhang asked sophisticated questions about how her case would proceed in terms of securing bond and hiring an attorney, which were relayed to the judge by her interpreter.

“You’re obviously very intelligent because your questions are excellent for a defendant in this situation,” remarked the judge, William Matthewman, who added that the hour-and-15-minute initial appearance was probably the longest that had ever taken place before him.

While Zhang requested an interpreter at the hearing, the Secret Service noted that she had exhibited a “detailed knowledge of, and ability to converse in and understand even subtle nuances of … the English language” during her interactions with agents at Mar-a-Lago.

The affidavit submitted by a Secret Service agent stated that Zhang read a document out loud in English and would “question agents about the context of certain words throughout the form.”

At the court hearing, Zhang named her employer as Shanghai Zhirong Asset Management, a private-equity firm, but said she was paid on a “per project” basis and had made no money in 2019. She said she travels to the United States for business frequently enough to maintain a U.S. bank account but believed the account did not hold more than $5,000 and said she often brings cash on her trips. She said she had arrived in the country a short time before her arrest.

“My savings are mainly in China,” Zhang told the court.

Zhang will remain in custody pending a detention hearing Monday, but Matthewman ruled she should be allowed to make domestic telephone calls to seek a private attorney. She ultimately chose to be represented by a federal public defender.

She told the court that her family lives in China and said she would like to make international calls and use the Internet to contact relatives and friends, something the magistrate judge denied. She said that she opened the Wells Fargo bank account because she was looking for a “business partner” in the United States but nothing had panned out.

Zhang showed up at Trump’s Palm Beach club around noon on Saturday asking to use the pool and was allowed through an initial Secret Service checkpoint, according to the criminal complaint.

In the affidavit, a Secret Service agent wrote that “due to a potential language barrier issue,” Mar-a-Lago security believed Zhang was related to a club member with the same surname. But a receptionist soon realized she was not an approved guest. At that point, Zhang said she had been invited to attend a “United Nations Friendship Event” between China and the United States. While there was no function by that name on the social calendar, a Chinese-based group called the United Nations Chinese Friendship Association had promoted an event on that same day.

The function was one of two events originally scheduled to take place Saturday and promoted online by Cindy Yang, a South Florida massage parlor owner who also ran a business that promised Chinese business executives face time and photographs with Donald Trump. Both events had been canceled after the Herald published a selfie Yang took with Trump. Zhang apparently never got the message that the events were off.

The arrest at Mar-a-Lago is causing consternation in Congress. U.S. House Oversight Committee Chairman Elijah Cummings, D-Md., said Thursday that he plans to have the Secret Service brief him and Rep. Jim Jordan, the committee’s ranking Republican, over security protocols at the president’s club.

“The two main questions are how secure is it with regard to safety of the president and his family, and then we want to know about security with regard to communications. It seems like anybody can kind of mosey up and bring communications equipment,” Cummings said.

“You cannot play around with the safety of the president and the first family,” he said. “You just can’t do it.”

The Vatican, KINO and our Southern Border Incursions

Posted on April 5, 2019April 5, 2019 by Denise Simon

Primer: Callista Gingrich is the U.S. Ambassador to the Vatican. Given the crisis at our Southern border and the relationship Newt has with the Trump White House, imagine the conversations regarding the Pope’s constant call for no walls and global Catholic charities working against U.S. law enforcement. Yikes… and….it seems the Catholic Church in the United States has no use for Callista, Newt or President Trump. If you need some proof on that, click here.

The other part of the Primer:

President Obama’s Executive Action: In November, the Jesuits of the United States, Jesuit Refugee Services/USA, and the Kino Border Initiative issued a statement welcoming President Obama’s executive action to end the legislative gridlock and place pressure on Congress to make immigration reform a priority. The President’s order will provide temporary stays of deportation to as many as five million undocumented migrants who live in fear of discovery and separation from their families, but there are another 6 million undocumented immigrants whose situations are unaddressed by the order. To read the complete statement from the Jesuits of the United States, JRS/USA, and the KBI, please see: http://www.jesuit.org/news-detail?TN=NEWS-20141121032132.

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But KINO? Yes…and add in Georgetown University. Really? uh huh….just last year…

A collaboration between Campus Ministry and the Alternative Breaks Program of the Center for Social Justice Research, Teaching, and Service at Georgetown University, MAGIS: Kino Border Immersion is a weeklong trip during which participants will focus on building relationships of solidarity with the poor, growing in awareness of social justice issues, appreciating the convergence of learning, faith, and justice, and developing skills of reflection on one’s experience at the US/Mexico border.

Magis: Kino Border Immersion (KBI) strives to build participants’ understanding of immigration and the surrounding issues. Through interactions with a wide range of stakeholders in the Arizona border region, participants will learn about the structures that shape migration and gain a firsthand look at different sides and stages of the issue. By engaging in dialogue with migrants, faith leaders, workers, service providers, and law enforcement, we will attempt to humanize the issue and escape limiting stereotypes and misconceptions. The Jesuit values of interreligious understanding, faith and justice, community in diversity, and contemplation in action will guide our efforts to understand the motivations for migration, the experience of migration, and the challenges faced by migrants in the United States. Ultimately, KBI aims to facilitate a sustained commitment to education, activism, and solidarity with the migrant justice movement in our communities on the Hilltop, in DC, and around the country.

During our stay in and around Tucson, we will:

*Meet and live with families from San Miguel Cristo Rey High School, which serves many immigrant families in the economically depressed south side of Tucson
*Join the members of the Jesuit-run Kino Border Initiative as they serve migrants on the border
*Engage with various groups working with Migrants and Border related issues, including the Sierra Club
*Meet members of the border patrol and local law enforcement
*Visit with churches and faith-based communities committed to serving undocumented migrants at the border

Created in 2008, the Kino mission is to ‘break down barriers, provide direct assistance to migrants and dictate conditions for refugees with an annual budget of $700,000 per year but that does not include all chapters, other Catholic organizations or money from the Vatican.

And now for the Kino Border Initiative:

Based on both sides of the border in Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, KBI accompanies migrants to travel north to reach the United States. There was recently a dinner where a migrant named Sevilla shared his success story from Honduras to the United States merely escaping gang violence.

Sevilla first greeted the audience in broken English then recounted his journey in Spanish allowing a translator to fill in the gaps for those who needed it. He expressed gratitude for being able to leave Honduras and that God helped him on the journey through Mexico where he underwent “many nights without sleeping, many days without eating, but thanks to God everything turned out OK,” he said. He did encounter some volunteers who gave him food along the way, however.

Another hardship: a ride on the famous “Beast” train through Mexico due to the presence of the cartels in that country and having no other choice of transportation. Riding on this network of trains has proved to be very dangerous to migrants. When he arrived in Nogales, Sevilla said he was very dirty and “really tired,” breaking into English which evoked laughter from the audience and might also have released some tension.

“But I here, now,” said Sevilla, with the audience breaking into applause.

When in Nogales, Sevilla heard from a friend of the KBI dining room, called the “Comedor” and he went there very tired and hungry. “But they gave me hope, which was very important for me,” said Sevilla through the translator.

KBI assisted Sevilla in his process of seeking asylum in the United States with legal help, a bond payment and a sponsor family. He stated the KBI is not just a group in Mexico but “it’s all of you,” referring to the attendees. “Thank you for saving life,” said Sevilla in broken English and then in Spanish.

Lisa and David Grant were his “life savers.” They sponsored Sevilla, then 24, during his asylum process into the United States.

“He has been such a blessing to our lives. He’s really taught us a lot about, honestly our faith,” Lisa said.

She pointed out an example that when Sevilla won his asylum case to legally stay in the U.S., she said the he was so lucky. Sevilla dismissed the notion of luck, instead pointing upward.

Also during the evening, four members of the Missionary Sisters of the Eucharist were presented with the Pope Francis award from the organization, for their dedicated service to the people served by the initiative.

“I see what they’re carrying, I see what’s inside them. I see the fear that they’re experiencing as they flee,” reflected KBI’s executive director Jesuit Father Sean Carroll during the dinner. “I see the hunger and the thirst that they’ve experienced along the way. I see their uncertainty about what’s next about the asylum process, about whether they can find safety and support.

Fr. Fred Adamson, vicar general of the diocese, spoke of the human effort just to meet basic needs such as food, clothing and shelter.

“At the heart of it, the Kino Border Initiative is to be the face of Christ, to really be the compassion, the care, the love in a real way at the border,” said Fr. Adamson. More here.

Huge ICE Raid Nabs 280

Posted on April 4, 2019April 4, 2019 by Denise Simon

And the Democrats continue to say to the media that illegals dont take jobs Americans need, they only do the jobs Americans won’t do.

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Hat tip to those that called in tips and to HSI for doing lots of homework, for about a year prior to the raid. At issue are fake ID’s and hiring undocumented immigrants. This is another reason that all states/companies must use E-Verify.

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It goes like this:

U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement announced Wednesday that it had arrested some 280 individuals in an immigration enforcement sting in northern Texas, the largest such raid in at least a decade.

ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) arm executed criminal search warrants at the headquarters of CVE Technology Group Inc., a technology repair company located in the suburbs of Dallas, Texas. Officials told KERA News that the action was the largest worksite raid in the country in ten years.

The raid was prompted by several tips, provided to HSI, which indicated that CVE had been knowingly employing illegal immigrants, and that a number of its employees were using fraudulent documents for identification. In January, HSI audited CVE’s I-9 forms, which led to the unearthing of “numerous irregularities,” the press release explained.

“Businesses that knowingly hire illegal aliens create an unfair advantage over their competing businesses,” said Special Agent in Charge Katrina W. Berger, HSI Dallas. “In addition, they take jobs away from U.S. citizens and legal residents, and they create an atmosphere poised for exploiting their illegal workforce.”

CVE is a cellphone refurbisher. One employee, who spoke to KERA News, described the raid.

“Man, it was crazy,” employee Yessenia Ponce said. “We were working like a normal day. … We just heard screaming, you know, people screaming and stuff. We went out and an officer just said ‘follow my voice, follow my voice.'”

The raid on CVE was larger than the previous record holder for the decade, a worksite enforcement action against a trailer manufacturer also in northern Texas. That event led to the arrest of 159 illegal workers.

The largest raid in U.S. history, by way of comparison, took place in Postville, Iowa in 2008. That day, HSI officials arrested some 400 men, women, and teenagers, according to the Des Moines Register.

Border Patrol Collapsing, but 20,000 Caravan Forming Now

Posted on March 28, 2019March 28, 2019 by Denise Simon

Yes and that newest caravan is in Honduras now and it is estimated to be 20,000 strong. Caravans get largest as they move north. Border Patrol has sounded the alarm and so has DHS. Anyone left in Honduras?

Trump Threatens Honduras Foreign Aid Over - One News Page ...

By the way, the United States via all government agencies gave Honduras $180,977,214 in foreign aid in 2017. The money is designated for local governance, counter-narcotics programs, reading programs, treaties, violence prevention, human rights and the justice system…..ever wonder where Congress is on this or an Inspector General? (click that link, it is interactive)

‘Mother of all migrants’ caravans’ is forming up in Honduras: interior secretary

Numbers could go higher than 20,000

A massive cohort of prospective migrants dubbed the “mother of all caravans” is forming in Honduras, the federal interior secretary said today.

“We are aware that a new caravan is forming in Honduras that they’re calling the mother of all caravans . . . and which could be [made up of] more than 20,000 people,” Olga Sánchez Cordero said.

She didn’t offer any details about when the caravan might leave Honduras to start the journey towards Mexico and on to the United States’ southern border.

The interior secretary told reporters that migration and specifically the formation of the huge caravan was a central issue in talks she held yesterday with United States Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen in Miami, Florida.

Sánchez said Nielsen told her that United States authorities returned at least 76,000 migrants to their countries of origin in February and expect to deport more than 90,000 this month and a total of 900,000 by the end of the year.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) said in a statement that Nielsen and Sánchez “discussed ways the U.S. and Mexico can work together to address irregular migration and the record levels of illegal entries at the U.S. southern border.”

Thousands of migrants fleeing poverty and violence in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have entered Mexico at the southern border since late last year as part of several large caravans.

Despite the federal government issuing more than 10,000 humanitarian visas that allow migrants to live and work in Mexico for up to 12 months, most caravan members have chosen to travel to the United States border to seek asylum.

Yet another migrant caravan made up of around 2,500 Central Americans and Cubans is currently traveling through Chiapas after leaving Tapachula last weekend.

Caravan members walk long distances through Mexico in often hot conditions but also try to hitch rides to reach towns on the well-trodden migrant route more quickly.

Sánchez said today that there is evidence that criminal groups are transporting migrants from Tapachula to the northern border in trucks and charging each person thousands of dollars for the service.

Trump’s EO on Electromagnetic Pulses

Posted on March 27, 2019March 27, 2019 by Denise Simon

If government agencies are working this mission, shouldn’t Congress take up some measures too? Given this Executive Order, consider what motivated this action and consider all the measures you yourself should take.

Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has the potential to disrupt, degrade, and damage technology and critical infrastructure systems. Human-made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the Nation’s security and economic prosperity, and could adversely affect global commerce and stability. The Federal Government must foster sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective approaches to improving the Nation’s resilience to the effects of EMPs.

Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

(a) “Critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

(b) “Electromagnetic pulse” is a burst of electromagnetic energy. EMPs have the potential to negatively affect technology systems on Earth and in space. A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of human-made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated at approximately 40 kilometers or more above the surface of Earth. A geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a type of natural EMP driven by a temporary disturbance of Earth’s magnetic field resulting from interactions with solar eruptions. Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect large geographic areas.

(c) “National Critical Functions” means the functions of government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.

(d) “National Essential Functions” means the overarching responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the Nation before, during, and in the aftermath of a catastrophic emergency, such as an EMP that adversely affects the performance of Government.

(e) “Prepare” and “preparedness” mean the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. These terms include the prediction and notification of impending EMPs.

(f) A “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) is the Federal department or agency that is responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment. The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience).

Sec. 3. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to prepare for the effects of EMPs through targeted approaches that coordinate whole-of-government activities and encourage private-sector engagement. The Federal Government must provide warning of an impending EMP; protect against, respond to, and recover from the effects of an EMP through public and private engagement, planning, and investment; and prevent adversarial events through deterrence, defense, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. To achieve these goals, the Federal Government shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize research and development (R&D) to address the needs of critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for adversarial threats, consult Intelligence Community assessments.

(b) To implement the actions directed in this order, the Federal Government shall promote collaboration and facilitate information sharing, including the sharing of threat and vulnerability assessments, among executive departments and agencies (agencies), the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. The Federal Government shall also provide incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners to encourage innovation that strengthens critical infrastructure against the effects of EMPs through the development and implementation of best practices, regulations, and appropriate guidance.

Sec. 4. Coordination. (a) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), through National Security Council staff and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the development and implementation of executive branch actions to assess, prioritize, and manage the risks of EMPs. The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit a report to the President summarizing progress on the implementation of this order, identifying gaps in capability, and recommending how to address those gaps.

(b) To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare the Nation for the effects of EMPs, the Director of OSTP shall coordinate efforts of agencies through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually review and assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting preparedness activities for EMPs, consistent with this order.

Sec. 5. Roles and Responsibilities. (a) The Secretary of State shall:

(i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States allies and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to the effects of EMPs; and

(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and deterrence efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack on the United States or its allies and partners by limiting the availability of nuclear devices.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with United States allies, international partners, and private-sector entities as appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize, attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including effects on space systems of interest to the United States;

(ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission of the Department of Defense along with United States allies and international partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings for natural EMPs that may affect weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States;

(iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities to model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and develop technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful execution of Department of Defense missions;

(iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

(v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their potential effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

(vi) incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense planning scenarios; and

(vii) defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of the United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the mission and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

(c) The Secretary of the Interior shall support the research, development, deployment, and operation of capabilities that enhance understanding of variations of Earth’s magnetic field associated with EMPs.

(d) The Secretary of Commerce shall:

(i) provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection (b)(ii) of this section; and

(ii) use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously improve operational forecasting services and the development of standards for commercial EMP technology.

(e) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-stage R&D, develop pilot programs, and partner with other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, to characterize sources of EMPs and their couplings to the electric power grid and its subcomponents, understand associated potential failure modes for the energy sector, and coordinate preparedness and mitigation measures with energy sector partners.

(f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

(ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the results of risk assessments to better understand and enhance resilience to the effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure sectors, including coordinating the identification of national critical functions and the prioritization of associated critical infrastructure at greatest risk to the effects of EMPs;

(iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs;

(iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in preparedness scenarios and exercises;

(v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to better understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on national critical functions and associated critical infrastructure — excluding Department of Defense systems and infrastructure — and develop technologies and guidelines to enhance these functions and better protect this infrastructure;

(vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency information to the public during and after EMPs; and

(vii) in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered within 1 year of the date of this order.

(g) The Director of National Intelligence shall:

(i) coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as appropriate, of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries’ capabilities to conduct an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood of such an attack; and

(ii) provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the heads of relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk assessments on EMPs.

(h) The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall enhance and facilitate information sharing with private-sector counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance preparedness for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce vulnerabilities.

(i) The heads of all agencies that support National Essential Functions shall ensure that their allhazards preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs, including through mitigation, response, and recovery, as directed by national preparedness policy.

Sec. 6. Implementation. (a) Identifying national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

(i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other agencies as appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, including space-based assets that, if disrupted, could reasonably result in catastrophic national or regional effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list as necessary.

(ii) Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection (a)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall, using appropriate government and private-sector standards for EMPs, assess which identified critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets are most vulnerable to the effects of EMPs. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide this list to the President, through the APNSA. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list using the results produced pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and as necessary thereafter.

(b) Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall review test data — identifying any gaps in such data — regarding the effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets representative of those throughout the Nation.

(ii) Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data, as directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall use the sector partnership structure identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to develop an integrated cross-sector plan to address the identified gaps. The heads of agencies identified in the plan shall implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as appropriate.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary, quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form that is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(iv) Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous United States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators conduct EMP vulnerability assessments.

(i) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the Director of OSTP, the heads of other appropriate agencies, and private-sector partners as appropriate, shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, a report that analyzes the technology options available to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure to the effects of EMPs. The Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security shall also identify gaps in available technologies and opportunities for future technological developments to inform R&D activities.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and in consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop and implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering approaches for mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified in subsection (a)(ii) of this section.

(iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, and in consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility commissions and other stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non regulatory mechanisms, including cost recovery measures, that can enhance private-sector engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

(d) Strengthening critical infrastructure to withstand the effects of EMPs.

(i) Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate agencies and with the private sector as appropriate, shall develop a plan to mitigate the effects of EMPs on the vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets identified under subsection (a)(ii) of this section. The plan shall align with and build on actions identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall implement those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete its implementation. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update the plan as necessary based on results from the actions directed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the actions identified in subsection (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Energy, shall conduct a pilot test to evaluate engineering approaches used to harden a strategic military installation, including infrastructure that is critical to supporting that installation, against the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of completing the pilot test described in subsection (d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Defense shall report to the President, through the APNSA, regarding the cost and effectiveness of the evaluated approaches.

(e) Improving response to EMPs.

(i) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the heads of appropriate SSAs, shall review and update Federal response plans, programs, and procedures to account for the effects of EMPs.

(ii) Within 180 days of the completion of actions directed by subsection (e)(i) of this section, agencies that support National Essential Functions shall update operational plans documenting their procedures and responsibilities to prepare for, protect against, and mitigate the effects of EMPs.

(iii) Within 180 days of identifying vulnerable priority critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets as directed by subsection (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall provide the Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Director of OSTP with an assessment of the effects of EMPs on critical communications infrastructure, and recommend changes to operational plans to enhance national response and recovery efforts after an EMP.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 26, 2019.