Lone Wolves vs. QRF vs. Patriot Act

In the news is the discussion of terminating parts of the Patriot Act and key uses the NSA was using. While having parts of the Patriot Act go dark is a good thing to protect our granted privacy rights, there is one section that will go dark and that is part in parcel the ‘lone-wolf’ section.

The condition or phenomenon known as lone wolf is a matter that needs some further attention as most recent attacks have been performed by units of lone wolves.  Such was the case of Major Nidal Hassan, the Ft. Hood shooter as the recent case in Garland, Texas. Others include the attacks in Paris and in Australia.
It is suggested that you take the time to watch this video and continue the debate.

 

As it relates to the Patriot Act and up for debate is shown below:

Lone Wolf.

A Summary by Mary DeRosa

Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, known as the “lone wolf” amendment, broadens FISA to allow surveillance of a new category of individuals. The provision amends FISA’s definition of “agent of a foreign power” to include any person, other than a U.S. person, who “engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore.” Previously, that definition required a nexus to a foreign power or entity, such as a foreign government or an international terrorist organization. The expanded definition allows the government to use FISA for surveillance of a non-U.S. person who has no known ties to a group or entity. Congress passed this “lone wolf” provision because it was concerned that the previous FISA definitions did not cover unaffiliated individuals—or those for whom no affiliation can be established—who nonetheless engage or are preparing to engage in international terrorism.

The standards and procedures for FISA collection are different, more secretive, and in some cases less rigorous than those for law enforcement surveillance. But FISA is limited by its requirement that the target of surveillance be a foreign power or its agent. After this “lone wolf” provision, a target can be considered an “agent of a foreign power” without any evidence that they are acting with a group. But there must be probable cause that the target is engaging or preparing to engage in “international terrorism,” which FISA defines to be activities that involve violent, criminal acts intended to intimidate or coerce a population or a government and that occur totally outside of the United States or transcend national boundaries.

Section 6001(b) of the Intelligence Reform Act subjects the “lone wolf” amendment to the PATRIOT Act’s sunset provision. Therefore, unless reauthorized, the expanded authority will expire on December 31, 2005.

Targeting the Loosely-Affiliated Terrorist
by Michael J. Woods

Critics of FISA’s new “lone wolf’ provision argue it is a dangerous expansion of authority, allowing the application of FISA to individuals lacking any connection to foreign powers. The language actually enacted, however, integrates a definition of “international terrorism’ that preserves a sufficiently strong foreign nexus requirement. Therefore, the statute’s parts, taken together and read in context, contain adequate safeguards to ensure that the lone wolf provision will be used against its intended targets—international terrorists.

Before the lone wolf provision, there were two principal paths to obtain FISA surveillance of an international terrorist: first, by demonstrating probable cause that the target acts in the U.S. as a “member’ of an international terrorist group (found in FISA section 101(b)(1)(A)); and second, by demonstrating probable cause that the target “knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power’ (section 101(b)(2)(C)). The first option is difficult to establish given the informality of terrorist organizations and is not available where the target is a U.S. person. The second is the stock from which the present “lone wolf’ provision is cut, and provides the conceptual foundation for the new provision.

The legislative history of those two original FISA provisions, found primarily in House Report 95-1283, Senate Report 95-701 and House Conference Report 95-1720, reveals that the drafters’ chief concern here was to avoid application of the FISA to purely domestic terrorists or political dissidents. Congress was reacting to the Supreme Court’s 1972 holding in United States v. United States District Court (found at 407 U.S. 297, and commonly called the “Keith case’) that “domestic security surveillance’ was subject to the warrant and reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The group at issue in Keith was a radical organization (the White Panther Party) that had bombed a number of federal facilities to draw attention to the group’s domestic social/political agenda. (See The Court Legacy, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Nov. 2003).) The Court emphasized that its Keith holding addressed only “the domestic aspects of national security’ and did not reach “the activities of foreign powers or their agents.’ FISA was the legislative approach to the area beyond Keith: the field of foreign intelligence surveillance. In addressing terrorism as a national security threat, the FISA drafters needed to draw a line between the purely domestic variety covered by the Keith ruling, and the activities of international terrorist organizations (which could take place in the United States).

 

Why are in Talks with Iran on Nuclear Program?

IRAN: Molten lead will be poured down throat of nuclear inspectors, IRGC commander says

The United Nations nuclear inspectors would be wrong to dare to want to look at nuclear sites in Iran and if they do so they will be arrested and molten lead would be poured down their throat, a senior commander of the Iranian regime’s Revolutionary Guards says.

IRGC Brigadier General Gholamhossein Qeybparavar, the commander of IRGC forces in the Fars province said on Saturday: “You would be wrong to dare to want to inspect our military centers and whoever does look at IRGC centers we will fill his throat with molten lead.”

Speaking to officials of the Iranian regime, members of Basij paramilitary force and high ranking clerics in the city of Eghlid in the southern province of Fars, he said: “We have not begged our nuclear knowledge from the West and Europeans to give it to them easily. We have suffered a lot and have lot our best young scientists on this path.”

Qeybparavar’s remarks come as the question of access for international inspectors has become one of the main sticking points between Tehran and six world powers as they try to overcome obstacles to a final nuclear agreement one month ahead of a deadline.

Then comes France….

ABUJA, Nigeria—French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said a possible nuclear deal with Iran risks sparking a nuclear arms race in the Middle East unless the agreement grants international inspectors access to Iranian military sites and other secret facilities.

In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Fabius insisted the ability to inspect such sites be part of a final agreement with Iran to ensure Tehran doesn’t covertly try to build a nuclear weapon.

The six powers are contemplating the worst already….

Exclusive: Six powers agree way to restore U.N. sanctions in push for Iran deal – sources

Six world powers have agreed on a way to restore U.N. sanctions on Iran if the country breaks the terms of a future nuclear deal, clearing a major obstacle to an accord ahead of a June 30 deadline, Western officials told Reuters.

The new understanding on a U.N. sanctions “snapback” among the six powers – the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China – brings them closer to a possible deal with Iran, though other hurdles remain, including ensuring United Nations access to Iranian military sites.

The six powers and Iran struck an interim agreement on April 2 ahead of a possible final deal that would aim to block an Iranian path to a nuclear bomb in exchange for lifting sanctions. But the timing of sanctions relief, access and verification of compliance and a mechanism for restoring sanctions if Iran broke its commitments were among the most difficult topics left for further negotiations.

Negotiators of Iran and six world powers face each other at a table in the historic basement of Palais Coburg hotel in Vienna April 24, 2015.  REUTERS/Heinz-Peter Bader

U.S. and European negotiators want any easing of U.N. sanctions to be automatically reversible if Tehran violates a deal. Russia and China traditionally reject such automatic measures as undermining their veto power as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

As part of the new agreement on sanctions snapback, suspected breaches by Iran would be taken up by a dispute-resolution panel, likely including the six powers and Iran, which would assess the allegations and come up with a non-binding opinion, the officials said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would also continue regularly reporting on Iran’s nuclear program, which would provide the six powers and the Security Council with information on Tehran’s activities to enable them to assess compliance.

If Iran was found to be in non-compliance with the terms of the deal, then U.N. sanctions would be restored.

The officials did not say precisely how sanctions would be restored but Western powers have been adamant that it should take place without a Security Council vote, based on provisions to be included in a new U.N. Security Council resolution to be adopted after a deal is struck.

“We pretty much have a solid agreement between the six on the snapback mechanism, Russians and Chinese included,” a Western official said. “But now the Iranians need to agree.”

Another senior Western official echoed his remarks, describing the agreement as “tentative” because it would depend on Iranian acceptance.

A senior Iranian diplomat said Iran was now reviewing several options for the possible “snapback” of Security Council sanctions against Tehran.

It was unclear exactly how the snapback mechanism would function, and the officials did not discuss the precise details. It was also unclear how the proposal would protect the United States and other permanent Council members from a possible Chinese or Russian veto on sanctions restoration.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power has made it clear that Washington does not want Russia’s and China’s recent slew of vetoes on resolutions related to Syria to be repeated with an Iran nuclear agreement.

France’s Ambassador to the United States Gerard Araud said in Washington last week that, under a French idea, sanctions would be reinstated automatically in the event of non-compliance, avoiding the threat of a veto.

Under that idea, which Araud said had not to date been approved by the six powers, the onus would be on Russia or China to propose a Security Council vote not to re-impose sanctions.

Russian and Chinese officials did not respond immediately to requests for confirmation that they signed off on the snapback mechanism.

REVIEWING THE OPTIONS

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Geneva on Saturday. They discussed progress and obstacles to an agreement in the Iran nuclear talks a month before the deadline for a deal aimed at reducing the risk of another war in the Middle East.

Restoring U.S. and EU sanctions is less difficult than U.N. sanctions because there is no need for U.N. Security Council involvement.

For their part, Moscow, Beijing and Tehran have wanted assurances that Washington cannot unilaterally force a sanctions snapback – a risk they see rising if a Republican wins the U.S. presidency in 2016.

A senior Iranian diplomat confirmed that discussions of specific snapback options were underway. He told Reuters Tehran was preparing its own “snapback” in the event the Western powers fail to live up to their commitments under the agreement.

“At least three or four different suggestions have been put on the table, which are being reviewed,” he said. “Iran also can immediately resume its activities if the other parties involved do not fulfill their obligations under the deal.”

He added that it was “a very sensitive issue.”

If Iran accepts the proposed snapback mechanism, there are other hurdles that must be overcome, including IAEA access to Iranian military sites and nuclear scientists and the pace of sanctions relief.

Iran says its nuclear program is entirely peaceful and rejects allegations from Western countries and their allies that it wants the capability to produce atomic weapons. It says all sanctions are illegal and works hard to circumvent them.

 

If Released Gitmo Detainees are no Risk, Then Why?

Mohammed Zahir historyAs of May 31, 2015, 5:00 PM, EST Qatar and the United States have agreed to an extension of detention.

Sample detainee: Mohammed Zahir’s Guantanamo detainee assessment Mohammed_Zahir's_Guantanamo_detainee_assessment_pdf   Who is really deciding who does get released, to what transfer point, why and who approves? What are the conditions of release, is there money paid to the country of last destination? How long are they to stay in the last country of destination and under what conditions? If these people pose no threat, they why are the negotiations not for public release? If they pose no threat, then how come they are not released back to their home country? How come the Obama administration does not offer them refugee status in the United States? Here is a list of the detainees through 2006. Merely skim this list for names and country of origin. See a pattern? The Taliban 5 that were swapped for deserter Bowe Bergdahl are free from their Qatar Club Med fully vacation location, TODAY. What deal did the United States work with Qatar to monitor their future activities? Another secret. If this was such a great swap deal, then why did the White House not advise Congress 30 days prior to the swap, which is law? Do you believe this? (CNN)Senior administration officials said Friday that the U.S. is continuing to hold negotiations with the governments of Afghanistan and Qatar as a deadline to determine the fate of five Taliban figures released in a prisoner exchange with the U.S. looms. Qatar is willing to extend the agreement under exactly the same terms, but will not renegotiate the terms, the source said. The Americans are sending signals they want to add additional surveillance and more restrictions on their movement. “[Qatar] will keep them if both parties agree and if there are the same conditions of the old agreement,” the source said. “[Qatar is] not going to add other terms because [Qatar is] not going to make it more complicated for [themselves].” The source said that although U.S., Afghanistan and Qatar are the main parties, the Taliban do have a say and are welcome to stay in Qatar, noting the five have brought their families to Qatar and now total about 70 people among them. The source emphasized Qataris will not send them back to Afghanistan if the men don’t want to return to Afghan government control. One of the Taliban 5: Mullah-Norullah Nori, Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an admitted senior member of the Taliban and led troops against US and Coalition forces. Detainee was directly subordinate to Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar, commanded Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan, and in late 2001, he was in charge of Taliban troops positioned near Mazar-e-Sharif. Detainee is wanted by the UN for possible war crimes including the murder of thousands of Shiites. Detainee is also associated with members of al-Qaida, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the Hezb-E- Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). His full history is here, this explains just who the United States was taking off the battlefield under the Bush administration. To read about the hearing Congress had on this Taliban 5 swap for a deserter, that document is here. Further, here is Uruguay’s position of the 6 released detainees to took. There are growing concerns in some corners of the American government that six former Guantanamo Bay detainees freed by the Obama administration could pose a threat to the safety of U.S. personnel. Those detainees were sent to Uruguay in December. And in recent months, the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo has substantially expanded its defenses against a possible threat, according to three sources familiar with the matter. The embassy has increased the number of guards present, as well as the size of the embassy’s Marine Guard detachment, adding two more men to the handful who were there previously. The embassy has also taken steps to heighten security for employees. All local hires have been ordered to park two to three blocks from the building so that embassy guards can conduct surveillance more easily over American cars and passengers parked nearby. Some local staff have taken that order as disregard for the safety of foreign nationals working at the embassy. Read the full story here. Repeat, if these released detainees pose no threat, then why?

Surveillance State, Your Touch and Your Smartphone

There was a Rand Paul filibuster last week over the NSA broad sweep of citizen’s private affairs. Senator Paul does have a major point in his efforts to protect our privacy yet to what ends when it comes to national security? He pledges to take the matter of the vote on the NSA to see the Patriot Act end.

There is yet another piece of legislation that is important to understand. The USA Freedom Act. In part:

Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet Collection, and Online Monitoring Act

H.R. 3361/ S. 1599

Purpose:  To rein in the dragnet collection of data by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other government agencies, increase transparency of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), provide businesses the ability to release information regarding FISA requests, and create an independent constitutional advocate to argue cases before the FISC.

End bulk collection of Americans’ communications records

• The USA Freedom Act ends bulk collection under Section 215 of the Patriot Act.
• The bill would strengthen the prohibition on “reverse targeting” of Americans—that is, targeting a foreigner with the goal of obtaining communications involving an American.
• The bill requires the government to more aggressively filter and discard information about Americans accidentally collected through PRISM and related programs.

Reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

• The USA Freedom Act creates an Office of the Special Advocate (OSA) tasked with promoting privacy interests before the FISA court’s closed proceedings. The OSA will have the authority to appeal decisions of the FISA court.
• The bill creates new and more robust reporting requirements to ensure that Congress is aware of actions by the FISC and intelligence community as a whole.
• The bill would grant the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight  Board subpoena authority to investigate issues related to privacy and national security.

Increase Transparency

• The USA Freedom Act would end secret laws by requiring the Attorney General to publicly disclose all FISC decisions issued after July 10, 2003 that contain a significant construction or interpretation of law.
• Under the bill, Internet and telecom companies would be allowed to publicly report an estimate of (1) the number of FISA orders and national security letters received, (2) the number of such orders and letters complied with, and (3) the number of users or accounts on whom information was demanded under the orders and letters.
• The bill would require the government to make annual or semiannual public reports estimating the total number of individuals and U.S. persons that were subject to FISA orders authorizing electronic surveillance, pen/trap devices, and access to business records.

DONT APPLAUD JUST YET…this next introduction of technology is very chilling. When does it all stop with surveillance?

NSA will Track Your Smartphone Finger Strokes

Smartphone technology built by Lockheed Martin promises to verify a user’s identity based on the swiftness and shape of the individual’s finger strokes on a touch screen. The mobile device feature, created by Lockheed Martin, verifies a user’s identity based on the swiftness and shape of the individual’s finger strokes on a touch screen. The technology is but one incarnation of handwriting-motion recognition, sometimes called “dynamic signature” biometrics, that has roots in the Air Force. “Nobody else has the same strokes,” said John Mears, senior fellow for Lockheed IT and Security Solutions. “People can forge your handwriting in two dimensions, but they couldn’t forge it in three or four dimensions. Three is the pressure you put in, in addition to the two dimensions on the paper. The fourth dimension is time. The most advanced handwriting-type authentication tracks you in four dimensions.”  The biometric factors measured by Lockheed’s technology, dubbed “Mandrake,” are speed, acceleration and the curve of an individual’s strokes. “We’ve done work with the NSA with that for secure gesture authentication as a technique for using smartphones,” Mears said. “They are actually able to use it.” According to Defense One . Lockheed officials said they do not know how or if the agency has operationally deployed the Mandrake smartphone doodling-recognition tool. The company also is the architect of the FBI’s recently completed $1 billion facial, fingerprint, palm print, retina scan and tattoo image biometric ID system. That project, called the Next Generation Identification system, could tie in voice and “gait matching” (how a person walks) in the future, the bureau has said. Mandrake potentially might be useful for emergency responders who often do not have the time or capability to access an incident command website, Mears said.

Stuxnet V. 1 Success V. 2 North Korea Failed

Iran wasn’t the only country that had its nuclear ambitions targeted by a sneaky US cyberattack. It turns out the American government also tried to take down North Korea’s nuclear programs with the Stuxnet worm five years ago, Reuters reports. But there was one major difference: That attack ultimately flamed out. While the US managed to get Stuxnet into Iran’s nuclear facilities (reportedly by hacking suppliers), which ultimately led to the destruction of more than a thousand uranium enriching centrifuges, it never managed to get it into North Korea’s core systems. It turns out having an extremely isolated network worked in North Korea’s favor. That’s particularly ironic since Stuxnet quickly made its way out of Iran and wreaked havoc across the web.

The operation began in tandem with the now-famous Stuxnet attack that sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program in 2009 and 2010 by destroying a thousand or more centrifuges that were enriching uranium. Reuters and others have reported that the Iran attack was a joint effort by U.S. and Israeli forces.
According to one U.S. intelligence source, Stuxnet’s developers produced a related virus that would be activated when it encountered Korean-language settings on an infected machine.
But U.S. agents could not access the core machines that ran Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, said another source, a former high-ranking intelligence official who was briefed on the program.
The official said the National Security Agency-led campaign was stymied by North Korea’s utter secrecy, as well as the extreme isolation of its communications systems. A third source, also previously with U.S. intelligence, said he had heard about the failed cyber attack but did not know details.
North Korea has some of the most isolated communications networks in the world. Just owning a computer requires police permission, and the open Internet is unknown except to a tiny elite. The country has one main conduit for Internet connections to the outside world, through China.
In contrast, Iranians surfed the Net broadly and had interactions with companies from around the globe.


A spokeswoman for the NSA declined to comment for this story. The spy agency has previously declined to comment on the Stuxnet attack against Iran.
The United States has launched many cyber espionage campaigns, but North Korea is only the second country, after Iran, that the NSA is now known to have targeted with software designed to destroy equipment.
Washington has long expressed concerns about Pyongyang’s nuclear program, which it says breaches international agreements. North Korea has been hit with sanctions because of its nuclear and missile tests, moves that Pyongyang sees as an attack on its sovereign right to defend itself.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said last week that Washington and Beijing were discussing imposing further sanctions on North Korea, which he said was “not even close” to taking steps to end its nuclear program.

Experts in nuclear programs said there are similarities between North Korea and Iran’s operations, and the two countries continue to collaborate on military technology.
Both countries use a system with P-2 centrifuges, obtained by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who is regarded as the father of Islamabad’s nuclear bomb, they said.
Like Iran, North Korea probably directs its centrifuges with control software developed by Siemens AG that runs on Microsoft Corp’s Windows operating system, the experts said. Stuxnet took advantage of vulnerabilities in both the Siemens and Microsoft programs.
Because of the overlap between North Korea and Iran’s nuclear programs, the NSA would not have had to tinker much with Stuxnet to make it capable of destroying centrifuges in North Korea, if it could be deployed there.
Despite modest differences between the programs, “Stuxnet can deal with both of them. But you still need to get it in,” said Olli Heinonen, senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
NSA Director Keith Alexander said North Korea’s strict limitations on Internet access and human travel make it one of a few nations “who can race out and do damage with relative impunity” since reprisals in cyberspace are so challenging.
When asked about Stuxnet, Alexander said he could not comment on any offensive actions taken during his time at the spy agency.
David Albright, founder of the Institute for Science and International Security and an authority on North Korea’s nuclear program, said U.S. cyber agents probably tried to get to North Korea by compromising technology suppliers from Iran, Pakistan or China.
“There was likely an attempt” to sabotage the North Korean program with software, said Albright, who has frequently written and testified on the country’s nuclear ambitions.

The Stuxnet campaign against Iran, code-named Olympic Games, was discovered in 2010. It remains unclear how the virus was introduced to the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz, which was not connected to the Internet.
According to cybersecurity experts, Stuxnet was found inside industrial companies in Iran that were tied to the nuclear effort. As for how Stuxnet got there, a leading theory is that it was deposited by a sophisticated espionage program developed by a team closely allied to Stuxnet’s authors, dubbed the Equation Group by researchers at Kaspersky Lab.
The U.S. effort got that far in North Korea as well. Though no versions of Stuxnet have been reported as being discovered in local computers, Kaspersky Lab analyst Costin Raiu said that a piece of software related to Stuxnet had turned up in North Korea.
Kaspersky had previously reported that the software, digitally signed with one of the same stolen certificates that had been used to install Stuxnet, had been submitted to malware analysis site VirusTotal from an electronic address in China. But Raiu told Reuters his contacts had assured him that it originated in North Korea, where it infected a computer in March or April 2010.
Some experts said that even if a Stuxnet attack against North Korea had succeeded, it might not have had that big an impact on its nuclear weapons program. Iran’s nuclear sites were well known, whereas North Korea probably has at least one other facility beyond the known Yongbyon nuclear complex, former officials and inspectors said.
In addition, North Korea likely has plutonium, which does not require a cumbersome enrichment process depending on the cascading centrifuges that were a fat target for Stuxnet, they said.
Jim Lewis, an advisor to the U.S. government on cybersecurity issues and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said there are limitations to cyber offense.
A cyber attack “is not something you can release and be sure of the results,” Lewis said.