DPRK: What Barack/Hillary Knew and When

Posted on September 4, 2017September 4, 2017 by Denise Simon

Hey China…what gives? France, you have a call holding on line 4.

None of this would have been in Obama’s, Hillary’s or John Kerry’s emails? Hillary did not use ANY official government email platform…just say’n.

John Kerry under the instruction of the Obama White House negotiated the Joint Plan of Action with Iran on the nuclear development program. Purposely many things were overlooked including the nefarious activities between Iran and North Korea.

Imagine the developments are cables since 2009.

Countries that were part of the long negotiations were the P5+1, which included:

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.

North Korean front companies operate inside China with impunity.

The extent of Chinese companies’ role in enabling North Korea’s evasion of sanctions is detailed deep in the fine print of the still unpublished 105-page report. For instance, North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank, both subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions, continue to operate in the Chinese cities of Dalian, Dandong, and Shenyang in violation of U.N. resolutions. The panel suspects that one of the banks, Daedong, may in fact be majority-owned by Chinese shareholders, citing July 2011 documents indicating the sale of a controlling stake, 60 percent, to a Chinese firm. More here.

So, when it comes to France, what did they know via the MTCR?

Background

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) to a range of 300 kilometers (km) or more. The G-7 States formally announced the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) on 16 April 1987.

Since then, membership has expanded to the present 34 States, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other States, including China, India, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

Regime Goal

The regime goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.

Regime Guidelines

The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex

Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited.

Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as the materials for the construction of missiles. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate. More here.

So, to answer the question in the title of this article, here is a WikiLeaks cable providing background:

***

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM
Date: 2009 October 6, 13:14 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 09STATE103755_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
In the metadata of the Kissinger Cables this field is called ‘Previous Handling Restrictions’. Cablegate does not originally have this field. We have given it the entry ‘Not Assigned’. Citations for acronyms used are available here.” data-hasqtip=”true” oldtitle=”Handling Restrictions” title=””>Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned —	Character Count: 14817
Executive Order: — Not Assigned —	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: BR – Brazil \| ETTC – Trade and Technology Controls \| FR – France \| KSCA – Science Counselors and Attachés \| MNUC – Military and Defense Affairs–Military Nuclear Applications \| MTCRE – Missile Technology Control Regime \| PARM – Political Affairs–Arms Controls and Disarmament \| TSPA – Technology and Science–Space Activities	Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned —	Type: TE – Telegram (cable)
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank —	Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Secretary of State	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: France Paris \| Missile Technology Control Regime

Original cable: Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H). 1. (U)

This is an action request.

Please see paragraph 2. 2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper “North Korea,s Missile Program” in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.

Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) North Korea’s Missile Program Introduction North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic missile development efforts. We expect both the new Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle (SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. North Korea’s deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.

North Korea remains one of the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to provide assistance to both Iran’s and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. These sales have included complete Category I missile systems, as well as production technology and expertise.

North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic missiles and continues to market its systems to countries in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile technology.

North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues to make progress in its missile development efforts, it remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of missile-related raw materials and components. While most of these materials are for direct application to its missile program, North Korea may procure some items in support of its missile customers.

Program History North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- range Scud C in the mid-1980s.

These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.

North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is deployed as part of North Korea’s missile forces. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which could strike all of South Korea and Japan. Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North Korea’s TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North Korea had successfully developed many of the essential technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM development.

The DPRK has also developed the follow-on system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration, the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg.

In a three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.

The first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew only about 40 seconds. Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile IRBM –called the Musudan by the United States.

The Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants — unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) — than those used in Scud-type missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles — or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity — than would be possible using Scud-type technology. As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has started to develop its own solid-propellant missile systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM.

This new missile — called the Toksa by the United States — has a range of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a disturbing development since North Korea can apply its experience in producing this missile to other, longer- range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and shorter launch times, making them more survivable than liquid propellant missiles. North Korea,s advances — in both its liquid and solid propellant programs — have come despite a self-imposed missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea’s ability to verify new designs or modifications to its missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.

North Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. Program Activities On April 5, 2009, North Korea — despite UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic missile program — conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is making progress in developing technology that can directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No Dong MRBMs on July 4th.

The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range missile systems and that long range missile development probably remains a priority. North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world, without requiring the lengthy — and potentially vulnerable — launch preparation time required by the TD-2. Technology Supplier The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. North Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile-related raw materials from third-parties for customers through its extensive procurement network. Iran Iran is one of North Korea’s key missile customers.

Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, which is based on North Korea’s No Dong. North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.

This technology would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian missile and SLV designs. North Korea also provided assistance to Iran’s SLV program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program suggests that North Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Syria Syria is another of North Korea’s key missile customers. North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the “Scud D.”

The missiles came initially in either partially or completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic production capability, probably with extensive assistance from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of other missile-related services to Syria, including production technology, ground support equipment, raw material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.

North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria’s development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for its Scud ballistic missiles. Yemen In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.

Burma The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, probably was associated with North Korea’s primary arms export entity — suggesting that the cargo was most likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely Burma.

The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic missile production facility suggests that the two sides probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, and that the cargo may have been related to these discussions.

Foreign Assistance North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and materials needed to support both its own and its customers’ missile programs. Members of this network often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of controlled items. Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile program includes material North Korea finds too costly or too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and liquid-propellant precursors. Although important for its own program, North Korea also uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials for its missile export customers.

Conclusion North Korea will continue to develop missiles with increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers — most commonly China-based, given their proximity and access to technology that would be beneficial to North Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or technology associated with missile systems other countries — including MTCR Partners — have retired. International pressure against North Korea and its customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s missile sales.

However, despite such pressure, North Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, their production technology, and missile maintenance and support services to all interested customers. END TEXT OF PAPER.

4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR.

A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON

Starfish Prime, a Response to North Korea?

Posted on September 4, 2017September 4, 2017 by Denise Simon

The United States knows all too well about an EMP. With regard to North Korea, the Kim regime has acknowledged it was active in EMP pursuits. The U.S. has EMP weapons developed by Boeing.

So what is Starfish Prime?

On July 9, 1962 — 50 years ago today — the United States detonated a nuclear weapon high above the Pacific Ocean. Designated Starfish Prime, it was part of a dangerous series of high-altitude nuclear bomb tests at the height of the Cold War. Its immediate effects were felt for thousands of kilometers, but it would also have a far-reaching aftermath that still touches us today.

In 1958, the Soviet Union called for a ban on atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons, and went so far as to unilaterally stop such testing. Under external political pressure, the US acquiesced. However, in late 1961 political pressures internal to the USSR forced Khrushchev to break the moratorium, and the Soviets began testing once again. So, again under pressure, the US responded with tests of their own.

It was a scary time to live in.

The US, worried that a Soviet nuclear bomb detonated in space could damage or destroy US intercontinental missiles, set up a series of high-altitude weapons tests called Project Fishbowl (itself part of the larger Operation Dominic) to find out for themselves what happens when nuclear weapons are detonated in space. High-altitude tests had been done before, but they were hastily set up and the results inconclusive. Fishbowl was created to take a more rigorous scientific approach. Read more here.

The Wall Street Journal published an item offering insight regarding North Korea and the threat of an EMP and the United States is not prepared for such a weapon in either a defensive or offensive posture without some exceptional consequence to life.

As South Korea performed some live fire drills in response to the last nuclear test by North Korea that measured a 6.3 on the Richter Scale, at issue is the immediate line of an estimated thousands of rockets pointed at South Korea. It would take a robust offensive first strike to remove this border threat in cadence with other strike operations into the North Korea tunnel network where most of the weaponry is located.

Finally, South Korea’s leader has taken a more aggressive posture, leaning towards a military operation and this could bring the closer to Japan which is a positive indication where activities to neutralize North Korea is tantamount.

Tensions sharply escalated Sunday as the communist regime conducted what it claims to have been a test of a hydrogen bomb mountable on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The test was only the latest in a recent series of saber-rattling, including two ICBM tests in July.

In its report to the legislature’s defense committee, the defense ministry said that it, in consultation with Washington, will seek to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, strategic bombers and other powerful assets to the peninsula as a response to the North’s nuclear experiment.

It also unveiled its plan to stage unilateral live-fire drills involving Taurus air-to-surface guided missiles mounted on its F-15K fighter jets. The missile, with a range of 500 kilometers, is capable of launching precision strikes on the North’s key nuclear and missile facilities.

In his assessment of the sixth nuke test, Song said that the North is presumed to have reduced the weight of a nuclear warhead to below 500 kilograms. More here.

Adding more sanctions on China or those doing business with North Korea does not stop or deter North Korea at all. China knows precisely what North Korea is doing and has not moved to stop any of these missile or nuclear activity.

Photo

North Korea’s nuclear test occurred in Punggye-ri, the same site where a nuclear test occurred in January 2016, about 50 miles away from the border with China. Tremors were felt in the Chinese border city of Yanji, home to about 400,000 people, Chinese media reported. The latest test occurred as China hosted the leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries for their annual summit. China “strongly condemned” North Korea’s provocation and a draft communique from the BRICS summit quoted in Chinese state media “strongly deplored” North Korea’s nuclear test but called for a peaceful solution to the crisis. More here.

All the alleged professional continue to say the United States, Japan and South Korea have no good options with regard to North Korea, and there may be some truth to that given the descriptions as defined here.

What is left out of all conversations is the cyber abilities of the United States, knocking out North Korea’s space segments on existing satellites owned by China, Iran or Russia and lastly once again dusting off the files of Starfish Prime as described below:

Launched via a Thor rocket and carrying a W49 thermonuclear warhead (manufactured by Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory) and a Mk. 2 reentry vehicle, the explosion took place 250 miles (400 km) above a point 19 miles (31 km) southwest of Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. It was one of five tests conducted by the USA in outer space as defined by the FAI. It produced a yield equivalent to 1.4 megatons of TNT.

The Starfish test was one of five high altitude tests grouped together as Operation Fishbowl within the larger Operation Dominic, a series of tests in 1962 begun in response to the Soviet announcement on August 30, 1961 that they would end a three-year moratorium on testing.^[2]

In 1958 the United States had completed six high-altitude nuclear tests, but the high-altitude tests of that year produced many unexpected results and raised many new questions. According to the U.S. Government Project Officer’s Interim Report on the Starfish Prime project:

“Previous high-altitude nuclear tests: YUCCA, TEAK, and ORANGE, plus the three ARGUS shots were poorly instrumented and hastily executed. Despite thorough studies of the meager data, present models of these bursts are sketchy and tentative. These models are too uncertain to permit extrapolation to other altitudes and yields with any confidence. Thus there is a strong need, not only for better instrumentation, but for further tests covering a range of altitudes and yields.”^[3]

More details here.

Now al Shabaab has Ownership of Uranium Set for Iran

Posted on August 31, 2017August 31, 2017 by Denise Simon

In 2015:

Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Mohamed Muktar Ibrahim has talked about the Somalia’s Mineral Resources saying that they have made contacts with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the controlling of minerals that can be use chemical weapons.

He noted they are taking measures to prevent raw materials like Uranium to fall into the hands wrong people.

In an exclusive interview he gave to Universal TV, the minister highlighted that they also held talks with UNDP which had information on mining depots in the country as it has surveyed on the country’s mineral deposits in the years between 1965 and 1975.

In a UN report released in 1968 shows that Somalia is a hotspot for uranium.

Somali government is busy amending some provision in the Mineral Law 1984 and compliance with the current conditions in the country now.

To read the full letter, go here.

An Al Qaeda affiliate has seized control of uranium mines in Africa with the intent of supplying the material to Iran, according to a diplomatic letter from a top Somali official appealing to the U.S. for “immediate military assistance.”

The letter, reviewed by Fox News, was addressed to U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Stephen Schwartz. Somalia’s Ambassador to the U.S. Ahmed Awad confirmed to Fox News on Thursday that the letter “has indeed been issued” by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Garaad Omar, whose signature is on the document.

The Aug. 11-dated letter delivered an urgent warning to the U.S. that the al-Shabaab terror network has linked up with the regional ISIS faction and is “capturing territory” in the central part of the country.

“Only the United States has the capacity to identify and smash Al-Shabaab elements operating within our country. The time for surgical strikes and limited engagement has passed, as Somalia’s problems have metastasized into the World’s problems,” the letter said. “Every day that passes without intervention provides America’s enemies with additional material for nuclear weapons. There can be no doubt that global stability is at stake.”

The State Department would not comment on the diplomatic letter, but did not dispute its authenticity and referred Fox News to the government of Somalia. Iran was supposed to pull back on its nuclear program under the terms of the agreement struck with the Obama administration. More here from FNC.

***

Background:

Is Somalia a safe haven for terrorists?

On one hand, Somalia is a chaotic, poor, battle-weary Muslim country with no central government and a long, unguarded coastline. Its porous borders mean that individuals can enter without visas, and once inside the country, enjoy an almost complete lack of law enforcement. Somalia has long served as a passageway from Africa to the Middle East based on its coastal location on the Horn of Africa, just a boat ride away from Yemen. These aspects make Somalia a desirable haven for transnational terrorists, something al-Qaeda has tried to capitalize on before, and is trying again now.

On the other hand, Somalia is different from other failed states in several ways. While it is roughly the size of Afghanistan, its landscape lacks Afghanistan’s many natural hiding places and does not offer the topographical haven of other states like Yemen. It is also a fiercely clan-oriented culture with an aversion to foreign presence of any kind, including Arab jihadi organizations. “When you get these extremist ideologies, the Somalis look at them and they are immediately perceived as foreign,” says Bruton, “They’re perceived as Arab. It’s an Arab ideology. And just as the Somalis are hostile to American ideology, they’re hostile to Arab ideology as well.” Finally, the Somalis–Sufi Muslims since the birth of Islam in the seventh century–have moderate religious views; until recently, Taliban-style fundamentalism was unfamiliar in the country.

These factors were responsible for al-Qaeda’s failure in the 1990s, when it tried working closely with al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI). Al-Qaeda was unable to root itself in Somalia’s clan system, and, according to former ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn, “overestimated the degree to which Somalis would become jihadists.” The experience of the al-Qaeda operatives was so treacherous that Bruton says: “U.S. intelligence officials came up with a verdict that Somalia was actually inoculated from foreign terrorist groups, that it’s just fundamentally inhospitable, that the clan system is so closed to foreigners that there’s just no way that these groups can operate.”

Since the Ethiopian invasion, al-Qaeda has seen a resurgent connection to the country, and HI and al-Shabaab control most of the territory. However, experts disagree over whether Somalia could be the base for an international attack or whether the group will continue its domestic focus. “Personally, my view is that they don’t have much to gain by [partnering with al-Qaeda to conduct an international attack],” Bruton says. “And they probably don’t have the capacity to do it. But it’s worrisome that they’re making the threats, so I think it’s something to be watched and assessed very carefully. But right now, I would say the odds of a transnational attack are very, very low.” More here.

Hawaii, Missile Defense Test MRBM Success

Posted on August 30, 2017August 30, 2017 by Denise Simon

Aegis BMD System Intercepts Target Missile

Aug. 30, 2017

The Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) successfully conducted a complex missile defense flight test, resulting in the intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) target using Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) guided missiles during a test off the coast of Hawaii today.

Photo

John Paul Jones detected and tracked a target missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, Hawaii with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar, and onboard SM-6 missiles executed the intercept.

“We are working closely with the fleet to develop this important new capability, and this was a key milestone in giving our Aegis BMD ships an enhanced capability to defeat ballistic missiles in their terminal phase,” said MDA Director Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves. “We will continue developing ballistic missile defense technologies to stay ahead of the threat as it evolves.”

Photo

This test, designated Flight Test Standard Missile-27 Event 2 (FTM-27 E2), marks the second time that an SM-6 missile has successfully intercepted a medium-range ballistic missile target.

Aegis BMD is the naval component of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. MDA and the U.S. Navy cooperatively manage the Aegis BMD program. Additional information about all elements of the ballistic missile defense system can be found here.

*** Meanwhile in Nevada, testing of upgraded nuclear weapons components were performed.

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and U.S. Air Force completed two qualification flight tests of B61-12 gravity bombs August 8 at Tonopah Test Range in Nevada.

The non-nuclear test assemblies, which were dropped from an F-15E based at Nellis Air Force Base, evaluated the weapon’s non-nuclear functions and the aircraft’s capability to deliver the weapon.

These tests are part of a series over the next three years to qualify the B61-12 for service. The first qualification flight test occurred in March.

“The B61-12 life extension program is progressing on schedule to meet national security requirements,” said Phil Calbos, acting NNSA deputy administrator for Defense Programs. “These realistic flight qualification tests validate the design of the B61-12 when it comes to system performance.”

The flight test included hardware designed by Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories, manufactured by the Nuclear Security Enterprise plants, and mated to the tail-kit assembly section, designed by the Boeing Company under contract with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center.

The B61-12 consolidates and replaces four B61 bomb variants in the nation’s nuclear arsenal. The first production unit is scheduled to be completed by March 2020.

These activities are not exclusive to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, but include other rogue nations such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia and those allied such that any weapons are transferred to another nation as in Syria or worse Venezuela.

The United States is not alone in these activities which does bring some comfort.

Theresa May refuses to rule out military action and cyber attacks over North Korea missile launches

Theresa May has refused to rule out using cyber warfare or even taking part in military action against North Korea if it does not stop firing missiles in “illegal” acts of provocation.

Mrs May arrived in Japan on Wednesday morning in the midst of an escalating crisis over Pyongyang’s latest missile launch, and will have lengthy discussions with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe about what can be done.

She arrived with a message for China’s President Xi Jinping, telling him in no uncertain terms that it is his responsibility to rein in Kim Jong-un.

She said China, which has the military might to remove Mr Kim from power if it chose to, must do “everything it can” to make North Korea desist from firing more missiles.

On Tuesday, Pyongyang launched a missile that flew over Japan before landing in the Pacific, triggering the national J-alert system which tells the Japanese population to take cover.

President Donald Trump has made it clear that all options remain on the table for dealing with North Korea, and during her overnight flight to Osaka Mrs May was asked four times by journalists if she would rule out joining military action against the Kim regime. Each time, she refused to address the question directly.

She also refused to rule out cyber warfare. Separately, a Whitehall source even raised the possibility that cyber warfare might already be in use, saying: “If we were doing that we certainly wouldn’t be telling you.”

Mrs May said: “The actions of North Korea are illegal, they are significant actions of provocation, it’s outrageous, that’s why we will be redoubling our efforts with our international partners to put pressure on North Korea to stop these illegal activities.

“China has a key role to play in this… I have said this to President Xi, I know others have as well, we think that China has that important role to play and we would encourage China to do everything it can to bring pressure to bear on North Korea to stop this.

“The UK is looking at the discussion around further sanctions and the sort of change that China can bring. We see China as being the key in this.”

During her three-day visit to Japan, Mrs May will become only the second foreign leader to attend a meeting of the country’s national security council, at which she will speak to Mr Abe and his advisers.

One of the key aims of the trip is to strengthen Britain’s cooperation with Japan over security and defence, and Mrs May will tomorrow board the aircraft carrier Izumo, the flagship of the Japanese Navy, where she will be briefed by Japanese and British military personnel.

She said: “It’s an important, long-standing relationship between the UK and Japan, they’re our closest partner in Asia and I’m looking forward to the opportunity to talk about a number of subjects – trade, of course, but also building on our defence and security co-operation.”

The Prime Minister’s visit came as the United Nations condemned North Korea’s “outrageous” firing of a ballistic missile over Japan on Tuesday, demanding Pyongyang halt its weapons programme but holding back on any threat of new sanctions on the isolated regime.

US Ambassador Nikki Haley said “something serious has to happen” but didn’t specify what.

British Ambassador Matthew Rycroft suggested members need to look at further strengthening of sanctions. Read more here to include graphics and video.

Location of N Korea Missile Launch over Japan, What we Know

Posted on August 29, 2017August 29, 2017 by Denise Simon

Why no country shot it down?

In part: While the US and Japan have conducted ballistic missile defense exercises and both have Aegis-equipped ships capable of shooting down some ballistic missiles, it would be extremely difficult for the US or Japan to intercept a North Korean intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missile in flight over Japan toward a target such as Guam. The Aegis system is capable of intercepting shorter-range missiles in mid-course with the SM-3 missile, and it also provides “terminal phase” defense with the SM-2 missile closer to the ballistic missile’s target. But it’s uncertain whether either system would be successful against a “pop up” attack with an ICBM.

The SM-3 Block IIA has an operational range of about 1,350 miles. But range isn’t the issue as much as the speed required to intercept. If a North Korean missile were fired to an altitude of over 500 kilometers, success in a shoot-down would depend greatly on how quickly the missile was tracked and the timing of an interceptor launch. Based on the time/distance envelopes for SM-2 and SM-3 missile intercepts calculated from Joan Johnson-Freese (a professor at the Naval War College and a lecturer at Harvard University) and Ralph Savelsberg (an assistant professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy), an Aegis defender would only have a few minutes to get off a shot at an ICBM launch from North Korea. Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers would have to be dangerously close to the North Korean coast to get a chance to strike an ICBM in “boost” phase as it rose and could be vulnerable to North Korean submarines if an actual attack were planned. Read more here.

***

North Korea has taken steps in recent months to disguise their missile-related activities, including fueling rockets inside structures, outside of aerial view.

There are three basic ways the U.S. gathers most of its foreign intelligence: collecting information from human spies; intercepting electronic communications; and observing what’s happening on the ground, mainly with satellites.

The National Security Agency, which hacks computers and intercepts email, has had some success pulling bits and bytes out of North Korea, former officials say, but North Korea is much less forgiving than most of its targets. That’s because most of the country is not connected to the internet and few people have cellphones. To the extent that the regime communicates electronically, it has made increasing use of encryption, experts say.

“If you look at that satellite picture [of Asia] of the lights at night from the satellite, there is one dark area with no lights on, and that is North Korea,” Coats told Congress. “Their broadband is extremely limited. So using that as an access to collection — we get very limited results.” More here.

N. Korea must be met with stronger action: U.S. experts

WASHINGTON, Aug. 29 (Yonhap) — North Korea must be met with stronger action if it is to be stopped from triggering a catastrophe on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. experts said Tuesday.

The firing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile over Japan earlier in the day was a rare hostile act that increased the chances of a military confrontation in the volatile region.

The United States and South Korea must take decisive action to demonstrate that the regime in Pyongyang will not be allowed to get away with any more provocations, and China, they noted, will have to play a key role in that effort.

KCNA has released photos of the HS-12 launch that overflew Japan

“China has the power to increase the pressure on North Korea and must take steps towards doing so,” said Donald Manzullo, president of the Korea Economic Institute of America. “The longer China continues to refrain from using all of the leverage at its disposal to convince North Korea to return to talks, the more likely North Korea is to miscalculate.”

Beijing is Pyongyang’s only major ally and key benefactor. U.S. President Donald Trump and others have urged China to do more to rein in its wayward neighbor, but Beijing has refused to bear responsibility for the North Korean nuclear problem.

Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at RAND Corp., said the latest launch could have resulted in part from a lack of action by the U.S. and South Korea against what was seen as a low-intensity provocation Saturday. North Korea launched three short-range ballistic missiles then.

“If the (U.S. and South Korea) fail to act seriously against (Tuesday’s) test, the North may feel that it can commit an even more serious provocation, while the exercises are ongoing, perhaps even another intercontinental ballistic missile test or a nuclear weapon test,” he said in an email.

Bennett was referring to the Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise currently under way between South Korea and the U.S. Analysts have said the back-to-back provocations were staged in response to the annual drills, which Pyongyang views as rehearsals for an invasion.

North Korea may also believe it has China’s backing because Beijing recently proposed the allies cancel their drills in exchange for a halt to North Korea’s missile and nuclear testing, he noted.

Robert Manning, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, said the U.N. Security Council is likely to adopt tougher sanctions against Pyongyang.

“There may be other steps Trump is considering to take unilaterally, whether cyber or kinetic. The key question is: How far is China prepared to go?” he said in a separate email. “But even if effective, sanctions will take time to have an impact — nine to 12 to 15 months. The danger is that this cycle of tensions rises to the point where the U.S. seeks more immediate results. That could be catastrophic.”

Media preview

The North Korean single stage Hwasong-12 is a liquid fueled IRBM of estimated 4500 km range.

The Hwasong-2 appears to be a stretched improved version of the Hwasong-10 IRBM and appears to be single staged.

The missile was first shown in the 2017 military parade and has conducted its first successful flight after three failures in May 2017 from a site near Kuosong, likely Panghyon Air Base, on a lofted short range trajectory of 787 km range and 2111 km apogee height, which hints to a maximum range of about 4500 km.

For more information regarding the DPRK airfields and what is underground at those airfields across the country, go here.