ISIS in Latin America, Terror Funding Operations

Islamists population report, including those in Cuba is found here. Latin America has a long history of nefarious connections starting with those in support of Nazis and harboring many that fled to the region after the fall of the Third Reich. There is Paraguay, then Argentina and Chile, even Brazil.

Now we have the modern day threat of militant Islam as a neighbor.

 Wisc.edu

 Jamaica

 Buenos Aires

 El Paso

Spanish Military Report: Islamic Terrorists Operate, Raise Cash in Latin America to Attack U.S.

JW: Latin America is a hotbed of Islamic terrorism where groups like ISIS and Hezbollah operate freely and raise large sums of money to finance terrorist activities in other countries, mainly the United States, according to a new report released by Spain’s Defense Ministry. “Latin America represents an important region for Islamic radicalism because conditions enable the free, almost undetectable, movement of their members throughout the region,” the defense document states.

Governments in the region consider Islamic terrorism to be a foreign problem, the report says, and intelligence agencies are ill equipped to handle the threat they represent. “The ignorance involving the threat of jihadist terrorism in Latin America has been such that some governments have refused to cooperate with U.S. authorities and other intelligence services,” the disturbing assessment reveals. The report was released this month by the division of Spain’s Defense agency known as Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE), Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies. The document, authored by a counterterrorism expert, is titled “El radicalismo islámico en América Latina. De Hezbolá al Daesh (Estado Islámico),” Islamic Radicalism in Latin America, from Hezbollah to ISIS.

The Lebanese group Hezbollah is identified as having the largest fundraising operations in the region, though others, such as ISIS, are also prominent. The terrorist organizations have teamed up with established drug trafficking conglomerates to raise and launder large quantities of cash. The report identifies a group called El clan Barakat in Paraguay and Joumaa in Colombia as two examples of drug trafficking enterprises that have long worked with Islamic jihadists to launder money. Spain’s military experts refer to the relationships as a “marriage of convenience” between Latin American organized crime and Muslim terrorists with different objectives and interests. “Each takes advantage of the benefits that the relationship provides,” the report states.

ISIS is expanding quickly in Latin America, the report warns, revealing that around 100 individuals from the region’s large Muslim community have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups recently. Argentina and Brazil have the largest Muslim populations in Latin America with more than 1 million each, the report says. Venezuela, Mexico, Peru and Chile also have large and rapidly growing Muslim populations. Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean islands on the northern edge of Latin America, are identified as “especially worrisome” because local authorities reported that 70 of their citizens traveled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. Additionally, nine of the islands’ citizens were detained in Turkey attempting to cross the border into Syria. The report cites a 2012 article in a military publication from Trinidad that compares the growth of radical Islam in the country to a group of violent Muslims that tried to overthrow the government in 1990.

The strong connection between Islamic terrorists and Latin America has been developing for years and Judicial Watch has reported it extensively, especially when it comes to Mexico. With a dangerously porous southern border, the collaboration between Muslim terrorists and Mexican drug cartels has created a critical threat to the United States. Last year Judicial Watch reported that ISIS is operating a camp just a few miles from El Paso, Texas, in an area known as “Anapra” situated just west of Ciudad Juárez in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. Judicial Watch also broke a story about Mexican drug cartels smuggling foreigners from countries with terrorist links into a small Texas rural town near El Paso. The foreigners are classified as Special Interest Aliens (SIA) by the U.S. government and they are being transported to stash areas in Acala, a rural crossroads located around 54 miles from El Paso on a state road—Highway 20.

Earlier this year Judicial Watch uncovered State Department records confirming that “Arab extremists” are entering the U.S. through Mexico with the assistance of smuggling network “cells.” Among them is a top Al Qaeda operative wanted by the FBI. The government documents also reveal that some Mexican smuggling networks actually specialize in providing logistical support for Arab individuals attempting to enter the United States. The top Al Qaeda leader in Mexico was identified in the State Department records, via a September 2004 cable from the American consulate in Ciudad Juárez, as Adnan G. El Shurkrjumah. In December, 2014 Shukrijumah was killed by the Pakistan Army in an intelligence-borne operation in South Waziristan. But before he died Shukrijumah helped plan several U.S. attacks, including plots to bomb Oprah Winfrey’s studio and detonate nuclear devices in multiple American cities. For years Shukrijumah appeared on the FBI’s most wanted list and, despite being sought by the agency, he crossed back and forth into the U.S. from Mexico to meet fellow militant Islamists in Texas. Back in 2014 Judicial Watch reported that, as one of the world’s most wanted terrorists, Shukrijumah piloted an aircraft into the Cielo Dorado airfield in Anthony, New Mexico.

Obama Terminates NSEERS

CAIR is delighted with this Obama decision and so is the New York Attorney General. Essentially, this is removing many of the national security tools used to secure the homeland. It is not only about tracking Arab or Muslim men. How about foreign national spies?

Obama gets rid of visitor registry before Trump takes over

TheHill: The Obama administration is abolishing a national registry program created to track visitors from countries with active terrorist groups, a move likely intended to send a strong message to Donald Trump just weeks before he takes office, the New York Times reports.

The registry, officially called the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, was created after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but has not been in use since 2011.

President-elect Trump has suggested he was open to reviving the program and has even floated a wider national registry of all Muslims and potentially barring people from countries with a history of Islamist extremism from entering the country.

The Department of Homeland Security submitted a rule change for dismantling of the program, writing that it no longer helps security. The changes will take effect Friday.

“D.H.S. ceased use of NSEERS more than five years ago, after it was determined the program was redundant, inefficient and provided no increase in security,” Neema Hakim, a spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security, said in a statement.

Hakim said the program diverts personnel and resources from other areas that are more effective.

Civil liberties groups have long criticized the program.

The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee praised the move, calling the registry a “failed program rooted in discriminatory profiling.”

In a statement, the group said it has worked “tirelessly” in pushing DHS to dismantle the program.

“This is the right decision by [Homeland] Secretary [Jeh] Johnson. We commend him, and the Obama administration, for letting it be known that such registry programs are futile and have no place in our country,” said Abed Ayoub, the group’s legal and policy director.

“However the community cannot be at ease; the next administration has indicated that they will consider implementing similar programs. We will work twice as hard to protect our community and ensure such programs do not come to fruition.”

Kris Kobach, Kansas’s secretary of state and a member of Trump’s transition team, was photographed with a document recommending reintroducing the visitor registry program in the first year of Trump’s presidency.

“All aliens from high-risk areas are tracked,” the document said.

Trump has waffled on whether his administration would create a broader so-called Muslim registry, and he faced new questions about the proposal this week after the attack in Berlin.

Asked by reporters if he intends to set up a registry, he said: “You know my plans,” adding, “All along, I’ve been proven to be right, 100 percent correct.”

****

This site posted a summary on this database a month ago.

It is called NSEERS.

There is an entry and exit program managed by the Department of Homeland Security….well they maintain it but don’t use it to remove people…but it does exist to the point of a backlog of 1.6 million and it actually a Visa Overstay system.

Thank you GW Bush, as NSEERS was launched in 2002 and used to collect names, backgrounds and locations of people that were inside the United States that would pose a threat and cause additional harm to the homeland. The Bush administration earnestly applied all elements of this program and performed thousands of deportations as well as criminal investigations on violators or those connected to nefarious groups and organization. By the end of the calendar year 2002, 3,995 wanted criminals had been arrested attempting to cross into the United States. 

The 9/11 Commission Report dedicated an entire chapter to immigration and the flaws. Many of the hijackers were in the United States illegally. Okay, then the 9/11 Commission also made stout recommendations of which everyone in Congress agreed to and signed. Then a few years later, those agreements began to fall apart on the Democrat side and continue to be forgotten today.

Chinese Spy Caught Stealing Military Documents

If you don’t think that our country is full of foreign spies and operatives engaged in industrial espionage, perhaps this case will change your mind. One has to ask why foreign nationals are employed by domestic corporations that are government contractors in the first place.

Long Yu Criminal Complaint

Related reading: Russian Spies and Espionage in NATO and USA

Chinese National Admits to Stealing Sensitive Military Program Documents from United Technologies

Yu Long, 38, a citizen of China and lawful permanent resident of the U.S., waived his right to be indicted and pleaded guilty today in New Haven federal court to charges related to his theft of numerous sensitive military program documents from United Technologies and transporting them to China.

The announcement was made by Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security Mary B. McCord, U.S. Attorney Deirdre M. Daly of the District of Connecticut, Special Agent in Charge Patricia M. Ferrick of the New Haven Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Agent in Charge Matthew Etre of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in Boston, Special Agent in Charge Craig W. Rupert of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Northeast Field Office, and Special Agent in Charge Danielle Angley of the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations.

“Long admitted to stealing and exploiting highly sensitive military technology and documents, knowing his theft would benefit China’s defense industry and deliberately contravene the embargo on U.S. Munitions List technology the United States has imposed on China,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General McCord. “Export laws exist as an important part of our national security framework and disrupting and prosecuting this kind of economic espionage is one of the National Security Division’s highest priorities.”

“In an effort to further his own career, this defendant stole an extraordinary amount of proprietary military program information from United Technologies and transported much of that stolen information to China,” said U.S. Attorney Deirdre M. Daly.  “His actions, which he knew would benefit China, not only violated his employment agreement and damaged the company, but have threatened our country’s national security interests.  U.S. companies continue to be targeted by those who seek to steal intellectual property, trade secrets and advanced defense technology – whether through a computer hack or cyber intrusion, or through a rogue employee.  Working closely with our nation’s defense contractors, we will relentlessly investigate and prosecute those who steal, or attempt to steal, trade secrets and sensitive military information, whether for their own personal gain or for the benefit of foreign actors.”

“This case highlights the complexity in which the FBI and law enforcement are being challenged to keep the integrity of our industry intellectual property intact,” said Patricia M. Ferrick, Special Agent in Charge of the New Haven Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  “Investigating criminal activity of this nature will continue to be a priority.”

“These sophisticated technologies are highly sought after by our adversaries,” said Special Agent in Charge Matthew Etre of HSI Boston.  “They were developed to give the United States and its allies a distinct military advantage, which is why HSI and our law enforcement partners will continue to aggressively target the individuals who steal the ideas of others and sell these items.”

“Today’s plea demonstrates the commitment of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and our federal law enforcement partners to identifying those who illegally export sensitive defense information to adversarial Foreign governments,” said Craig W. Rupert, Special Agent in Charge, DCIS, Northeast Field Office.  “DCIS will continue to safeguard sensitive technology and to shield America’s investment in national defense by disrupting efforts of groups and individuals who try to illegally acquire our national security assets.”

“This case was enabled by the outstanding teamwork of the FBI, DCIS, HSI, AFOSI and the U.S. Attorney’s office,” said Danielle Angley, Special Agent-in-Charge with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.  “In addition, it demonstrates the focus of law enforcement agencies to protect our nation’s critical resources.”

According to court documents and statements made in court, from approximately May 2008 to May 2014, Long worked as a Senior Engineer/Scientist at United Technologies Research Center (UTRC) in Connecticut. Long’s employment at UTRC included work on F119 and F135 engines. The F119 engine is employed by the U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft, and the F135 engine is employed by the U.S. Air Force F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft.

Beginning in 2013, Long expressed his intent to individuals outside UTRC to return to China to work on research projects at certain state-run universities in China using knowledge and materials he had acquired while employed at the UTRC. To that end, Long interacted with several state-run institutions in China, including the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and the Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA), a state-run university in China affiliated with CAS.

During 2013 and 2014, Long was recruited by SIA and other state-run universities, during which he leveraged information that he had obtained while working at UTRC to seek employment in China, culminating in his travel to China in the possession of voluminous documents and data containing highly sensitive intellectual property, trade secrets and export controlled technology, which he had unlawfully stolen from UTRC.

In December 2013, after Long agreed in principle to join SIA, an SIA-CAS Director and an SIA-CAS Recruiter asked Long to provide documents from his work at UTRC and examples of projects on which he had worked to substantiate the claims Long made in his application, and interview with SIA.  Long agreed.

On Dec. 24, 2013, Long emailed several documents to the SIA-CAS Director, including a document that contained the cover page of an export controlled UTRC presentation on Distortion Modeling dated Sept. 30, 2011.

While negotiating with SIA, Long also continued to explore other opportunities at other state-run institutions in China. In one email, Long stated: “I have made my mind to return to China, so have prepared a research plan based on my industry experience and current projects.” In the research plan, Long stated: “In the past five years, I have been working with Pratt Whitney, also other UTC business units, like UTAS (including Hamilton Sundstrand and Goodrich), Sikorsky, CCS (including Carrier and Fire & Security), and Otis. These unique working experiences have provided me a great starting point to perform R&D and further spin off business in China. I believe my efforts will help China to mature its own aircraft engines.”

On May 30, 2014, Long left UTRC. In June 2014, Long traveled to China and began working for SIA. Beginning in July 2014, digital evidence and forensic analysis indicated that Long brought with him and accessed in China a UTRC external hard drive that had been issued to him and that he unlawfully retained.

In July 2014, Long was listed as the project leader on a lengthy research plan for CAS involving fourteen other individuals.  The plan was replete with references to how the proposed research and development would benefit China. The plan stated: “The three major engine companies in the world, i.e. GE, Pratt & Whitney in the US and Rolls-Royce in the UK, are all using this technology. . . Our nation lacks the ability to process high performance components, such as airplane wings, tail hooks on carrier aircrafts, and blisks . . . Because of the technology embargo imposed by western developed countries, it is very difficult for us to obtain more advanced design and manufacturing technology . . . This research project will increase our independent ability, efficiency and quality in key component manufacturing.”

On or about Aug. 12, 2014, the Document on Distortion Modeling – the same document from which Long had sent the cover page to the SIA-CAS Director on Dec. 24, 2013 – was accessed on the external hard drive. Travel records and forensic analysis confirmed that both Long and the external hard drive were in China when this file was accessed.

On Aug. 19, 2014, Long returned to the U.S. from China through John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. During a secondary inspection screening by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, Long was found in the possession of a largely completed application for work with a state-controlled aviation and aerospace research center in China. The application highlighted certain parts of Long’s work related to the F119 and F135 engines while at UTRC.

On or about Aug. 20, 2014, Long emailed an individual at a university in China, attaching an updated “achievement and future plan.” In the plan, Long discussed his work related to the F119 and F135 U.S. military fighter jet engines and stated that he also had knowledge of unpublished UTRC projects in which the U.S. Air Force had shown interest.

On Nov. 5, 2014, Long boarded a flight from Ithaca, New York to Newark Liberty International Airport in Newark, New Jersey, with a final destination of China. During Long’s layover in Newark, CBP officers inspected Long’s checked baggage and discovered that it contained sensitive, proprietary and export controlled documents from another defense contractor, Rolls Royce.

Further investigation determined that the U.S. Air Force had convened a consortium of major defense contractors, including Pratt and Rolls Royce, to work together to see whether they could collectively lower the costs of certain metals used. As part of those efforts, members of the consortium shared technical data, subject to restrictions on further dissemination. Rolls Royce reviewed the documents found in Long’s possession at Newark Liberty Airport and confirmed that it provided the documents to members of the consortium, which included Pratt. Rolls Royce further confirmed that Long was never an employee of Rolls Royce. A review of UTRC computer records indicated that Long had printed the documents while employed at UTRC.

Long was arrested on a federal criminal complaint on Nov. 7, 2014. A review of Long’s digital media seized at the time of his arrest revealed voluminous files protected by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations, and voluminous files proprietary to various U.S. companies. In short, the investigation revealed that Long took his laptop and the UTRC external hard drive with him to China in 2014, at which time there was a substantial body of highly sensitive, proprietary and export controlled materials present on that digital media. UTRC has confirmed that the hard drive that Long unlawfully retained and accessed in China contained not only documents and data from projects on which Long worked while employed at the company, but also from projects on which he did not work to which he would have had access.

Long pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to engage in the theft of trade secrets knowing that the offense would benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality or foreign agent, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years. He also pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful export and attempted export of defense articles from the U.S. in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years.

Long, who has been detained since his arrest, will be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Robert N. Chatigny in Hartford.  A sentencing date has not been scheduled.

This investigation is being led by the FBI in New Haven in coordination with Homeland Security Investigations in New Haven and Newark; the Defense Criminal Investigative Service in New Haven; the U.S. Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations in Boston, Massachusetts; and, the Department of Commerce’s Boston Office of Export Enforcement. U.S. Attorney Daly and Acting Assistant Attorney General McCord also thanked the FBI in Newark, Ithaca and Syracuse, New York, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service in New York and Newark, and the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Northern District of New York and the District of New Jersey, for their efforts and assistance in this matter.

This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Tracy Lee Dayton and Stephen B. Reynolds of the District of Connecticut, and Trial Attorneys Brian Fleming and Julie Edelstein of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.

Known Wolves: Belgium is Molenbeek, Germany is North Rhine-Westphalia

The default position is always there is an intelligence gap when it comes to tracking militants and jihad networks. The blame is never placed on local or state politicians that lack the will to enforce laws and take a harder stance protecting their own communities due to grace, generosity and political correctness.

Such is the case in London, Paris, Berlin and not the least, Brussels.

BBC: The Tunisian man wanted for the Berlin lorry attack which killed 12 people and injured 49 had been under surveillance earlier this year, media reports say.

Anis Amri, 23, was reportedly monitored on suspicion of planning a robbery in order to pay for guns but surveillance was lifted for lack of evidence.

Before entering Germany, he served four years for arson in Italy and faced a jail sentence in absentia in Tunisia.

The failed asylum seeker is now the subject of a manhunt across Europe.

***

So, what is known about the militant networks in Germany and what is being overlooked by Chancellor Merkel? What is of note is it appears the majority of these known wolves are foreign nationals. Contrary to what Barack Obama’s position is, capture, detention and interrogations do work as long as the gathered intelligence is applied and laws are both robust and followed.

Security officials are concerned Germany is increasingly in the crosshairs of the Islamic State. German Islamic State recruits interrogated on their return home have made clear the group is seeking to launch attacks on German soil, but their testimonies suggest it has proven difficult for the group to enlist German nationals and residents to hit their home country. German officials are concerned the group is trying to exploit migrant flows to infiltrate non-European operatives into Germany, but so far there is little evidence of such operatives being involved in attack plans on German soil. 

When Harry Sarfo arrived in Bremen on a Turkish Airlines flight from Izmir on July 20, 2015, the police were already waiting to arrest him. The son of Ghanaian immigrants who grew up in the Bremen neighborhood of Osterholz-Tenever, Sarfo had left Germany three months earlier. He had traveled through Bulgaria and Romania and then to Turkey, where he crossed into Syria and joined the Islamic State.

Back in Germany, Sarfo refused at first to talk to investigators about his time in Syria. Then, in October, he finally agreed to tell his story. He was visited three times in prison by the German domestic intelligence agency, the Verfassungsschutz.[a] The transcript of the interrogations and several court documents, reviewed by the author, fill several hundred pages.

Sarfo recalled in detail how he was registered as an Islamic State fighter at a safe house of the terrorist group in the city of Tal Abyad in northern Syria.[b] By his own account, he was then sent to Raqqa where he received the usual four-week, military-style training on AK-47 and various other weapons, which was followed by a “special course” training at a camp near At-Thawra and on an island in the Euphrates River.[1] The main goal of this training, which included swimming and diving courses as well as camouflaging exercises, was to prepare to serve in a special Islamic State unit tasked to support fighting forces in “difficult terrain” like Kobane.

Sarfo described how he was then sent on missions in Syria and Iraq and even witnessed executions of captured Assad soldiers in the ancient city of Palmyra. He also appeared in an Islamic State propaganda video carrying the flag of the terrorist group before he was diagnosed with hepatitis and allegedly fled the so-called caliphate after hospital treatment, crossed into Turkey, and returned to Germany.[2]

What most worried the Verfassungsschutz agents was what Sarfo told them happened on the second day he was in Syria. A black SUV stopped next to him, he said. Masked French fighters from the Islamic State’s internal security service Amniyat approached him and asked him if he would be willing to carry out an attack in Europe. Sarfo refused, he told the interrogators. “They wanted to know if I knew anyone in Germany who would be willing to carry out an attack. I also declined.”[3] The previous German recruits tasked with carrying out attacks “had gotten cold feet,”[4] the Islamic State members told him. Now there was a lack of willing candidates from among the German Islamic State contingent, but there were many Frenchmen and Belgians committed to attack, they said.

One month after Sarfo told the intelligence agency about the Islamic State’s plans for Europe attacks, Islamic State operatives did indeed strike at the heart of the continent. A terrorist cell led by Belgian Abdelhamid Abaaoud killed 130 people in Paris. Carnage had come to the streets of Europe—planned in Syria and organized by terrorists who had been able to build up a sophisticated network of support.

In Germany the security agencies watched with great concern the attack in Paris. The question immediately arose—how big is the Islamic State threat to Germany? Were there any Islamic State terrorists in the country ready to strike? What was the role of German jihadis within the terrorist organization? Was there a terrorist cell on its way to Germany?[5] This article examines the Islamic State threat to Germany by drawing on hundreds of pages of interrogation reports and court documents, German government studies on German foreign fighters, and interviews with German counterterrorism officials.

Target: Germany 
According to security officials, Germany is in the crosshairs of the Islamic State, even though the country is not involved in the bombing campaign against terrorist targets in Syria and Iraq. This has been evidenced by several propaganda videos calling for attacks in Germany and even threatening Chancellor Angela Merkel. Numerous German militants have been trained in terrorist camps of the so-called caliphate.[6]

Around 820 Islamists from Germany have traveled to Syria and Iraq in recent years. Most of them have joined the Islamic State. At least 140 are said to have been killed; about 14 of them carried out suicide bombings. Of those who went to the war zone around a third have already returned to Germany, with some in custody while others are under intense surveillance.[7]

The German Federal Police (Bundeskriminalamt BKA) has analyzed the biography of 677 of these jihadist travelers.[8] The results show that 79 percent of those who traveled to Syria and Iraq were males and 21 percent female. The youngest traveler was 15 years old, the oldest was 62. The vast majority were between 22 and 25 years old. Sixty-one percent of the jihadis were born in Germany, 6 percent in Turkey, 5 percent in Syria, 5 percent in Russia, and 3 percent in Afghanistan. In total, 64 percent had German citizenship, followed by Turkish, Moroccan, Russian, Syrian, Tunisian, and Afghan nationality. One-hundred and nineteen of the 677 jihadis analyzed by the BKA were converts to Islam. All except 22 were seen as followers of salafism. Two out of three jihadist travelers had ties to known Islamist extremists. Before their departure, many took part in salafist missionary work like the nationwide Qur’an distribution campaign entitled “Lies!” (read).

The Germans of the Islamic State 
Of those jihadis who have returned from Syria and Iraq, only a few have been willing to speak about their time with the Islamic State.[9] Nevertheless, over the years, more and more information about the role of German jihadis within the Islamic State has been accumulated, and some of this was revealed during the first trials of returnees from Syria. It became clear that Germans have served in the Islamic State’s media wing, in its internal intelligence agency, and even in special forces groups tasked to carry out difficult missions.

German intelligence now knows of “German villages” in northern Syria, towns or neighborhoods where foreign fighters and their families have settled. Some of them were located near the cities of al-Bab, others in Minbij or Jarabulus.[10] Investigations also uncovered that many former members of the salafist group “Millatu Ibrahim,” which was banned by the German interior ministry in 2012, ended up with the Islamic State. Their number included former rap musician Denis Cuspert (“Deso Dogg”), who took on the jihadist name “Abu Talha al-Almani,” Michael Noack from Gladbeck, and Silvio Koblitz from Essen.[11]

Reda Seyam, a German-Egyptian labeled by some investigators as a “veteran of jihad,” is most likely the highest-ranking German member of the Islamic State.[12] He was present in Bosnia during the civil war there and later was arrested in Indonesia where he was suspected of having played a key role in the al-Qa`ida Bali nightclub bombing in October 2002. Later, Seyam was sent back to Germany and became an influential figure within the salafist community before he left for Syria.

Today, Seyam is said to be the “emir for education” in the “Wilayat Nineveh,” the Islamic State governance in northern Iraq where he allegedly is responsible for “education reform” in the region.[13] Also known as “Dhul al-Qarnain,” Seyam has appeared in propaganda videos (titled “Education in the Shadows of the Caliphate”) and in pictures taken inside Islamic State-occupied Mosul University.[14]

While most German jihadis seem to play a rather low-level role in the organization, serving as guards and supplying fighters with food, weapons, and ammunition, a few apparently took up the position as “commanders.”[15] One of them is a German convert to Islam named Konrad Schmitz (kunya: Abdulwahid al-Almani) who was known as “Konny” back in his hometown of Mönchengladbach and is allegedly still operating with the Islamic State. According to the account of an Islamic State defector, he served as the “emir” of a German Islamic State brigade.[16]

Another German Islamic State member, Samy W. from Walshut-Tiengen,[17] ended up with the Islamic State’s “Anwar al-Awlaki Brigade,”[18] a unit of English-speaking foreign fighters,[19] some of whom are allegedly tasked to plan operations in Europe and North America.[20]

At least two jihadis from Germany worked in the media sector of the Islamic State, translating statements, video files, and audio tapes. One of them, Usman Altaf (kunya: Abu Jandal al-Almani), was a salafi of Pakistani origin from the city of Mannheim. The Islamic State hailed his death in Iraq with a poem that described him as an important figure in propaganda work.[21] The other, Christian Emde, is a convert to Islam from Solingen and is described by German intelligence as an important recruiter responsible for media work who communicated with salafis in Germany via WhatsApp chat groups.[22] He was even interviewed on camera in Mosul by German journalist Jürgen Todenhöfer, who was allowed to travel through Islamic State territory to shoot a documentary.

According to intelligence sources, numerous Islamic State jihadis from Germany have taken part in active fighting in Syria or Iraq.[23] Most have done this as “foot soldiers” or suicide bombers. Others served as guards in Islamic State prisons or questioned newly arrived recruits. The German Federal Prosecution Office (Bundesanwaltschaft) has also started investigations against some foreign fighters for crimes beyond joining a terrorist group or attending a terrorist training camp. Some like German-Algerian Fared Saal (kunya: Abu Luqman al-Almani) from Bonn are being investigated for war crimes and crimes against humanity.[24]

But only one German Islamic State recruit has ever appeared on camera committing an execution. Yamin Abou-Zand, aka “Abu Omar al-Almani” from Königswinter and a former employee at the Telekom company, is seen in a Wilayat Hims clip entitled “Der Tourismus dieser Ummah” (“The Tourism of this Ummah”) next to Austrian Islamic State recruit Mohamed Mahmoud (kunya: Abu Usamah al-Gharib) shooting two alleged Syrian soldiers in Palmyra. In the video, released in August 2015, Abou-Zand also called on Muslims in Germany to join the Islamic State or carry out terrorist attacks in their homeland.[25]

Just a few days after the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015, Nils Donath,[26] a former Islamic State member from Dinslaken in North Rhine-Westphalia, was arrested by German police.[c] After he came back from Syria, Donath had been under constant surveillance. His car had been wiretapped, and police were listening when he told a friend that while in Syria he had been part of an Islamic State unit responsible for hunting down, torturing, and executing alleged spies and traitors. During around 40 interrogations, Donath, who had been an Islamic State member from October 2013 to November 2014 and whose cousin had carried out a suicide bombing for the group, outlined how he had joined the Amniyat, which the prosecution described as the Sturmtrupp or “Gestapo of the IS.”[27] He had been given a car, a special permit to travel around Islamic State territory, an AK-47, and a golden Browning pistol.[28]

Donath told interrogators not only about horrific torture methods and public executions by the Islamic State but also that foreign fighters have the option of enlisting themselves for “external operations,” meaning terrorist attacks in Europe or North America.[29] And he claimed that he met Belgian and French jihadis, including Abaaoud.[30]

Donath’s account and those of Harry Sarfo and other Islamic State defectors create a threat picture that remains very concerning to German security services, one in which the Islamic State is apparently working extensively on trying to set in motion attacks in the West, including Germany.[31] “They want something that happens on several locations simultaneously,” Sarfo stated during his interrogation.[32]

After the Paris attacks in November 2015, German counterterrorism officials wanted to find out if there were any connections between the cell commanded by Abaaoud and German jihadis or if there were any helpers or supporters in Germany. They looked particularly at the situation in Syria itself. Was there any information about a Belgian-French-German connection?

The BKA came to the conclusion that German jihadis, especially a group of salafis from Lohberg (District of Dinslaken in Northrhine-Westphalia) that became known as the “Lohberger Brigade,” had most likely befriended several Belgians and French terrorists.[33] They even shared housing—at least for some time in 2013 and 2014—in the Syrian villages of Kafr Hamra or Azaz.[34] Pictures obtained by German intelligence show French jihadi Salahuddin Ghaitun alongside Hassan Diler, a  Turkish national from Dinslaken, and David Gäble, a convert from Kempten. One picture most likely taken in Raqqa even shows Abaaoud next to Hüseyn Diler, Hassan’s 43-year-old brother, also from Dinslaken.[35] Despite these linkages, German security officials have found it difficult to ascertain whether jihadis from Germany were also involved in terrorist plots. Nevertheless, Hüseyn Diler was put on a most wanted list.[36]

Flade photo
Hüseyn Diler, an Islamic State recruit from North Rhine-Westphalia (right), with Paris attack team leader Abdelhamid Abaaoud in Syria in 2015. (Retrieved by Guy Van Vlierden from Islamic State social media)

Infiltration by Foreign Operatives 
While it seems the Islamic State has not been able to successfully recruit German nationals or jihadis from Germany to carry out attacks in Europe, the security services are on high alert regarding another potential threat—non-European terrorists being smuggled into Europe hidden among refugees, a tactic already used by the Islamic State in the Paris attacks. With hundreds of thousands of refugees coming to Germany from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and other regions since 2015, the concern is that the Islamic State might have already moved terrorists into the country. The BKA has received hundreds of tips regarding possible jihadis hiding in refugee shelters in Germany. In a few cases, arrests have been made. In Brandenburg and North Rhine-Westphalia, two terror suspects, Syrian Shaas E. M.[37] and Tajik national Mukhamadsaid S.,[38] were arrested in recent months. In another case, Farid A., an Algerian Islamic State member, lied when he applied for asylum. He pretended to be a Syrian refugee and was living in a shelter in Attendorn. Pictures allegedly taken in Syria and obtained by German police show him in military gear holding weapons.[39]

Another possible case of an Islamic State operative smuggled into Germany is that of 20-year-old Algerian Bilal C., who was arrested in Aachen in April for petty crimes. While in custody, German security services received information that he had been a member of Islamic State before he came to Germany as a refugee in the summer of 2015. Further investigation revealed that Bilal C. had scouted the Balkan route and other ways of entering Europe and had been tasked with that mission by Abaaoud. Bilal C. allegedly also helped Thalys train attacker Ayoub el-Khazzani secretly enter Europe.[40]

In February, a Syrian refugee named Saleh A. traveled from Düsseldorf to Paris and walked into a police station. There he told investigators about an Islamic State terror plot to carry out attacks in Düsseldorf using suicide bombers and assault rifles. Saleh A. said he had been tasked by the Islamic State leadership in Raqqa to form a terror cell. While being questioned by French police, he named three co-conspirators living as refugees in Germany.[41] After several months of investigation, German prosecution decided to move in. The three Syrians that Saleh A. had named were arrested in June.[42] Despite the case attracting significant global media attention, there is no proof of any real terrorist plot. No weapons or explosives were found, and no charges have been filed yet. German security sources say the case could very likely turn out to be a false alarm.[43]

Islamic State-Inspired Attacks 
Even though the Islamic State has set its sights on Germany as a potential target, the terrorist group has not been able to cary out a sophisticated attack in the country. German security officials meanwhile see a high-threat level for the country, especially coming from lone attackers inspired or motivated by the Islamic State. Such cases already exist. In February, 15-year-old Safia S. attacked a policeman at the main train station in Hanover with a kitchen knife. Prior to the attack, the teenage girl had traveled to Turkey possibly to cross into Syria and join the Islamic State. The general prosecutor has labeled the knife attack a “terrorist act” and has confirmed that Safia S. had been in contact with people close to Islamic State.[44] Just two months later, two 16-year-old salafis, Yusuf T. and Mohamed B., attacked a Sikh temple in Essen using a homemade explosive device they had built. Both had been active members of a WhatsApp chat group named “Ansaar Al Khalifat Al Islamiyya” in which at least a dozen young salafis of Turkish-German origin communicated about jihadism.

And on July 18, a 17-year-old refugee named Riaz Khan Ahmadzai, who allegedly was born in Afghanistan, carried out an attack on a train near Würzburg in Bavaria, Southern Germany. Ahmadzai attacked train passengers, including a group of Chinese tourists with a cleaver and a knife, seriously injuring at least four people. After the train was stopped, he left the wagon and attacked a nearby woman walking her dog. The victim was also seriously wounded. The attacker was finally shot by the police.[45] Only a few hours after his attack, the Islamic State-linked Amaq Agency released a video message Ahmadzai had recorded in Pashto in which he said he wanted to carry out a martyrdom operation on behalf of the Islamic State and threatened that “IS will attack you anywhere.” Police later found a hand-written farewell letter to his father and a drawing of an Islamic State flag.[46] On July 24, Germany suffered its first ever jihadist suicide bombing. In the Bavarian town of Ansbach, 27-year-old Syrian refugee Mohammad Daleel detonated a homemade bomb close to a music festival. Fifteen people were injured in the attack. In a video message later released by Islamic State-linked Amaq news agency, Daleel said he was renewing his pledge of allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and wanted to carry out a “martyrdom operation in Ansbach” as revenge for the killing of Muslims by Germans.[47]

Conclusion 
Whether the source is a lone attacker such as Ahmadzai or Safia S. or a potential large-scale plot, the terrorist threat to Germany remains high. Hans-Georg Maassen, head of Verfassungsschutz, said in May that the threat is “higher than it ever was” with around 260 Islamic State fighters who have returned to Germany and around 90 radical mosques under surveillance.[48] According to German security sources, Islamic State operatives in Syria and Iraq are increasingly reaching out directly to supporters in Germany and Europe to urge them to carry out attacks.[49] It is possible this is because the Islamic State is finding it more difficult to send operatives back to Western Europe after governments there took steps to seal off the Turkey-Greece-Balkan migrant corridor, sharply reducing travel flows and making it more difficult for Islamic State operatives to pose as Syrian refugees.[50]

As jihadist defectors Donath and Sarfo told police and intelligence services, the Islamic State is probably still on the lookout for German terrorist recruits. The Bundeswehr deployment to northern Iraq, the training and support for Kurdish peshmerga forces, and the German Air Force reconnaissance missions over Syria mean that Germany is regarded by the Islamic State as just another “crusader nation”[51] that has to be attacked.

Florian Flade is an investigative journalist for Die Welt and Die Welt am Sonntag. He is based in Berlin and blogs about jihadism at ojihad.wordpress.com. Follow @FlorianFlade

Substantive Notes
[a] Sarfo was interrogated by the Bremen branch of the Verfassungsschutz, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

[b] The details on Harry Sarfo’s time in Syria are from the transcript of his interrogation seen by the author.

[c] At first there was not enough evidence to arrest him, but after the Charlie Hebdo attack, the decision was made to take him into custody. “Festnahme eines mutmaßlichen Mitglieds der ausländischen terroristischen Vereinigung Islamischer Staat Irak und Großsyrien,” Bundesanwaltschaft, January 10, 2015.

Citations
[1] Court documents in the case of Harry Sarfo, obtained by the author.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Florian Flade, “Ich will kein Blut an meinen Händen haben,” Die Welt, June 26, 2016.

[4] Interview of Harry Sarfo on “Frontal 21,” Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), June 16, 2016.

[5] Author interview, German security source, February 2016.

[6] Florian Flade, “Islamist droht in Terrorvideo Angela Merkel,” Die Welt, October 15, 2014.

[7] “Jeder zweite Gefährder aus Deutschland im Ausland,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 23, 2016.

[8] “Analyse der Radikalisierungshintergründe und -verläufe der Personen, die aus islamistischer Motivation aus Deutschland in Richtung Syrien oder Irak ausgereist sind,” Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), December 2015.

[9] Author interview, German security source, February 2016.

[10] Author interview, German security source, April 2016.

[11] Court documents on legal ban of Millatu Ibrahim Organization, obtained by the author.

[12] Author interview, German security source, April 2016.

[13] “IS-Video präsentiert Terrorverdächtigen Reda SEYAM als wichtigen Funktionär,” Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, June 2016.

[14] Florian Flade, “Reda Seyam: Totgeglaubte leben länger,” ojihad.wordpress.com, March 6, 2015.

[15] Author interview, German security source, February 2016.

[16] Court documents in the case of jihadi Sebastian S., obtained by the author.

[17] Florian Flade, “Dschihad-Rückkehrer Teil 8 – Bin im Kalifat,” ojihad.wordpress.com, April 15, 2016.

[18] Colonel Steve Warren, Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesman, press briefing, April 7, 2016.

[19] Court documents in the case of jihadi Samy W., obtained by the author.

[20] “ISIS Creates English-Speaking Foreign Fighter ‘Anwar al-Awlaki’ Brigade For Attacks On The West: Report,” International Business Times, January 22, 2016.

[21] “Medienfunktionär des „Islamischen Staats“ stirbt bei Kämpfen im Irak,” Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, May 2015.

[22] Author interview, German security source, April 2016.

[23] Author interview, German security source, January 2016.

[24] Florian Flade, “Kriegsverbrechen: Ermittlungen gegen deutsche IS-Dschihadisten,”Die Welt, February 8, 2015.

[25] Florian Flade, “Behörden identifizieren deutschen IS-Mörder,” Die Welt, August 13, 2015.

[26] Court documents in the case of Nils Donath, obtained by the author.

[27] Jorg Diehl and Fidelius Schmid, “IS-Kronzeuge Nils D. vor Gericht: Gescheitert, erweckt und abgehauen,” Spiegel Online, January 20, 2016.

[28] Florian Flade, “Dschihad-Rückkehrer Teil 6 – Der Jäger,” ojihad.wordpress.com, August 18, 2015.

[29] “Nils D. beschreibt IS-Folterpraktiken,” N-TV, January 22, 2016.

[30] Lena Kampf, Andreas Spinnrath, and Boris Baumholt, “Wussten deutsche Islamisten von Pariser Anschlagsplänen?” WDR, January 14, 2016.

[31] Author interviews, German security officials, 2016.

[32] Court documents in the case of Harry Sarfo, obtained by the author.

[33] Author interview, German security source, February 2016.

[34] Author interview, German security source, April 2016.

[35] Author interview, German security source, April 2016.

[36] Police search warrant for Hüseyn Diler, obtained by the author.

[37] “Haftbefehl wegen Mitgliedschaft in der ausländischen terroristischen Vereinigung Islamischer Staat Irak und Großsyrien (ISIG),” Bundesanwaltschaft, March 24, 2016.

[38] “Festnahme eines mutmaßlichen Mitglieds der ausländischen terroristischen Vereinigung Islamischer Staat Irak und Großsyrien (ISIG),” Bundesanwaltschaft, June 22, 2016.

[39] Florian Flade, “Terrorpläne in der Frühphase?” ojihad.wordpress.com, February 5, 2016.

[40] “Festnahme eines mutmaßlichen Mitglieds der ausländischen terroristischen Vereinigung ‘Islamischer Staat’ (IS),” Bundesanwaltschaft, July 7, 2016.

[41] “Düsseldorfer IS-Anschlagsplan: Drei Verdächtige in U-Haft genommen” Deutsche Welle, June 3, 2016

[42] “Festnahme dreier mutmaßlicher Mitglieder der ausländischen terroristischen Vereinigung Islamischer Staat Irak und Großsyrien,” Bundesanwaltschaft, June 2, 2016.

[43] Author interview with German security source, July 2016.

[44] “Haftbefehl gegen Safia S. wegen des Angriffs auf einen Beamten der Bundespolizei erwirkt,” Bundesanwaltschaft, April 15, 2016.

[45] Police document on the attack, obtained by the author.

[46] Bayerischer Rundfunk, “Attentäter von Würzburg – Klassisches Abschiedsvideo,” July 20, 2016.

[47] Video message by Mohammad Daleel, released by Amaq  via Telegram, July 26, 2016.

[48] “Maaßen: Terrorgefahr so hoch wie nie,” MDR, May 2, 2016.

[49] Author interview, German security sources, summer 2016.

[50] Ioannis Mantzikos, “The Greek Gateway to Jihad,” CTC Sentinel 9:6 (2016); author interview, German security source, July 2016.

[51] Interview with Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Dabiq, issue 7, p. 74.

 

Europol Warning on Vehicle Ramming in Germany

Europol, the European Union police intelligence agency, warned earlier this month that lone attackers or small cells were plotting mayhem using vehicles as weapons.

Europol also pointed to reports that German authorities were aware of hundreds of attempts by jihadists to recruit refugees.

In November the United States warned its citizens it had ‘credible information’ that the Christmas markets were a target, while in the UK, the Foreign Office revised its travel advice earlier this month saying there was a ‘high threat from terrorism’ in Germany.

Islamic State militants had even published a terror manual last month containing instructions on using a lorry to inflict maximum carnage.

Their chilling Rumiyah magazine said using a vehicle was one of the most successful ways of ‘harvesting’ large numbers of non-believers.

Yet in Berlin, no concrete bollards were in place to protect revellers, with the authorities saying it would be wrong to turn the famous markets into ‘fortresses’. More here.

****

The current suspect and manhunt is on for Anis Amri, who is well known to European authorities. He is from an area of Tunisia that borders Libya where Islamic State has a functioning operation cell but ISIS has been cleared from Sirte, while other areas of Libya still have ISIS fighters than do move back and forth between Tunisia and Libya.

Amri, who was born in the desert town of Tataouine in 1992 – a well-known ISIS stronghold close to the Libyan border - was apparently recently arrested for GBH but vanished before he could be charged. He was also found with a fake passport

Amri, who was born in the desert town of Tataouine in 1992 – a well-known ISIS stronghold close to the Libyan border - was apparently recently arrested for GBH but vanished before he could be charged. He was also found with a fake passport DailyMail

Previous: Amri, who was born in the desert town of Tataouine in 1992 – a well-known ISIS stronghold close to the Libyan border – was apparently recently arrested for GBH but vanished before he could be charged. He was also found with a fake passport

DM: Amri is allegedly a disciple of Abu Walaa, arrested in Hildesheim last month for recruiting radicals into the ranks of Isis. Walaa has previously spoken at mosques in London.

He was arrested along with five members of a terrorist recruiting network operating on behalf of the so-called Islamic State, according to prosecutors.

The arrests took place in the states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. The network is alleged recruited and provided logistical support for local volunteers making their way from Germany to Syria.

Iraqi citizen known Abu Walaa, 32, or Ahmad Abdelaziz as he is also known, is a leading figure of the movement in Germany, and many of his followers have made their way to Syria.

Walaa has been at the centre of a year-long investigation, which also yielded arrests in the city of Hildesheim in July 2016. The arrest appears to have been aided by a former IS fighter, Anil O, 22, who identified Walaa as Germany’s ISIS leader.  

***

November, 2016:

A group of suspected Isis supporters accused of radicalising people and sending them to fight in Syria have been arrested in Germany.

The German federal prosecutor’s office said the five men were part of a “national Salafist-jihadi network” suspected of supporting Isis.

The group’s alleged leader is a preacher known as Abu Walaa, who is the head of a group promoting an “authentic understanding of Islam” through online speeches, videos and texts.

“Ahmad Abdulaziz Abdullah A, known as Abu Walaa, openly professes his support for the so-called Islamic State [Isis] and has appeared at numerous Salafist events in the past,” a spokesperson for federal prosecutors said.

Abu Walaa allegedly approved and organised the journeys to Syria, delegating the work to fellow suspects Mahmoud O, a 27-year-old German, and Ahmed FY, a 26-year-old Cameroonian national.

The network is known to have transported at least one man and his family to fight for Isis in Syria.

Abu Walaa preaches at the German-speaking Islamic Circle of Hildesheim mosque in the city of Hildesheim, where he was arrested on Tuesday as police launched coordinated raids in the states of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia.

The mosque was previously raided by counter-terror police in July, but no arrests were made. More here from IndependentUK.

***

Meanwhile, the FBI has a counter-terrorism office in Berlin and has been working diligently with intelligence professionals there under a specialized division known as the ‘Fly Team’.

Vehicle Ramming Tactics

And in 2010, the Department of Homeland Security posted a bulletin. The full distribution and published in the public domain including the news has been a failure.

Terrorists overseas have suggested conducting vehicle ramming attacks—using modified or unmodified vehicles—against crowds, buildings, and other vehicles. Such attacks could be used to target locations where large numbers of people congregate, including sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers. Vehicle ramming offers terrorists with limited access to explosives or weapons an opportunity to conduct a Homeland attack with minimal prior training or experience.

(U) Indicators: Although a single indicator may not be suspicious, one or more might indicate a ramming attack is being developed, based on the specific facts or circumstances. A ramming attack can be conducted with little to no warning.

  • (U//FOUO) Unusual modifications to commercial motor vehicles, heavy equipment, passenger cars, and sports utility vehicles (SUVs), such as homemade attempts to reinforce the front of the vehicle with metal plates.
  • (U//FOUO) The purchase, rental, or theft of large or heavy-duty vehicles or equipment, such as SUVs, trucks, or commercial motor vehicles, if accompanied by typical indicators such as nervousness during the purchase, paying in cash, or lack of familiarity with the vehicle’s operations.
  • (U//FOUO) Commercial motor vehicles or heavy equipment being operated erratically, at unusual times, or in unusual locations, particularly in heavy pedestrian areas.
  • (U//FOUO) Attempts to infiltrate closed areas where traffic usually moves, but where crowds are gathered, such as for street festivals or farmers’ markets.
  • (U//FOUO) A vehicle operator’s apparent unfamiliarity with commercial motor vehicle or heavy equipment operation (unable to back up; trouble with shifting; poor lane tracking; unfamiliarity with basic vehicle mechanics such as air brake operations, slack adjusters, fifth wheel operations, Jake brakes, engine type, or location of fire extinguishers and other emergency equipment).