Category Archives: Department of Defense

ISIS Targets are Nominated, POTUS Refuses 75%

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Is John Kerry at odds with the White House? Does Kerry even talk to the White House when it comes to the war against Islamic State? The White House is running the conflict against ISIS but refuses to prosecute it with conventional engagement rules.

Reuters: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said on Thursday the United States has the ability to “neutralize” Islamic State much faster than it was able to do with al Qaeda.

“We are going to defeat Daesh. We always said it will take time,” Kerry said, using an alternative name for the Islamist militant group.

“We began our fight against al Qaeda in 2001 and it took us quite a few years before we were able to eliminate Osama bin Laden and the top leadership and neutralize them as an effective force. We hope to do Daesh much faster than that and we think we have an ability to do that,” he told reporters.

U.S. Pilots Confirm: Obama Admin Blocks 75 Percent of Islamic State Strikes

‘We can’t get clearance even when we have a clear target in front of us’

FreeBeacon: U.S. military pilots who have returned from the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq are confirming that they were blocked from dropping 75 percent of their ordnance on terror targets because they could not get clearance to launch a strike, according to a leading member of Congress.

Strikes against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) targets are often blocked due to an Obama administration policy to prevent civilian deaths and collateral damage, according to Rep. Ed Royce (R., Calif.), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The policy is being blamed for allowing Islamic State militants to gain strength across Iraq and continue waging terrorist strikes throughout the region and beyond, according to Royce and former military leaders who spoke Wednesday about flaws in the U.S. campaign to combat the Islamic State.

“You went 12 full months while ISIS was on the march without the U.S. using that air power and now as the pilots come back to talk to us they say three-quarters of our ordnance we can’t drop, we can’t get clearance even when we have a clear target in front of us,” Royce said. “I don’t understand this strategy at all because this is what has allowed ISIS the advantage and ability to recruit.”

When asked to address Royce’s statement, a Pentagon official defended the Obama administration’s policy and said that the military is furiously working to prevent civilian casualties.

“The bottom line is that we will not stoop to the level of our enemy and put civilians more in harm’s way than absolutely necessary,” the official told the Washington Free Beacon, explaining that the military often conducts flights “and don’t strike anything.”

“The fact that aircraft go on missions and don’t strike anything is not out of the norm,” the official said. “Despite U.S. strikes being the most precise in the history of warfare, conducting strike operations in the heavily populated areas where ISIL hides certainly presents challenges. We are fighting an enemy who goes out of their way to put civilians at risk. However, our pilots understand the need for the tactical patience in this environment. This fight against ISIL is not the kind of fight from previous decades.”

Jack Keane, a retired four-star U.S. general, agreed with Royce’s assessment of the administration’s policy and blamed President Barack Obama for issuing orders that severely constrain the U.S. military from combatting terror forces.

“This has been an absurdity from the beginning,” Keane said in response to questions from Royce. “The president personally made a statement that has driven air power from the inception.”

“When we agreed we were going to do airpower and the military said, this is how it would work, he [Obama] said, ‘No, I do not want any civilian casualties,’” Keane explained. “And the response was, ‘But there’s always some civilian casualties. We have the best capability in the world to protect from civilians casualties.’”

However, Obama’s response was, “No, you don’t understand. I want no civilian casualties. Zero,’” Keane continued. “So that has driven our so-called rules of engagement to a degree we have never had in any previous air campaign from desert storm to the present.”

This is likely the reason that U.S. pilots are being told to back down when Islamic State targets are in site, Keane said, citing statistics published earlier this year by U.S. Central Command showing that pilots return from sorties in Iraq with about 75 percent of their ordnance unexpended.

“Believe me,” Keane added, “the French are in there not using the restrictions we have imposed on our pilots.”

And the same goes for Russians, he said, adding, “They don’t care at all about civilians.”

The French have been selecting their own targets since beginning to launch strikes on the Islamic State earlier this week, according to a second Pentagon source who spoke to the Free Beacon earlier this week about the strikes.

France dropped at least 20 bombs on key Islamic State targets within two days after the terror attacks in Paris that killed 129. French strikes have killed at least 33 Islamic State militants in the past several days.

In the case of the initial French strikes, the “targets were nominated by the French whose strikes against them were supported by the coalition” fighting the Islamic State, the official explained.

Any coalition member can nominate a potential target.

“Once a target is validated, great care is taken—from analysis of available intelligence to selection of the appropriate weapon to meet mission requirements—to minimize the risk of collateral damage, particularly any potential harm to non-combatants,” the official said.

Since the beginning of the year, more than 22,000 munitions were dropped on Islamic State targets during more than 8,000 sorties, according to information provided to the Free Beacon by the Defense Department.

Some experts questioned whether the administration is handing off portions of the battle to other nations.

“The French airstrikes have been billed as a significant uptick in the battle against the Islamic State; preliminary data indicate that this is not the case,” said Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism expert at the U.S. Treasury Department. “It appears that the U.S. is simply allowing France to strike many of the targets that would usually be reserved for the U.S. and some of its coalition allies. In other words, this appears to be a redistribution of daily targets in the ongoing campaign, and not a significant change.”

These strikes have forced the Islamic State to evacuate at least 20 to 25 percent of the territories it held one year ago in both Iraq and Syria, according to the Pentagon.

Attacks have focused on the Islamic State’s “staging areas, fighting position, and key leaders,” as well as its “oil distribution chain,” according to the Pentagon.

Meanwhile, a poll released Thursday found that at least 70 percent of American support an expanded fight against the Islamic State, including sending U.S. troops to the region.

U.S., Allies Conduct 31 Air Strikes in Syria, Iraq: U.S. Military
The U.S. military said, U.S.-led forces targeted Islamic State militants in Syria with five air strikes from Sunday to Monday morning and conducted 26 strikes against the group in Iraq. Four of the strikes in Syria hit targets in Kobani, striking an Islamic State tactical unit, and destroying fighting positions and a heavy machine gun.The military said in a statement on Monday, that the coalition forces also hit eight fighting positions with a strike near Al Hasakah. In Iraq, eight air strikes near Fallujah destroyed Islamic State fighting positions, mortar tubes, an excavator and a vehicle, and hit seven tactical units.
Inform

6 Americans Among Hostages in Mali al Qaeda Attack

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On Friday, a group of local terrorists stormed the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali, taking 170 hostages and up to 3 are dead. Some hostages have been released if they could recite verses of the Koran. U.S. military personnel is assisting as they were already in the region doing training. The U.S. State Department has confirmed there are 6 Americans as part of the hostages. The UN was also holding an event at the hotel.

The group of attackers is known as the Macina Liberation Front, an operating wing of Boko Haram, another operating wing of al Qaeda. Some of the attackers spent the night at the hotel while others stormed the building with grenades and gunfire.

Meanwhile, when the world and especially looks to Barack Obama for answers, solutions, missions and strategies, only blank stares are the result. Obama has retreated completely from global conflicts and national security to focus on social justice agendas. He  attends only 40% of presidential daily briefings known as PDN’s. The Pentagon and the intelligence apparatus is disgusted with the commander in chief. The safety of America and other allied nations is damned to some doom over Obama’s lack of will, knowledge or involvement.

Breitbart:

A new Government Accountability Institute (GAI) report reveals that President Barack Obama has attended only 42.1% of his daily intelligence briefings (known officially as the Presidential Daily Brief, or PDB) in the 2,079 days of his presidency through September 29, 2014.
The GAI report also included a breakdown of Obama’s PDB attendance record between terms; he attended 42.4% of his PDBs in his first term and 41.3% in his second.

The GAI’s alarming findings come on the heels of Obama’s 60 Minutes comments on Sunday, wherein the president laid the blame for the Islamic State’s (ISIS) rapid rise squarely at the feet of his Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.

“I think our head of the intelligence community, Jim Clapper, has acknowledged that I think they underestimated what had been taking place in Syria,” said Obama.

According to Daily Beast reporter Eli Lake, members of the Defense establishment were “flabbergasted” by Obama’s attempt to shift blame.

“Either the president doesn’t read the intelligence he’s getting or he’s bullshitting,” a former senior Pentagon official “who worked closely on the threat posed by Sunni jihadists in Syria and Iraq” told the Daily Beast.

On Monday, others in the intelligence community similarly blasted Obama and said he’s shown longstanding disinterest in receiving live, in-person PDBs that allow the Commander-in-Chief the chance for critical followup, feedback, questions, and the challenging of flawed intelligence assumptions.

“It’s pretty well-known that the president hasn’t taken in-person intelligence briefings with any regularity since the early days of 2009,” an Obama national security staffer told the Daily Mail on Monday. “He gets them in writing.”

The Obama security staffer said the president’s PDBs have contained detailed threat warnings about the Islamic State dating back to before the 2012 presidential election.

“Unless someone very senior has been shredding the president’s daily briefings and telling him that the dog ate them, highly accurate predictions about ISIL have been showing up in the Oval Office since before the 2012 election,” the Obama security staffer told the Daily Mail.

This is not the first time questions have been raised about Obama’s lack of engagement and interest in receiving in-person daily intelligence briefings. On September 10, 2012, the GAI released a similar report showing that Obama had attended less than half (43.8%) of his daily intelligence briefings up to that point. When Washington Post columnist Marc Thiessen mentioned the GAI’s findings in his column, then-White House Press Secretary Jay Carney dubbed the findings “hilarious.” The very next day, U.S. Libyan Ambassador Chris Stevens and three American staff members were murdered in Benghazi. As Breitbart News reported at the time, the White House’s very own presidential calendar revealed Obama had not received his daily intel briefing in the five consecutive days leading up to the Benghazi attacks.

Ultimately, as ABC News reported, the White House did not directly dispute the GAI’s numbers but instead said Obama prefers to read his PDB on his iPad instead of receiving the all-important live, in-person briefings.

Now, with ISIS controlling over 35,000 square miles of territory in its widening caliphate in Iraq and Syria, and with Obama pointing fingers at his own Director of National Intelligence James Clapper for the rise of ISIS, the question remains whether a 42% attendance record on daily intelligence briefings is good enough for most Americans.

Intel Community, POTUS Refuses Terror Reports

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Home Affairs Correspondent

SkyNews: The Paris attacks and last month’s bombing of a Russian airliner in Egypt herald a possible return to more ambitious mass casualty attacks, according to the two men responsible for safeguarding the nation at the time of the London bombings.

Former defence and home secretary Lord Reid and Lord Blair, in charge of Scotland Yard at the time of 7/7, have told Sky News they believe the capability of so-called IS has now caught up with their ambition to mount attacks on a global scale.

It has been more than a decade since four suicide bombers struck the London transport system, killing 52 innocent people and injuring almost a thousand more.

At the time of those attacks, terrorists tried to carry out other very ambitious multiple bombings.

Five would be suicide bombers were jailed for planning a second attack on London just two weeks after 7/7 and police and security services foiled plans for a large scale attack on transatlantic passenger planes, using liquid bombs.

The decade since has been largely defined by numerous lower intensity terror plots.

Former Met Commissioner Lord Blair says he firmly believes that era is over and the UK is entering a new and more dangerous phase.

“These last few weeks – with the bombs in Istanbul, the Sharm el Sheikh plane and now Paris – are showing this group ISIS to have some capabilities, a bit like they had in 2005 when it was al Qaeda inspired.”

Lord Blair said he feared police forces would find it much more difficult in the years ahead to gain proper ground level intelligence on people of concern because of Home Office budget cuts, which were forcing chief constables to reduce traditional neighbourhood policing.

Lord Reid was defence secretary at the time of the London bombings and then home secretary when police foiled the liquid bomb plot.

He believes the recent multi-pronged attacks in Turkey, Egypt, Beirut and France are a worrying illustration that the capability of IS is now catching up with its ambition.

Lord Reid, who now heads the Institute for Security and Resilience Studies, said: “Their ambition remains the same, but they’re adapting to circumstances, and in particular, the circumstances of young men going to Syria to be trained, and then coming back to this country.”

Around 750 British citizens are believed to have travelled to Syria and Iraq and about half are now back in the UK.

Chris Philips, former head of the National Counter Terrorism and Security Office said the concern for police and the security services is that many were now returning with specific training on how to use weapons and make bombs.

“We’ve got people now that have potentially killed people in Iraq and Syria coming back to our country.

“And quite frankly, we don’t know who they all are, where they all are and it’s impossible for the security services and the police – with the resources they’ve got – to keep an eye on these people and keep them under surveillance.”

UK authorities say the public should not be alarmed, but must certainly be vigilant.

An urgent review is now under way to ensure the UK can properly respond if a major attack hits British streets.

But authorities stress there is no specific intelligence beyond the general severe terror threat level.

*** From TheHill: Authorities in Honduras say they have arrested five Syrian nationals who were attempting to travel to the United States using stolen Greek passports, according to Reuters. Authorities said there was no apparent indication the Syrians were among suspects linked to last week’s attacks in Paris, the news outlet reported.

Debate has raged since the Friday attacks over whether terrorists may attempt to slip into the U.S. after reports that one Paris attacker may have come to Europe mixed in with Syrian refugees.
A French official said a passport found near a Paris suspect’s body and had passed through Greece border controls was probably stolen, The New York Times reported.

2011, POTUS Stopped Syrian Refugees, Security Concerns

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The real humanitarian thing to do at this point is fight this war against all enemies and fight to win it. Syrians and the rest of the refugees can go home, where most do have loyalties.

The Obama Administration Stopped Processing Iraq Refugee Requests For 6 Months In 2011

November 18, 2015 By

Although the Obama administration currently refuses to temporarily pause its Syrian refugee resettlement program in the United States, the State Department in 2011 stopped processing Iraq refugee requests for six months after the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered evidence that several dozen terrorists from Iraq had infiltrated the United States via the refugee program.

After two terrorists were discovered in Bowling Green, Kentucky, in 2009, the FBI began reviewing reams of evidence taken from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that had been used against American troops in Iraq. Federal investigators then tried to match fingerprints from those bombs to the fingerprints of individuals who had recently entered the United States as refugees:

An intelligence tip initially led the FBI to Waad Ramadan Alwan, 32, in 2009. The Iraqi had claimed to be a refugee who faced persecution back home — a story that shattered when the FBI found his fingerprints on a cordless phone base that U.S. soldiers dug up in a gravel pile south of Bayji, Iraq on Sept. 1, 2005. The phone base had been wired to unexploded bombs buried in a nearby road.

An ABC News investigation of the flawed U.S. refugee screening system, which was overhauled two years ago, showed that Alwan was mistakenly allowed into the U.S. and resettled in the leafy southern town of Bowling Green, Kentucky, a city of 60,000 which is home to Western Kentucky University and near the Army’s Fort Knox and Fort Campbell. Alwan and another Iraqi refugee, Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, 26, were resettled in Bowling Green even though both had been detained during the war by Iraqi authorities, according to federal prosecutors.

The terrorists were not taken into custody until 2011. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. State Department stopped processing refugee requests from Iraqis for six months in order to review and revamp security screening procedures:

As a result of the Kentucky case, the State Department stopped processing Iraq refugees for six months in 2011, federal officials told ABC News – even for many who had heroically helped U.S. forces as interpreters and intelligence assets. One Iraqi who had aided American troops was assassinated before his refugee application could be processed, because of the immigration delays, two U.S. officials said. In 2011, fewer than 10,000 Iraqis were resettled as refugees in the U.S., half the number from the year before, State Department statistics show.

According to a 2013 report from ABC News, at least one of the Kentucky terrorists passed background and fingerprint checks conducted by the Department of Homeland Security prior to being allowed to enter the United States. Without the fingerprint evidence taken from roadside bombs, which one federal forensic scientist referred to as “a needle in the haystack,” it is unlikely that the two terrorists would ever have been identified and apprehended.

“How did a person who we detained in Iraq — linked to an IED attack, we had his fingerprints in our government system — how did he walk into America in 2009?” asked one former Army general who previously oversaw the U.S. military’s anti-IED efforts.

President Barack Obama has thus far refused bipartisan calls to pause his administration’s Syrian refugee program, which many believe is likely to be exploited by terrorists seeking entry into the United States. The president has not explained how his administration can guarantee that no terrorists will be able to slip into the country by pretending to be refugees, as the Iraqi terrorists captured in Kentucky did in 2009. One of those terrorists, Waad Ramadan Alwan, even came into the United States by way of Syria, where his fingerprints were taken and given to U.S. military intelligence officials.

Obama has also refused to explain how his administration’s security-related pause on processing Iraq refugee requests in 2011 did not “betray our deepest values.”

*** Were we even paying attention last February when POTUS made his declaration on accepting Syrian refugees? What changed between 2011 and earlier this year? The UN? Money? Iran?

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration’s commitment to take in potentially thousands of Syrian refugees is raising national security concerns among law enforcement officials and some congressional Republicans who fear clandestine radicals could slip into the country among the displaced.
The administration has vowed to help those who fled the civil war by providing homes, furniture, English classes and job training in the United States. It says they’ll be subject to intensive screening before entering the country, and that the overwhelming majority are vulnerable women and children.
“These are people I think that if most Americans met them, their instinct would immediately be, ‘We have to help these people,'” Anne Richard, the assistant secretary of state for population, refugees and migration, said in an interview with The Associated Press.
But without reliable intelligence within Syria, some argue that it’s impossible to ensure that someone bent on violence or supporting a militant cause doesn’t come in undetected.
The issue came to the fore at a House Homeland Security Committee hearing earlier this month, when Michael Steinbach, the FBI assistant director for counterterrorism, said the information the intelligence community would normally rely on to properly vet refugees doesn’t exist in a failed country like Syria.
“You have to have information to vet, so the concern in Syria is that we don’t have systems in places on the ground to collect the information,” Steinbach testified.
More than 3.8 million Syrians are believed to have fled their country in the four years since an uprising against President Bashar Assad led to a civil war.
Most who have resettled have traveled to neighboring countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. But those avenues are strained. Lebanon announced plans last month to impose restrictions on Syrians trying to enter the country, and an international human rights group accused Jordanian authorities in the fall of deporting vulnerable refugees, including wounded men and unaccompanied children, back to Syria.
The United States last year resettled nearly 70,000 refugees from dozens of countries and accepts the majority of all referrals from U.N. refugee programs. More than 500 Syrian refugees are in the U.S., and plans call for adding a few thousand more in the next couple of years.
But aid groups say they’d like to see the U.S. move more quickly to take in more, given the humanitarian crisis in Syria.
“They need countries like the United State that have capacity to host significant numbers to really start to share that burden,” said Anna Greene, a policy and advocacy director at International Rescue Committee, a New York-based humanitarian organization.
As the Obama administration pushes to boost the numbers, three Republican members of Congress — Reps. Peter King of New York, Michael McCaul of Texas and Candice Miller of Michigan — have asked the administration to say how many Syrian refugees it plans to resettle and to provide a timeline and steps to ensure they’re not a security risk. They warned that a weak screening process could become a “backdoor for jihadists.”
When McCaul raised the issue Wednesday with Secretary of State John Kerry, Kerry assured him that the refugees would be subject to “super-vetting” and that if the FBI expressed concerns about someone, that person would not be let in. “We have amazing ways of being able to dig down and dig deep,” Kerry said at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing.
The security concerns echo those voiced over the past decade, when large number of Iraqis sought U.S. refuge from that country’s war.
Two Iraqi refugees who entered the United States in 2009 were charged in Kentucky two years later with plotting to send weapons and money to al-Qaida operatives in Iraq. The case raised particular alarm within the intelligence community because one of the men was able to enter the country even though his fingerprints years several earlier had been left on an unexploded bomb in Iraq. In 2011, then-FBI Director Robert Mueller said the FBI was scrutinizing Iraqi refugees already in the U.S. for possible links to al-Qaida’s affiliate in Iraq.
U.S. officials say they’ve since tightened the controls.
The FBI’s Steinbach told Congress that unlike Iraq, where Americans personnel on the ground were able to gather intelligence, there’s no comparable “footprint on the ground in Syria.”
“All of the data sets, the police, the intel services that normally you would go and seek that information, don’t exist,” he said.
State Department officials say refugees are screened more carefully than all other visitors to the United States, checked against all databases maintained by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies and undergo extensive medical checks and fingerprinting. Specially trained officers from the Homeland Security Department conduct overseas, in-person interviews with those seeking refuge. Refugees are far more likely to be victims of violence than criminals themselves.
“I think if we talk about just this faceless mob of people from conflict-ridden lands, it seems very scary,” the State Department’s Richard said. “But if you meet individuals and individual families, you start to understand the very, very human nature of what it means to be a refugee.”

Last May, DHS Warned on Belgium ISIS Cell

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UNC L A S S I F I E D / / F O R  O F F I C I A L  US E  O NL Y

UNC L A S S I F I E D / / F O R  O F F I C I A L  US E  O NL Y
(U//FOUO)  Future ISIL Operations in the
West Could Resemble Disrupted Belg  Plot
13 May 2015
Office of Intelligence and Analysis
IA-0 -15
(U)  Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO).  It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).  It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.  
UN C L A S S I F I E D / / F O R  O F F I C I A L  US E  O N L Y
UN C L A S S I F I E D / / F O R  O F F I C I A L  US E  O N L Y
13 May 2015
(U//FOUO)  Future ISIL Operations in West Could Resemble Disrupted Belgian Plot
(U//FOUO)  Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).  Coordinated with NPPD, the FBI, and NCTC.  
(U)  Key Judgments
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more complex operations in the West.  We differentiate the complex, centrally planned plotting in Belgium from other, more-simplistic attacks by ISIL-inspired or directed individuals, which could occur with little
to no warning. 
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses the group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency information sharing about emerging and ongoing threats.  
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that items recovered by Belgian authorities suggest the group’s plotting may
have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers and underscores the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement of potential terrorist activity through suspicious activity reporting (SAR).  (See Appendix A for details on the importance of SAR reporting.)
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that the security measures used by this group to avoid physical and technical collection highlight how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their behavior and the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to deflect scrutiny.  
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that facilitation efforts by
the group were likely aided by members’ criminal
background and possible access to criminal groups underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.  
(U//FOUO)  Awareness of some of the tactics and tradecraft used by the group in Belgium could assist with identifying and disrupting potential plots in the United States.  
(U//FOUO)  Belgian Plot Signals ISIL’s Interest
in Complex Plots Against the West
(U//FOUO)  The plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 is the first instance in which a large group of terrorists possibly operating under ISIL direction has been discovered and may indicate the group has developed the capability to launch more sophisticated
(U)  Scope
(U//FOUO)  This Assessment highlights the tactics, targets, and tradecraft allegedly used in a plot disrupted by Belgian authorities in January 2015 that potentially could be used in the Homeland by individuals associated with or inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  This Assessment is intended to support the DHS activities to assist federal, state, and local government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, first responders, and private sector security partners in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.   
(U)  Background
(U)  On 15 January 2015, Belgian authorities raided multiple locations including a safe house in Verviers, a suburb of Brussels, where a firefight ended in the deaths of two individuals and the arrest of a third suspect.  The raids disrupted an alleged plot involving an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group with at least ten operatives—some of whom were returning foreign fighters—possibly targeting police or the public.  The group may have been acting under the direction of a member(s) of ISIL.  There is no publically available information as to whether a specific target was selected.  Since the initial raids, multiple individuals in several European countries have been arrested and charged in connection with the group’s activities.  The investigation into this plot remains ongoing.1,2  
UN C L A S S I F I E D / / F O R  O F F I C I A L  US E  O N L Y
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operations in the West.  I&A judges that the threat from ISIL plots involving multiple operatives may grow, but are more likely to occur in Europe—where several recruitment networks have been disrupted, and several returning fighters have already demonstrated the ability to conduct attacks—than in the United States given the different operating environments, number of European foreign fighters currently in theater, and Europe’s
geographic proximity to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.3,4  While we assess the threat is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.  I&A notes that small-scale attacks using comparatively less sophisticated tactics—such as the 3 May attempted attack against a
“Draw the Prophet” event in Garland, Texas by
individuals inspired to act by ISIL-linked messaging, or by individuals taking direction from an oversea plotter after connecting through social media—could proceed with little to no warning.    
(U//FOUO)  Dispersed Activities and Remote Leadership Possibly Intended to Conceal
Activities 
(U//FOUO)  The group’s choice to operate across several countries highlights both the significant challenges for law enforcement to detect and investigate multi-jurisdictional threats and the necessity of interagency sharing information about emerging and ongoing threats.  Even though the group likely planned to attack targets in Belgium, the
investigation into the group’s activities spans several
European countries, including France, Greece, Spain, and the Netherlands, as well countries where there is limited- to-no counterterrorism cooperation with the United States,
such as Syria.  
» (U)  The purported leader of the group, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, directed the operation from a safe house in Athens, Greece using a cell phone, while other group members operated in several other European countries, according to European media reporting citing a senior Belgian counterterrorism official.5,6
» (U)  In addition to the 13 arrests made throughout Belgium, two operatives were arrested in France and police apprehended a cell member in Greece after tracing links to a second safe house in Athens, according to a Belgian news conference and Greek media reporting citing senior police officers.7,8,9
» (U)  Multiple members of the cell appear to have been able to communicate and travel unimpeded across borders to facilitate attack planning.  In addition to directing operatives from the safe house in Athens, Abaaoud boasted he was able to return to
Syria after the Verviers raid despite having international warrants for his arrest, according to an interview featured in the February release of ISIL’s
Dabiq magazine.10 
» (U)  The passport of an identified Dutch national—
possibly associated with the group—who likely traveled to Syria in late 2014 was found at the Verviers safe house, according to Dutch media reporting.11  Dutch officials conducted a search of his parents’ home and confiscated laptops and other media.  As of early April, he was reportedly killed while fighting in Syria, according to unconfirmed Dutch media reporting.12  
(U//FOUO)  Material Acquisition Suggests Attacker’s Potential Tactics and Targets 
(U//FOUO)  Items recovered during searches of
residences affiliated with the cell suggest the group’s
plotting may have included the use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and the impersonation of police officers.  There is no publicly available information about the acquisition of these items, but the amounts and types of materials acquired by the group highlights the role of the public and private sector in alerting law enforcement through SARs of attempts to acquire or store a large cache of equipment or chemicals needed to support larger operations.
» (U)  Belgian law enforcement discovered automatic firearms, precursors for the explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a body camera, multiple cell phones, handheld radios, police uniforms, fraudulent identification documents, and a large quantity of cash during the raid in Verviers, according to statements made by Belgian government officials.14,15,16  At the time
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)  A picture, from ISIL’s Dabiq magazine, of Abdelhmaid Abaaoud (far right) with the two alleged cell members killed during the January 2015 raid in
Verviers, Belgium.13
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of the raid, the members of this cell were also searching for an ice machine to cool and transport the TATP, according to European press reporting.17
» (U)  Belgian officials were reportedly concerned that the acquisition of police uniforms and discussion by group members of a Molenbeek police station—where members of the group had reportedly spent time—
suggests that they may have intended to target a police station or to impersonate officers to potentially gain access to a sensitive site. 18,19,20  While there is no confirmation the group was actually going to target police, such an attack would have been consistent with media reports about recent ISIL-linked plots in the West directed at law enforcement and ongoing messaging by ISIL since September 2014.21
(U//FOUO)  Alleged Operational Security Measures Suggest Knowledge of Law Enforcement Methods
(U//FOUO)  The steps group members reportedly took to avoid physical and technical collection of their preoperational activities suggest members were likely cognizant of the potential for scrutiny by Belgian authorities given their status as returning foreign fighters and had at least a rudimentary knowledge of law enforcement efforts to monitor social media and other communications.  The countermeasures used by this group underscore how knowledge of law enforcement tactics can help subjects adapt their patterns of behavior and highlight the need for investigators to consider whether subjects may be using countermeasures to
deflect scrutiny.
(U//FOUO)  Communications Security.  The group made extensive efforts to prevent or limit law enforcement’s ability to conduct technical surveillance.
» (U)  A group member reportedly changed his cell phone five times and urged operatives to change vehicles often and to search the vehicles for
microphones in an effort to thwart potential surveillance by police and intelligence officials, according to Belgian media reporting citing police
officials.23   
» (U)  According to an unverified Belgian media report, intercepted communications between cell members were conducted in French, Arabic, and a Moroccan dialect, and frequently used coded language to discuss attack planning to make translation problematic for law enforcement and intelligence services.24    
» (U)  Belgian authorities discovered that the incarcerated brother of one of the cell members may have acted as an intermediary to facilitate communications between Greece- and Belgian-based members after officials at a prison in Belgium notified law enforcement of the brother’s suspicious
communications, according to Belgian media reporting.25  
(U//FOUO)  Physical Security.  The group attempted to obscure their operational travel and material acquisition from Belgian officials.
» (U//FOUO)  According to several media reports, the family of Abaaoud received a call in late 2014 that he had been killed while fighting in Syria.  However, Abaaoud’s probable involvement in this plot implies this may have been done intentionally to deter efforts by Belgian officials to track his activities.26 
» (U//FOUO)  Belgian and Greek authorities recovered multiple identification documents, some of which may have been fraudulent, at safe houses reportedly used by the group, according to media reports. 27,28,29  Moreover, the use of false identity documents may have led to the misidentification of the two operatives killed during the raid in Verviers, according to a European media report, suggesting the group may have used fraudulent documents to conceal travel from Syria to Europe and to facilitate their attack planning. 30
» (U//FOUO)  The large amount of cash recovered by Belgian authorities at the safe house in Verviers was likely intended to fund some of the group’s
procurement activities and to conceal purchasing patterns.31  Activities such as these highlight the importance of scrutinizing suspicious purchases of bulk quantities of precursor chemicals where individuals insist on paying only in cash.
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)   Belgium investigators at scene following the raid in Verviers, Belgium on 15 January 2015.22
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UNCLASSIFIED
(U)  Figure 1. Map of Group Activities
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(U//FOUO)  Member’s Criminal Background Likely Aided Planning and Facilitation  
(U//FOUO)  Facilitation efforts by the group were likely aided by members’ criminal background and possible access to criminal groups, underscoring the potential for operatives to bypass traditional tripwires and obscure operational planning efforts.  The nexus between terrorist preoperational planning and criminal activities may offer law enforcement opportunities to detect ongoing plotting, as investigations of intercepted illegal activities may present indicators of other nefarious
intentions.
» (U)  At least one alleged cell member, Souhaib el Abdi, had previous experience with trafficking forged documents, according to comments from his lawyer reported in open source media.32  The groups’ purported leader Abaaoud spent time in prison for theft before departing Belgium for Syria, according to a US press report.33
» (U)  The Belgian police uniforms, large cache of illegal weapons—including Kalashnikov rifles, handguns, ammunition, and materials to make explosives—that were seized by police during the raids, were likely acquired illegally, according to a media reporting coverage of Belgian police news conference.34  Cell members have subsequently been charged with violating Belgian weapons laws, according to statements made by Belgian officials.35
(U)  Implications
(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that future Western complex attacks and plots could resemble the size and capabilities of this group and awareness of the tactics and tradecraft used by this group could assist with identifying and disrupting potential complex plots in the United States. Prior to the disruption of this plot, nearly all of the approximately one dozen ISIL-linked plots and attacks in the West to date involved lone offenders or small
groups of individuals, raising I&A’s concern that the
involvement of a large number of operatives and group leaders based in multiple countries in future ISIL-linked plotting could create significant obstacles in the detection and disruption of preoperational activities.*  
* (U//FOUO)  DHS defines a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve direction, assistance, or influence from a larger terrorist organization or foreign actor.
(U//FOUO)  We assess that plots involving foreign fighters, who have returned from conflict zones, or foreign fighters based overseas, who have the ability to leverage violent extremists in their home countries, are more likely to plot an attack on this scale than are their less-experienced counterparts.  While we assess that the threat of such an attack is more likely to manifest in Europe, we cannot discount the possibility for potential complex attacks here in the Homeland.  
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(U//FOUO)  Appendix A: Importance of Suspicious Activity Reporting
(U//FOUO)  Given the range of targets and tactics of ISIL-associated plots since last year, we encourage reporting of suspicious activity to appropriate government authorities and encourage our security, military, and law enforcement partners to remain vigilant.  We face an increased challenge in detecting terrorist plots underway by individuals or small groups acting quickly and independently or with only tenuous ties to foreign-based terrorists.  Pre-operational indicators are likely to be difficult to detect; as such, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners play a critical role in identifying and reporting suspicious activities and raising the awareness of federal counterterrorism officials.
(U)  Indicators
(U//FOUO)  DHS encourages federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials, as well as first responders and private sector security partners, to remain alert and immediately report suspicious activity and potential behavioral indicators of pre-operational terrorism planning activities, to include suspicious acquisition of materials and construction of explosive devices.  Some observed activities that may be suspicious include constitutionally protected activity.  These activities should not be reported absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion that
the observed behavior is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism.  No single behavioral indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action.  The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.
» (U//FOUO)  New or increased advocacy of violence, including providing material support or recruiting others to commit criminal acts;
» (U//FOUO)  Reports to law enforcement that a community member has adopted a new name, style of dress or speech, and/or other significant changes in presentation to others in association with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Communicating with known or suspected homegrown or foreign-based violent extremists using e-mail or social media platforms;
» (U//FOUO)  Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, or barriers;
» (U//FOUO)  Attempts to purchase all available stock of explosives precursors or to acquire materials in bulk without explanation or justification or making numerous smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of time—a possible sign of covert stockpiling;
» (U//FOUO)  Theft of chemicals, hazardous substances, weapons, pre-cursor materials, or items that could compromise facility security, such as uniforms, identification, blueprints, vehicles (or components), technology, or access keys or cards;
» (U//FOUO)  Internet research for target selection, acquisition of technical capabilities, planning, or logistics; » (U//FOUO)  Insisting on paying in cash or using a credit card in another person’s name; » (U//FOUO)  Participation in weapons training, paramilitary exercises, and reconnaissance and surveillance activities in
a manner that is reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism, particularly in conjunction with advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Use of cover terms to mask the true meaning of events or nefarious activities combined with active advocacy of violence;
» (U//FOUO)  Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition, or materials that could be used to produce explosives, such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer; and
» (U//FOUO)  Activities that a reasonable person would deem as suspicious, indicating a storage facility or other areas are being used to construct an explosive device.
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(U)  Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.8
(U)  Source Summary Statement
(U//FOUO)  This Assessment is based on information drawn from a body of unclassified reporting, including open source media reports, public statements of senior foreign government officials, and public accounts of foreign law enforcement investigations from multiple law enforcement agencies.  We have medium confidence in the press reports used in this product, some of which have been corroborated by public statements made by senior foreign law enforcement officials.  
(U)  Report Suspicious Activity
(U)  To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement.  Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action.  For more information on the Nationwide
SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.
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1 (U); “Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe”; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
2 (U); OSC; EUL2015041773002595; 17 April 2015. 3 (U); OSC; EUL2015021166933318; 11 February 2015. 4 (U); OSC; EUR2015022528575929; 24 February 2015.
5 (U); OSC; EUN2015020948731295; 31 January 2015. 6 (U); OSC; EUL2015020274740312; 1 February 2015. 7 (U); OSC: EUN2015020947629159; 30 January 2015. 8 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 9 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 10 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 11 (U); OSC; EUL2015012065248183; 19 January 2015.
12 (U); Teen with Connection to Verviers Deceased in Syria; http://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20150403_01614138;
accessed 9 April 2015.
13 (U); DHS-OS-0316-15; 12 February 2015. 14 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 15 (U); “Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe”; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-
belgium-isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
16 (U); “Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers”; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
17 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
18 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying;
http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presume; accessed 6 April 2015.
19 (U); OSC; EUL2015021764970267; 17 February 2015. 20 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
21 (U); OSC; TRR2014092201178788; 22 September 2014. 22 (U); Belgian Operation Thwarted ‘Major Terrorist Attacks,’ Kills 2 Suspects; http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/
world/belgium-anti-terror-operation/; accessed 13 April 2014.
23 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/
    verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
24 (U); Verviers: What the Terrorist Suspects under Surveillance Were Saying; http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/
societe/verviers-voici-ce-que-les-terroristes-presumes-sous-ecoute-se-disaient-693909.aspx; accessed 18 March 2015.
25 (U); OSC; EUL2015012064970018; 20 January 2015. 26 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
27 (U); Inside the ISIS Plot to Attack the Heart of Europe; http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/13/europe/europe-belgium-
isis-plot/; accessed 20 March 2015.
28 (U); Belgium Terror Group Planned to Kill Police Officers; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
    belgium/11349805/Belgium-terror-suspects-planned-to-seize-passenger-bus.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
29 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 30 (U); Belgian Police Admit Seeking Wrong Man as Vervier Shooutout Jihadists Named; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11362093/Belgian-police-admit-seeking-wrong-man-as-Vervier-shooutout-jihadists-named.html; accessed 13 April 2015.
31 (U); OSC; EUN201502094762159; 31 January 2015. 32 (U); Terrorist Threat – Dismantled Verviers Terrorist Cell: 4 Suspects Face Council Chamber;
http://www.thebrusselstimes.com/belgium/terrorist-threat-dismantled-verviers-terrorist-cell-4-suspects-face-
council-chamber/; accessed 1 April 2015.
33 (U); Belgium Confronts the Jihadist Danger Within; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/europe/belgium-
confronts-the-jihadist-danger-within.html; accessed 3 April 2015.
34 (U); OSC; EUL2015011674541100; 16 January 2015. 35 (U); OSC; EUR2015012167949567; 21 January 2015.